

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.554  
24 April 1990

---

## FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 24 April 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Ahmad Kamal (Pakistan)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 554th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with our programme of work, this is the last meeting of the first part of the annual session of the Conference. In conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

As agreed earlier, and if time permits, the Conference will hold today, immediately after this plenary meeting, an informal meeting devoted to the substance of agenda item 2, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany, Brazil, the United States of America, Egypt, Canada, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India, Indonesia, the German Democratic Republic and Mexico. Of these speakers, three today are friends and colleagues who will be leaving the Conference and who will be delivering their farewell statements today. I refer to Ambassador Paul Joachim von Stülpnagel, Ambassador Marcos de Azambuja and Ambassador Kamallesh Sharma, all three of whom have contributed significantly to the work of our Conference. I intend to bid them farewell on behalf of the Conference after they have made their respective statements. I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Paul Joachim von Stülpnagel.

Mr. von STULPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, it is a particular pleasure for me to make my last statement before this important body under your presidency. I do not want or need to qualify you or your stewardship because we have known each other too long not to be fully aware of how much there is mutual respect and friendship and on my side the recognition of your particular intellectual capacity. The month of April is normally not a month in which a President can make himself felt, but you always do and you do it well, even in the month of April. You may even find yourself in the Guinness Book of Records for having three colleagues depart in one day. The months of March and February are more prone to allow a President to make his mark, and I think Ambassadors Azikiwe of Nigeria and Wagenmakers of the Kingdom of the Netherlands did an exemplary job, appreciated by all. We owe to those two Ambassadors the fact that we have made progress in our work.

As I am leaving after almost four years, I of course regret - as so many others have done before me - that I did not have a chance to stay long enough to become the dean of the Conference on Disarmament, having had wide-ranging ideas of what I would have done, had I had this chance. But perhaps the thoughtful way and restraint and wise neutrality of our two longest-serving colleagues, Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia and Ambassador Benhima of Morocco, was more helpful for our work.

My country is currently not - as one says - at a crossroads; it has traversed a long-standing road-block to a new life, and as we hope, a future that is better for Germany as it will be better for its neighbours. We could not have done this alone. We gladly acknowledge the decisive help and guidance

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

and acceptance from Governments in East and West. In the first place there were of course the two super-Powers, which were instrumental in letting history change its course. There were the important, noble and audacious decisions by the Hungarian, Czechoslovak and Polish Governments to let Germans leave their country, Germans who wanted to go to the other part of their country. The subsequent sympathy we Germans were spontaneously granted by our other European neighbours, and here in the first place those of the European Community, will help us to continue our responsible policy which in the context of the Conference on Disarmament is expressed in efforts to build a new and effective security order for Europe.

This old continent has young chances. Lasting peace and unity for our grief-stricken continent is no longer Utopian. A just order of peace has a realistic perspective now. Walls have tumbled, barbed wire has been cut. Europe is beginning again to remember its common history and culture and values. The realities of the military threat have changed substantially. East and West must no longer perceive each other as ineluctable enemies, even if the arsenals and forces have so far barely been influenced by the political developments. But we know from experience that disarmament always follows threat conditions and does not change them. This is one of the reasons why disarmament activities in Europe - and hopefully also in other parts of the world - now have a chance to be energetically activated. The mandate of all the peoples who have chosen the road to freedom and democracy and European unity is also a mandate for this body. The German step on the European road should help to foster new European policies of peace and unity.

Let me return to our Conference on Disarmament. When during all these years I have looked from different places around this square table at different perspectives of the pictures on our walls, I have wondered what they have to do with us. These pictures stem from violent times and they are violent and particularly brutal. They stem from a time when one thought that peace could be achieved only in the same way as it was broken. I think we know better today. The word "revolution" has taken on a different colour - at least in Europe. We no longer - I hope - live in a world of the victorious and the vanquished as depicted above our heads here; we have left the state of mind where even the angels carry sticks.

If there is a new approach to the problems of the world, we had a glimpse of it two months ago. In the month of February, when despite deep-seated feelings our Conference reached consensus on acceptance of the participation of more than 30 non-member States, I expressed my gratitude for that development then, and I would like to repeat it today. Then, at that time, political culture had won a victory.

It is my turn now to thank all those who have enabled us to do what we did. In the first place I have to thank our tireless Secretary-General, Ambassador Komatina, who with his impatient patience oversaw our debates, guided us skilfully, and was always looking for positive solutions with the aid of his deputy, Ambassador Berasategui, who is the institutional memory of the Conference on Disarmament, which should make good use of it. I would like to acknowledge the fine co-operation from which my delegation and myself have benefited over the years on the part of the entire secretariat. I would like to refer particularly to Ms. Pasqualin, who was always available to answer

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

ignorant questions, Mrs. Waskes-Fischer, who did a splendid job by informing the press about our proceedings, Mrs. Robert-Tissot, whose documentary help was always to the point. And last but not least, the whole chemical weapons crew, with Mr. Bensmail, Miss Marcaillou and Ms. Darby in particularly responsible places. Over my entire period of office I have admired our interpreters, who have coped with our occasionally bad but nevertheless rather far-fetched English vocabulary. But since our migrating body also needs the help and understanding of the New York branch of the Department for Disarmament Affairs, I would like here to thank its Under-Secretary-General Yasushi Akashi and through him his loyal international staff. I remember particularly their valuable services during the third special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, which started with a high sense of expectancy and finally, in one bitter night, all those expectations broke down and crumbled. New York has its dramatic moments, and that was one of them.

The subject which has occupied most of my attention during my term of office here in Geneva has been chemical weapons. This is not only because my Government attaches the highest priority to the early conclusion of a comprehensive, global and securely verifiable ban on chemical weapons. The conclusion of a chemical weapons convention is an historic opportunity that the Conference on Disarmament must not let slip out of its hands. To speak for those who have suffered from chemical weapons use, it is no exaggeration to say that the Conference on Disarmament has to meet its responsibility to mankind. There is no time to lose to translate the existing overwhelming consensus of the international community for a global ban into an effective convention. As I have said before: time is not on our side. Reports meant to be alarming on a rapid spread of chemical weapons are indeed alarming. We are called upon to prevent these ghastly weapons from becoming an accepted means of warfare. Determined action is called for. Interim measures like export controls to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons, even when effectively applied, are clearly not sufficient. The same goes for the Geneva Protocol, which has proven to be painfully inadequate. The only means of establishing a global accepted norm is to make possession of chemical weapons illegal. To renounce the option of acquiring chemical weapons will not find sufficient incentive as long as arsenals of chemical weapons continue to exist.

For almost four years I have hoped that we would be able to conclude a convention soon, my hopes not being founded on illusions but on an assessment of the state of work in our negotiations. I always believed in a common resolve to come to terms with the issues involved in our negotiations. I am convinced that it would have been possible. Let me again stress that there is no reason in my view why we should not approach our task of concluding a convention in as ambitious a manner as we see now being displayed in other forums, and for which we are grateful. As I said in my previous plenary statement on 8 March: "Otherwise we risk being the last to change in a world of change, or those who did not change in time".

I think we all know that the necessary political and material prerequisites for the timely conclusion of our task of drafting a comprehensive and global convention effectively banning chemical weapons exist. I cannot help but observe that we are in many instances discussing

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

the same issues time and again, looking at them from various angles, trying to elaborate certain parts further. I have had an impression of déjà vu many times. Belabouring problems is not necessarily the best recipe for arriving at better solutions. Rather, the risk is real that we will get bogged down in unnecessary details and lose sight of the imperatives of our task. We have lately started an extensive drafting exercise which in my view is - before we have come to the necessary principal conclusions - a rather lofty undertaking. A question still persists: How can we make the sense of urgency and resolve prevailing in Vienna and in the bilateral Geneva negotiations contagious so that we too can achieve something concrete? If we cannot come to grips with the early conclusion of a global CW convention, we will no longer be able to demonstrate that multilateral disarmament can keep abreast of international developments and disarmament and arms control efforts on other levels.

Having said this, I have wondered a number of times about the protracted and vigorous yet futile debates on other items on the agenda of our Conference. Knowing full well that at this juncture we are not able to bridge existing differences and that these items are not ripe for serious negotiations, we continue to dwell on them with relentless joy. For chemical weapons at least we had the Paris consensus of 149 States. For the other subjects on our agenda there is certainly much less consensus, much less chance to get anywhere. The Conference on Disarmament is a negotiating forum, indeed the only international negotiating forum, and should negotiate in earnest an instrument of international law where this proves possible. If the Conference on Disarmament fails to fulfil this task entrusted to it even in fields where there is consensus, it is not only faced with a drastic loss of credibility.

Permit me to say a few final words about a few slogans which seem to guide our work. How do we understand the notion of consensus which I have just cited? We work by consensus. Otherwise one cannot come to an agreement on negotiated material, of course. That again presupposes some flexibility by negotiators and their capacity to negotiate. Extreme positions by one side provoke extremes on another side. In some cases that leads to not having a negotiated mandate at all. In other cases we lack a work programme. But in our most advanced field of negotiations we might create a credibility problem for ourselves, as for the world outside this chamber, if we continue a negotiation "as if". I have often wondered how much we have been really looking for consensus in many fields, or whether positions are just there to fill empty spaces.

Another guiding principle of our work is the security of the States we represent. Security is the most important single objective of any Government. The question is: If all other parameters change, can the perception of security remain unaffected? We ambassadors in this room are not here to make politics, we implement it. But if we cannot agree on almost anything, it is seeming proof that world and regional policies have not changed sufficiently to allow us to draw the consequences. Yet this is not true: world politics and regional politics have changed considerably. In this room - do we really feel that? The acoustics of this chamber do not seem to allow the right echoes.

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

Equality is another basis of our work, one would think. In fact I have not witnessed any discrimination against any delegation as to opportunities to express itself. But I have often wondered whether some delegations' opinions have been honoured with the same respect as others have demanded for theirs. How truly democratic is this body? In my view the answer is: Not more or less democratic than any other international conference. Some have thought we could do better. That has not proved to be the case.

Why is there so little sense of urgency in what we are doing? The Secretary-General of the Conference tells us every year how many hours we have lost, hours that were granted to us by this rather clouded process of allocation of administrative services. In other organizations you have deadlines, because people have to be served with concrete decisions. They need them for their existence or subsistence, and they demand them. Here we do not have deadlines, which, if proposed, are regularly depicted as being artificial. Deadlines are helpful in my view, and the word "artificial" does not make them less effective nor less attractive nor our work less meaningful. What we should have are deadlines.

Allegations of the absence of "political will" almost always mean a demand to accept one's own position. So in Canberra the Dutch delegation invented the notion of "practical will", to get us one step ahead of this old stereotype. I am afraid it is not political nor practical, diplomatic or administrative will that we lack very often, it is just the will to achieve some feat. So let me add to our dictionary the notion of the "will to achieve" as an element we are sometimes lacking, but for which we should always strive.

