REPORT

OF THE UNITED NATIONS COUNCIL FOR NAMIBIA

Volume III

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

OFFICIAL RECORDS: THIRTY - FOURTH SESSION SUPPLEMENT No. 24 (A/34/24)



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Volume I contains parts one and two of the report of the United Nations Council for Namibia covering the period from 26 October 1978 to 31 October 1979. Volume II contains parts three and four of the report of the Council and annex I to the report. The present volume contains annexes II to V to the report, and includes documents which were initially issued in provisional form under the symbols A/AC.131/L.108 and Add.1, L.109-L.110, and L.111 and Corr.1. Volume IV contains annexes VI to XXXII.

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Report of the Mission of consultation to China, Pakistan, Turkey and Japan, 12 February to 9 March 1979

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^{*} Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.131/L.108 and Add.1.

A. Introduction

1. By approving the report of the Council in its resolution 33/182 C of 21 December 1978, the General Assembly also approved the programme of work outlined therein, by which the Council proposed to send two missions of consultation to Asia, one of which was to visit China, Pakistan, Turkey and Japan. a/

2. The Mission to China, Pakistan, Turkey and Japan was composed of the following members:

Mr. Ahmed Esmat Abdel Meguid (Egypt), Chairman

Mr. Mohammad Tayyab Siddiqui (Pakistan)

Mr. Chérif Bachir Djigo (Senegal)

Mrs. Solmaz Ünaydin (Turkey)

Mr. Ramadan Marmulaku (Yugoslavia)

Mr. John Shafashike Kahana (South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO))

Mr. John F. Robson of the United Nations Secretariat accompanied the Mission as Principal Secretary.

3. The Mission visited China from 12 to 19 February 1979. Following its visit to Pakistan from 21 to 23 February, the Mission continued on to Turkey, where it remained from 24 February to 1 March. It then journeyed to Japan, where it stayed from 6 to 9 March. A detailed chronology of the Mission appears in the appendix to the present report.

B. Visit to China

4. The Mission visited China from 12 to 19 February 1979.

5. It was received at Peking Airport by Mr. Ho Ying, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, who expressed appreciation for the opportunity afforded by the Mission to hold serious discussions on the question of Namibia.

6. At a meeting with Mr. Pi Chi-lung, Deputy Director of the Department of International Organizations, Law and Treaty of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Mission gave a preliminary review of the Namibia question, and preparations were made for the various meetings to be held.

a/ For the report of the second mission to Asia (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines) see annex III below. Volume I of the present report contains a detailed summary of the Council's four missions to Asia and Europe in 1979 (see part two, sect. II, paras. 104-161).

1. First working meeting

7. At the first working meeting, held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Mission held discussions with a Chinese delegation consisting of Mr. Ho Ying; Mr. Pi Chi-lung; Mr. Chou Ming-chi, Deputy Director of the Department of African Affairs; and the following senior officials of the Foreign Ministry: Mr. Tsou Yi-min, Mrs. Wu Yi-yu, Mr. Yung Chung-liang and Mr. Chen Kuo-ching.

8. The Chairman of the Council Mission explained that the United Nations Council for Namibia attached great importance to consultations with Governments of States Members of the United Nations in order to bring about the speedy implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions on the question of Namibia. The Council was convinced that such consultations would make a significant contribution to the cause of Namibia at the present crucial stage. Namibia had a unique status at the United Nations and the United Nations had a special responsibility in assisting the Namitian people in achieving self-determination and independence.

9. Although the Council had received a mandate to administer Namibia until independence, the implementation of that mandate had been impeded by South Africa's defiance of the continued demands of the United Nations for the withdrawal of its illegal administration from Namibia. Notably, the General Assembly, in its resolution 32/9 D of ¹/₄ November 1977, had reiterated that the continued illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa constituted an act of aggression against the Namibian people, as well as against the United Nations as the legal Administering Authority for the Territory until independence.

10. By resolutions 33/182 A and B of 21 December 1978, the General Assembly had also condemned South Africa for unilaterally holding elections in Namibia in December 1978, in contravention and defiance of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) of 29 September 1978 and 439 (1978) of 13 November 1978, in an attempt to impose on Namibia an internal settlement designed to give a semblance of power to a puppet régime. The Assembly had declared those elections and their results to be null and void, and had decided to reconvene its thirty-third session in order to consider fully the question of Namibia and the implications of Scuth Africa's continued defiance of the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

11. The international community, including all Member States, had been requested to refrain from according recognition to any régime which the illegal South African administration might impose upon the Namibian people in disregard of the provisions of Security Council resolutions.

12. The United Nations Council for Namibia was committed to the mobilization of international support and continued assistance for SWAPO, the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people, in its efforts to achieve self-determination and national independence in a united Namibia. The intensification of the liberation struggle led by SWAPO in Namibia reflected the increasing mobilization of the Namibian people against the illegal presence of South Africa. The Namibian people had shown to the world their determination to resist all the efforts of the oppressive illegal occupation of South Africa to perpetuate its control over the Territory. At the same time, SWAPO had shown flexibility and co-operation ir all the efforts that had been exerted for achieving a peaceful settlement in Namibia. South Africa, on the other hand, was still manoeuvring to perpetuate its occupation of the Territory. For that purpose, it had held internal elections in December 1978 in an attempt to install a puppet régime that would serve its purpose. Those activities required renewed efforts by the international community to foil such manoeuvres and to compel South Africa to comply fully with the United Nations resolutions on Namibia.

13. It was the duty of the international community and all Member States to grant all necessary support and assistance to the Namibian people and to SWAPO in their struggle to achieve independence and national unity in a free Namibia.

14. The Chairman summarized the attempts to implement Security Council resolution 435 (1978) and briefed the Chinese delegation on the activities of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the basis of the situation as it stood at the end of January 1979.

15. The Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed thanks for the briefing given by the Chairman and for the information on South African intentions as far as they were known.

16. The Namibians, he continued, had, in common with other African peoples, suffered a great deal of oppression, compounded by gross exploitation and racism. The Chinese people had always supported African peoples who were struggling for independence.

17. Since the Second World War, the peoples of Africa had won great victories. The balance of forces in the world had now become unfavourable to colonialism and imperialism and had tipped decisively in favour of the peoples of the world. When one reviewed the past 30 years in Africa, it was clear that colonialism had disintegrated and that the African people had risen and were playing an important role. The revolutionary storm which had swept Africa since the Second World War was continuing and was directed towards the struggle against colonialism and

18. The African people were also striving to consolidate their sovereignty and independence and the struggle in those areas not yet independent was surging ahead. The independent African States were now an important part of the non-aligned movement and were also becoming more independent in their policies. Any stateman who failed to recognize those developments was committing a great mistake.

19. Tactically speaking, racist South Africa was stubbornly attempting to hold on to its interests as long as possible; strategically, however, it was being forced to retreat. The situation in South Africa as a whole and the specific situation concerning Namibia had been discussed during the recent visit of Vice-Premier Li Ching-nien to four African countries.

20. The Chairman of the Mission thanked the Vice-Minister for his detailed and comprehensive analysis of the situation, adding that the Mission would present a working paper on the situation in Namibia at the next working meeting. He pointed

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out that the official statement by South Africa that it was willing, under certain conditions, to co-operate with the United Nations in the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), while still being a long way from unconditional acceptance of the proposal, \underline{b} / had nevertheless created a new political situation.

2. Second working meeting

21. The Chairman of the Mission, commenting on the analysis of the situation in Africa made by the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs at the previous meeting, stated that Africa was in need of support and assistance at a time when, in addition to the struggle for liberation in Namibia and southern Africa as a whole, there was a need for stability and progress in Africa.

22. The Mission was gratified to know that it could count on the support of China in the struggle for the liberation of Namibia and in efforts to assist Africa in general. In addition to participating in the non-aligned movement, African countries were also members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the best hope for Africa's future, whose position should be strengthened.

23. The Chairman expressed appreciation for the generous and sincere support and assistance given by China to SWAPO and other national liberation movements. The Namibian people were in the greatest need of assistance.

24. The Vice-Minister emphasized China's concern for the unity of Africa. His Government's position was that African affairs should be left to Africans. China believed, for example, that the resolution adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964, which supported the maintenance of the <u>status quo</u> in regard to frontiers in Africa, was a correct policy.

25. Regarding Namibia, China appreciated the work done by the United Nations Council for Namibia and would continue to support it strongly in the future.

26. The main reason why South Africa continued its stubborn resistance in Namibia was that the five authors of the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation, <u>c</u>/ namely Canada, France, Germany, the Federal Republic of, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America had failed to exert sufficient pressure on that country.

27. It was the position of China that the Council should exert pressure on the States close to South Africa so that they in turn would apply pressure to South Africa. China was in favour of sanctions against South Africa, and would

b/ For details, see Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-third Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1978, document S/12636; <u>ibid</u>., Supplement for July, August and September 1978, documents S/12827 and 12869; ibid., Supplement for October, November and December 1978, document S/12903.

c/ Ibid., Supplement for April, May and June 1978, document S/12636.

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like to see the international community fully mobilized in that regard. However, the outcome of the struggle would depend on the Namibian people and on the support given by other African countries. In the meantime, the Council was advised to be on its guard. Although South Africa had made certain promises, it might well go back on its word and resort to its tactic of spinning out the question. The Namibian people must be supported in the expansion of the armed struggle; that did not mean the exclusion of other forms of struggle, whether political or diplomatic, or through the United Nations.

28. The Vice-Minister stated that his country had long had good relations with SWAPO, whose President, Mr. Sam Nujoma, had visited China five times. China's policy was all-out support for SWAPO; its views on that matter were identical with those of OAU, the front-line States and the Council. In fact, after the restoration of the lawful rights of China at the United Nations in October 1971, the Council was the first body which his country joined. His country's co-operation with the Council was good, and it was willing to do more.

29. A member of the Mission stated that China's position was a source of strength to the peoples of the third world who were fighting against racism and colonialism for freedom and independence. At the present time it was important for the non-aligned countries to exert pressure on South Africa.

30. In response to a question by another member of the Mission, the Vice-Minister stated that the question was how to force South Africa to carry out resolutions of the Security Council which South Africa had always disregarded. It would now be appropriate for the United Nations Council for Namibia to establish a common policy in which the role of that Council would be fully developed. China would fully support any steps which the Council might propose.

31. Responding to a question by a third member of the Mission the Vice-Minister stated that China had always given support, including material assistance, to the peoples of southern Africa and their national liberation movements.

32. The representative of SWAPO expressed his thanks for China's support of SWAPO. Regarding the efforts which were being undertaken to implement Security Council resolution 435 (1978), it had become clear to the Executive Committee of SWAPO that there were still many difficulties before the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) could be assembled and that it would be difficult to meet the target date of 28 February 1979. SWAPO felt that South Africa was moving away from the terms of the report of the Secretary-General, \underline{d} which was the basis for the plan; it was therefore clear that more time was needed.

33. The Vice-Minister reiterated that the Namibian people should be actively on guard against any manoeuvres of South Africa, which was unwilling to withdraw and would leave no stone unturned in order to be able to stay in Namibia. South Africa had resorted to delaying tactics in the past and could be expected to do so again in the future. The enemy of the Namibians was a shrewd one. The struggle should not be relaxed until genuine independence had been attained. Furthermore, the Namibian people should not rely solely on the Security Council and the

d/ Ibid., Supplement for July, August and September 1978, documents S/12827 and S/12869.

United Nations Council for Namibia. Vice-Premier Li Ching-nien had made known that view to the front-line States during his recent visit to those countries.

34. In response to a question by a member of the Mission the Vice-Minister stated that China considered the pressure exerted by the five Western Powers on South Africa to be insufficient. Chinese leaders had conveyed that view to United States leaders.

35. After presenting to the Chinese delegation the Mission's working paper on the situation in Namibia, the Chairman, on behalf of the Mission, conveyed his thanks to the members of the Chinese delegation for their hospitality and for their attention to the question of Namibia.

3. Luncheon given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs

36. At a luncheon given by Mr. Huang Hua, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the members of the Mission and the Chinese delegation exchanged views informally on the Namibian question. The Foreign Minister expressed China's support for the people of Namibia in their struggle for genuine independence.

4. <u>Meeting with the Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of National</u> <u>People's Congress</u>

37. The Mission was received by Mr. Ji Peng-fei, Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. He stated that the resumed thirty-third session of the General Assembly concerning the question of Namibia should be used, <u>inter alia</u>, to increase pressure on those countries which had close links with South Africa. Nevertheless, peaceful methods and the armed struggle should go forward at the same time. In that connexion, the Vice-Chairman reviewed with the representative of SWAPO the current military situation in Namibia, including the size and deployment of the South African forces.

38. The Vice-Chairman observed that there were at present a number of disturbed areas in Africa and that South Africa would undoubtedly attempt to take advantage of the situation by using delaying tactics. In conclusion, he stated that China's support for the liberation struggle in Namibia was not given with any thought of return; it was merely an obligation which the Chinese people felt was incumbent on them as a result of their own prolonged liberation struggle.

5. Dissemination of information

39. The Mission gave a press conference which was attended by journalists representing the following publications and organizations: <u>World Knowledge</u> <u>Magazine</u>, <u>Kwangming Daily</u>, All-China Women's Federation, National Broadcasting Bureau, <u>Physical Culture and Sports Daily</u>, <u>Chinese Youth Daily</u>, <u>People's Daily</u>, <u>Peking Daily</u>, <u>Workers' Daily</u>, New China News Agency and the Foreign Language Publishing Centre. The Chairman of the Mission was interviewed on national television. At the conclusion of its visit, the Mission issued a communiqué, the text of which appears in volume II of the present report (part four, sect. II, para. 53).

C. Visit to Pakistan

40. The Mission visited Pakistan from 21 to 23 February 1979.

41. The Mission was received at Karachi Airport by Mr. Rashid Akhund, Additional Chief Secretary, Sind Province, and by Mr. Aslam Rizvi, Deputy Chief of Protocol and head of the Karachi Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Later the same day, the Mission was received at Islamabad Airport by Mr. S. A. Pasha, Additional Foreign Secretary, and by Mr. Sultan Hayat Khan, Deputy Chief of Protocol. Mr. Pasha welcomed the Mission and, on behalf of his Government, expressed its long-standing support for the people of Namibia.

1. Meeting with the Foreign Secretary and first working meeting

42. The meeting with Mr. S. Shah Nawaz, Foreign Secretary, was immediately followed by the first working meeting. The Pakistani delegation consisted of Mr. Nawaz; Mr. Pasha; Miss Selma K. Jan, Director-General (Africa); Mr. Anwar Kamal, Director (United Nations); and Mr. Janshed Badar, Section Officer (United Nations).

43. The Foreign Secretary welcomed the Mission and noted that the Pakistani people had been closely associated with the question of Namibia and hoped to remain so until the successful outcome of the problems involved. Involvement by the United Nations was an important factor; he expressed the view that, with the determination and support of all concerned, the struggle of the people of Namibia would be successful. How long it would take would depend on the intensity of the efforts of all parties concerned in the near future.

44. In reply, the Chairman of the Mission stated that the Council attributed great importance to the exchanges of views taking place during the course of the Mission prior to the resumed session of the General Assembly, devoted to Namibia. The decision of the Assembly to hold a resumed session devoted solely to Namibia was contained in its resolution 33/182 A; the session would be held in the spring shortly after the return of the Mission to New York.

45. The Council was responsible for administering Namibia until independence. The Chairman summarized the work of the Council and described its relationship with SWAPO.

46. Countinuing, the Chairman noted that despite the efforts of the United Nations and the widely advertised attempts of five countries friendly towards South Africa, that country continued to impose its policies of exploitation, racial discrimination and "bantustanization" in Namibia, as well as a policy of militarization, using the Territory to launch attacks against neighbouring independent African States. In its attempts to divide the Namibian people, South Africa had organized and promoted the Turnhalle tribal group in an attempt to establish the basis for a pseudo-independence of the Territory. It had unilaterally held elections, without international supervision, in which the Turnhalle group had obtained a majority. South Africa was thus creating a power base for the Turnhalle puppets. To strengthen that power base, South Africa was continuing to create tribal armies. It was also adhering to its illegal decision to annex Walvis Bay. 47. The Council was committed to the mobilization of international support and continued assistance for SWAPO, the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people, in its efforts to achieve self-determination and national independence in a united Namibia. The Namibian people, led by SWAPO, had shown the world their determination to resist all the efforts of the oppressive illegal régime of South Africa to perpetuate its control of the Territory.

48. Although the Council had received a mandate to administer Namibia until independence, the implementation of that mandate had been impeded by South Africa's defiance of the continued demands of the General Assembly and the Security Council for the withdrawal of its illegal administration from Namibia. In particular, the Assembly, in its resolution 32/9 D, had reiterated that the continued illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa constituted an act of aggression against the Namibian people, as well as against the United Nations as the legal Administering Authority for the Territory until independence. The Assembly had further requested all Member States to co-operate fully with the Council in discharging its mandate until the Territory attained independence. The Assembly had also reaffirmed the status of SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people and recognized SWAPO as a permanent observer at the United Nations, thereby creating conditions for the active participation of that organization in the work of the United Nations.

49. Thus, the efforts of the United Nations had been concentrated on exerting pressure on South Africa to withdraw from Namibia, and the various missions of consultation of the Council were devoted mainly to finding ways to increase this pressure.

50. In 1978, there had been efforts to negotiate with South Africa on a solution to the problem of Namibia, which, the Chairman emphasized, had been conducted entirely outside the framework of the United Nations, although the participants had made much of their United Nations connexion. Those efforts had been one of several to negotiate with South Africa. In 1957, the General Assembly, by its resolution 1143 (XII) of 25 October 1957, had established a Good Offices Committee on South West Africa, composed of Brazil, the United Kingdom and the United States, $\underline{e}/$ to negotiate with South Africa. In the 1960s, representatives of the Philippines and Mexico had undertaken a similar mission. Early in the 1970s, the mission of the Secretary-General of the United Nations $\underline{f}/$ had been followed by the mission of his Special Representative, Mr. Alfred Martin Escher. $\underline{g}/$ All had foundered on the same rock: the stubborn refusal of South Africa to consider anything which might lead to the genuine independence of Namibia.

51. The missions of consultation sent out by the Council in 1978 had discussed earlier efforts to negotiate with South Africa, during their visits to the

e/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 39, document A/3900; and ibid., Fourteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 38, document A/4224.

f/ Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-seventh Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1972, document S/10738.

g/ Ibid., Supplement for October, November and December 1972, document S/10832.

front-line States - Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia - the State carrying out the functions of Chairman of OAU (Gabon) and two major countries in Africa, namely Algeria and Nigeria. \underline{h} / The policy which had emerged from the consultations with those Governments was that neither the Council nor the General Assembly should associate itself with negotiations conducted outside the framework of the United Nations.

52. Now, in 1979, the missions being sent out by the Council faced a completely new situation. The five Western members of the United Nations Security Council (known as the Five) had submitted their proposal \underline{i} / to the Security Council, and the Secretary-General had submitted reports on the possibilities of implementing that proposal. \underline{j} / Finally, South Africa had officially informed the United Nations that it was willing to co-operate, subject to certain conditions, in the implementation of the plan. \underline{k} / That response, though far from an unconditional acceptance of the plan, had created a new political situation, leading to a belief in many countries that a settlement of the Namibian question was near and that the settlement might well be approved by all members of the Security Council.

53. The imminent possibility of a settlement had raised new and difficult questions. The plan provided for the creation of UNTAG. The principal question which arose was the following: what should be the precise nature of the role of the United Nations during the transitional period, and how would the work of UNTAG be guided?

54. The Chairman of the Mission then provided information on the status of attempts to implement Security Council resolution 435 (1978) and on the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

55. The representative of SWAPO briefed the meeting on the most recent developments in the matter. He stated that three points had been raised which were not satisfactory to SWAPO, leading SWAPO to believe that the South African Government was moving away from the terms of the report of the Secretary-General which South Africa had originally accepted. The position of SWAPO was that it was ready to co-operate fully in the implementation of the report, but that i⁺ should be implemented in its entirety. The South Africans should not be allowed to force the United Nations to depart from the terms of the report as drawn up and accepted.

56. The Foreign Secretary thanked the Mission for its comprehensive and clear exposition of the situation. Pakistan had followed the matter very closely and was trying to assist in the liberation of Namibia. The Foreign Secretary was particularly gratified to note the presence of the representative of SWAPO in the

<u>h</u>/<u>Official Records of the General Assembly, Ninth Special Session, Supplement</u> No. 1 (A/S-9/4).

i/ Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-third Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1978, document S/12636.

<u>j</u>/ <u>Ibid.</u>, <u>Supplement for July</u>, <u>August and September 1978</u>, documents S/12827 and S/12869; <u>ibid.</u>, <u>Supplement for October</u>, <u>November and December 1978</u>, document S/12903.

k/ Ibid., Supplement for October, November and December 1978, document S/12983, annex I.

Mission. It was clear that the Namibian question had come a long way since 1967 and was now the focus of attention in many countries. The policy of his Government was to assist Namibia in every possible way. From the account which had been given, it seemed that tactics were being employed to delay the process to the maximum extent. Such impediments and efforts were to be expected under the circumstances and should not necessarily be factors of discouragement. Pakistan could not accept the demands of South Africa at present; these were only tactics to delay the process. It was necessary that the momentum attained so far should be continued with the assistance of all concerned. Pakistan was prepared to give maximum assistance.

57. The Foreign Secretary then invited suggestions and recommendations from the Mission so that a discussion of their merits could be held.

58. The Chairman stated that political pressure on South Africa should be applied continuously and should come mainly from the Western Powers. He expressed his gratitude for the positive attitude of Pakistan and for its support.

