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CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1717)	1
Expression of thanks to the retiring President	1
Adoption of the agenda	1
The situation in the Middle East:	
(a) Security Council resolution 331 (1973);	
(b) Report of the Secretary-General under Security Council resolution 331 (1973) (S/10929)	1

NOTE

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SEVENTEEN HUNDRED AND SEVENTEENTH MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 6 June 1973, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. Yakov MALIK
(Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Australia, Austria, China, France, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Yugoslavia.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1717)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. The situation in the Middle East:
 - (a) Security Council resolution 331 (1973);
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General under Security Council resolution 331 (1973) (S/10929).

The meeting was called to order at 11.5 a.m.

Expression of thanks to the retiring President

1. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): Before taking up discussion of the substance of the item on the provisional agenda for today's meeting of the Security Council, I should like to pay a tribute to my predecessor as President of the Security Council last month, the distinguished Permanent Representative of the Sudan, Mr. Abdulla, who very skilfully directed the proceedings of the Council in May. I take particular pleasure in pointing out that Ambassador Abdulla represents a country with which the Soviet Union maintains friendly relations. Ambassador Abdulla is known as an experienced diplomat with profound knowledge of matters affecting the practice, procedure and substance of the work of the Security Council. Under his effective guidance, the Council last month considered the question of the situation in Southern Rhodesia. Unfortunately, the Council was unable to conclude its consideration of that question by the adoption of a decision which would have been in full accord with the just interests of the liberation of the people of Zimbabwe. I am sure that all members of the Security Council will agree that Ambassador Abdulla guided the proceedings of the Council with great skill last month. On behalf of the Council, I have pleasure in conveying to him our congratulations, in paying a tribute to him and in thanking him for the efforts he made while he held the office of President.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in the Middle East:

- (a) Security Council resolution 331 (1973);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General under Security Council resolution 331 (1973) (S/10929)

2. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): As President of the Security Council, I have received letters from the Permanent Representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the United Republic of Tanzania, Chad, the Syrian Arab Republic, Nigeria and Algeria to the United Nations. These letters contain requests that the delegations of those countries be invited to participate in the discussion of the item just included in the Council's agenda. In accordance with established practice and the provisional rules of procedure, I propose to invite the representatives of those countries to participate, without the right to vote, in the consideration by the Council of the question of the situation in the Middle East.

3. In view of the regrettably limited number of seats at the Council table, and bearing in mind the chronological order in which the letters requesting permission to participate in the discussion reached me, I propose, in accordance with the Council's established working practice, to invite the representatives of the parties directly concerned, Egypt, Israel and Jordan, to take the places reserved for them at the Council table and I propose to invite the representatives of the other countries to take the seats reserved for them in the places specially set aside for that purpose at the side of the Council chamber, on the understanding that they will be invited to take a seat at the Council table when it is their turn to speak. Thus, I invite the representatives of Egypt, Israel and Jordan to take the places reserved for them at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. M. H. El-Zayyat (Egypt), Mr. Y. Tekoah (Israel) and Mr. A. H. Sharaf (Jordan) took places at the Council table.

4. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): I invite the representatives of the United Republic of Tanzania, Chad, Syrian Arab Republic, Nigeria and Algeria to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. J. W. S. Malecela (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. H. G. Ouangmoting (Chad), Mr. H. Kelani (Syrian Arab Republic), Mr. O. Arikpo (Nigeria) and Mr. A. Bouteflika (Algeria) took the places reserved for them in the Council chamber.

5. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): I would have preferred to invite them to take places at the Council table itself, but, unfortunately, that is not possible because

no more than three delegations from countries which are not members of the Council may be seated at the Council table at one time and one seat must be left free for the delegations of those countries which will be participating in the discussion of this item, when their turn comes to speak.

6. As members know, at its 1710th meeting, on 20 April 1973, the Security Council, in resolution 331 (1973), took a decision to meet specially to examine the situation in the Middle East. Pursuant to that resolution, the Secretary-General has submitted to the Security Council a detailed report [S/10929] on the efforts made by the United Nations with regard to this important international question since June 1967. In accordance with that resolution, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, will be taking part in the Council's meetings; his mission and efforts represent an important and integral element in the succession of attempts made by the United Nations to achieve a peaceful political settlement in the Middle East.

7. The Council's decision to consider the question of the situation in the Middle East was taken following a request by Egypt, whose Foreign Minister, Mr. El-Zayyat, has come to New York specially in order to be able to participate personally in the discussion of this item by the Security Council. I should like to take this opportunity to welcome Mr. El-Zayyat, our distinguished friend and colleague from earlier days in the United Nations, and also to welcome the Foreign Ministers of other countries who will be taking part in the discussion of this item.

8. As members know, the Security Council has frequently considered the question of the situation in the Middle East. The Council has already unanimously adopted the well-known resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, which has won wide recognition, and a number of other decisions. Resolution 242 (1967) is rightly considered by an overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations as providing an international legal basis for a Middle East settlement. Resolutions on this question have also been adopted by the General Assembly. They are all awaiting implementation.

9. The Security Council's decision to undertake a wide-ranging discussion of the situation in the Middle East in all its aspects testifies to the broad recognition by the members of the Council of the responsibility placed on them by the United Nations Charter and of the urgent need to ensure progress towards a political settlement in the Middle East. The international political importance which States Members of the United Nations attach to the consideration of this matter by the Council is also demonstrated by the intention and desire of many States Members of the United Nations to take part in the debate.

10. The need to establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East without delay is particularly evident to all in view of the auspicious changes which have come about in the international situation, the noticeable improvement in the political climate on our planet and the continuing further easing of tension.

11. The world is living through a period of major change in international relations, a change from the dangerous tension of the "cold war" to *détente* and peace.

12. In these circumstances it is all the more unacceptable that the situation in the Middle East should continue to be an explosive one and to constitute a threat to international peace and security.

13. The Council's discussion of the situation in the Middle East which begins today offers a real opportunity to intensify the efforts of the Security Council and the United Nations as a whole to achieve a peaceful political settlement and eliminate a hotbed of dangerous tension in the area. The peoples look with confidence and hope to the United Nations and its principal organ for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council, and expect constructive and effective measures aimed at establishing the long-awaited peace in the Middle East.

14. It is the duty of the Security Council and each of its member States to justify this high trust by an active discussion of the item on the Council's agenda, the problem of a Middle East settlement, and by seeking effective ways to bring about such a settlement in the name of peace and the security of peoples.

15. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I am grateful for the opportunity to introduce briefly the report prepared in response to Security Council resolution 331 (1973) which the Council adopted on 20 April 1973. At that time the Council asked for a comprehensive report giving a full account of the efforts undertaken by the United Nations pertaining to the situation in the Middle East since June 1967. We have done our best, within the limits of space and time and taking into account the reports previously submitted, to provide the Council with a balanced, objective and comprehensive account.

16. The report before the Council describes great efforts but little progress, and comments on it so far have tended to give more prominence to the latter aspect than to the former. The fact remains that a settlement must primarily depend on the Governments concerned. Neither they nor any other group of Governments has so far been able to devise an effective means of reaching a settlement. Thus the Middle East problem in its various aspects has been brought again and again to the United Nations, which has now been seized of it continuously for more than 25 years. Nor should it be forgotten that during this period the Council, and various instrumentalities set up by it and by the General Assembly, have played a vital role in limiting conflict and in preserving the truce which has prevailed in the area for most of the time.

17. It is perhaps relevant, at the opening of this important debate, to remind ourselves of the basic realities which make the Middle East problem so hard for the Council to tackle. In the Middle East we see in an acute form the interaction of historical developments and situations of various kinds giving rise to emotion and resentment, to fear and conflict, to a vicious circle of action and reaction, violence and reprisal, and to a series of seemingly insurmountable obstacles to the process of conciliation and

settlement. The fact that conciliation and peaceful settlement would unquestionably be to the advantage of all concerned has not as yet carried enough weight to counterbalance the intensity of feeling and conflicts of interest which prevail in the area.

18. Another reality is the wider context of world relationships which are represented in the Council itself. It is no secret that the Council consists of representatives and groupings who represent fundamentally different attitudes to certain international problems, one of which is that of the Middle East. This second reality often makes it difficult for the Council to act with unanimity in promoting settlement of a problem as complex as that of the Middle East. None the less, the debates and consultations of the Council, however acrimonious they may have been at times, have tended to act as a safety valve, as a process for decreasing tension, and as a means of turning away from conflict.

19. These realities must be seen in the perspective of the relevant principles and provisions of the Charter, to which all Member States have voluntarily adhered and which are the foundation of the activities of all organs of the United Nations, including this Council.

20. When it last considered the problem of the Middle East as a whole, more than five years ago, the Council did manage, after great efforts, to adopt unanimously a resolution which was, and still is, the basis for the search for peace in the Middle East. In adopting resolution 242 (1967) the Council demonstrated its willingness and ability to agree on a basic approach to an infinitely complex problem. In now resuming the search for a peaceful settlement the Council has raised hopes of its possibilities for making progress. However, the Council cannot succeed in this quest if the parties concerned do not wish to avail themselves of its efforts and of its advantages as a meeting place for all concerned, a forum of discussion and an instrument for peace. But if, as I have said in the concluding observations of my report, that wish is present, this new effort to find a way to a settlement need not be futile, however great the difficulties. Indeed at the moment there seem to be few, if any, practical alternatives to the efforts of the United Nations in the quest for peace in the Middle East.

21. Obviously I, as Secretary-General, my Special Representative, the Secretariat and the various instrumentalities of the United Nations in the Middle East are at the disposal of the Council and of the Governments concerned to assist in any way we can.

22. May I express here, at the opening of this debate, my earnest hope that the Council's deliberations may contribute to the better understanding of the problem before us and thus pave the way to a more constructive chapter in the history of the Middle East.

23. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): I thank the Secretary-General for his statement. The next speaker on the list is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, Mr. Mohamed Hassan El-Zayyat, on whom I now call.

24. Mr. EL-ZAYYAT (Egypt): Mr. President, first I should like to thank you not only for giving me the floor, not only for your courtesy and the kind words addressed to me but more for convening this meeting. It is really the Council which I am thanking, through you. Its ready acceptance of our request for this meeting and its serious and constructive reaction to that request has been sustained by the thinking and efforts made in the time that elapsed between my requesting the Council's meeting and its convening. Without naming names I wish to thank all concerned.

