
VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 28th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. HEPBURN (Bahamas)

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The meeting was called to order at 3 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 30 TO 45, 120 and 121 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. ABOUL-NASR (Oman) (interpretation from Arabic): In this first statement I shall limit myself to comments of a general nature, and shall endeavour not to waste the time of the Committee reiterating views pertaining to the objectives of disarmament that are all set forth in the Final Document of the tenth special session devoted to disarmament. That is, after all, a document for which we voted, and therefore we do not have to reiterate its contents. Nor do we have to repeat what we said in the statements we made at the beginning of the tenth special session and at ensuing regular sessions. And there have been no changes so significant as to warrant our augmenting or changing what we have already said.

We do know that it is neither practical nor realistic to try to attain our disarmament objectives from one day to the next. However, we must say that we feel we have the right to call for the political will that will make it possible for them to be attained. We welcome any achievement, whatever it be, pending the broadening of agreements on disarmament and as long as it is based on the preliminary accords. One of the first steps, albeit a modest one, towards the achievement of our aims was embodied in the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, held in Geneva in September last. We are happy that some results - albeit meagre ones - were in fact obtained during that Conference, since unfortunately we had become somewhat inured to no progress being made at all.

Although we did not succeed in reaching agreement on the majority of the items submitted to that Conference for consideration, the limited agreement we did arrive at on the prohibition of the use of mines and booby-traps, and the similarly modest agreement on the limitation of incendiary weapons, encourage us to believe that very soon there will be an agreement covering the

(Mr. Aboul-Nasr, Oman)

indiscriminate use of such conventional weapons. We trust that at the next meeting in 1980 more progress will be made in this field, particularly with regard to small-calibre weapons, the use of which is on a par with the use of the prohibited dum dum bullet.

Some progress has also been made in the field of radiological weaponry, and we are happy to note the report of the Committee on Disarmament, which contains an "Agreed joint USSR-United States proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons" (CD/31). We hope that an agreement will be signed as soon as possible and before possession of these weapons becomes more general, making an agreement more difficult to arrive at.

In addition to the weapons I have just mentioned, I should like to deal also with a different type of armament on which lengthy talks and negotiations have been taking place. I am referring specifically to chemical weapons, in connexion with which progress is at a snail's pace.

(Mr. Aboul-Nasr, Oman)

We recognize the technical difficulties arising from the number of chemical elements that could be used for weapons, but which can be and are at times used for peaceful purposes. But once again a political will must be shown so that we can prohibit their use for weapons purposes altogether. An agreement must be reached on cessation of the production of chemical weapons and on the reduction and eventual elimination of existing stockpiles of them.

Although, as I have said, we are happy to note the results of the bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on these matters, we feel nevertheless that the negotiations on chemical weapons should be referred back to the Disarmament Commission, particularly on those issues on which no agreement was reached, such as the planning of chemical warfare and the use of chemical weapons in training and tactical manoeuvres. Therefore, efforts should be made, first of all, to reach agreement on the destruction of existing stockpiles of these weapons, as well as of the means of producing them. We are convinced that if the Disarmament Commission took up this matter that would in no way undermine the bilateral talks; on the contrary, it might well spur them to successful results.

The Government of Oman has consistently supported efforts to ensure the security of various geographical regions of the world and has urged that they be respected as denuclearized zones, whether in Africa, the Middle East, South America or the Indian Ocean. In particular, we have supported the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

Despite all appeals and efforts, and despite the fact that we have, in public meetings, informed the world that those areas are nuclear-free zones, we know that last month, in the South Atlantic off the coast of South Africa, a nuclear blast took place. Although the announcement that South Africa may well have exploded a nuclear device in the region of the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean on 22 September is a challenge to the world, it came as no surprise to us, since we had constantly warned of this danger. What does surprise us is that the news was broken to us so late, and we are equally surprised at the diffidence with which certain public information media have dealt with it. We have constantly stressed this danger and alerted the world to it, and we have also tried to put an end to nuclear co-operation with South Africa. This effort is reflected in many resolutions and recommendations of the United Nations calling on States to cease

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their collaboration with South Africa in the nuclear field.

We trust that the Secretary-General will very speedily report to us in response to the request made of him by the General Assembly to ascertain the facts surrounding the nuclear blast in question, as well as to ensure that no similar blast occurs in any other delicate and tense region of the world.

My next point is one that everybody has heard about and understands, namely, the nuclear co-operation between South Africa and Israel. We have watched with great concern what has been taking place. In its issue of 22 October last, the Christian Science Monitor published an article on the subject of the nuclear blast that took place off the southern coast of the African continent. It suggested that it might well have been from an Israeli nuclear device that could not be tested in the Middle East because of the density of the population there, and that the Israelis allowed South Africa to explode it within the framework of South African-Israeli co-operation in nuclear matters.

On this specific issue we have a draft resolution concerning Israeli nuclear capability, and we hope that it will command the support of all representatives wishing to avoid a nuclear build-up that would create an enormous danger with unforeseeable consequences. We trust that the Committee and the Assembly will ensure that the Middle East shall remain a nuclear-free zone.

Oman attaches great importance to the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace because of our geographical location bordering that Ocean. We know that peace and stability must reign in that part of the world so that our people can develop and can devote themselves to the creation of a better life for themselves and for succeeding generations, and avoid air-Power rivalry being imported into our area through the creation of spheres of influence.

Oman has constantly appealed to all nations to ensure that there shall be no foreign presence in the area, whether it be in the form of fleets plying the Indian Ocean, military bases, or military blocs or friendship pacts. The question of the Indian Ocean region is a matter of great concern to us, and we trust that the Committee will be successful in ensuring that it shall be respected as a zone of peace. We hope that all States, and particularly the permanent members of the Security Council, will participate in efforts to that end.

As well as attaching great importance to the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, Oman is fully conscious of the responsibilities that devolve upon it by reason of its geographical location, especially since we happen to be

(Mr. Aboul-Nasr, Oman)

close to the junction of the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean, through which oil tankers sail. Furthermore, Oman has endeavoured to ensure the control and monitoring of ships going through the straits, in an effort to preserve both its own interests and those of neighbouring States, to avert any danger to the shipping lanes and to bar any dangerous incursions into the region.

Oman, with the neighbouring fraternal States, has endeavoured to ensure this freedom of the seas and respect for the rights of the coastal States. We would appeal to all States possessing the necessary technology to assist us in safeguarding the security of ships passing through the straits. We reject any military pacts or blocs, and we feel that the presence of foreign military bases poses a possible danger to the region. This is something we have drawn to the attention of the countries of the region and of the world at large.

At this the end of Disarmament Week, which began on 24 October, we cannot but say once again how much we hope that we shall be able to break through the vicious circle of armament in all its forms so as to ensure a better future for generations to come. We are sure, Mr. Chairman, that under your enlightened guidance we shall be able during this session to make more progress towards the realization of a number of our aspirations.

Mr. HA VAN LAU (Viet Nam)(interpretation from French): Speaking just after the week for the promotion of the objectives of disarmament, I should like, on behalf of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, to reaffirm that our Government and our people firmly support the struggle for disarmament and regard it as one of the most effective ways for peoples living under different social systems to fight against oppression, exploitation and unjust war and for the preservation of the peace and security of nations.

The head of the delegation of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, in his statement of 28 September 1979 before the plenary meeting of the General Assembly, described the current international situation as follows:

"My delegation is glad to note that in this year of 1979 we have witnessed many great successes achieved in all regions of the world by the forces of peace, national independence, democracy and social progress. This is the essential direction for the development of the world situation at present. Nevertheless, imperialists, in collusion with international reactionaries, seek by every means to obstruct the advance of mankind, to try to regain their lost positions and to prepare new interventions and aggressions against the peoples that refuse to submit to their dictates." (A/34/PV.13, p. 59)

"The recent painful ordeals of Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea, like other peoples' own experiences throughout the world, show quite clearly that a new danger is threatening the international community: the big nation hegemonism of an Asian Power, in collusion with imperialism, is challenging the peoples of the world." (Ibid., p. 72)

We can safely say that this dual characteristic of the current international situation is clearly reflected in the attitude of States to the problem of the limitation of the arms race and disarmament.

On one hand, in the circumstances in which the victories of the forces of peace, national independence and social progress can put pressure on the forces of war, there is evidence of progress in the application of the recommendations and decisions of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. As evidence of this, a positive event in the area of bilateral and multilateral agreements concerning limitation of strategic nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament has been the signing in 1979 of the SALT II agreement by the Soviet Union and the United States. There can be no doubt,

(Mr. Ha Van Lau, Viet Nam)

in the words of the Chairman of this Committee when he opened the general debate on disarmament items on 16 October 1970, that

"this development will leave its impact not only on the reduction of nuclear and strategic arms but also on other areas of armaments".

(A/C.1/34/PV.4, p.6)

Only recently, the Soviet initiative, made in agreement with the German Democratic Republic and after consultation with the member nations of the Warsaw Pact, to withdraw from the territory of the German Democratic Republic, over the next 12 months, 20,000 Soviet troops, 1,000 tanks and other types of military equipment, bears eloquent testimony to their sincere desire to adopt more effective measures to strengthen trust among the countries participating in the Conference of Security and Co-operation in Europe. It is in the same spirit that the Soviet Union has declared its readiness to reduce, on a unilateral basis, the number of medium-range nuclear weapons deployed in the western part of the Soviet Union, on condition that there is no additional deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe.

Despite the positive trend evinced by the elaboration of concrete measures for arms limitation and disarmament, peace-loving peoples throughout the world are gravely concerned at the declared intentions of certain circles within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), who are developing plans to deploy an American medium-range nuclear weapon in Western Europe to be aimed at the territory of the socialist States. In certain Western countries, warlike forces wish to sabotage the results of the conclusion of concrete international agreements or to halt all impetus for talks on, and the conclusion of such agreements.