Another thing is the picture of the enemy which has persisted over so many decades in regional as well as universal contexts, and which in the first years of my presence here was very elaborate and colourful. Today we have a chance to change, thanks to the process induced by creative forces which have developed a new perspective, a new thinking, even in the most unbelievable places. All States represented in this room have lived for decades with clear pictures of their enemies which were ossifying their way of doing diplomacy. But it seems that the peoples of the world have become tired of the way diplomats have been painting things. I think we should try hard to learn that we can live without our traditional tableaux of enmity. We should in all sincerity try to identify our true and objective security needs in the light of the changes as being different from our perceived or even thought-of security requirements. History will punish not only those who come too late, but those who identify their real security needs too late.

I know I have spoken too long, but he whose heart is full - you know the rest. I part from you, my dear colleagues, with very sincere and best wishes for your personal happiness, but also with the expectation that the day may come when you find yourselves together in achieving one great task that until today has eluded us, with a success which will honour all of you, and will give you your deserved place in history.

The PRESIDENT: I would like to thank Ambassador von Stülpnagel for a highly thought-provoking farewell statement, as well as for the very kind and affectionate words that he addressed to my person.

Ambassador von Stülpnagel has served this Conference with distinction for almost four years. He was our President in March 1988. His diplomatic experience, his deep knowledge, his incisiveness and his competence in the subject of the Conference have been appreciated over these years by all of us, and also by his own Government, which has now appointed him to a new and important assignment. He has served his country in Geneva faithfully and ably, and he leaves behind many friends and many admirers among whom I count myself most particularly. All of us will miss him and Mrs. von Stülpnagel. I wish both of them, on behalf of the Conference, every success and every personal happiness in their new post, where I am sure that he will perform outstanding services once again for his country. We look forward, Paul, to meeting you again here or elsewhere, and always on the same side of the diplomatic table.

I now call on Ambassador Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja to make his statement.

Mr. AZAMBUJA (Brazil): It is with great pleasure and emotion that I come back to this room, surely one of the great rooms of multilateral diplomacy, a room full of history, full of distinction and full of honour, to say a few words about the work of the Conference on Disarmament and also to say farewell to dear colleagues and very close friends. I cannot but say that I feel very much at home here, among old acquaintances, and cherishing already fond memories of my work here for the last three years.

My delegation, Sir, feels great satisfaction to see you in the Chair. Your well-known and well-tested qualities of wisdom, sharpness and wit have assured us of a first-class stewardship throughout this month of April. I do not have to add my personal feelings and my high regard for you - we are, I think, very close friends; we will remain so. I would like to say a word about Ambassador Miljan Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference, and Ambassador Vicente Berasategui, Deputy Secretary-General, who both deserve my praise and thanks, not only for their work during this month, but for their constant help and advice throughout my presence in this body. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank all members of the secretariat and the interpreters and translators for their contribution, assistance, support and patience. I have been in contact with Under-Secretary-General Akashi in New York to tell him how much I will miss him and how much I valued the co-operation of the United Nations in our joint work. I must also say that I am delighted to say goodbye to the Conference on the same day that two dear friends perform the same duty - Ambassador Paul von Stülpnagel and Ambassador Kamallesh Sharma. I could not have had better company and closer friends if I had chosen them myself.

(Mr. Azambuja, Brazil)

When I first came to the Conference, in August 1987, the world was still haunted by the ghosts of mistrust and rigid ideological confrontation. The winds that have brought us so many political changes since then were only beginning to blow, softly and slowly. With the INF agreement, a new era of détente between the two super-Powers was ushered in, opening wide avenues of common endeavour in the search for disarmament. Today, we can have good and well-founded hopes of seeing, in the near future, a broad agreement in the field of conventional disarmament in Europe, a 50 per cent cut in the strategic offensive nuclear weapons of the two super-Powers and a universal and non-discriminatory convention banning chemical weapons for ever.

These very welcome prospects are not enough to dispel all of our fears and misgivings. There are still too many nuclear weapons. Chemical weapons remain and have been used, and there are threats that they could be used again. The risk of an arms race in outer space has not disappeared and naval disarmament is still not on everyone's agenda. Many States seem not to be ready yet to give up resort to military force to solve their differences with other States.

Even with the good news of recent vintage, the international community has to go a step further, and address in a global way those problems which are unequivocally global. The better way to do this is through increased use of the multilateral system, where all nations and regions are represented or can make their voices heard. A former Brazilian Foreign Minister, Ambassador Araujo Castro, once active in our CD, made a memorable speech many years ago dedicated to what he called the three Ds - disarmament, development, decolonization - which were then the main items on the United Nations agenda. With the recent accession of Namibia to independence, a most significant page of the saga of decolonization has been turned, and one of those three Ds is now almost disposed of. Disarmament and development, on the contrary, will be with us for a long while yet, and will constitute a significant part of the agenda of the international community in the 1990s.

This forum has a major role to play in the global process of disarmament, as the only multilateral forum that can negotiate measures in this field. I would like to share with you some of the general guidelines my Government considers it essential to follow if this process of comprehensive disarmament is to be acceptable to all members of the international community.

First, disarmament should be a process of asymmetrical reductions, based on the concept of levelling out. The States more heavily armed and those with the more sophisticated weapons systems have a special responsibility to disarm and should be the catalysts of the whole process.

Disarmament is essential to all members of the international community, and thus each of them, even the smallest and the poorest, has the right to have a say on a matter intimately linked to its survival.

Disarmament has to proceed from the most threatening weapons to the least, and concentrate, as its utmost priority, on nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.



(Mr. Azambuja, Brazil)

Disarmament should never be used as a pretext to deny developing countries or other States access to science and technology, on the assumption that if civilian advanced technologies are mastered by the newcomers they will necessarily be diverted to military uses, as has happened in some, but not all, of the States which are the sources of those technologies.

Disarmament should not be used as a pretext to perpetuate inequalities in the international system, be it in the military, scientific, technological or economic fields.

Disarmament should not tie up resources released by cuts in military spending in highly redundant and expensive systems of verification.

Disarmament is as global a process as the protection of the environment or any other universal item in the agenda of the United Nations. It does not allow for exclusive regional treatment, except in the conventional dimension. In any case, in a world where nuclear weapons, intercontinental ballistic missile technology and naval power enable their possessors to reach every point of the map, a merely regional approach would appear naïve or discriminatory and unfair.

Finally, disarmament cannot be separated from the more general process of building an international society based on the rule of law, which, as has happened internally in our societies, would permit the disarming of its members. The reinforced role the United Nations has found in the solution of regional conflicts is a promising avenue in this complementarity between conflict resolution and progress in disarmament.

In my statement before this Conference in February last I shared with you some of the ideas I had on the need to make this body more effective and useful in this era of fast change. I will no longer be able to participate in the day-to-day business of the CD, but I am sure that this forum will make a major contribution to the achievement of our ultimate goal of achieving peace through disarmament. I hope that the chemical weapons convention, to which you have devoted so much hard work, will be concluded soon and thus confirm the capacity of this body to help build a new order in the field of security. My thoughts and my best wishes will always be with you in your endeavours, and I hope from time to time to come back to this room and share my thoughts with you and learn from your collective wisdom and concern.

Ambassador Rubens Ricupero, a very good friend and a respected colleague, will be Brazil's representative in this Conference. He is well known to most of you and requires no introduction. It gives me great pleasure that a man of his talent and ability will be our spokesman and assure the undiminished interest of Brazil in all aspects of our extremely relevant and challenging agenda.

May God bless the efforts of this Conference and bring happiness to each and all of you.

The PRESIDENT: I would like to thank Ambassador de Azambuja for his important and lofty statement, and also for the very kind words that he addressed to me and to the Chair. Ambassador de Azambuja has served this Conference for almost three years in an unusually brilliant and competent manner. His outstanding diplomatic ability and the wit of his strategic insight has led to his recent appointment as Secretary-General for Foreign Policy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brasilia. He, more than anyone else, has constantly urged us towards the process of consideration of the improved and effective functioning of this Conference, and I would like to assure him that with the process which has been started happily last week, we shall not fail to keep in mind his very valuable advice in the matter. I am convinced that Ambassador de Azambuja will be as successful in his new and important functions as he has been here in the Conference on Disarmament, and on behalf of the Conference I would like to wish him and Mrs. de Azambuja all the best for the future. As Secretary-General, Marcos, you will continue to oversee the work of the Conference on Disarmament, and so we hope to see you again here in this room this year. I welcome the sentence in your statement which holds out that hope for all of us. The children of this room always return to this room sooner or later. We have evidence here in the presence of Ambassador Yamada, whose presence I would like to salute in this room also. We wish you, Marcos, all the best, and hasta la vista.

I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Before making my remarks, I would like first to welcome to the Conference our new colleague, Ambassador Králík of the Federal Republic of Czechoslovakia. Ambassador, my delegation and I look forward to working with you and your staff. I would also like to take this occasion formally to bid farewell to three of our colleagues who are departing for new and important assignments - Ambassador de Azambuja of Brazil, Ambassador Sharma of India and Ambassador von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany. Let me express appreciation for your important contributions to the Conference and wish you well as you take on your new duties. And lastly, Mr. President, I would like to express my personal appreciation for the wise and effective way in which you have guided the Conference during your tenure this month. We have all been beneficiaries.

Because today's plenary meeting marks the end of the spring part of our 1990 session, I have taken the floor in order to provide information to the Conference on the fifteenth round of the United States-Soviet consultations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which is currently under way and will end the day after tomorrow. My statement is made by agreement with the head of the Soviet delegation, Minister Serguei Batsanov, and supplements his statement to the Conference made on 8 March.

Since the end of the fourteenth round on 8 March, United States-Soviet discussions of a chemical weapons ban have continued in an intensive manner. During their meeting in Washington from 4 to 6 April, United States Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze reviewed progress in the discussions and provided further guidance for our two delegations.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

In this round, the delegations have devoted particular attention to completion of a bilateral agreement on reciprocal obligations of the United States and the Soviet Union pending a multilateral convention including, inter alia, the destruction of the bulk of their CW stocks to equal low levels. Further progress was made and discussions are continuing in an effort to resolve the remaining issues as soon as possible.

In the discussions, both sides emphasized that in their destruction activities under the bilateral agreement the highest priority would be given to safety of people and protection of the environment. They also have agreed that under the agreement the CW stocks of both sides will be reduced to a level of 5,000 tons (i.e. equal to approximately 20 per cent of the current United States stockpile). The sides concur that, once the multilateral convention comes into force, its terms will take precedence over those of the bilateral agreement.

Another priority area during the fifteenth round has been implementation of the Wyoming memorandum of understanding. The sides continued their efforts to build confidence between the United States and the Soviet Union regarding the chemical weapons capabilities of the other side. In this connection, the delegations exchanged detailed information in preparation for the exchange of visits to chemical weapons storage facilities that will take place in June. Planning continued for the additional visits that will take place in August and in early 1991. Overall, there will be seven visits in each country, covering chemical weapons storage facilities, chemical weapons production facilities, and industrial chemical production facilities. The sides anticipate that, in addition to building confidence between the United States and the Soviet Union, these visits will provide valuable insights into the application of the provisions of the multilateral convention to such facilities.

