



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 27th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. BURWIN (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)  
(Vice-Chairman)

later: Mr. HEPBURN (Bahamas)

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ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 10.40 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 30 TO 45, 120 AND 121 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. PALMA (Peru) (interpretation from Spanish): Once again our Committee is focusing its efforts on the discussion of the general question of disarmament, which has without doubt irrevocably become one of the perennial items on our agenda of international problems. This is a good thing, for it cannot be said too often that the arms race and the stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction constitute the most serious threat to mankind as a whole.

Over a year ago the international community rightly focused its attention on the proceedings of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The Final Document, the result of lengthy and thorough preparation, was the most comprehensive text on which we were able to agree. There is no need to stress its relevance and significance in terms of content with regard both to substantive and procedural items, for these are well known to all. In these circumstances, and without wishing to carry out an exhaustive assessment of the state of compliance with what was agreed upon on that historic occasion, it would seem to be appropriate to refer to some of the most outstanding questions which have rightly drawn the attention of numerous delegations.

First of all, my delegation welcomes the decision of the People's Republic of China to join in the work of the Committee on Disarmament. We consider that its very presence will help the Committee to discharge its duties. We also note with satisfaction that the Committee, under its new democratic chairmanship system, has drawn up its rules of procedure and has agreed upon an agenda for its initial work.

We must, however, associate ourselves with those delegations which have rightly deplored the paucity of results in the Committee's substantive work. No progress has been achieved with respect to the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests or in connexion with chemical weapons, which is especially regrettable since, on numerous occasions and from various sources, we were led to believe that we were not far from achieving agreement on those two questions. My delegation is convinced that substantive treatment of these items must be

(Mr. Palma, Peru)

intensive in the Committee's work in 1980 and we nurture the hope that those delegations which can do the most to help achieve the required agreements will be ready to make the compromises that are required.

The Disarmament Commission has had a very encouraging start. Its meetings have not only commanded the attention and enlisted the participation of the international community, but it has also been in a position to undertake the priority task entrusted to it and has duly formulated the elements of the comprehensive disarmament programme which should now be considered by the Committee. We reaffirm our expectation that the Commission will continue to operate as a broad specialized forum in the United Nations to deal with all disarmament matters. Its work should be oriented towards specific questions of particular importance, in which all Members of our Organization can and should participate.

Negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union have ended in the conclusion of an agreement whose early ratification and entry into force we await with interest. We are aware of the efforts involved in the conclusion of this kind of agreement, but, in the more general context of the arms race, we cannot fail to note with concern that its acceptance requires other measures which represent an escalation of military expenditures and potential. We believe that the SALT II agreement should be implemented and followed as early as possible by other agreements which will represent effective reductions in the nuclear capacity of the principal Powers possessing this type of weapon.

We deem this to be essential because should the catastrophe we all wish to avoid actually occur, it would be the consequence solely of the continued stockpiling and development of these weapons of mass destruction. We fail to understand the reasoning whereby the credibility of nuclear deterrence depends on a multiplication of the number of times mankind can be destroyed or of the ways in which this may be accomplished. On the contrary, the reduction of such weapons to the point of their total elimination would strengthen the confidence of all in the possibilities of disarmament, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the organization of peace based on principles which, after the disaster of

(Mr. Palma, Peru)

the Second World War, we all undertook to respect, as well as in the strengthening of international co-operation, which becomes more necessary with each passing day to quell the deep concerns that justifiably, in all corners of the globe, afflict so many sectors of mankind.

My delegation has maintained and will continue to maintain that, on the question of disarmament, we are all responsible, but that some are more responsible than others. All nations have the same yearning for peace and for the same concerns with security. Therefore it is still difficult to understand the growing disparity between the armaments of some States and those of others and the trend to increase that disparity or to insinuate that certain initiatives connected with conventional weapons must be implemented on a priority basis by medium-sized and small nations. However, since in order to achieve disarmament the security of all nations must be maintained as stated in the Final Document of the special session, the obvious corollary would seem to be that the process should be initiated by those who possess the greatest destructive power.

Not only does the arms race not help increase the security of States, it absorbs resources which have reached immeasurable levels. What makes it necessary to invest nearly \$450 billion a year to develop systems of destruction? What makes it so difficult to understand that, not only in the developing, but also in the more developed countries, there are human and social needs which could be met satisfactorily with a small fraction of that sum? These are the basic questions of a complex subject that seems to have no beginning and no end, but which in fact is conditioned by certain realities such as power politics, acts of overt or covert intervention, the continuation of actions at variance with international law and the provisions of our Charter, all of which create a climate of insecurity which is at once the reflection and motivation of such situations.

(Mr. Palma, Peru)

The Sixth Meeting of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries emphasized the central role which falls to the United Nations in the field of disarmament. As on earlier occasions we, the non-aligned States, will make our contribution to the specific consideration of the various disarmament items because we believe that we must persevere and insist as much as is necessary to achieve some results in this field.

The most appropriate condition for disarmament will not appear overnight as if by magic. They must be created through the efforts and exercise of the political will of States, based on the conviction that the course followed to date has not led to greater security.

The results of the United Nations conference on the prohibition or restriction of use of specific conventional weapons should not be repeated. The Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty must be provided with concrete elements which make it conceivable that all its provisions are being implemented. The various studies carried out by the Organization on matters of interest should be directed in all States towards the adoption of specific effective measures to halt and reverse the arms race.