59. A member of the Mission stated that 1979 was the International Year of Solidarity with the People of Namibia and that preparations were being made at the United Nations to create an awareness of the Namibian question all over the world in an effort to increase support for Namibia, particularly through the mass media. In that respect, he urged maximum co-operation from the Pakistani Government to achieve this goal.

60. Another member of the Mission stated that the question of the nature of the role of the United Nations during the transitional period was of particular importance; he hoped that Pakistan might be able to conduct consultations among Asian countries on the matter before the commencement of the resumed session of the General Assembly. Pakistan might be in a position to raise the question of the Namibian prisoners. There was also a serious need for fellowships for Namibians and for lecturers at the Institute for Namibia.

61. A third member of the Mission emphasized the importance of defining the role of the United Nations during the transitional period and stated that many countries had been disappointed by the conduct of the Five, which had suffered a decline in credibility. It was important now to build a strategy for the resumed session that might influence developments in other parts of the world.

62. The Foreign Secretary noted that a number of the points made were practicable. It was also important to avoid delay in the over-all process. He agreed with the need for pressures to be exerted on South Africa and reaffirmed that Pakistan strongly supported a continuing role for the United Nations and would do whatever it could to accelerate the process of liberation of Namibia. He also said that he would look into the question of training of cadres. The Pakistani training programme had been in existence for some time and required expansion. Pakistani citizens had sometimes been excluded from Pakistani institutions in order to admit Namibians. In conclusion, the Foreign Secretary agreed to consult with other Asian countries on how best to co-ordinate action and pressure to prevent the delaying tactics now being employed by South Africa.

2. Meeting with the President of Pakistan

63. The Mission was received by General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq, the President of Pakistan. The Chairman of the Mission outlined the purpose of the Mission's visit to Pakistan and the nature of the consultations which had already taken place. The President stated that he would support measures to induce those countries having close links with South Africa to exert increased pressure on that country in order to bring about its compliance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). The President added that Pakistan would be willing to arrange for Namibians to obtain training in administration in Pakistan and was ready to provide technical assistance to the Namibian people. The President also informed the Mission that continuation of the armed struggle was essential to the solution of the Namibian problem.

3. Second working meeting

64. The Mission held a second working meeting with a delegation of officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs headed by Mr. Agha Shahi, the Adviser to the President on Foreign Affairs.

65. The Adviser to the President expressed the hope that the resumed thirty-third session of the General Assembly would result in a settlement of the Namibia question and that the settlement's main feature would be fairly conducted elections. The Chairman of the Mission drew attention to the divergencies which still existed (see also para. 55 above). There was, therefore, still a need for exerting strong political pressure on those countries which were supporting South Africa. The pressure could be exerted bilaterally as well as multilaterally. It was also important that any draft resolution to be placed before the next meeting of the Security Council on Namibia should be discussed with particular care before the meeting was held and that Chapter VII of the Charter should be kept firmly in mind. SWAPO, for its part, had shown great flexibility and was following political as well as military methods. It was thus clear that South Africa was on the defensive and no longer boasting that it would stay in Namibia for ever.

4. Dissemination of information

66. The Mission received extensive publicity, particularly in the press, both before and during its visit. The Chairman and other members of the Mission were interviewed on television. A press conference given at the end of the Mission's stay was attended by 25 Pakistani and foreign journalists and by an international television news service.

67. Responding to questions at the press conference, the Chairman of the Mission stated that the Five should now face their responsibilities and exert genuine pressure on South Africa. The United Nations Council for Namibia was aware, however, that the attainment of independence for Namibia was a very long and difficult task; however, it was the determination of the United Nations and SWAPO to continue the struggle until that goal was achieved.

68. The representative of SWAPO stated that South Africa was moving away from the terms of the reports of the Secretary-General and was trying to delay the independence of Namibia. Every effort should be made to prevent such a deviation. The Secretary-General's report should be implemented in toto.

5. Joint communiqué

69. Following the conclusion of a third and last working meeting with the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a joint communiqué was issued by the Government of Pakistan and the Mission. The text of the joint communiqué is reproduced in volume II of the present report (part four, sect. II, para. 53).

D. Visit to Turkey

70. The Mission visited Turkey from 24 February to 1 March 1979.

71. The Mission was received at Istanbul Airport by Mr. Halit Tokullugil, Deputy Governor of Istanbul. After informal consultations at Istanbul with officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Mission was received at Ankara Airport by Mr. Ayhan Kamel, Director-General of Bilateral Political Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Mrs. Filiz Dincmen, Head of the International Organizations Department; and Mr. Erdinc Karasapan, Chief of Protocol.

1. Meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs

72. Mr. Gündüz Ökçün, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated that the struggle of the Namibian people was similar to the struggle of the Turks 60 years ago, when the National Forces movement had come into being. The Turkish Government felt that more pressure should be exerted on those countries which were supporting South Africa. Turkey was committed to support the struggle of oppressed peoples for independence and, in general, Turkey strongly upheld the concept of self-reliance and interdependence for developing countries.

73. Turkey was willing to provide lecturers for Namibians attending school outside Namibia and to make scholarships available for Namibians. The scholarships could probably be made available at the Middle East Institute of Public Administration in Ankara, where English was one of the languages of instruction.

74. The Chairman of the Mission discussed with the Foreign Minister ways of exerting increased pressure on South Africa and its supporters and exchanged views on the points which could be dealt with in a joint communiqué.

75. The Foreign Minister stated that Turkey was willing, jointly with Egypt, Pakistan and Senegal, to raise the question of Namibia at the Tenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers to be held at Fez from 8 to 12 May 1979 (see A/34/389 and Corr.1, annex I).

76. The Chairman of the Mission expressed his gratitude and appreciation for the proposals made by Turkey.

2. First working meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

77. At the first working meeting, the Turkish delegation consisted of Mr. Kamel; Mrs. Dingmen; Mr. Irfan Saruhan, Acting Head of the Africa Department; Mr. Gursel Demirok, Chief of Section of the International Organizations Department; and Mr. Engin Yazicioglu, Chief of Section, Africa Department. 78. At the opening of the meeting, the Director-General welcomed the Mission on behalf of the Turkish Government and recalled the previous mission of the Council to Turkey, which had taken place in 1972. 1/ The presence of a representative of SWAPO with the Mission clearly increased the importance of the present visit. He hoped that the representative would accept the invitation of the Turkish Government to stay on in Turkey after the Mission had concluded its work.

79. The struggle of Turkey against imperialism in the 1920s, he continued, could serve as a good example for many peoples. Since the Second World War, Turkey had made it a definite policy to give support to the struggle of oppressed peoples in all parts of the world. Turkey had been a co-sponsor of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and later had been one of the founding members of the Council.

80. The Chairman of the Mission delivered an opening statement followed by a review of the efforts being made to bring about a settlement of the Namibian situation through implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978).

81. In that connexion, the representative of SWAPO stated that Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, had held a meeting with the leaders of SWAPO. After that meeting, the Executive Committee of SWAPO had noted three areas in which South Africa was moving away from the terms of the plan for a settlement of the Namibian situation.

82. The Mission and the Turkish delegation reviewed a summary of the Secretary-General's report which had been cabled from United Nations Headquarters. $\underline{m}/$

83. The Director-General stated that although there were obviously serious problems ahead, particularly concerning the cease-fire and the question of monitoring, the forthcoming resumed session of the General Assembly might lead to their solution. Turkey would condemn all illegal acts of South Africa. Turkey would also use its good offices to attempt to bring pressure to bear on South Africa in order to prevent deviations from the Security Council plan. It was essential to have impartial elections in Namibia under United Nations supervision. The attempts by South Africa to annex Walvis Bay were unacceptable and had been rejected by Turkey. There should, indeed, be a role for the United Nations Council for Namibia until independence; the modalities of that question could be discussed.

84. He added that Turkey had established for the first time a special fund for Africa, and, in that way, would attempt to make a financial contribution to Namibians.

85. In response to a question by the head of the International Organizations Department, the Chairman of the Mission stated that the resumed session of the General Assembly would be an occasion to accept the Security Council plan for the

1/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 24 (A/8724), vol. 1, part II: and vol. II, annex IV, appendix IV.

m/ See Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-fourth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1979, document S/13120.

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settlement of the Namibian question and to increase political pressure on South Africa. The Assembly would probably recommend action under Chapter VII of the Charter if South Africa continued its delaying tactics. As to the role of the United Nations Council for Namibia, it possessed sovereign power over Namibia and legally had the task of bringing Namibia to independence. Consideration should be given to the role of the Council during the transitional period.

86. The Director-General observed that a way should be devised by which the Council could be present during the transitional period.

87. A member of the Mission stated that in the course of its previous consultations, the Mission and the Turkish delegation had exchanged views on a possible role for the Council. A number of ideas relating to that matter were in circulation, including the composition of UNTAG, the mode of reporting of the Special Representative and the monitoring of UNTAG itself.

88. Another member of the Mission observed that to a considerable extent it was a question of how to formalize the channels of communication which already existed.

89. The representative of SWAPO added that the five States which had devised the proposal for the se lement of the Namibian question had expressed a strong desire to establish observer stations in Namibia during the transitional period. That proposal should be looked into carefully.

3. Lumheon given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs

90. At the luncheon given in honour of the Mission, the Foreign Minister recalled Turkey's own history, in which there had been a period of struggle against intervention by imperialist Powers and a campaign against the companies controlled by foreigners then dominating the Turkish economy. As a result, Turkey had established a strong principle of assisting all the liberation movements; specifically, Turkey supported SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people. It was also important that political independence should be accompanied by economic independence. In that connexion, independent countries should look towards self-reliance and interdependence as a solution to their problems rather than merely depending on the former colonial Powers.

4. <u>Meeting with the Prime Minister</u>

91. Mr. Bülent Ecevit, the Prime Minister, observed that Turkey, which had been one of the founding members, strongly supported the Council as an example of international solidarity and co-operation. Furthermore, Turkey considered that Walvis Bay, an important economic and strategic area, was an integral part of Namibia. The Prime Minister expressed Turkey's full support for SWAPO and reiterated the invitation of the Turkish Government to the representative of SWAPO (see para. 78 above).

5. Working meetings on the joint communiqué

92. The Mission held four working meetings with the Turkish delegation on the content of the joint communiqué.

6. Dissemination of information

93. The Mission received extensive press, radio, and television coverage during its visit to Turkey. The Chairman of the Mission and the representative of SWAPO were interviewed on television, and the Mission's press conference was televised.

7. Joint communiqué

94. At the conclusion of the Mission's stay, a joint communiqué by the Government of Turkey and the Mission was issued simultaneously by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the United Nations Information Centre at Ankara and the Department of Public Information at United Nations Headquarters. The text of the joint communiqué is reproduced in volume II of the present report (part four, sect. II, para. 53).

E. Visit to Japan

95. The Mission was received at Tokyo Airport by Mr. S. Imanishi, Deputy Director of the Political Affairs Division, United Nations Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

1. Meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs

96. Mr. Sunao Sonoda, the Foreign Minister, welcomed the Mission and discussed the question of UNTAG, whose creation had been foreseen in the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation. He stated that the Japanese Government was willing to provide equipment and civilian personnel in addition to its regular contribution to UNTAG. Furthermore, subject to parliamentary approval, it was willing to increase substantially its contribution to the various United Nations funds for southern Africa.

2. <u>Meeting with the Director-General of the United Nations Bureau</u> of the <u>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</u>

97. Mr. Harunori Kaya, the Director-General, observed that the elections provided for under the plan might raise considerable problems with regard to monitoring. In response to his inquiry, the Mission stated that the Council viewed the December 1978 elections as fraudulent inasmuch as only whites and their followers had participated in the voting. Members of the Mission also provided information on certain difficulties which had arisen concerning the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation.

3. Meeting with the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs

98. At a meeting with Mr. Masuo Takashima, the Deputy Foreign Minister, the recent developments in Namibia were reviewed. The Deputy Minister reaffirmed that his Government was willing to provide civilian forces to UNTAG if the proposal were to go into effect.

4. <u>Meeting with the Director-General of the Middle Eastern and</u> <u>African Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs</u>

99. Mr. Kazuo Chiba, the Director-General, informed the Mission that his Government was paying close attention to the situation in Africa, particularly to the southern region. In that context, his deputy was at that time visiting the front-line States.

5. Norking meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

100. At the working meeting, the Japanese delegation consisted of Mr. S. Kobayashi, Deputy Director-General of the United Nations Bureau; Mr. K. Haraguchi, Director of the African Affairs Division, Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau; Mr. Y. Kikuchi, Director of the Disarmament Division; Mr. T. Kawakami, Director, and Mr. S. Imanishi, Deputy Director, of the Political Affairs Division, United Nations Bureau: Mr. T. Kiya, Deputy Director of the Legal Affairs Division, Treaties Bureau; and Mr. Osamu Igami of the Political Division of the Economic Co-operation Bureau.

101. Mr. Kobayashi, the head of the delegation, opened the meeting. He stated that the Japanese Government viewed with satisfaction the possibility of a settlement of the Namibian question and reaffirmed that his Government would be willing to provide transport and equipment, as well as civilian staff, for UNTAG.

102. The Chairman of the Mission reviewed certain efforts which had been made towards bringing about a settlement of the Namibian situation through the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). He emphasized the need for exerting more pressure on South Africa and requested the Japanese delegation to inform the Mission from a legal point of view of the precise nature of any Japanese involvement in Namibia.

103. The Mission and the delegation reviewed certain aspects of the proposal and both sides emphasized the need for fairness in any election which might be held in Namibia.

104. In response to a specific question raised by the members of the Mission, the Deputy Director-General of the United Nations Bureau stated that Decree No. 1 for the Protection of Natural Resources of Namibia n/ had been published some years previously in the Japanese Government Gazette; his Government believed that it was being observed by Japanese companies.

105. The Director of the African Affairs Division added that the Japanese Government prohibited direct investment in Namibia by Japanese companies: there was a limited amount of direct trade which was decreasing. He pointed out that, from a strictly legal point of view, his Government was dealing with the question of Walvis Bay on a slightly different basis. Security Council resolution 432 (1978) of 27 July 1978 appeared to be a suitable approach to the problem: following the accession of Namibia to independence, negotiations should take place between the new administration and South Africa. At the present time, pressure from the international community would be important.

n/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 24A (A/9624/Add.7), para. 84. The Decree has been issued in final form in <u>Namibia Gazette No. 1</u>.

106. The Deputy Director of the Political Affairs Division stated that the Japanese Government was making a considerable effort to disseminate information on Namibia in Japan. Namibia Day had been commemorated in Japan in 1978, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs issued a press release on that occasion. The Deputy Director-General of the United Nations Bureau added that the offer of the Japanese Government to contribute to UNTAG had generated considerable publicity in Japan and had helped to raise the level of knowledge of the Japanese people about the Namibian question. The major part of the work of dissemination was being carried out by private organs.

107. The Deputy Director-General stated that, in general terms, the position of the Japanese Government on the Namibian question was as follows: (a) the South African presence in Namibia was illegal; both the civilian and military forces from South Africa should be withdrawn from Namibia: (b) the Namibian people should be given the opportunity to exercise their right to self-determination and independence; (c) the United Nations possessed direct responsibility over Namibia and should therefore play the primary role in bringing Namibia to independence; and (d) it would be desirable for the Namibia question to be resolved quickly by peaceful means.

108. In response to a question raised by the representative of SWAPO, the Deputy Director-General stated that as a result of "administrative guidance" from the Japanese Government, a contract involving the importation of uranium ore from Mamibia had been suspended. No further importation of uranium would take place until Namibia became independent.

109. In response to a question by a member of the Mission, the Deputy Director-General stated that the Japanese Government possessed certain limited channels of communication with South African officials, and used them to convey to South Africa the need for a speedy solution to the question of Namibia.

110. Responding to an observation by the Director of the Political Affairs Division, a member of the Mission stated that the role of the Council as the legal Administering Authority for Namibia had been laid down since the establishment of the Council by General Assembly resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967. Furthermore, the activities of those countries which had put forward a proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation had taken place outside the framework of the United Nations until those countries had finally brought their plan before the Security Council.

111. The Japanese delegation and the Mission decided to form a working group to prepare a communiqué.

6. <u>Meeting with the Vice-Minister for International Affairs of the Ministry</u> of International Trade and Industry

112. The Mission held a meeting with Mr. Toshikazu Hashimoto, Vice-Minister for International Affairs of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, who stated that Japan conducted only ordinary trade with Namibia; there was no direct investment and no government involvement. Japanese exports to Namibia were less than \$US 2 million <u>per annum</u> and consisted mainly of chemicals, textiles and transportation equipment; Japanese imports were in the region of \$US 10 million per <u>annum</u> and consisted principally of copper, ore and food-stuffs.

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113. A member of the Mission inquired about the position of the Japanese Government concerning the involvement of transnational corporations in Namibia and South Africa. Certain corporations in Namibia, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, although apparently independent of each other, were in fact related through their common links with corporate headquarters in the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan and other countries. The United Nations was attempting to stop further investments in those three countries.

114. The Vice-Minister stated that there was no direct Japanese investment and no intergovernmental arrangements in regard to South Africa or Namibia. Ordinary trade was also restricted. The usual Japanese policy was to permit free investment overseas but that was not the case in South Africa. Although certain companies had been directly informed of Decree No. 1 for the Protection of Natural Resources of Namibia, this was not the same process as the administrative guidance mentioned at an earlier meeting (see para. 108 above).

115. The representative of SWAPO observed that trade of any kind in Mamibian goods was assisting South Africa to continue its illegal occupation of Namibia and was not beneficial to the Namibian people. SWAPO was pleased to note, however, that the uranium contract had been suspended.

7. Meeting with representatives of the Committee on Co-operation with Africa of Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organizations), the United Nations Association of Japan and the Africa Society of Japan

116. The Mission was invited to participate in a joint meeting of Japanese business leaders who are members of the Committee on Co-operation with Africa of Keidanren, officials of the United Nations Association of Japan and officials of the Africa Society of Japan.

117. Representatives of 25 major corporations and banks participated in the meeting, represented generally by their presidents, vice-presidents or general managers. The United Nations Association of Japan was represented by its Managing Director and Executive Director, and the Africa Society of Japan by its Secretary-General. Mr. Fumihiko Kono, Chairman of the Committee on Co-operation with Africa of Keidanren, presided at the meeting. The role of Keidanren can be compared to that of the National Association of Manufacturers in the United States or the Confederation of British Industries in the United Kingdom. Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also participated in the meeting.

118. The Chairman of the Committee on Co-operation stated that both the Japanese Government and the private sector in Japan had great expectations for the peaceful independence of Namibia. The Government had promised to co-operate with UNTAG by making available civilian personnel and equipment. The Japanese private sector was making preparations to contribute to the Government's efforts on behalf of UNTAG. He recalled that four years ago, at the time of the first visit of a Council mission to Japan, <u>o</u>/ he had expressed strong hope for a peaceful settlement of the Namibian problem without resort to arms. He emphasized that those hopes had not changed.

119. In a statement on the current conditions in Namibia and its future, the Chairman of the Mission, after reviewing briefly the political situation in Japan, stated that one of the elements in the efforts of the Council to find a solution to the Namibian problem had been a campaign against economic activities in Namibia by companies of all nationalities.

o/ Ibid., Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 24 (A/10024), vol. II, annex V, paras. 28-65.

120. An instrument in that campaign had been Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia, about which doubts had been expressed. The Chairman pointed out first, that South Africa's presence in Namibia was illegal: the International Court of Justice had delivered an advisory opinion on the matter. \underline{p} / Second, the Decree was not in itself new; it was primarily a restatement of certain elements of resolutions adopted by the Security Council. Third, it had never been intended that the Decree should have legal power in each State Member of the United Nations. Rather, it was intended as a model for individual States to follow, either by the enactment of legislation or by administrative action. In Japan, for example, the Government, by administrative action, had obtained the suspension of a contract between a Japanese corporation and the Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation, Ltd. (RTZ) of the United Kingdom covering the importation of uranium into Japan (see paras. 104 and 10^R above).

121. The representative of SWAPO stated that some Japanese companies were believed to be among the approximately 30 foreign companies operating in Namibia. The transnational companies followed the discriminatory laws of South Africa and in the process paid starvation wages to the Namibian workers. Although he was aware that both the public and private sectors of Japan would not have economic interests in Namibia as large as those of other countries, transnational companies of all countries should cease their activities in Namibia however small they might be. Upon the accession of Namibia to independence, it was the intention of SWAPO to co-operate with all nations.

122. In response, the Chairman of the Committee on Co-operation said that many misleading rumours about Japan's attitude towards South Africa were still circulating, including the rumour that Japan was still investing in South Africa.

123. A member of the Mission stated that some years ago, Japan had been on a par with Western Powers in the matter of investments in southern Africa. The positive change which had occurred in that connexion in the last few years was recognized by African countries and by the non-aligned, third world countries.

124. The Chairman of the Committee on Co-operation stated that at present there were no economic activities conducted by Japanese interests in Namibia which would run counter to the interests of the Namibian people. He referred to the administrative action taken by the Japanese Government which had resulted in the suspension of a long-term contract for the purchase of uranium ore from Namibia (see also para. 108 above).

125. Mr. Yuichi Saito, the Executive Director of the United Nations Association of Japan, noted that the comment made by the representative of SWAPO regarding the starvation wage applied in Namibia was very apt, since that expression very clearly described the situation in the country.

126. Mr. Ishida of the Overseas Business Division of the Nippon Kokan Company asked whether there was any concern about tribal conflicts in Namibia following independence. He also wished to know the number of tribes in the country.

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p/ Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.

127. The representative of SWAPO responded that South Africa had always underestimated the Namibian population for political reasons. Although South Africa had quoted a figure of 900,000 in 1974, United Nations statistics used the figure 1.5 million persons. SWAPO estimated that the total population of Namibia was approximately 2.2 million. Although there were six main tribes, there were no hostilities among them and no tribal conflicts were anticipated after independence. Such conflicts at the moment, if any, had been created and encouraged by South Africa with the aim of creating disunity among the people of Namibia. SWAPO was constituted of members from all sectors of Namibian society and the word "tribe" was not part of the vocabulary of SWAPO.