Building on the very useful exchanges that took place during the fourteenth round, the delegations during the current round have intensified their work regarding bilateral co-operation in the field of destruction of chemical weapons. The goal of this co-operation is to facilitate safe and expeditious elimination of chemical weapons. For these discussions the delegations were reinforced by experts who are directly involved in the destruction programmes of the United States and the USSR. A number of special meetings devoted to destruction of chemical weapons took place. The experts exchanged detailed information on the programmes under way in each country, including the technology employed and the special difficulties that need to be dealt with.

In view of their desire to accelerate the conclusion of a multilateral chemical weapons ban, the two delegations are also conducting discussions for that purpose. During the round, suggestions for refining definitions and the guidelines for schedule 1 were communicated to the Chairman of the appropriate Working Group. The two sides are also discussing ways to promote the universality of the multilateral convention.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

The fifteenth bilateral round will conclude on 26 April. Bilateral discussions on a chemical weapons ban will continue during the meeting of ministers scheduled for mid-May and at the summit meeting between President George Bush and President Mikhail Gorbachev. It is the jointly expressed hope of both countries that the new bilateral CW agreement can be signed at the summit meeting and that it will be possible to report further progress toward a global, comprehensive chemical weapons ban.

Mr. ELARABY (Egypt): I would like to start by thanking the Ambassador of Canada for yielding the floor to me because I have to go to another meeting.

I am pleased to take the floor today to invite the attention of the Conference to a letter dated 16 April 1990 which the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt addressed to the Secretary-General on a proposal to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The letter is contained in document CD/989, which has been circulated today.

The rationale of the proposal is to spare a region fraught with tension from the scourge of a possible recourse to any type of weapon of mass destruction. In this context it is appropriate to recall that as far back as 1948 the Commission for Conventional Armaments advised the Security Council that it considered that "weapons of mass destruction should be defined to include atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above". This definition seems to be still valid. We believe that means of delivery should also be included in the proposed ban. This lofty objective requires the conclusion of credible and verifiable regional measures to ensure the total absence of all such weapons from the Middle East.

Since 1974 Egypt has presented annually to the General Assembly a proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The international community has resolved that nuclear weapons are the most lethal and devastating weapons of mass destruction. Consequently, it has assigned the highest priority to the task of removing the threat of nuclear war. Our proposal has been endorsed by the General Assembly by consensus ever since 1980. A highly qualified group of experts appointed by the Secretary-General is now in the process of finalizing a report which the Secretary-General will subsequently submit to the General Assembly.

Egypt recognizes, however, that the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone needs to be strengthened by including other weapons of mass destruction. The rapid pace of progress in the production and development of weapons of mass destruction necessitates the adoption of a more comprehensive approach. For the sake of ensuring peace and security to future generations in our region, Egypt deems it imperative now to advocate the importance of widening the scope of the zone to comprise all weapons of mass destruction.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

It is the considered opinion of the Government of Egypt that the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East merits urgent attention and serious examination. The document circulated today is self-explanatory. I believe a careful perusal of its contents will contribute to a better and more profound appreciation of our proposal. It is our earnest hope that this proposed comprehensive approach will command the active support of all concerned States as well as the international community as a whole.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt, Ambassador Nabil Elaraby, for his statement and for the very important proposal which is contained in that statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Shannon.

Mr. SHANNON (Canada): I am pleased to have the opportunity today to make my first formal presentation to the Conference on Disarmament. May I begin first by expressing my own delegation's great appreciation of your leadership during the past month, Sir, as well as our satisfaction that you will continue to oversee our affairs during the coming period while the Conference is in recess? I would also like at this point to thank your predecessors for the particular contributions each one made during their terms in office earlier in this session.

Second, I would like to say how pleased and honoured I was to learn that I would be joining this committed and truly very capable group, the heads of delegations to this Conference. Since I am myself a relative newcomer, it would hardly be appropriate for me to welcome those others who are also members of the class of 1990. But I would like to say a special word of congratulation to our colleague, Ambassador Sinegiorgis of Ethiopia, one of the longest-serving among the delegates to the Conference on Disarmament, on her recent appointment as her country's Ambassador and Permanent Representative. I would also like to extend best wishes in their new assignments to three colleagues who are soon to leave us, Ambassador von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Azambuja of Brazil and Ambassador Sharma of India.

I would also like to note the presence at the Conference again today of Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Ambassador Margaret Mason.

We have come to the end of our spring session. As our speakers' list today is a long one, I will not review in detail or place on record all of Canada's views concerning all the work of the Conference on Disarmament. We are an active Conference on Disarmament delegation. Where ad hoc committees have already been established, our views are being registered. Where we have decided that discussion on other agenda items can be more effectively advanced in informal plenary meetings, we have either expressed our own views or supported the collective views of the Western Group to which Canada belongs. Nevertheless, there are several broader concerns which I do wish to address this morning. Since you collectively have entrusted Canada with the chairmanship of the Ad hoc Committee on outer space, I shall begin with that item.

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

I must say with feeling that my experience as Chairman has constituted quite an initiation into the complexities of multilateral disarmament diplomacy. On outer space there is both very little and a great deal to say. I say "very little" because, as we all know, we have spent the past three months trying first to establish the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and then to find agreement on a programme and organization of work. Thus we have not been able to begin substantive work until now. On the other hand, there is a great deal to say, in the sense that the Committee has much valuable work to do in furtherance of its goal of preventing an arms race in outer space.

As I mentioned at the first meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on 13 March Canada has for many years shown a strong interest in, and has contributed significant resources to, its work. It is precisely because of this that I was extremely disappointed by our collective inability to get down to substantive work during this spring session. I hope that our meetings during the summer session will contribute to greater understanding of the issues involved in the prevention of an arms race in outer space and will result in greater progress towards the goal of the Committee, a goal that is enshrined in its title.

As Chairman of the Committee I indicated to it that I have a number of definite ideas as to how our work could be made more productive. I will not detail these here today, as they are well known to the Committee members. But I would like to stress that, both in my capacity as Canadian representative and in my capacity as Chairman of the Committee, I will make every effort to ensure that our work will be constructive, productive and useful. I proceed on the understanding that we must concentrate on exploring the subject before us in all its complexity and search for areas of convergence in our thinking. The differences that will emerge in the course of that exploratory process must also be pursued with a view to finding common ground.

The Conference has not yet reached consensus on giving this Committee a negotiating mandate. However, this should not prevent us from amassing the technical and other information we will need when this Committee becomes in fact entrusted with conducting multilateral negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It is on the basis of such reasoning that Canada has regularly distributed to the Committee outer space compendiums comprising plenary statements and working papers. These have been circulated every year since 1985; they bring together documentation covering the period 1962-1988 inclusively. I am pleased to inform you that we are today distributing as a CD document the compendiums for 1989. This afternoon, we shall also be distributing in the Ad hoc Committee itself a compendium of those working papers submitted to it over the last four years. We hope that these volumes will be used by delegations to advance our work in this area.

Next, I would like to speak to the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention, the subject to which most of us are devoting by far the greatest part of our time, and where we are, I believe, beginning to see increasing convergence of views.

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

I begin my comments on this item by offering my belated, but no less sincere, congratulations to our Swedish colleague, Ambassador Carl-Magnus Hyltenius, on his appointment as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The Swedish delegation, particularly in the person of Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, has long played a signal role in providing leadership in our efforts to develop a convention banning chemical weapons. My delegation and I look forward to continuing our full co-operation with Ambassador Hyltenius and his delegation in this most important work.

Indeed, I do not exaggerate if I suggest that the negotiation of the chemical weapons convention is the single most important task confronting the Conference during its 1990 session. Almost daily, it seems, we are being reminded that the threat posed by the existence of chemical weapons not only continues but is in danger of growing. And this notwithstanding the several important and encouraging developments that took place during 1989, both in terms of the progress achieved by the CW Ad hoc Committee under Ambassador Morel's inspired and energetic leadership, and in terms of the separate but closely related meetings in Paris, Canberra, and Jackson Hole, Wyoming. For my Government, it is critically important, therefore, that, under the spur of the continuing threat of chemical weapons, the momentum provided by these developments must be continued and must be rapidly translated into concrete progress in resolving our remaining differences.

In this respect, I am happy to note that, at this midway point in our formal session, there are several solid signs that some of our outstanding problems are well on the road to resolution. The various working groups have been particularly assiduous in tackling the difficult technical, practical, and legal issues before them, and I congratulate them and their chairman for their efforts.

Most significant to date, perhaps, may be the success so far achieved by Working Group B in developing appropriate texts on the crucial issue of the order of destruction of chemical weapons and CW production facilities. Thanks in large measure to the important contribution here from the United States and Soviet delegations, we are getting closer to resolving what has been one of the more difficult issues facing us. However, we are not yet out of these woods and further efforts need to be made.

My Government is especially impressed and pleased with the success Working Group C has had in addressing the immensely complicated set of legal issues involved in our consideration of sanctions, amendments, and settlement of disputes. Barely a year ago it might have seemed to a casual observer that these issues were intractable, but, thanks to the constructive spirit of compromise shown by delegations, it now appears that solutions are being identified that should meet the various concerns of all negotiators.

Working Group A has also been successful in continuing and completing the work begun last year on the protocol on inspection procedures. My Government has noted in particular the serious attention that has most recently been given to the issue of procedures for the investigation of alleged use, a subject that has long been of special concern to Canada. In this latter respect,

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

I might note that my delegation is in the course of distributing to the secretariat copies of a report prepared by one of the experts advising the Verification Research Unit of the Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada on "Verification methods, handling, and assessments of unusual events in relation to allegations of the use of novel chemical warfare agents". This report develops a methodology for the examination of allegations of the use of novel CW agents and focuses on the need for epidemiological studies and on the type of national infrastructure that might be appropriate to oversee such investigations for a future Canadian national authority. While its general application might seem particularly relevant to longer-term objectives, my authorities hope that it may also prove useful to our ongoing discussions in these negotiations of the problem of novel CW agents.

The other development of particular significance that I wish to take note of here is the work that Working Group A has most recently begun on the question of ad hoc verification, based upon the discussion paper that was submitted earlier this month by our Australian colleague, Ambassador Reese. After careful consideration of the various approaches and proposals in this area, my Government has come to the conclusion that the concept of ad hoc verification must be an essential part of the structure that we are trying to develop to ensure the effective verification of the convention. In our view, ad hoc verification offers the most satisfactory means short of challenge inspection of ensuring that facilities relevant to the goals of the convention are subject to appropriate verification. We are therefore particularly hopeful that, early in the summer session, Working Group A will have productive exchanges on this proposal that will lead to the development of appropriate treaty language.

In highlighting some of the achievements to date in the 1990 session, I have been very conscious of the need to slight neither the other encouraging developments that have taken place nor the magnitude of the tasks that remain. My primary purpose in addressing these particular items has been to suggest that the momentum of 1989 is being continued and we are making considerable progress towards our ultimate goal. This has been due to the conscientious and constructive attitude that the negotiators have been taking towards their work. My Government fully expects that, if this attitude is maintained and strengthened during the summer session, we will have gone a very long way towards resolving most, if not all, of the remaining outstanding problems.