We possess the appropriate procedures and machinery. Although the task is vast and complex, it is also indispensable and urgent. My delegation hopes that under the wise guidance of its Chairman, the First Committee will make it possible for us to believe, at the end of our labours, that we have effectively fulfilled that task.

Mr. HARMON (Liberia): I first wish to congratulate Mr. Hepburn of the Bahamas on his assumption of the Committee's Chairmanship. He has already demonstrated his skill and objectivity in presiding over our difficult deliberation.

By logical coincidence, we are approaching the climax of our debate on the thirty-four-year old issue of disarmament - a word to which we are manacled for better or for worse, with our achievements mostly for the worse.

(Mr. Harmon, Liberia)

It saddens us to sound a note of pessimism which is only one note in the general chorus of similar expressions by not less than the majority of representatives who have spoken before me on what the Under-Secretary-General for Public Information, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, described as one of the three most crucial issues facing the United Nations as we approach the decade of the 1980s - the issue of disarmament. The other two are the New International Economic Order and the resurgent emphasis on human rights.

Parenthetically, I wish to state that for the Liberian delegation, author of the concept of a new philosophy for disarmament, these three issues are politically, theoretically and morally interrelated. This evolution of their inherent interdependence has been gaining vogue, especially in the past three years, in a proliferation of new thoughts and new ideas on the whole baffling question of the United Nations disarmament effort. But I shall return to this later.

At this point, when we are all in quest of the problem of action, and even more so the problem of implementation, it is only just and fair that at least on the call of the action programme for a vigorous policy of promoting a sense of public awareness of the arms crisis, we have seen some truly important initiatives on the part of Mr. Akashi as the head of the Department of Public Information.

My delegation was astonished at a set of 10 disarmament fact sheets issued by the Centre for Disarmament, and subsequently the Disarmament Forum staged on 25 October in the Hammarskjold auditorium in which seven speakers participated - representatives, Ambassadors, Foreign Ministers, together with Mr. Martenson of the Centre and Mr. Davidson Nicol of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR). They participated before representatives of non-governmental organizations and other representatives of the people, launching Disarmament Week as recommended by the special session on disarmament, and distributed an astonishingly well-organized kit which, in the opinion of this delegation, is the kind of information that can reach peoples in every walk of life, helping them quickly to grasp even the most complex aspects of the problem.

(Mr. Harmon, Liberia)

This is action - real action - and the Committee might note it with commendation and encouragement, for here strangely enough, we have a course on disarmament, even before we have disarmament or even a comprehensive plan for disarmament.

We hear much about the dedication of this Committee to the provisions of the action programme of the special session on disarmament, but in reality this is only an umbrella under which the disarmament negotiations are taking place - not in comprehensiveness at all, but in the same piecemeal approach which has marked the old procedure whose inadequacy and failures have produced what we may call the revolt of the special session.

To be sure, in the introduction to the Final Document it is stated:

"There is also a need to prepare through agreed procedures a comprehensive disarmament programme." (resolution S-10/2, para. 9)

But now, some 15 months after the adoption of the Final Document, we ask: where is even a beginning of such a comprehensive programme?

We established, with a sense of triumphant achievement, the new Disarmament Committee which has staged its first operations on the Geneva battlefields for disarmament, and has returned to New York for the General Assembly to none of the cheers and hosannas that greet conquering heroes. On the contrary, representatives in this Committee and Ministers in the general debate sadly expressed their dismay at the meagre accomplishments, if any, which the Committee has brought back in its briefcase.

Let me be frank - there is no plan for disarmament; there is no comprehensive programme. There are only individual items. As in the circumnavigation of the globe, our disarmament world is not one of forward but of circular motion, and we are back to the point from which we departed. We are back to the vacuous, item-by-item, step-by-step procedures, moving at a snail's pace, while the arms race gathers speed and momentum, with the headlong flight of an uncontrolled meteor.

(Mr. Harmon, Liberia)

I quote two significant sentences from the Declaration in the Final Document, para. 17:

"No real progress has been made so far in the crucial field of reduction of armaments ..."

And further on that paragraph says:

"These partial measures have done little to bring the world closer together to the goal of general and complete disarmament". (resolution S-10/2, para. 17)

This was said some two years ago, even five years ago, and is still being said today. In our deliberations here at the United Nations we proceed with the repetition of words while the assembly-line arms race moves with the repetition of production.

I have raised the issue of comprehensive planning and the individual issue approach. What really is the difference? Is it that fundamental? Of course, we are in favour of negotiating a convention for the abolition of radiological weapons. Such an accord can stand on its own feet and remove one category of weapons from the race.



(Mr. Harmon, Liberia)

Of course, we shall support any commitment not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States, not because Liberia or more than 100 States like ourselves stand in any trepidation that some mighty Power will waste a nuclear bomb on such a small and disarmed nation but because it narrows the area of nuclear warfare and to that extent adds to the disarmament catalogue.

Of course, we favour negotiations on the elimination of chemical warfare, but not because nations are seriously convinced of their usefulness in a defence arsenal. We recall seeing millions of soldiers in the Second World War carrying gas masks which they never used. But again we should be happy to see an agreed ban on chemical weapons, because it symbolizes an intent to restrict the expanding scope of weapons in our time.