128. A member of the Mission pointed out that the size of population could not be a decisive factor in considering the independence of a country, and that it was in the interest of the peoples of the world as a whole to allow any people, regardless of their number, to accede to independence and full sovereignty. He recalled the history of migration in Japan, Europe and elsewhere and stressed the importance of the will of the Namibian people to struggle for independence.

129. Mr. Tasuku Hasemura, Senior Vice-President of the Kitano Construction Corporation, asked where priority would be given in the public sector, including infrastructure, after independence.

130. The representative of SWAPO replied that it was difficult to pinpoint particular economic areas; the economic situation in Namibia had been kept secret by South Africa and its present status was not precisely known. Furthermore, that economy had always been dominated by South African and transnational companies, without the participation of the Namibian people. In public policy, the highest priority would be given to education and training.

131. A press conference given by the Mission was attended by representatives of the following publications and agencies: NHK TV, <u>Asahi Shimbun</u>, <u>Tomiari Shimbun</u>, The <u>Japan Times</u>, <u>Mainichi Shimbun</u>, Tanjug News Agency, <u>The Observer</u> (London), Agence France Press, Asahi Evening News, Jiji Press Agency and Kyodo News Service.

132. The Chairman of the Mission explained the purpose of the Mission's visit to Japan, the results of its meetings with representatives of both government and private sectors of Japan and the commitment by the Government of Japan to assist the Namibian people to obtain their independence.

8. Communiqué

133. After a number of meetings of a joint working group (see para. 111 above), the Mission issued a communiqué on 9 March 1979, the text of which is reproduced in volume II of the present report (part four, sect. II, para. 53).

F. Conclusions and recommendations

1. <u>Conclusions</u>

134. In the light of the consultations carried out with the Governments of China, Pakistan, Turkey and Japan, the Mission established the following conclusions:

(1) The combined efforts of the Namibian people, led by the South West Africa People's Organization, their sole and authentic representative, the United Nations Council for Namibia and the United Nations as a whole, have brought the Namibian people to the verge of independence;

(2) As was specifically stated by the respective Governments of the countries visited, the South West Africa People's Organization has manifested substantial and commendable flexibility in an attempt to achieve the genuine independence of Namibia by peaceful means;

(3) The Mission considers that the armed struggle must continue until genuine independence is attained

(4) The Mission observes that while the proposals for settlement of the Namibian question approved by the Security Council have aroused considerable hope and even a widespread belief that independence is near, in fact, no agreement on the specific process leading to Namibian independence has as yet been reached. Substantial and effective pressure should therefore be applied to South Africa by all countries having dealings with it and, particularly, by the five Member States which are the authors of the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation.

2. Recommendations

135. As a result of its extensive consultations, the Mission wishes to place before the United Nations Council for Namibia the following recommendations:

(1) The Council should give full attention to all ways and means of increasing the pressure on South Africa to withdraw from Namibia. The resumed session of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly should be devoted principally to this goal.

(2) All the countries visited expressed willingness to consider suggestions for the role of the Council in the transitional period. In accordance with the views conveyed to it, the Mission recommends that the Council itself should now give consideration to what its role might be during the proposed transitional period. In that connexion, the Mission wishes to mention the following fields of activity to which the Council might wish to give consideration:

- (a) The submission by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, in his capacity as the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, of regular reports to the Council;
- (b) Consultations by the President of the Security Council with the United Nations Council for Namibia regarding the implementation of the proposed plan;
- (c) The position of the South West Africa People's Organization regarding the stationing of an observer team in Namibia by the United Nations Council for Namibia during the proposed transitional period.

G. Acknowledgements

136. The Mission wishes to take this opportunity to express its warm thanks to the Governments of China, Pakistan, Turkey and Japan for their hospitality and for the opportunity to hold the consultations. The Mission also wishes to express its thanks to the United Nations Secretariat.

H. Adoption of the report

137. The present report was adopted by the Mission on 13 March 1979.

<u>Appendix</u>

Chronology of the Mission

A. China

Monday, 12 February 1979	9 p.m.	Received at Peking Airport by Mr. Ho Ying, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs
Tuesday, 13 February 1979	10.30 a.m.	Meeting with Mr. Pi Chi-lung, Deputy Director, Department of International Organizations, Law and Treaty, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
	6.30 p.m.	Dinner given by Vice-Minister
Wednesday, 14 February 1979	3 p.m.	First working meeting with senior officials of Foreign Ministry headed by Vice-Minister
Thursday, 15 February 1979	9.30 p.m.	Second working meeting with senior officials of Foreign Ministry
Friday, 16 February 1979	8.40 a.m.	Chairman interviewed on Chinese National Television (broadcast at 7.10 p.m. and 9.20 p.m.)
	12.30 p.m.	Luncheon given by Minister for Foreign Affairs
	3 p.m.	Consultations on communiqué
	4 p.m.	Press conference
Saturday, 17 February 1979	10.30 a.m.	Meeting with Mr. Ji Peng-fei, Vice-Chairman, Standing Committee, National People's Congress
Sunday, 18 February 1979	6.30 p.m.	Dinner in Canton given by Mr. Yang Kung-hua, Deputy Chief, Revolutionary Council of Kwangtung Province

	B. Pakis	stan
Wednesday, 21 February 1979	3 a.m.	Received at Karachi Airport by Mr. Rashid Akhund, Additional Chief Secretary, Sind Province
	9.15 a.m.	Received at Islamabad Airport by Mr. S. A. Pasha, Additional Foreign Secretary
	3.30 p.m.	Meeting with Mr. S. Shah Nawaz, Foreign Secretary
	4 p.m.	First working meeting at Foreign Ministry
	8 p.m.	Dinner given by Foreign Secretary
Thursday, 22 February 1979	10 a.m.	Television interview
	4 p.m.	Audience with Gen. Mohammed Zia ul-Haq. President of Pakistan
	7 p.m.	Press conference and second television interview
Friday, 23 February 1979	10 a.m.	Second working meeting at Foreign Ministry, headed by Mr. Agha Shahi, Adviser to the President on Foreign Affairs
	12 noon	Third working meeting at Foreign Ministry
	8 p.m.	Dinner given by Lieutenant General Sawar Khan, Governor, Punjab Province
	C. <u>Turk</u>	ey
Saturday, 24 February 1979	10 a.m.	Received at Istanbul Airport by Mr. Halit Tokullugil, Deputy Governor of Istanbul
Monday, 26 February 1979	2.30 p.m.	Informal discussions with officials of the Foreign Ministry
	б.30 р.т.	Received at Ankara Airport by Mr. Ayhan Kamel, Director-General, Bilateral Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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Tuesday.	27	February	1979

Wednesday, 28 February 1979

Thursday, 1 March 1979

Tuesday, 6 March 1979

Wednesday, 7 March 1979

- Meeting with Mr. Gündüz Ökçün, Minister for Foreign Affairs
- First working meeting at Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- 1 p.m. Luncheon given by Foreign Minister
- 3.30 p.m. Laying of wreath at Ataturk Mausoleum
- 4 p.m. Television interview
- 4.30 p.m. Second working meeting at Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- δ p.m. Meeting with Mr. Bülent Ecevit, Prime Minister of Turkey
- 10 p.m. Third working meeting with officials of Foreign Ministry
- 10 a.m. Televised press conference
 - 3.30 p.m. Fourth working meeting at Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- 10 a.m. Consultations on joint communiqué

D. Japan

9 a.m.

10 a.m.

- 8.05 p.m. Received at Tokyo Airport by Mr. S. Imanishi, Deputy Director, Political Affairs Division, United Nations Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- 9 a.m. Received by Mr. Sunao Sonoda, Minister for Foreign Affairs
- 9.30 a.m. Meeting with Mr. Harunori Kaya, Director-General, United Nations Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- ll a.m. Meeting with Mr. Masuo Takashima, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs

11.30 a.m., Meeting with Mr. Kazuo Chiba, Director-General, Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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(continued)	2 p.m.	Working meeting at Ministry of Foreign Affairs
	5 p.m.	Meeting with Mr. Toshikazu Hashimoto, Vice-Minister for International Affairs, Ministry of International Trade and Industry
	7 p.m.	Dinner given by Director-General, United Nations Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Thursday, 8 March 1979	12 noon	Luncheon given by Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs
	3 p.m.	Discussion with representatives of Committee on Co-operation with Africa of Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organizations), Africa Society of Japan and United Nations Association of Japan
	5 p.m.	Reception given jointly by above- mentioned organizations
Friday, 9 March 1979	10 a.m.	Press conference

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ANNEX III*

Report of the Mission of consultation to Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines, 15 February to 4 March 1979

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* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.131/L.109.

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A. Introduction

1. By approving the report of the Council in its resolution 33/182 C, the General Assembly also approved the programme of work outlined therein, by which the Council proposed to send two missions of consultation to Asia, one of which was to visit Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines. a/

2. The purpose of the Mission was to review the situation in Namibia in the light of issues relating to the implementation of United Nations resolutions on Namibia, to reaffirm and secure continued support and utmost vigilance by the Governments of the countries visited at a stage crucial to Namibian independence and to find ways to enable the Council, as the legal Administering Authority for Mamibia until independence, to accelerate the process of implementation of United Nations resolutions on Namibia.

3. In its discussions with the Governments concerned, the Mission emphasized the special and direct responsibility of the United Nations for Namibia and the unequivocal position of the United Nations that the Council was the legal Administering Authority for the Cerritory until independence. The Mission also emphasized that the United Nations recognized SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people. The Mission further emphasized the need for giving support and assistance to SWAPO.

4. The Mission drew particular attention to the current political situation in Namibia and the continuing efforts of the United Nations to lay the groundwork for the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978).

5. The Mission also stressed the urgent need for vigilance by the international community in order to nullify the persistent manoeuvres of South Africa to impede the implementation of United Nations resolutions on Namibia, in particular, that country's policies of intimidation, harassment and imprisonment of Namibian patriots in its attempts to perpetuate its illegal occupation of Namibia.

6. Furthermore, the Mission recalled the decision of the General Assembly, in its resolution 32/9 D, that no recognition should be granted to any régime installed in Mamibia by South Africa in contravention of United Nations resolutions.

7. The Mission also drew attention to the principle of the territorial integrity of Namibia, particularly in regard to Walvis Bay, which, the United Nations has reiterated, is an integral part of Namibia, as emphasized in General Assembly resolution S-9/2. The Mission also directed attention to Assembly resolution 33/182 by which the Assembly requested the Security Council to consider as a matter of urgency further appropriate action under the Charter of the United Nations, including Chapter VII thereof, in order to secure South Africa's compliance with the relevant United Nations resolutions.

a/ For the report of the other mission to Asia (China, Pakistan, Turkey and Japan), see annex II above. Volume I of the present report contains a detailed summary of the Council's four missions to Asia and Europe (see part two, sect. II, paras. 104.161).

8. The Mission emphasized that the General Assembly, in resolution 33/182 A, had also decided to meet in resumed session to consider fully the question of Namibia and the implications of South Africa's continued defiance of the resolutions of the Assembly and the Security Council.

9. In its resolution 33/182 B, the Assembly had further decided that if the Security Council were unable to act effectively, the Assembly would consider the situation further and would take all necessary measures in conformity with the provisions of its relevant resolutions and the Charter for the purpose of dealing with the threat to international peace and security.

10. In its consultations with the Governments of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines, the Mission raised the following specific issues:

- (a) The urgency of implementing United Nations resolutions to enable Namibians to exercise their right to self-determination;
- (b) The need to examine ways and means of accelerating the process of liberation of the Territory;
- (c) The need to strengthen international support for the Namibian people under the leadership of SWAPO:
- (d) The need for scrupulous adherence to the spirit and letter of United Nations resolutions on Namibia;
- (e) The special and direct responsibility of the United Nations for Namibia;
- (f) The urgency of preventing any manoeuvres by South Africa to install a puppet régime in Namibia;
- (g) The territorial integrity of Namibia;
- (h) Action to be taken by the Security Council in the event of South Africa's failure to comply with United Nations resolutions;
- (i) The decision of the General Assembly to reconvene its thirty-third session to consider the question of Namibia and to take effective measures in conformity with the Charter and relevant United Nations resolutions to end South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia;
- (j) The proclamation of 1979 as the International Year of Solidarity with the People of Namibia (General Assembly resolution 33/182 C).

B. Composition of the mission

11. The Mission was composed of the following members:

Mr. Winston A. Tubman (Liberia), Chairman Mr. Chin Yung-tsien (China) Mr. Wisber Loeis (Indonesia) Mr. Petre Vlasceanu (Romania) Mr. Nchimunya J. Sikaulu (Zambia)

Ms. Maria D. Maldonado of the United Nations Secretariat accompanied the Mission as Principal Secretary.
12. The Mission held consultations with the Government of Thailand from 15 to 17 February 1979.

13. On 16 February, the Mission was received by Mr. Sunthorn Hongladarom, the Deputy Prime Minister of Thailand. The Mission also met with Mr. Arung Panupong, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Suphot Phiansuthon, Deputy Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs; M. L. Birabhongse Kasemsri, Director-General of the Department of International Organizations, and other senior officials.

14. During consultations held with the Mission, the Deputy Prime Minister reaffirmed his Government's support for the just struggle of the Namibian people for national liberation and for the Council and pledged Thailand's full co-operation in the implementation of United Nations resolutions on Namibia.

Consultations with government officials

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15. The representative of the Government of Thailand defined the position of the Government as one of full support for the United Nations and the Council. In that regard, he reaffirmed the support of his Government for United Nations resolutions, in particular, Security Council resolutions 431 (1978) of 27 July 1978 and 435 (1978).

16. His Government was heartened by the fact that negotiations in connexion with the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) appeared to be progressing. It was aware however of South Africa's continued attempts to delay and thwart such efforts and to undermine the Council. The Government of Thailand would observe maximum vigilance in that matter.

17. He affirmed the willingness of his Government to assist the United Nations in its efforts to secure self-determination and independence for Namibia. It would continue to apply all possible measures to keep up the pressure on South Africa. Thailand had imposed a trade embargo on South Africa in 1978, and, in compliance with United Nations resolutions, did not maintain any relations with South Africa.

18. His Government had imposed a trade embargo against South Africa because it believed that pressure should be brought to bear upon that country. He hoped that in order for such measures to be effective, all States, particularly the major Powers, would be willing to apply and scrupulously observe them.

19. The representative of the Government of Thailand also reaffirmed his country's support for the territorial integrity of Namibia, of which Walvis Bay was an integral part. In that regard, he stated that his Government fully endorsed Security Council resolution 432 (1978) of 27 July 1978. He emphasized his Government's strong opposition to South Africa's attempts to divide Namibia and declared that Thailand would continue to refuse to give recognition to South African bantustans as it had done in the case of the Transkei and Bophuthatswana.

20. On 17 February, following consultations, the Government of Thailand and the Mission issued a joint communiqué, the text of which appears in volume II of the present report (part four, sect. II, para. 53).

D. Visit to Malaysia

21. The Mission visited Malaysia from 17 to 21 February 1979.

22. The Mission was received by Mr. Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malaysia; Mr. Abdul Hamid Pawanchee, Acting Secretary-General; Mr. Ajit Singh, Under-Secretary; and other senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

23. During consultations held with the Mission, the Foreign Minister reiterated the full support of the Government of Malaysia for the position of the Council and assured the Mission of the unwavering commitment of the Malaysian Government to the cause of Mamibian independence.

Consultations with government officials

24. The representative of the Government of Malaysia reaffirmed his Government's full support for the liberation of Namibia and for the Council as the legal Administering Authority for the Territory until independence. In particular, he reiterated his Government's strong position in favour of the immediate implementation of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on Namibia. In that regard, he emphasized his Government's determination further to strengthen its support for the Namibian people under the leadership of SWAPO, their sole and authentic representative.

25. His Government was fully aware of the obstacles faced by the Namibian people in their struggle for freedom and independence. It was particularly concerned that South Africa would continue its attempts to impede the implementation of United Nations resolutions on Namibia and to install a puppet régime in the Territory. However, the Malaysian Government would exercise utmost vigilance to defeat South Africa's manoeuvres and would not recognize any puppet régime installed in Namibia by South Africa.

26. He reaffirmed his Government's support of the decision of the General Assembly to resume its thirty-third session to consider the question of Namibia and to take measures, in conformity with the Charter and the relevant United Nations resolutions, to end South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia. His Government would continue to co-operate in all efforts undertaken by the United Nations to bring about the realization by the people of Namibia of their right to self-determination and independence.

27. The representative of the Malaysian Government stated that his Government had welcomed the proclamation of 1979 as the International Year of Solidarity with the People of Mamibia (General Assembly resolution 33/182 C) and would actively join in its observation.

28. On 21 February, following consultations, the Government of Malaysia and the Council issued a joint communiqué, the text of which appears in volume II of the present report (part four, sect. II, para. 53).

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E. <u>Visit to Singapore</u>

29. The Mission visited Singapore from 21 to 24 February 1979.

30. The Mission was received by Mr. S. Rajaratnam, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Singapore; Mr. Rahim Ishak, the Senior Minister of State; and other senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

31. The Minister for Foreign Affairs reaffirmed his Government's unfailing support for the cause of Namibia, for the mandate of the Council and for United Nations resolutions on Namibia.

Consultations with government officials

32. The representative of the Government of Singapore reiterated his Government's firm stand in support of the purposes and principles of the Charter and of the mandate of the Council to bring about self-determination and independence for the people of Namibia under the leadership of SWAPO, their sole and authentic representative. To that end, the Government of Singapore would continue to support and participate in strong, concerted, sustained action by the international community to assist Namibians in their legitimate struggle for independence and to end the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa in accordance with United Nations resolutions.

33. The Government wished to reaffirm its position that the continued illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa and the imposition of its colonial and racist policies constituted a threat to international peace and security. His Government was corcerned that South Africa would persist in resorting to violence and to manoeuvres intended to divide the Namibian people and undermine their national liberation movement in order to impede the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions and to install a puppet régime in the Territory. His Government would remain vigilant and deny recognition to any such puppet régime.

34. In view of South Africa's refusal to comply with United Nations resolutions, the Singapore Government would support any measures taken by the United Nations to expedite the implementation of its resolutions on Namibia in conformity with the Charter, including measures dealt with in Chapter VII therein. The representative of the Government of Singapore also reaffirmed his Government's position that no compromise was possible in regard to the unity and territorial integrity of Namibia, of which Walvis Bay was an integral part.

35. On 24 February 1979, following consultations, the Government of Singapore and the Mission issued a joint communiqué, the text of which appears in volume II of the present report (part four, sect. II, para. 53).

F. Visit to Indonesia

36. The Mission visited Indonesia from 24 to 28 February 1979.

37. The Mission was received by Mr. Adam Malik, the Vice-President of Indonesia; Mr. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Suryono Darusman, Director-General for Political Affairs; and other senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Mission was also received by Mr. Mud'ar Amin, Vice-Chairman of Commission I (Political and Security Affairs) of the House of Representatives.

38. The Vice-President and the Minister for Foreign Affairs reaffirmed the readiness of the Government and people of Indonesia to assist in the liberation struggle of the Mamibian people. As a member of the Council, Indonesia would continue to play an active role in support of the independence of Mamibia and the discharge of the mandate of the Council.

Consultations with government officials

39. The representative of the Government of Indonesia stated that Indonesia was traditionally, constitutionally and politically committed to decolonization. Accordingly, he reiterated his Government's firm support of the struggle for the liberation of Namibia and emphasized its determination to continue to participate actively, as a responsible member of the Council and the international community, in efforts to accelerate the implementation of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on Namibia so that the Namibian people could freely exercise their inalienable right to self-determination and independence under the leadership of SWAPO, their sole and authentic representative.

40. In that connexion, his Government strongly recommended that the Council, as the legal Administering Authority for the Territory until independence, play a more substantial role during the transition to independence. In the view of his Government, the Council should be involved in every step of the decolonization process, particularly in the preparation and supervision of elections in Namibia.

41. His Government had followed with careful attention developments in connexion with United Nations efforts to implement its resolutions on Namibia. Nevertheless, it would continue to remain vigilant, concerned as it was with South Africa's manoeuvering and intransigence and its attempts to thwart such efforts.

42. South Africa had not only responded equivocally to United Nations efforts to bring about independence for Namibia but had also taken steps, in violation of United Nations resolutions, to install its own puppet régime through elections totally controlled and manipulated by the illegal South African administration. His Government would not accord recognition to any puppet Government or representative established by South Africa in Namibia.

43. It would support the application of enforcement measures against South Africa by the Security Council in the event of South Africa's failure to comply with United Nations resolutions, and it supported the decision of the General Assembly to resume its thirty-third session to consider the question of Namibia and to take effective measures in conformity with the Charter and relevant United Nations resolutions to end South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia.

44. The representative of the Indonesian Government welcomed the adoption of resolution 33/182 C, by which the General Assembly had proclaimed 1979 as the International Year of Solidarity with the People of Namibia, and reaffirmed his Government's intention actively to seek effective ways and means of broadening the support and solidarity of the international community for the Namibian people.

45. On 28 February, following consultations, the Government of Indonesia and the Mission issued a joint communiqué, the text of which appears in volume II of the present report (part four, sect. II, para. 53).

G. Visit to the Philippines

46. The Mission visited the Philippines from 1 to 4 March 1979.

47. The Mission was received by Mr. Ferdinand E. Marcos, the President and Prime Minister of the Philippines; Mr. Carlos P. Romulo, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Jose O. Ingles, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Leandro I. Verceles, Director-General for United Nations Affairs and International Conferences; and other senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

48. The President of the Philippines and the Minister for Foreign Affairs affirmed that the Philippines was committed to freedom and independence for all peoples and that it was willing and ready to assist the efforts of the United Nations to enable Namibians to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination, freedom and independence.

