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THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA

SECURITY COUNCIL
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Letter dated 25 June 1990 from the Permanent Representative
of Cambodia to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith, for your information, the text of a memorandum, entitled "Manoeuvre of Viet Nam and the régime installed in Phnom Penh by Viet Nam on the cease-fire", which was adopted by the Council of Ministers of the National Government of Cambodia on 17 June 1990 (see annex).

I should be very grateful if you would arrange for the present letter and its annex to be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 32 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) THICUNN Prasith
Permanent Representative

* A/45/50.

ANNEX

Memorandum adopted by the Council of Ministers of the National
Government of Cambodia on 17 June 1990

Manoeuvre of Viet Nam and the régime installed in Phnom Penh
by Viet Nam on the cease-fire

1. HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS

In the historical precedents of the 1954 Geneva Agreement on the "cessation of hostilities in Indochina" and the 1973 Paris Agreement on "ending the war and restoring peace in Viet Nam", the cease-fires were part of the overall settlements of the problems at that time. In the afore-cited cases, the cease-fires were followed by the withdrawal of foreign forces within 90 days as of the date when the Agreement came into force. To ensure that the cease-fires were respected by all parties, an international control was instituted through an "International Commission of Control and Supervision". The foreign forces were confined into barracks, following the cease-fire, before being withdrawn. Therefore, there was no cease-fire without international control.

Furthermore, all those agreements have been deliberately violated by Viet Nam. That is why, in a comprehensive political settlement on Cambodia, it is absolutely indispensable that, inter alia, the withdrawal of all Vietnamese forces and the cease-fire be controlled and supervised by a United Nations international control mechanism and a United Nations peace-keeping force.

2. CURRENT SITUATION IN CAMBODIA

There has not been, on the contrary, an effective withdrawal of the Vietnamese armed forces from Cambodia as deceitfully claimed by the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam.

At present, nearly 100,000 Vietnamese soldiers wearing the uniforms of the Phnom Penh régime's army and militia, as well as in regular units, continue to fight against the National Government of Cambodia (NGC) and the Cambodian National Resistance (CNR) headed by H.R.H. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk. These facts have been confirmed by the Vietnamese soldiers captured on the battlefield, and amply substantiated by numerous pieces of evidence and impartial studies. According to a report of 26 April 1990 prepared by the "Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare - House Republican Research Committee of the US House of Representatives", the number of Vietnamese troops stationing in Cambodia by mid-April 1990, was estimated as high as 64,340 to 66,740 (see appendix).

Since October 1989, in order to withstand the offensives mounted by the CNR, Viet Nam has successively sent new reinforcements in order to prop up at arm's length the shattering régime in Phnom Penh, as pointed out in the resolution of the Economic and Social Council adopted on 22 May 1990 which mentioned the subsequent reports of the return of foreign forces into Cambodia.

The return of the Vietnamese forces to Cambodia has been widely reported, notably in the London-based Jane's Defense weekly of 10 February 1990, The New York Times of 23 February 1990, the International Herald Tribune of 22 February 1990, The Guardian of London of 24 February 1990 and Le Monde of 9 February 1990, to cite only a few. The presence of Vietnamese forces in Cambodia engaging in combat against the CNR is irrefutable.

Given these conditions, it would be unjust to impose a cease-fire in Cambodia, thus depriving the Cambodian people of their sacred right to carry out their struggle for national liberation to recover the independence of Cambodia and to restore peace.

The NGC and the CNR together with all countries committed to peace and justice have reiterated their willingness to reach a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian problem on the basis of the relevant United Nations resolutions on the situation in Cambodia and the summary of conclusions of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. The latter have looked into this problem since their Paris Meeting in January 1990, followed by three other meetings, the fourth being held in New York on 25 and 26 May 1990. In the last summary of conclusions, the Five clearly reaffirmed that "only a comprehensive political settlement will bring lasting peace and stability to Cambodia", and that a comprehensive political settlement must include specific provisions (see A/45/322-S/21373, para. 2).

