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 MEETING**

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Chairman: Sir Claude COREA (Ceylon).

AGENDA ITEM 65

United Nations Emergency Force:
(a) Cost estimates for the maintenance of the Force
**(A/3823, A/3839, A/3899, A/3984, A/4002, A/C.5/
 L.545, A/C.5/L.548, A/C.5/L.549) (continued)**

1. Mr. TREMBLAY (Canada) considered that the method of assessment for the cost of operation of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was clearly the chief issue in the present debate. Before dealing with it, he wished to make a few remarks on some points raised in the reports of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/3839, A/4002).

2. The appropriation requested for 1958 and 1959 included a total of \$5.8 million to cover claims by Governments to reimbursement for undue depreciation or for replacement of equipment destroyed or worn out in the service of UNEF. The addition of that sum to the \$1.2 million available for the same purpose at the end of 1957 would increase the total reserve for compensation to approximately \$7 million. Since the total value of equipment, material and supplies had been estimated at approximately \$12 million, and since the Force would have been in operation for three years by the end of 1959, it seemed prudent to provide for a reserve of some \$7 million to meet prospective claims by Governments. Whether that amount was adequate to meet the obligations of the United Nations would depend on the rules worked out for calculating the amount of compensation and for the settlement of claims.

3. The formulation of such rules involved some difficult problems, but it was to be hoped that sufficient experience would soon be acquired to enable a satisfactory and equitable set of rules to be drawn up. That would put the United Nations in a better position to determine the extent of its obligations and the dates on which they fell due, and Governments would be able to submit claims and to receive interim payments on them. In the Canadian delegation's opinion, it would not be desirable to defer all payments until the contingents supplied by the Governments concerned had completed their period of service; the cost of equipment was heavy, and it would be inequitable to expect participants to bear it for an indefinite period.

4. However, the rules which he had mentioned, and which were urgently needed, would be meaningless unless the United Nations had cash at its disposal to meet claims from Governments. Unless there was a diminution in the number of unpaid contributions to the Special Account and an improvement in the unsatisfactory situation described in paragraph 19 of the Advisory Committee's report (A/4002), UNEF's operations would be jeopardized and the United Nations might have difficulty in establishing other emergency forces for the maintenance of international peace and security should that be found necessary. Indeed, the effectiveness of the United Nations itself as an organ for maintaining international peace and security might be seriously impaired.

5. With regard to the method of financing the Emergency Force, some delegations considered that the expenses of the Force should not be divided among Member States in accordance with the scale of assessments adopted by the Assembly. Some held that those expenses should be paid by voluntary contributions; others favoured dividing them among the permanent members of the Security Council; still others took the view that a scale different from that adopted by the Assembly should be established for the purpose. The Canadian delegation realized that the cost of the Emergency Force represented a large proportion of the total United Nations budget, and fully understood the reasons for the various objections and suggestions advanced; it nevertheless felt that UNEF costs should be met as an ordinary budgetary expense in accordance with the regular scale of assessments. The General Assembly, in establishing the Emergency Force, had exercised the authority conferred on it under resolution 377 A (V); in other words, contrary to what the USSR representative had suggested, the Emergency Force had not been established in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, and its financial support was the collective responsibility of all Members of the United Nations. The method of relying on voluntary contributions would be unreliable and inconsistent with the obligation of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security. He had no desire to discourage the practice of voluntary contributions, but

could not agree to its adoption as the regular method of financing UNEF.

6. The view had been advanced that the scale of assessments adopted by the Assembly was perhaps inequitable for the distribution of UNEF's expenses. If that was the case, that scale was surely inequitable for the regular budget. The fact was, however, that the scale had been established after lengthy discussion in which all the relevant criteria, and especially the ability of Member States to pay, had been taken into account. It had also been suggested that the cost of UNEF should be borne by the permanent members of the Security Council, since they had special responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security. That was the case in practice, but the Charter did not confer special responsibilities on the permanent members of the Security Council in that respect; so much was clear from Articles 1 and 2. To give currency to the contrary view would be a violation of the principle of equality among Member States which, in close interdependence with the principle of collective responsibility, dominated the whole structure of the United Nations. Nor could it be argued that the Emergency Force should be financed by those States which had a special interest in the operation; that, too, would be a violation of the principle of collective responsibility which no one challenged, for example, in the case of the regional economic commissions despite the fact that certain countries had a special interest in their work.