I should, perhaps, not need to add that my Government is fully committed to doing all that it can to assist in realizing our final goal. In closing my comments on this item, I should note, however, that to this end my delegation will also be distributing through the secretariat a number of other documents for the use of delegations in their work. Some of these documents I shall describe in a few moments, but I should like to note here that, as in previous years, we are distributing the latest compendiums of documents comprising the plenary statements and working papers of the 1989 session.



(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

This morning I am also pleased to be able to table a paper describing Canada's first national trial inspection, which is designated CD/987. Since Canada currently has no significant production of schedule 2 chemicals and there was no suitable plant available at the time that could be used as a substitute Canada was unable to participate in the earlier phase of this exercise. However, in keeping with the move to expand the national trial inspections into other areas, such as challenge and ad hoc inspections, Canada decided it could best contribute through an inspection at a simulated single small-scale facility for schedule 1 chemicals.

The trial was carried out in a facility based on an organic synthesis laboratory at the Defence Research Establishment Suffield, where research quantities of schedule 1 chemicals are occasionally prepared for protective purposes. The practicality of the inspection procedures in the "rolling text" was thoroughly tested and a number of suggestions are made in the paper for modifications and improvements. In addition, it was found that the model for facility agreements for single small-scale facilities found in appendix II was more appropriate for larger dedicated facilities and required some adaptation in order to be used for a laboratory. It is our hope that the results of this trial will prove to be a useful contribution to the work of the ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Further national trial inspections are being considered in Canada, and results will be reported when available.

There are in addition two other papers which we have also asked the secretariat to distribute to you. The first we originally made available in September 1989 during the Canberra Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons. This report, which is entitled "Role and function of a national authority in the implementation of a chemical weapons convention", was prepared by Dr. Ronald Sutherland of the University of Saskatchewan. The report reviews the obligation to the chemical weapons convention of a State party that does not possess chemical weapons. It attempts to assess how such a State party can demonstrate compliance using existing organizations and also suggests the probable costs involved. We hope that this report will be of help both in furthering work on the "rolling text" and to Governments contemplating the establishment of a national authority.

And finally, we have asked that the secretariat distribute the fifth in a series of verification brochures issued on a periodic basis. Entitled "Canada and international safeguards: Verifying nuclear non-proliferation", this brochure provides background information on Canadian support of the nuclear non-proliferation régime and, in particular, International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. It also describes the achievements of the Canadian safeguards support programme. While the brochure has been written for the general public, and thus represents part of an ongoing effort by our verification research programme to heighten understanding by Canadians and others of issues relating to arms control verification, we believe that it could also be of interest to the more professional audience comprised by the members of delegations to the Conference on Disarmament.

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

As I indicated at the beginning of this statement, I will not be dealing today with some other items on our agenda, such as items 6 and 7, negative security assurances and radiological weapons, although I must admit that, when Ambassador Ceska of Austria referred to these two items in his own recent statement, I took satisfaction that his down-to-earth and pragmatic approach to them closely approximated our own views. Nor will I say anything at this time about the first item on our agenda, "Nuclear test ban", except to express the strong hope, which so many among us clearly share, that Ambassador Donowaki's continuing patient exploration of the mandate issue will soon be answered by success.

There is one additional subject, however, on which I do want to put our views on record, and this seems to be the right time and place to do so. That subject is improved and effective functioning of the Conference, on which you, Mr. President, have already convened an open-ended consultation. In our delegation we also were struck by Ambassador Azambuja's wise suggestion that we give careful thought to how best the Conference on Disarmament might adopt and retain relevancy in face of the new international situation that has emerged during the past momentous 18 months or so. While all of us can concur in the correctness of Ambassador Azambuja's remarks, what I want to suggest today is that there are really two different aspects to the issue of improved functioning. There are good grounds for a very careful re-examination of our list of subjects; I appreciate that we should approach any changes to our basic agenda and programme of work with the greatest of care. Issues that are under consideration by us at this Conference reflect deep concerns with their substance. Nevertheless we are strongly in favour of dropping or modifying at least some of our items and replacing them with issues that have greater contemporary relevance. There is, as well, a second methodological aspect to improving how we function. I believe it would be relatively easy for us to agree to certain changes in our schedule to enable all our delegations to function more effectively and more efficiently. While the Canadian delegation is comparatively small, there are others much smaller. Even we find that, by the end of each of the current long sessions, we are increasingly overwhelmed by ongoing work-loads. We have too little time to give appropriate consideration and mature reflection to all subjects on our agenda. We strongly believe that, without changing the overall time devoted to our work, a modified rescheduling, which would provide for three shorter sessions and would at the same time allow for more frequent time between sessions for reflection, consultation and the development of policies, would be of real benefit to all.

I have spoken selectively today about only certain of the issues that confront us. There are other matters which I will wish to address in greater detail in due course, and I plan to return to these in the summer session.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Shannon, the distinguished representative of Canada, for his important statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Mr. Han Chang On.

Mr. HAN (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Mr. President, first of all I congratulate you on your able presidency for the last month of the current CD, leading the session to a successful conclusion.

It is the common aspiration of the world's peoples greeting the first year of the 1990s that the current decade will be a decade of disarmament free from the dangers of nuclear weapons and war in every part of the globe, and a decade of peace, friendship and co-operation. This aspiration became dearer to them as a result of recent changes in the international arena rather than the time conception that the 1990s is the last decade in the twentieth century.

Since many delegates have referred to the world-wide changes, in particular the progress made in the field of disarmament through bilateral or regional multilateral negotiations, I am going to avoid a repetition of them.

Disarmament and stability are not solely for particular countries and regions. Comprehensive and complete disarmament should be realized in all regions and in every part of the world; when various negotiations lead to adoption of measures aimed at this, world peace and security can be secured. The détente and disarmament process should be especially expedited in the region where mass lethal weapons, including nuclear ones, and huge military forces are concentrated and where confrontation and tension are high as a result of frequent military operational manoeuvres.

Measures of disarmament and détente for peace and security in Asia and the Pacific are urgently needed, both from the historical viewpoint and in the light of the present military and political situation. It is in the Asian continent that large-scale wars owing to interference in internal affairs by the big Powers after the Second World War have broken out most frequently, and it is in the Asian continent that nuclear military bases and foreign troops are being kept and large-scale military operations are being intensified.

It is well known that the Korean peninsula, where the danger of nuclear war is most threatening, is becoming the hotbed of tension endangering world peace and security and the potential cradle of a new war. The area of the Military Demarcation Line is the most heavily armed area in the world, where over a million troops confront each other in a state of semi-war along a line less than 250 kilometres long. Although it is generally known that 45,000 foreign troops, military bases and 1,000-odd nuclear weapons of various types are deployed on the Korean peninsula where the situation is tense, due attention is not paid to the stage the danger of nuclear war has reached and how serious it is. Over 1,000 nuclear weapons deployed in south Korea - that is, more than one nuclear weapon per 100 square kilometres, with a density four times higher than that of NATO and a total explosive capacity of 13,000 kilotons - are enough to kill 160 million persons. Already modern facilities for carrying nuclear weapons have been deployed and special nuclear stores have been built there.

What is dangerous is that an operational command system has been established for the use of nuclear weapons at any moment and rehearsals for nuclear war are being stepped up. The joint military exercise known as "Team spirit", which has been carried out since 1976, is growing in size every year, and the nature of the exercise has become offensive. At this very moment the

(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

joint military exercise "Team spirit 90" with 200,000 United States and south Korean troops is going on in a real war atmosphere in south Korea. Military experts and world opinion draw the unanimous conclusion that the "Team spirit" joint military exercises are offensive drills for nuclear war, considering their characteristics or the involvement of mainly nuclear war material such as the E-4B nuclear command aircraft, nuclear aircraft carriers, submarines and cruisers, the B-52 strategic bomber, F-15 and F-16 fighter-bombers and all sorts of nuclear missiles.

No one can confirm that the strong nuclear-equipped force of 200,000 troops engaged in practical military rehearsals near the Military Demarcation Line would not invade the north.

The open armed intervention in the internal affairs of Panama last year increased our concern.

Unlike NATO, which has a Nuclear Advisory Committee composed of 15 countries and deters any wilful arbitrary use of nuclear weapons, the south Korean side is completely excluded and has no say as far as the deployment and use of nuclear weapons in south Korea are concerned. Moreover, the field commander of the United States army stationed in south Korea has full authority to use nuclear weapons at any moment. Since 1982 the threats to use nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula have been repeated, and recently United States Defence Secretary Cheney said that if there is a place on the globe now where disputes could turn into a war, that is the Korean peninsula.

All the facts show that in the Korean peninsula any accidental event could trigger a war, and that would be a nuclear war. If a nuclear war breaks out in Korea, Asia and the world as well as Korea will suffer a terrible nuclear disaster. Consequently, the prevention of war and the realization of disarmament on the Korean peninsula are very important for world peace and security.

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea became a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1985 and put forward a proposal for the creation of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula, a proposal for phased arms reductions and many proposals for disarmament and peace, and initiated negotiations for their realization in order to remove the danger of a nuclear war. But even negotiations for disarmament are not being held in the Korean peninsula, owing to the negative position of the other side. Arms are being increased and the situation is growing more tense.

It is the unanimous aspiration of mankind to live peacefully in a nuclear-free world. The only multilateral negotiating body, the CD, has a heavy responsibility to realize this aspiration of mankind. Regrettably, however, there is no evident progress in discussions on various agendas on nuclear weapons; it is anyone's guess how long it will take to achieve the complete abolition of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

Under such circumstances we consider one of the most urgent priorities in preventing nuclear war is the early establishment of an international legal system that deters and bans the use of nuclear weapons. Since the use of nuclear weapons is recognized as a wanton violation of the United Nations Charter and a crime against mankind, the adoption of such legislation is urgent. It is one of the important ways for nuclear disarmament to minimize nuclear deployment and establish and expand nuclear-free peace zones.

Today, when partial disarmament is under way and acute regional disputes are being settled by the withdrawal of foreign troops, there are no grounds for continuing to deploy nuclear weapons and troops in a non-nuclear-weapon State or region. Once all nuclear weapons and troops deployed in foreign lands have been withdrawn to their original State and the proposed nuclear-free zones have been established in all continents, the process of nuclear disarmament will be rapidly expedited.

I should like to emphasize that no region should suffer the introduction of all sorts of nuclear weapons and the construction of nuclear stores for any nuclear-weapon State by that State's own decision without any deterrence. A strict international system of surveillance and control should be established which would ban the deployment of even a single foreign nuclear weapon in a non-nuclear-weapon State or region; authorities which are unable to control the introduction of foreign nuclear weapons on their soil and exacerbate the danger of nuclear war and nuclear proliferation should be denounced by the international community.