Consultations with government officials

49. The representative of the Government of the Philippines stated that his Government had been consistently in the vanguard of the struggle for decolonization and vigorously supported the cause of Namibian liberation. In that context, he reaffirmed his Government's continued support for the Council as the Territory's legal Administering Authority until independence and for the Namibian people, under the leadership of SWAPO, their sole and authentic representative. In the view of his Government, it was essential that the Council play a substantial role in any efforts by the United Nations to bring about a solution to the question of Namibia.

50. He emphasized his Government's strong position in favour of the speedy implementation of United Nations resolutions on Namibia, in particular, Security Council resolution 435 (1978). No delaying tactics should be allowed to impede the exercise by the Namibian people of their right to self-determination and independence in a united Namibia, including Walvis Bay.

51. South Africa's manoeuvres to install a puppet régime in Namibia and its efforts to divide the people would be defeated by the Namibian people themselves, united for freedom and supported by the vigilant and consolidated action of the international community. In view of South Africa's intransigence, his Government supported the application of effective measures against South Africa, in particular an oil embargo, and other sanctions envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter to obtain South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia. In that regard, his Government had endorsed the decision of the General Assembly to resume its thirty-third session to consider the question of Namibia and to take effective measures, in conformity with the Charter and relevant United Nations resolutions, to end South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia.

52. The representative of the Government of the Philippines welcomed the adoption by the General Assembly of its resolution 33/182 C, by which it proclaimed 1979 as the International Year of Solidarity with the People of Namibia, and expressed his Government's determination to contribute to the search for effective ways and means of intensifying international solidarity and support for the Namibian people.

53. On 3 March 1979, following consultations, the Government of the Philippines and the Mission issued a joint communiqué, the text of which appears in volume II of the present report (part four, sect. II, para. 53).

H. Observations and recommendations

54. The Mission considers that its consultations with the Governments of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines were timely and of the utmost importance to international mobilization against the continued illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa.

55. The fact that members of the Mission were afforded the opportunity to meet and hold discussions at the highest possible levels in those countries is indicative not only of the concern of their Governments for the continued illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa but also of their support for the United Nations, as well as their commitment to put an immediate end to the illegal occupation of Namibia, leading to the exercise by the people of Namibia of their inalienable right to self-determination and independence.

56. The Mission found the discussions both inspiring and useful and considers that the ideas, opinions and proposals expressed by the representatives of the Governments concerned will contribute significantly to the work of the Council.

57. The Mission notes that recent developments have more than vindicated the wisdom and timeliness of the Council's decision to undertake missions of consultation. The racist régime in South Africa, which is intent on creating a puppet régime in Namibia, continues to raise obstructions to the implementation of the proposals in the report of the Secretary-General and is creating obstacles to impede efforts intended to give effect to United Nations resolutions on Namibia, in particular Security Council resolution 435 (1978).

58. Of particular relevance is the call for constant vigilance, emphasized during consultations and in the joint communiqués issued by the Governments concerned and the Mission.

59. In the light of its extensive consultations with the Governments of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines, the Mission recommends to the Council the following:

(a) Based on the recommendations of Governments consulted, particularly Indonesia, the United Nations Council for Namibia, as the legal Administering Authority for Namibia until independence, should be involved in the transitional period leading to independence of Namibia.

(b) Bearing in mind the obstacles created by South Africa to impede the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions, consultations should be initiated immediately for the convening of a resumed session of the General Assembly on Namibia.

(c) In view of the persistent manoeuvres by South Africa to frustrate the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) and perpetuate its illegal occupation of the Territory, the United Nations Council for Namibia should initiate consultations with the Security Council regarding sanctions to be imposed on South Africa.

(d) The United Nations Council for Namibia should consider issuing in booklet form for widespread dissemination a publication containing the texts of its declarations and of joint communiqués with Governments dated from 1967.

I. Acknowledgements

60. The Mission wishes to express its gratitude to the Governments of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines for the hospitality extended to it and in particular for the opportunity to exchange views with the aforementioned Governments at the highest political level on the question of Namibia and including proposed action to accelerate the implementation of United Nations resolutions on Namibia.

61. The Mission wishes to acknowledge with appreciation the competent assistance received from the regional offices of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations information centres in the capitals visited.

62. The Mission also wishes to acknowledge with appreciation the competent and dedicated services of the staff of the Secretariat of the Council.

J. Date of adoption

63. The Mission adopted the report on 21 March 1979.

ANNEX IV*

Report of the Mission of consultation to Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria and Fortugal, <u>3 to 18 May 1979</u>

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* Previousl issued under the symbol A/AC.131/L.110.

A. Introduction

1. By approving the report of the Council in its resolution 33/182 C, the General Assembly also approved the programme of work outlined therein, by which the Council proposed to send two missions of consultation to Europe. <u>a</u>/

2. The Mission to Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria and Portugal was composed of the following members:

Mr. Ferdinand Léopold Oyono (United Republic of Cameroon), Chairman

Mr. Mostafa F. Mohammed (Bangladesh)

Mr. Louis Fobe (Belgium)

Mr. Dimiter Kostov (Bulgaria)

Mr. B. Adekunle Adeyemi (Nigeria)

Mr. John Shafashike Kahana (SWAPO)

Mr. Francesc Vendrell (Principal Secretary) and Ms. Gloria Shepherd (Secretary) of the United Nations Secretariat accompanied the Mission.

3. The objectives of the Mission were: (a) to review the situation in Namibia with the Governments of the countries visited in the light of the latest developments relating to the implementation of United Nations resolutions on Namibia; and (b) to examine ways and means of intensifying the joint action of the Council and of the five above-mentioned Governments during the forthcoming resumed thirty-third session of the General Assembly with a view to speeding up the process towards the self-determination and independence of the people of Namibia.

B. Position outlined by the Mission

4. In its discussions with the Governments of Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria and Portugal, the Mission stressed the special and direct responsibility of the United Nations for Namibia and the rcle of the Council as the legal Administering Authority established by the General Assembly to administer the Territory until independence. The Mission also emphasized the role of SWAPO in the struggle for the liberation of Namibia and its recognition by the United Nations as the sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia.

5. The Mission emphasized the need to preserve the territorial integrity of Namibia in the fact of South Africa's attempts to detach Walvis Bay from the rest

For the report of the second mission to Europe (Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Bulgaria) see annex V below. Volume I of the present report contains a detailed summary of the Council's four missions to Asia and Europe (see part two, sect. II, paras. 104-161).

of the Territory and recalled several United Nations resolutions to that effect, especially Security Council resolution 432 (1978).

The Mission outlined the current political situation in Namibia and United 6. Nations efforts to lay the groundwork for the implementation of Security Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978). The Mission in particular referred to the persistent manoeuvres by the South African Government to impede the implementation of the United Nations plan for a peaceful settlement of the Namibian question, notwithstanding that country's outward acceptance of the Western proposal. In that context, the Mission, after recalling the history of South Africa's prevarications since the founding of the United Nations, drew attention to the series of unilateral actions undertaken by South Africa in violation of the plan as exemplified by the appointment of an Administrator-General for the Territory, the unilateral registration of voters in Namibia, the holding of elections for a so-called Constituent Assembly, b/ the decision by South Africa to transform that body into a National Assembly with legislative powers and the move towards the establishment of an interim Government through the allocation of responsibilities of an executive nature to members of that Assembly.

7. The Mission further drew attention to the strengthening of South Africa's military presence in the Territory, its increasingly brutal repression of the Namibian people as exemplified by the arrest of an unprecedented number of leading members of SWAPO, c/ the extension of the security zone to the major population centres in Namibia, thus in effect placing most of the Territory under martial law, and the use by South Africa of the international territory of Namibia to launch attacks against neighbouring countries.

8. The Mission also stressed that the objections raised by South Africa d/ to the Secretary-General's report on the implementation of the plan e/ ran counter to the stated interpretation of its Western authors. f_i As such, South Africa's virtual rejection of Security Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978) constituted a challenge not only to the world organization but also to the authors of the plan.

9. The Mission referred to the scepticism with which many States Members of the United Nations, in the United Nations Council for Namibia and in the African Group in particular, had at first greeted the Western initiative on Namibia and the

b/ The use without quotation marks of official South African terminology does not in any way imply recognition by the United Nations of the <u>status quo</u>.

c/ Between 6 and 9 May 1979, the number of officially known arrests totalled 70.

d/ See Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-third Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1978, documents S/12836, S/12853 and S/12868; and ibid., Supplement for October, November and December 1978, documents S/12900 and S/12983.

e/ Tbid., Supplement for July, August and September 1978, documents S/12827 and S/12869; and ibid., Supplement for October, November and December 1978, documents S/12903 and S/12938.

f/ Ibid., Supplement for April, May and June 1978, document S/12636.

concessions that the African countries and SWAPO had eventually agreed to make once they had been persuaded of the sincerity of that initiative. In that connexion, it was pointed out that the plan adopted by the Security Council allowed for a continued South African role in Namibia during the interim period, despite the illegality of South Africa's presence in the Territory, and that SWAPO had indicated its willingness to participate in elections on an equal footing with other political groups despite its recognition as the sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia.

10. The Mission emphasized two factors encouraging South Africa to pursue its own internal solution in Namibia: the recent illegally held elections in Southern Rhodesia in April 1979 and the sympathetic response they had met in certain Western countries, and the possibility that the United Kingdom and the United States might unilaterally decide to lift sanctions against Southern In that context, the proposal made in April 1979 by Mr. P. W. Botha, Rhodesia. the South African Prime Minister, to establish a so-called southern African community under the aegis of South Africa was significant in that it suggested that the South African Government was aiming at the establishment of a cordon sanitaire to the north of its borders by setting up puppet régimes in Zimbabwe and Namibia. The Mission called on the Governments of the five countries visited not to recognize any régime that might be set up in Namibia by South Africa which was not the result of free and democratic elections held under United Nations supervision and control.

11. The Mission expressed the view that it would be foolhardy to expect South Africa to reject outright the plan elaborated by the five Western Powers. By its actions, South Africa had clearly shown its refusal to implement the plan and its repeated assertions of its willingness to continue the dialogue were only for cosmetic effect and served to provide an excuse for those countries which were unwilling to support action in the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

In view of the above considerations, the Mission stressed that only the 12. imposition of sanctions by the Security Council could force South Africa to comply with the wishes of the international community. In that connexion, the Mission discussed with the Governments of the countries visited the various range of sanctions which might be adopted, the chances of their being effectively implemented by all Member States and their probable impact on South Africa. In particular, the Mission referred to the use of economic sanctions against South Africa, including a freeze and/or withdrawal of foreign investments, the possibility of an oil embargo or an air traffic boycott and the cessation of any form of nuclear collaboration. The Mission called on the five Governments to support any resolution on sanctions which might be introduced in the Security Council and to use their influence with other Western Governments to do likewise and, in particular, to prevent the use of the veto in the Security Council. The Mission emphasized that failure to impose sanctions against South Africa as a result of the use of the veto would leave as the only alternative the intensification of the armed struggle and the internationalization of the conflict with all its attendant consequences for international peace and security.

13. In its exchanges with the five Governments, the Mission inquired about any consular or economic relations which those Governments might maintain with South Africa in regard to Namibia in the light of the international status of

that Territory and the need to protect its natural resources in conformity with the Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971 of the International Court of Justice; g/Security Council resolutions 276 (1970) of 30 January 1970, 283 (1970) of 29 July 1970 and 301 (1971) of 20 October 1971; and Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia. h/ In particular, the Mission requested the five Governments to endeavour to prevent the importation into their countries of uranium and uranium products originating in Namibia.

14. The Mission conveyed the Council's appreciation to those Governments which were providing humanitarian assistance to SWAPO and to Namibian refugees and expressed thanks for their contributions to the Institute for Namibia, the United Nations Fund for Namibia and the Nationhood Programme for Namibia.

C. Acknowledgements

15. The Mission thanked the Governments of Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria and Portugal for their warm welcome and hospitality as well as for their support of the efforts of the Council to achieve early self-determination and genuine independence for the people of Namibia.

D. Adoption of the report

16. The present report was adopted by the Mission on 26 June 1979.

E. Visit to Norway

17. The Mission held consultations with government officials and other authorities in Norway on 3 and 4 May 1979.

18. The Mission was received by Prime Minister Odvar Nordli, and by Mr. Knut Frydenlund, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and held a working session with a delegation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs headed by Mr. Torbjorn Christiansen, Director-General of the Political Division in the Ministry. The Mission also met with members of the Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Committee of the <u>Storting</u> and was guest at a dinner offered by Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, which was attended by Mr. Tvygve Brattelie, leader of the governing Labour Party in Parliament and a former Prime Minister, as well as by other leaders of Norwegian political parties, and by representatives of non-governmental organizations active in the anti-apartheid movement.

19. Before leaving Oslo, the Mission held a press conference and issued a press release, the text of which appears in volume II of the present report (part four, sect. II, para. 53).

g/ Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.

h/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 24A (A/9624/Add.1), para. 84. The Decree has been issued in final form in <u>Namibia Gazette No. 10</u>.

1. Meeting with the Prime Minister

20. The Mission was received by Prime Minister Nordli. In his remarks, the Prime Minister referred to Norway's support for the various United Nations resolutions on South Africa and Namibia adopted by the General Assembly and by the Security Council. He reiterated his country's strong support for the territorial integrity of Namibia and for the efforts to implement the United Nations plan to hold free and democratic elections in Namibia under United Nations supervision and control. The Norwegian Government realized that special responsibility for the present impasse lay with South Africa. Norway believed that for any elections in Namibia to be free, all parties including SWAPO should have the right to participate. Without free elections, there was no hope for a just solution.

21. The Prime Minister stated that Norway was willing to consider any realistic way to seek a peaceful solution to the question of Namibia and to avoid the development of a more brutal situation. The Norwegian delegation to the United Nations would therefore make every effort in the Security Council to ensure the implementation of the United Nations plan. Norway would also support any realistic steps towards the adoption of sanctions and would co-operate in the application of effective political and economic pressure on South Africa regarding Namibia. Norway had discussed those issues at meetings of the Nordic Council, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and in other international forums and would continue to do so in the future. The Prime Minister added that his country was prepared to give economic aid to the Government of an independent Namibia.

2. Meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs

22. The Mission was received by Mr. Knut Frydenlund, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Foreign Minister stated that Norway favoured a peaceful solution to the Namibian problem and thus strongly supported the United Nations plan and hoped that negotiations might still be possible to bring about its implementation. In his view, the attitude of South Africa had moved from a position of apparent willingness to co-operate in carrying out the United Nations plan to one favouring an internal solution. Since the five Western sponsors of the proposal still hoped for a last-minute break-through, Norway was prepared to wait until the chances of a positive outcome had been exhausted.

23. Concerning sanctions, Norway had always declared its readiness to increase pressure on South Africa and his Government had the political will to implement any sanctions adopted by the Security Council. It was in favour of the establishment of a committee of experts to examine the whole range of sanctions against South Africa. If sanctions were to be effective, it was important to have a clear idea of the various options available and of the political possibilities of their being effectively carried out. Norway had advocated an oil embargo and would support a proposal to that effect in the Security Council. Sanctions in the field of air transport were a limited measure but had the advantage of causing an immediate effect.

24. The Foreign Minister agreed that while South Africa was not likely to reject the United Nations plan explicitly, it was in the meantime pursuing a policy of faits accomplis which might well lead to an internal settlement in Namibia. It would thus be useful to stipulate a time-limit beyond which South Africa would be deemed to have rejected the United Nations plan. The resumed session of the General Assembly might include such a suggestion among its recommendations.

25. The Foreign Minister referred to the history of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and expressed the view that sanctions, to be effective, had to be seriously carried out by the international community. Although both Norway and the Nordic countries favoured a policy of sanctions against South Africa, he warned that such an attitude was not shared by other Western countries, particularly those which had major economic interests in southern Africa. The Mission therefore should have no illusions about Norway's capacity to influence other Western countries to support sanctions in the Security Council.

26. The Foreign Minister concluded by reiterating that his Government would not recognize any régime in Namibia which was the result of internal elections carried out by South Africa without United Nations supervision and control.

3. Consultations with the delegation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

27. The Mission held a working session with a delegation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs headed by Mr. Torbjorn Christiansen, Director-General of the Political Division of the Ministry. In the course of the discussions, the head of the Norwegian delegation referred to the objections being raised by South Africa to the deployment of UNTAG, but added that the five Western authors of the proposal had apparently not yet entirely given up hope of persuading South Africa to implement the plan. Although the international community could not be expected to wait indefinitely, he believed that a little more patience was required as long as there was no final reply from South Africa. If and when it became obvious that South Africa was not going to implement the United Nations plan, it would be necessary to consider the question of sanctions. In that connexion, Norway would support all attempts in the United Nations to apply pressure on South Africa, and that position was shared by all other Nordic countries, as shown by the communique published at the conclusion of the Nordic Foreign Ministers Meeting, held at Copenhagen from 29 to 30 March 1979.

28. The Director-General emphasized that sanctions should be effective and expressed interest in the idea of a committee of experts to study the whole range of sanctions against South Africa. It was important to select measures that would have an impact on South Africa and a careful study would be useful as to how and when to proceed with their application. The resumed session of the General Assembly on Namibia might adopt a programme of sanctions with a specific timelimit. Norway for its part was ready to adopt any sanctions agreed to by the Security Council and would support sanctions which were likely to be effective. He reiterated that Norway was in favour of an oil embargo. Norway would do its best to influence its Western partners but it had to be realized that Norway was a small country and that some Western Powers had major economic interests at stake in South Africa, while others believed in keeping the dialogue open with South Africa.

29. Referring to the negotiations held during the past two years by the five Western Powers with South Africa and SWAPO, the Director-General praised the co-operation and flexibility shown by SWAPO and agreed that there was a point beyond which SWAPO could not be expected to make further concessions. South Africa, for its part, had also shown a greater willingness to talk than had been the case in the past. 30. Concerning the possibility of an internal settlement in Namibia, the head of the Norwegian delegation categorically stated that Norway would not recognize any Government in Namibia which was the result of internal elections just as it would not recognize the régime resulting from the internal elections in Southern Rhodesia.

4. <u>Meeting with members of the Foreign Affairs and</u> <u>Constitutional Committee of the Storting i/</u>

31. The Mission held discussions with members of the Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Committee of the <u>Storting</u>. Mr. Lars Korvald, Chairman of the Committee, presided at the meeting. In the course of the discussion, a member of the Conservative Party who was also Chairman of the North Atlantic Council remarked that international sanctions had been tried in the past without much success both by the League of Nations and the United Nations. In the case of Southern Rhodesia, they had not played a decisive role. In his view, it would be easy for Norway to participate in international sanctions against South Africa since Norway had few investments in that country and if the Security Council decided to impose sanctions, Norway would loyally co-operate in their application. He did not believe in their usefulness, however, except in the case of the existing arms embargo against South Africa which was relatively easy to enforce. On the other hand, the threat of sanctions, as opposed to their actual application, could have the effect of persuading South Africa to be more co-operative.

32. The same member of the Committee and another member belonging to the Christian People's Party wondered about the declaration by the United Nations that SWAPO was "the sole and legitimate representative of the people of Namibia". In their view, that position was not helpful in the search for a peaceful solution of the problem. Norway, they added, believed that all sections of the Namibian people should have an equal right to participate in elections and in building up an independent Namibia.

33. In reply, the representative of SWAPO stated that his movement regarded itself as the sole and legitimate representative of the people of Namibia since it was the only one carrying out the struggle for the liberation of the Territory. Nevertheless, in order to satisfy those countries which did not accept that view, SWAPO had agreed to participate in internationally supervised elections and would abide by the free verdict of the Namibian people.

34. The Chairman of the Mission said that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had adopted that position concerning SWAPO in order to avoid the establishment of political parties supported by South Africa which might in turn establish a neo-colonial régime in Namibia. SWAPO clearly enjoyed majority support in the Territory; otherwise South Africa would not be so obviously afraid of holding free elections under United Nations supervision and control.

i/ The following members of the Committee were present: Mr. Lars Korvald, Chairman, a former Prime Minister, and Mr. Jacob Aano, members of the Christian People's Party; Mr. Per Karstensen, Mr. Odd Lien and Ms. Margil Tøsdal, members of the Labour Party; and Mr. Paul Thynness, a member of the Conservative Party.

35. A member of the Labour Party asked how Norwey and the Nordic countries could help to ensure the transition to majority rule in southern Africa. She also wished to know the view of the Council on the dangers of increased East-West confrontation in Africa.

36. In reply, the Chairman of the Mission stated that the question was a matter of decolonization and that therefore the Council expected all countries to put aside their narrow national interests and co-operate in the establishment of true majority rule in southern Africa. He hoped that Norway would support initiatives which might be undertaken with that objective both in the Security Council and in the General Assembly.

F. Visit to Sweden

37. The Mission held consultations with government officials and other authorities in Sweden on 8 and 9 May 1979.

38. The Mission was received by Mr. Ola Ullsten, the Prime Minister, and by Mr. Hans Blix, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and held talks with a delegation of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs headed by Mr. Leif Leifland, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State. The Mission also held discussions with members of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of the <u>Riksdag</u>. Before leaving Stockholm, the Mission gave a press conference and issued a communiqué, the text of which appears in volume II of the present report (part four, sect. II, para. 53).

1. Meeting with the Prime Minister

39. The Mission was received by Prime Minister Ullsten who expressed his Government's support for the work of the Council and for the aspirations of the Namibian people to self-determination and independence. He emphasized his country's strong support for the United Nations plan for Namibia but entertained serious doubts about South Africa's willingness to implement it. He feared that the recent elections in Southern Rhodesia, which his Government did not recognize as valid, and the possibility that the United Kingdom and the United States might lift sanctions against Southern Rhodesia were encouraging South Africa to pursue its own internal solution for Namibia.