7. The Canadian delegation would support the principle that the financing of the Emergency Force was a collective responsibility of Members of the United Nations and that the cost involved should be borne in accordance with the scale of assessments adopted by the Assembly, as provided by operative paragraph 4 of the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.5/L.545). In its opinion, the natural course would be to include the expenses of the Force in the regular United Nations budget, but it would not object to the maintenance of the Special Account in so far as that was consistent with the basic principles he had just stated. It was important that every Member State should bear its proper share of the cost of UNEF, whose establishment had been decided by an overwhelming majority—indeed, without a single opposing vote by any delegation. It was to be hoped that members of the Committee, by unreservedly supporting the joint draft resolution, would dispel any doubt as to the willingness of Member States to enable the United Nations to continue maintaining peace and security.

8. Mr. MAJOLI (Italy) observed that the discussion of the question of financing the Emergency Force was becoming increasingly difficult. There were two entirely different reasons for that. Some countries refused, on purely political grounds, to bear what was their proper share of the expenses under General Assembly resolutions. The Italian delegation could not accept their argument. The relevant Assembly resolutions were binding under Article 17 of the Charter. Those who failed to give effect to them placed the United Nations in a very difficult financial position. Furthermore, the activity of the Emergency Force in keeping the peace on the Israel-Egyptian frontier was in the interest of all countries which had international peace and security at heart, and it was surprising that some States should refuse to share in the cost involved.

9. There was another group of countries whose concern for the maintenance of peace and respect for international obligations was not in doubt, but which had to contend with economic and financial difficulties. The Italian delegation was prepared to consider any proposal which would meet the case of countries in that group.

10. Italy, for its part, would, as in the past, pay its contribution towards the expenses of the Emergency Force to which, incidentally, it had made its airfields and various other installations available on many occasions. In the absence of any other course of action which made due allowance for the financial difficulties of certain countries, the Italian delegation would vote in favour of the six-Power draft resolution, under which the method of sharing the expenses adopted at the previous session would be continued for a further year.

11. Mr. ARNOTT (Australia) said that he would vote in favour of the six-Power draft resolution. Australia had paid in full its contributions towards UNEF expenses for 1957 and 1958, and was prepared to do so for the ensuing financial years in accordance with the scale fixed by the General Assembly resolutions. He noted with satisfaction that the appropriations for 1959 requested by the Secretary-General in his report (A/3984, para. 4) were 22.5 per cent below the amount assessed for the current financial year. He further noted that the Advisory Committee believed that further economies might reasonably be expected to result from the continued application and refinement of the procedures already put into effect (A/4002, para. 7).

12. He had no wish to embark on a juridical debate on the question whether the General Assembly had been competent to establish the Emergency Force. The fact was that it had done so, and its Members must collectively bear the costs involved in that decision so long as the need persisted.

13. Mr. HICKENLOOPER (United States of America) said that a number of delegations seemed to have forgotten the circumstances in which the Emergency Force had been brought into being, and, in order to restore a proper perspective in the debate, he quoted two passages from the statement made by the representative of the United States at the twelfth session (720th plenary meeting, paras. 95 and 105).

14. Some countries took the view that it was unfair that they should be asked to pay a share of UNEF expenses calculated on the basis of the scale of assessments. It had also been said that a special responsibility for financing the Force was, or should be, imposed upon the five permanent members of the Security Council, which had been accused by some of ignoring the views of other Member States on the subject.

15. The United States delegation did not accept the view that the permanent members of the Security Council had a special financial responsibility simply because of the nature of the Emergency Force. The Force had been established by the General Assembly, where all Member States had an equal voice. Moreover, even if the Emergency Force had been established by the Security Council, the situation would have been exactly the same as far as financial responsibility was concerned, as in the case of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon, since the Charter provided no

special rule of financial responsibility in such a case. The Governments who considered that they should not be called upon to pay their share of UNEF expenses in the same way as they did for the expenses of other United Nations missions apparently believed that, since they had no direct responsibility for the circumstances which had necessitated the creation of UNEF, they had no special interest which was served by UNEF. However, it must be remembered that the Charter and the voting equality of all Member States were based on the principle that all nations had an interest in maintaining peace and security in the world. If the theory was now to be accepted that only the great Powers had such an interest, the next step might well be the adoption of a system of weighted voting, at least on some questions. He was not advocating the adoption of such a system and doubted that those who objected to the application of the regular scale of assessments to UNEF expenses would do so, but it was perhaps desirable to indicate where that theory might lead.

16. The United States delegation was fully aware of the financial burden which the payment of UNEF expenses imposed on certain Governments. However, the ten Governments which had provided troops and had undertaken to meet many expenses for which they would never be reimbursed had nevertheless agreed to pay their share of the common costs on the basis of the regular scale of assessments, although they had in no way been responsible for the circumstances which had led to the establishment of the Force. It was, therefore, hard to see how Governments that had not provided troops could believe that it was too much to ask them merely to pay their regular share of the costs.