It must be emphasized that during the period which has elapsed, these Western warlike forces have been encouraged by a hegemonistic Asian Power which has been conducting a policy based on a frantic nuclear and conventional arms race, a policy which has aggravated and extended armed conflicts in Indo-China and South-East Asia and which now is the cause of a constant threat of war in the region. It has become ever more clear to enlightened international public opinion that this hegemonism, which has its roots in the thousand-year-old "Celestial Empire" here on earth, is aimed at making it the most "super" of all those it considers to be super-Powers in the world.

The supreme leader of that Power declared in 1956, among other things, that "We must at all costs become a first-rank world Power in the cultural, scientific, technical and industrial spheres. ...It is unacceptable that our country should not achieve this within a few decades".

In September 1959 he said further:

"We must conquer the planet. That is our objective".

Despite that country's economic backwardness, in the early years of the 1950s its leaders focused their efforts on the creation of a strategic nuclear force and now they are pressing ahead feverishly with the "modernization" of their armed forces and accelerating the production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons.

By comparison with the other regions of the world, South-East Asia is an area in which that power has at its disposal the most favourable conditions, as well as the greatest means and opportunities for the implementation of its expansionist and hegemonist policies. In August 1965, that same leader affirmed that:

"We must at all costs get our hands on South-East Asia, embracing South Viet Nam, Thailand, Burma, Malaysia and Singapore. ...Once it is in our hands, we can build up our forces in that zone and we will be able to stand up to the Soviet Union-Western European bloc and the East wind will prevail over the West wind."

(Mr. Ha Van Lau, Viet Nam)

For more than 30 years we have been witnessing evidence of this policy of expansionist hegemonism in South-East Asia, evidence that has been described in the White Book on relations between our country and that Power, distributed in document A/34/553-S/13569 of 9 October 1979, to which I wish to invite the attention of this meeting without actually quoting from it because of the shortage of debating time. The culmination of that policy of hegemonism was the two-pronged armed aggression launched in a pincer movement by that Power against Viet Nam at the end of 1978 and the beginning of 1979, one prong consisting of the military forces of its tools, coming from the South West, and the other, comprising 600,000 of its own regular troops, coming into Viet Nam from the north, massacring the civilian population and destroying Vietnamese economic and cultural establishments in the regions where hostilities took place.

Since the defeat of its aggression against Viet Nam, the facts are there to prove that that Power is feverishly preparing a new act of aggression against Viet Nam, which could be unleashed at any time. No man of conscience can fail to be aware of that. In Kampuchea that Power stubbornly persists in reviving the last remnants of the defunct genocidal régime to engage them in the sabotage of the Kampuchean people's work of peaceful reconstruction.

The CHAIRMAN: I apologize to the representative of Viet Nam for interrupting him, but it appears to the Chair that the substance of his remarks is not centred on disarmament items. I wonder whether very soon he might get to the substance of the matter rather than going into great detail, as he has done so far. I apologize again for interrupting, but I thought that I should bring that point to his attention.

Mr. HA VAN LAU (Viet Nam) (interpretation from French): Yes, Sir, I was about to proceed to the substance of the problem.

We realize the imminent danger to mankind represented by that nuclear Power which is playing the game of war with such effrontery, arrogating to itself the right to give lessons to independent and sovereign States that it

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would like to subjugate, and which, to that end, has always made sure that it has been free from any conventional or nuclear disarmament commitment, while at the same time declaiming demagogically about the unilateral guarantee for the security of all non-nuclear States.

If our people had not reacted as it should, what would have happened in our region? Without any doubt, a conflagration would have broken out which could have drawn into its terrible vortex several other countries and thus destroyed the peace and stability of the South-East Asia region.

Recently enlightened politicians and businessmen in the West have warned their Governments, which have been strongly attracted by the frantic arms race conducted by that Power and also by its hysterical policy of hegemonism, but they warned them only against the possible grievous consequences which could ensue if that Power should collapse in a new internal political crisis. They have not yet spoken about the infinitely graver impact which the expansionist policies of that Power could have on the interests of countries of the world.

There is no doubt that humanity faces a new danger flowing from hegemonism in collusion with imperialism, and that these forces are tending to reverse the flow of international relations and to take the world back to a period of acute international conflict.

The efforts put into the effective application of recommendations and decisions of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which have led to certain concrete results, are now in danger of being thwarted more than ever. But it is equally true that the forces of peace, national independence and social progress throughout the world are constantly becoming strengthened and are winning resounding new victories. This is the essential trend of development in the international situation, despite the fact that hegemonism in collusion with imperialism is seeking by all possible means to impede the forward progress of mankind.

That is why, we express the hope, with full confidence, that with determination to overcome all possible difficulties, the international community will continue its tireless efforts to put into effect the decisions of the special session in accordance with the order of priorities recommended by that session.

(Mr. Ha Van Lau, Viet Nam)

In the field of nuclear disarmament, faithful to our position as stated in the First Committee at the thirty-third session, we regard as among the desirable measures that deserve to be implemented first the Soviet initiative relating to the conclusion of an international convention designed to guarantee non-nuclear weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons.

For reasons which we have thoroughly developed earlier in this statement, and in view of the international situation, we fully support the Soviet initiative on the draft resolution on the inadmissibility of the policy of hegemonism in international relations and the proposal put forward by the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic concerning the adoption by the General Assembly of a declaration on international co-operation for disarmament. If the General Assembly adopts these drafts, they will become two most timely basic legal instruments with broad scope, not just for disarmament but for the whole trend of developments in the international situation.

As far as concerns zones of peace, and I think it useful to quote from the Final Document of the special session, where it states:

"The establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world under appropriate conditions, to be clearly defined and determined freely by the States concerned in the zone, taking into account the characteristics of the zone and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in conformity with international law, can contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and to international peace and security as a whole. In this regard, the General Assembly notes the proposals for the establishment of zones of peace, inter alia, in:

"(a) South-East Asia where States in the region have expressed interest in the establishment of such a zone in conformity with their views;"

(resolution S-10/2, para. 64)

(Mr. Ha Van Lau, Viet Nam)

With a view to the application of this text, which we have always greatly valued, at the thirty-third session we emphasized in the First Committee the joint efforts made by the countries of the region during the special session, and afterwards in direct contacts carried out between them at the highest level. We expressed our hope that there would be a progressive continuation of these efforts, at the same time warning the countries of South-East Asia against the divisive manoeuvres of a hegemonistic Power.

Unfortunately, events have disappointed us. It is regrettable that certain countries in South-East Asia in the intervening period, have allowed themselves to be drawn into the wake of the hegemonistic Asian great-Power against the peoples of Viet Nam and other countries of the Indo-Chinese peninsula. We sincerely hope that those countries will think again in time about this matter and that they will do so in their own national interests as in the interests of the peace and stability of the region and of co-operation.

In regard to Viet Nam, we have always advocated contacts and we are anxious to maintain a dialogue in order to achieve a greater mutual understanding. Without doubt, this is the best way to establish a zone of peace, liberty and neutrality in South-East Asia in keeping with the recommendations of the Final Document of the special devoted to disarmament.

Mr. RANDRIANARIVELO (Madagascar) (interpretation from French):

"We must go beyond the present détente and see what in actual fact can turn this détente into immediate and general disarmament, the unconditional liquidation of the stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. We must succeed in turning that détente into a great world-wide agreement whose guiding principle will be world peace."

Those were the words the President of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar used when he addressed the Sixth Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries and summed up his views of the problems of disarmament and security that are now being considered in this Committee. The task which he asked us to perform is not an impossible or utopian one. It can be carried out. It is within our grasp, because success depends on a choice, one that is perhaps easy to make, between, on the one hand, co-operation and peaceful coexistence and, on the other, armed confrontation and mutual annihilation.

It is natural that we should choose to be partners in life rather than death, and so it should not be too difficult to turn that choice into a political will to which all military options will be subordinated. We are convinced, therefore, that it is possible to go beyond the present stage, which is characterized by the qualitative and quantitative proliferation of implements of death and the multiplication of initiatives, conferences, proposals and appeals for peace and disarmament.

One of the conditions for our joint survival is disarmament, but it also holds the key that can lead us to unexpected political prospects which at present we cannot perceive. The benefits that we can gain are numerous: the establishment of true equality among States; equal security for all; more stable security, since it will not depend on the balance of terror; the strengthening of the principle of non-recourse to force; and substantial savings that can be diverted to development programmes.

Since weapons are both the symbol and the instrument of the policies of power, of domination, of threat, of interference and of intervention, disarmament is the surest means of putting an end to those particular policies. Such policies are still being carried out relentlessly in southern Africa and in the Indian Ocean, a scene of recent developments that directly affect our security. Perhaps I may be allowed, before I touch on other questions on the agenda, to speak on this matter.

(Mr. Randrianarivelo, Madagascar)

Do I have to prove that the racist régime of Pretoria has violated the status of Africa, regarded as a denuclearized zone? Have we not long known the intentions of that régime, the preparations it has made, what natural and technological resources are, or have been placed at its disposal, enabling it to carry out its diabolical plans?

We were not surprised at the news published, rather belatedly, by the United States, since we are well aware of Pretoria's attitude towards the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its determination to continue its anti-African policy, even to the extent of violating the Charter and the principles of international law. I need not stress that the acquisition by South Africa of nuclear weapons will incite it to redouble its excesses and its savage repression of the national liberation movements and their supporters and to continue with even greater arrogance its adventurist and aggressive policy towards neighbouring independent States. The peace and security of the region are affected by the inevitable repercussions that this must have on the international situation.