Of course, we should like to see an accord on the complete banning of tests of nuclear weapons when these tests are the breeding ground for more powerful strategic missiles - although by the time such an accord is reached these tests probably will have become obsolescent. Powerful States are already encumbered with an inventory of missiles sufficient to ensure their security for many years to come. But again if such a complete ban will return one brilliant scientist to honest labour on behalf of a world that needs his genius in the fields of health, development or education, we shall celebrate the day of such an agreement.

Of course, we shall support further negotiations on horror-type conventional weapons such as fragmentation and incendiary bombs, not because we believe for one moment that in a showdown of victory or defeat men will take defeat rather than violate an international agreement but because it will remove a brutalization factor from the human spirit, because when the human spirit becomes totally brutalized and is reduced to sheer sadism the gates are flung wide open to an age of holocaust and genocide, and I fear we are already approaching that reversion to the soulless man.

(Mr. Harmon, Liberia)

Yes, we shall take all these item-by-item goals - if we can get them. However, as we note from the reports that have come in from the Committee on Disarmament, from the Disarmament Commission and from the bilateral talks, the fact is that we are not getting them, that we are still in the not-yet stage as the parties continue the game of small-time bargaining, negotiating in a spirit of fear and apprehension, with little trust and no confidence.

On the question of confidence, my delegation has taken note of our attempt to make a study of the confidence-winning factor. In our country, Liberia, we held the naive notion that this meant an attempt to win over the heart and the mind of our potential adversary; we believed in the old, now forgotten phrase of "peace and friendship". It was a good phrase expressing the basic truth that peace or any aspect thereof could not thrive in a climate of fear and suspicion. That was the foul atmosphere of Europe on the eve of the First World War and also on that of the Second World War.

Therefore you can imagine our surprise when we discovered, from a poll taken by the Secretary-General, that confidence-winning meant inviting observers to watch military manoeuvres or notifying a potential adversary of a programme for manoeuvres and so on. In other words, the game of confidence-winning was to be based on complete lack of confidence in a potential adversary, who would reciprocate in kind. Nations, instead of beating swords into ploughshares, shall abandon their ploughshares to monitor the other fellow's swords.

We believe there will be more confidence in the world when there are less missiles, less weapons, less of all the tools of war, and more and quicker agreements to reduce them.

So we return to our question: if concrete items will produce results, what difference does the comprehensive factor introduce into our work? The items we have mentioned have been in the negotiating process long before the special session on disarmament. The difference, I submit, makes all the difference. First, under the item-by-item approach we fragmentize our efforts, we become lost in the forest by seeing only the trees.

(Mr. Harmon, Liberia)

Secondly, we disperse the disarmament efforts among too many forums, too many groups, composed of too many participating nations, and thus return the issues to the big Powers, contrary to the provisions of the Final Document, which underlined the principle the equal participation of the smaller States. However, most of all, without a comprehensive programme or a unified plan we lose the focused purpose that originally gave design and impetus to the United Nations concept of complete and general disarmament.

Permit me to say a word about the basic significance of purpose. Looking back, we see that the runaway arms race really began when the United Nations deviated from the dimensions of the all-encompassing goal. Aside from the fact that loss of purpose deteriorated into loss of progress, the United Nations lost contact with the people of the world, whose vital interest, we now discover, is a basic component for any progress in the ancient field of arms and armaments, and who, psychologically, do not rally to the support of any political objective unless it is postulated on a great hope, a better world and a better life. People want peace; divide it into fractions, such as our 20-year-old peace-keeping process, and they lose touch. People want human rights; divide it into fractions, politicize it, and they lose touch. People want disarmament; divide it into individual weapons and they lose contact.

(Mr. Harmon, Liberia)

We have called on the United Nations information services to begin to blow their trumpets and make people "aware" of the transcending importance of the disarmament issue. I ask the Department of Public Information (DPI) now: how are you going to explain the technicalities of an incendiary weapon? I may safely assume that even we here do not know the nuts and bolts of the missiles covered by the SALT agreements. How will the DPI explain them to the man in the street? Even the chemists are lost in the web of their silence. How will the DPI explain them to the man on the farm or in the factory, or to the busy doctor in the hospital?

The honest answer is, I believe, that it cannot, and if it could they would not have time to listen. But when the DIP called for freedom from colonialism, they understood that freedom, and reduced an expected century of decolonization into a quarter of a century.

People are just plain naturally-born utopians and the Utopias become reality when people believe in them. Only politicians are pragmatists. We are living in an age of utopianism; change is all around us, engulfing our work with each latest headline.

It was as a result of this concept of the disarmament problem - dismayed as our President Tolbert was by 34 years of failure on the United Nations disarmament issue - that Liberia, way back in 1976, expressed the idea that what was needed was a new philosophy regarding disarmament.

We now note that the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies has chosen to give our proposal a low rating in the category of issues recommended for further study and analysis.

It is not my intention to discuss the Board's entire report of 15 October. The Committee will undoubtedly take up the report in detail in the course of time. Therefore I will confine myself strictly to its report on the particular Liberian item.