25. Second, I should like to mention with appreciation the Secretary-General, his Special Representative and all his assistants and thank them for carefully preparing and now presenting the report that the Council asked them to prepare and submit. The report certainly deserves, and will get from us, the most careful examination and attention, and we shall not fail to make on a subsequent occasion any comments or remarks that we may then wish to make. However, it is important to say right now that Egypt agrees with the Secretary-General when he says in his observations:

"The Security Council is, as far as I know, the only forum where all the parties to the conflict have been able to meet together in the same room. In the forthcoming debate it is to be hoped that this advantage may be used for constructive moves. . . ."

I agree with him even more when he says:

"The problem before the Council is an extremely complex and difficult one, which no Government or group of Governments has been able to solve outside the framework of the United Nations." [*S/10929, para. 116.*]

It is inside the framework of the United Nations that we put our case. It is inside the framework of the United Nations that we think the responsibility of the world lies.

26. Third, I have seldom attended any other Council meeting that warranted the presence of eight Foreign Ministers. This shows, as should be obvious to all, that the problem of which the Council is seized is a problem that touches on such grave matters as the effectiveness and usefulness of the Organization itself and the meaning of the Charter, as well as such serious questions as security, justice and peace in our region. I do not know how to convey my thanks and appreciation for the presence of these Foreign Ministers except by saying simply and sincerely that Egypt already feels that its burden has been partially alleviated by their presence.

27. We have requested this series of meetings of the Council to examine and discuss the Middle East situation after six years of effort and endurance have failed to put an end to the Israeli military occupation of our land. During those six long years we have tried every channel consistent with our membership in this Organization and with our commitment to accept the obligations contained in the Charter and to carry out all its decisions and resolutions. During those six long years the eyes of our millions of people have remained turned to the United Nations, at times to this Council, at times to the General Assembly and

at other times to the Secretary-General and his Special Representative. They have awaited with hope the tangible results of these efforts and deliberations. Those hopes, unfulfilled, are giving place to disillusion and scepticism. Already many among our people doubt the usefulness of my coming now to the Council. They question what the Council can do while the aggressor is digging more fortifications and creating more so-called new facts in the conquered lands, acquiring all the time more armour to silence our resistance and to terrorize us into surrender. "Can this Council ever go", they ask, "beyond making appeals or expressing condemnations to be addressed to those who disregard both and heed neither and understand only the language of force?". "How can the United Nations and its bodies help dislodge the military occupants of Egypt, Syria and Jordan and redress the injustices long inflicted upon the people of Palestine?", they ask. "Why then", they ask again, "do you go to the Council?". We do not come to the Council to seek a forum for propaganda. We do not come here to score points or to seek a verbal victory. We do not come to threaten or to seek a showdown. We do not come motivated by mischief or to cause pointless nuisance.

28. A quarter of a century ago the General Assembly by its resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 recommended the partitioning of the land of Palestine as it was under British Mandate into two States, one Arab and one Jewish. Member States of our Organization that have recognized the Jewish State gave it recognition within the frontiers allotted to it in that 1947 resolution. Thus the letter dated 14 May 1948 to the President of the United States by which the Agent of the Provisional Government of the Jewish State, Mr. Eliahu Epstein, sought and received United States recognition clearly stated:

"I have the honour to notify you that the State of Israel has been proclaimed as an independent Republic within the frontiers approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution of 29 November 1947."¹

29. Mr. President, you yourself, as representative of the USSR, on 4 March 1949 addressed this Council to explain the recognition that the USSR had given to Israel. Replying to the query put by the United Kingdom, "Where are the borders of that State?", you said:

"... We all know that its territory has been defined by the General Assembly resolution and that a special map has been attached to that resolution. Those who are interested in seeing the territory of Israel may refer to the General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947 and the annexed map which clearly marks that territory."
[414th meeting, p. 10.]

30. In the past quarter of a century the world has witnessed the Palestinian people being systematically turned into a nation of refugees, huddled in the sector of Gaza under Egyptian trust, and in the West Bank of the River Jordan under the rule of the Kingdom of Jordan,

while the Jewish authorities have systematically and perpetually imported hundreds of thousands of aliens to replace the people of Palestine in their homeland—in their homes and in their fields, but especially in their homeland.

31. Six years ago, in June 1967, the rest of what had been left to the native people of Palestine, including Arab Jerusalem, was invaded and occupied by the military forces of Israel. All the people who were in the then Palestine either are now living under Israeli military rule or have been pushed out of their country to live as exiles, homeless and stateless.

32. Again six years ago, in June 1967, the Israeli military violated the international boundaries between all of Palestine under the British Mandate and its neighbours. Over and above their onslaught on Arab Jerusalem, the West Bank of Jordan and the Palestinian sector of Gaza, the Israeli armies crossed the Egyptian and Syrian frontiers, and seized and occupied parts of the territories of Egypt and Syria; today, almost six years to the day, the occupation remains.

33. In 1967, when an emergency special session of the General Assembly was convened, some Members insisted on immediate Israeli withdrawal to the lines from which they had attacked on 5 June 1967. They thought this was an urgent first requirement, to be followed by consideration of the original Palestinian question. Other States had another approach. Their approach was that it was an opportunity to find a solution for the whole of the Middle East conflict—that is, for the problem of the Palestinians, as well as that of the 1967 attack. The Assembly session, as we know, ended without adoption of a resolution, although it should be remembered that all United Nations Member States agreed on one principle—namely, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967. A Latin American draft resolution which our colleagues here remember well stated that the Assembly:

"1. *Urgently requests:*

(a) Israel to withdraw all its forces from all the [Arab] territories occupied by it as a result of the recent conflict;"²

And unless I am mistaken, in which case I hope I will be corrected, the delegations of the United States of America and Israel voted for that Latin American resolution.

34. On 7 November 1967 Egypt requested the convening of the Security Council in an urgent meeting to consider the dangerous situation caused by Israel's refusal up to that date to withdraw its armed forces from the territories which it had occupied in June 1967. The Council, on 22 November 1967, chose to deal again with the two problems together. It did not limit itself to considering the question of Israeli aggression against the three Arab States, as requested by Jordan, Syria and Egypt: it sought a simultaneous solution to this problem and also to the problem resulting from the 1947 partition of Palestine and the injustices inflicted on the Palestinian nation.

¹ See *The Department of State Bulletin* (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.), vol. XVIII, No. 464, p. 673.

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Emergency Special Session, Annexes*, agenda item 5, document A/L.523/Rev.1.

35. We then called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Israeli forces from all the territories invaded in June 1967. Israel proclaimed that it had no territorial designs against the Arab States at all. That proclamation is contained in the verbatim records. That proclamation is to be considered and contrasted with the Israeli insistence now, officially communicated to the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, that it will never return all the occupied territories and never go back to the lines of 5 June 1967.

36. Israel at that time claimed also that it attacked because it had been exposed to the danger of extermination. This myth too has been dissipated by those who created it themselves. According to a member of the Israeli Council of Ministers—and I shall quote his words—during the six-day war “the story of the threat of extermination was invented by Israel to justify the annexation of the occupied territories”.

37. Another Israeli, General Peled, Chief of the Bureau of Logistics during the 1967 conflict, asserted in 1972 that “there had been no danger of the Hebrew State being exterminated by Egypt”. He even went further and asserted that there had been no proof that the Egyptians had really intended to attack Israel at that time. Then there was another statement. General Haim Herzog, of the Israeli Military Intelligence, admitted, with some embarrassment, the non-existence of such a danger. The daily newspaper of the Labour Party, *OT*, in June 1972, published a debate between Generals Weizmann, Gavish, Peled and Herzog in which they all agreed, without ambiguity, that no danger of extermination had threatened Israel before the Six-Day War.

38. So, from these two postures—having no designs on any Arab territory and having fought just as a reaction to a threat, and now satisfied that they have defeated the threat—what remains of the Israeli posture in the Council in June 1967 is the insistence on holding direct negotiations under the Israeli occupation, between Israel and the countries it occupies. This I do not think Israel will change. I do not think it will change because, as a victor, Israel deems it to be its right to meet the vanquished and dictate its terms. Further, this operation must and should be carried out only outside this Organization, and only while the forces of occupation can make this dictation possible.

39. Since November 1967 the Security Council has met several times to consider certain subjects and matters emanating from this complaint—important matters such as Jerusalem. The Council's resolutions are on record. They certainly have the same weight as all other resolutions. The Council has adopted resolutions on the repeated attacks and acts of violence committed by Israel in the region, and has also adopted several other resolutions.

40. The General Assembly, at four sessions, has also discussed the situation of the continuing aggression and the persisting military occupation of our countries. On 8 December 1972, the General Assembly resolved to refer the question to the Security Council [*resolution 2949 (XXVII)*]. It is now before us.

41. All those United Nations resolutions have, alas, remained mere documents, pieces of paper, known by numbers, repeated like charms, and their magic has been no match for the power of the aggressor. Today, six long years after the Israeli military attack on 5 June 1967, the heavy hand of military occupation is still stifling our national life. A costly war is still imposed on us, a war that we intend to end. The only way we can think of to put an end to it is to put an end to the military occupation. We have accepted and we do accept all the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly in deference to the will of the international community.

42. Egypt accepted the package deal embodied in Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967; Egypt accepted the principle of the appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary General, who was to be Ambassador Gunnar Jarring. Egypt gave him its active support and sincere co-operation when, on 8 February 1971, after four long years of arduous work, he addressed to us, and to Israel, his two identical aide-mémoires [*S/10403, annex I*]. Seven days later, on 15 February [*ibid., annex II*], Egypt gave him the serious commitments which he had asked for, including readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel if Israel also carried out all its obligations under the Charter and as requested by Ambassador Jarring.

43. But Israel blocked the Jarring Mission. Israel challenged Ambassador Jarring's mandate and authority. After a year of challenge, frustration and immobility, he again tried to work. It was suggested in February 1972 that the parties should exchange, through Ambassador Jarring, clarifications of their position on the various subjects dealt with in the Council resolution of November 1967, with a view to formulating provisions for inclusion in a peace treaty. Again, Egypt accepted in an effort to break the impasse. Again, Israel scuttled this latest and last effort, insisting that the so-called Jarring initiative of 8 February 1971 was outside his terms of reference. In a word, Israel threw out the last long six years. It has aimed, and I am sure it still aiming, at keeping the *status quo* in order to perpetuate its occupation and, again I repeat, to terrorize us into surrender.