The fourth NPT conference to be held in August in Geneva will be an important occasion for focusing international attention on comprehensive nuclear disarmament, and especially on eliminating the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and withdrawing all foreign nuclear weapons and troops. In this regard my delegation will support the proposal made by Nigeria and other developing non-nuclear-weapon States at the third meeting of the Preparatory Committee. It is a positive event that there are disarmament talks in progress and disarmament measures are being taken in Europe where world wars broke out twice. This should also happen in the Asian continent and other parts of the world. Unfortunately, weapons being reduced in Europe are surprisingly flowing into other continents; several delegates have expressed concern about this at the present session. The New York Times dated 25 March reported that 30 billion dollars' worth of equipment, out of that due to be withdrawn from Europe as a result of the CFE negotiations, would be sold to third world countries. In particular, 20 F-18 fighters worth 3.5 billion dollars will be handed over to south Korea. If détente in one continent causes tension in another continent, the détente will be meaningless and world peace and security cannot be expected. This will be another serious challenge to our Conference. Our delegation strongly maintains that all troops reduced should go back to the original States and their equipment should be destroyed or returned to those States.

What is needed as a solution for rapid overall disarmament is confidence-building, which is under active discussion today in various international forums, and in regional meetings in particular. At the Asia and Pacific regional meeting on confidence-building held in January in Nepal, urgent regional issues were considered.

(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

In confidence-building aimed at disarmament, the tendency to indefinitely defer disarmament by dissociating confidence-building from disarmament and making confidence-building a precondition must be resisted. What is important is to strengthen confidence-building through bold disarmament. Especially in the situation prevailing in the Korean peninsula, where peace is not guaranteed by law and where dialogue at all levels and exchanges are restrained by military super-tension, a breakthrough for confidence-building will come about only through the easing of military confrontation.

If our proposals for high-level political-military North-South talks, for turning the demilitarized zone along the Military Demarcation Line into a peace zone, for stopping large-scale joint military exercises with foreign countries, and for withdrawing foreign troops and nuclear weapons and reducing armed forces to less than 100,000 troops on either side, had been negotiated and put into implementation, the question of the Korean peninsula would never have remained an international question.

Early this year our Government proposed pulling down the 240-kilometre concrete wall built in the area south of the Military Demarcation Line, and opening all doors to allow free travel between the north and the south. This is a general means of building full confidence in the political, economic, military and cultural fields. Free travel promotes personal understanding, and opening all doors permits correct understanding of the policies of the other side; these are the best methods of confidence-building that we can offer. As for the south Korean side, the pulling down of the concrete wall that hinders free travel mentally and physically would be their best offer for confidence-building.

The Conference on Disarmament has undertaken this year's work with a new life power against the background of the changing international situation. It is the hope of all participants that it will be possible to submit a draft convention on chemical weapons next year at the latest. It is also the expectation of the international community. The bright prospect for chemical weapons is due to the energetic efforts of Ambassador Morel and his colleagues through difficult technical problems and such significant international meetings as those of Paris and Canberra. I express appreciation once again of these efforts. I am convinced that the final work will result in success under the guidance of Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons this year.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for his statement and for the kind words address to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Sharma.

Mr. SHARMA (India): My statement does not really qualify as a farewell statement. If it is one, it is singularly dry and technical, almost esoteric given the wide canvas of disarmament we deal with. However, from the last occasion I took the floor in the Conference some weeks ago, also under the presidency of your country, I had shared some parting thoughts concerning the crucial work we are engaged in within the Conference.

(Mr. Sharma, India)

My delegation has taken the floor today to present document CD/988, which contains the results of a national trial inspection conducted by India in the context of the proposed chemical weapons convention. The trial inspection was carried out in August 1989 at Searle India, Bombay, a multi-purpose unit manufacturing various drugs. For the purposes of the proposed convention, the facility is manufacturing diisopyramide phosphate from DIPC alcohol which is initially converted into DIPC hydrochloride (DIPC HCl) and then to nitride pyramixetosylate. Another product - propantheline bromide - is also produced by esterification of xanthanoic acid with DIPC HCl. The chemical DIPC HCl is listed in schedule [2] in the current "rolling text".

The inspection was carried out in accordance with the provisions contained in document CD/CW/WP.213 to identify effective means of verifying that the production, processing, consumption and transfer of chemicals are consistent with purposes not prohibited by the proposed chemical weapons convention. The intent of the trial inspection was to develop an adequate system of verification and establish the degree of intrusiveness required while protecting commercial confidentiality. Experience gained from the inspection was very useful in this regard.

Within the proposed convention, verification is one of the most complex areas. A considerable amount of work has been done, though some issues still need to be resolved. The scale of the exercise adds to the complexity. Our approach to the verification issue is based upon certain principles. We believe that these provide an effective set of guidelines for tackling the problems relating to non-production as well as those related to challenge inspection. While the conclusions drawn from the national trial inspection conducted by India are self-evident from document CD/988, which has been circulated today, I would like to reiterate that the principles of universality and non-discrimination are among the most important for any international agreement. For the chemical weapons convention to succeed in enhancing global security it has to be based on universal multilateralism.

The verification régime must be appropriate and adequate, and it should not unduly interfere with legitimate activities. The balance between "appropriate" and "adequate" is a delicate one. With greater interaction with the chemical industry, it should be possible to find the right balance. In developed countries, the importance attached to the fact that verification activities should not be unduly intrusive or interfere with normal commercial activities, especially in sensitive areas of research and development, and also maintain confidentiality of sensitive information, is appreciated. For the developing countries, the additional natural correlated concern is that verification measures should not in any way jeopardize the development of a peaceful chemical industry, which plays a crucial role in national planning and the national economy. Greater openness and transparency will be an important confidence-building measure and lead to increased peaceful co-operation among the developed and developing countries. The development of a verification régime on the basis of these principles can give us a régime acceptable and beneficial to all.

A similar approach can also help us in furthering our work on challenge inspection. Such a measure is likely to be invoked as a last resort, when all other measures have been tried and found inadequate. The procedure should

(Mr. Sharma, India)

therefore reinforce this conclusion. A challenging State has a far-reaching right, but it has to be curtailed by the obligation not to abuse it. The challenged State is obliged to accept such intrusive inspections provided for within the convention, with a right also to satisfactorily demonstrate its compliance with the convention through alternative measures. In view of the political nature of this exercise, it is necessary to balance the rights and obligations of both sides. When the procedures in the post-inspection phase are finally amplified, the principles elaborated above can enable us to develop an effective mechanism that will reflect a truly objective multilateral character.

Since this is the last time that I will be taking the floor before the Conference on Disarmament, I would like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to all the colleagues with whom I have had the opportunity of working closely on all matters connected with the work of the Conference. It has been a very rewarding experience. I would like to wish the Conference much success in obtaining effective and speedy results in various items of paramount interest for the world community being deliberated by it.

It is a pleasure for me, Mr. President, to have made my last statement before the Conference with you in the Chair, as I have particularly valued our close personal association and friendship. We appreciate your very able stewardship of the work of the Conference during this concluding month of the spring session. I also wish to express our delegation's appreciation of the important contribution which Ambassadors Komatina and Berasategui have been making to the functioning of the Conference, as well as the excellent support from the secretariat and the team of interpreters. My best wishes also go to Ambassador Azambuja and Ambassador von Stülpnagel, who share this occasion with me in making a final appearance before the Conference and for both of whom I have the highest personal regard. There is no doubt that in the high positions they will henceforth occupy they will bring to bear the exceptional skills and commitment which have been so much in evidence in their outstanding contributions to the Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Ambassador of India, Ambassador Kamallesh Sharma, for his statement. Ambassador Sharma leaves us soon, after one and a half years, as a result of the process of perestroika and the magnetic attraction of the events in Central Europe. He moves to a very important assignment where events are unfolding on a truly historic scale. He will be a privileged witness to those events and, to that extent, his gain is our loss. In the relatively short period that Ambassador Sharma has been associated not only with the Conference on Disarmament but also with the vast panoply of United Nations institutions which he oversees, he has earned the respect of all his colleagues for his dignity, for his moderation, for his commitment to enlightened principles. He and Mrs. Sharma will leave behind many friends, among whom I myself and my wife are privileged to count themselves. Kamallesh, we will all of us miss you and we look forward to meeting you on an early occasion.

I now give the floor to the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Wisber Loeis.



Mr. LOEIS (Indonesia): Mr. President, it is my great pleasure to associate by delegation with the previous speakers in expressing our immense pleasure at seeing you, the representative of Pakistan, a country with which Indonesia has always enjoyed a close relationship, presiding over our work in the Conference on Disarmament. Being one of the last three speakers on your list on this last day of our spring session, I think that I am qualified enough to say how much your skill, expertise and your vast experience have proved invaluable in guiding our deliberations in April. Moreover, it should be noted that your presidency has also coincided with the holy month of Ramadan and this, undoubtedly, has meant hardship for you personally. My delegation would also like to avail itself of this opportunity to extend its grateful appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Azikiwe of Nigeria, for his tireless dedication and constructive efforts during his presidency in March. To Ambassador Juraj Králík of Czechoslovakia, who has just joined the Conference, I wish to extend my delegation's warm welcome and pledge its readiness to work closely with him and his delegation. I would also like to warmly congratulate Ms. Kongit Sinengiorgis on her promotion to Permanent Representative and Ethiopian Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament. Allow me also to express my regret at the departure of Ambassador de Azambuja of Brazil, Ambassador von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany and my neighbour, Ambassador Kamallesh Sharma of India. Their wisdom and contributions to the cause of disarmament will be missed by all of us. On behalf of my delegation and myself, I wish them every success in their new and very important posts.

We have heard quite a number of statements made by eminent personalities and distinguished representatives of member as well as non-member States of the Conference during the past three months. None of them, including that of my own delegation, failed to refer to the recent developments in East-West relations. My delegation is pleased to note that all views aired brought into sharp focus the need for the Conference to address its agenda in a more purposeful manner.

The views expressed by various speakers during this spring session have confirmed the importance of a number of points crucial to our deliberations. One of them is the need for the Conference to retain its international credibility. I am in complete agreement with the observation that the Conference had no choice but to exploit recent developments.

I also share the opinion that the epochal changes taking place outside this forum should give fresh impetus to our work in the Conference on Disarmament, and that the changes should inspire the emergence of a new concept concerning international peace and security commensurate with the demands of the new international environment.

It is common knowledge that the narrow concept of international peace and security caters to deep-rooted bipolar antagonism. It undermines the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, which underscores that the purpose of the elaboration and implementation of measures for the regulation of armaments and disarmament is to promote the maintenance of international

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

peace and security. Today, when conflicts and confrontations have given way to dialogue and negotiations, and when political rapprochement and reconciliation are seen to be spreading across ideological boundaries, such a concept may need to be thoroughly reviewed.