40. Sweden supported the adoption of sanctions by the Security Council against South Africa and would use its influence with other Western countries, particularly those holding veto power in the Security Council, to persuade them not to oppose a call for sanctions. However, he was not hopeful that a veto could be avoided in the Security Council at the present time. The Prime Minister also referred to proposed legislation pending before the Swedish Parliament imposing a freeze on Swedish investments in South Africa and his Government's decision to increase its humanitarian assistance to Namibian refugees and to SWAPO.

2. Meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs

41. The Mission met with Mr. Hans Blix, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Foreign Minister, after briefly mentioning his recent visit to Angola and his Government's decision to increase Sweden's humanitarian aid to SWAPO, reaffirmed his country's strong support for the United Nations plan for a peaceful settlement of the Namibian question and its readiness to participate with a mil contingent in UNTAG. He expressed disappointment at South Africa's temporizing and delaying tactics and praised the African States and SWAPO for their positive attitude. The Swedish Government was somewhat pessimistic about the turn of events in Namibia and feared that South Africa might be encouraged to seek its own internal solution for Namibia as a result of the internal elections in Southern Rhodesia and the rather positive reaction to those elections in some Western circles. Sweden, he stated, would not recognize an internal solution in either Zimbabwe or Namibia. The Swedish Government believed that stronger pressure should be applied against South Africa because of its negative attitude on Namibia, its encouragement of the internal settlement in Southern Rhodesia and its own <u>apartheid</u> policies.

42. Turning to the issue of sanctions, the Foreign Minister expressed support for a United Nations trade embargo against South Africa and mentioned that legislation would soon be passed in Sweden, effective 1 July 1979, barring further Swedish investments in South Africa. Sweden had no illusions about the impact that such a symbolic measure would have on South Africa but hoped to set an example that might be followed by other States. The Foreign Minister also expressed interest in the possibility of an oil embargo and an air boycott of South Africa. A total air boycott would be a quick and spectacular measure which might have a real psychological impact on South Africa. Another area for United Nations action was in the nuclear field. The Security Council might call for a cessation of all forms of nuclear co-operation with South Africa. The Security Council was unlikely to vote for a general trade ban against South Africa; a freeze on foreign investments in South Africa might have a better chance of being adopted.

43. He supported the idea of a committee of experts which could be set up either by the General Assembly or by the Security Council or by both. Sweden would be glad to play a role in such a body which should have as its principal task the study of the various types of enforcement measures available against South Africa. Although the constitution and composition of such a group would have to be very carefully negotiated, it was his view that the establishment of such a body would in itself be a means of pressure on South Africa.

44. In summation, the Foreign Minister reiterated Sweden's commitment not to recognize a government in Namibia which was not the result of free and democratic elections under United Nations supervision and control, and reaffirmed his country's willingness to co-operate in the military composition of UNTAG and his Government's support for increased pressure on South Africa, both in the forthcoming resumed session of the General Assembly and in the Security Council.

3. <u>Consultations with the delegation of the</u> Ministry of Foreign Affairs

45. The Mission held a working session with a delegation of the Foreign Ministry headed by Mr. Leif Leifland, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State. In the course of those conversations, the Swedish delegation analysed the situation in Namibia in the light of the recent developments in the Territory which suggested South Africa's intention not to implement the United Nations plan. The Swedish delegation mentioned that Sweden was providing \$US 6 million in direct aid to SWAPO while an additional \$US 3 million was being given through different channels. Sweden was contributing substantially to educational assistance for Namibians through the International University Exchange Fund (IUEF) and the Institute for Namibia. The Foreign Minister had also discussed with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) the possibility of increasing aid to Namibian refugees. 46. In reply to a question by a member of the Mission, the Permanent Under-Secretary stated that so far only humanitarian aid to SWAPO had been considered. If SWAPO became the Government of Namibia, Sweden would consider giving it substantial aid for development.

47. The Swedish delegation outlined the bill to freeze Swedish investments in South Africa which would become law on 1 July 1979. Previous Swedish Governments had tried unsuccessfully to persuade Swedish private industry to stop investing in South Africa by showing that it was in their long-term interest to do so. A government commission had in fact been appointed for that particular task. The Swedish trade unions had also been active in opposing investments in South Africa, and the Scandinavian trade unions had decided on a joint course of action to put pressure on their Governments to adopt sanctions against South Africa. The Swedish Government had decided to undertake legislative action only when it became apparent that voluntary persuasion would not work.

48. There were no Swedish investments in Namibia. The total value of Swedish investments in South Africa had been estimated in 1976 at \$US 45 million. Although some 20 Swedish companies were active in South Africa, most of the investments came from 7 major companies. Approximately 4,000 persons worked in Swedish-owned companies in South Africa. Swedish companies were generally acknowledged to follow the most enlightened labour policies in South Africa and had introduced measures to abolish racial discrimination in employment and wages. The reaction of Swedish companies to the legislation referred to earlier had been generally negative. They argued that national legislation should only be introduced after the Security Council had adopted binding sanctions against South Africa and that to freeze Swedish investments would only leave the field free for other companies with less liberal employment policies.

49. In answer to a question by the representative of SWAPO, the Permanent Under-Secretary stated that Sweden regarded SWAPO as the authentic but not the sole representative of the people of Namibia. To do so would be to prejudice the outcome of internationally held elections. Nevertheless, the fact that SWAPO was the only political group in Namibia to which Sweden gave assistance was proof that his Government had a special regard for that organization as the authentic representative of the Namibian people. The head of the Swedish delegation concluded by declaring that Sweden would use its influence to try to persuade other countries, both bilaterally and in multinational forums such as the United Nations, to join in the adoption of enforcement measures against South Africa.

4. Discussion with members of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Riksdag j/

50. The Mission also met with members of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of the <u>Riksdag</u>. The discussions centred around the latest developments

j/ The following members of the Standing Committee were present: Mr. Allan Hernelius, Chairman of the Committee, and Ms. Ingrid Sundberg, members of the Conservative Party; Ms. Anna-Lisa Lewén-Eliasson, Vice-Chairman, Mr. Axel Andersson and Mr. Mats Hellstrom, members of the Social Democratic Party; Mr. Georg Aberg, Mr. Ylwa Annerstedt and Mr. David Wirmark, members of the Liberal Party; and Mr. Sture Korpus, a member of the Centre Party.

in southern Africa with particular attention to Namibia, in the light of the resumed session of the General Assembly, and possible courses of action if South Africa rejected the United Nations plan to pursue an internal settlement in the Territory. Members of the Committee referred to the possibility of further efforts by the five Western Powers to achieve a negotiated settlement of the question and to the probable attitude of the permanent Western members of the Security Council in the event of the introduction of a resolution on sanctions. Members were unanimous in their support for a peaceful settlement of the Namibian issue on the basis of free and democratic elections held under United Nations supervision and control, and for the actions of the Council in assisting the people of Namibia to achieve their right to self-determination and independence. They were uniformly regretful of the continued illegal presence of South Africa in the Territory.

G. Visit to the Netherlands

51. The Mission held consultations with government officials and other authorities in the Netherlands on 10 and 11 May 1979.

52. The Mission was received by Mr. C. A. van der Klaauw, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and held talks with a delegation of the Foreign Ministry headed by Mr. L. H. J. B. van Gorkom, Director-General for International Co-operation. The Mission also met with the President of the Second Chamber of the Netherlands Parliament as well as with members of the Standing Committee for External Affairs of the Second Chamber. The Mission held informal consultations with the Netherlands Committee against Apartheid and gave a press conference.

53. Before leaving The Hague, the Mission issued a communiqué, the text of which appears in volume II of the present report (part four, sect. II, para. 53).

1. Meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs

54. The Mission was received by Mr. C. A. van der Klaauw, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who referred to his country's support for the efforts undertaken by the five Western Powers to seek a peaceful solution to the Namibian question. The Netherlands regarded a solution in Namibia on the basis of the Western plan of capital importance and as an example which could be followed in solving the Southern Rhodesian issue as well. Failure to find an internationally acceptable settlement in either of those Territories would have a major impact on the other.

55. Although, in the view of the Foreign Minister, the latest developments in Namibia were not very hopeful, the Netherlands was willing to give the negotiations a last chance if the five Western Powers believed that further efforts might prove fruitful. The Netherlands had already stated its readiness to send a contingent of Dutch policemen to participate in UNTAG and the Minister reiterated his country's willingness to give economic assistance to the Government of an independent Namibia.

56. On the question of Walvis Bay, the Foreign Minister stated that the Netherlands Government believed the enclave should form part of an independent Namibia since its separate status was only the result of an historical accident.

2. <u>Consultations with the delegation of the Ministry of Foreign</u> Affairs

57. The Mission held a working session with a delegation of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs headed by Mr. van Gorkom. In his remarks, the head of the Netherlands delegation stated that the Mission was visiting Western Europe at a crucial time for southern Africa. His Government would continue to support all efforts for a speedy and peaceful transition to independence in Namibia. In that context, it had supported and would continue to support the efforts undertaken by the five Western Powers and by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to put the United Nations plan into operation.

58. The Director-General praised SWAPO for its flexibility in co-operating with the five Western Powers and in accepting the United Nations plan. The internal elections held in Namibia in December 1978 had been a setback; those elections had never been accepted by the nine members of the European Community nor by the Netherlands Government. Nevertheless, the Netherlands remained hopeful and had welcomed the proposals of the Secretary-General to implement the plan and his subsequent explanatory statement, as well as the two missions by his Special Representative to Namibia. Recent events in the Territory had cast a shadow over South Africa's intentions, however. His Government was concerned at the recent announcement that the so-called Constituent Assembly, elected in December 1978, was now to become a National Assembly with legislative powers. He noted, though, that South Africa had not closed the door to further negotiations and that it still appeared to be interested in the Western plan.

The Director-General expressed concern that developments in Southern 59. Rhodesia, including the April 1979 elections, might have a negative effect on the situation in Namibia. The Netherlands Government did not recognize the validity of those elections and continued to believe that the Anglo-American proposal constituted the best chance for a settlement in that Territory. He recalled that the last of the six principles enunciated by Sir Harold Wilson when he was Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and accepted by successive British Governments, had not yet been met despite the holding of the April elections, since it remained to be proven that the new constitution in Southern Rhodesia was acceptable to the population as a whole. The Netherlands Government had not yet given up hope that in the coming months it would be possible to arrive at an internationally recognized peaceful settlement in Namibia. Should that fail to happen, and should there be a unilateral declaration of independence in Namibia, the Netherlands would reject such a move as it had done in the case of Southern Rhodesia.

60. The Director-General assured the Mission of his Government's continued support for the work of the Council and for the self-determination and independence of the people of Namibia. He recalled his Government's support for the African liberation movements recognized by OAU, including SWAPO. There was a very keen widespread interest in the Netherlands for the cause of liberation in southern Africa, whether in academic or church circles, in the trade unions or in women's movements, and the Government had taken advantage of some of those private organizations to channel assistance to the liberation movements. The Netherlands was giving assistance to SWAPO and had also granted requests for support from other groups in Namibia, namely the Namibia National Front (NNF) and SWAPO-D (Democratic). During 1979, the Netherlands would continue its assistance to SWAFO, to the Nationhood Programme for Namibia and to other relevant international programmes. 61. Turning to the question of sanctions, the Director-General stated that the Netherlands Government did not believe that the time had come to call for sanctions in the Security Council since South Africa had not yet closed the door to further negotiations on Namibia. There were also certain signs of change in South Africa's internal policies exemplified by legislation soon to be introduced in the South African Parliament to alter certain aspects of the <u>apartheid</u> system, particularly in the field of labour relations. He was also encouraged by the invitation to participate in a dialogue issued by the South African Minister for Plural Affairs to African leaders, including some who had been previously arrested or otherwise harrassed. Nevertheless, the Netherlands would support an oil embargo if such a measure were adopted by the Security Council. He stressed that, to be effective, sanctions should be decreed by the Security Council and supported by all Member States, especially those with the power to enforce them. It would be advisable to avoid a repetition of the Southern Rhodesian experience, where sanctions had been so widely evaded.

In reply to a question by the Chairman of the Mission, the Netherlands 62. delegation stated that no uranium had been imported into the Netherlands from Namibia nor would it be allowed in the future. Concerning the enrichment of processed uranium at Almelo, Netherlands, by the Uranium Enrichment Company (URENCO), the enrichment plant owned jointly by the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, the Netherlands delegation pointed out that it was virtually impossible to determine the country of origin of uranium already processed. As a result of questions raised in Parliament, the Government had been studying the matter carefully for the past few months to determine whether any further action could be undertaken in the Netherlands or within the context of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). Under the EURATOM Treaty, the Netherlands lacked the legal power to prevent the entry into the Netherlands of uranium already imported by another member of EURATOM since the treaty establishing EURATOM provided for the free circulation of uranium among, inter alia, the States parties to the Treaty. Nevertheless, the Netherlands would seek to persuade its other partners in EURATOM to adopt adequate measures to bar the importation by EURATOM of Namibian uranium. The Netherlands Government believed that Security Council resolution 283 (1970) provided an adequate legal basis for such action.

3. Meeting with the President of the Second Chamber of the Netherlands Parliament and with members of the Standing Committee for External Affairs of the Second Chamber k/

63. The Mission held an exchange of views with Mr. A. Vondeling, President of the Second Chamber of Parliament, and with members of the Standing Committee for External Affairs of the Second Chamber. In the course of the discussions, the Mission was told that all political parties in the Netherlands had agreed that

<u>k/</u> The following members of the Standing Committee were present: Mr. A. Vondeling, Chairman, Second Chamber, and Mr. van der Stoel, a former Foreign Minister, members of the Labour Party; Mr. Bolkestein and Mrs. Vrijlandt members of the Liberal Party; Mr. van der Spek, a member of the Pacifist Socialist Party; and Mr. G. van Weezel, a member of the Christian Democrat Party.

the presence of South Africa in Namibia was illegal and that South Africa should withdraw from Namibia, including Walvis Bay. Members expressed the hope that the United Nations plan for Namibia could still be put into effect. On the question of sanctions, it was pointed out by a former Minister for Foreign Affairs that a large majority in the Dutch Parliament would support the application of sanctions against South Africa if South Africa refused to comply with the United Nations plan.

64. Concerning the importation of uranium into the Netherlands, the view was expressed that it was difficult, if not impossible, to discover the origin of uranium entering the Netherlands from another country member of EURATOM. A Liberal member of Parliament suggested that if proof of origin became available the Council might consider bringing an action in a Netherlands court to have the uranium confiscated within the context of Security Council resolution 283 (1970) and Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia.

H. Visit to Austria

65. The Mission held consultations with representatives of the Government of Austria on 14 and 15 May 1979.

66. The Mission was received by Mr. Bruno Kreisky, the Federal Chancellor, and by Mr. Willibald Pahr, the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Mission held consultations with a delegation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs headed by Mr. Hans Georg Rudofsky, Director of the United Nations Section. During its stay in Vienna, the Mission also held discussions with senior officials of the United Nations International Development Organization (UNIDO) regarding its assistance programme for Namibia. The Mission met with representatives of Austrian non-governmental organizations concerned with the situation in southern Africa and also gave a press conference.

67. Before leaving Vienna, the Mission issued a communiqué, the text of which appears in volume II of the present report (part four, sect. II, para. 53).

1. Meeting with the Federal Chancellor

68. The Mission was received by Chancellor Kreisky, who expressed concern at the situation in southern Africa and voiced the hope that a peaceful settlement in Namibia could still be found. Austria was committed to the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, and it was in that context that Austria strongly supported the United Nations plan for Namibia and was willing to participate in UNTAG, as it had done in other United Nations peace-keeping operations. He assured the Mission that Austria would use its influence with its friends to continue the search for a settlement in Namibia acceptable to all parties. His Government appreciated the work of the Council and would continue to support the aspirations of the Namibian people for self-determination and independence.

2. Meeting with the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs

69. The Mission met with Mr. Willibald Pahr, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who expressed his preoccupation with the serious turn of events in southern Africa and in Namibia in particular. Austria was committed to the search for a peaceful solution in Namibia and would use its influence to persuade South Africa to collaborate in the implementation of the United Nations plan which, in his Government's view, remained the best hope for a peaceful settlement of the question. He thought that sanctions often proved to be counter-productive. They might further isolate South Africa by encouraging the development of what he termed a "bunker" mentality which would make the South African Government less amenable to negotiations. He wondered whether other means might not be available to encourage South Africa to co-operate with the international community, although he agreed that sanctions remained a possibility to be seriously considered as a last remedy in order to avoid a dangerous escalation in the present conflict. The Foreign Minister feared that the recent internal elections in Southern Rhodesia and the sympathetic reaction which those elections had received in some Western capitals might encourage South Africa to seek its own internal solution in Namibia. Austria did not consider the internal elections in Southern Rhodesia as valid and would hold the same view of a similar situation in Namibia. In neither case would Austria recognize a Government that was not the result of genuinely free elections and in which all parties had had an equal right to participate.

3. Consultations with the delegation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

70. The Mission held a working session with a delegation of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs headed by Mr. Rudofsky, who underlined his country's interest in the question of Namibia. Austria fully supported the United Nations plan for a peaceful settlement in Namibia and had been disheartened by the latest developments in that Territory which were delaying the execution of the plan, if they had not compromised it entirely.

71. Austria firmly supported a peaceful transition to independence. Its support for the United Nations plan should be seen in the context of Austria's commitment to the democratic principles embodied in the plan and to the principle of the peaceful settlement of international disputes, hence Austria's readiness to participate in UNTAG and in other United Nations peace-keeping operations. His Government appreciated the flexible stand taken by SWAPO during the negotiations undertaken by the five Western Powers. On the other hand, it had been deeply worried by South Africa's decision to conduct internal elections in Namibia in December 1978 as well as by the more recent South African actions. The Austrian Government, which maintained relations with South Africa in order to keep the dialogue open with that country, would try to persuade the South African Government to agree to the implementation of the United Nations plan.

72. Austria had loyally applied sanctions imposed by the Security Council against Southern Rhodesia as well as the arms embargo against South Africa. It had also supported in the United Nations the proposal for a freeze in foreign investments in South Africa and would support any meaningful measure adopted in the United Nations to bring about a change in South Africa's attitude. Although his Government did not believe in sanctions unless they were loyally and effectively applied, it would be prepared to fulfil any obligations resulting from decisions of the Security Council.

73. The Director stressed that Austria would view with great concern any violent developments in Namibia with all their grave consequences for international peace and security. Although realizing the natural impatience of peoples who aspired to independence, his Government continued to hope that South Africa would eventually agree to an internationally acceptable solution to the Namibian question. Austria would use its influence to facilitate an understanding between the West and the African nations, both in the context of the forthcoming resumed session of the General Assembly and elsewhere. He concluded by expressing his Government's appreciation of the role played by the Council in supporting the aspirations of the people of Namibia for self-determination and independence. Austria was considering measures to assist the people of Namibia after independence, contingent on the execution of the United Nations plan.

I. <u>Visit to Portugal</u>

74. The Mission held consultations with government officials and other authorities in Portugal on 17 and 18 May 1979.

75. The Mission was received by Mr. João Carlos Lopes Cardosa de Freitas Cruz, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and held a meeting with Lieutenant-Colonel Melo Antunes, Chairman of the Constitutional Committee and a member of the Revolutionary Council. The Mission also held a working session with a delegation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs headed by Mr. José Manuel de Villas-Boas, Director-General for Political Affairs in the Ministry, and exchanged views with members of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly. The Mission met with representatives of the Portuguese Committee against <u>Apartheid</u>, attended a public meeting on Namibia sponsored by the Committee and held a press conference. Before leaving Lisbon the Mission issued a communiqué, the text of which appears in volume II of the present report (part four, sect. II, para. 53).

1. Meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs

76. The Mission was received by Mr. João Carlos Lopes Cardosa de Freitas Cruz, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who expressed serious misgivings about the current situation in Namibia. He could not envisage an early solution to the problem and therefore feared an armed escalation in the conflict. Portugal was actively interested in an early settlement in Namibia since the situation in that Territory had major implications for Portugal's relations with Angola which Portugal was in the process of strengthening, hence, the recent visit to Angola by Lieutenant Colonel Antunes in his capacity of Special Envoy of the President of Portugal. During his stay in Luanda, the Lieutenant-Colonel had also held talks with Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO.

77. In its approach to southern Africa, Portugal had also to take into account its links with South Africa as a result of about 600,000 Portuguese citizens living in that country. As a result, Portugal, while willing to use its influence both with its Western partners and with South Africa, could not guarantee that it would take as strong a line towards South Africa as the Government might desire. Portugal had to balance its relationship with South Africa and its desire to strengthen its links with its former colonies in Africa. Nevertheless, Portugal would assist in the search for a peaceful solution in Namibia and the Mission could count on Portugal's sympathy and goodwill.

2. Meeting with the Chairman of the Constitutional Committee

78. In his remarks, Lieutenant-Colonel Antunes referred to his two visits earlier in the year to Mozambique, Zambia and Angola as the special envoy of the President of Portugal and in particular to his most recent visit to Angola in mid-May 1979 when he discussed the question of Namibia with the President and the Foreign Minister of that country. He had also held talks with the President of SWAPO.

79. He expressed the belief that Portugal could play a key mediating role between the Western world, in particular Europe, and Africa. The decolonization policy pursued by Portugal after the April 1974 revolution had given Portugal sufficient prestige and influence to work for the normalization of the situation in southern Africa.