44. The representatives of the four permanent members—before the admission of China—France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the USSR, supported Ambassador Jarring's aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971. They, all four of them, expressed satisfaction with Egypt's response. They, all four of them, asked that Israel give a similar reply. The four representatives of the four permanent members of this Council, as you know Mr. President, requested the Chairman of one of their meetings, Ambassador George Bush of the United States of America, to convey this position to the Secretary-General, which he did. He conveyed to the Secretary-General the fact that the four Powers supported Jarring, found him to be within his mandate and accepted his aide-mémoire.

45. But the Israelis simply believe that they have conquered and that therefore they must enjoy the fruits of conquest, invoking the obsolete right of conquest. If this right is resisted by Egypt, that resistance must be broken.

The conquered territories must be pacified and controlled by all means. If the conqueror needs more weapons to impose the conqueror's will, he knows where to obtain them. If the Council, if the United Nations deem inadmissible the acquisition of territories by force, that is, in the eyes of the conqueror, a hypocritical and immoral posture to be rejected and disdained. The United Nations has no power to dislodge the occupier militarily or materially, and therefore it warrants no respect whatsoever.

46. Israeli leaders keep insisting on direct negotiations with the Arab States "with no prior conditions". Egypt accepts to have any talks without prior conditions. But do not let us be fooled. Everything, they claim, would be negotiable. In the same breath, the Israeli Government has declared and notified you, Mr. President, and this Council officially by notifying Ambassador Jarring, that it poses a very heavy pre-condition. In its communication to Ambassador Jarring dated 26 February 1971 [*ibid.*, annex III], Israel says it would not withdraw to the pre-5 June boundaries: to wit, it will have to take a part of Egypt and part of Syria and part of Jordan. This is a pre-condition.

47. Another pre-condition is the pre-condition of occupation. The peace *diktat* imposed by the victor upon the vanquished is a pre-Charter concept which the United Nations system has outlawed. Basic norms of contemporary international law contain a rule on the non-validity of treaties imposed under occupation under the threat or use of force. Article 17 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, signed in Bogota in 1948, states:

"No territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized."

But this is perhaps too old, it is 1948. Let us see whether there is some other fresh affirmation. The principle has been clearly stated and solemnly codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties concluded by the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties in Vienna on 23 May 1969.³ Article 52 of that Convention states:

"A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations."

48. We hear of the need to guarantee Israeli security. For the sake of this illusive security they import and manufacture the deadliest weapons in the world today. If we believe them, their security would be satisfied by their being 100 per cent militarily secure, which can only be achieved at the expense of 100 per cent insecurity for our peoples.

49. Israeli leaders now object to American arms sales to some Arab countries. It is not Israel's objection or acceptance that is significant. It is the reason they gave for

that objection. They are apprehensive, they say, lest those arms should correct or upset the balance or imbalance of power between Israel and all the Arab countries combined—after a decade. They are apprehensive that such arms may upset the balance of power between Israel's 2.5 million people and the 125 million Arabs—after a decade. Israel then says that it has now to respond by escalating its territorial claims vis-à-vis Egyptian lands and that it will now have to keep more of those lands of Egypt, including the line of mountain ranges in the middle of Sinai.

50. What does this mean? Does it need any explanation? First, the authorities of Israel do not expect and certainly are not looking for a peaceful settlement in the area for at least another decade. Second, when and if they have this, they must be kept 5,000 per cent stronger than the Arabs, *per capita*. Because if we are going to have all the arms in the hands of 2.5 million which should be in the hands of 125 million—I hope my arithmetic is wrong—it means this is a ratio of 5,000 per cent. It also really means that Israel is looking for any pretext to justify further expansion. This time it means taking half of Sinai; some other time there will be another pretext to take something more.

51. Mr. President, we are not trying to frighten you or to frighten ourselves. I have just spent last night reading a very long symposium by seven former Israeli Chiefs of Staff, organized by the Israeli paper *Maariv* on 6 January of this year and published by that newspaper. It is very long, and I hope I have been honest in trying to boil down to a page the opinions voiced by these seven former Israeli Chiefs of Staff. They are all in agreement on the following.

52. First, they believe that the Arab leaders are now ready and willing to sign a peace agreement with Israel on the basis of Israeli withdrawal to the international borders before 5 June 1967, which they call "the green line" in their symposium. There is a map showing a green line; it is the line of the beginning of the attack of 1967. I repeat: they are all in agreement in their belief the Arab leaders are now ready and willing to sign a peace agreement with Israel on the basis of Israeli withdrawal to the international borders before 5 June 1967.

53. Secondly, they agree that it is preferable for Israel to disregard this Arab readiness for peace and to hold out in the hope of complete Arab capitulation. That capitulation is to come within 30 years.

54. Thirdly, they feel there is now no military danger at all from the Arab countries. They believe the contrary to be true.

55. I do not know if it is possible to reduce 80 or 90 pages to one page, but I think that what I have said is sustained by the verbatim symposium. There are many pages, and different people are speaking. What I have just said is a condensed version. It represents the inner thinking—and it is frightful, really—of Israel. The significance of this thinking should not escape our friends who have advised patience for an unlimited time, hoping for a just solution finally to emerge. It should also not escape the attention of those who declare that they will always sustain the present so-called balance of power, for this is a posture heavily

³ See *Official Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Documents of the Conference* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.70.V.5), document A/CONF.39/27, p. 287.

tilted in favour of aggression and dreams of perpetuating aggression.

56. While the military occupation remains, Israel continues its active war. It continues to change the physical character and demographic composition of the occupied Arab territories in order to create what it has always called new facts and to confront the world with them. To that end, Israel resorts to lawless practices such as the total destruction of towns and villages, mass deportation of inhabitants and, most important, establishment of Israeli military and paramilitary settlements in the Arab territories—concerning which these generals have said, “What we build must stay; it is not prefabricated.”

57. The whole membership of the United Nations must reject these so-called new facts. It is the responsibility of this Council clearly to declare that all changes carried out by Israel in the territories it occupies are null and void—whether they are carried out in Gaza, in Sinai, in the Golan Heights or on the West Bank of the Jordan.

58. In its resolution 2949 (XXVII) of 8 December 1972, the General Assembly called upon all States to avoid actions, including actions in the field of aid, that could constitute recognition of Israeli occupation of Arab territories. The position of the occupying authority and its obligations in regard to the territories under military occupation and to their inhabitants are clearly defined in the basic norms of international law and the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Third parties and all those persons who have taken or might consider taking measures or actions or engaging in enterprises regarding the Arab territories now occupied by Israel that could constitute recognition on their part of that occupation or that might help sustain it should know that Egypt and, I am sure, the other Arab States do not and will not recognize the validity of their actions. International law does not recognize such validity.

59. The millionaires who are gathering in Israel for a fund of funds, with a one-million dollar share, should perhaps hear that. Furthermore, the United Nations membership should—as, indeed, decided by the General Assembly—refrain from giving Israel aid that might help it in its continued occupation of Arab territories. On the contrary, and in an effort of collective security reflected by the presence of the eight Foreign Ministers here, help should be given to the victims of the military occupation in order to rid themselves of this yoke.

60. Security Council resolution 242 (1967), adopted in November 1967, called for the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the lands they had occupied in what the Council then referred to as “the recent conflict”. The Council stressed the right of all nations of the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. The suggestion that omission of the word “the” before the word “territories” in paragraph 1 (i) of that resolution means that acquisition of the entire territory of a Member State is not permissible but the acquisition of small amounts of its territory is permissible does not really warrant any comment here. Most obviously the Council did not resolve, and

could not have resolved, that secure boundaries for Israel be established inside Egypt or inside Syria. The Israel borders that the Council wished to be fixed and recognized could exist only within the geographical area of Palestine which the 1947 General Assembly partition resolution had dealt with [*resolution 181 (II)*]. Any other proposition would evoke such questions—not very serious questions—as the following.

61. Did the Security Council decide, could the Security Council have decided, is it in the power of the Security Council to decide to partition Egypt among its Egyptian inhabitants and those of the Jewish State to which the 1947 General Assembly resolution allotted a part of Palestine under the British Mandate? Did the Security Council decide, could the Security Council decide now to partition Syria, or any other country, among its inhabitants and those of the Jewish State to which the General Assembly allotted a part of Palestine under the British Mandate? Placing the borders inside Egypt or placing the borders inside Syria, placing the borders outside the international boundary of Palestine under the British Mandate would indeed be a new partition of Egypt and a new partition of Syria, and a new partition of any other Arab country—or of any country at all.

62. My coming here, the meeting of the Council, the time which has generously been given to me, and the time of the Council itself will have no relevance unless we hear the aforementioned questions answered loudly and clearly and without any ambiguity, constructive or otherwise.

63. If indeed it was not and could not have been the Council's intention to partition Egypt or any other Arab country, then the Council's decision and resolution would have to demand the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Israeli forces of occupation from all the territories they now occupy, and to affirm the sanctity of international borders. Furthermore, it would have to resolve that all the rights and aspirations of the Palestinian nation be respected, including their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries in their homeland of Palestine as it was before the partition, as it was under the Mandate. They should have been there, and in that land they should have recognized and secure boundaries, the same right accorded to the Jewish State and to all the people of the area by the Security Council resolution of November 1967.

64. Around this table sit representatives of many countries that have recognized Israel. We ask them: did they recognize the State of Israel in any place except within the territory of Palestine under the British Mandate? Has any State represented at this table that has recognized Israel recognized Israel outside the territory of Palestine under the British Mandate? There can be only one answer: it is clear that the boundaries that have been recognized for Israel must be in Palestine. Thus, those boundaries will have to be between Israel and the Palestine nation envisaged in the partition laid down in General Assembly resolution 181 (II) of 1947. Those boundaries can never be outside the international boundary of Palestine and, more precisely, they cannot be and they will not be inside Egypt.

65. We have been subjected to force at various periods of our history of thousands of years, and we have always managed to shake ourselves free. Egypt does not now concede the right of anyone to encroach on its sovereignty or territorial integrity, which even in the darkest hours of its history was left intact. Our territorial integrity and sovereignty will not be touched no matter how strong the forces which the aggressor has in its hands. Syria and Jordan will certainly declare this same conviction.

66. Today the people of Palestine live either under the military rule of Israel or as refugees and homeless persons. They are deprived of nationhood and of the right which the United Nations Charter seeks for all, including the right of self-determination, the same right sought and obtained by Israel. The resolutions of the General Assembly and the resolutions of the Security Council concerning Jerusalem and the Middle East brought them little or no help at all. With their continued suffering the area will know no rest.