Despite this legitimate demand of the world community, Viet Nam and the régime installed by Viet Nam in Phnom Penh have tried desperately to impose a cease-fire without United Nations monitoring. Through this manoeuvre, they aim at making people believe that the aggression war in Cambodia is a civil war and at deceiving the world community into accepting the Vietnamese fait accompli. Another objective is to give credence to a thesis according to which all the Vietnamese forces have already been pulled out of Cambodia.

In these conditions, to accept a cease-fire would be tantamount to renouncing the sacred struggle of national liberation that has been carried out for already more than 11 years to recover our independence and to restore peace within the territorial integrity of Cambodia. That would also amount to enabling the Vietnamese aggressors and the régime installed by Viet Nam in Phnom Penh to obtain on the negotiating table what they have failed to achieve on the battlefield. The NGC and the CNR as well as the world community cannot allow that situation to happen. In the case of a cease-fire without effective control and supervision, Viet Nam will continue to maintain its forces in Cambodia and to dispatch overtly or covertly reinforcements to perpetuate its occupation of Cambodia.

The cessation of hostilities through an effective cease-fire in Cambodia is an ardent wish of the Cambodian people and their National Government of Cambodia as well as the CNR, being victims of foreign aggression and occupation. However, the cease-fire should be part of a comprehensive solution to the problem if it is to be durable, and would become effective only at the time that an interim administration authority takes office, and the United Nations international control mechanism and the United Nations peace-keeping force becomes operational.

We avail ourselves of this opportunity to renew our firm and unreserved support to the summary of conclusions of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. We appeal to all peace- and justice-loving countries to continue supporting a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian problem on the basis of the relevant United Nations resolutions on Cambodia and the summary of conclusions of the Five. In so doing, they will undoubtedly bring an invaluable contribution not only to the achievement of the just cause of the Cambodian people but also to the maintenance of world peace and security.

APPENDIX

Excerpts from "Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare" - House Republican Research Committee - US House of Representatives, 26 April 1990

"... The current deployment of Vietnamese forces in Cambodia was accomplished in two phases. The first phase was accomplished during the 'withdrawal' of late 1989. Major PAVN units, and a few subordinate subunits, were left behind in key strategic locations. ... The second phase involved the still continuing insertion of small units into Cambodia to consolidate positions and garrisons in key military installations. From there, the PAVN subunits, independently or with subordinate RPKAF (Armed Forces of the People's Republic of Kampuchea) subunits, deploy to small posts and garrisons in the countryside, gradually expanding the area controlled by Hanoi and displacing the rural population ...

"The current deployment of PAVN forces and their RPKAF subordinates ... are controlled from a Corps Headquarters in south-east Pursat province where 7,000 PAVN troops are deployed. In early March 1990, the Corps Headquarters was in command of approximately 46,970 to 45,370 PAVN troops ...

"The parts of Cambodia dominated by the Corps are divided into two strategic echelons (S.E.): The Western command is the 1st S.E., which is divided into two Fronts. The northern Front is devoted to dealing with the freedom fighters operating from Thailand. The southern Front is devoted to securing the main lines of communication from southern Vietnam and the Cambodian shore line. The 2nd S.E. is the Eastern command which is devoted to controlling the Cambodian interior and especially ground and river transportation.

"This command structure remained intact even during the height of the Vietnamese 'withdrawal'. Indeed, the Corps Headquarters and its approximately 7,000 troops remained inside Cambodia well into late-1989, with control of the northern Front of the 1st S.E. accomplished by two 'stay-behind' PAVN Regiments (1,200 and 3,000 troops respectively). These regiments, in turn, controlled 3 RPKAF divisions (286th, 5th and 81st) with PAVN core elements, as well as 2 RPKAF divisions (196th and 4th) with only PAVN special forces elements, all deployed along the Thai border. The control of the southern Front of the 1st S.E. was accomplished through a single 'stay-behind' PAVN Regiment (5,000 troops specialized in internal security). This regiment also controlled 2 RPKAF divisions with PAVN core elements deployed along the Tonle River. During the 'withdrawal', the control of the 2nd S.E. was accomplished through 2 PAVN Regiments (3,000 troops each) in the eastern Kompong Cham province near the Vietnamese border. A RPKAF division with a PAVN core unit in the center of the province was subordinated to this force. All together, approximately 27,060 troops remained in this deployment in Cambodia when the 'withdrawal' was completed."