We have no quarrel with its right to make recommendations; that is what the Board is for; but I hope members of the Board will take no offence if we are compelled, for the sake of our national dignity, to take exception to the cavalier manner in which the Board treats a proposal from a sovereign Member State of the United Nations, when it "paid tribute to this initiative and expressed sympathy with the motives behind it". (ST/SC/C.1/R.10, para. 26) It then proceeds

(Mr. Harmon, Liberia)

to prejudice the substance of our proposal; "At the same time, the Board considered that with so many contradictory approaches and perceptions existing in a divided world, it would be very difficult to draw up a generally acceptable philosophy". (ST/SC/C.1/R.10, para. 26) I invite members of this Committee to read the rest and I will leave it to them to decide, after reading the whole thing, whether the Board has not departed from its terms of reference.

The Board vetoed our proposal on the grounds that there might be many other similar proposals, so that it would be very difficult to draw up a generally acceptable philosophy. Since when has any Member State in this room surrendered its right to make a proposal because other Members might have different proposals?

Even more astonishingly, the Board then proceeds to make up its own philosophy when it states that what is needed is; "a practical approach ... in which account was taken of complex realities" (ST/SC/C.1/R.10, para. 26) and that this approach is the road "for strengthening the confidence among people and for mobilizing public opinion towards genuine disarmament". (ST/SC/C.1/R.10, para. 26)

Thus the Board has its own philosophy and disposes of ours summarily because it is contrary to its conviction and without fully informing itself on the documentation relating to our item. Among that documentation they will find that at no time did we oppose our formula to that of practical negotiations on concrete items and we are not doing so in this statement now.

If the Board is prone to engage in a discussion of the substance of our item, then we must say that we totally disagree, as we have just carefully and with historical evidence insisted that the item by item approach, followed exclusively, cannot mobilize public opinion towards genuine disarmament.

As it has its own philosophy the Board has arrogated to itself the right to be the judge and jury of ours and Liberia finds that inadmissible.

Under the circumstances I respectfully suggest that the Board reconsider its decision when it meets in its fourth session in New York on 28 April 1980.

I cannot end this statement without reference to the situation in regard to the reported explosion of an atomic bomb by the Republic of South Africa. I shall not go into detail since the matter is being considered by the African States.

We Africans are now in danger of becoming the target of tactical atomic weapons in the struggle for the final liberation of our continent from racist colonialism. All I will say is that the bomb, exploded or in preparation, is not the product of a philosophy on disarmament. It is the child of 34 years of

(Mr. Harmon, Liberia)

what the Board recommends as "a practical approach ... of complex realities".

Finally we regard arms as evil, immoral and obsolete, and disarmament cannot be achieved merely by processes and procedures. It must be held up to the peoples of the world as an irrevocable and irreversible United Nations ideal. People love and understand ideals, even if politicians do not.

Mr. ELLIOTT (Belgium) (interpretation from French): About 16 months ago, a special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament adopted its Final Document. Its importance has not ceased to assert itself since. The lengthy negotiations which finally led to its adoption find their justification now to the extent that it is clear that no initiative in the field of disarmament, whether nuclear or conventional, could any longer omit reference to the principles and guidelines laid down in that document.

The outstanding event of the last few months in the field of disarmament is undoubtedly the conclusion by the United States and the Soviet Union of the SALT II agreement relating to the limitation of their strategic nuclear weapons. This falls within the context of paragraph 52 of the Final Document of the special session, which called on the United States and the Soviet Union to take as early as possible that "important step in the direction of nuclear disarmament and, ultimately, of establishment of a world free of such weapons". (A/S-10/4, para. 52).

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ireland, as acting Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the European Community, recently stressed, from the rostrum of this General Assembly, the importance that those nine countries attach to such agreements. For his part, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Mr. Henri Simonet, recently recalled from that same rostrum that the Belgian Government is;

"pleased by the conclusion...of a new Treaty ... Even though, strictly speaking, this is not a disarmament measure, the treaty - if it is ratified, as my country ... hopes, ... (will) make a powerful contribution to the creation of a climate favourable to the success of other negotiations now under way or being prepared."

(A/34/PV.22, p. 63)

The entry into force of the SALT II agreement should in particular allow for new talks between the United States and the Soviet Union with a view to

(Mr. Elliott, Belgium)

the conclusion of other agreements on the reduction and limitation of the strategic nuclear weapons of those two countries. Those talks, as recent public statements appear to indicate, could also encompass long-range nuclear weapons which form part of the strategic balance, even if they do not have an intercontinental capacity.

(Mr. Elliott, Belgium)

Belgium is especially pleased with this prospect. Indeed, it has become imperative to remedy the excessive and, in this instance, destabilizing asymmetries which have come about in the relation of long-range nuclear forces in the European theatre of operations. Corrective measures have become indispensable and urgent. Our immediate concern is to see the balance of forces restored. It is through the conclusion of agreements relating to arms control that Belgium would by far prefer to see the situation redressed. It therefore places its hope in the readiness of the parties concerned to do everything in their power within the framework of negotiations on arms control and disarmament in order to achieve rapid, tangible results that will make it possible to review in time programmes of reinforcement whose full implementation would otherwise become inevitable.

In addition, the Belgian Government finds some satisfaction in the activities carried out during the first session of the new Committee on Disarmament established in Geneva, of which Belgium has the honour of being a member. It is also pleased with the expressed intention of the People's Republic of China to participate in the work of the Committee on Disarmament. The latter - and my Government is happy to emphasize this point - is accessible to any non-member State wishing to make a contribution thereto.