I could not agree more with you, Mr. President, when, in your recent statement as head of the delegation of Pakistan, you mentioned that in the world of today, agreements between the two super-Powers alone to limit their arsenals and reduce their forces do not constitute a sufficient guarantee for world peace and security. Indeed, we will delude ourselves if we pretend that all conflicts in the world are attributable to East-West hostilities. In this connection, our efforts to establish a new international peace and security system through disarmament can only be assured if we formulate a framework which takes the following caveats into account. Firstly, the myriad of militarily-non-significant States participating in the multilateral disarmament forums should be recognized as having a legitimate role to play in the international peace and security system. Their presence and their claims, therefore, must not be dismissed as passing phenomena, nor can they be adequately responded to by the narrow interest of one, two, or several major Powers. Secondly, the non-military as well as the military dimension of international peace and security, together with increased global interdependence, should be approached as interrelated phenomena by concerted multilateral actions with a view to avoiding a recurrence of major tensions in the coming decade. Thirdly, multilateral and group diplomacy should not be avoided, and the most sensible course of action is to make them as effective and equitable as possible.

In order to assure the achievement of concrete results and avoid the pitfalls which have led to a prolonged stalemate in the past, the negotiations in multilateral forums should not be cast in terms of "demands" by one group of countries. In this increasingly multipolar world, democratic approaches should take greater hold in the conduct of inter-State relations, including our deliberations. In this way, the role and the function of the Conference on Disarmament as a single multilateral negotiating body could be enhanced.

It is encouraging to note the readiness of a number of delegations to adopt a positive approach towards the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament. In view of the emergence of the positive international climate, we should continue our endeavour on this particular issue. In this connection, I wish to welcome the process of informal meetings organized as an in-house mechanism to examine ways and means of working for the improved and effective functioning of the Conference.

Concerning the agenda of the Conference, my delegation is of the view that the items now on the table remain cogent. While we are open to any suggestion to improve the agenda, we should however bear in mind that the proposed improvement should not distract the Conference from exhaustive work on items pertinent to the interests of the majority of States inside and outside this room.

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

The honourable Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand, the distinguished Ambassador of Sweden and your good self, Mr. President, as head of the delegation of Pakistan, made reference to the very pertinent issue of naval armaments and disarmament. My delegation has always attached particular importance to this issue. Because of its geographical location between two major oceans and the geopolitical factors which have shaped my country's maritime outlook, Indonesia is particularly sensitive to and concerned by the build-up of naval nuclear armaments. We are also particularly concerned at the rapid development of new naval arms systems, including naval nuclear weapon systems. All of these factors, in our view, have added a new and dangerous dimension to the arms race in general, have heightened the threat to regional and international peace and security and may have a significantly adverse impact on international maritime commerce, as well as on the peaceful exploitation of marine resources.

A non-nuclear State like my own can only be affected in a negative way if there is a nuclear confrontation, or even a nuclear accident, in the sea of the region. My delegation sees the merit of the view expressed by Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden that thought should be given to the issue of a multilateral agreement on the prevention of incidents at sea. A question which has a global dimension such as naval nuclear disarmament also deserves to be put on the table, in my view. Agenda item 3 of the Conference might be suited to cover these questions.

The question of regional security and armaments referred to by a number of delegations is of particular interest to my delegation. Perhaps I should begin by acknowledging that in many regions there is a long tradition of regional co-operation in permanent institutions, as well as modalities which have been created to promote the reduction of tension and the settlement of disputes. In the region of South-East Asia, co-operation among States through ASEAN has helped reduce the sources of conflict and has strengthened peace and security in the region. Regional peace and security could grow out of successful national and regional developments resulting from national and regional stability, thus placing emphasis on the totality of social, economic, cultural and political aspects as bases for peace and security in the region, rather than on the military dimension.

With regard to peace and regional security, the ASEAN member States recognize that every State has the right to lead its national existence free from foreign interference, subversion or coercion. It is also accepted that the use or the threat of the use of force in the conduct of relations among States should be renounced. ASEAN has therefore created a mechanism as well as norms and methods of consultation on social, economic, cultural and political issues which have proved beneficial and effective for its members. In this regard, I wish to say that in dealing with the question of regional peace and security, armaments and disarmament, a thorough elaboration of issues relating to the enhancement of peace and security in all regions is called for. This is indeed quite a delicate undertaking, since each region displays different levels of security, concerns and conditions, differing levels of regional cohesion and different degrees of extra-regional military involvement. The feasibility of bringing in the question of regional peace and security and armaments therefore needs to be given some more thought.

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

Touching upon the nuclear questions, I wish to welcome the progress made in the bilateral nuclear arms control and disarmament endeavours which, in recent years, have resulted in some achievements. There is also an indication of success in the near future on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons through a START agreement which could crown the summit meeting between President Bush and President Gorbachev next June. We are heartened by this development, and we are looking forward to such an agreement.

Concerning item 1 of our agenda, my delegation appreciates the tireless endeavours expended by Ambassador Donowaki in attempting to resolve the difficulties in establishing an ad hoc committee to deal with this item. It is encouraging to note that a path has been found towards a convergence of views concerning the mandate for the establishment of an ad hoc committee. In this regard, I would hope that at the beginning of our summer session, the ad hoc committee could be established.

The majority of States are waiting for concrete results from the work of the Conference in this particular field. Since the original parties to the partial test-ban Treaty proclaimed their commitment through the preamble of the Treaty almost 30 years ago, it is only natural that we, particularly the non-nuclear-weapon States, are impatiently awaiting the materialization of that commitment. It was not the non-nuclear-weapon States which initially commenced making commitments which sought to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, and which were determined to continue negotiations to this end. It is therefore fully understandable that the majority of States, almost all of which are non-nuclear-weapon States, are anxious to see a concrete result emerging from any negotiation to ban nuclear testing comprehensively.

The fourth review conference of the non-proliferation Treaty is scheduled to be held in August this year. In this respect, my delegation has been following with serious interest the assessments made during the course of this spring session on matters pertinent to the implementation of this international legal instrument. However, my delegation's view concords with that of the speakers who affirmed that the Treaty has been far from successful in curbing the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

At the risk of repeating myself, I wish to reiterate that under article VI of this instrument, nuclear-weapon States have committed themselves to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. Since this year will mark the twentieth anniversary of this Treaty, my delegation would only like to express its profound hope that this commitment will produce more concrete results in the near future.

The non-proliferation Treaty has withstood the test of time and become one of the foundation-stones on which the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons rests. While the multilateral effort should continue, it is to be noted that the question of non-proliferation is primarily a matter of political will. A non-proliferation system can be respected only if it is based upon the conviction of States that their interests are better safeguarded within the system rather than outside it. I believe that the Conference could, if it so

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

wished, give new impetus to the efforts to achieve nuclear non-proliferation, serving better the interests of States parties, as well as attracting States which are non-parties to become parties to the Treaty, thus strengthening the non-proliferation régime.

I have spoken about many issues, which mostly concern nuclear weapons and the effective functioning of the Conference in relation to the present international climate. It may be premature now to judge the work of our Conference. It seems to me, however, that the Conference runs a risk of being outpaced by political events prevailing in the relations among members of the international community, particularly in the East-West context. As the two super-Powers have done well with the strategic arms reduction talks and the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe, I believe that the Conference should match them by setting a self-imposed time frame for the early conclusion of the CW convention if it is not to lag behind.

My delegation is heartened that a number of the obstacles at the technical level which have long impeded efforts to devise a verification régime have now been removed. Such circumstances facilitate the resolution of the remaining political issues. The time is now ripe to elaborate the questions which are more political in nature, such as the crucial issue of universal adherence.

There are many aspects to take into account if we wish to conclude a convention which can attract universal adherence. In addition to the points it raised during its last intervention, my delegation feels that it is of paramount importance that the convention should be non-discriminatory. In particular, it should ensure equal rights and obligations for possessor as well as non-possessor States.

The paramount importance of provisions concerning sanctions, assistance and protection against chemical weapons, and economic and technological development has been mentioned by many speakers during the course of the spring session. My delegation would like to echo the view expressed in this respect by other delegations that provisions which take into account the interests of States which do not possess chemical weapons should be included in the convention. This would, I believe, lead to universal adherence to the convention.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Indonesia for his very comprehensive statement and for the kind words that he addressed to myself. I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Dietze.

Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic): I have already had an opportunity to warmly welcome in our midst all new colleagues. Today, let me especially welcome Ambassador Králík of Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, it is a less pleasant duty to say goodbye to colleagues leaving us - Ambassador von Stülpnagel, Ambassador de Azambuja and Ambassador Sharma intend to leave Geneva very soon. With their personal commitment, great experience and their diplomatic skill, as well as their well-known ability to foster

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

personal contacts, they have contributed much to resolving a good many issues within the work of the CD. In taking leave of our three colleagues, I wish them good health, happiness and success in their new assignments and, for bilateral reasons, this goes especially to Ambassador Sharma.

Today the Geneva Conference on Disarmament is winding up its first round of this year's session. Busy weeks lie behind us. A good many things have seen encouraging developments during this session. On the other hand, we know full well that not all our expectations in the spring part of this session have been fulfilled.

My delegation shares the assessment made during the spring session by virtually all delegations, both members and non-members of the Conference, that drastic and big changes in the international situation have laid a sound foundation on which far-reaching disarmament steps could be achieved in the near future, thus making 1990 a year of real disarmament.

We are convinced that the headway made so far in bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations needs to be strengthened and supported by purposeful action at the multilateral level. In this context, the role of the CD as a unique forum for bringing together all militarily significant States in the world cannot be underestimated. It is worth mentioning here that a record number of observers actively participated in the work of the Conference during its spring session, thus assisting in the search for universally acceptable solutions.

The negotiations on a CW convention yielded further progress this spring - this is our assessment. We regard the drafting of texts on article IV and the annex to article IV, as well as article V and the annex to article V, as an achievement of real significance. The close co-operation between the Soviet Union and the United States produced results which contributed to agreement on important provisions concerning the destruction of CW and CW production facilities. Furthermore, procedures for the investigation of the alleged use of chemical weapons have been developed, and the inspection protocols and annexes have been further streamlined. Solutions are taking shape on a number of legal issues, such as amendments, settlement of disputes and measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance. We deem it especially remarkable that this year progress has not been confined to provisions of a merely procedural character, but has been extended to matters of substance.

This is all the more important since other matters of substance, such as completion of the verification system by solving the questions of ad hoc inspection and inspection on request, are still awaiting solution. We should make use of the recess to further address these issues. Material offered by the delegations of Australia and the Federal Republic of Germany will be helpful in this regard. We believe that the paper on article IX provided by the Chairman of the ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons deserves special attention. It should be regarded as a bold attempt to overcome a stalemate which has hampered progress on this important subject for a rather long period, adversely affecting the whole of our work on the convention. We would hope that all delegations, especially those which so far have had difficulties with

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

the existing concepts in this field, will open-mindedly approach the ideas in the Chairman's paper. We see a chance that the optimistic start to this year's work will yield further results. My delegation will spare no effort to advance our work on a subject which is of crucial importance to our Government.

The forthcoming fourth review conference of the non-proliferation treaty, to which my country also gives particular weight, highlights the need for our forum to intensify its efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament. We welcome the fact that during the spring session all 40 members of the CD finally agreed on the basic approach to a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on agenda item 1. We expect this committee to be set up early in the summer, thus allowing the Conference, after a long and - let me say - a not particularly encouraging recess, to proceed with practical work on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Although such a basis is still lacking with regard to agenda items 2 and 3, we none the less consider the decision taken by the CD to hold a series of informal plenary meetings on these items as a useful mechanism for identifying possible areas and topics for future negotiations. I am confident that, given the universal importance of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war, such areas of common concern will be found.

