

UNITED NATIONS



SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

TWENTY-EIGHTH YEAR

1713th MEETING: 16 MAY 1973

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1713)	1
Adoption of the agenda	1
Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:	
(a) Letter dated 8 May 1973 from the representatives of Guinea and Kenya to the President of the Security Council (S/10925);	
(b) Second special report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia (S/10920 and Corr.1)	1

NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

SEVENTEEN HUNDRED AND THIRTEENTH MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 16 May 1973, at 4 p.m.

President: Mr. Rahmatalla ABDULLA (Sudan).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Australia, Austria, China, France, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Yugoslavia.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1713)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:
 - (a) Letter dated 8 May 1973 from the representatives of Guinea and Kenya to the President of the Security Council (S/10925);
 - (b) Second special report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia (S/10920 and Corr.1).

The meeting was called to order at 4.35 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:

- (a) Letter dated 8 May 1973 from the representatives of Guinea and Kenya to the President of the Security Council (S/10925);
- (b) Second special report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia (S/10920 and Corr.1)

1. The PRESIDENT: I have received from the representative of Somalia a letter containing a request for an invitation to take part in the discussion of the item on the agenda under the terms of Article 31 of the Charter, without the right to vote. In accordance with the usual practice of the Council and with the provisional rules of procedure I propose, if I hear no objection, to invite the representative of Somalia to participate in the discussion under the terms of that Article.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Nur Elmi (Somalia) took a place at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT: The first name on the list of speakers is that of the representative of Somalia, on whom I now call.

3. Mr. NUR ELMI (Somalia): Mr. President, I am very grateful to you and to the members of the Security Council for giving my delegation an opportunity to take part in this debate on the question of the implementation of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia—a question which my delegation has always followed closely and in which we have in the past been directly involved.

4. But before turning to this question permit me to express my delegation's sense of satisfaction at your presence this month as President of the Security Council, an office which you are eminently qualified to fill. We recall with pleasure the close co-operation which existed between our two delegations during Somalia's term of office on the Council and we know that your personal qualities of statesmanship and concern for justice will continue to be used in the cause of peace.

5. In the view of my delegation, the second special report of the sanctions Committee poses the following questions. Is the Security Council serious about the implementation of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia or is it not? Will the Council continue with the policy of applying pressure by such gradual steps that the illegal Rhodesian régime is given ample opportunity to arrange to circumvent the sanctions, or will it act decisively and powerfully to achieve the objective of bringing down the Smith régime and helping to establish a just society in Southern Rhodesia?

6. Of course, the Security Council, like the United Nations as a whole, represents only the thinking of its members. It has no separate will apart from theirs and no magic wand to turn its decisions into reality. One can only hope that once the Council has committed itself to a course of action its members will co-operate in its effective implementation so that threats to peace can be prevented or ended and the Council's authority can be maintained. In the context of the Southern Rhodesian situation that hope often seems in vain.

7. For example, there is a frightening similarity between the way in which the Rhodesian situation is developing and the way in which the South African problem was allowed to develop. In the Rhodesian problem now, as in the South African situation a decade ago, there is the same correlation between the increasing boldness of the minority régime in applying its racial policies and the failure of the international community to match its condemnations with effective action.

8. The newspaper headlines tell us, on the one hand, that the Smith régime in Southern Rhodesia has taken the first steps towards establishing Bantustans or that the civil liberties of Africans in Southern Rhodesia—in Zimbabwe, that is—have been further curtailed on racial grounds, and on the other hand we are told that sanctions have been openly breached by the supply of Boeing jet airliners from a West German company, and, of course, that sanctions have been breached by the United States importation of \$13 million worth of strategic commodities since the passing of the Byrd amendment. It is interesting to note in this connexion that the United States now plans to sell its stockpile of strategic metals, and according to a *New York Times* report of 1 May, nickel, which is one of the metals imported from Southern Rhodesia, is one of the surplus metals to be sold. I need make no further comment on the discrepancy between this development and the reasons which were given originally for the import of strategic materials from Southern Rhodesia by the United States. Whether sanctions have been breached openly or secretly, the fact is that they have been seriously undermined. This is authenticated by statistics given in annex V of the fifth report of the sanctions Committee¹ and noted by the representative of Yugoslavia in his statement to the Council last Monday [1712th meeting]. He pointed out that exports from Southern Rhodesia are almost at pre-sanctions level and that imports into that Territory have surpassed the pre-sanctions level by \$60 million.