80. The existence of a substantial number of Portuguese citizens in South Africa had to be taken into account but should not be regarded as a decisive factor in Portugal's policy towards that country. He thought that there was only a limited chance that South Africa would adopt reprisals against its Portuguese community in the event of Portugal's taking a militant line against South Africa, first, because the Portuguese community in South Africa had adjusted itself the official policy of <u>apartheid</u> and, second, because the system of <u>apartheid</u> precluded the South African Government from antagonizing any section of the minority white community.

81. Portugal should fulfil its international obligation by implementing any resolution adopted by the United Nations on southern Africa. It should show its moral strength and stand by its established position against <u>apartheid</u>, against the illegal presence of South Africa in Namibia and against the puppet régime being established in Zimbabwe. He had transmitted those views to the President and to the Government of Portugal.

82. During his last visit to Angola the Chairman of the Constitutional Committee had found the leaders of that country deeply pessimistic about the situation in the region. They were persuaded that a peaceful cutcome to the problem of Namibia was becoming more and more difficult and that the only solution left was renewed armed struggle. Angola was determined to give every kind of support, including armed assistance, to SWAPO. President Agostinho Neto and other Angolan leaders with whom he had talked had expressed their deep disappointment with the Western Powers and their firm conviction that France, Germany, the Federal Republic of, the United Kingdom and the United States lacked the political will to resolve the situation in Namibia in terms of real independence for that Territory. The analysis of the situation by the Angolan leaders, to which he subscribed, was based on the fact that the Western Powers had substantial economic interests in South Africa and Namibia and, therefore, would not be inclined or would not be in a position, to impose sanctions in respect of Namibia.

83. Developments in Southern Rhodesia could become a precedent for Namibia. In Southern Rhodesia, sanctions had never been effectively applied. The United States and the United Kingdom had failed to impose their own proposals on Ian Smith despite the backing they had received from the front-line States and from the Patriotic Front. Internal elections had recently taken place and the United States Senate had called for the lifting of sanctions. He believed that the United Kingdom Government would lift sanctions at the conclusion of the Commonwealth Conference at Lusaka and that the new British Prime Minister would use the period prior to the Conference to rally support for her point of view in Europe and elsewhere. Such a situation, in his view, left little margin for manoeuvre to the front-line States and to the Patriotic Front other than to continue the armed struggle. 84. A similar situation was developing in Namibia. Conversations were now in progress between South Africa and two minor groups in Namibia (NNF and SWAPO-D) with the aim of co-opting members of those parties into the so-called National Assembly. He doubted that, in the event of an internal settlement such as the one in Southern Rhodesia, the Western Powers would undertake any serious action against South Africa other than in the form of rhetorical statements.

85. The Chairman believed that Portugal's duty was to maintain the policy it had pursued hitherto and to persuade the five Western Powers of the enormous dangers that developments in southern Africa contained for international peace and security.

86. His analysis appeared to be that of the President of Portugal. However, he doubted that such action as Portugal might take would have positive results. He was profoundly pessimistic. President Neto had summarized the situation in southern Africa in two sentences: "The situation is explosive. The situation is critical."

87. The Chairman of the Constitutional Committee stressed the need for unity within OAU in the face of manoeuvres by the Western Powers to divide African countries. Africans should prepare themselves for a vital political battle on sanctions and they should resist outside attempts to split their ranks.

88. While emphasizing that he had no mandate to speak on behalf of his Government, the Chairman concluded by reasserting his belief that Portugal would continue to exercise a positive influence at the United Nations not only out of principle but also because Portugal's vital interests lay in strengthening its links with Angola as well as with its other former colonies and with other progressive African countries. It was in that context that the forthcoming visit to Zambia of the President of Portugal in the latter part of 1979 should be viewed.

3. Consultations with the delegation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

89. The Mission held a working session with a delegation from the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs headed by Mr. José Manuel de Villas-Boas, Director-General for Political Affairs. The delegation agreed with the analysis of the Chairman of the Mission concerning the situation in Namibia and expressed Portugal's commitment to seek a peaceful solution to the Namibian problem. Such an outcome was very important for the Portuguese Government within the context of its ties with Angola. Unfortunately, South Africa, after showing some signs of willingness to co-operate with the United Nations, now seemed to have changed course.

90. In principle, Portugal would have no major problems in implementing sanctions since it had no major economic interests in South Africa and virtually none in Namibia. Since the change of régime in 1974, Portugal had complied with and voted for United Nations resolutions on southern Africa and there should be no doubt about Portugal's intentions and stand on the question of Namibia. Nevertheless, due regard had to be given to the large Portuguese community in South Africa, consisting mainly of migrants from the island of Madeira, as well as persons who had migrated there at the time of the accession to independence of Angola and Mozambique. There were an estimated 600,000 Portuguese citizens in South Africa, including persons holding dual nationality, but excluding South African citizens of Portuguese descent. Most of those people occupied relatively modest positions in South African society and although their presence should not alter Portugal's position in the United Nations, it was a factor which Portugal had to keep in mind.

91. Portugal was a member of NATO and as such shared certain common interests with its NATO allies. It was also actively seeking admission to the European Community but at the same time maintained ties with the third world and particularly long-standing links with Africa. As such, Portugal could play a useful mediating role between conflicting views in the Security Council and his Government intended to the best of its ability to assist in the search for a harmonious solution to the Namibian question.

Replying to questions by the Chairmar of the Mission, the delegation of 92. Portugal placed the number of Portuguese citizens in Namibia at approximately 500. Apart from its embassy at Pretoria, Portugal maintained two consulatesgeneral at Johannesburg and Cape Town, one consulate at Durban and a consular section in the Portuguese embassy at Pretoria. Portugal also had a small administrative office at Mindhoek to look after the interests of Portuguese citizens in Namibia. That office was not a consulate and was an adjunct of the consular section of the embassy at Pretoria. In reply to a suggestion by the Chairman of the Mission that the Fortuguese administrative office at Windhoek was a de facto consulate, the Director-General said that the Portuguese agent who headed the office in that town did not have the rank of consul. The career Consul at Windhoek under the former régime had been replaced by a consular agent or a head of bureau. The Portuguese Government felt that it could not leave the Portuguese in Namibia without some form of protection. He drew a comparison with the practice followed by Portugal in Southern Rhodesia where there were some 6,000 Portuguese citizens and where the Portuguese consulategeneral had been replaced by a consular office when diplomatic relations were severed after April 1974. He also referred to the policy pursued by the Federal Republic of Germany which had recently closed its consulate at Windhoek but had left someone there to look after the interests of the nationals of the Federal Republic. Portugal had to maintain a balance between its wish to implement United Nations resolutions on Namibia and the need to protect its nationals in that Territory. None the less, he would convey the preoccupations expressed by the Mission to the Foreign Minister.

93. In answer to another question, the representative of Portugal declared that the Portuguese living in Namibia were humble people and that, in so far as South Africa was concerned, the Portuguese Government had no major economic interests in that country. Portugal's trade relations with South Africa were minor. As to the possibility of an aerial boycott of South Africa, he declared that the Portuguese community would obviously be affected. If the Security Council decided on such a measure, however, Portugal would comply as it had done when, after the fall of the old régime, it had discontinued flights of the Transportes Aéreos Portuguese (TAP) to Salisbury even though that had been one of the airline's most profitable routes.

94. The Portuguese representative also stated that his Government would not recognize any government in Namibia which was the result of internal elections without supervision and control by the United Nations.

4. <u>Meeting with members of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the</u> National Assembly 1/

95. The Mission held conversations with members of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Portuguese National Assembly. In the course of those conversations, members of the Committee declared themselves unanimous in their opposition to the system of <u>apartheid</u> in South Africa and to South Africa's continued presence in Namibia which they regarded as illegal.

Those members of the Committee belonging to the Portuguese Socialist Party 96. supported the idea of sanctions against South Africa as a result of its persistent refusal to withdraw from Namibia but emphasized that the presence in South Africa of some half million Portuguese citizens made public opinion in Portugal very sensitive to the issue of sanctions. The party believed that sanctions were necessary at the current stage since it was not possible to accept the creation of a neo-colonial situation any more than in Southern Rhodesia. Nevertheless. their Committee was also aware of some of the problems which Portugal would have to face with regard to its citizens in South Africa if sanctions, particularly in the form of an air boycott, were to be imposed against South Africa. Public opinion in Portugal, as in other Mestern countries, would have to be mobilized and Portugal would support any United Nations initiative in that direction. They assured the Mission that the party would use its influence in all international forums including the Socialist International in support of true independence for Namibia.

97. The members of the Committee belonging to the Portuguese Communist Party stressed their utmost support for the struggle of the Namibian people for freedom and independence. They believed that sanctions should be imposed against South Africa and that any difficulties which Portugal might face in applying them could be resolved.

98. On the other hand, members of the Committee belonging to the Social Democratic Centre Party and to the Social Democratic Party, were of the view that not all peaceful avenues to solve the question of Namibia had been exhausted. They felt that sanctions should be approached with great caution. South Africa had put an interpretation to certain aspects of the United Nations plan which was in contradiction to that of the majority of Member States, but they thought it was still possible to solve the remaining differences through negotiations.

^{1/} The following members of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly were present: Mr. Henrique de Moreas, Vice-President of the Committee, a member of the Social Democratic Centre Party; Ms. Maria Alda Noqueira, Secretary of the Committee, and Mr. Carlos Carvalhas, members of the Portuguese Communist Party; Mr. Rudolph Crespo, Mr. João Lima, Mr. Luis Filipe Madeira, Ms. Maria Emilia de Melo and Mr. Manuel Pires, members of the Portuguese Socialist Party; and Mr. H. Lacerda and Mr. Augusto Nunes de Souza, members of the Social Democratic Party.

ANNEX V*

Report of the Mission of consultation to Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Bulgaria, 9 to 22 May 1979

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^{*} Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.131/L.111 and Corr.1.

A. Introduction

1. By approving the report of the Council in its resolution 33/182 C, the General Assembly also approved the programme of work outlined therein, by which the Council proposed to send two missions of consultation to Europe. <u>a</u>/

2. The Mission to Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Bulgaria was composed of the following members:

Mr. Fathih K. Bouayad-Agha (Algeria), Chairman Mr. Joseph J. Stephanides (Cyprus) Mr. Vicente Montemayor-Cantu (Mexico) Mr. Milivoje Zagajac (Yugoslavia) Mr. Kasuka S. Mutukwa and Mr. I. B. Kachunga (Zambia) Mr. Tulinane Obed Emvula (SWAPO)

Mr. John F. Robson (Principal Secretary) and Ms. Geisa M. Rocha (Secretary) of the United Nations Secretariat accompanied the Mission.

3. The Mission visited Poland from 9 to 12 May 1979. Following its visit to Czechoslovakia from 12 to 15 May, the Mission continued on to the Soviet Union, where it remained from 16 to 19 May. It then journeyed to Bulgaria, where it stayed from 20 to 22 May. A detailed chronology of the Mission appears in the appendix to the present report.

B. <u>Visit to Poland</u>

4. The Mission visited Poland from 9 to 12 May 1979.

5. The Mission was received at Warsaw Airport by Mr. Antoni Pierzchala, Director of the Department of African and Middle East Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Mr. A. Czarkowski, Deputy Director of the Department of International Organizations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Mr. Jerzy Markiewicz, Secretary-General of the Polish Committee of Solidarity with the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

1. Meeting with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs

6. Welcoming the Mission, Mr. J. Czyrek, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated that the Polish Government and people fully supported the principle of full rights for the Namibian people on the basis of independence, sovereignty and

a/ For the report of the other mission to Europe (Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria and Portugal) see annex IV above. Volume I of the present report contains a detailed summary of the Council's four missions to Asia and Europe (see part two, sect. II, paras. 104-161).

territorial integrity. The Polish Government recognized SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people in their struggle and believed that they would inevitably succeed in their efforts to obtain genuine independence.

7. At the present time, however, there were certain complications which might have a negative impact on the situation and also might harm both the Namibian people and the whole movement for decolonization in Africa.

8. The approach of Poland to the problem of decolonization was also an emotional one. That was the result of the sufferings of the Polish people in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when the country had been partitioned among three foreign Powers and more recently, of the sufferings during the Second World War at the hands of the fascists who had occupied Poland.

9. The Chairman of the Mission stated that the Mission was pleased to arrive in Warsaw on Victory Day when the Polish people were celebrating their victory against the Mazis. In the southern part of Africa, despite the defeat of Portuguese colonialism, South Africa, was still trying to perpetuate systems of colonialism and racism in Namibia and in other areas. In that situation, support for the armed struggle was essential. Even South Africa was aware of the solidarity of the international community in that regard.

2. Working meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

10. The meeting with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs was followed by a working meeting at the ministry. The Polish delegation was composed of Mr. Eugeniusz Kulaga, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Antoni Pierzchala, Director of the Department of African and Arab Affairs; Mr. A. Czarkowski, Deputy Director of the Department of International Organizations; and Mr. B. Ludwikowski, Advisor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

11. The Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomed the Mission and stated that the Polish Government recognized SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people.

12. The Chairman of the Mission explained that the purpose of the Mission was to exchange views with the Governments of Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Bulgaria in order that positions might be prepared both by the Council and the Governments visited for the resumed thirty-third session of the General Assembly devoted to Namibia. It had been announced that the resumed session would commence in May in New York and would be devoted exclusively to the consideration of further action to expedite the independence of Namibia.

13. The Mission was certain that the Polish Government would be able to provide resources to intensify its support for the Namibian people in their struggle against aggression and occupation and that it would also give its unconditional support to the efforts of the Council to assist the Namibian people to attain genuine independence in a unified Namibia under the leadership of SWAPO. In that connexion, the Chairman expressed the appreciation of the Mission for the constant support given by the Socialist countries to the Namibian people through the Council. 14. The struggle of the Namibian people had been longer than that of any other colonial people. During the First World War, the Namibian people had been led to believe that the ending of German colonialism would mean an improvement in their condition. Unfortunately, the mandate over Namibia granted to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland by the League of Nations was soon transferred to South Africa, whose Government had introduced policies of racial discrimination. Even the League of Nations had been moved to criticize South African practices in Namibia, which were copied from the policies of racial discrimination being carried out inside South Africa. At the end of the Second World War, all mandated Territories had either been placed under the International Trusteeship System or exercised the right to self-determination in various ways. The exception was Namibia, which South Africa had refused to place under United Nations trusteeship.

15. In 1966, in the light of South Africa's policies of <u>apartheid</u> and massive exploitation, the General Assembly by its resolution 2145 (XX) of 27 October 1966 had terminated South Africa's mandate over Namibia. In 1971, the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion of 21 June, <u>b</u>/ had ruled that, the mandate having been terminated, all States were under obligation to recognize the illegal nature of the South African presence in Namibia.

16. In 1967, following the termination of the mandate, the Council had been established to act as the legal Administering Authority for Namibia until independence. The Council had since worked to mobilize international support for the cause of Namibian independence. It had organized assistance to Namibians through SWAPO and created the Institute for Namibia and the Nationhood Programme for Namibia. The Council had also issued travel and identity documents for Namibians which were recognized by over 80 countries. Further, the Council had turned back attempts by South Africa to create a route for recognition of its puppet authorities and, as the legal Administering Authority for Namibia, had obtained full membership for Namibia in the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and other organizations.

17. The Council had taken important political initiatives, notably at the International Conference in Support of the Peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia, held at Maputo from 6 to 21 May 1977; c/ the World Conference for Action against <u>Apartheid</u>, held at Lagos from 22 to 26 August 1977; d/ the extraordinary plenary meetings of the Council, held at Lusaka from 20 to 25 March 1978; e/ the ninth

b/ Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.

c/ Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-second Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1977, document S/12344/Rev.1.

<u>d</u>/ A/CONF.91/9 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.XIV.2 and 3 and corrigendum).

e/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Ninth Special Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-9/4).

special session of the General Assembly; f/ and the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries, held at Maputo from 26 January to 2 February 1979. g/ It had also consulted individual Governments on ways to increase the pressure on South Africa to withdraw from Namibia. The importance of the Council itself had been greatly enhanced by the gradual increase in its membership, from 11 countries in 1967 to 31 countries in 1978.

18. At the same time, SWAPO had continued its struggle and was now recognized by the OAU, the non-aligned movement and the United Nations as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people. The United Nations had granted it the status of permanent observer. SWAPO had intensified its armed struggle against South Africa and had received material and military support from African countries, members of the non-aligned movement and the Socialist countries.

In defiance of the decisions of the United Nations, South Africa was 19. continuing to impose its policies of exploitation, racial discrimination and attempts to split the people of Namibia into separate ethnic groups through its policy of "bantustanization" in Namibia. It had also pursued a policy of militarization, using the Territory to launch attacks against neighbouring independent African States. In its attempts to maintain control over Namibia, South Africa had organized and promoted the Turnhalle tribal group in an attempt to establish the basis for a pseudo-independence in the Territory. Furthermore, it had unilaterally held elections, without international supervision, in which the Turnhalle group supposedly had obtained a majority. South Africa was continuing to create tribal armies and was maintaining its pretensions regarding Walvis Bay, despite the provisions of Security Council resolution 432 (1978), which had been adopted unanimously. The policies pursued by the South African régime in Namibia were copied from those pursued by that régime in South Africa itself and constituted in both cases a threat to international peace and security.

20. In 1978, there had been efforts, entirely outside the framework of the United Nations, to negotiate a so-called peaceful solution with South Africa to the problem of Namibia. Those efforts had supposedly been based on Security Council resolution 385 (1976), which had also been adopted unanimously. The Chairman pointed out that the participants had attempted to make political capital out of their United Nations connexion. The leadership of SWAPO, while having no illusions about South Africa, had shown itself willing to consider a peaceful settlement and prepared to make substantial concessions. As in the case of previous attempts along those lines, however, the efforts begun in 1978 had failed as a result of the stubborn refusal of South Africa to consider anything which might lead to the genuine independence of Namibia.

21. It was clear that the intention of South Africa was and, indeed, always had been to establish the Turnhalle tribal group as a puppet Government through which South Africa could continue to rule Namibia. It was also clear that the South African plan for Namibia was part of a master plan for the whole of southern Africa.

f/ Ibid.

g/ A/34/126-S/13185. For the printed text, see Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-fourth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1979, document S/13185.

22. The present Mission was taking place within the framework of similar earlier missions in 1978 h/ and 1979 (see also annexes II to IV above).

23. It was now the task of the Mission to ask the Government of Poland what course of action should be followed by the Council at the present time, particularly with regard to the forthcoming resumed thirty-third session of the General Assembly and also in light of the fact that the long-term strategy of the enemy in southern Africa had now become clear.

24. The Deputy Foreign Minister observed that, in supporting the Namibian people in their struggle for independence, it was necessary at the present time to emphasize that that independence should be genuine and should include the attributes of full sovereignty. He noted that SWAPO, which the Polish Government recognized as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people, was now widely recognized as such by the United Nations, by OAU and by the non-aligned movement as well as in other forums. Poland was providing political and material support for SWAPO both at the United Nations and through bilateral arrangements with SWAPO. In December 1978, the President of the Council of State had visited Angola where he had had occasion to meet the President of SWAPO. Poland was totally opposed to South African policies both in Namibia and in South Africa itself. The struggle in the southern part of Africa had reached a decisive stage, on the one hand, in Namibia and Southern Rhodesia and, on the other hand, in the front-line States themselves.

25. Responding to the points raised by the Chairman of the Mission, the Deputy Foreign Minister stated that there was a need to counter the attempts to perpetuate the <u>status quo</u> through cosmetic changes. It was clear that in South Africa as a whole attempts were being made to promote a so-called internal solution both in Namibia and in Southern Rhodesia.

26. The position of the Polish Government was to support the creation of genuine independence and to oppose attempts to bring about a fait accompli. Political action should be taken both at the United Nations and in other forums. The resumed thirty-third session should be an occasion for launching a political counter-attack. Additional political and material support should now be provided to the Namibian people. It was also important to continue the training of cadres, particularly at the middle level.

27. The Chairman remarked that training was needed not only to prepare the people to govern the country after independence but particularly at the present time so that the liberation movement could achieve its goal.

28. In response to specific questions raised by the Chairman of the Mission in his opening statement, the Deputy Minister stated that it was important to analyse the plans being devised by the racists. Unceasing pressure on South Africa was indispensable. In particular, it was essential to counter the continued military build-up of South Africa, above all by preventing the transfer of arms and technology to South Africa. Comprehensive sanctions should be established against South Africa.

h/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Ninth Special Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-9/4), paras. 42-312.

29. At the United Nations concerted action should be taken by the three organs principally concerned with South Africa, that is, the United Nations Council for Namibia, the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the Special Committee against <u>Apartheid</u>. It was particularly important at the present time to strengthen the role of the Council as the legal Administering Authority for Namibia. At the Security Council, which it was anticipated would meet in the near future to discuss the question of Namibia, it was important to press for the imposition of comprehensive sanctions against South Africa and for the implementation of Security Council resolution 385 (1976) in its entirety.

30. A member of the Mission observed that in recent months the danger of war in the region had increased and the possibility of an all-out war could no longer be excluded. The present military strength of South Africa was not a result of the efforts of the South Africans but rather the result of their easy access to Western military technology and also of the fact that they did not feel any obligation to incur expenditure in order to improve the standard of living of their own people. It was also important that the territorial integrity of the frontline States should be preserved.

Another member of the Mission stated that measures, as appropriate, should 31. always be taken for the effective implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions. However, faced with the seeming inability of the Security Council to bring about the full implementation of its resolutions on Mamibia, particularly resolution 385 (1976), it had become necessary for the General Assembly to consider more determined action by which to compel the South African régime to cease forthwith its illegal occupation of Namibia. It was clear that, if near unanimity on the issue could be attained during the forthcoming resumed session of the General Assembly, the present obstacles in the way of implementation of the aforementioned resolutions would be overcome and the long overdue genuine independence of Namibia would be expedited. What was at stake in the case of Namibia was not only the fate of a cruelly oppressed nation but also the credibility of the United Nations as a world organization designed to be the guardian of international peace and security and the means of promoting legal order at an international level.