67. We have come to the Security Council because the two situations are intolerable. If we are to know peace under international law, we must first secure the immediate Israeli withdrawal from the Arab territories invaded in 1967. The aspirations of the Palestinian nation will then have to be satisfied and their rights guaranteed. A solution is needed which will bring back justice and peace to an area now in the ruthless grip of violence.

68. We proclaim here our respect for the Charter of the United Nations and our acceptance of all United Nations resolutions concerning the present problem. It is obvious that we cannot accept the continuation of the present situation much longer.

69. We have repeatedly announced our readiness to continue Ambassador Jarring's talks with a view to achieving a just and lasting peace. The price, however, has not been and shall not be the betrayal of our territorial integrity or the abandonment of the inalienable right of the Palestinians as a nation to live in peace within recognized and secure boundaries. The Council will certainly clearly endorse these objectives.

70. We remain loyal to the international order which this Organization represents and is meant to defend. It is, however, our responsibility, which the Charter sanctions, to try our best to repel the aggression and to end the occupation of our homeland by every available means.

71. A question you may like to put to the Israeli representative, Mr. President, and one which I believe to be pertinent, is whether or not Israel accepts this principle of non-acquisition of territory by force. Would his reply be in the negative or would there be no reply at all?

72. And I have a word to say about the so-called interim solution before ending. On 4 February 1971 President Sadat envisaged an approach leading up to and organically tied with a comprehensive settlement of the conflict. We sought peace but Israel tried to turn it into a partial settlement—in fact an end in itself which would leave it in occupation of a part of Egyptian territory and leave Egypt

with no hope or promise of redeeming the rest of its territory in any foreseeable future.

73. Let me emphasize that such a so-called partial or interim settlement is completely, definitely unacceptable to Egypt.

74. Before ending these remarks I should like again to express my thanks to the Foreign Ministers of some African and Arab countries for being with us here. This is an historic meeting. My African and Arab colleagues expect no thanks from me. Our cause is their cause. We share really the same things.

75. Speaking of Africa I remember Ethiopia and I remember the League of Nations. Before the League of Nations on 30 June 1936, the Emperor of Ethiopia had this to say:

"...the issue before the Assembly today... is a question of collective security; of the very existence of the League; of the trust placed by the States in international treaties; of the value of promises made to small States that their integrity and their independence shall be respected and assured... In a word it is international morality that is at stake.

"...

"I ask the great Powers who have promised the guarantee of collective security to small States... what measures do they intend to take?

"Representatives of the world, I have come to Geneva to discharge in your midst the most painful of the duties of the Head of a State. What answer am I to take back to my people?"⁴

76. At moments such as this one does not seek to win a battle of words. The only battle I wish to win for my people is the battle against despair. Hope shall find us Charter-abiding Members of this Organization ready to do its will. Despair can only mean that in a cold world unprotected by the Charter each one of us will have to fend for himself as best he can. The question I am asking today is the same that Ethiopia asked the League of Nations in Geneva in 1936: what do I take back to my people?

77. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): I call on the representative of Israel.

78. Mr. TEKOA (Israel): Mr. President, I should like to express to you my respect and cordial wishes.

79. Peace is not an abstract concept. It is not a matter of theory or formulae that can be worked out from a distance. It is a concrete situation which must be built and preserved by those who aspire to live in peace with each other. If a State desires peace, it joins the other party in constructing it.

⁴ League of Nations, *Official Journal, Special Supplement No 151, part II*, p. 25.

80. It is, therefore, regrettable that instead of taking the road of dialogue and agreement, Egypt decided to turn to renewed polemics in the Security Council.

81. Peace is not pursued by recrimination and by fanning the flames of hostility. Israel has sought peace with Egypt for 25 years. It appealed for peace when Egypt tried to prevent Israel's independence. It offered peace when Egypt tried and failed to shatter Israel in the Arab invasion of 1948. It endeavoured to attain peace during the years of Egyptian blockade and terror warfare that led to the hostilities of 1956. It probed all possible avenues to peace in the pre-1967 period. It has repeatedly attempted in the last six years to reach peaceful agreement with Egypt and with the other Arab States.

82. An ancient Jewish sage said: "The world rests on three things—Truth, Law and Peace." Indeed, without truth there can be no law and peace. We must seek out the truth, we must see the facts as they are if we are to build peace.

83. Thus the Government of Israel has repeatedly declared that it does not wish to freeze the existing situation or to perpetuate the cease-fire lines but wishes to replace them in peace with secure and agreed boundaries to be established through negotiation with each of its Arab neighbours. This position is clear. It cannot be distorted by propaganda artifices, by misrepresentation of Israeli actions and misquotations from Israeli statements. The conditions of life in those territories are well known. They have been witnessed at first hand and have been widely reported by numberless outside observers, including hundreds of thousands of citizens of Arab States who visit them annually. There can be no constructive purpose in charges which on the one hand try to paint a picture of total darkness and, on the other, allege at the same time that the high standard of life, the impressive economic development, the freedom of movement and expression either are meaningless or have been ensured by Israel for ulterior motives.

84. This is equally true of misrepresentation of the peace-making efforts since 1967. What, in fact, have been the salient developments during this period in the search for peace?

85. First, to the world-wide call to peace in the Middle East, Egypt and other Arab States reacted with the notorious Khartoum resolution of 1 September 1967: "No recognition, no negotiation, no peace with Israel".

86. Second, when the Secretary-General's Special Representative commenced his mission at the end of 1967, Israel presented to him a detailed agenda for direct peace talks. Egypt rejected both the agenda and the idea of such negotiations.

87. Third, Ambassador Jarring proposed then a different method. In March 1968 he invited the parties to send delegations to Cyprus for conferences under his auspices. Israel accepted. Egypt refused. This was a crucial test of the parties' attitude. The Secretary-General's Special Representative tried to bring about meetings between the parties, for this was the normal, logical and constructive manner of

conducting his mission under resolution 242 (1967). The Arab refusal was a decisive turning point. Thereafter the mission found itself in ever-growing difficulties.

88. Fourth, Egypt intensified its violations of the cease-fire along the Suez Canal until by early 1969 it declared the so-called war of attrition against Israel. A solution was to be achieved not through negotiation and agreement with Israel but by the use of arms and through coercion by the great Powers. When the four-Power talks began in April 1969, President Nasser announced that in order to impress the participating States with the need to exert pressure on Israel he intended to "heat up" the cease-fire line—and he did. In those conditions there was little that Ambassador Jarring could do.

89. Fifth, Israel persisted, however, in its efforts towards agreement with Egypt. In September 1968 it transmitted through Mr. Jarring to the Foreign Minister of Egypt detailed proposals for peace negotiations. In October 1968 a peace plan enumerating nine points, including *inter alia* the establishment of secure and recognized borders to be laid down by mutual agreement, was submitted by Israel to the General Assembly.⁵ Later Israeli memoranda based on the nine-point programme were transmitted to the Governments of Egypt and Jordan. All this proved to be in vain.

90. Sixth, the attempt to use military and political force against Israel failed. In August 1970 at the initiative of the United States the cease-fire was restored and an understanding reached to resume the Jarring talks. In approving the Israel Government's decision to accept the American peace initiative, the Knesset expressed support for a permanent peace with Egypt and Jordan inclusive of a "withdrawal of armed forces of Israel from territories occupied since the 1967 conflict and as a result of it to secure and agreed borders to be laid down in peace agreements." However, no sooner had that arrangement entered into force than Egypt violated it by moving missiles into the standstill zone, thus raising the question of confidence in undertakings solemnly given.

91. Seventh, Israel asked that this grave issue be clarified and that Egypt rectify its breach of the agreement under which the Jarring talks had resumed and were to be pursued. Egypt refused.

92. Eighth, on 22 December of that year the Government of Israel nevertheless decided to try again to help advance the peace mission and declared that "the present political and military conditions" enabled the Jarring talks to resume.

93. Ninth, Ambassador Jarring was invited to Jerusalem for conversations with the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Documents containing Israel's views on "Essentials of Peace" were presented to him, for transmission to the Governments of Egypt and Jordan. Both Israel and Mr. Jarring expressed the hope that a process of quiet diplomacy would now ensue to permit a serious exchange of ideas. The Egyptian Government reacted with

⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1686th meeting, paras. 109-118.

a series of papers couched in the language of propagandistic recrimination and requested their circulation as Security Council documents. The attempt at quiet diplomacy was stillborn. The effort to initiate a meaningful exchange collapsed. This was accompanied by Egyptian threats not to prolong the cease-fire and to start shooting again. In these circumstances, Ambassador Jarring suggested that Israel accept the Egyptian position on the question of withdrawal.

94. Tenth, this suggestion was transmitted in the aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971. Israel was asked not only to agree to withdraw to the old line but to do so in a prior commitment. Egypt and its supporters had failed in their attempt to introduce a provision for such withdrawal in Security Council resolution 242 (1967) adopted on 22 November 1967. Now it was put forward with a proviso that Israel's acceptance was a pre-condition for the continuation of the Jarring talks. The condition to continue the talks was thus the exclusion from them of the central question that was to be agreed upon between the parties: the question of secure and recognized boundaries. The aide-mémoire of 8 February requested also that the Government of Egypt, on its part, give a prior commitment. In the words of the Secretary-General's report before the Council:

"The United Arab Republic would give a commitment to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and to make explicitly therein to Israel, on a reciprocal basis, various undertakings and acknowledgements arising directly or indirectly from paragraph 1 (ii) of Security Council resolution 242 (1967)." [S/10929, para. 80.]

In this manner Egypt was asked in 1971 to accept the essence of the 1967 resolution—conclusion of an agreement with Israel on a just and lasting peace. In return for such acceptance, Israel was to accede to the demands for which Egypt had failed to obtain the Security Council's approval.

95. Eleventh, despite this development, Israel expressed its readiness to pursue the talks without pre-conditions. Egypt continued, however, to insist that Israel should accept the Egyptian *diktat*.

96. Twelfth, all attempts by Israel and by others to remove this impediment have failed.

97. Thirteenth, the 8 February 1971 aide-mémoire and the General Assembly resolutions supporting it thus remained obstacles preventing progress in the Jarring mission. They remain such obstacles to this very day. They also endanger the only Security Council resolution which both parties have accepted. Indeed, the commitments which Israel took upon itself in respect of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) are contingent on its original text and its original interpretation.