9. It is clear from all the information that is available that the 135 violations reported to the sanctions Committee represent only the tip of the iceberg, so to speak, with regard to sanctions violations.

10. It is in the context of the shameful gap between principles established by the United Nations and the practice of many Member States that my delegation wishes to express its strong support for the proposals put forward by the African members of the Council. These proposals represent the absolute minimum that should be expected from the Security Council at this time. My delegation supports also the suggestion of the delegation of China in paragraph 37 of the report. My delegation also fully supports the proposals of the Soviet Union, which represent the optimum approach to the problem, calling as they do for the extension of sanctions to South Africa and the Portuguese Territories and the interruption of all means of communication with Southern Rhodesia.

11. Both the African and the Russian proposals are aimed principally at stopping the major leaks in the sanctions at their principal sources. It is obvious to everyone that sanctions against Southern Rhodesia will never succeed unless concomitant action is taken against South Africa and the Portuguese administration in Mozambique and Angola, which not only disregard the sanctions themselves but act as the channels for the clandestine trade carried on by many of the highly industrialized countries. The Security Council is, after all, committed under resolution 320 (1972) to attacking this particular aspect of the problem, and the frame of reference given to the sanctions

¹ *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-seventh Year, Special Supplement No. 2.*

Committee includes proposals for extending the scope of sanctions as well as for improving existing arrangements.

12. My delegation believes that the recommendations and proposals contained in section III of the report, on which there is a consensus, are valuable ones which would certainly go far towards improving existing arrangements. However, with the exception of the proposals for action by the sanctions Committee to assist Member States in implementing sanctions, the recommendations describe what one would expect to have been the normal procedures enforced during the past eight years by Governments with any real intention of complying with sanctions. There is a certain irony, for example, in the fact that after sanctions have been in effect for eight years it is still necessary to emphasize, as in paragraph 16 of the report, that awareness on the part of Member States of the whole purpose of the United Nations sanctions policy is vital.

13. It is section IV of the report, on which no consensus has so far been reached, that contains proposals for extending the scope of sanctions and for a truly significant sharpening of the application of existing measures. The feasibility and scope of the African proposals contained in both sections III and IV of the report have been fully described by the representative of Guinea [*ibid.*] and need no further elaboration. My delegation wishes, however, to single out a few proposals which appear in section IV of the report and which, in our view, particularly deserve wide support. The African and British proposals to involve insurance companies in the effective application of sanctions measures seem to us to be eminently practical measures which at least deserve exploration. The denial of landing rights to the national carriers of countries which continue to grant landing rights to aircraft from Southern Rhodesia or operate air services to Southern Rhodesia would be a direct and telling indication of the seriousness of purpose of the Security Council. The extension of the Beira blockade to cover Lourenço Marques and a call to Member States to join with the British Navy in patrolling Beira would be valuable extensions of measures that are essential to any blockade. The British proposal on domestic legislation to provide for action against nationals and companies that seek to avoid sanctions would seem to be a basic prerequisite to the control of trade with Southern Rhodesia and, therefore, to the implementation of sanctions in accordance with the international obligations of Member States.

14. My final observation on section IV concerns paragraph 33. My delegation has noted the significantly wide support that has been expressed for the recommendation that the United States be asked to co-operate fully with the implementation of sanctions by revoking its existing legislation permitting the importation of minerals from Southern Rhodesia. My delegation joins its voice now—as it has so often done before—with other voices which call for a return by the United States Administration to a sense of its moral responsibilities towards the African people of Southern Rhodesia and of its political and legal responsibilities as a permanent member of the Security Council. It is to be hoped that despite the lack of consensus over the proposals in section IV of the report the way is still open for

agreement to be reached on many of the valuable measures that are outlined therein.