We willingly endorse the declaration published on 29 October on behalf of the non-aligned countries, in which they ask the Security Council to apply the mandatory provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter so as to put an end once and for all to the nuclear collaboration among South Africa, certain Western countries and Israel. We can never stress sufficiently the responsibility that those countries bear before history for having allowed the racist régime to achieve a nuclear capability after repeated warnings from African countries.

The situation in the Indian Ocean has deteriorated rapidly in the course of the past year. We have noted decisions and actions that are the very denial of the aims and principles of resolution 2832 (XXVI), declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. I refer to the creation of the Fifth Fleet and to the establishment of task forces, whose theatre of operations is mainly in the Indian Ocean. I refer also to the strengthening of the base on Diego Garcia and the militarization of certain islands regarding which questions of sovereignty are still pending.

(Mr. Randrianarivelo, Madagascar)

The South African nuclear explosion, which it appears was carried out in the Indian Ocean or in the neighbouring regions, has just been added to the already long list of barriers to the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. Could this have been avoided by a more prompt adherence by the permanent members of the Security Council to the notion of demilitarization and denuclearization of the Indian Ocean? No one will ever know. However, it is more urgent than ever to take specific measures to ensure the implementation of resolution 2832 (XXVI). My delegation shares that conclusion, already reached by the countries of the region and by the Ad Hoc Committee.

With the expansion of the atomic club, the prospect of achieving true nuclear disarmament, to which the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament allocated the highest priority, has been reduced. The continuation of the arms race, and more particularly the qualitative and quantitative nuclear arms race, has become a matter of increasing concern. The political and legal rampart that was intended to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons will not stand much longer after the breach opened by South Africa. The treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests which has been promised us for more than two years may be obsolete before it is adopted.

(Mr. Randrianarivelo, Madagascar)

Seen in this perspective, the signing of the SALT II agreement, which captured the attention of all, has become a symbol. To the extent to which it can strengthen the climate of confidence between the Powers and promise the conclusion of other agreements conducive to authentic disarmament measures, SALT II has been welcomed by the non-aligned countries, in spite of its manifest deficiencies.

We are thus facing a new disarmament decade, that of the 1980s, with an additional handicap certainly, but also with a few trumps.

We have a Programme of Action which represents a solid basis for starting a real process of disarmament. Adopted by consensus, that Programme does not propose a solution to all the problems, but at least it has the advantage of defining, in terms acceptable to all, the approach to be adopted in the negotiations and the priorities to be given to each question. We endorse the appeal made by the non-aligned countries for the urgent implementation of the Programme of Action in accordance with a specific timetable. We draw attention to the urgency of the measures related to nuclear disarmament, but without minimizing the importance of the limitation of conventional weapons.

Machinery has been set up that will allow all Members of the United Nations to take an active part in the process of consideration and negotiation of those matters which none can ignore. This machinery has begun to operate and the active role played by the non-aligned countries is a source of satisfaction.

My delegation assesses at its true value the intensive work done by the Committee on Disarmament to give practical effect to the provisions of the Final Document of the tenth special session.

As far as procedure is concerned, the "more open" nature of the Committee has been strengthened by a provision of the rules of procedure allowing non-member States to present their views to that body.

As far as substance is concerned, the programme of work and the agenda which the Committee adopted respects the priority agreed upon for problems of nuclear disarmament.

It is true that the treaty on the complete prohibition of all nuclear weapons testing has not been achieved, apparently because of difficulties concerning verification. But those difficulties are not insurmountable and the Committee is right to call on the Powers engaged in trilateral negotiations to redouble their efforts to achieve early conclusion of the treaty.

(Mr. Randrianarivelo, Madagascar)

As far as the international arrangements to guarantee the security of non-nuclear-weapon States are concerned, we support the proposal by the Group of 21 favouring adoption of a convention. The assurances repeatedly given by the nuclear Powers must be embodied in a binding international instrument. We would prefer them to be submitted in a standard form.

It is encouraging to note that the Disarmament Commission has been able to prepare "the elements of a comprehensive disarmament programme", although we would have preferred a consensus on subjects that the non-aligned countries regard as important, that is: the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; the dissolution of military alliances and the dismantling of military bases; the prohibition of the development, manufacture and deployment of conventional weapons of mass destruction.

In the light of resolution 33/71 B which states that the use of the atomic weapon is a crime against humanity, the fact of not including among the recommendations the point concerning the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons represents a step backwards as far as we are concerned.

Having made these observations we support the recommendations of the Disarmament Commission.

We reiterate the hope expressed by the Chairman, Mr. Velodi, when he closed the session, that the Commission could, by working closely with the Committee on Disarmament, encourage the process of disarmament.

We are told that a problem clearly understood is a problem half solved. Would that this were true in the case of disarmament, a problem debated, studied and analysed in all its aspects and ramifications for years. However, despite the considerable amount of work on it, it has still not been possible to make the necessary decisive progress to put an end to the arms race and to stride forward on the road to disarmament.

Some see in this the consequences of a lack of political will. Others conclude that it is necessary to create a climate of confidence among States, without which they will not be ready to accept the sacrifices and concessions needed for the negotiations to be successful.

It appears to us that the draft submitted by Czechoslovakia as a code of principles and political standards governing the conduct of States in negotiations connected with disarmament meets the concern of all involved.

(Mr. Randrianarivelo, Madagascar)

The sponsors of the draft do not hope to create or replace the political will where it does not exist because of the opposing interests of States; they merely nurture and encourage it by proposing a form of ethics in negotiation.

They call on States to constantly mobilize their efforts towards disarmament, to tackle negotiations in a constructive spirit, to conduct the negotiations with sincerity and to do everything they can to create an international climate conducive to the speedy realization of the desired progress.

The draft goes further. In order to get States to co-operate towards disarmament, it sets as a principle that disarmament must be organized so as to strengthen and not reduce the security of States. Other provisions are particularly appreciated by the non-aligned countries. They are those which provide that international co-operation in disarmament presupposes that no new political or military organization will be set up and that efforts will be made towards dissolving those that already exist. I would also like to mention those provisions which state that the use of military forces for purposes of intimidation or pressure is incompatible with the spirit of disarmament.

It has often been stated that most urgent task facing the international community is that of effectively resolving the vital problems of disarmament. We are ready to co-operate to that end, because we know that the rapid achievement of that objective will mean the establishment of lasting peace and security for all peoples.

It is in that spirit that I would like to state, in conclusion, that we intend to give our support to the draft submitted by Czechoslovakia.

Mr. AL-ALI (Iraq) (interpretation from Arabic): Everyone is keenly aware of the explosive nature of the situation prevailing in the Middle East resulting from the continuous military actions undertaken by the Zionist entity against neighbouring Arab countries and the Palestinian people. There are a number of elements in the situation some of which are relevant to the work of this Committee, particularly those relating to the items now under discussion here. We can sum them up by asking the following question: why must the international community pay more attention to Israel's nuclear armaments and what measures does it intend to take, through the United Nations, in that respect?

With reference to these elements, we wish to give an account of the historical background. It is a secret to no one nowadays that those who contributed to the creation of the Zionist entity had their minds set from the very start on the acquisition of nuclear weapons as a way of continuing the process of expulsion of the Palestinian people and continued regional expansion at the expense of the neighbouring Arab States. In order to achieve the Zionist dream of setting up what is called "Greater Israel", as the Zionists understand it, conventional weapons were not enough to attain that objective, particularly if the matter was viewed from the standpoint of the Zionist entity's dependence on foreign countries as a source of weaponry. This is a question that may be influenced by alien interests which bear no relation to the Zionist interests of Israel - the acquisition by the Arab States of that same weaponry and its use in a manner that might thwart Zionist ambitions.

We therefore feel that from its very beginning the Atomic Energy Agency of Israel was linked to the formation of the Zionist entity in 1948, as was stated by Ernest David, President of the Atomic Energy Agency of Israel, in a broadcast on the "Voice of Israel" on 19 November 1954.

Moreover, Shimon Peres, former Israeli Defence Minister, now the Leader of the Israeli Opposition, stated:

(spoke in English)

"The military strength of a nation is measured today not only by type and quantity of the weapons it possesses but also by its capacity to produce them in time of need - and this is particularly true of

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advanced weaponry. It is probably easier for intelligence services to gather information about the arms held by an adversary than it is for them to gain a correct estimate of its national potential in the field of research and in the production of existing weapons or of new and unknown weapons - that is probably the important area, more so than in many others, in which one nation can surprise another, and it is much simpler to conceal the means of production than the item produced."

(continued in Arabic)

It is evident from that passage that the production of nuclear weapons is very important to Israel. It is a way of carrying out its aggressive aims, relying on nuclear blackmail of the Arab countries.

Reviewing the nuclear activities of Israeli scientific bodies, we wish to make the following observations.

Chaim Weizmann, first President of Israel, regarded "science" as a very effective weapon to be skilfully used by Israel in order to attain the objectives of zionism. That is why the Weizmann Institute at Rehoboth has, since 1949, concerned itself with nuclear research. Among the major tests undertaken by the Institute was the extraction of uranium from crude phosphate in the Negev.

In 1952 the Ben-Gurion Government decided to create a body to co-ordinate and supervise all work relating to nuclear energy. That led to the formation of the Israeli Committee for Nuclear Energy on 13 June 1952. That Committee was attached to the Israeli Defence Ministry. It was given a separate budget and laboratories, and Ernest David Berman, Scientific Director of the Weizmann Institute, was placed in charge. That scientist discovered uranium in the Negev desert. The existence of the Israeli Atomic Energy Committee remained a secret until 1954.