At present the Committee is seized of a draft treaty concerning the prohibition of radiological weapons. Belgium will not fail to make all the necessary efforts to ensure that a definitive draft treaty is elaborated during the next session of the Committee on Disarmament in 1980.

The Committee on Disarmament's discussions on chemical weapons have proved useful. Belgium hopes that those talks, as well as the bilateral United States-Soviet negotiations, will be so intensified as to enable the Committee on Disarmament to do constructive work at its next session. Given the massive destructive power of chemical weapons, my country indeed attaches the greatest importance to that question. However, we must understand that the elaboration of an international treaty prohibiting such weapons, as the length of bilateral



(Mr. Elliott, Belgium)

negotiations has shown, constitutes a long-term task. The technical problems inherent in the subject and the great difficulties raised by the question of verification would explain this state of affairs.

With reference to verification, Belgium pays a tribute to those countries which have taken initiatives designed to ensure that information on the subject is placed at the disposal of the international community, be it in the specific field of chemical weapons or in a more general context, in particular through verification by satellites.

In 1980 non-proliferation will be one of our main concerns. Belgium is fundamentally attached to the principle of non-proliferation, because a multiplication of decision-making centres on the use of nuclear weapons would ipso facto increase the danger of the break-out of a nuclear war.

Belgium confirms yet again at this time its interest in the Non-Proliferation Treaty which, in our view, remains the corner-stone of all action to be undertaken. However, we believe it is indispensable that both the rights and obligations provided for in the Treaty should be respected by all States parties on a footing of absolute equality and without any discrimination whatsoever.

Article IV stipulates that all parties have

"... the inalienable right ... to develop, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination..." (resolution 2373 (XXII), annex)

Therefore, the Treaty should be able to ensure specifically - of course while respecting article III - guarantees of free access to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including improvements and new developments.

That implies free access also to the required scientific information, as indicated in article IV (2), which states that all parties

"... undertake to facilitate ... the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information..." (ibid.)

(Mr. Elliott, Belgium)

If we want the Treaty to remain the basis of non-proliferation, two elements appear to us to be fundamental. On the one hand, it is desirable to avoid having non-nuclear-weapon States which, through their accession to the Treaty, have voluntarily accepted its constraints find themselves in a less favoured position vis-à-vis other States which have declared that they do not possess nuclear weapons but do not adhere to the Treaty or subscribe to its obligations. On the other hand, it is essential that the Non-Proliferation Treaty system remain the privileged framework of the discussion relating to the whole question of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. A multiplication of forums would have as a consequence a dilution of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to the point of rendering it meaningless. We must prevent this danger before it actually occurs.

In this same context of non-proliferation, we regard as satisfactory the detailed exchanges of views carried out in the Committee on Disarmament concerning security guarantees which the nuclear Powers should give to non-nuclear-weapon States in respect of recourse or threat of recourse to nuclear weapons. The Belgian authorities will continue to work to find a mutually acceptable formula. If the principle of a convention on the subject is intellectually enticing, it is equally true that we must wonder whether it is a practical possibility to cover in a single instrument the diversity of situations that arise and must be fully taken into account.

Belgium also hopes, in this same context of non-proliferation, that the Committee on Disarmament will pursue its work actively with a view to the early conclusion of an agreement on halting, in adequate conditions of verification, the production of fissile material for military purposes. This is an important measure in the context of any policy designed to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race.

These preoccupations lead the Belgian authorities to deplore the absence of decisive progress in the talks between the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union concerning the complete cessation of

(Mr. Elliott, Belgium)

all nuclear tests. The successful conclusion of those talks and their consideration in due course by the Committee on Disarmament would contribute to the success of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.

The acceleration of the conventional arms race is, in our view, another reason for concern. We attempt in Europe to achieve mutual and balanced reduction of forces. We cannot but deplore the veritable conventional arms race that we are witnessing in other parts of the world, and that in regions which did not possess such weapons till now. This only confirms the value of a regional approach to those questions. We shall be happy to see the question considered in depth by a group of experts appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

In the same spirit, we wish to give our support to the initiative of the Federal Republic of Germany aimed at having a detailed study undertaken of appropriate measures to promote confidence. That study would not compete with the one under way on the regional approach; it could in fact supplement it.

(Mr. Elliott, Belgium)

The Belgian authorities intend to reaffirm their will to pursue and increase their actions in the field of disarmament in the spirit of the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly and on the basis of the principles adopted therein, in particular the one according to which:

"The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others ...". (General Assembly resolution S-10/2, para. 29)

The course to follow is long and arduous. It concerns us all. Countries and men of goodwill must make their contribution to this common ideal to do away with the spectre of war.

Mr. VELISSAROPOULOS (Greece) (interpretation from French): The Greek delegation has noted with deep satisfaction the large number of statements in this general debate. This, certainly, is evidence of the persistent will of States, almost 17 months after the special session on disarmament, vigorously to continue the effort and under no circumstances to allow it to lose any of its impetus. The general debate is in particular helping to maintain the hold on the problem of disarmament as a whole. Indeed, before it is tackled as a practical necessity, disarmament must take place in our minds in ideological terms. Has that happened? It has, of course, gained much ground, but we feel that it has not yet totally crossed the threshold that separates rational acceptance of a goal to be achieved from the total hold of an ideal upon our thoughts and our hearts. That is because the enormous difficulties that arise on the difficult path towards the objective cause doubts that frequently lead to scepticism. That frame of mind is not likely to be changed by attitudes based on the excessive enthusiasm or self-interested calculation that leads deliberations towards premature hopes or disaffection. All too frequently it is very easy to detect in speeches and draft resolutions submitted for our approval precisely those two kinds of motivations, one excessively laudable and the other all too disappointing.