15. Finally, I should like to take issue with one view expressed in section V, that, since existing provisions are not being adequately applied, it is useless to add new measures with no guarantee that they will be more adequately enforced than the existing measures. Obviously there is as much need for the will to enforce measures as there is for their devising. But the cynicism and apathy of the past should not constitute a permanent barrier against new initiatives and bold approaches. My delegation believes that the time is ripe for such initiatives. With all their short-comings, existing sanctions are hurting the Rhodesian economy by creating a chronic shortage of foreign currency. This has given rise to a number of political and economic problems and no doubt caused the régime of Ian Smith to seek a formula—albeit an unsatisfactory one—for solving the constitutional problem with Britain in 1971. This is certainly not the time for the Security Council to feel defeated over the issue of Southern Rhodesia. Perhaps the Council should remind itself of the reasons why it is committed to the use of economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, and why it must not fail to achieve its goals. It should remind itself that it has taken this action in order to prevent the full implementation in that Territory of the same *apartheid* policies whose application in South Africa constituted a crime against humanity. It has taken this action on behalf of a people who seek the modest goal of equal opportunity in their own native homeland. The Council should remind itself, too, that it is committed to the effort to establish a just society in Southern Rhodesia because the massive attack on the rights of innocent people, such as is being attempted in that Territory, creates a situation which threatens the peace of the region and which, within the context of the whole southern African situation, could well threaten international peace and security. It is within these wider contexts that the vigorous application of new and old measures to bring down the rebel régime in Southern Rhodesia must be made.

16. Mr. SOEGOMO (Indonesia): Mr. President, before speaking on the substance of the question before us today, my delegation would like to avail itself of this opportunity to congratulate you upon your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of May. We are convinced that under your able and experienced guidance the Council can look forward to a month marked by achievement. In this regard, my delegation promises you its fullest co-operation.

17. May I also express, on behalf of my delegation, our deep appreciation to your predecessor, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar of Peru, for the skilful manner in which he conducted the affairs of the Council during a most difficult and delicate period.

18. The Council has before it the second special report of the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia. This report is submitted to the Council in accordance with Council resolution 320 (1972) which was adopted in September of last year. The report is a product of hard and often frustrating work and its finalization could

not have been achieved but for the untiring efforts of the whole Committee under the able leadership of its Chairman, Mrs. Jeanne Martin Cissé, in collaboration with the officers of the Committee, to all of whom my delegation would like to express its gratitude.

19. Having been directly involved in the proceedings of the Committee, as have the members of the Council, my delegation will therefore limit itself to some brief comments on the Committee's report which was introduced to the Council by the representative of Guinea on Monday [1712th meeting] with her usual eloquence and clarity.

20. The recommendations and suggestions as presented in section III as well as the proposals contained in section IV of the report were based upon the working paper submitted by the delegations of Guinea, Kenya and the Sudan. The proposals as they originally stood in the African working paper were designed to exert more effective pressures upon those countries which continue to demonstrate varying degrees of laxity in their observance of the obligations decided upon by the various United Nations agencies. The original African proposals envisaged adequate measures to cope effectively with the increasing clandestine and overt violations of the sanctions in contravention of the provisions of resolution 253 (1968). These proposals would impose a more detailed examination of documents on consignments emanating from South Africa and the Portuguese Territories; they would also ensure rigid probing and identification of "suspect cargoes". These proposals furthermore envisaged more specific methods in the procurement of details regarding sanctions-violating operations and the ways and means to expedite the necessary actions once this information was supplied. Moreover, greater public pressure was to be exerted upon those Governments which do not live up to their obligations.

21. These proposals should have merited more serious consideration since, in the opinion of my delegation, they are consistent with the reality of the situation. It is therefore with regret that my delegation noted the inability of some delegations to accept the just and proper demands submitted by the African members of the Committee.

22. My delegation supported the African proposals in the belief that their adoption would more positively assist the effective implementation of the various methods of sanctions already prescribed by the Security Council in previous meetings. We would indeed have been happier if those proposals could have enjoyed the Committee's unanimous approval in order to accommodate more effectively the provisions incorporated in paragraph 4 of resolution 320 (1972). My delegation would like to stress the foregoing because it is now more important that we pursue a more effective implementation of the sanctions rather than endeavour to formulate numerous sanction methods whose implementation lack practicability. In this connexion, permit me to remind the Council that one of the conclusions of the Security Council Special Mission to Zambia in its assessment of the conditions in the area was that the key to the solution of the problem dealt with in resolution 326 (1973) lies in the application of, among others, the strict implementation of the mandatory sanctions against the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia. I feel

the need to refer to the Special Mission's report² to underscore the importance for stricter implementation of the mandatory sanctions because of "the flagrant and widespread violations of sanctions," that are still being practiced in certain quarters, as is clearly brought out in paragraph 21 of the Committee's second special report.