Let me add that the activities of that Committee remained within the framework of the Defence Ministry. The main objective of the Committee, as described by its head, Mr. Berman, is the discovery of the possibility of acquiring radioactive metals for the production of uranium and heavy water. There is no denying the importance of heavy water in the context of nuclear power.

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The conclusion of a co-operation agreement between France and Israel in the field of nuclear power in the first part of 1953 marked a new qualitative phase in the development of Israel's nuclear capacity. Nuclear co-operation between the two countries enabled Israel to obtain material and technical information. Israeli scientists and experts were trained at more advanced institutes and engaged in more complex types of work than those conducted in Israel.

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Moreover, the Israeli scientists had the advantage of the experience of other scientists, who had arrived at that stage of knowledge several years ahead of them. France contributed to the elaboration of the working basis for the Israeli programme by opening the doors of its nuclear institutes to Israeli scientists and by providing valuable information from the early years. Moreover, for its part, the United States provided Israel with its first nuclear reactor through an agreement concluded between Israel and the United States in 1955. Under that agreement, there was to be an exchange of information concerning nuclear reactors and their use. The agreement provided for the supply by Israel of enriched uranium-235 to the United States. It also entitled Israel to buy a small nuclear reactor for nuclear-research purposes. The reactor was bought in the United States. A financial contribution of \$350 million was made by the United States, which also made available to Israel a scientific library containing 6,500 items of research, nuclear reports based on those prepared by the Atomic Energy Committee and about 45 volumes on nuclear theory, together with summaries of nuclear papers and articles.

In May 1960 the nuclear reactor bought by Israel in the United States was at last set up in the town of Nahal Sourek, to the south of Tel-Aviv. The capacity of the Nahal Sourek reactor was originally 1,000 kilowatts. The reactor was so planned as to ensure that its capacity could rise to 5,000 kilowatts. The costs of installing the reactor were assessed at \$1.41 million. Over-all, the cost of installation in fact rose to \$3 million.

The importance of the Nahal Sourek reactor, from a military point of view, lies in the fact that it is used to train scientific and nuclear research experts. While the Nahal Sourek reactor is subject to partial verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Daimona reactor, on the other hand, in the north of the Negev, represents a more dangerous development of Israel's policy of acquiring nuclear weapons. In 1957 an agreement was arrived at between France and Israel for the building of a reactor with an estimated capacity of 24,000 kilowatts. The Daimona reactor

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was activated late in 1964. The Israeli Government confirmed that that reactor was not subject to any controls, whether French, foreign or even international. When American experts visited the reactor in 1969 in response to pressure from the United States administration, they presented a written complaint in which they said that Israel was refusing to comply with verification measures and there could be no guarantee that work going on at Diamona was not concerned with armaments. This bears witness to non-peaceful intentions of Israel, which are confirmed also by the fact that the project was carried out in the most total secrecy. It came to light only in 1960 through the United States intelligence services. Only then did it become known that what had been built at Daimona ostensibly as a textile plant was in fact nothing other than a nuclear reactor.

On 20 December 1960, The New York Times described the Diamona reactor as follows:

(spoke in English)

"well suited for producing the fissionable plutonium used in the nuclear bomb".

(continued in Arabic)

This reactor is similar to the American reactor at Savannah, in South Carolina, which has provided the United States with the bulk of its current stocks of plutonium. The danger posed by the Daimona reactor, from the military point of view, is that it can produce between 100 and 300 grammes of plutonium-239 per metric ton of untreated uranium processed in the reactor for the purpose of obtaining pure plutonium-239. We may assume that a ton of uranium produces 300 grammes of plutonium-239. The Daimona reactor produces about one gramme of plutonium per megawatt per day. Thus, if it were to work at full capacity for 300 days a year, the Daimona reactor, the capacity of which is as high as 24 megawatts, could produce - multiply 24 grammes by 300 days and divide it by 1,000 grammes, 2 kg - 7.2 kg of plutonium-239.

The critical mass which is necessary to detonate an atomic bomb is 5.79 kg of pure plutonium, according to Arnold Kramish, in The Peaceful Atom in Foreign Policy. Consequently, Israel is capable of producing at Daimona the natural plutonium it needs. If each metric ton of uranium produces 300 grammes of plutonium, and since Israel can obtain 7.2 kg, it would take 24 tons of uranium a year to meet the total quantity of fuel needed annually for the functioning of the Daimona reactor.

According to Leonard Beaton in his book, Must the Bomb Spread? published in London in 1968, Israel first received the heavy water for the Daimona reactor as follows: 10 metric tons from South Africa; 10 tons produced locally from Dead Sea phosphates; and the remaining 4 tons from French sources. Israel must obtain a similar quantity every year unconditionally if the reactor is to be used to full capacity in the armaments programme. Thus there are two paths open to Israel: it can buy the plutonium it needs from such other sources as would not insist on verification, or it can produce the plutonium locally.

Local production is particularly valuable, in the sense that it means long-term self-sufficiency. For that reason, Israel, in the mid-sixties, developed a plan to step up its local production of uranium: instead of producing 10 tons, Israel will be producing 50 tons per annum. Here I refer the Committee to Leonard Beaton's book, Must the Bomb Spread?. That was done early in the seventies, as Doctor Zvi Katzinal noted in the paper Ma'ariv, on 10 October 1971. In addition, the London Times, on 3 December 1974, affirmed that Israel had been able to ensure the necessary nuclear fuel for the Daimona reactor from local production. Doctor Zvi Katzinal's statements, according to the London Times, showed that the phosphate reserves in Israel were 220 million tons, from which it was possible to extract 25,000 tons of natural uranium. Nevertheless, Israel did not stop acquiring uranium from foreign sources through unlawful channels.

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The article published in December 1977 by The Rolling Stone, an American publication, and written by Howard Kohn and Barbara Newman, describes thefts of highly enriched uranium in the United States. Among the most famous companies which declared they had lost uranium was the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation, a company known by the abbreviation NULEC, located in Pennsylvania. It had lost appreciable quantities of that substance. The then head of the company, a Mr. Shapiro, was obliged, following the revelations which had been made, to pay \$1.1 million for the loss of the stolen uranium and was also obliged to emigrate to Israel - which suggests collusion in that theft.

On several occasions Israel has attempted to steal enriched uranium from the United Kingdom and France. Certain significant sources are quite sure that various Western capitals were in connivance with Israeli intelligence services in helping to provide Israel with uranium. We could mention in this respect the attack launched against the German ship, Sheersbery, in November 1968, with the consequent disappearance of 200 tons of uranium being carried by that vessel. The same sources report that the uranium was transferred to Israel, according to The Nuclear Axis, by Zdenek Cervenka and Barbara Rogers, London, 1978, pages 322 and 323.

Consequently, we must ask ourselves various questions about the means used by Israel at the diplomatic and political levels to strengthen its political activities so as to achieve its Zionist aims - although Levi Eshkol, a former Prime Minister of Israel, claimed to have put an end to the activities started by Ben Gurion during the fifties. He stated his willingness to renounce the nuclear option as long as the balance of forces was maintained in the region and as long as Israel could continue to obtain the conventional weapons it regarded as necessary. This was published by The New Outlook of February 1966, pages 3 to 7.

Notwithstanding all this, the evidence available to us shows that Israel has spared no effort to promote its nuclear position in the scientific and technical field by providing for its own needs through the prompt acquisition of nuclear weapons. Israel is continuing its capacity to produce nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Al-Ali, Iraq)

All this, however, took place in a setting of the utmost secrecy. Israeli newspapers were not allowed to write about nuclear matters, except in the form of the briefest references. Moreover, any public discussion was so strictly limited that the Knesset was unable to hold full discussions of all aspects of nuclear power. This was a result of the secrecy imposed in order to conceal the activities of the nuclear and military authorities in Israel. There was another reason for the Israeli authorities to have treated nuclear matters with the greatest circumspection: Israel is determined to use the nuclear option as an additional deterrent. As long as Israel's nuclear activities and plans remain secret, the suspicion to which they give rise would force the Arabs to a position of greater hesitation with regard to the elaboration of their own plans and might lead them to assess Israel's capacity with a view to increasing their own capacity, with all that that would entail for their relations with other countries, including the United States.

The nuclear option is being used as a means of blackmail to obtain conventional weapons such as the Hawk anti-aircraft missile.

Meyer Feldman, an aide to the late President Kennedy stated that he had offered Hawk missiles to Israel in 1961 on the condition that Israel committed itself not to proceed with the development of nuclear weapons. On the basis of that offer Israel adopted a negative position on the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. Israel's accession to the NPT would mean not only a renunciation of its policy of deterrence, based on suspicion, in its relations with the Arab countries, but would also involve a solemn commitment not to try to produce nuclear weapons in the near future. This, of course, reveals Israel's plans under its aggressive nuclear policy. The Arab countries signed the NPT, but Israel has in the past used as an excuse the fact that Egypt had not ratified the NPT. However, Israel's signature of the Camp David agreement and the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty disposes of that pretext once and for all. The Israeli leaders have done their utmost to conceal their Government's position on the question of nuclear weapons by using an ambiguous formula open to different interpretations. They have constantly repeated that "Israel will not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East". On this subject, Steven Vosen, in his study "Nuclearization and

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stability in the Middle East" says that:

(spoke in English)

"Israeli leaders have repeatedly stated that /Israel will not be the first to introduce atomic weapons in the Middle East/ but nobody seems to believe them. The disclaimer leaves three semantic ambiguities that may be seen as loopholes. 1. 'The first ...'. Nuclear weapons have already been introduced into the Middle East on board ships of the American Sixth Fleet and on the Soviet ships in the Mediterranean. 2. '... to introduce ...' This could be interpreted to allow advanced development without final testing and deployment. 3. '... atomic weapons ...' Israeli acquisition of fissile material and fabrication of devices could stop first short of final assembly of deliverable explosives."