17. The special assistance provided by the United States Government, in addition to its regular contribution to UNEF, had made it possible to reduce by almost 25 per cent the total sum to be recovered from Member States on the basis of the scale of assessments. The United States had already paid in cash towards the costs of UNEF \$26 million, or 47 per cent of the total expenditures authorized by the General Assembly, and 72 per cent of the cash received by the Secretary-General had come from the United States. He mentioned those figures only because it had been suggested that the permanent members of the Security Council were insensitive to the financial difficulties created for other Member States by the Emergency Force. The United States had done everything it could to lessen the burden on smaller countries, and he only regretted that the Soviet Union, certainly one of the most financially powerful Member nations, had not made similar efforts. In that connexion, the United States delegation could not understand how the representative of the Soviet Union could describe as unlawful a mission against which the Soviet Union had not voted in 1956; in any case, a country which held views such as those expressed by the USSR delegation was not thereby relieved of its legal and financial responsibilities under Articles 17 and 19 of the Charter.

18. The United States was again prepared in the current year to lighten the total financial burden imposed by the Emergency Force. The United States Congress would shortly be asked to appropriate an amount of \$3.5 million as special financial assistance towards the 1959 UNEF expenses. He hoped that other Governments, particularly that of the Soviet Union, would give

comparable assistance. The United States special contribution was conditional upon a decision by the General Assembly to apportion the balance of UNEF expenses, after deduction of amounts contributed as special assistance, among all Member States on the basis of the regular scale of assessments. He pointed out that the United States special contribution would bring the total amount paid by his country towards UNEF expenses for 1959 to a sum representing some 43 or 44 per cent of the total costs, and would mean a reduction of more than 15 per cent in the assessments of other Member States.

19. The United States delegation proposed two amendments (A/C.5/L.548) to the six-Power draft resolution: the first was based on the suggestion made in paragraph 20 of the Advisory Committee's report (A/4002) and the second was prompted by the considerations he had just outlined.

20. In conclusion, he said that the United States had always considered the Emergency Force as a temporary mission like others included under section 4 of the budget. His delegation was therefore prepared to support any proposal that the Fifth Committee should decide that the UNEF Special Account should become section 4 a of the budget, but the United States itself was not making such a proposal, since it did not consider that such action would change the legal or factual situation.

21. Mr. DE PINIES (Spain) said that he was gratified to note an appreciable reduction in the expenses of the Emergency Force. In general, he supported the conclusions and recommendations of the Advisory Committee as set forth in its reports. It was incontestable that the Emergency Force had accomplished the task entrusted to it; the Spanish delegation had voted for the establishment of the Force, and its position regarding the financial obligations that that imposed was, therefore, clear. There was no justification for the view that the creation of UNEF constituted a violation of the Charter, and it was beyond question that all Member States must accept financial responsibility with regard to the Emergency Force. Nevertheless, the present method of financing the Force raised serious problems for a number of countries. At the time when UNEF had been created, the Spanish delegation had stressed the need to ensure that the costs of the Force would not become an excessive burden for many countries. Spain had said that the scale of assessments for the regular United Nations budget should not be the basis for the apportionment of extraordinary expenses, and had proposed what it considered a more equitable formula, which had received the support of a number of Governments. At the twelfth session, Spain had been one of the sponsors of the draft resolution which had become resolution 1151 (XII).

22. The present six-Power draft resolution made no reference to voluntary contributions, and the Spanish delegation could not vote for it without the United States amendments. Apart from that regrettable omission, it was greatly to be feared that a decision to apportion the expenses of the Emergency Force in accordance with the scale of assessments might create a precedent. Several delegations had opposed that formula. It might be more equitable to establish two scales of assessments, one for contributions to the regular budget, the other for the apportionment of extraordinary expenses. Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter stated that

expenses should be borne "as apportioned by the General Assembly", but it did not say that the General Assembly could not decide on another method of apportionment. It was true that paragraph 1 of that Article, which was inseparable from paragraph 2, spoke of the "budget" of the Organization in the singular, but the Committee was now dealing with the third budget for the financial year 1959. The time had come to study the question more closely in order to avoid imposing excessive burdens on Member States year after year. In that connexion, the view set forth by the Secretary-General in paragraph 115 of his report (A/3943) was unacceptable. The best course would be to ask Member States for their views on the method of financing the Emergency Force, and to examine their replies at the fourteenth session of the General Assembly. It might thus be possible to find an equitable formula for apportionment which could serve as a basis for future emergency forces, and thus avoid creating an automatic resistance in Member States to any future undertaking that imposes burdensome financial obligations on them.