98. Fourteenth, another avenue was opened in early 1971, when the United States proposed that Israel and Egypt enter into proximity talks for a special arrangement to reopen the Suez Canal to international shipping, providing also for a withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Canal to an agreed distance. Israel agreed. Thus far Egypt has not. In July 1972, the Prime Minister of Israel appealed to the

President of Egypt to open a new chapter in the annals of the Middle East by sitting down to the negotiating table. On that occasion the Prime Minister clarified that for Israel the partial Suez arrangement does not bear the character of finality but is viewed as one step, after which additional steps would immediately follow until eventually a permanent and agreed border had been established.

99. This is the record of the last six years. These are Israel's continuous efforts to reach agreement with Egypt. This is the story of Egypt's flight from peace. It is a story of rejected peace proposals, of opportunities for peace brushed aside, of efforts to bring the parties into meaningful exchanges undermined. Had Egypt reacted favourably to these opportunities, peace might have already been achieved.

100. Looming over these developments is a perturbing question: Has Egypt abandoned the ultimate objective of bringing about Israel's destruction as an independent State? This is a question asked again and again whenever Egyptian leaders speak of Israel's withdrawal as being only the first stage in a continuing struggle that will go on. It is a question which poses itself in the light of Egypt's identification with terrorist organizations the avowed objective of which is Israel's liquidation. It is a question which turns into grave suspicion of Egypt's real intentions when Egypt and other Arab States boost the terrorist organizations and their aims in the United Nations by creating the issue of the so-called "inalienable rights of the Palestinians", at the expense of the people of Israel, to the exclusion of the Jewish people's inalienable rights to self-determination and national independence, and despite the fact that the Palestinian State of Jordan is already a full-fledged Member of the United Nations.

101. Notwithstanding this sombre view of Egypt's position, Israel does not give up hope for peace and understanding with its neighbours. Israel will continue to search for peace with perseverance and goodwill. It will strive for peace with determination to safeguard its rights, but also with understanding and respect for the rights of other States. It will be steadfast in the defence of its views, but at all times considerate of the views of its neighbours. It will explore all realistic possibilities to attain genuine peace.

102. The melancholy chronicle of peace-making efforts in the last six years has much to tell about such possibilities. To ignore the lessons of those years would leave us in the morass of frustration. If there is a sincere desire for peace, the mistakes of the past will not be repeated. If the road to peace is to be kept open, it will not be encumbered with new barriers even before the old ones have been removed.

103. The preceding years have made it abundantly clear that the use of force against Israel is futile and will not bring closer a solution of the conflict. The rights to life and freedom and security are too precious for force to have any effect on the Israeli people's unity and determination to guard and defend them.

104. The people of Israel have demonstrated that they face with equal resolve other forms of coercion. The Arab States have tried to bring it about in a variety of ways.

They thought to exert pressure through one-sided resolutions in the United Nations and in other international organizations. Egypt and other Arab States have attempted to impose their will through the two great Powers and through the four permanent members of the Security Council. They tried to pressure Israel through *ad hoc* committees, through special committees and advisory groups and through demands for time-tables, calendars and guidelines contrary to Israel's legitimate interests. The Arab States apparently did not wish to recognize that, after 25 years of siege and embattlement and gigantic burdens and vicissitudes, Israel is not a country that would yield to coercion.

105. If the experience of the last few years has demonstrated an incontrovertible fact, it is that there can be no imposition of a solution from the outside. If there is a message to be retained from that experience, it is that Israel will not be drawn into any process that would introduce third Powers and their own differences, whether as members of committees or participants in consulting groups, into a conflict which only the parties themselves can settle. Such processes would render the situation even more complex than it is, and Israel will not prejudice its search for understanding and agreement with its neighbours by the deliberate injection of additional complicating factors.

106. Another fundamental premise that emerges from the experience of recent years is that Israel will under no circumstances relinquish its right under international law to have the boundary of peace established for the first time in the Middle East through negotiation and agreement; nor will Israel acquiesce in any other change in the substance, balance or interpretation of resolution 242 (1967). Egypt's attempt to tamper with resolution 242 (1967), and especially to exclude determination of secure and recognized boundaries from the process of agreement between the parties, has been the main obstacle to progress in the search for peace.

107. The purpose of resolution 242 (1967) is to establish a new situation and not to restore the one created by the provisional military Armistice lines, a situation of vulnerability and peril that resulted in the 1967 hostilities. It is clear that the "secure and recognized boundaries" are not defined in the resolution, being dependent upon negotiation and agreement. There is no rule or principle in international law that prevents agreed border changes in peace treaties even when recognized boundaries already exist. In any event Israel's acceptance of the November 1967 resolution was and is based on that assumption.

108. It is thus evident from the preceding years that resort to force, coercion, pressure and tampering with the original text and interpretation of resolution 242 (1967) are not methods that can bear fruit. These are means which will impede the search for peace and have already done so and must not be tried again if there is to be progress towards settlement.

109. On the other hand there is one method that has not been applied throughout these years—that of dialogue between the parties. While all the others have already been

tested in the Middle East situation and have proved unsuccessful and even harmful, the method of negotiation has remained conspicuously absent. It has brought about settlement of wars and disputes in other parts of the world. It has achieved understanding between old and fiery opponents. There is no justification whatever that this method should be ostracized in the Middle East. It is inherent in the 1967 resolution's basic concept of agreement between the parties. The one way in which the United Nations could at this stage make a constructive contribution to the solution of the Middle East problem would be by encouraging the parties to enter into negotiations. If Member States desire to assist the parties in a tangible, effective manner, they will promote the initiation of a negotiating process. Surely the exchanges of acrimony across the Security Council table cannot be more edifying or beneficial to the cause of the Arab States and Israel alike than exchanges across a negotiating table.

110. We take note of the statement made by the Foreign Minister of Egypt that Egypt accepts direct negotiations with Israel without prior conditions. Much that Minister El-Zayyat said after that destroyed the significance of that declaration and turned it into another seemingly polemical argument. Yet, this is an opportunity that the Security Council must not and cannot miss. This is a challenge to which it must respond. This is the hour for the Security Council to call on the parties to enter into direct negotiations without any pre-conditions. The eyes of the world are on this chamber. Will it now live up to the historic test? Will it now turn away from the methods which have proved to be fruitless in the past, and will it guide the parties to the path of negotiations, the only one that can lead to peace?

111. This is the road Israel invites Egypt and the other Arab States to take. Israel considers that the most practical way would be to follow this road step by step, beginning with the proximity talks for the reopening of the Suez Canal. Israel is prepared, however, to enter into any free negotiations without pre-conditions. It has no ultimative demands. It does not ask Egypt to accept in advance any Israeli views or positions on any point, and in the same way it cannot accept in advance, as a pre-condition, the Egyptian demands. Israel seeks an honourable, meaningful dialogue in which the parties would engage in a joint effort to find mutual accommodation and agreement on every question.

112. The time has come to apply the method of negotiation. The alternative is the continuation of the impasse. If Egypt wishes to move out of it, there is no justification for delaying any further the negotiating process with Israel. If Egypt recognizes Israel's right to independence and sovereignty and seeks genuine peace, there can be no reason to hesitate about entering into a serious dialogue with Israel. For the good of all nations in the Middle East this will, hopefully, be soon.

113. Six years ago Egyptian belligerency, pursued against Israel since 1948, reached its climax. The Arab Governments, led and directed by Egypt, methodically prepared and mounted an assault designed to bring about Israel's total destruction. The world watched and listened in shock

and trepidation. The world has not forgotten. Israel has not forgotten. We know what would have happened had Egypt succeeded. We still remember President Nasser's declaration of 27 May 1967: "It will be a total war and the objective will be to destroy Israel".

114. When Israel emerged from the peril of those days, its first act was to call for peace with Egypt and with other Arab States. Today, we are doing that again. We hope that this time Egypt will accept. We hope that this time it will join Israel in building peace together, for that is the only way in which it can be built.

115. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): I call on the representative of Jordan.

116. Mr. SHARAF (Jordan): Mr. President, allow me to express to you my Government's highest respect and esteem on your assumption of your high office. Your wise and firm leadership is a guarantee for the successful management of the Council's affairs.

117. After nearly six years of agony, failure, outbursts of violence and the unmistakable signs of inevitable explosion, the Security Council is taking up again what it had started but left unfinished in November 1967. The urgent effort at peacemaking, initiated by the Council then, is now, through both commission and omission, nearly a dead body. The omission belongs to the Council, which outlined in its resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 the course of a just peace in the Middle East but failed to follow up its pronouncement with concrete and timely action. The commission falls upon Israel, which had created the problem in the first place and has since 1967 worked diligently to compound it and close every avenue for its just and constructive resolution. The Security Council is meeting today to confront both those aspects of the explosive Middle East situation.

118. Let us start with the role of the Security Council. But before I speak of what the Council has omitted to do and what it must, by right and by duty, do, allow me a little introduction of my country's place in the Council's concerns and proceedings. Jordan is a major aggrieved party in the present conflict in the Middle East. It is connected by bonds of history, geography, interest, grievance, suffering and claim for justice to the realities of war and peace in the Middle East. It is a country torn by occupation, bleeding every day in economic, human and emotional terms. Over one third of Jordan's citizens have been under occupation since June 1967. Nearly one third of its total population consists of displaced refugees tossed into its embraces by the ruthless vivisection of Palestine in 1947-1948. Hundreds of thousands of its own and other citizens have since the 1967 occupation flooded its eastern region as displaced persons. The economic and social burdens of the occupation, and its continuing corrosive effects, are only matched by the anguish of national dismemberment. Jordan has, therefore, a direct and urgent interest in a serious and early action by the Security Council to end the occupation, liberate the people now in bondage and establish a just and lasting peace in the area. With its Arab partners, Jordan is united in this goal because it most directly feels the problem.

119. Let us now get back to the role of the Security Council. The Council has two main sources of guidance to act upon in dealing with the situation in the Middle East. The first source is its own constitution: the Charter of the United Nations. The second is its own resolutions on the question. How do those instruments of guidance apply to the Middle East conflict?

120. One has to look at the condition in the Middle East to come readily to the answer. One Member of the United Nations, Israel, occupies today, and since June 1967, the national soil of three countries Members of the United Nations: Jordan, Egypt and Syria. It refuses to withdraw under any conditions. Initially it claimed it was only seeking guarantees for future peace after its withdrawal. When the Security Council adopted a clear resolution to that effect, and the Arab parties concerned gave their assent, Israel reversed its position and spoke categorically of retaining the Arab territories occupied through conquest, in part or in totality, under any circumstances.