(Nuclearization and Stability in the Middle East)

(continued in Arabic)

Yigal Allon increased the doubts arising from Israel's stated position when he said: (quoted in English) While Israel would not be the first, "we will not be the second either". (Jewish Observer on Middle East Review, 24 December 1965)

(continued in Arabic)

This indicates that Israel possesses nuclear weapons and could use them if necessary.

During the Johnson administration in 1968, the United States Government asked Israel for explanations about its nuclear weapons policy. On that subject William B. Quandt said:

(spoke in English)

"The NPT issue was discussed at length with Israeli representatives. The most the Israelis would say was that they would not be the first ones to 'introduce' nuclear weapons in the Middle East. In trying to clarify what this meant, US officials discovered that it was understood by Israeli Ambassador Rabin to mean that Israel would not be the first to 'test' such weapons or to reveal their existence publicly".

(Decade of Decisions, p. 67)

(Mr. Al-Ali, Iraq)

(continued in Arabic)

These statements leave no doubt about the fact of Israel's development of its nuclear capacity and its acquisition of nuclear weapons. What was said by Ephraim Katzir on behalf of the Zionist entity in July 1974 confirms that Israel (quoted in English) "possesses the potential to produce atomic weapons" and will do so "if we need it". (The New York Times, 5 December 1974)

(Mr. Al-Ali, Iraq)

I refer to a book - a very important book - written by a group of investigators and published by the London Times "Insight" team. I quote from that book:

(spoke in English)

"Israel's stock of atomic bombs is, by super-Power standards, small. Kissinger has said privately that Washington believes Israel to have three nuclear devices. Israeli sources mention up to six."

(continued in Arabic)

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook for 1972, the London Daily Telegraph, and Jane's All the World's Aircraft for 1972-73, Der Spiegel and other sources also indicate directly or indirectly that Israel was trying to acquire nuclear weapons.

Hedrich Smith, in The New York Times on 18 July 1970 wrote an article entitled "United States assumes the Israelis have the A-Bomb or its parts." William Beecher, in the same paper on 5 October 1971, wrote an article entitled "Israel believed producing missile of atomic capacity." It was also pointed out by Richard Helms, former head of the CIA, in a private meeting of a Congressional Committee that Israel had the capacity to produce nuclear weapons.

In 1974 to 1976 the United States Intelligence Services revealed that Israel possessed nuclear weapons, on the basis of statements by Richard Helms, former head of the CIA, and by the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Science and Technology in the same Intelligence Agency. The latter pointed out that Israel had between 10 and 20 nuclear weapons. This information was published on 14 September 1974, in a memorandum of about five pages, under a Freedom of Information Act request. The memorandum represents the first official United States acknowledgement that Israel is a nuclear Power. Time, in an issue of April 1976, according to information provided by the CIA, indicated that Israel had 13 nuclear devices as large as that dropped on Hiroshima. This information was released during the 1973 war.

(Mr. Al-Ali, Iraq)

Another article describes Moshe Dayan's role in the development of these weapons:

(spoke in English)

"Dayan secretly and against the government's decision started the construction of a separation plant in 1968 to produce the fissionable material necessary for an A-Bomb. In 1973 Dayan sought and gained permission from Premier Golda Meir to assemble Israel's first atomic weapons. The bombs, ready for use in 1973 and capable of being delivered by Kfir or Phantom jet fighters as well as Jericho missiles, are reportedly in storage in Israel today".

(continued in Arabic)

Moreover, Patrick Moynihan, who until recently was head of the United States delegation to the United Nations, said that he thought it preferable for the world to know that Israel had between 10 and 20 nuclear weapons. He made that statement so that there should be no illusions as to what could happen. In testimony before the Foreign Affairs Committee of Congress, he said that it was preferable that these things should be announced publicly so that everybody should know. This was published in "Davar" on 26 March 1977.

Dayan's allegation and those of other representatives of Israel at the United Nations, saying that Israel would not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East, are seen as nothing more than an attempt to fool public opinion. Dayan himself in 1976 invited Israel to declare that it had or was in the process of producing nuclear weapons. I quote from Haaretz, "The Nuclear Option's Importance" by Avraham Schweitzer, 15 March 1976, and from SWASIA, vol. III, No. 14, 9 April 1976.

What we have seen so far shows the explosive nature of the situation in the Middle East in relation to the Palestinian problem. This situation cancels out the efforts of the United Nations to resolve the problem, particularly if we take into account the repercussions of Israel's possession of nuclear weapons.

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All sources, including the SIPRI yearbook for 1979, show that the difference between nuclear-weapon countries and those which are on the point of acquiring such weapons is a slight one at present, particularly if we remember that the time it takes to prepare nuclear warheads can be measured in weeks, if not days.

If we consider in this connexion the capacity of the Zionist entity and of the racist powers that possess nuclear weapons, such as Israel and South Africa, we all clearly realize the danger inherent in this potentially explosive situation in southern Africa and the Middle East, particularly as the historical background of co-operation between Israel and South Africa, especially in nuclear matters, is well known to members of the United Nations and other organs.

I refer in this respect to document A/33/22/Add.2, the document which contains the report of the Special Committee on Apartheid dealing with the development of relations between Israel and South Africa, and to document S/13157 containing the report of the United Nations seminar on nuclear co-operation with South Africa, held in London on 24 and 25 February of this year.

(Mr. Al-Ali, Iraq)

I also refer to General Assembly resolution 33/183, dealing with the policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa.

That is why, if we were merely to accept the fact of Israeli nuclear weapons, we would be merely strengthening the efforts of South Africa in this field because these two régimes represent two sides of the same coin.

All that I have said indicates that Israel has nuclear weapons and is capable of producing them. Therefore we call upon all Members of the United Nations to do what is necessary to put an end to all collaboration with Israel that may be conducive to the development of its nuclear capability. The present situation must be dealt with appropriately in the light of international commitments assumed by Member States, so as to prevent further complications in the explosive situation in the Middle East.

We must not forget another important fact, that is, that the countries which have acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the general disarmament interests of the international community and in order to strengthen international peace and security, have a special responsibility in respect of Israel's nuclear weapons and the need to prohibit such weapons. Israel has not acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and is in practical terms using nuclear weapons to threaten those neighbouring States that have acceded to the Treaty and voluntarily renounced their nuclear option, since they are aware of the danger that the nuclear option poses for the future of mankind and because they are anxious to ensure world peace and security. This special responsibility is of particular importance because a failure to make a commitment to this effect would be tantamount to penalizing those countries which are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We must take into account the interests of the international community. We are quite sure that the international community could not accept such a situation without endangering the credibility and the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The question of Israeli nuclear weapons constitutes a real danger. We sincerely hope that the Members of this international Organization will act in a manner consistent with its main objective, the maintenance

(Mr. Al-Ali, Iraq)

of international peace and security, which also requires the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the strengthening of efforts to put an end to Israeli nuclear weapons before we suddenly find ourselves caught unawares by a nuclear explosion conducted by Israel, like the one in South Africa, which caused the General Assembly to consider the matter separately and to come to a decision on it. Is that the option that we want? An objective analysis of the situation suggests that it certainly is not. We must also take into account the considerations on which were based the General Assembly's decision on South Africa's nuclear explosion. The two racist entities to which I refer represent settler colonialism based on racism and expansionism.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to reiterate the appeal I have made twice already, that representatives take into consideration the time-limits they indicate when they inscribe their names and try to stay as much as possible within those limits. That would be very much appreciated.

Mr. NGONDA (Zambia): Matters of international peace and security enjoy the highest priority in Zambia's foreign policy. Therefore we attach great importance to the political and security issues being discussed in this Committee. It is my delegation's view that the issues discussed in this Committee have far-reaching ramifications in terms of the establishment of a peaceful world order. None of these questions yearns for a definitive resolution more than the perennial question of general and complete disarmament. We must work for peace and we must consolidate the gains of peace rather than those of war. This is what makes disarmament a central issue on the agenda of man.

The preoccupation with disarmament is a reflection of the relentless struggle by the United Nations to find ways and means of arresting the arms race. It also represents a positive attitude on the part of the world body to respond to the desire for the global peace and security that are inherent in disarmament.

The year 1979 marks the end of the first Disarmament Decade, declared in 1969. This year -- and this particular regular session of the General Assembly -- represents a propitious occasion on which we should pause and reflect on the international community's performance in the field of disarmament. There have been some positive developments in mankind's quest for general and complete disarmament.

During the past decade or so we have witnessed a genuine move by the world community to conclude treaties, conventions, protocols and instruments, all designed to halt the arms race. The latest of such developments is the signing of the agreement on strategic arms limitation (SALT II) on 18 June 1979 between the United States and the Soviet Union.

(Mr. Ngonda, Zambia)

My delegation has taken note of the Soviet Union's unilateral decision announced on 6 October to withdraw 20,000 troops and 1,000 tanks from the soil of the German Democratic Republic. We can characterize that exercise as a humble beginning. We are however conscious of the fact that a journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step.

Turning to the tenth special session of the General Assembly last year devoted to disarmament, my delegation believes that it was the high water-mark of the first Disarmament Decade. It gave impetus, if not enhancement, to the world community's awareness of the dangers of modern day armaments. It also defined remedies under the heading of disarmament. We do not need to redefine the ways and means of arresting the arms race any more; what we need to do is to translate into reality the decisions and message of that special session.

Furthermore, my delegation has not lost sight of the significance of the inauguration of Disarmament Week, which was a creation of the special session and indeed a product of the first Disarmament Decade. The week will occupy an important place on the calendar of disarmament efforts. We hope that it will arouse humanity's awareness regarding the dangers inherent in the arms race.