(Mr. Velissaropoulos, Greece)

But this applies not only to our intentions and our draft resolutions. Their numbers are involved too. We have in mind in particular the number of draft resolutions and, frequently, their length. There is no point in mentioning the difficulties created by these semantic labyrinths in which it is difficult to find one's way. We are here to deal with the problem, and let those who do not delve into it in proper depth beware; they are the ones who will pay the price. What should especially engage our attention is the depreciation, brought about by necessity, of these resolutions because of a numerical inflationary trend independent of all the good intentions that have motivated them. Last year, we adopted several scores of resolutions. It is highly probable that we shall do so again this year. I am not certain that in doing so we shall be moving in the proper direction. Nevertheless it will be desirable for us to consider this point and to try to see whether we might not be less prolific but more effective, just as enthusiastic but a little less expansive in the expression of our wishes, which are laudable, to be sure, but frequently pious.

We owe that to the peoples - especially those which the circumstances of history have rendered less fortunate and which, having only recently enriched the ranks of the international community by the contribution of their as yet untainted humanity, feel an urgent and indeed vital need that an appreciable part of the \$450 billion spent annually on armaments be allocated for the abolition of famine, malnutrition, illiteracy and epidemic diseases, and, in short, for the strengthening of their efforts in economic and cultural development.

How then can we act in such a way that we might persevere in order to spread throughout the world an awareness of the problem of disarmament, even as we endeavour to make it more reliably effective? I think that we must start by making a distinction in our minds between the two aspects of the problem. Let us shout so that we may be heard by the whole of the world, and by those upon whom disarmament depends in the first instance, that we want to see general and complete disarmament brought about. The voices of disarmament must be heard, and they must become more demanding, because, as is stated in the Final Document of

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the special session, disarmament is the business of all States. But, on the other hand, when we come to the drafting and adoption of resolutions, let us cultivate boldness but let us still love reason. Boldness, which is the fruit of enthusiasm, will be the motive force of reason, and reason will be the guide of enthusiasm. Only thus shall we be able to make progress in the increasing realization of the aims stated in the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly.

How can we better express these generalizations in concrete action and a progressively more tangible reality? Several delegations have already expressed a certain number of highly edifying ideas. We should like to add ours.

We would start by saying that what is important now is to determine, in a much more realistic fashion, the method to be followed in our effort at disarmament, and not excessively to repeat definitions of objectives. The latter have already been set out in the Final Document. They are ambitious and numerous. Realization of only a part of those goals before a not too distant time-limit would meet the most fervent wishes of all and would encourage hopes and a spirit of determination. The major differences of opinion lie not so much in the choice of what must be done in regard to disarmament but in the method to be followed and the order in which the aims should be pursued, because some things can be realized in the more or less foreseeable future and others only at a much later stage. But whether they are ambitious goals or not, there are certain prerequisites without which no progress can be made.

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Foremost among the various prior conditions there is the establishment and preservation of an international climate favourable to negotiations. Détente is an essential instrument for the realization of that climate, but it itself depends on other conditions which engender and sustain it. One of these conditions is the building of confidence measures. Political conditions depend upon practical measures on disarmament or arms control, just as those measures, in turn, depend upon international détente.

But even assuming that, as we hope, the prior political conditions are in evidence, there are certain principles enunciated in the Final Document which, if not complied with, doom any negotiation on disarmament to mark time. I am referring, for instance, to respect for the principle of parallel and balanced progress in nuclear and conventional disarmament, which alone can establish those conditions, ~~or~~ - or, again, respect for another principle, that of respect for the security of countries. For no country is in a position to disarm if it feels that its own existence, territorial integrity or political independence is going to suffer as a result.

Another principle is that no country should aspire to measures which would provide it with unilateral strategic advantages. If we fail to adhere to this principle, we will certainly be sapping the very foundations upon which the march towards disarmament is possible.

Assuming that the political conditions for disarmament are met and that the principles - such as those we have enumerated - are complied with, there still remains the problem of priorities. Various criteria for the establishment of those priorities can be envisaged: for example, that of the concrete possibility of progress in certain sectors of the disarmament negotiations rather than in others; then, that of the urgency imposed upon us by the devastating power of certain weapons; and, finally, that of the possibilities offered by the partial regionalization of the disarmament process. In this context, we might mention, for example, negotiations such as those of the SALT series, which, we hope indeed, will be continued;

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the tripartite nuclear-test-ban negotiations; and the negotiations on chemical weapons and on weapons having excessively injurious effects, which the countries of the world are following with anxiety and impatience, in spite of the assurances that certain progress has already been made. The regionalization itself of certain negotiations, as in the case of those which resulted in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, also is subject to the criterion of realistic possibilities.

Along this line of thinking, and following the same criterion of pragmatic possibilities, there are a series of other measures to be adopted, which, though auxiliary in nature, are vital to the progress of disarmament negotiations. We have in mind, for example, the draft resolution relating to a disarmament research institute and the establishment of a world-wide satellite monitoring system. The importance of this idea cannot be over-emphasized given the absolute necessity for means of verification as an essential prerequisite for any pragmatic disarmament effort. Another point, which has already been mentioned but which bears repetition here, is precisely the adoption of measures for the building of confidence among States.