23. The Spanish delegation expressed its gratitude to the Government of the United States for its generous offer, and to all the countries that had made voluntary contributions, whether in cash or in the form of the troops so necessary for the maintenance of peace.

24. Mr. MANGASHA (Ethiopia) thanked the United States for its generous contribution. Ethiopia had been in favour of the establishment of UNEF and it continued to support the Force, but that did not mean that it approved of the existing method of financing. He reminded the Committee of the second preambular paragraph of resolution 1089 (XI) which showed that UNEF's costs were very different from those which could be financed under the regular United Nations budget. Articles 17 and 19 of the Charter were therefore irrelevant. UNEF's expenses should not be apportioned in accordance with the scale of assessments. If a clear distinction was not made between the scale of assessments for the regular budget and the scale applicable to UNEF's expenses, a still heavier financial burden would be placed on the under-developed countries which already had considerable difficulty in paying their regular contributions on time; that would be a great injustice. A more equitable method for the apportionment of UNEF's expenses should therefore be found.

25. Mr. YOGASUNDRAM (Ceylon) considered the comments of the representative of the Union of South Africa on the apportionment of unforeseen and extraordinary expenses very interesting. At the time UNEF had been established, it had not been intended to be a permanent police force, but it had in fact more or less become one. Consideration should therefore be given to the question of its financing and the financing of any force which might be established in the future. His delegation did not wish to endorse any particular method of financing, but it hoped that the question would be included in the agenda of the fourteenth session of the General Assembly. Operative paragraph 4 of the six-Power draft resolution dealt with the matter for 1959. His Government had always bowed to the decisions of the General Assembly and it paid its contributions promptly despite the fact that they were a heavy financial burden. He would vote in favour of the six-Power draft resolution, because decisions of the General Assembly were binding on all Member States. His

delegation greatly appreciated the generous gesture by the United States.

26. Mr. KEATING (Ireland) was glad to support the draft resolution before the Committee, particularly in view of the amendments proposed by the United States representative. In his opinion, the question of principle should be cleared up. When the General Assembly instituted a programme, it should be ready to find the money to finance it and to apportion the expenses equitably among all Member States. His delegation endorsed the Canadian representative's remarks on that subject. The maintenance of peace was the most important function of the United Nations. The sums expended on UNEF were considerable and the Committee had had very little time to consider them, but the Secretary-General and the Advisory Committee had certainly shown the greatest regard for economy in their estimates.

27. Nevertheless, he had some doubts about sections 8 and 9. It was rather disquieting that more than \$18 million should be provided for expenses which could not be accurately estimated at that juncture. The normal procedure was to begin by determining expenses and then to find the money to meet them. He hoped that the provision for extraordinary costs and the reserve had been greatly exaggerated, especially as it was not particularly advisable from an accounting point of view to establish too large a reserve. The United Nations should obviously meet necessary expenses as soon as possible, but he would like further information as to how the appropriations were spent.

28. Mr. GEORGIEV (Bulgaria) endorsed the comments made at the previous meeting by the USSR representative. Whatever the political, legal or financial value of the arguments presented by various delegations to support the existing method of financing, the question remained whether the countries which had committed the aggression against Egypt should or should not bear the cost of UNEF. Until that question was solved, it would be impossible to make any progress on the issue of financing. Acceptance of the existing method of financing was equivalent to acceptance of an offence against international law and of a violation of the Charter. The only body competent to establish UNEF was the Security Council. It would be contrary to the Charter to include UNEF's expenses in the ordinary budget, as certain delegations had proposed, especially as that might provide an additional argument for those who sought gradually and imperceptibly to transform UNEF into a permanent force—a possibility feared by many States.

29. Some representatives had suggested that the permanent members of the Security Council should assume the main share of the costs of UNEF. That would be contrary to the Charter; it would amount to a restriction on the prerogatives of membership in the case of those States which did not share in the costs on an equal footing. The suggestion implied that the task of maintaining peace devolved on the Security Council and that the Council alone had the right to set up a United Nations military force. Some had also suggested that the States with interests in the Middle and Near East should bear the major part of the expenses of UNEF. That was obviously unacceptable for the same reasons, but, oddly enough, it was what was, in fact, happening; a certain number of States which had a substantial material stake in the region

were at present financing UNEF. That coincidence made him wonder about UNEF's political role and its possible consequences.