These positive developments constitute no more than marginal progress in our efforts aimed at the lofty goal of general and complete disarmament. First and foremost, we have witnessed during the decade ending this year the proliferation of nuclear weapons, notwithstanding the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty. Related to this development has been an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons. Apartheid South Africa, with its well-known evil policies, is apparently the latest member of the nuclear club.

The situation has been worsened by the fact that nuclear weapons have assumed qualitative as well as quantitative proportions with the destructive power to kill the whole of mankind many times over. This means that the world is in more danger today than it was at the height of the cold war. Surely we do not need to kill ourselves many times over, even if we wanted to. All efforts at designing weapons of mass destruction to kill mankind many times over are therefore meaningless and not worth engaging in.

(Mr. Ngonda, Zambia)

The other negative aspect that flies in the face of disarmament is the enormous military expenditure which has been rising throughout the first Disarmament Decade. This is notwithstanding the fact that since 1973 the world economic outlook has been characterized by mounting difficulties. Despite the grim economic situation prevailing during the decade under consideration, funding for armaments and related research has been on the increase. We are already aware that in 1969 the figure spent on armaments stood at \$256 billion. In 1979 it is estimated that the world community will squander over \$450 billion on military expenditure.

The acquisition of weapons of mass destruction as a means of ensuring security between and among States has been rendered obsolete because of the indiscriminate nature of the destruction of these weapons. This is the characteristic of the weapons of mass destruction that makes them a negative security guarantee, in that there would be no victors in the end.

In the circumstances we have an obligation to guard against the holocaust which weapons of mass destruction represent. Our only way out of the impending holocaust is the achievement of the goal of general and complete disarmament.

If disarmament is achieved the world community could be in a position to release its resources for development efforts among the larger segments of the world's people who are currently living in conditions of abject poverty.

In accordance with the decisions taken by the General Assembly on 26 October of this year, the Secretary-General is currently investigating reports that South Africa recently conducted a nuclear explosion. We of course look forward to the report of the Secretary-General in this regard. Whatever the findings of the Secretary-General, it will be imperative for concrete and effective measures to be taken by the United Nations to prevent collaboration with South Africa in the nuclear field. Such collaboration should not be entertained.

The recommendations of the International Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa held in London this year are most relevant in this regard. As rightly pointed out in the report of the seminar, which is now I understand a United Nations document, in view of the nature and the record of the apartheid régime no international or bilateral safeguards, including those under the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Non-Proliferation

Treaty system of control, are adequate. We subscribe to the view that what is currently and urgently required is action by the Security Council under chapter VII of the Charter to prevent any and all forms of nuclear collaboration with racist South Africa. No permanent member of the Security Council should block such legitimate action.

Consistent with its opposition to South Africa's acquisition of nuclear military power, my delegation is mindful of the danger of chemical weapons now in the hands of minority régimes in southern Africa. Rebel forces in Rhodesia, with South Africa's collaboration, and indeed with the collaboration of certain States in the West, have unleashed chemical weapons on front-line States such as Zambia, Mozambique, Angola and Botswana. In this regard we wish to underscore the urgency expressed in General Assembly resolution 33/59 on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

From the foregoing assessment of the positive and negative developments in relation to the question of disarmament it is clear that negative developments outweigh positive ones. We therefore need action to reverse the imbalance. One way of doing this would be to deny military budgets the preponderance they have enjoyed over civil appropriations during the first Disarmament Decade. Furthermore the General Assembly would do well to start thinking seriously about having a moratorium on the production, testing and research related to nuclear weapons, because their capacity to kill mankind many times over is indeed unnecessary.

Finally my delegation supports those other delegations that have expressed themselves in favour of a resolution on marking 1980 as the beginning of the second Disarmament Decade. It is our hope that during the second Disarmament Decade we shall all redouble our efforts to achieve the lofty goal of general and complete disarmament.

Mr. PATRICIO (Mozambique): Throughout our debate in this Committee the concern of the international community with the issue of disarmament has been clear. Today, more than ever before, international peace and security has become a fundamental demand of our peoples; consequently, to strive for general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, must be a priority task of the States Members of the United Nations.

Thus, the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, guided by those principles and aims, took place. Its Final Document defines the means and objectives aimed at achieving general and complete disarmament under international supervision. However, since the holding of such an important session no meaningful results have yet been achieved. Nevertheless, we are still hopeful that the Programme of Action adopted by that session will be effectively implemented in the near future.

For the People's Republic of Mozambique genuine disarmament must meet the following requirements: first, a complete observance of and respect for the right to self-determination and national independence of peoples under colonial and foreign domination; secondly, adequate implementation of the economic and social development strategy, as envisaged in the New International Economic Order; and, thirdly, the universalization of political and military détente in international relations.

Those are the indivisible elements that would generate mutual confidence and total commitment of all States in creating a world without war, hunger, disease, misery, illiteracy and exploitation of man by man.

In my country the need to halt the arms race, as well as other important disarmament issues, is no longer an exclusive concern of experts. This is also the case in respect of the need to establish a New International Economic Order. Those issues are of daily concern to the Mozambican people.

By this statement we affirm that we have learnt from our national liberation struggle in Mozambique, inter alia, to love peace even if that means sacrificing our own lives. We mean that the need to defend our sovereignty and territorial integrity from constant acts of aggression and violations perpetrated by the racist régimes of Pretoria and Salisbury increases

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our people's understanding and desire for adequate and concrete measures for genuine disarmament. Finally, we mean that only lasting peace in the world in general, and in southern Africa in particular, will enable us to develop our economy, build up prosperity and assure the well-being of our people in our liberated homeland. It is in this context that we pay particular attention to the issues relating to the denuclearization of Africa as well as to the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

My country, along with African countries and other peace-loving countries elsewhere, is aware of the nuclear and military collaboration existing between certain Western countries, Israel and the racist régimes in southern Africa. Particularly for my country, which is a target of constant acts of aggression by the racist régimes, the captured weapons, abandoned ammunitions, a destroyed military jet and helicopter, as well as other military supplies, are clear evidence of the close military links between the southern African racist régimes and the United States of America, France, West Germany, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Israel and others. A recent example of that criminal coalition is the explosion of a nuclear device by racist South Africa which African, non-aligned and other peace-loving countries have strongly condemned and denounced.

In this connexion, we wish to recall the recommendations of the United Nations Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa and express our concern at the increasing violations by the Western countries and Israel of the pertinent Security Council and General Assembly resolutions.

In my Government's view, this growing military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa has the ultimate objective of convincing the oppressed South African people that apartheid is invincible. It aims at blocking the ever-growing success of the liberation movements in southern Africa, and it is also meant to intimidate independent Africa. We African and other peace-loving peoples are and will remain vigilant. We strongly denounce that kind of co-operation because it is directed against our

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willingness to transform the African continent into a zone of peace and without nuclear weapons.

We are convinced that the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly - and in particular the First Committee - will adopt effective measures to frustrate the unconcealed intentions of war promoters and will interpret correctly the aims of the forces fighting for lasting international peace and security.

The People's Republic of Mozambique and other countries of the region draw particular attention to the issue of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. We attach paramount importance to any development which affects the security and sovereignty of the countries of the region and violates the principles enshrined in the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. In this regard my country cannot but express its regret at the growing strength of imperialist military bases at Diego Garcia, Reunion and occupied Mayotte. We also denounce the strengthening of the South African military base at Simonstown and condemn the United States Government's decision to station its Fifth Fleet in the Indian Ocean and President Carter's recent statement announcing the reinforcement of his country's military presence in the region. It is evident that those developments cannot contribute to the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI); rather, they jeopardize permanently the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries in the region.

Notwithstanding those negative developments, my country supports the convening of an international conference on the Indian Ocean, to be held in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in 1981, as indicated in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean. We hope that all Member States, in particular those which can contribute much to the materialization of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, will participate in that conference and in its preparatory sessions.

The establishment of zones of peace is not only an aspiration of the African people; it is also an aspiration of all mankind. For that reason, my country expresses its solidarity with the peoples of the Middle East, South Asia, Latin America and other regions of the world in their efforts aimed at creating such zones.

(Mr. Patricio, Mozambique)

Peace and security are imperative for the developing countries, particularly in our times. For us, peace means that the enormous amount of money devoted to the arms race shall be directed to the assistance of the social and economic development projects of the developing countries. We also welcome peace because it assures security for all mankind, and in particular for the non-nuclear countries, which would be the first to be destroyed in a possible nuclear war that might break out at any moment due to the false dilemma of supremacy and balance of the nuclear States. That is why my country, a non-nuclear and developing country, strongly believes there is a need to decrease military expenditures so that the financial surpluses resulting therefrom may be invested in the social and economic development programmes of the developing countries. We are also in favour of effective measures of nuclear disarmament, and in the meantime we support the need to set up an international convention for the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States, an item still under discussion in an ad hoc working group of the Disarmament Committee.

Looking at the reports of the Committee on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission introduced at this thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly, we obtain a clear understanding of the long and complex road we have to follow to achieve implementation of the Programme of Action of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament.

We are, however, confident that by the next session of the General Assembly substantial results will have been achieved in this field. This hope rests upon the fact that substantial proposals on the banning of nuclear tests, on the banning of radiological arms, and on aspects relating to the prohibition of chemical weapons have already been presented to the Committee on Disarmament by the main nuclear Powers. The signing of SALT II, which we welcome, and which we hope will be urgently ratified by the United States Government, gives us positive expectations of future more substantial negotiations on strategic arms limitation. It is also within that framework that we view the several initiatives of the socialist countries presented to the First Committee and the Committee on Disarmament. It is now our responsibility to conclude the ongoing negotiations as soon as possible in order to answer positively the legitimate demands of our peoples for a better life of peace and prosperity.