At this juncture, let me add that the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime also calls for additional efforts by the CD on items 6 and 7 of its agenda. Although no major breakthroughs have been achieved, the work accomplished to date, in our opinion, provides a solid foundation to build on during the summer session.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is another item to which my delegation accords high priority. I believe that despite continued procedural difficulties there is a further convergence of views, though not as broad as we would wish, concerning the importance of multilateral consideration of certain confidence-building measures. This, we hope, will help bring about more comprehensive agreements.

My delegation also welcomes the serious and interesting discussion commenced during the spring session on the need to adapt the work of the Conference to the new developments taking place in the world. We hope that the process of open-ended presidential consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the CD, which began last Friday under your very able chairmanship, Sir, will lead to concrete decisions, allowing the Conference to play an even more important part in the disarmament field. In this way, the CD will be able to come up to the expectations that the world community of nations placed in this forum in 1978.

As you already know, after free, equal and secret elections a new Government has taken the destiny of the German Democratic Republic into its hands. The policy statement delivered by Mr. Lothar de Maizière, the Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic, before the Parliament on 19 April touches on many aspects of the work of our Conference. May I therefore use this opportunity to inform you about some major points of his statement?

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

Germany is located in the middle of Europe, but it must never again wish to become a power centre in Europe. We do not want to stand between the peoples in Europe, but wish to be a pier of a bridge of understanding. Germany must be a factor of peace. The unification of Germany is to enhance the stability in Europe and promote the establishment of an all-European order of peace, democracy and co-operation. We want to contribute to a united Germany our awareness of the significance of internal peace. We know that therefore we have to come to terms with our history first. No more must there be one part which was to be blamed for everything while the other one had allegedly kept historically clean. We too have acknowledged our share of responsibility for the crimes of the National Socialist dictatorship. German unity is designed to strengthen the comity of the Europeans. The principal condition for that is the guaranteeing of the borders in Europe. This includes the need for our neighbours to be sure of the permanence of their borders with Germany. The recognition of Poland's western border - binding under international law - as described in the Görlitz Treaty between the German Democratic Republic and Poland and in the Warsaw Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland, is unrenounceable. Upon unification of the two German States, the future German constitution, for instance, will no longer contain article 23 of the Basic Law. Germany has no territorial claims vis-à-vis other States, and will not make such claims in the future.

Unification has become possible in connection with world-wide détente and the end of the East-West conflict. The division of Germany has been an expression of that conflict. Human rights and disarmament are central elements of détente. At this stage of the process of détente there is an inseparable link between defence and disarmament policies. Also in this context we remember the roots of our country's democratic renewal, in which the peace movement has been playing a fundamental role.

It is incumbent upon the Government of the German Democratic Republic to pursue a policy which promotes the process of military alliances being superseded by structures that transcend alliances as a first step towards an all European security system. In that regard our aim in the negotiations is to help bring about a European security system with constantly decreasing military functions. We believe that expanding the term "security" to the economic, environmental, cultural, scientific and technological spheres is a dictate of our time.

For a transitional period there will exist, beside the Soviet armed forces, a drastically reduced and strictly defence-oriented national people's army on what is today the territory of the German Democratic Republic, whose task it will be to protect that territory. Loyalty to the Warsaw Treaty Organization means to us, among other things, that in the forthcoming negotiations we will always take into account the security interests of the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Treaty States.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic seeks a drastic reduction in all German armed forces. The German Democratic Republic renounces the production, transfer, possession and development of ABC weapons and would like to see a unified Germany take a similar position. Moreover, it favours a global ban on chemical weapons before the end of this year.



(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

The process of nuclear disarmament must go on. We hope for the favourable conclusion of the START negotiations on a 50 per cent cut in strategic nuclear weapons between the Soviet Union and the United States before the end of this year.

An order of peace and security in Europe can create the prerequisites for abrogating the rights of the Second World War allies with regard to Berlin and Germany as a whole. The Government of the German Democratic Republic considers that these rights should be annulled in the framework of the "two plus four" talks. These talks too belong in the overall framework of the CSCE process for creating an all-European peace order.

CSCE is of special importance to us. In particular, the Government of the German Democratic Republic supports the establishment of a CSCE security agency to verify disarmament and restructuring arrangements. Likewise, it advocates the setting up of a CSCE arbitration body and the establishment of a permanent joint council of foreign and defence ministers.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic wants to be in the vanguard of the disarmament process. We will take immediate measures to restrict as a first step and to completely cease in the foreseeable future, the production and export of weapons of war. There must be no arms exports at all to areas of crisis. We will initiate the restructuring of the national people's army and gradually scale down the German Democratic Republic's military obligations. By contrast, political co-operation within the Warsaw Treaty is to be intensified. To this end, the Government will contact the Governments of the Warsaw Treaty States in the near future. In the spirit of this policy statement, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic will continue to work for results which enhance security and stability for peoples.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): The delegation of Mexico would like to congratulate you on the way you have conducted our work during the present month of April. We thank you for your efforts and dedication. Allow me also to put on record our appreciation for Ambassador Azikiwe's work during the month of March. The delegation of Mexico would like to welcome Ambassador Králik of the Federal Republic of Czechoslovakia. We are also happy to note that Mr. Rubens Ricupero of Brazil has agreed to add the tasks of disarmament to his already considerable diplomatic duties in Geneva. We would also like to say goodbye to the three colleagues who have taken leave of us today. We thank Ambassadors von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany and Kamallesh Sharma of India for their constant dedication to the search for a solution to the various problems on our agenda. To them and their distinguished spouses we wish every success, personal and professional.

The presence of Ambassador Marcos de Azambuja of Brazil among us today is especially pleasant for us. Despite his new and important duties he has been kind enough to return to Geneva to say farewell to his many friends. My delegation thanks him for his valuable contribution to the work of this Conference and wishes him and his distinguished wife all the best.

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

Boa sorte. We would also like to express appreciation for the information which Ambassador Ledogar gave us this morning on behalf of the United States and the Soviet Union on the fifteenth round of bilateral talks on the elimination of chemical weapons.

As we near the end of our spring session we would like to make a few comments on the item concerning a comprehensive test ban. Twenty-seven years after the signing of the Moscow Treaty, and twenty years after the entry into force of the non-proliferation Treaty, not only has the agreement promised by the depositary States of both those instruments not been concluded, but this single forum for the negotiation of disarmament agreements is not even holding negotiations on the matter. If there is one item on our agenda that is worthy of inclusion in the lists of Robert Leroy Ripley it is without doubt that of the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear tests. Believe it or not, in 1963 the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union proclaimed themselves "determined to continue negotiations" to achieve "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time". And believe it or not, in 1968 those same three States reiterated that same "determination" in the preamble of the NPT. Some determination! We do not know if Ripley ever defined the verb "to determine", but our dictionary tells us that it means "to establish the boundaries of something" or "to resolve". In other words, since 1963 those countries have been resolved to put an end to all nuclear weapon testing, only they have yet to do so.

For years the international community has assigned the highest priority to a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. This was reaffirmed in December of last year by the General Assembly in its resolution 44/105. That resolution recalls that the question, "which has been examined for more than 30 years and on which the General Assembly has adopted more than 50 resolutions, is a basic objective of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament". It also recalls that over five years ago the Secretary-General - and I continue to quote from resolution 44/105, as if it were, as we have been told, a kind of holy writ - "emphasized that no single multilateral agreement could have a greater effect on limiting the further refinement of nuclear weapons and that a comprehensive test-ban treaty is the litmus test of the real willingness to pursue nuclear disarmament". Last autumn, on the occasion of Disarmament Week, the Secretary-General himself pointed out that "unless the present positive momentum in bilateral negotiations on various nuclear questions, including the urgent need for the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, is soon translated into concrete undertakings, the risks of both vertical and horizontal proliferation will become more acute".

Since the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty in 1963, this Conference has been unable to move forward substantially in working out a multilateral agreement banning all nuclear weapon tests. Since 1984 it has not even been able to establish an ad hoc committee to examine the question. In the course of this spring session we were told that there was a possibility of setting up such an ad hoc committee provided that all the groups were prepared to accept the proposed mandate contained in document CD/863. That was over a month ago and, in spite of Ambassador Mitsuro Donowaki's intense efforts, we have not yet been able to establish the ad hoc committee - with the modest mandate proposed - because of the opposition of some delegations of the Western Group.

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

The flexibility shown by the other members of the Conference, including the Group of 21, to which Mexico belongs, has not been matched by others. It is obvious that we are not going to go on waiting indefinitely for certain parties to accept what they themselves have proposed.

During the 1960s we heard repeated promises by the three depositary States of the partial test-ban Treaty, promises concerning the prompt cessation of all such tests. That has been the basic working premise for the consideration of that item here and in the General Assembly. That also formed part of the balance in the obligations assumed in the NPT by the non-nuclear-weapon States on the one hand, and the nuclear-weapon States on the other. The NPT does not speak sole of horizontal non-proliferation; the measures it provides for in order to stem vertical proliferation are also clear. And a comprehensive nuclear test ban is the key measure in this regard. Neither the Moscow Treaty nor the NPT speak of a partial ban on underground nuclear tests. Nor do they speak of limiting such tests to a certain threshold, still less of a 150-kiloton threshold or limit or of "reducing" such tests "to a minimum". The threshold agreed bilaterally by the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1974 Treaty is equivalent to over 10 times the yield of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima in 1945. Some threshold! With regard to the number of tests, the situation is equally disheartening. Between 1945 and August 1963, when the Moscow Treaty was signed, the annual average of nuclear tests conducted by the two super-Powers was some 28 tests per year. Between August 1963 and 1974, when the threshold test-ban Treaty was signed, the average was about 48. Between 1975 and 1988 the average was around 36 tests per year. In short, as the heads of State or Government associated with the Six-Nation Initiative on peace and disarmament stated in their Stockholm Declaration of 21 January 1988, "any agreement that leaves room for continued testing would not be acceptable" (A/43/125 - S/19478, annex).

The régime and perhaps the very concept of non-proliferation is being undermined by the Moscow Treaty and NPT depositary States themselves. What would be the reaction in Latin America or in the rest of the world if the depositary government of the Treaty of Tlatelolco were the first to stop properly complying with its provisions? A couple of months ago, on 14 February, the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Dr. Hans Blix, stated in an address to the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva: "I should in fairness point out that while 'horizontal proliferation' is a risk, 'vertical proliferation' is a reality". And he added: "The nuclear-weapon States, especially the super-Powers, are very active to prevent further proliferation. There is perhaps something paradoxical about nuclear-weapon States desperately urging non-nuclear-weapon States not to do what they themselves seem to find indispensable to continue doing, namely, develop nuclear weapons".