30. Mr. LEVYCHKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) was astonished that anyone should link the financing of UNEF to a country's interest in maintaining international peace and security; that would imply that the USSR was not as devoted as other States to the maintenance of peace and security throughout the world.

31. Some representatives thought they had detected a contradiction between the Soviet Union's attitude at the time UNEF had been established and its refusal to contribute. It was pertinent to bear in mind the circumstances in which UNEF had been established; the problem at that time had been to halt the aggression committed by France, the United Kingdom and Israel against Egypt, and the General Assembly had unanimously voted in favour of the withdrawal of foreign troops from Egypt. Egypt had agreed to receive UNEF in its territory in the belief that that would bring an end to the aggression from which it had suffered. The situation had therefore been exceptional. Since then, circumstances had entirely changed and the Western Powers, which justified UNEF's existence on the ground that peace must be maintained in the Arab East, were really using it as the thin end of the wedge to obtain the establishment of an international police force, which had nothing in common with the principles of the Charter. The idea of an international police force, which was in fact designed to violate the sovereignty of small Powers, was meeting with very strong resistance.

32. The fact that many States refused to take part in financing UNEF showed that they shared the point of view he had just expressed. As the Advisory Committee's report (A/4002) indicated, the sums contributed to the Special Account of UNEF declined considerably from year to year. On 31 October 1958, more than \$5 million had remained to be collected for 1957 and about \$13.6 million for 1958, which greatly exceeded the Soviet Union's assessment. By refusing to pay their contributions, States were protesting against the existence of an Emergency Force that was no longer needed. It would therefore be pointless to adopt a resolution by a mechanical majority, since many States were determined not to pay their contributions. The arguments advanced by various representatives had not convinced his delegation and his Government would continue to take no part in financing the cost of UNEF.

33. Mr. QUIJANO (Argentina) said that he had followed the debate with interest; it had shown that there were serious differences between the position of various delegations on the question. He welcomed the generous gesture by the United States Government, which would help to alleviate the financial burden on the States which had expressed difficulty in meeting those costs. He also welcomed the United States amendment to paragraph 4, which improved the six-Power draft resolution by giving some flexibility to the rigid principle set out in that paragraph. Some of the objections previously raised by Argentina had now been met.

34. His delegation was submitting an amendment (A/C.5/L.549) which would add a new operative paragraph requesting the Secretary-General to consult with Governments concerning the manner of financing UNEF in the future.

35. His delegation would be able to vote for the draft resolution if the amendments by the United States and Argentina were adopted, although it maintained its reservations with regard to the principle in operative paragraph 4 concerning the application of the scale of assessments to cover costs of that kind.

36. Mr. DORANTE (Venezuela) recalled that his delegation had abstained from voting on the draft resolution adopted by the Special Political Committee and subsequently by the General Assembly (resolution 1263 (XIII)) on the ground that the cost of UNEF should be apportioned more equitably. Costs of such a special nature could not be apportioned on the basis of the criteria applied to costs under the regular budget. His delegation would accordingly abstain from voting on the six-Power draft resolution, although it wished to express its gratitude to the United States for its generous offer which would reduce the financial burden on the small Powers.

37. The CHAIRMAN declared the general discussion closed.

AGENDA ITEM 46

Report of the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds (concluded)

DRAFT REPORT OF THE FIFTH COMMITTEE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (A/C.5/L.544)

38. Mr. QUIJANO (Argentina), Rapporteur, presented the draft report of the Fifth Committee (A/C.5/L.544).

The draft report was adopted.

AGENDA ITEM 44

Budget estimates for the financial year 1959 (continued)

Working Capital Fund (concluded)*

DRAFT REPORT OF THE FIFTH COMMITTEE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (A/C.5/L.543)

39. Mr. QUIJANO (Argentina), Rapporteur, presented the Committee's draft report (A/C.5/L.543), which constituted the first part of the draft report on the budget estimates for the financial year 1959. In order to facilitate preparation of the Fifth Committee's report, he had thought that the various parts of it should be distributed as soon as they were ready.

40. Mr. MANGASHA (Ethiopia) congratulated the Rapporteur on that procedure and hoped that his example would be followed at future sessions.

The draft report was adopted.

FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF DRAFT RESOLUTION II SUBMITTED BY THE THIRD COMMITTEE IN DOCUMENT A/4001 AND CORR.1 ON AGENDA ITEM 31** (concluded)

DRAFT REPORT OF THE FIFTH COMMITTEE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (A/C.5/L.546)

41. Mr. QUIJANO (Argentina), Rapporteur, presented the draft report of the Fifth Committee (A/C.5/L.546).

The draft report was adopted.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.

*Resumed from the 674th meeting.

**Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.