121. On this matter the guiding principles of the Security Council are clear. The Charter, the primary source, is based on respect for the territorial integrity of States and on the undertaking by Members not to use force against the territorial integrity and political independence of States. The most relevant Council document in this regard, after the Charter, is Security Council resolution 242 (1967). It emphasized unequivocally in its preamble the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, giving a decisive judgement on how its provision for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the occupied territories is to be understood. Neither the law of the Charter, therefore, nor the provisions of the Council resolution condone an Israeli acquisition of any part of the occupied territories. This is both obvious and logical.

122. But for six years now, the Council has omitted action on this matter while Israel has been actively doing and saying the very opposite of what the United Nations rules. Its leaders spoke loudly of their determination to stay in and absorb what amounts to all of the occupied territories. Its diplomatic agents recorded with the United Nations and with its instrumentalities their Government's official policy of expansion at the expense of the occupied territories. The actions of Israel matched the words. Israel is engaged feverishly in consolidating its occupation and absorbing the areas under occupation. All occupied areas are witnessing the imminent danger of loss of national character. Settlements are being planted in the various parts of the occupied territories. By the beginning of this year over 50 settlements had been established in the West Bank of Jordan, in the Golan Heights, in Gaza and in Sinai. Mahoula, Argman, Haboqi, Ma'aliah Ephraim, Kiryat A'rba, Rosh Tsurim, Shavot Allon, Gilgal, Meso'ah, Na'ran, Geteet, Ramat Baniyas, Gesher, Ramat Shalom, Giv'at Yu'ab, Nahal Golan, Nahal El-Al, Nahal Uz, Nahal Yam, Nahal Sinai, Nahal Netsorim, Nahal Morag and many others are mushrooming in the occupied Arab lands and in the midst of the Arab people who inhabit those lands. Various means are used by the occupying Power to annex the areas surrounding those settlements. Through outright confiscation, forcible transfer of population or other means of pressure the land is being taken over by the occupation authorities, and the

Israeli physical and demographic presence is creeping into the Arab areas. It is a process of national replacement, much more fearful and radical than the traditionally known violations of human rights for people under conventional occupation. It is a process that evokes the memories of pre-1948 in Palestine, when piecemeal demographic invasion—also through agricultural-military settlements—culminated in the forcible and collective expulsion of the people of Palestine and their exclusion from any right to return to their homeland.

123. Nowhere is this fearful operation of national and cultural replacement more direct and immediate than in the heart of the occupied lands, in Jerusalem. Inside and outside the walls of the Old City in Arab Jerusalem large-scale confiscation of land is coupled with the physical elimination of ancient quarters for the erection, on their ruins, of Israeli structures and dwellings. This is happening all over occupied Jerusalem. Shu'fat, Sheikh Jarrah, Jabal Al-Masharif, Hai Al-Magharibah, Sharafat, Beit Hanina, Qalandia, Al-Ram, Al-Tur, Al-Nabi Samuel—all those ancient names and areas are quickly vanishing. The new Israeli quarters which are being imposed on those Arab areas would accommodate, according to an early version of the Israeli plan, no less than 122,000 Israeli Jews. It is a calculated demographic and physical strangulation of the Arab inhabitants and owners of the land, and a gradual elimination of the City's Arab identity. It takes place within the framework of Israel's official, if arbitrary, annexation of occupied Jerusalem in 1967. It therefore goes parallel with the other equally ruthless, legislative, cultural and economic operations undertaken by the occupying Power to effect the total absorption of Jerusalem in the political and economic body of Israel. Innumerable methods, both subtle and crude, are employed by the occupation authorities to pressure the Arab inhabitants to give up or sell their property and to emigrate. The long-established educational, cultural and legal institutions of the people of occupied Jerusalem are dissolved, subverted or taken over by Israel. The beautiful, unique, pluralistic and serene Jerusalem is now the victim of physical and cultural mutilation and the captive of fanatical chauvinism.

124. As the heart of the occupied lands, Jerusalem, bleeds, the rest of the body is being disfigured. While the Israeli settlements mushroom on confiscated land in the occupied West Bank, Gaza, Rafah and Golan, terrific pressures are applied to the people to give up their farms and small factories and join the horde of Arab cheap labour in Israel. Permanent Israeli industrial projects are set up in the occupied territories. Cut-throat competition and discriminatory regulations are reducing the active and prosperous inhabitants of the West Bank of Jordan to a state of helplessness. The economy of the West Bank and of the other occupied areas is manipulated to serve the needs and policies of the Israeli economy. It is, in fact, being fully integrated into the economy of Israel.

125. Human beings, who are the most important component of nations, are the target of a systematic Israeli game of geo-politics. Over a half-million Arabs from the occupied territories had to flee the area of hostilities in 1967. East Jordan received some 400,000 displaced

persons. Despite repeated calls on Israel by the Security Council and the General Assembly, the vast majority of those displaced persons have not been allowed to return to their areas of residence prior to the hostilities. From Gaza alone, over 45,000 displaced persons are still dwelling in temporary shelters in East Jordan—which is perhaps understandable: the people of Gaza have been in the centre of this massive demographic dislocation; tens of thousands of them have been tossed about while their dwellings have been bulldozed; Gaza itself is being quickly absorbed into Israel.

126. The sum total of what is happening in the occupied territories is a sad and shocking spectacle of national dissolution and national displacement.

127. For six years, the Security Council has watched but refrained from action on this shocking spectacle. It is true that other organs and committees of the United Nations have concerned themselves with these problems and adopted appropriate resolutions. Many times, the Assembly has reproached Israel for its actions. Invoking the general and specific instruments and provisions of humanitarian international law, it called upon Israel to desist from changing the physical character and demographic composition of the occupied territories. It condemned the violations of human rights by the occupying Power. It expressed its opposition to Israeli's radical measures of confiscation of properties, deportation, transfer of population, establishment of settlements, collective punishment, violation of religious sites and holy places, and annexation of occupied areas. So did the Commission on Human Rights, and repeatedly. In fact, the General Assembly established the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories—a committee which, incidentally, was repeatedly denied entry and co-operation by Israel. How reminiscent of Israel's similar attitude towards the mission set up by the Secretary-General in accordance with Security Council resolution 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971 on Jerusalem.

128. So the United Nations has indeed pronounced itself many times on Israel's policies and actions throughout the last six years. But for those pronouncements and resolutions to have effect the Security Council must intervene with its implementing power. That has not yet happened, but that is what is needed. The reason why it has not happened is the fact that since adopting its resolution of November 1967 the Council has been deriving patience, if not satisfaction, from two deceptive appearances: first, the cease-fire system has not yet collapsed; secondly, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General assigned to the task by the Security Council is still technically engaged in the peace-making operation. Well, both appearances are deceptive. I shall try to explain why.

129. First, the cease-fire is an interim, transitional stage. It cannot last or be an end in itself. It is not an alternative to a peace based on respect for territorial integrity and freedom from foreign domination. At this moment the cease-fire is based on an abnormal situation. It freezes a situation which is contrary to the very basis of the Charter of the United

Nations, a situation in which Israeli forces occupy an area three times the size of Israel, belonging to three countries Members of the United Nations and inhabited by over a million people. It is imperative for the Council to work against the freezing of the present situation because the freezing of the situation means its swift deterioration. Under the umbrella of this frozen situation, Israel is frantically changing the character of the occupied areas and absorbing them irreversibly.

130. If nothing is done by the Council to halt the Israeli actions in the occupied territories, the goal of peace will continue to be eroded to the point where it could become completely unachievable. Israel will have locked itself in its insatiable greed and self-created vicious circle of violence.

131. So the cease-fire is a deceptive appearance. It cannot be relied upon to produce peace by itself. It is no alternative to a parallel and successful United Nations operation to end the occupation and transform the cease-fire into a genuine and just peace.

132. There is another deceptive appearance which must not distract the Council from coming to grips with its responsibility in the Middle East. The valiant and honourable representative of the Secretary-General has not yielded or given up in his determined effort to carry out his mandate of peace making in the last five and a half years. But his technical engagement in the effort does not relieve the Council of its responsibility to render every support and assistance to him and to remove the objective difficulties and obstacles hindering the successful conclusion of his efforts. At the moment the Jarring mission is completely deadlocked. The factual and objective report of the Secretary-General, which is now in the hands of members of the Council, is a chronicle of Israeli obstructionism. It shows clearly and poignantly that every time the Arab parties opened themselves to an honourable peace Israel blocked the road. Every time the Arab parties responded positively to the initiatives of the Special Representative, of the Security Council or of the General Assembly, Israel met those initiatives negatively.

133. Two years passed after the adoption of resolution 242 (1967) with Israel refusing explicitly to accept the resolution. Three years passed with Israel refusing to accept or mention the word "withdrawal". Jordan and its Arab partners received Ambassador Jarring a dozen times in their capitals. They made clear commitments to the acceptance and implementation of resolution 242 (1967) in all its provisions. They accepted in it the balance of obligations between the Israeli obligation to withdraw and the Arab commitment to a guaranteed peace. They made clear and positive statements in answer to Ambassador Jarring's questions regarding the provisions of the resolution such as the definition of peace, the demilitarized zones, freedom of navigation in the international waterways, the refugee question and others. But Israel neither accepted the principle of withdrawal nor even gave the Special Representative its definition of the extent of its so-called "secure boundaries". When four permanent members met in consultation to render some necessary support and assistance to the Special Representative, Israel raised sharp protesting

noises and exerted every effort to frustrate this Security Council initiative. When in June 1970 the United States of America undertook a unilateral initiative to reactivate the Jarring mission in the context of a general cease-fire, Israel expressed bitterness and anger and chose the earliest moment to sabotage the renewed peace efforts and suspend its co-operation with Ambassador Jarring. When the Special Representative, in the course of his normal efforts, made ordinary and logical suggestions in February 1971 involving the principle of withdrawal, Israel virtually boycotted the Special Representative's mission until this moment.

134. Whenever Governments friendly to Israel suggested that the provision for withdrawal in resolution 242 (1967) meant real withdrawal, Israel depicted this normal suggestion from a friendly source as a cardinal sin and heaped abuse on the leaders of those countries. How can the mission of the Special Representative achieve any measure of success with one party so totally opposed to its fair and objective operation?