(Mr. Patricio, Mozambique)

The convening of a world conference on disarmament in the near future is the result of the need to complement the on-going substantial negotiations in this field. That conference is a proposal of the Non-Aligned Movement as enshrined in the Final Document of the special session, and it should be implemented, as should other measures contained therein. It is within this context that we reiterate our support for the urgent convening of such an important conference.

We have reached the end of the Disarmament Decade without having achieved the results and objectives that were behind its establishment. This reality underlines the need to honour the resolutions of the United Nations, the main forum for negotiations and decisions on problems of peace and international security.

On the threshold of a new decade, let us strengthen our commitment to build a world of lasting peace and harmonious development. Let us consider the next decade as one of struggle against underdevelopment, a reality that is to be supplemented by concrete and efficient measures of comprehensive and general disarmament.

A luta continua.

Mr. OULD SIDI (Mauritania) (interpretation from French): In the field of disarmament many aspects and priorities command the attention of a country such as Mauritania. Without wishing to discuss the order of those priorities, I should like to dwell on three points insofar as they directly affect the interests and the security of Mauritania at the national and regional levels.

The Mauritanian delegation appreciated very much the constant reminders, contained in most of the statements preceding ours, that there is a link between disarmament and development.

From the standpoint of financial resources, that link has been very eloquently demonstrated. But, above and beyond strictly financial calculations, it also determines a series of qualitative commitments involving, above all, human resources. The global mobilization of experts directly or indirectly employed in the armaments phenomenon represents the diversion of skills from the development process to the detriment of the productive sectors of the economy, education or research.

(Mr. Ould Sidi, Mauritania)

In the case of purchasers of weapons, the industrial and technological dependence implied by the total financial and human resources invested is proving an obstacle to the free choice of those countries vis-à-vis their suppliers, even in the field of economic development. Hence the quantity and the continuity of military supplies in the end weave links of dependence that may mortgage the economic and social development options and impair the independence and the national priorities of the developing countries.

Trade in weapons escapes the laws and norms of trade and becomes a network of obligations among States, which gravely endangers the attributes of sovereignty. The arms industry is the more profitable since it does not obey the normal rules of trade. In all cases, producer States have the prerogative of setting prices and market conditions. Because of the interests of the supplier countries, this structure of the arms industry is the most powerful curb to any efforts aimed at reducing the number of weapons in the world.

In this connexion, we feel that, as a political option, disarmament is the most serious economic advantage at the world level and corrects the priorities of the developing countries.

The second concern of our delegation involves conventional weapons. Armed conflicts that have the third world as their theatre of operations mobilize a broad range of conventional weapons. I should like to add that the number of such weapons has considerably increased in the past five years in the two continents most afflicted by economic backwardness and social scourges - that is, Africa and Asia.

While they have a relatively comparable level of economic and social development, some countries of those regions have embarked upon a frenetic arms race to the point of deploying periodically an arsenal of destruction that is clearly in contrast with the military capacity of their respective regions. This inequality, provoked by the unilateral will of those States, encouraged and served by the interests of one or another of the major Powers, clearly is at the root of the reflex action that leads inevitably to an arms race throughout the region. It is the law of self defence which of course justifies the conventional rule that bases security within a geographic area on the balance of forces.

(Mr. Ould Sidi, Mauritania)

Here and there in the regions Africa and Asia we are confronted by a growing imbalance, a factor of destabilization that is particularly harmful to the promotion of mutual confidence. Twenty billion dollars is spent each year on the acquisition of new conventional weapons, and most of those weapons are destined precisely for the developing countries.

While we do not wish in this forum to dwell on the causes underlying this situation, we feel that at this stage it is above all necessary to have as complete an understanding as possible of the global economy of conventional weapons in the world, including the transfer of such weapons, the estimated and real expenditures involved, and the indebtedness of the countries concerned. More complete information in this field will make it possible to have a better, more just and realistic awareness of the state of relations between the countries of the North and the South. It will also make it possible better to understand relations among the developing countries themselves and to assess the inequalities that exist in the light of the equal need of all for economic and social development.

(Mr. Ould Sidi, Mauritania)

This improvement in the level of information applied to the sphere of conventional weapons has been called for by many during this discussion. The Mauritanian delegation associates itself with those appeals, and feels that it is up to the United Nations to see that they are heeded. Such a contribution would be valuable for the small countries, which form the majority of our Organization, and would be the best way of working towards a policy of peace and peaceful coexistence. It will also serve to improve stability and build greater trust in various geographical areas which are particularly threatened.

Mauritania wished to underscore this point because we recognize the imperative need for disarmament, not as a matter of polemics but rather as part of international responsibility, which must be shouldered by the great Powers and others alike.

We also feel that it is time for disarmament to be the responsibility of the third world too. Its virtues and vices are strongly felt throughout the world by all nations. Moreover, while the countries of Europe and North America have now committed themselves to ongoing negotiations with a view to reducing levels of weapons and having mutual control over the balance of power, nothing of the sort has yet been begun in the third world.

Our third subject of concern is the threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We may be caught off guard in this respect at any time by candidates for nuclear weapons - countries which have never demonstrated a sense of responsibility in their international or regional behaviour. It can easily be seen that it is to Israel and South Africa that I am pointing.

The paradox which promoted their progress, or even their break-through, in this field lies in the determination with which the Western Powers claimed to be barring nuclear proliferation for all while those two countries were acquiring expertise in the manufacture of nuclear weapons and were even on the threshold of self-sufficiency, at which point they would be in full control of the process. In fact, reliable sources indicate that they have already reached that threshold of self-sufficiency.

(Mr. Ould Sidi, Mauritania)

My delegation joins the overwhelming majority of member countries in speaking out against this threat, the sources of and the responsibility for which we all deplore. We do so, above all, to make clear the obligations stemming from this issue at the political and military levels.

Israel and South Africa are engaging in behaviour actively hostile to the ideals of the vast majority of Members of the United Nations by virtue of the racist systems underlying their political régimes, and of their policies of torture and the destruction of elements of the civilization of the peoples surrounding them. It is clear that the basic facts of security in Africa and in the Arab world, the countries of which are united in implementing the stringent economic embargo against Israel and South Africa, are being upset and that the imbalance in nuclear weapons has gone beyond that of a strictly regional threat.

Moreover, the repeated calls by the countries in the region to have the continent proclaimed a denuclearized zone become virtually pointless, because it is unthinkable, in view of considerations of stability and defence, for them to refrain from arming themselves when Israel and South Africa, already guilty of relentless aggression and savage acts of destruction against their neighbours, will now have nuclear weapons to use against the countries of their region and perhaps others as well.

It is therefore in order to affirm and stress the need for a basic change in current concepts of the possession and non-possession of nuclear weapons, at least in Africa and in the Arab world, if not in the whole non-aligned world, that we have taken the liberty of raising this problem today in the hope that the suppliers and guarantors of the Israeli and South African nuclear industries will duly display a responsible attitude. It is our conviction that the ideals of the United Nations will guide our deliberations in the essential review of data on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Mr. ABDEL MEGUID (Egypt) (interpretation from Arabic): Mr. Chairman, the fact that we are meeting under your leadership during this session to study questions of disarmament and international security is a good sign which causes us to be optimistic and makes us confident that at the result of our work we shall have a clear idea of what we have accomplished so far in the disarmament field, and in particular in the implementation of the resolutions of the tenth special session, devoted to disarmament. We hope that we shall also achieve something that has so far eluded us - that is, that we shall be able to define in specific terms the measures to be taken in the course of our future activities.

We have before us a number of reports on the work of the organs dealing with disarmament, and particularly of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and of the Disarmament Commission. Also before us are a number of reports on the activities of the Working Groups considering the possibility of implementing various of the proposals adopted by the General Assembly in previous years on disarmament. All of these reports have been drafted carefully and sincerely, yet they give us the impression that international efforts in this field have not gone beyond the stage of study and preparation and have not actually reached the stage of specific measures for achieving general and complete disarmament.

At the same time, there is a technological race in progress in the production of armaments which is strengthening the existing arsenals of nuclear weapons in particular, and of weapons of mass destruction in general, throughout the world. This very serious situation now confronting the world raises many questions to which, in the light of the present complex situation, clear replies are needed before the international community loses enthusiasm in its efforts to make progress towards disarmament - especially nuclear disarmament, to which we attach particular importance.

My delegation wonders whether the resolutions of the General Assembly and the provisions of the Final Document of the special session devoted to disarmament represent a practical view of the possibilities of making progress in disarmament. Do not the measures advocated by the group of Non-Aligned countries err in the sense of being too ambitious and going beyond what is feasible, and is this not true also of the statements of the two nuclear super-Powers and the other nuclear Powers that they are prepared to carry out a balanced gradual reduction so as to rid the world of nuclear weapons?

(Mr. Abdel Meguid, Egypt)

My point is, are those statements merely declarations of intent that are clearly contradicted by the pursuit of a policy of strategic supremacy and balance of forces of deterrence? We must be realistic and practical in our approach to these situations. The Egyptian delegation has no doubt that the two nuclear super-Powers bear the prime responsibility for the lack of progress thus far. At the last session, my delegation suggested that the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be invited to compile and analyse the official statements of leaders of the nuclear Powers and their representatives in the United Nations. The Centre would then forward to us a complete technical study of the points of convergence and divergence in their positions. Such a study would certainly help the negotiating organ in its new form, and in particular the group of non-aligned countries, properly to assess the positions of the two main Powers.