Over the past few years, some statements have been heard and some events have occurred which are frankly discouraging. In September 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to conduct the "nuclear testing talks". The aim of those talks is not to prohibit all nuclear tests, but rather to trace out an extended programme of "step-by-step" negotiations on nuclear tests and their verification. The position of the United States Administration announced in 1988 and repeated on several occasions,

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

including 18 October of last year, during the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly, by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, is to regard the complete prohibition of all nuclear tests as a long-term goal, since his country's security and that of its allies depends, and will continue to depend, on the deterrent capacity of its nuclear arsenal. That same day in the same First Committee of the General Assembly, the representative of the United Kingdom reiterated his Government's identical position, stating that "an immediate move to a comprehensive test ban would be premature and perhaps even destabilizing. For the foreseeable future the United Kingdom's security will depend on deterrence based, in part, on the possession of nuclear weapons. That will mean a continuing requirement to conduct underground nuclear tests to ensure that our nuclear weapons remain effective and up to date".

At the beginning of January this year, the United States announced that, in relation to the nuclear testing talks, it had not identified any further limitation on nuclear testing (beyond those already laid down in the threshold test-ban Treaty) that would be of national security interest. The Soviet Union responded on 30 January that the new attitude of the United States could undermine support for the "step-by-step" cessation of nuclear tests.

Last month was the twentieth anniversary of the entry into force of the NPT. In 1995, in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, "a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision", says the article, "shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty". So the 1995 conference will be rather different from the NPT review conferences that are held every five years in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3. At those conferences the States parties have been reviewing the NPT's operation "with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized". Following each such review, the parties have attempted - not always successfully - to adopt a declaration by consensus. This occurred in 1975, 1980 and 1985, and the same may be expected to happen this summer at the fourth review conference. In 1995, however, a majority - and not a consensus - of the 142 States parties will have to decide whether or not to extend the Treaty's life. Consequently, over the next five years the international community, and in particular the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, will have to consider in different forums the operation and the future of the present nuclear non-proliferation régime. One such forum will be the NPT fourth review conference, to be held in a few months, whose third and final preparatory stage began yesterday. In parallel, in a few weeks, the Moscow Treaty amendment conference will begin in New York. That will be another forum which will have before it various aspects of the question of nuclear testing with a view to finding a formula to convert it into a complete ban.

In conclusion, this Conference's situation regarding the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban is thus becoming more and more delicate, and the coming years may prove especially difficult, not to say decisive, for its credibility. If in the near future we do not start to see concrete progress

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

on a comprehensive test ban, there will also be further erosion of the faith many countries have placed in the non-proliferation Treaty. Obviously those countries will have to take this seriously into account when in 1995 they are called on to take a decision on extending the life of the NPT.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Marín Bosch, for his incisive statement. That concludes my list of speakers today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea.

Mr. LEE (Republic of Korea): My delegation deeply regrets that the North Korean representative has introduced a statement of a contentious nature to the plenary at this stage when the business of the spring session is being wound up. If I were to respond to every point raised by the North Korean representative, I would have to repeat the points already made in my Ambassador's statement on 12 April, which I think is superfluous.

The statement made by the North Korean representative has once again disappointed us. The one-sided, uncompromising tone of the statement revealed to us that they are indeed out of touch with reality. While the world is changing rapidly and to a great extent, North Korea continues to turn its back on this reality. In this regard, my delegation wishes to clarify some points.

The North Korean representative alleged that a concrete wall has been constructed on the southern boundary of the demilitarized zone, hence comparing it to the Berlin Wall, thus placing the blame on the South for blocking inter-Korean travel. The so-called concrete wall is nothing but an anti-tank barrier built for defensive purposes. Such military barriers also exist on the northern boundary of the demilitarized zone. The North Korean representative stated that the concrete wall extends for 240 kilometres. Where has this figure come from? The total length of the demilitarized zone itself is 250 kilometres, and the demilitarized zone itself is the land of "no crossing". Why would it then have been necessary to build a barrier of such a length?

Under the present circumstances, where there are no exchanges of mail, telephone calls, not to mention freedom of travel, practical measures need to be taken for mutual opening and exchanges between the two sides of Korea. Such measures are of paramount importance, and in order to achieve this an agreement has to be made on the subject of inter-Korean travel and communications. The barriers that stand in the way of inter-Korean opening and exchanges are not physical barriers, but mental barriers. In order to eliminate this psychological barrier, dialogue and exchanges are matters of top priority.

Although the North Korean representative said that it joined the non-proliferation Treaty in 1985, it has not yet submitted itself to the international full-scope safeguard measures under IAEA, which increasingly provokes the suspicion of the world community concerning the dangerous potentiality of North Korean nuclear development for military purposes. My delegation once again takes this opportunity to call upon North Korea to complete its commitment to non-proliferation by placing its nuclear facilities under the full scope of the IAEA safeguards.

(Mr. Lee, Republic of Korea)

While one side is entrenched in dogma and dwells on propaganda, advancement of any meaningful dialogue is extremely difficult, if not insurmountable. The international trend for dialogue and co-operation is a great encouragement for us to overcome the obstacles ahead of us, and we will continue our efforts to convert distrust and hostility into trust and reconciliation.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Republic of Korea. Before I give the floor to the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, I wish to point out that it is not part of the procedure or the tradition of the Conference on Disarmament to have rights of reply. Basically we are all here to hear statements and, of course, any delegation on the floor - whether member or non-member - is free at any time to ask for the floor to make their statement. Having said that, I give the floor to the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Mr. HAN (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Mr. President, I am sorry to ask you for the floor again. However, I would like to ask you to give me the floor after the statement of the representative of the United States. I will answer briefly after hearing the two statements.

The PRESIDENT: May I ask the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for a clarification? I hope he heard that we do not have a system of rights of reply. If there is a statement to be made, my understanding is that when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has asked for the floor to make a statement then there is a statement to be made. If so, you have the floor now, Sir, to make your statement, because there is no concept, procedure or tradition of rights of reply. So, are you availing yourself of this opportunity to make a statement or are you yielding that opportunity?

Mr. HAN (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): I am sorry to delay the conclusion of the Conference. However, it is regrettable to hear the statement made by the representative of South Korea saying this and that. It is not worth arguing, and I therefore refrain from doing so. May I make one thing clear? As regards the concrete wall, we are ready to invite anyone who has doubts to the site where the wall stands. Secondly, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is ready to sign the safeguard agreement of NPT, and we have had negotiations with the Atomic Energy Agency twice, so that there is no need for them to worry about this and mislead world opinion.

Mr. BRECKON (United States of America): Mr. President, I am very conscious of the comments you made and have no wish to prolong the session this morning. Let me just make two very brief points.

I feel it incumbent on my delegation to make clear that we make no apology regarding the presence of United States forces on the Korean peninsula. On the contrary, the United States believes, as was made clear in a statement by Secretary Cheney quoted here this morning, that the Korean peninsula is a potentially dangerous place. We are convinced that the presence of United States forces and our defence co-operation with the Republic of Korea have lessened the risk of war and contributed to stability.

(Mr. Breckon, United States)

I would also like to say that we take issue with comments that disparage proposals for steps that could begin to build confidence and reduce tension in that region, and we would urge that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea take another look at what is happening in the rest of the world and decide that the time has come to find practical ways to reduce a situation of military confrontation that is strikingly out of tune with the times.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement.

If there are no other speakers, I should now like to put before you for consideration the timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the first week of the second part of its annual session. As usual, the timetable has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees. If I see no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: As we conclude the spring session I feel that this is a good opportunity to pause for a few minutes, with the permission of the interpreters, to take stock and to see how far we have come since the beginning of the year. The coming break will also enable us to reflect on our future course of action for the remaining part of the session.

This session started against a backdrop of improved relations between the super-Powers. There was visibly a replacement of confrontation and mistrust by debate and dialogue, of suspicion by a spirit of understanding. Consequently, as we began this year's session there was a feeling of optimism in the air. It is against that backdrop that I would very briefly review the items on our agenda.

The first three items on our agenda deal with nuclear issues. On item 1, the nuclear test ban, my understanding is that Ambassador Donowaki is continuing his consultations. We look forward to the day when he will have something positive to report to us during the summer session.

On items 2 and 3, relating to "Ceassation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" and "Prevention of nuclear war and all related matters" respectively, we have moved forward by addressing these subjects in informal plenary meetings. This is a good beginning and a step forward. I hope that we can move to an even more structured discussion on these important subjects in the future as the international climate improves.

On chemical weapons, we were able to improve the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee this year. I hope that we can achieve reasonable flexibility in national positions, particularly on some of the political aspects of the negotiations, so that a chemical weapons convention can be concluded at the earliest.

(The President)

On the prevention of an arms race in outer space, it is my understanding that the procedural impediment which had slowed down the work of the Committee has been resolved. That is news which is welcome - better late than never. I hope that the Committee will be able to make progress on substantive matters during the summer session.

On negative security assurances, in view of some important events on the nuclear disarmament agenda for this year - the NPT review conference and the amendment conference of the PTBT - it is my hope that progress will be achieved on this issue, particularly in view of the very large consensus on the matter in the General Assembly.

On radiological weapons, efforts have been made to narrow down the differences between various delegations on the question of scope, and while success may not quite be around the corner, it is gratifying to note that the debate continues.

A significant point during the spring session was the briefing by the United States and the Soviet Union on the START and space talks. This is something to be welcomed. It keeps the members of this single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum up to date on developments. We hope that such briefings will continue on a regular basis in the future. We also look forward to the successful conclusion of the negotiations at an early date.

During the spring session also, the Conference adopted the progress report on the twenty-ninth session of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. The Group's usefulness has been acknowledged by delegations, and one expects that it will be able to successfully conclude its Second Technical Test as planned.

Finally, and in my opinion most significantly, on the subject of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament, there is a general realization now that there is a need to review our direction and our procedures. Informal open-ended consultations have started, and it is my hope that they will lead to a Quo Vadis mechanism, which will enable us to see by the end of this year's summer session how far we can go to bring the Conference on Disarmament into tandem with the developments and changes taking place in the real world outside.

To sum up, therefore, there has been progress during the spring session but much remains to be done.

Before closing the plenary, I would like to thank all of you. I would like to thank the secretariat, and I would like to thank the interpreters for their co-operation. I look forward to the presidency of Peru in the month of June, and until then I remain at your disposal for any interim housekeeping which is required.

Before I adjourn this plenary meeting, I would like to make two announcements. The first is that the informal meeting which was supposed to be held immediately after this meeting on the subject of agenda item 2 will no longer take place, because we have run out of our allocated time today.



(The President)

The next informal meeting will now take place on Tuesday, 19 June, and it will be devoted to agenda item 2, which is being carried over from today. The plenary meeting which was originally scheduled to take place on 19 June, on agenda item 3, will in consequence also be pushed back by one week to Tuesday, 26 June.

The second announcement relates to the open-ended consultations on effective and improved functioning. The next open-ended consultation will take place on Thursday, 21 June at 3.30 p.m. I would be grateful if, long notice notwithstanding, that date and that time is duly noted in your calendars.

As I have no other business for today, it is my intention now to adjourn this meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 12 June, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.