32. Another member of the Mission stated that the policies of the newly elected Government of the United Kingdom might tend to strengthen the positions of the régimes in South Africa and in Southern Rhodesia. The failure of the United Nations to act at the present time might lead to a conflagration in southern Africa.

33. Another member of the Mission observed that the visit of the Mission to Poland was one of the first actions taken by the Council within the framework of the International Year of Solidarity with the People of Namibia, launched on 4 May 1979, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 33/182 C.

3. Meeting with the Chairman of the Council of State

34. The Mission was received by Mr. Henryk Jablonski, the Chairman of the Council of State.

35. The Chairman of the Council of State observed that the Polish position on the question of Namibia was already well known. The people of Namibia were fully

entitled to fight with all accessible means against the occupation of their country. The Polish Government recognized SWAPO as the only representative of the Namibian people. The Polish Government also recognized Walvis Bay as part of the territory of Namibia and the United Nations Council for Namibia as the legal Administering Authority for Namibia. His Government rejected the so-called internal settlement that was being attempted by the South African régime.

36. At present, the Polish Government was providing medical assistance to SWAPO and was also offering fellowships for Namibians, some of which were for secondary education. His Government was willing to consider increasing its assistance in both domains and would continue to provide assistance after independence had been attained. The Polish Government and people considered all liberation efforts as their own. That attitude had developed as a result of the Polish struggle for liberation from the Nazis. The Polish Government would do everything possible to help the Namibian people attain independence under the leadership of SWAPO.

4. <u>Meeting with the Polish Committee of Solidarity with the</u> <u>Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America</u>

37. Mr. Jerzy Markiewicz, Secretary-General of the Polish Committee of Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America, presided at the meeting with the Mission.

38. The Secretary-General stated that the Committee of Solidarity represented all important organizations in Poland concerned with African questions; it was thus able to speak on behalf of the Polish people.

39. With regard to Namibia, it was clear that the United Nations resolutions were not being implemented. South Africa appeared to be changing its tactics, but its strategic goal, which was to subjugate Namibia by direct or indirect means, remained the same. That country's previous tactics having proven bankrupt, a new policy had been evolved in an attempt to impose on Namibia a subordinate status through the establishment of a puppet régime. The purpose of the policy as a whole was to create a kind of an anti-liberation bloc in Namibia, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa under the leadership of the South African régime. Although the racism of the Nazis had already been defeated in one of the bloodiest and most vicious wars in history, another form of barbarous racism continued to survive in southern Africa. The Polish people for their part would never forget the attempts of the Nazis to exterminate them in accordance with the Nazi doctrine of untermensch.

40. The Chairman of the Mission observed that the South African régime was composed of usurpers and gangsters without faith or law who were exploiting the Namibians and other African peoples without shame or mercy. Their launching of attacks on countries friendly to the Namibian liberation movement was the behaviour of a wounded beast exposed in its lair and therefore at its most dangerous. The beast was being armed by countries which desired to control the Namibian people in order to exploit their resources and to direct their future. It was essential to attack the beast from all sides. The Polish people were clearly aware of the nature of that beast, which was resorting to violence as well as every other possible strategem to undermine the liberation struggle. The Committee of Solidarity would be welcome to speak as an observer before the Council at United Nations Headquarters.
41. The Chairman of the Mission outlined to the Committee of Solidarity the purposes of the International Year of Solidarity with the People of Namibia. First, assistance that could be given, particularly in the area of education, would be most useful for the Namibian people. Second, it was important to be aware of the danger to international peace and security posed by the South African attacks upon neighbouring independent African States. Third, it was important to increase military assistance both to the Namibian liberation movement and to the front-lines States to enable them to strengthen their defences.

42. In response to a question by a member of the Mission, the Vice-Chairman of the Committee of Solidarity explained that the Committee was an associated member of the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization. National committees for that organization existed in most Socialist countries. The Committee of Solidarity was co-operating with national liberation movements in Africa, notably with SWAPO, the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe and the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC). Assistance given by the Committee was mainly of a humanitarian nature. With regard to Namibia, the Committee would be glad to do everything possible in the matter of training Namibians both to serve in the liberation movement at present and to prepare them to administer an independent Namibia.

5. <u>Meeting with the Vice-Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for</u> Foreign Affairs

43. The Vice-Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs stated that the Polish members of Parliament fully supported SWAPO as the sole representative of the Namibian people and would continue to do so until total independence was achieved. SWAPO represented the highest aspirations of the Namibian people.

44. Poland was a member of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, At its latest meeting, held at Bonn from 5 to 13 September 1978, the Polish delegation to the Union had called upon the participants to put pressure on their Governments to take action leading to a solution of the Namibian problem.

45. The Inter-Parliamentary Union had then adopted a resolution on the question of Namibia.

46. In response, the Chairman of the Mission emphasized the importance of keeping in mind that South Africa's policy in Namibia was a clear threat to international peace and security and that neither détente nor a consolidation of peace in the world could be achieved without a just solution to the Namibian people.

47. A member of the Mission stated that it was also important to remain aware of the fact that the five Western countries which had put forward a plan for a so-called settlement of the Namibian problem \underline{i} / were in fact collaborating closely with South Africa while pretending to be engaged in seeking a solution. It was thus clear that SWAPO had no other option except to step up its armed struggle.

48. In conclusion, the Vice-Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee stated that there was no need to convince the Polish public of the necessity of supporting Namibian independence. It was necessary to convince the public in Western

i/ Official Records of the Security Council. Thirty-third year, supplement for April, May and June 1978, document S/12636.

countries, however, owing to the strength of the campaign mounted by South African propaganda organs. In that connexion, the Inter-Parliamentary Union was in fact an important forum in which all kinds of political trends were represented.

6. Meeting with the Director-General of the Ministry of Education

49. The Mission discussed with the Director-General of the Ministry of Education the question of increasing the number of scholarships available to Namibians and the nature of an appropriate programme to improve the weak educational base of many Namibians, particularly at the secondary level, caused by the <u>apartheid</u> educational system imposed upon Namibians by South Africa.

50. The Director-General stated that the Polish Government would consider the question of increasing the number of scholarships beyond the 24 already offered and would study possible measures to improve education at the secondary level.

7. Communiqué

51. At the conclusion of the Mission's visit, the Government of Poland and the Mission issued a joint communqué, the text of which appears in volume II of the present report (part four, sect. II, para. 53).

C. Visit to Czechoslovakia

52. The Mission visited Czechoslovakia from 12 to 15 May 1979.

53. The Mission was received at Prague Airport by Mr. Pavel Lukes, Deputy Head of the Department for International Organizations of the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Jaroslav Cezar, Head of the African Department of the Foreign Ministry; Mr. Alexander Slaby, of the Foreign Ministry; Mr. Rudolf Dvoulety, Head of the International Department of the National Front and the Presidium Member of the Czechoslovak Committee of Solidarity with the Nations of Asia and Africa; Mr. Jana Spalenkova and Ms. Zdena Mareckova of the International Department of the National Front; and Mr. Oldrich Fabian, Acting Director of the United Nations Information Centre.

1. Visit to the Institute of Tropical and Sub-Tropical Agriculture

54. As a result of the interest expressed by the Mission before its arrival in Czechoslovakia in the question of training for Namibian students, the Czechoslovak Government arranged a visit to the Institute of Tropical and Sub-Tropical Agriculture at Suchdol, near Prague. The Director of the Institute explained that the Institute had been established mainly to cater for students from Africa and Latin America. At present there were 320 students, 200 of whom came from tropical countries. The criterion for admission was completion of secondary education.

55. In response to questions raised by the members of the Mission, the Director stated that consideration was being given to the question of how to raise the educational level of students who had not completed their secondary education. That matter had already been discussed with regard to students from the Zimbabwean liberation movements, and a draft programme was being prepared to provide education at the secondary level, with emphasis on agriculture. At the present time, about 20 scholarships were available to Namibian students.

2. First working meeting at the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs

56. The Mission held its first working meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a Czechoslovak delegation headed by Mr. Milous Vejvoda, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and composed of Mr. Jaroslav Cezar, Mr. Pavel Lukes and Mr. Alexander Slaby. After being welcomed by the Deputy Foreign Minister, the Chairman of the Mission explained the purpose of its visit to Czechoslovakia and provided information on the present situation in Namibia. The Chairman also raised the question of whether Czechoslovakia could provide education at the secondary level for Namibian students.

57. The Deputy Foreign Minister stated that his Government considered that the previous goal of mobilizing world public opinion in favour of Namibia had been realized to a considerable extent and that it was now necessary to devise a new strategy for Namibia based on specific actions. The Jzechoslovak Government also considered that a number of Western Powers were <u>de facto</u> allies of South Africa and that their position at the United Nations was based on egoism and double standards - supporting Namibian independence in United Nations resolutions and continuing their collusion with South Africa at another level. In fact, the assistance which some Western countries had been extending to South Africa, particularly in the economic, military and security spheres, had compounded the situation in Namibia and increased racial confrontation in that part of the world. That co-operation with racists had enabled South Africa to maintain its hold on Namibia and to commit acts of aggression against the neighbouring independent African countries of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia.

58. The Chairman of the Mission stated that it was time for those Western count countries - <u>de facto</u> allies of South Africa - to pay attention to the appeal of the African and non-aligned countries, before it was too late. It was time for those countries to decide whether they were on the side of justice.

59. The Deputy Foreign Minister affirmed that his Government believed that the Security Council should take a strong position on the question of Namibia. Specifically, it should take into account the fact that insufficient political pressure had been applied to the <u>de facto</u> allies of South Africa. Those countries should be compelled to break off trade agreements and cease providing military supplies to South Africa.

60. A member of the Mission stated that South Africa was now using sophisticated weapons to attack the front-line States and that the frequency and number of attacks, and the number of casualties was increasing. The attacks were being made with weapons provided by the Western countries. The new tactics were designed to achieve the basic South African goal: to maintain control over the population of Namibia and of Southern Rhodesia.

61. The Deputy Foreign Minister observed that the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia had recently visited Mozambique and Zambia where had had discussed the deteriorating situation in that region.

62. Another member of the Mission observed that the Security Council appeared to have reached an impasse. The General Assembly should therefore consider taking up the responsibilities which were not being assumed by the Security Council; othervise the already dangerous situation in Namibia and in southern Africa in gene. I would critically deteriorate, thus jeopardizing world peace and destroying the confidence of States - especially the small, non-aligned States - in the effectiveness of the United Nations collective security system.

63. The Deputy Foreign Minister stated that measures should be taken to persuade the Western countries that a serious situation would develop if they continued to sabotage decisions of the United Nations. A new strategy could be established before the resumed session of the General Assembly.

64. In response to a question by the Deputy Foreign Minister, the Chairman of the Mission observed that certain countries wished to eliminate the position of the Council as the legal Administering Authority for Namibia. Furthermore, five of the Western countries had attempted to implement a plan outside the framework of the United Nations. The fact that South Africa had just arrested more than 100 members of SWAPO in Namibia was clear evidence that that country did not wish to negotiate.

65. The Deputy Foreign Minister stated that the Czechoslovak delegation to the United Nations would be instructed to give strong support both in the Security Council and in the General Assembly to measures proposed by the African Group. Support would also be given by the other Socialist countries. In conclusion, he added that the Czechoslovak Government would give consideration to increasing the volume of educational assistance to Namibians.

3. <u>Working dinner with the Czechoslovak Committee of Solidarity</u> with the Nations of Asia and Africa

66. A working dinner was given by Mr. Miloslav Vacik, First Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee of the National Front and Chairman of the Czechoslovak Committee of Solidarity with the Nations of Asia and Africa.

67. At the dinner the First Deputy Chairman and other officials of the Committee of Solidarity explained the activities of the Committee and the type of assistance which it was able to provide to liberation movements and to organizations and individuals in Africa. The role of the National Front in Czechoslovak public life, an organization encompassing all political parties and most trade unions and social organizations, was also explained to Mission members.

4. Second working meeting at the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs

68. At a second working meeting at the Foreign Ministry, the Czechoslovak delegation and the Mission prepared the text of a joint communiqué which was released later the same day. The text of the joint communiqué appears in volume II of the present report (para. four, sect, II, para. 53).

5. Press conference

69. At a press conference, which received radio and television coverage, the Chairman of the Mission explained the purpose of the Mission's visit and the contents of the joint communiqué.

6. Meeting with the President of the Federal Assembly

70. Mr. Alois Indra, the President of the Federal Assembly of Czechoslovakia, welcomed the Mission and expressed his Government's unwavering support for Namibia and for the legitimate struggle of the Namibian people under their sole and authentic representative, SWAPO. The President underlined the urgent need for concrete action to end the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa and bring about the independence of Namibia without further delay.

71. The Chairman of the Mission thanked the President of the Federal Assembly for the warm welcome and generous hospitality extended to the Mission. He expressed the Mission's appreciation for the opportunity to hold fruitful discussions with the Government of Czechoslovakia which had reaffirmed the deep commitment of the Government and people of Czechoslovakia to the liberation of Namibia.

D. Visit to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

72. The Mission visite the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from 16 to 19 May 1979.

73. The Mission was received at Moscow Airport by Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affiars; Mr. Boris Prokofiev, Deputy Head of the Department of International Organizations; Mr. Vladimir Khanzhenkov, Counsellor in the Department of International Organizations: Mr. Oleg Shchesbak, Assistant Head of the Third Africa Department; and Mr. Vassili Vakhrushev, Acting Director of the United Nations Information Centre.

1. Luncheon given by the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs

74. The first working meeting on the question of Namibia took place at a luncheon given by Mr. L. F. Ilychev, Deputy Foreign Minister specializing in African Affairs. The luncheon was attended by all the members of the Soviet delegation which would be taking part in the formal working meeting and was an occasion for a substantive discussion of the Namibian problem.

2. First working meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

75. The working lunch was followed immediately by a formal, two-hour working meeting. The Soviet delegation was headed by Mr. L. F. Ilychev and was composed of Mr. Petrovsky; Mr. Vyacheslav Ustinov, Head of the Third Africa Department (Eastern and Southern Africa); Mr. Prokofiev; Mr. Khanzhenkov: and Mr. Mr. M. I. Bocharnikov of the Third Africa Department.

76. The Chairman of the Mission explained the purpose of the Mission's visit and outlined the situation in Namibia, summarizing the history of the problem and indicating certain important events which had taken place recently. The Chairman stated that at the present it was most important to find means to enable the United Nations to assume control in Namibia. It was also important to note the threat to international peace and security posed by the South African attacks on neighbouring independent African States. He observed that it was not by chance that the announcement by the South African racists of their intention to set up a fradulent régime in Namibia had been made at the very moment when the present Mission was visiting the Socialist countries, and when the General Assembly was about to meet in a resumed session to consider the question of Namibia. 77. The Deputy Foreign Minister stated that his country had a long tradition of supporting peoples fighting for national and social liberation and that that obligation was recorded in its new Constitution. The Government of the Soviet Union considered that all forms of liberation struggle were legitimate, including, in particular, armed struggle. However, his Government was not opposed to efforts aimed at peaceful solutions, however, if that was in accordance with the desires of the people. Furthermore, his Government would firmly oppose any attempts at stifling the liberation struggle. In the case of Namibia, the Soviet Union was in favour of the direct transfer of power to SNAPO.

78. The Soviet Covernment considered that the plan for a so-called settlement of the Namibian question put forward by certain Western Powers had been shown to be defective, particularly after the adoption of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). Indeed, the authors of the proposal were now trying to circumvent their own plan. In that matter, the Soviet Government had been on the side of truth. The so-called elections held in Namibia in December 1978 had helped South Africa to set up its own puppets, the danger of a false solution to 'he Mamibian problem was clearly increasing.

79. According to the propaganda of certain Western countries, it was now impossible to persuade South Africa to accept a solution within the framework of Security Council resolution 385 (1976). That was merely an indication of the unwillingness of the Western Powers to force the South African racists to submit to the will of the international community. Resolute action was needed, including action by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Such action would no doubt be discussed at the forthcoming resumed thirty-third session of the General Assembly.

80. The Government of the Soviet Union considered that the position of the United Nations Council for Namibia with regard to the proposals for a settlement of the Namibian situation had been a correct one.

81. His Government was also giving various forms of assistance to SWAPO, to other liberation movements in the region and to the front-line States. That assistance had already reached an important level which would be raised as required.

82. A member of the Mission observed that the racists had become bolder in their attacks on neighbouring countries, in their desperate attempts to maintain the minority régimes. The front-line States were now facing a serious problem of defence, and assistance from other countries was needed.

83. The Deputy Foreign Minister stated that his Government considered that the Security Council had not yet exhausted all political possibilities with regard to Namibia. It was known, of course, that certain Western Powers were attempting to circumvent the Security Council and take decisions outside it.

84. With regard to action by the Security Council, the Government of the Soviet Union was confident that any proposed actions that might be harmful to the cause of the Africans would be blocked with the support of friendly countries. With regard to any decisions which might be taken with respect to South Africa, the Deputy Foreign Minister felt that, on the one hand, any decision to apply sanctions to South Africa would be an important moral and political factor. On the other hand, if the Western Powers were to veto a resolution on Namibia, such an action by itself would reveal their true political physiognomy. A political revelation of that nature would indeed be a powerful factor.

3. <u>Discussion at the Institute of Africa of the Academy of Sciences</u> of the USSR

85. The Mission was invited to discuss the situation in the southern part of Africa during a visit to the Institute of Africa of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. The discussion was presided over by Mr. Anatolv Gromvko, the Head of the Institute.

86. In the course of a general analysis of the situation, the Head of the Institute explained that the Soviet Union was interested in seeing conflict in southern Africa coming to an end. The members of the Institute had informed various Western scholars of that view. The research workers of the Institute felt that if certain Western Powers would take more resolute positions in the problems of Namibia, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, the "light at the end of the tunnel" would soon be seen and indeed would rapidly become stronger. However, the belief of five of the Western Powers that they could influence the South African racists appeared to have been proven wrong. In fact, as a result, those Powers had given the impression to Pretoria that their position was somewhat weak while the position of Pretoria was rather strong.

87. During the course of the meeting, the participants also discussed the question of possible Soviet assistance to the Institute for Namibia at Lusaka.

4. <u>Meeting with the Soviet Committee of Solidarity with the</u> countries of Asia and Africa

88. The Chairman of the Mission explained the purposes of the visit of the Mission.

89. Mr. Kudriavtsev, Vice-Chairman of the Solidarity Committee, stated that the Solidarity Committee fully supported the struggle of the Namibian people for genuine independence and the work of the Council to that end. The Solidarity Committee maintained a number of programmes of assistance for Namibians. particularly by means of scholarships, and it would endeavour to expand those programmes. Furthermore, the Solidarity Committee was actively engaged in disseminating information on the question of Namibia. The Solidarity Committee was in the course of approaching various Soviet news media, including Pravda, Izvestia and Tass, in order to increase the dissemination of information on Namibia in the Soviet Union. It would also contact similar committees in other countries in order to increase public awareness of the Namibian problem. Most important of all, the Solidarity Committee would make a special effort to raise the level of consciousness of the people in Western countries concerning Mamibia. At present, there was considerable ignorance on the question and even a danger that some sectors of public opinion might be inclined to believe in certain false solutions being put forward.

5. <u>Meeting with the Vice-Chairman of the Presidium of the</u> Supreme Soviet of the USSR

90. The Mission was received by Mr. A. Duysheev, the Vice-Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

91. The Vice-Chairman stated that the Soviet Government fully supported the Namibian people who were courageously fighting for freedom against the South African racists. His Government was actively pursuing policies aimed at liquidating the last vestiges of the colonial system. Those policies were reflected in the documents of the twenty-fifth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and in statements made by Mr. Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

92. The Soviet Government was also pursuing policies in the Security Council and in the United Nations as a whole in support of the liberation of the people of Namibia. The Soviet Government was aware, however, that the decisions of the United Nations on Namibia had not yet been implemented by South Africa, because the South African Government was supported in its refusal by the Government of the United States of America and other Western Powers. The Soviet Government believed that the Namibian people would succeed in liberating themselves, and the Soviet Government would provide possible assistance for that purpose. The fundamental position of the Soviet Union favoured a policy of disarmament, but in the domain of freeing colonial peoples from oppression it was clear that the armed struggle was often the only method possible. That method should be fully supported.

93. The Chairman of the Mission described the role of the Council, emphasizing its position as the legal Administering Authority for Namibia. He stated that the Mission wished to make the Soviet Government fully aware of the plans that were being hatched by South Africa to impose a fraudulent régime on the Namibian people and of the dangers to international peace and security posed by the repeated acts of aggression of South Africa against neighbouring independent African countries. South Africa was being supported in its policies by certain of its Western allies which were trying to promote a so-called "peaceful solution" in order to continue their exploitation and control of Namibia and to deceive world public opinion.

94. There was also an important need to increase assistance to SWAPO and to step up the training of cadres for Namibians, particularly by means of education at the secondary level.

95. The Vice-Chairman of the Presidium stated that the concern of the Mission about the dangers of a false solution was fully understood in the Soviet Union. The present large membership of the Council indicated that the just nature of the struggle of the Namibian people had been recognized. The Soviet Government would study methods of increasing assistance to SWAPO and of increasing educational programmes in favour of Namibians.

6. Visit to the Patrice Lumumba Friendship of Peoples University

96. In welcoming the Mission, Mr. Kashlev, the Acting Rector of the University, stated that the university had been founded in 1960 as a manifestation of Lenin's foreign policy of providing assistance to developing countries. It was the policy of the university to give preferences to students from socially disadvantaged families. It was also the policy to accept students who had completed their secondary education, but the university possessed a preparatory faculty to assist students whose secondary education had some weaknesses. 97. The Chairman of the Mission observed that it was symbolic that the university had been founded in the year in which the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, had been adopted.