135. We have heard the Israeli spokesmen speak of "negotiation". We have heard them pose as the advocate of dialogue in this question. But any deeper look beyond the slogan reveals its deliberate misapplication in the present situation. Negotiation is a method to achieve a concrete goal. Israel's verbal utilization of the slogan does not exempt it from the goal that any peaceful method is normally designed to achieve. What does "negotiation" mean when Israel makes its own claims and territorial ambitions not negotiable? What does negotiation mean when Israel rejects beforehand the two main Arab claims, which are the essence of the present issue? The Arab States directly concerned define their case as the termination of Israeli occupation and respect for the inalienable rights of the Palestinian Arabs expelled from their homes. The United Nations has explicitly recognized both rights. Israel is *a priori* opposed to both these rights, as the records of the United Nations show, but speaks at the same time of "negotiation". Nothing can be more meaningless and misleading. This is why the United Nations and the international community cannot and should not leave the situation in the Middle East to be decided by the party which, at the moment, has the stronger coercive force and the most extreme territorial and political designs.

136. We must put the whole Middle East conflict within its simple and proper context. The ramifications of the Arab-Israeli conflict are many and complex, but its essence is simple. The Arabs did not create the Arab-Israeli problem; it was imposed on them. It started when a peaceful and prosperous land, Palestine, inhabited and owned by Arabs, was forcibly emptied and taken over. The Arab neighbours shared the grievance of their uprooted and displaced brothers and sensed the danger of the expanding force in their midst. In their pain and alarm they sought not revenge, but redress for their grievance and assurance for their safety. Israel completely rejected the course of peaceful redress to the Palestinians, including the appeals and demands of the United Nations that the displaced Palestinians be allowed repatriation to their homes and compensation for their losses. While Israel stubbornly denied justice to the Palestinians it was inviting Jews from all over the world, on the sheer basis of religion, to emigrate

and settle in the homes of the Palestinian Arabs. It followed that the Arab States withheld their recognition of this unjust situation. It also followed that the Israelis had to pursue their logic of force to its necessary conclusion. Hence the war of 1967, a dramatic expansion of earlier limited attacks on the neighbouring Arab States, which brought under Israeli occupation substantial territories and masses of people belonging to three Arab States.

137. The Israeli pretexts for the war of 1967 are immaterial. The supreme fact is that the impulse of force and militarism has governed Israel's approaches to the problems it created with its neighbours. In the origin of the problem Israel totally ignored the rights and even the existence of the Palestinian Arabs when it commanded enough military power. Later it resisted any just solution to their tragedy for two decades, under the shield of its own or imported power. Finally, it sought to silence the protests of the neighbouring Arabs by a massive military conquest, believing that force was the way to break the back of the complex political, human, ethical, emotional and geopolitical problems it had created with its neighbours. By its intransigent and negative posture today it is escaping again from a constructive solution to a violent confrontation.

138. But the logic of force is self-defeating. If the Israeli leadership today does not know it, the Security Council must. That is why the Council cannot, in fairness, accept the role of an observer in this situation. The United Nations is a party. It is not a third party. It cannot remain silent while the logic of force unleashes destruction in the Middle East. It cannot sit by and watch masses uprooted, borders violated, national entities torn and one State engaged in a fantastic game of destruction and self-destruction. The role and duty of the Security Council are obvious. They are made even more so by the fact that with the exception of the attitude of one party, the objective conditions of peace and justice are achievable. On our part, our position is simple and reasonable. We want the occupying forces to evacuate our national soil. No territorial exception is morally permissible or practically feasible. We continue to believe that the legitimate and inalienable rights of the Palestinian Arabs must be respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and its resolutions. On these foundations a just and lasting peace can be established. We are committed to the preservation of such a lasting peace, when its prerequisites are realized.

139. So the task of the United Nations is simple but serious. It requires that the international community muster its will and resources and put them in the right direction. If the United Nations fails in this, it will have no excuse. The guiding principles are clear. The conditions of peace in the Middle East are clear. The obstacles are not insurmountable. The United Nations must succeed in the interest of peace in the Middle East. But it must succeed, and even more so, in the interest of peace in the world and a viable and civilized international order.

140. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): The list of speakers for today's meeting is now exhausted. It was my intention to adjourn the meeting at this point, but the representative of Israel has asked to speak in exercise of his right of reply. In view of the time factor, I consider it

necessary, in calling on him, to draw attention to one of the provisions in the conclusions of the Special Committee on the Rationalization of the Procedures and Organization of the General Assembly approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 2837 (XXVI). Paragraph 77 of those conclusions states, with regard to the "right of reply", that the Special Committee recommends to the General Assembly that delegations should use restraint in the exercise of their right of reply, both in the General Assembly and in the Main Committees, and that their statements in exercise of that right should be as brief as possible.

141. This is a rule of procedure of the General Assembly and it might be objected that it does not apply to the Security Council, but, none the less, in view of the time factor, I felt it necessary to recall this working practice of the General Assembly.

142. I call on the representative of Israel.

143. Mr. TEKOAH (Israel): I regret that I have asked for the floor at this late hour. This debate and its unfortunate polemics are not of our initiative, but I think that some of the abuse and distortions to which the representative of Jordan has subjected this Council cannot be left without reaction.

144. As I said in my first statement this morning, at least let us see the facts, let us describe the facts as they are. I am not going to enter into a lengthy discussion about Israel's acceptance of resolution 242 (1967) and of the principle of withdrawal, but what we have heard from the representative of Jordan today is an utter absurdity and I would simply suggest to him that he reread and restudy the report of the Secretary-General, and, if that is not sufficient, that he should turn to a statement made by me on Israel's acceptance of that resolution—not in 1970 and not in 1971, but on 1 May 1968 [*1418th meeting*].

145. Jordan's history is interwoven with Israel's. Jordan has its origin as a distinct entity, in the 1922 partition of Palestine. It was then that the greater part of Palestine was separated from the territory on the West Bank of the river and constituted into the Palestinian Arab Emirate of Transjordan. However, the British High Commissioner of Palestine remained also the High Commissioner for the eastern part of Palestine, for Transjordan. The population of what had become Transjordan by that partition was composed entirely of Palestinian Arabs. Transjordan was barred to the Jews returning to their ancient homeland pursuant to the mandate of the League of Nations. In 1948 the country became the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. It could have been hoped that an Arab State constituted of most of the territory of Palestine would at least respect the Jewish people's right to enjoy its freedom and to restore its sovereignty in the remaining parts of the country which has always been the Jewish national homeland. But this was not to be.

146. The history of Israeli-Jordanian relations is the tale of repeated attempts to persuade Jordan to remain at peace with Israel and of Jordanian refusals and decisions to participate in the aggression of other Arab States against the Jewish State. On the eve of Israel's independence a

delegation headed by the present Prime Minister, Mrs. Golda Meir, visited King Abdullah in Amman. It tried to dissuade him from attacking the nascent State. However, on the day of Israel's proclamation of independence the Jordanian forces began their invasion in defiance of the United Nations. Jerusalem with its holy places was besieged and indiscriminately shelled. The Jewish quarter of the Old City was razed and its entire population expelled. The Jewish villages in the Etzion area south of Jerusalem were overrun and completely destroyed. The village of Beit Haarava, which had gained renown for its soil desalination and successful cultivation on the arid shores of the Dead Sea, was captured and devastated. The same fate befell Atorot and Beit Yacov to the north of Jerusalem. All inhabitants were driven out of these Jewish localities.

147. At the end of the fighting Jordan remained in control of part of Jerusalem and of the West Bank. Unilaterally it annexed the occupied territories. Now it sits as a Member of the United Nations. In the entire world only two States recognized that annexation. Nineteen years later, during which period Jordan served as a base for almost continuous terrorist murder attacks against Israel, the Government of Israel appealed again to Jordan not to join in aggression against it. On the morning of 5 June the Government of Israel transmitted to the Jordanian Government a message through the United Nations Chief of Staff, General Bull, saying that Israel would not initiate any action against Jordan even though by then the hostilities between Egypt and Israel had already broken out, and appealing to Jordan not to intervene and not to attack Israel. The Jordanian answer came in a series of attacks at various points of the Armistice Demarcation Line and in the bombardment of West Jerusalem. Even after that the Government of Israel tried three times during that day of 5 June to reach a cease-fire with Jordan. The Jordanian Government rejected all these efforts and intensified its attacks along the entire front, concentrating particularly on Jerusalem.

148. The outcome is known. The Jordanian forces were thrust out of the areas they had occupied in violation of the United Nations Charter in the 1948 aggression. In the light of these facts the charges of aggression levelled by Jordan against Israel are historical, political and juridical nonsense.

149. So also are the allegations regarding the situation in Israeli-administered territories. Jordan's own record of occupation of these areas is a grim one. The 19 years of Jordanian rule was a period of suppression and exploitation, riots and strikes. Military repressive measures against the local population, including the killing of demonstrators and mass arrests were a daily occurrence. The West Bank was deliberately kept in a state of economic neglect and backwardness. Indeed it is instructive that the only way in which Jordan ever expressed its purported concern for the inhabitants of the West Bank has been in anti-Israeli propaganda distortions. Why has the Jordanian Government's interest in the life of these Arab inhabitants been aroused only when Jordan was no longer in occupation of the West Bank?

150. For 19 years the Jordanian Government had the opportunity to demonstrate regard for the rights and needs

of the Palestinians of the West Bank. For 19 years the Jordanian Government could have shown its understanding and sympathy for the Palestinian population of the West Bank. Why did the Jordanian Government suppress them politically? Why did it sentence them to economic stagnation? Why did it not help them to raise their standard of living as Israel has done? Why did it not assist them in developing their agriculture as Israel has in the past six years? Why did it not encourage the establishment of industry as Israel has done? If the Jordanian Government is sympathetic towards the Palestinian refugees, why did it not provide them with full employment, with salaries equal to those of non-refugees, with public services, as Israel has done in less than a third of this time? Why did Jordan not permit the founding of a university on the West Bank as Israel has done? If Jordan really has at heart the freedom and human rights of the Arab population of the West Bank, why was there so much less freedom of thought and expression and so much more political restriction than there is today?

151. An understanding of the real situation on the West Bank does not have to rely on Israeli sources. There are enough Arab reports which testify to it.

152. As for Jerusalem, it is still healing the wounds inflicted on it by the Jordanian invaders. The latter left no stone unturned in the Jewish quarter of the walled city. All houses, synagogues and institutions of learning were destroyed. Tombstones of the most ancient Jewish cemetery, on the Mount of Olives, were removed and used for paving roads and constructing latrines in Jordanian Army camps. Access to the holy places of Judaism was barred for the first time in two thousand years. Jordanian forces kept the city under permanent threat of violence, opening fire time and again on Jewish inhabitants and on tourists, killing and maiming. Jordan, responsible for so much devastation in Jerusalem and desecration of its holy places, has no right whatever to interfere in the life of the city, which is flourishing and developing, the barbed wires and minefields that bisected it gone, its inhabitants tranquil and secure, its holy places protected under the administration of their religious communities and free access to all of them ensured by the authorities.