23. My delegation does not suppress the fact that it is not completely satisfied that the proposals submitted by the African members could not have been accommodated in their entirety. Nevertheless, we are happy to note that there are recommendations that have enjoyed unanimity of approval by the Committee. I do not need to take up the time of this Council to dwell on these recommendations at length. The representative of Guinea had already dealt with them when she introduced the report to the Council at Monday morning's meeting.

24. I should like, however, to revert briefly to paragraph 19 of the report, which is actually an offspring of paragraph 13 of the Committee's special report of 9 May 1972 [S/10632]. The latter stated very clearly that the secretariat of the Committee should be in a position to keep the Committee continuously informed of all developments relevant to the task entrusted to it by Security Council resolutions 253 (1968), 277 (1970) and 314 (1972). The secretariat should also initiate any specialized studies required by the Committee with the assistance, when necessary, of other competent departments of the Secretariat. It is obvious that this task involves a great deal of extra duties for the already heavily burdened secretariat of the Committee. My delegation therefore fully endorses the recommendation in paragraph 19 of the report, which recommends the appointment of an individual with experience in international commerce, particularly of trade conducted through third parties, to assist the Committee's secretariat so as to enable the latter to keep the Committee continuously and adequately informed of developments relative to its task as entrusted to it by the relevant Council resolutions. The reasons for and desirability of reinforcing the secretariat with an individual of such wide experience have already been clarified by the representative of Guinea.

25. The recommendations and suggestions that we now have before us, as they appear in section III of the report, are, to a great extent, a rather watered-down version of some of the African proposals. This mild version of the original African proposals leaves, in the view of my delegation, no room for expansion of sanctions, nor other concrete actions which should be taken against the open and persistent refusal of South Africa and Portugal to implement sanctions against Southern Rhodesia.

26. I have already stressed the necessity of a more effective implementation of the sanctions. My delegation therefore regrets the absence of censure in the Committee's report against Member States that violate these sanctions. We are convinced that a corresponding degree of censure against such violations would effectuate a more rigid implementation of the sanctions as defined in the related Security Council resolutions.

27. As I stated earlier, my delegation does not intend to tax the patience of this Council by commenting individually on the numerous recommendations and proposals. The Committee's report is clear and self-explanatory. The proposals, though not fully meeting the wishes of my delegation, could be considered a step in the right direction. As such, they should not be considered as being conclusive, but rather as a step leading towards a more stringent and effective implementation of the sanctions in order to achieve the ultimate purpose of the United Nations with regard to Southern Rhodesia: namely, the elimination of the illegal minority régime of Ian Smith.

28. It is with these considerations in mind that my delegation commends the Committee's report for unanimous approval by the Council.

29. Mr. SCALI (United States of America): The second special report of the sanctions Committee gives me my first opportunity to speak to an issue to which the United States delegation attaches great importance.

30. At the outset I wish to reaffirm my Government's full support for majority rule in Southern Rhodesia and the sooner the better. This is the objective fixed by this Council and is the reason that it voted for sanctions in the first place.

31. That objective has not yet been achieved. At the same time, there is no doubt that sanctions have inflicted hardships on the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia. The original framework of sanctions as set out in resolution 253 (1968) is a valid one. What is required is to act now to make the present sanctions more effective rather than to expand or widen their scope. For the first time the sanctions Committee has come to grips with some of the fundamental stumbling blocks to full implementation. The agreed recommendations and suggestions in the report offer a serious prospect of making sanctions more effective. Therefore, they have our full support.

32. What has the Committee accomplished? If we accept its recommendations and suggestions, the Council would request States to take effective measures to examine cargoes which, because of their nature or because they were shipped from Angola, Mozambique or South Africa, can reasonably be suspected to be of Southern Rhodesian origin. States would also be asked to report on measures taken to prevent sanctions evasions. With the co-operation of Governments, experts would be made available to an importing country, if so desired, to inspect suspicious cargoes to determine their true origin. If it were established that such cargoes originated in Southern Rhodesia, they would be seized or disposed of in accordance with domestic laws and regulations. These recommendations are fundamental and can be effective if we, the Members of the United Nations, respond quickly and positively, without exception.