The Mission described the educational situation of Namibians, which had been 98. reduced to the lowest possible level as a result of the infamous policy of The Acting Rector stated that, for those Namibians whose secondary apartheid. education was seriously defective, the university would not be able to provide suitable programmes. However, there were a number of other institutions in the Soviet Union in which Namibian students could complete their secondary education in full. Furthermore, the university was willing to give serious consideration to two matters: (a) a possible increase in the number of scholarships to be made available to Namibians with adequate secondary education; and (b) the possibility of providing assistance to the Institute for Namibia at Lusaka to enable it to raise the secondary education of Namibian students to a level that would enable them to undertake university studies on scholarships offered by the Soviet Union and other countries. It would be desirable for the Council to prepare a formal proposal on those two matters for formal submission to the University.

7. Second working meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

99. In the course of an informal working meeting with the officials of the Foreign Ministry, the Mission discussed a joint communiqué, the text of which appears in volume II of the present report (part four, sect. II, para. 53).

E. Visit to Bulgaria

100. The Mission visited Bulgaria from 20 to 22 May 1979.

101. The Mission was received at Sofia Airport by Mr. Boris Tzvetkov, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, in charge of International Organizations; Mr. Stefan Staykov, Head of the United Nations and Disarmament Affairs Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs; and Mr. Dimitar Chorbadjiev, Head of the African Affairs Department.

1. First working meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

102. The Mission held a working meeting with a Bulgarian delegation headed by the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Bulgarian delegation consisted of Mr. Tzvetkov; Mr. Staykov; Mr. Chorbadjiev; Mr. Georgi Yovkov, Deputy Head of the African Affairs Department; Mr. Ivan Garvalov, Deputy Head of the United Nations and Disarmament Affairs Department; Mr. Stefan Georgiev of the United Nations and Disarmament Affairs Department; Mr. Lalo Lalov of the African Affairs Department and Ms. Lyudmila Bozhkova of the United Nations and Disarmament Affairs Department.

103. Opening the meeting, the Deputy Foreign Minister observed that the Bulgarian position on assistance to liberation movements was well known. As far as Namibia was concerned, certain Western Powers had prepared a plan which had eventually obtained the approval of the Security Council. However, it later appeared that those same Powers were attempting to prepare a new colonial solution in Namibia. At the same time, the racists of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia were defying United Nations resolutions and organizing so-called elections both in Namibia and Southern Rhodesia. At a time when there was a certain trend in the world to attempt to achieve co-operation among countries, the situation in southern Africa was in complete contrast, causing as it did a serious threat to international peace and security. In fact, the struggle for liberation was running parallel with certain other struggles taking place in the world, notably, the struggle for a just reshaping of economic relations among countries. The forces which were opposing that reshaping were the same forces which were opposing liberation movements and were interested in armaments. It was thus clear that the efforts of liberated countries were closely linked with those people still struggling for liberation.

104. Since the advent of socialism in Bulgaria, it had been the policy of the Bulgarian Government to assist all peoples and countries not yet liberated and then to assist them to consolidate their economic independence after liberation. That policy was not influenced by present considerations. The struggle of the Bulgarian people to obtain independence had lasted for several centuries. The Bulgarian people would therefore always attempt to give as much assistance as possible to peoples now struggling, by direct assistance and by action at the United Nations. For many years, Bulgaria had been a member of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, where the Bulgarian representative had served as Vice-Chairman. In 1976, Bulgaria had been the author of a proposal stating that maximum use should be made of all specialized agencies of the United Nations in order to give assistance to Namibians through SWAPO.

105. Bulgaria was now pleased to be a member of the United Nations Council for Namibia and would support the role of the Council as the legal Administering Authority for Namibia until that country achieved genuine independence. Bulgaria disapproved of the attempts of certain countries to solve the Namibian problem outside the United Nations; such attempts would distort the process of decolonization and lead to a false independence. It was essential to solve the problem of Namibia in accordance with decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

106. An expression of Bulgarian support for the liberation movements had been the recent visit of its Head of State to Nigeria, Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia. In all those visits the President had emphasized Bulgaria's total support for the liberation movements. With regard to Namibia, there were two cardinal points in Bulgaria's policies: first, the Namibian people had the right to fight by all means at their disposal; and second, the Council was the legal Administering Authority for Namibia.

107. Outside the United Nations, in complete opposition to world public opinion, the Pretoria régime was ignoring the decisions of the most authoritative organs of the United Nations, that is, the General Assembly and the Security Council. The Pretoria régime was creating tension in the whole region and was attempting to build up a nuclear capability, thus threatening world peace and security. Bulgaria considered that it was time for the Security Council to take decisive steps on the Namibia problem. It was also clear that if South Africa continued with its present policies, it was because of the silent and public support of certain Western countries who were also members of NATO. They were providing political, military and economic support; additional financial support was being provided by transnational corporations based in the United States, the United Kingdom and other Western countries. 108. The Security Council should now meet and take action under Chapter VII of the Charter. If decisions involving political, military and economic boycotts were attempted at the forthcoming resumed thirty-third session of the General Assembly and if those decisions should be forced upon certain Western countries the independence of Namibia could be attained. In the meantime, world public opinion was increasing its pressure on certain recalcitrant Governments. Until independence was attained, Bulgaria would continue to give active assistance to the Namibian people both through the United Nations Council for Namibia and through bilateral arrangements with SWAPO.

109. The Chairman of the Mission explained the role of the Council, its present policies and the purpose of the Mission's visit to Bulgaria. He also outlined the present situation in Namibia and the background leading to it.

110. A member of the Mission observed that no member of the Council could feel free until all the countries of southern Africa had become free.

111. Another member of the Mission stated that SWAPO military forces were extending their areas of operation in Namibia. South Africa had even admitted that SWAPO was active in new areas and that certain people living in the so-called South African "security areas" had had to be evacuated.

112. Another member observed that South Africa was able to maintain its position with respect to Namibia as a result of the support given to South Africa by certain Western countries and by a number of transnational corporations based in the same countries.

113. Other members observed that the non-aligned movement was giving strong support to the Namibian people and that an important decision on Namibia could be expected at the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, to be held at Havana in September 1979. <u>j</u>/ It was necessary to increase the pressure on the racists and to keep in mind that, if effective action was not taken at the present time, it would create difficulties regarding the role and prestige of the United Nations.

114. The Deputy Foreign Minister stated that he agreed with the analysis of the situation put forward by the Mission. It was clear that an extensive conspiracy was now being organized involving Namibia, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa and that sanctions imposed by the Security Council were the correct solution. However, the resolutions of the General Assembly were still a form of moral pressure on Governments and they served to raise the level of consciousness of world public opinion.

115. With regard to the question of the education of Namibians, the Deputy Foreign Minister observed that Bulgaria was already providing scholarships to Namibians through the intermediary of SWAPO. In addition to university scholarships, a number of Namibians were also studying at secondary schools. Bulgaria was also providing scholarships through the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa.

116. The Deputy Foreign Minister stated that the Bulgarian Government would be glad to consider any proposal which the Council might wish to formulate regarding an increase in educational assistance to Namibians.

<u>j</u>/ See A/34/542, annex.

2. Meeting with the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs

117. The Mission was received by Mr. Marii Ivanov, First Deputy Foreign Minister.

118. The Chairman of the Mission explained that a principal feature of the present situation in Namibia was the attempts by the racists to prepare a co-ordinated plan for the whole of southern Africa. Guided by the racist régime in Pretoria, the racists were attempting to preserve their position in Namibia, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa by setting up fraudulent régimes in Namibia and Southern Rhodesia and establishing similar régimes in certain areas of South Africa itself. The racists were attempting to dislocate the process of independence in the region.

119. The First Deputy Foreign Minister stated that the Bulgarian Government would continue its policies and its material support for the Namibian people both through the Council and on a bilateral basis through SWAPO.

3. Meeting with the President of the National Assembly

120. Dr. Vladimir Bonev, the President of the National Assembly, stated that United Nations resolutions designed to compel South Africa to withdraw from Namibia should be strengthened. The elections held in Namibia in December 1978 had been a parody and would merely complicate the situation in southern Africa. The puppet régime in Namibia should be ignored, despite the fact that certain Western Powers were trying to impose it as a solution. Bulgaria would continue to support SWAPO, the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people.

121. The Chairman of the Mission stated that the complicity of certain Western countries, members of NATO, was a form of support for South Africa in its repeated attacks against neighbouring African States and in its attempts to maintain control of Namibian resources.

122. The President of the National Assembly stated that Bulgaria supported completely the struggle for liberation of the Namibian people under the leadership of their sole and authentic representative, SWAPO, and that the policy of his Government was to render assistance not only to SWAPO, but to all peoples fighting for independence and liberty.

123. The five Western countries were trying to solve the problem of Namibia by defying United Nations resolutions. The Council should appeal to the Governments of those countries through their social organizations and parliaments to demonstrate to the public in those countries the justice of the cause of the Namibian people.

4. <u>Meeting with the President of the Board of the Committee for</u> Solidarity with the Peoples of Asia and Africa

124. Responding to the statement of welcome of Mr. Ballevsky, President of the Board of the Committee for Solidarity, the Chairman of the Mission stated that it was important to counter the misleading propaganda on the Namibian question being circulated by certain circles in some Western countries. The representative of SWAPO observed that at the present time the South African régime was endeavouring to eliminate physically the SWAPO presence in Namibia. 125. According to the President of the Board of the Committee for Solidarity, the Bulgarian position was that the questions of Namibia, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa itself were related. During a recent seminar at Alma-Ata organized by the Special Committee against <u>Apartheid</u>, the Committee for Solidarity had instructed its delegation to the seminar to emphasize that relationship. It was also clear, he added, as could be seen from the attacks launched by Southern Rhodesian forces against members of the Patriotic Front in Zambia, that the enemy forces were well equipped.

5. Meeting at the Ministry of Education

126. The Mission held a meeting with Mr. Kanev, Head of the Foreign Students Department of the Council of Higher Education, who is also responsible for the admission of foreign students to Bulgarian educational institutions.

127. The Chairman of the Mission explained that the Council, as part of its work as the legal Administering Authority of Namibia, was responsible for providing educational assistance to Namibians. Such assistance was required first to assist the Namibian people in attaining independence and second to enable them to consolidate and develop independence after it had been achieved. As a result of the <u>apartheid</u> system of education imposed upon young Namibians by the South African régime, the secondary education of most Namibians was seriously defective. Scholarships at the university level were already being offered to Namibians but they were not always qualified to accept them as a result of weaknesses in their secondary education. It was the desire of the Mission first to inquire what was being done in that field in Bulgaria and to raise the question of increasing educational assistance for Namibians. It was understood, however, that bilateral programmes between the Bulgarian Government and SWAPO should continue unchanged.

128. The Head of the Department stated that at the present time students from 103 countries were studying in Bulgaria. Those students had been mostly accepted within the framework of cultural agreements signed with the responsible authorities of the various countries. Furthermore, the Bulgarian Government was offering scholarships through the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa. At the present time, there were approximately 30 Namibian students in Bulgarian institutions and, if a formal detailed request were to be submitted, consideration could be given to increasing that number.

6. <u>Meeting with the Vice-President of the Council of State</u>

129. Mr. Peko Takov, the Vice-President of the Council of State, stated that Bulgaria would continue to give its full support for the liberation struggle of the Namibian people until genuine independence was achieved. To that end, Bulgaria would provide all necessary material and moral assistance to the Namibian people.

7. <u>Meeting with the President of the National Council of the</u> Fatherland Front

130. Mr. Pencho Koubadinsky, the President of the National Council of the Fatherland Front, outlined the role of the Fatherland Front in the political life of Bulgaria. He stated that as a result of the adoption of a resolution on Namibia at a recent general meeting of the Fatherland Front, a new programme of assistance for the Namibian people was about to be launched. The new programme would emphasize educational assistance.

8. Radio and television interview

131. The Chairman of the Mission described the work of the Council as the legal Administering Authority for Namibia charged with bringing independence to the Namibian people. The Council also arranged assistance programmes for the Namibian people, particularly of an educational nature, and was working to mobilize world public opinion in order to bring about the liberation of a people who had been colonized twice over. As had been the case with other liberation efforts, it could be expected that the outcome of the struggle of the Namibian people would be successful. That outcome had been brought nearer as a result of the firm support of the socialist countries.

132. Bulgaria, which had just become a member of the Council, was well known for its anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist position. Its participation in the work of the Council would be appreciated in all fields, in particular in the field of education, where the Bulgarian Government was already providing substantial assistance to the Namibian people.

9. Second working meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

133. In the course of a second working meeting with officials of the Foreign Ministry a joint communiqué was prepared, the text of which appears in volume II of the present report (part four, sect. II, para. 53).

F. Conclusions and recommendations

134. From the consultations which it held during the course of its visits, the Mission has drawn certain conclusions and wishes to make certain recommendations as follows:

(1) The master plan of the racist forces in southern Africa consists of an attempt to perpetuate their control by the installation of fraudulent régimes in Namibia and Southern Rhodesia under the guise of "internal settlements".

(2) At the present time, South African forces, not satisfied with their military and police repression of the Namibian people, have turned Namibia into an armed camp from which they launch acts of aggression against neighbouring sovereign African States.

(3) These acts of aggression, coupled with the South African military build-up and the South African policy of developing, with external assistance, nuclear weapons, constitute a serious threat to international peace and security.

(4) The situation is further aggravated as a result of economic, political and military assistance provided to South Africa by certain Western countries. In fact, the situation in Namibia has now reached a turning point at which it is time for those Western countries which continue to be <u>de facto</u> allies of South Africa to heed a last appeal of the African countries to terminate their support for South Africa once and for all.

(5) The United Nations should take immediate and effective measures to end the South African occupation of Namibia and to bring about genuine independence for the Namibian people. It is therefore necessary that the General Assembly and the Security Council take urgent effective measures against South Africa, including the imposition by the Security Council of the mandatory sanctions provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

(6) In this connexion, the international community should continue to condemn the illegal presence of racist South Africa in Namibia and also ensure non-recognition of any bogus entities which may be established in Namibia.

(7) The international community should continue to support the legitimate struggle of the Namibian people under the leadership of the South West Africa People's Organization.

(8) The Mission notes with appreciation the determination of the four countries visited to give all possible assistance and support to the struggle of the Namibian people and their commitment to intensify their political and material assistance to the Namibian people, through the South West Africa People's Organization, which is internationally recognized as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people.

(9) The Mission also notes with appreciation the activities being undertaken in the countries visited in connexion with the International Year of Solidarity with the People of Namibia.

(10) The Mission, in concordance with the countries visited, considers that the educational and training programmes for Namibians should be strengthened, both in the period of struggle for independence and in the period after independence.

(11) The Mission notes with appreciation that in the four countries visited it was received at a very high official, State and parliamentary level, a fact which attests to the full support of these countries for the principles of genuine independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Namibia and the role of the United Nations Council for Namibia as the legal Administering Authority for Namibia until the final stage of the liberation struggle.

(12) The forthcoming resumed thirty-third session of the General Assembly should devote all its efforts to obtaining a decision of the Security Council to impose mandatory economic and military sanctions, including an oil embargo, upon South Africa.

(13) The General Assembly and the Security Council should proceed from the position that the efforts that were deployed since the passage of the unanimously adopted Security Council resolution 385 (1976) and which were supposedly aimed at a peaceful solution of the Namibian problem have merely resulted in a two-year respite for the South African racists and allowed them to perpetrate a fraud upon the Namibian people. During the respite, South Africa has acted deceitfully through sinister schemes and has used the time to prepare its machinations for bogues independence and a neo-colonial solution.

(14) The General Assembly should study ways and means of carrying out a transfer of power to the people of Namibia, under the leadership of the South West Africa People's Organization, which is recognized by the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the Non-Aligned Movement, as the sole, authentic and legitimate representative of the Namibian people.

(15) Expedients should no longer be resorted to as a substitute for serious political decisions and proper planning for the nationhood of the Namibian people. There are no make-shift solutions.

(16) Taking into account the fact that difficulties are occasionally experienced in finding a sufficient number of qualified candidates to fill scholarships which are already offered to Namibians, the United Nations Council for Namibia should give consideration to arranging educational programmes particularly at the secondary level to assist Namibians who have suffered under the <u>apartheid</u> educational system imposed on Namibia by South Africa. These new programmes should not disturb existing bilateral arrangements for the education of Namibian students.

(17) The United Nations Council for Namibia should invite representatives of the committees of solidarity with the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America, from Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Bulgaria to provide information to, and make statements in, the Council as observers.

(18) The United Nations Council for Namibia should give further study to the question of recognition of travel and identity documents issued by the Council, taking into account the fact that difficulties still exist in certain Western countries and that some countries which have signed the travel and identity documents agreement may not be fully recognizing those documents in practice.

(19) The United Nations Council for Namibia should consider proposing to the Governments of the countries visited and other Governments the preparation of cultural conventions dealing with educational assistance to Namibians. The proposed conventions would cover (a) university education; (b) vocational training; (c) secondary education; (d) assistance to Namibians whose secondary education has suffered under the <u>apartheid</u> educational system, in order to enable them to pursue university level studies; (e) assistance to the Institute for Namibia at Lusaka.

(20) The United Nations Council for Namibia should consider submitting to the Patrice Lumumba Friendship of Peoples University at Moscow for transmission to the appropriate educational institution a request for a specially designed scholarship programme to assist Namibians whose secondary education has suffered under the <u>apartheid</u> educational system imposed on Namibia by South Africa. The goal of the special programme would be to enable such Namibians to pursue studies at the university level.

(21) The United Nations Council for Namibia should consider submitting to the Patrice Lumumba Friendship of Peoples University a further request for assistance of a similar nature to be provided to the Institute for Namibia.

(22) The United Nations Council for Namibia should propose arrangements by which statements of the Council on the question of Namibia would be made known to the parliamentary or legislative bodies of certain Western and other countries which are still collaborating with South Africa.

(23) The United Nations Council for Namibia, through its Standing Committee III, should send informational material to institutions which have demonstrated an interest in the Namibian question in the four countries visited, including the appropriate committees of solidarity. The institutions should be invited to make use of this material in their bulletins and publications.

G. Acknowledgements

135. The Mission would like to take this opportunity to express its thanks to the Governments of Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Bulgaria for the assistance which they are now providing to the Mamibian people, for their willingness to consider proposals for new assistance, and for the hospitality extended to the Mission during its stay in the four countries.

136. The Mission also wishes to express its thanks to the members of the United Nations Secretariat for their assistance.

H. Adoption of the report

137. The present report was adopted by the Mission on 12 June 1979.

<u>Appendix</u>

Chronology of the Mission

A. Poland

Wednesday, 9 Hay 1979	· 2.25 p.m.	Received at Marsaw Airport
Thursday, 10 May 1979	9.30 a.m.	Meeting with Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs
	10 a.m.	Vorking meeting at Ministry of Foreign Affairs
	3 p.m.	Received by Chairman of the Council of State
	3.45 p.m.	Working meeting with Polish Committee of Solidarity with the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America
	7 p.m.	Dinner given by Deputy Foreign Minister
Friday, 11 May 1979	10 a.m.	Meeting with Vice-Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs
	11.30 a.m.	Meeting with Director-General of Ministry of Education
	1 p.m.	Working luncheon with Polish Committee of Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America
	3 p.m.	Press conference at Polish Journalist's Association
Saturday, 12 May 1979	ll a.m.	Consultations on communiqué
	B. Czechosl	Lovakia
Saturday, 12 May 1979	5.30 p.m.	Received at Prague Airport
Monday, 14 May 1979	8.15 a.m.	Visit to Institute of Tropical and Sub-Tropical Agriculture at Suchdol

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	11	a.m.	First working meeting at Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs
	8	p.m.	Working dinner with Czechoslovak Committee of Solidarity with the Mations of Asia and Africa
<u>Tuesday, 15 May 1979</u>	9.30	a.m.	Second working meeting at Ministry of Foreign Affairs
	10.30	a.m.	Press conference (radio and television)
	12	noon	Meeting with President of Federal Assembly
	1	p.m.	Luncheon at Foreign Ministry given by Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs
a			
С.	Union of	Soviet Socia	list Republics
<u>Wednesday, 16 May 1979</u>	4.10	p.m.	Received at Moscow Airport
<u>Thursday, 17 May 1979</u>	1	p.m.	Luncheon given by the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs
	3	p.m.	First working meeting at Ministry of Foreign Affairs
	5.30	p.m.	Discussion at Institute of Africa of the Academy of Sciences
Friday, 18 May 1979	10.30	a.m.	Meeting with Soviet Committee of Solidarity with the Countries of Asia and Africa
	.1.30	p.m.	Luncheon given by Director of the United Nations Information Centre
	4	p.m.	Meeting with Vice-Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
Saturday, 19 May 1979	10	a.m.	Visit to Patrice Lumumba Friendship of Peoples University
	5	p.m.	Second working meeting at Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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		D. <u>Bulgaria</u>	
Sundr , 20 May 1979	11.05	a.m.	Received at Sofia Airport

Monday,	21	May	1979	

9.30	a.m.	Working meeting at Ministry of Foreign Affairs
12.30	p.m.	Meeting with First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs
1	p.m.	Official luncheon
4	p.m.	Meeting with President of the National Assembly
· 5	p.m.	Meeting with President and Board of the Committee for Solidarity with the Peoples of Asia and Africa
7.30	p.m.	Dinner given by President of Committee for Solidarity with the Peoples of Asia and Africa
9	a.m.	Meeting at Ministry of Education
10	a.m.	Meeting with Vice-President of Council of State
11	a.m.	Meeting with President of National Council of the Fatherland Front
12	noon	Radio and television interview

Tuesday, 22 May 1979

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