All these intermediate goals are pragmatic and must be dealt with as a matter of priority. Only their achievement will permit progress towards that other imperative objective, that of total nuclear disarmament through the prohibition and total abolition of nuclear weapons, the most horrendous threat to humankind, which we must never lose sight of. It is to the attainment of that goal that we must direct all our efforts. But if we truly aspire to such vast objectives, we must first eliminate the obstacles in their path; and headway can be made only by intermediate stages. That goes without saying, but it is much better if we say it, as Talleyrand once said.



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The introduction to our statement made it sufficiently clear, I trust, that the Greek delegation, which has been against the proliferation of texts and resolutions, cannot subscribe to the establishment of additional international organs on disarmament. We believe that, with the possibility of additional special sessions of the General Assembly on disarmament, and with the existence of this present Committee, the Disarmament Commission and the Geneva Committee, there are already organs adequate in number and quality to meet the requirements of the disarmament efforts.

Bearing in mind the difficulty and the enormity of the task before us, those bodies have done and will continue to do their best. Nevertheless, Greece will give all due attention to the proposal for a European conference on disarmament, because, after all, at this present moment Europe is a focal point of world policy and strategy, and in general, when geographical regionalization of the effort is possible and is freely agreed to by the parties, we are in favour of it.

I believe it unnecessary for me to dwell on other specific disarmament items, since they have been competently dealt with by previous speakers. Nevertheless, there is a vital point to which I should like to make special though brief reference: the item on conventional disarmament. The delegation of Greece is of the opinion that this aspect of disarmament has been somewhat neglected and has not received the attention it deserves. As we emphasized last year and on every other occasion that arose, balanced conventional disarmament must be accorded paramount importance on a par with nuclear disarmament. It involves one of the most basic aspects of disarmament and is an absolute condition for compliance with the principle that disarmament is conceivable only through the constant maintenance of international security. This, we feel, is a sine qua non condition. After all, it is by means of conventional weapons that all the wars since 1945 have been waged - and they have been very numerous indeed.

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We have tried in this statement to call for a more pragmatic approach to the problem of disarmament, while stressing the importance we attach not only to our not losing sight of the final objective but to our reminding world public opinion of it at every opportunity. As we have also tried to emphasize, however, now that the goals have been defined we must concern ourselves with the method motivated by enthusiasm and guided by rational pragmatism.

Whether it is apparent or not, the eyes of the world are turned towards these efforts. If there is some scepticism, it is not over the goals we have assigned ourselves but over the methods we are following, and the sometimes excessively repetitious nature of the statement of those goals, as well as over the disparity between our wishes and our procedure. Rightly or wrongly, the public sometimes doubts the strength of our determination, but more often it imputes to us consideration of matters too minute to enable us to achieve any results. It would not think along those lines if it were to see that the draft resolutions before the Committee at this session are less numerous, more substantial, less political and more pragmatic. It is up to us to meet public expectations and justify the hope, if not the confidence, that this session, loyal to the objectives outlined by the Assembly at its special session, will, through a more methodical approach, take a modest but positive step towards realization of conditions in which the sums saved through disarmament will be channelled to those countries which have known nothing but famine, disease and illiteracy. The good will of delegations is present, as well as their competence. Let us try to take advantage of this by improving our methods. To this end, we have at our disposal the report of the Disarmament Commission (A/34/42) of 25 June 1979 - and, above all, the recommendations in chapter IV, which give us a comprehensive programme of disarmament - on the measures to be adopted and the procedures to be followed. Those recommendations should serve as an example of conciseness, which it would be very useful for us to follow in our work.

Mr. FOFANA (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I do not intend this morning to deal with all the questions on our agenda. While awaiting the opportunity to tackle these questions, I should like to offer some reflections on a problem which, in my delegation's view, could, if the General Assembly does not give it high priority, seriously jeopardize all the efforts to negotiate disarmament undertaken thus far both on the bilateral and multilateral levels, as well as the results achieved.

On the morning of 24 October 1979, with a grave but measured voice, the Chairman inaugurated Disarmament Week as proclaimed by the United Nations; with great eloquence and talent, he said simple things, but things full of truth, on the future of mankind which is inevitably bound up with the great adventure of peace; he pointed out our grave responsibility in this First Committee for the implementation of a dynamic of disarmament; finally, the spokesmen of the various regional groups, in moving and essentially harmonious statements, welcomed Disarmament Week and the Chairman allowed a message from the United Nations Secretary-General to be read out. There followed the screening of the Czechoslovak film. No one could have suspected then that only two days later the news would break of a nuclear explosion carried out by one of the most racist States in the international community, threatening the destruction of the great hopes born of the tenth special session of the General Assembly. Yet this was the bitter truth for on 25 October 1979 the United States announced a nuclear explosion by South Africa.