33. The Committee has also recommended that it urgently produce a manual containing information on the necessary documentation and clearing procedures to help determine the true origin of suspected cargoes. My delegation will co-operate fully in the preparation of such a manual. We

² *Ibid.*, Twenty-eighth Year, Special Supplement No. 2.

will, for example, pass on to the Committee the lessons that we have learned in testing products that might be of Southern Rhodesian origin. I would point out, however, that while such tests can be very effective for such products as chrome ore, ferrochrome and asbestos, we have not yet developed technical tests to determine the origin of some other products.

34. Members of the Council may recall Mr. Phillips' statement of 29 September 1972 [1666th meeting] in which he noted that close study of trade statistics contained in the Committee's fourth report³ would be illuminating. He underscored the fact that import statistics of certain materials—produced both in Rhodesia and in neighbouring countries—provided by importing States show considerably higher figures than export statistics provided by Rhodesia's neighbours. The natural inference is that trans-shipment of Rhodesian commodities through those areas accounts, in large part, for the discrepancies.

35. My delegation welcomes the fact that this point was stressed in paragraph 21 of the Committee's report. That paragraph noted the discrepancies in trade statistics in the Committee's fifth report and recommended that the Secretary-General bring them to the attention of countries trading with Angola, Mozambique and South Africa. It also recommended that the comments of countries concerned be solicited along with information on those countries' procedures to ensure that products from Southern Rhodesia are not being imported disguised as products of Angola, Mozambique and South Africa. These replies are to be published. However, it would have been more appropriate to ask States to take the necessary action to ensure that such discrepancies do not mask the importation of disguised Rhodesian goods. This would have gone to the heart of the problem and been consistent with other recommendations of the Committee. We hope the Committee will give fuller attention to this matter with particular reference to the relevant sections of the fourth and fifth annual reports. In this connexion the compendium on South Africa's external trade for the years 1965 and 1971 prepared for the Committee as working paper S/AC.15/WP.65/Corr.1 of 9 April 1973 is also a useful document.

36. The sanctions Committee has worked long and hard to prepare its report and, I am glad to say, my delegation actively participated in its preparation. I wish to express our appreciation to the delegations of Guinea, Kenya and the Sudan for making a wide variety of proposals for the Committee's consideration. All these proposals were genuinely intended to obtain wider compliance with sanctions. If we could not accept all of them, it was because they raised certain practical and legal difficulties. For the most part, however, the proposals were accepted, and we hope they will contribute to tightening sanctions against Southern Rhodesia.

37. The United States has constantly reiterated its belief that sanctions could have more effect on the policies of the Smith régime if they were thoroughly implemented in the

spirit which lies behind resolution 253 (1968)—the achievement of self-determination and majority rule in Southern Rhodesia. We commend the Committee for its efforts, which are a concrete and realistic step towards that end.

38. Mr. SEN (India): Mr. President, in congratulating you on your presidency of the Council for the month of May we express more than our usual goodwill for, in our opinion, it is most apt that you who have struggled persistently and diligently for the freedom of oppressed people should preside over our debate on Rhodesia. You have our full co-operation and understanding in guiding the work of the Council on this and other difficult questions which we shall be facing this month.

39. We should also like to place on record our admiration for the smooth and efficient manner in which your predecessor, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar of Peru, conducted the affairs of the Council last month.

40. We have noted the admirable and eloquent manner in which the Ambassador of Guinea, Mrs. Jeanne Martín Cissé—who is unfortunately not here with us today—introduced the second special report on sanctions on Rhodesia. Listening to her and subsequently reading the text of her statement again and again in the verbatim record [1712th meeting], my delegation could not help feeling that she was speaking with utmost distress at the delay which has occurred in introducing the principle of self-determination and independence of Zimbabwe on the basis of majority rule. We share her feelings and find nothing in the present report which encourages us to believe that sanctions in the future months and years will be more effective than they have been until the present in their main objective of bringing down the Ian Smith régime. The reasons for this conclusion are well known and have indeed been referred to by speakers before me. When one analyses the various proposals mentioned in section IV of the report, it is quite clear that only two or three countries prevent the application of measures, which the vast majority not merely of the Security Council but of the United Nations membership as a whole consider necessary—indeed essential—to make the policy of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia effective.

41. This morning those of us who wished to hear heard over the wireless that, according to Rhodesian sources, two young Canadian women and an American had been killed by Zambian soldiers. Assuming that the facts are correct, we must regret the death of innocent people and convey our sympathies to the families. Nevertheless, this reported incident, which has been covered by various news media this morning and which is supposed to have been announced by sources described variously as the Government of Southern Rhodesia, a Minister of the Government of Southern Rhodesia, and an official spokesman of the Government of Southern Rhodesia, raises a number of questions.