153. Jordan's presence on the West Bank was the result of aggression and unilateral annexation. The only international instrument sanctioning this presence was the Armistice Agreement with Israel, which established a temporary situation, with provisional military lines separating the armed forces of the two parties. The definitive situation and the recognized State boundary between Israel and Jordan can be determined only through negotiation and a peace agreement with Israel. Israel is prepared to enter into free negotiations whenever the Government of Jordan is ready for them. However, one thing is clear. The road to peace does not lead through calumny and public polemics in the United Nations. Let us, therefore, turn away from that and join together in constructing peace in the Middle East.

154. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): I call on the representative of Jordan to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

155. Mr. SHARAF (Jordan): I shall resist the urge to be drawn into a polemical debate based, as far as one side is concerned, on mythmaking—a talent that the Israeli representatives and their spokesmen everywhere have excelled in. In fact mythmaking has been associated with the record of Israel in the Middle East. The chronicle of the violent Israeli record in the Middle East is linked to it. The myth of Zionism was the rationale for the uprooting and dispossessing of the Palestinian people. The myth of overwhelming Arab predominance and preponderance and belligerent designs was the smokescreen for Israeli intransigence and militarism. Israel's successive waves of military expansion were covered by slogans of defensive war and pre-emptive strike to frustrate Arab strangulation. So the mythmaking and the distortion on the part of the Israeli representatives are not new. However, the important fact, which goes beyond all discussion and all disagreement on the facts, is not a debate over the juridical, political entities as much as the existence in that area of a certain culture and a certain national entity which has been usurped, uprooted and violated and an extension of which is now under occupation by Israel. This has nothing to do with 1922. It has nothing to do with what legally constituted Government existed and exercised jurisdiction in this or that area.

156. Jordan is proud of its record. It has completed over 50 years of existence as a political entity in the Middle East, but its roots and its people belong to an ancient civilization that had its physical and human presence, beyond the legal and the constitutional framework. It was against that human cultural entity that Israel perpetrated its first wave of aggression against the Arab world. There were people—call them Palestinians, call them Arabs, call them, more recently, Jordanians, call them whatever you want—who existed and owned a certain land, Palestine. They belonged to a certain cultural entity. It was against them that a violent force, an alien force, embarked. It descended upon them, violently expelled them and turned them into exiles in 1947-1948. It was in response to their appeals that the Jordanian Government and other Arab Governments then entered Palestine to defend them from annihilation and from actual dispersement. The comparison between the annihilation of the State of Israel and the annihilation or expulsion or uprooting of the people in the area is the difference between the myth and the reality. The living body is there: the Palestinian Arabs. However, when Jordan entered Jerusalem and the West Bank, it was an Arab country, an Arab people, joining in the defence of a neighbouring Arab people, at the invitation of and to support that people. The natural union that emerged between the West Bank of Jordan and East Jordan was something that came about not by occupation of a foreign country but by the constitutional democratic expression of will, at the request of the people in that area and in defence of their own national existence. It is enough to mention a few Arab names in this connexion. These areas were taken over by Israel not when Jordan attacked or when Jordan entered the area in 1948 but before that: Qazaza, Haifa, Salameh, Bir Adas, Kanna, Deir Yassin, Lejun, Tiberias, Jerusalem, Jaffa and then West Jerusalem.

157. How can the Israeli representative claim any possession over Jerusalem, when physically the Arab population

of Jerusalem in 1948 owned 82 per cent of the whole city? And even the reduction in ownership came as a result of that artificial injection of an alien body throughout the mandatory period.

158. However, I need not defend the unity of the people of the two Banks of Jordan. It is no wonder that Mr. Tekoah refers to this as occupation. That is a projection of Israel's own designs. When the people of East and West Jordan decided in 1949, through a democratic and constitutional process, to join an equal and constitutional partnership, they were only expressing an objective human, cultural and geographic reality; they were defending themselves.

159. With regard to Israel's intentions towards Jordan and the long years in which Israel chose to have a quiet and friendly relationship with Jordan, I need mention only several names. Qibya was not an attack by Jordan against Israel: it was an attack by Israel against Jordan. So was Nahalin; so was Samu'; and, of course, so was the massive attack of 1967. Our record in the West Bank and in the various parts of the Kingdom is something we take pride in. Objective observers have repeatedly viewed with admiration the fact that a small country with limited resources was able, through sheer force of will, to create confidence and bring about development and prosperity within its borders. I shall resist the urge to dwell on this subject. It is enough to mention that as one economic unit Jordan demonstrated a remarkable rate of growth and modernization throughout the 15 years prior to the Israeli occupation of 1967. In fact, Jordan was undergoing one of the most far-reaching economic and social advances among the countries of the third world. This fact was readily recognized by Governments and international agencies, including the United Nations. A United Nations publication of 1970 entitled *The measurements of development effort*⁶ cited Jordan as the first among 56 countries in terms of its rate of growth. In all this, Jordan, with its limited size and resources, had to rely on the resourcefulness of its own people. The proud men of the West Bank, many of whom had lost land, property and savings in the disaster of 1948, though not technically refugees, were rebuilding with determination and hope a new future and a new society.

160. In the 1967 annual report of the World Bank, the President of the World Bank commended the remarkable performance of the Jordanian economy and indicated that Jordan could maintain its growth and momentum and could accordingly double its gross national product in less than 10 years. The same was attested to by the International Monetary Fund and other objective organizations.

161. In Jerusalem Jordan continued the tradition of Arab stewardship and Arab protection of the Holy Places which had been in effect for centuries; it continued to maintain serenity, peace and respect and freedom of access by all faiths. It was not against Jews that there was any discrimination, but it was Israel which, by taking a totally negative attitude towards a solution, and even towards a

⁶ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.71.II.D.4.

partial acceptance of the appeal of the United Nations back in 1949 [*General Assembly resolution 303 (IV)*] to allow freedom of access to the Holy Places by all sides, brought about the reprisal of the Jordan Government against Israel. It was Israel which rejected the appeal of the Conciliation Commission in 1949 to allow freedom of access to all faiths on all sides, when Jordan, Syria, Egypt and Lebanon accepted it.

162. When the Israeli representative refers to the record or the domestic affairs of Jordan, he is using an argument which has long been rejected logically as an argument *ad hominem*. The issue is not how a country rules itself; the issue is not how successful it is in developing its economic resources or in developing its political institutions perfectly. The issue with which we are confronted is: Is any country entitled to occupy another country and to dehumanize that part which it occupies in the name of an imaginary, or perhaps even a real, superior political institution or economic structure? That is precisely what the Israeli representative has been saying.

163. But we are proud of our record in both social and economic development and in the area of developing our democratic political institutions. We cannot claim that we have been perfect, nor can any country in the third world claim any substantial measure of perfection; but we can always claim determination and sincerity. The important factor is that a country has no right to trample under foot the national identity of another, to cross its border and enslave its people. Whether that is done in the name of superior economic potential or in the name of a "civilizing mission", this Council and the United Nations as a whole have rejected that anachronistic and reactionary argument in all the forums of the United Nations.

164. What we are faced with is not a discussion of comparative records or comparative political and economic structures. The issue before us is that one country at the moment occupies the territory and enslaves the people of another nation. It has no right to do so, under any pretext, under the slogan of any myth or in the context of any mythological or fictional claims. The occupation must end. The people in the occupied territories will have an opportunity to express their choice; they can play their role, which they have done and will continue to do, in the construction of their political institutions and in deciding their own future. This the Jordan Government has repeatedly said.

165. The only hindrance to this effective and most constructive solution is the fact that Israel opposes it because it cherishes and covets the territory of the people who are now under its occupation. And if we defend the right of those people, it is not only by the authority that has been expressed through our constitutional structures and through the freedom of expression of our people on the West Bank, but also because, as a Member of the United Nations, we cannot tolerate, nor can any other Member, the usurpation of the lands of others, the encroachment on the borders of others, or the enslavement of people belonging to another State or nation. This is the issue before this Council; and in asking it to bring about a solution of this problem and an end to the occupation, we have continued

to maintain that we want that to be done through this Organization, through peaceful methods—not with a sense of vengeance but with a sense of grievance, and with a sense of claiming justice. That is what we have asked this Council do do; no fictions, no inventions, no mythical distortions can change the issue which is before us.

166. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): I call on the representative of Israel to speak in exercise of the right of reply

167. Mr. TEKOAH (Israel): I have taken note of the fact that the representative of Jordan explains to us that he does not wish to consider the political, the juridical, even the economic aspects of the situation—all this after we have heard accusations levelled against Israel in every single one of these realms: political juridical, economic. The representative of Jordan wants to defend the feelings of the Arab inhabitants of the West Bank. Now, let the Arab inhabitants of the West Bank answer themselves in an Arab paper. The Beirut daily *Al-Hawadess* writes on 23 April 1971 of the Israeli administration as compared with the Jordanian rule. I quote—and I have the paper here in Arabic:

"Those arriving from the West Bank defined the situation thus: We have not forgotten, nor will we ever forget the type of rule which degraded our honour and trampled the human feelings within us, a rule which they built by their inquisition and the boots of their desert men. We have lived a long period under the humiliation of Arab nationalism and it pains us to say that we had to wait for the Israeli conquest in order to become aware of human relationships with citizens."

168. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): I call on the representative of Jordan who wishes to exercise his right of reply.

169. Mr. SHARAF (Jordan): I shall be very brief. The quotation that the representative of Israel has just marshalled before us does not change the main argument. My main point is not that economic, human and political considerations are not relevant—they are relevant—but that the overriding fact before this Council is that no cultural, national entity can trample over another. That is the issue, the main issue.

170. As for the quotation that the Israeli representative has just brought before the Council, it is a quotation that we have heard a number of times. One can always find quotations in papers, either reflecting a genuine appraisal, but subjective appraisal, of the source, or—and the Israeli representatives have been very good at this—reflecting the opinion of a collaborator in the occupied territories, which again is a normal situation in all national conflicts and all situations of occupation. But the overriding fact remains the one I just mentioned before the Council. It is not just the expression of the feelings of the Arabs. In addition to the juridical and the political and the economic factors, the important and overriding factor is that no country, under any pretext, can trample over another culture, another national identity and another national State.

The meeting rose at 2.15 p.m.