My delegation welcomes the efforts made by the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva in establishing its rules of procedure, agenda and programme of work. Nevertheless, we are concerned at the Committee's failure to make any progress on disarmament measures, as reflected in the working paper presented by the Group of 21 non-aligned countries (CD/50) giving an account of its work during 1979. We see the direct link between disarmament and the national security of every State. That is what led the nuclear Powers to prefer negotiation outside the framework of the United Nations. What we should like to see is a change in the approach and thinking of the great Powers with regard to the negotiating organ in its new form, the Committee on Disarmament, particularly now that France has become a member and in light of China's statement to the effect that it will shortly be taking part in its work. China's positive step is warmly welcomed by my country. We feel that it will make a great contribution to the work of the Geneva Committee.

Apart from certain matters of great importance in the framework of negotiations, such as the preparation of a draft international convention on the prohibition of the production development, and

(Mr. Abdel Meguid, Egypt)

stockpiling of chemical weapons and the elaboration of a draft convention on the total prohibition of nuclear testing, progress has been slow, notwithstanding the promises made by various countries and by the great Powers during the special session. My country reaffirms its position on the important role to be played by the Committee on Disarmament, especially in considering the results of disarmament negotiations and the implementation of General Assembly guidelines, as well as on the Committee's free conduct of negotiations in the light of the prerogatives granted to it.

While recognizing the importance of negotiations conducted outside the United Nations, we feel that at its next session the Committee on Disarmament should study the draft conventions now being discussed elsewhere so that it may decide whether deadlines should be set for the preparation of those conventions and their presentation to it. Or possibly the Committee on Disarmament could draft the articles of such conventions itself.

The work of the Disarmament Commission at its first session in the preparation of provisions for general and complete disarmament was a step in the right direction. Agreement was reached at that session on many elements of the programme for general and complete disarmament. My delegation hopes that it will be possible to reach a consensus on certain matters of prime importance, in particular the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, questions of vertical and horizontal non-proliferation, and the balance of responsibilities, so as to ensure the universality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and strengthen the concepts it embodies, particularly the security of non-nuclear weapon States, and thus strengthen the system of non-proliferation as the basis of international security and the security of the various regions of the world.

The document on the programme for disarmament did not reflect adequately the importance of the establishment of denuclearized zones and respect by nuclear-weapon States for the status of such regions, or the role that the Security Council should play in this respect. The disarmament programme deals with conventional weapons also, and hence we feel that the reduction of weapons of that type should be considered within the framework of general and complete disarmament and that the responsibilities of the nuclear Powers in connexion with the reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces should be spelled out.

(Mr. Abdel Meguid, Egypt)

We hope that the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva will now be able to take up and complete work on the items on which it was not possible to reach a consensus in the past. Egypt, as we have repeatedly stated, supports the taking of decisions on arrangements for mutual security at the regional level, with due account being paid to the special characteristics of individual regions. These special regional features should be respected by the international community, in particular by the great Powers. My delegation feels that the success of such regional arrangements depends to a very large extent on a just and equitable solution of political problems in the regions themselves. It is that, in the last analysis, that will contribute to the implementation of the disarmament programme.

My delegation has participated in international efforts to implement the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. We hope that at this session the time and place will be set for a review conference on that declaration, and we appeal to the members of the Security Council and the major maritime Powers to do all they can to ensure the success of such a conference and in achieving its objective.

The Red Sea region is one of the most important strategic areas, not merely for its coastal States but for the whole world. For this reason we should work to make the Red Sea a lake of peace.

(Mr. Abdel Meguid, Egypt)

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt has reiterated the need to take this step. He recently stressed the basic principles which, in Egypt's opinion, represent the major guidelines for the preservation of the Red Sea as a lake of peace.

Egypt attaches particular importance and high priority to nuclear disarmament. We wish rapid measures to be taken to prevent vertical and horizontal proliferation.

We believe that the basic measure would involve the implementation of the draft convention on a nuclear test ban so as to reach an agreement on the cessation of such testing and of the further improvement of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles.

Stockpiles of nuclear weapons must be reduced, while duly taking into account the military capabilities of the various Powers. Priorities for a balanced reduction of nuclear weapons must be provided for at the same time. We hope that the Working Party of the Committee on Disarmament, over which my delegation had the honour to preside, will prove able to elaborate international guarantees for the non-nuclear weapon States and will provide an assurance to the effect that they will be immune from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The SALT II agreement is a necessary measure for the two major Powers. We wish to encourage this step at a time when international relations are becoming more tense and complicated. Despite the fact that the SALT II agreement is an agreement on minimum strategic arms levels, we hope that the effective reduction of strategic weapons, including nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and the prohibition of their production and stockpiling with a view to their total elimination, will be ensured.

With regard to horizontal proliferation, paragraphs 60 to 63 of the Final Document of the special session emphasized the importance of setting up nuclear-weapon-free zones. Various paragraphs of that document spell out the terms that should govern the establishment of such nuclear weapon-free zones in respect of the countries belonging to the region and

(Mr. Abdel Meguid, Egypt)

the nuclear powers. The role of the Security Council is pre-eminent in the next phase of the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, particularly in areas where it is difficult for the parties to enter into direct negotiations.

My delegation has at previous sessions proposed that the countries of the Middle East should solemnly undertake on a mutual basis to renounce the further production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and nuclear equipment, while prohibiting the installation by any other country of nuclear weapons on their territory. These countries should agree to make all nuclear activities subject to the safeguards laid down by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Security Council will become the depository of the declarations of the countries of the Middle East and should, in turn, declare the Middle East to be a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Resolution 33/64 remains unfulfilled because of Israel's refusal to heed this appeal. Israel, in the meantime, continues to develop its nuclear capacity unfettered by any international control. We must confront this situation in order to fulfil the objectives of all countries of the world including the nuclear Powers. Egypt's aim is to ensure that the Middle East will be a nuclear-weapon-free zone. If Israel continues to impede the attainment of these objectives, the United Nations must take the necessary measures, in keeping with the objectives and principles of the Charter, to prevent any threat to world peace and security in that strategic region of the world.

We, the African countries, have tried to have Africa declared a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Despite the support of the international community, the racist régime of South Africa continues to acquire nuclear weapons, thus endangering implementation of this declaration. The news that South Africa has conducted a nuclear explosion was a shock to the international community. Egypt commented on the news by describing the explosion as a most serious development. The Egyptian delegation wishes to convey its appreciation to Ambassador Clark of Nigeria for his initiative in raising the matter in the General Assembly.

(Mr. Abdel Meguid, Egypt)

The fear of nuclear proliferation must not inhibit the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, particularly to help the development of the developing countries. The use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes under international control, and under article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and paragraphs 68 and 69 of the Final Document of the special session, deserves encouragement by the nuclear Powers.

The studies which have been carried out on the relationship between disarmament and development, studies in which my country was involved, concerning the establishment of a disarmament fund and a reduction by the great Powers of their military budgets so that the resources thus released can be used for development, particularly of the developing countries - indeed all such studies and proposals - must be rendered in the form of decisions so that action can be taken upon them.

Our experience and practice of international relations have sometimes been bitter. The basis of international peace and security can be laid only through trust. An elaboration of principles and rules must compel respect for them. The establishment of peace and security would be made possible by the solution through détente of political problems - such as the Middle East, of Palestine, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia, and the elimination of foreign bases. We must take a new view of international relations based on trust and mutual respect.

The CHAIRMAN: Three representatives wish to speak in exercise of their right of reply. I remind them of the decision taken by the General Assembly as to the time-limit for such statements. I shall now call on them.

Mr. WU Zhen (China) (interpretation from Chinese): In the statement he made earlier today the representative of Viet Nam confounded right with wrong and black with white in an attempt to pin the labels of expansionism and hegemonism on others, so as to cover up Viet Nam's real feature of pushing its regional hegemonist policy. At the present time international opinion is strongly condemning Viet Nam's crimes in waging armed aggression against Democratic Kampuchea and creating a tragic refugee situation in Indochina. It demands that the Vietnamese authorities should immediately withdraw their aggressor troops from Kampuchea and stop their persecution and expulsion of the refugees. But, disregarding the rightful public opinion of the international community and relying on the support of a super-Power, they continue to strengthen their military occupation of Democratic Kampuchea and are in the act of stepping up a new dry-season offensive, vainly trying to wipe out Kampuchea's national resistance force against foreign aggression.

We would like to tell the representative of Viet Nam in all seriousness: your slanders and vituperation against others can in no way cover up your new crimes of aggression. Our advice to you is to watch your step before you fall down the abyss. Do not go too far along the path of aggression and expansion.

Mr. EILAN (Israel): The representative of Iraq has just made a statement in an attempt to justify the inscription of item 121 on the agenda of this Committee and, one is to assume, the submission of a draft resolution. My delegation is going to make its position clear both on the item, on the statement just made and perhaps on the draft resolution at a later stage in the debate.

Mr. NGUYEN VAN LUU (Viet Nam)(interpretation from French): The representative of China has just issued a warning, and to that I should like to reply that the world is no longer surprised by those warnings. Indeed, China, a nuclear power which claims that unilateral safeguards are demagogic, has arrogantly assumed the right to teach a lesson to sovereign and independent States. I developed this point at length in my statement to the effect that here we have a genuine threat to mankind.

(Mr. Nguyen Van Luu, Viet Nam)

Everything I said earlier, everything that we said before international audiences, is based on the blood we have shed on the sense of responsibility of the Vietnamese people, a people that struggled for 30 years not only for its own national interests but also for the cause of peace, for the independence of peoples. We can assure you that everything we say, everything we have asserted, is in keeping with history and that it is the truth. I should like to say that the hegemonistic Power, China, has since it embarked on its hegemonistic policies resorted to lies and deception as a State policy and as a strategic method.

In conclusion, I should like to say to the representative of China that we agree with people of good faith throughout the world that history will inevitably reject all the lies and all the slander and will reveal the truth to the world.

The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.