42. First, how and why do these visitors find themselves in Rhodesia? Who authorized their passports, endorsements for Rhodesia and visas for Rhodesia? Why is it that the news media, which should know better, continue to refer to the illegal régime of Ian Smith as "the Government of

³ *Ibid.*, Twenty-sixth Year, Special Supplement No. 2 and 2A.

Rhodesia"? If these unfortunate people went to Rhodesia as tourists—Victoria Falls is supposed to be attracting thousands of tourists every year—is it not time that we should, as part of our sanctions, take steps to discourage such tourism? Lastly, does not this incident, with its attendant circumstances, portray an insensitivity—I almost said callousness—about the fate of Zimbabwe and all that the majority of the people there are suffering? It seems to my delegation that apart from the policy of sanctions—because of the attitude of some countries, not all of which are necessarily great Powers—very little has been done through the news media and general official policy of Governments to bring to the attention of the public the tragedy of Zimbabwe and the need to make everyone conscious that any help, encouragement or recognition, direct or indirect, to the white régime of Ian Smith in that country adds to the length and bitterness of the struggle for freedom of the Zimbabwe people as a whole and frustrates to a great extent the efforts of the United Nations and of the Security Council in particular.

43. Turning to the specific report before us, we consider that section III, containing the agreed recommendations, does mark a small step forward. This section falls far short of what we, along with the African members and Indonesia, Panama, Peru and Yugoslavia, would have wished. But it was clear to the Committee that agreement on the African proposals could not be achieved.

44. However, as section IV indicates, a large number of proposals was forthcoming, and we do not see why some of them, on which there is no general agreement in the Committee, cannot be pursued in the Council. In paragraph 23 of the report the Soviet Union made comprehensive proposals which would deny South Africa and Portugal, as also the illegal régime of Zimbabwe, the export or import of many vital goods. We would have been quite prepared to support this proposal. The African counter-proposal that States should limit their purchases of certain goods from South Africa and Mozambique to the 1965 level is not only modest but eminently justified.

45. On paragraph 24, my delegation feels that while the African proposal is more suitable there is room for compromise between the African proposal and the United Kingdom proposal. We have not, however, been able to understand the United States proposal in this paragraph, for it seems to imply that while Governments can break the sanctions the nationals of the same Government would incur a penalty if they did not declare the "true point of origin" of goods imported from Southern Rhodesia. Apart from the distinction between the nationals and the Government in this respect, one of the difficulties of the Committee, as also of the Council, has been to determine the true point of origin. Or is it the intention that if the true point of origin were revealed, the penalties would not apply? I know that this can never be the intention, but the paragraph as drafted today in the report does give rise to much ambiguity.

46. In paragraph 25 the various proposals could again perhaps be combined. I do not suggest that this would be easy to achieve in the Council meetings, but we can make some attempt. In any event, it would be worth while for

the sanctions Committee to study the proposals on a future occasion and decide if they could not be combined in a manner which would not invite a veto.

47. On paragraph 26, my only comment is that I have heard with great regret a recent announcement that Portuguese civil airways have planned regular halts in a north African country.

48. I have also received several disquieting reports from different sources relating to various other administrative matters. I propose to take them up in the first instance with the authorities concerned rather than mentioning them in the Council.

49. In paragraph 30, the United Kingdom has suggested alternative proposals to the African proposals contained in paragraphs 27, 28 and 29. We do not believe that the United Kingdom proposals provide an effective deterrent to the violations which are undoubtedly taking place. We also do not believe that the British delegation can have suggested these proposals in the full knowledge of the practical difficulties involved. None the less, as a first step we would be prepared to give the British proposals a chance on the understanding that we strongly prefer the African proposals.

50. The proposal in paragraph 31 seems to us a logical consequence of the application of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. The fact that this proposal has not been accepted makes us doubt the genuineness of the desire of all members of the Council to make the sanctions work.

51. Similarly, paragraphs 32 and 34 are entirely innocuous, and if the Council cannot accept these two proposals I think the outside public, particularly those who wish to make sanctions effective against Southern Rhodesia, will be greatly disillusioned.

52. Paragraph 33 is directed specifically towards the United States, and I think we have said enough on this subject for the United States delegation to realize the strength of feeling in the Council on the need for relaxation by the United States Government of the measures it has sought and obtained from its Congress.

53. The purpose of my commenting in detail on these proposals on which there is no agreement is mainly to emphasize that there is scope for further study and serious attempts to find common ground in some groups—if not all the groups—of suggestions where differences now exist. One encouraging feature of this report, as also of the debate that has taken place in the Committee and in the Council so far, is that no false tears are being shed over what would happen to the unprivileged black population of Zimbabwe if sanctions were indeed made effective.

54. We also believe that the Secretary-General should be authorized to pursue the Governments concerned in any suspected violations committed by them or their nationals or vessels, or in their territories. Many speakers have already referred to the recent acquisition of planes and railway engines by the Ian Smith régime and I think such complaints could easily be pursued by the Secretary-

General with the Governments concerned if we gave him the authority to do so.

55. Similarly, we think that thought should be given to enabling the United Nations to sue individuals and companies in any national courts. The money for this purpose can be found and such prosecution can be arranged in advance and with the co-operation of the country concerned.

56. Lastly, we believe that the co-operation of the non-governmental organizations, particularly of trade unions, should be sought much more systematically and vigorously than we have done until now.

57. Much of our work in the Committee related to the collection of accurate information on violations and sanctions. Indeed, section III of the report gives considerable attention to detecting these violations and to giving publicity to them. I had, in the Council's debate last year, pressed for such publicity and I am glad that some of our ideas have been accepted. As regards the information about violations, the sources of supplies and so on, my delegation considers that there is enough technical equipment and trained manpower to detect all the violations if some of the Powers who have these facilities would co-operate with the Council in this matter. When it comes to detecting military movements, these means are liberally used, irrespective of legal considerations; yet, when it comes to detecting illegal trade by Southern Rhodesia and thus furthering the independence of several millions of people, we seem to shy away from the means which are at our disposal and which can be used without much cost.

58. While, therefore, we have considerable reservations on the efficacy of the measures suggested in section III of the report, we are, none the less, encouraged that there has been some movement. We hope this process will be strengthened, even if we realize that the independence of Southern Rhodesia will not be brought about through sanctions but by the struggle of the peoples themselves. In this process sanctions can contribute but cannot be a determining factor. The extent to which this struggle for freedom has gathered strength in recent years is reflected by the new oppressive and disastrous measures which the régime of Ian Smith has adopted. Alarmed by these successes, the Smith régime has reacted with more and more repression. Giving up its pretence that five and a half million blacks of Southern Rhodesia are loyal and happy under their white rule, the Provincial Commissioners have now been authorized to impose collective fines and other punishments on whole communities purely on suspicion that any of them are harbouring or otherwise aiding freedom-fighters.

59. In application of these punitive measures, no notice need be given and no representation is to be allowed. With the renewal of the state of emergency, the majority of the people of Zimbabwe have been deprived of all means of protest and their political activity has been effectively stopped. The African National Council, which has offered peaceful negotiations for settlement, is being subjected to all kinds of restrictions and harassments and its members are being arrested arbitrarily.

60. Along with these repressions, the illegal régime is moving firmly along the road to *apartheid*. Residential areas and public recreational facilities are already largely segregated. Laws have been introduced to make it compulsory for all Africans to carry identity cards, and the first steps have been taken towards establishing regional authorities in Mashonaland and Metabeleland on the South African Bantustan pattern. There has also been speculation that the Ian Smith régime is making utmost efforts to revive the Pearce Commission proposals and suggesting in various ways that those Africans who rejected the proposals were not true representatives of the people. In their own opinion, the true representatives are only those who agree with the white minority.

61. These methods of the Ian Smith régime will not succeed any more than similar measures succeeded elsewhere in suppressing peoples' desire for freedom and human dignity. While, therefore, we would continue to make the sanctions as effective as we can, despite flagrant and most cynical violations by many countries, we must not overlook the broader context of the struggle for freedom which the people of Zimbabwe are waging and waging successfully. We are convinced that they shall win, even if these sanctions are ineffective and therefore the struggle becomes more bitter, more long-drawn and more full of human tragedies. If through the application of sanctions we can shorten the struggle and make it a little less painful, we shall have contributed just a little.

62. Mr. DE GUIRINGAUD (France) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, may I first of all add my congratulations to those of other members of the Council who have already expressed to you what a great pleasure it is to see you take over the presidency of our work during the month of May. We are convinced that under your guidance our work will be conducted with effectiveness and also with wisdom.

63. May I also say to your predecessor, the Ambassador of Peru, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, how very much we admired his diplomatic talents, as well as his courteous authority, in the course of the delicate debates which occupied us last month.

64. On the agenda item I shall be brief. The Council has indeed on many occasions considered the question of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and our position in regard to their application has always been clearly stated.

65. Although from the outset we felt some doubts about the results to be expected from sanctions in seeking a solution to the Rhodesian problem, we voted in favour of their establishment in 1968 in order to respond to the expectations of the African countries and to the request of the administering Power. In 1970 we were in favour of their extension. Nationally, we have established a regulatory and penal system intended to prevent violations, and we have given strict directives to our customs services; and, also, we have actively participated in the work of the Committee set up under resolution 253 (1968). Having nevertheless accepted the fact that despite certain effects on the economy of Southern Rhodesia the system established is insufficient, and because of the importance we attach to

the strictest and most complete application of the sanctions system, we supported, in February and September of 1972, the initiatives intended to increase the effectiveness of the work of the Committee.

66. Today the Council is called upon to reach a decision on the second special report of the Committee, as is provided for in resolution 320 (1972).

67. The French delegation, for its part, wishes first of all to pay tribute to the important work which has been accomplished by the Committee under the wise and diligent guidance of Mrs. Jeanne Martin Cissé, with the assistance of Mr. Soegomo of Indonesia and the representative of Yugoslavia.

68. The French delegation obviously approves the recommendations and suggestions contained in section III of the report. We note that these recommendations are within the terms of reference of the Committee. We have, furthermore, always indicated that we would be in favour of recommendations intended to strengthen the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, whenever the means of application met the criterion of effectiveness. In this connexion, it would seem that the measures which after lengthy discussions led to unanimous agreement in the Committee should contribute to the prevention of the violation of sanctions and thereby further isolate the Ian Smith régime. But, as certain delegations have already emphasized, it goes

without saying that more satisfactory results than those registered so far cannot be attained unless the provisions adopted are scrupulously complied with by all Governments. For its part the Government of France will, as always, see to it that they are applied. On the other hand, we cannot agree with certain proposals contained in section IV of the report, and more particularly those intended to declare a kind of economic war on southern Africa as a whole.

69. Just as no draft resolution concerning sanctions can be effective unless the administering Power supports it so no political solution—and this is where the real problem lies—can be obtained without the administering Power. The latter has had the wisdom to admit the failure of the Pearce Commission, and we hope it will continue to seek a settlement so as to lead Rhodesia on the course to self-determination in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the population. It is, in fact, not possible to accept perpetuation of the illegal and unjust régime under which a minority of 250,000 people maintains domination over 5 million Africans. We hope that, before the internal situation in Southern Rhodesia deteriorates further, the state of affairs of which the international community disapproves, and the prolongation of which warrants our concern, will be ended as soon as possible.

The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m.

كيفية الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة

يمكن الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة من المكتبات ودور التوزيع في جميع أنحاء العالم . استعلم عنها من المكتبة التي تتعامل معها أو اكتب إلى : الأمم المتحدة ، قسم البيع في نيويورك أو في جنيف .

如何购取联合国出版物

联合国出版物在全世界各地的书店和经售处均有发售。请向书店询问或写信到纽约或日内瓦的联合国销售组。

HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS

United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Nations, Sales Section, New York or Geneva.

COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES

Les publications des Nations Unies sont en vente dans les librairies et les agences dépositaires du monde entier. Informez-vous auprès de votre libraire ou adressez-vous à : Nations Unies, Section des ventes, New York ou Genève.

КАК ПОЛУЧИТЬ ИЗДАНИЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ ОБЪЕДИНЕННЫХ НАЦИЙ

Издания Организации Объединенных Наций можно купить в книжных магазинах и агентствах во всех районах мира. Наводите справки об изданиях в вашем книжном магазине или пишите по адресу: Организация Объединенных Наций, Секция по продаже изданий, Нью-Йорк или Женева.

COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS

Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas están en venta en librerías y casas distribuidoras en todas partes del mundo. Consulte a su librero o diríjase a: Naciones Unidas, Sección de Ventas, Nueva York o Ginebra.