Up to that point, our Committee had examined the results achieved by the Committee on Disarmament in the course of its 1979 session. Although not everyone was agreed on the importance and scope they attached to those results, at least there was no one amongst us who denied that Committee's universal, multilateral and irreplaceable negotiating character. Each delegation stated - sometimes with passion, sometimes with implacable rigour, but always with a lofty critical sense - what it felt to be a realistic approach to the thorny question of disarmament, including its scale of priorities now known to us all. It had become almost a ritual for each delegation to express its opinion on the conclusion of an international convention with a view to the protection of non-nuclear States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests; on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, manufacture and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction;

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on the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa;  
on the necessary relationship between disarmament and development;  
in short, on all the difficult disarmament questions which have been the subject  
of resolutions relating to disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its  
tenth special session and at its thirty-third regular session and transmitted  
to the Committee on Disarmament by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

I must add that some delegations also expressed their views on the  
Disarmament Decade proclaimed by the United Nations in 1969, on what we might  
call the balance-sheet of that Decade in the field of disarmament. It was  
unanimously stated that the results achieved during **that** Decade were disappointing.  
Some did not hesitate to say that the balance-sheet of the Decade which is  
now ending is heavily weighted on the side of the expansion of armaments,  
as a result of the deplorable, apocalyptic nuclear, chemical and radiological  
arms race which the nuclear Powers continue to pursue. In this connexion it  
has been shown here that expenditures on these types of weapons have reached  
the level of two-thirds of world military expenditures, climbing to more  
than \$400 billion.

It was also revealed that the level of the balance of terror reached by  
the nuclear powers is on the order of twice the volume of atomic weapons as  
compared with the beginning of the Decade. While a glimmer of hope was  
able to temper the cruelty of the frightening picture of existing weapons - I  
refer to the signature of the SALT agreements - no delegation felt satisfied with the  
present situation because of the great disparity between the need for speedy  
disarmament proclaimed by the tenth special session and the thirty-third  
regular session of the General Assembly and the meagre results attained by  
the Committee on Disarmament; the disparity between today's enormous arsenals of  
nuclear armaments and the near-total absence of political will on the part  
of the nuclear Powers, in particular the super-Powers, in the area of general  
and complete disarmament. Like all others that preceded us, my delegation is  
profoundly concerned at the stagnation and foot-dragging of the negotiations  
on disarmament.

This was the course of our work in the First Committee when on 26 October  
1979 the representative of Nigeria, in his capacity as Chairman of the Special  
Committee against Apartheid, spoke from the high rostrum of the General Assembly,  
meeting in plenary, about the news of the nuclear explosion carried out by  
South Africa on 22 September 1979 in an unspecified location. I should like to

express to the Ambassador of Nigeria, on behalf of my Government, my delegation's highest appreciation for his valuable contribution and diligent reaction, which made it possible for the General Assembly to adopt a resolution requesting the Secretary-General of the United Nations to undertake forthwith an enquiry to determine whether or not a nuclear explosion was detonated by South Africa and to report on the matter to the current Assembly session.

That the news of a South African nuclear explosion should only have become known to the General Assembly a month after the explosion, and that this news should have been disseminated during Disarmament Week cannot fail to call for some prior remarks.

First of all, it matters little whether the news of the explosion is true or not, because everyone knows that South Africa now has a nuclear capacity. I shall elaborate on this point later.

Secondly, the choice of the date for the dissemination of the news of the South African nuclear explosion was not purely accidental in the view of my delegation. The day of 24 October 1979 was the anniversary of the foundation of the United Nations and the first day of United Nations Disarmament Week. Two days later, the news of the explosion was announced.

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In a situation of exceptional gravity, such as the one which has marked Disarmament Week with a white atomic mushroom, we must not lose our heads but remain calm, as we were reminded with wisdom by the Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid. But we cannot fail to think that those in Pretoria who chose the date of 22 September 1979 - that is to say, only four days after the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations began its work - to inaugurate South Africa's triumphant and fearful entry into the atomic club committed a provocation and hurled a challenge to the whole international community. The words we use are well chosen. Let nobody say that later South Africa formally denied the news of the nuclear explosion. That changes nothing.

Next, the monopoly of the control of nuclear tests possessed by the nuclear Powers makes the freedom of information to which the international community, through the intermediary of the United Nations, is entitled dependent on their good will. If a United Nations control system existed independently of that of the nuclear Powers, the international community would not have to deplore a delay of one month in receiving the news of South Africa's nuclear explosion and would have been informed of it immediately.

I said that South Africa's nuclear explosion was a challenge and a provocation. But what is there that is not a challenge and a provocation in the existence of the apartheid régime of Pretoria? Is not the very existence of apartheid a challenge not only to Africa but to the whole of the international community? A man, woman or child who is tortured or killed in Soweto, Capetown or elsewhere - are they not part of mankind that is being mutilated? How could it be otherwise? Does not the nuclear explosion in South Africa form part of the logic and essence of apartheid? After all, could those in Pretoria, who have definitely installed themselves in a world of comfort because of their bestial racial domination, resist the temptation of consolidating that domination other than on a basis of nuclear hegemony?

In my delegation's view there can be no more solemn or convincing way to illustrate the nuclear holocaust which threatens our world, than by showing how the challenge of the régime of apartheid in South Africa is not only a challenge to the United Nations and the international community but also to its protectors, the Western Powers, of which Pretoria has been the unalloyed product. For more

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than 20 years the people of the world have been struggling to avoid a nuclear war. Since the first Summit Meeting of the Non-Aligned States in Belgrade in September 1961 up to the Sixth Summit held recently in Havana there has not been a single political declaration which has not alerted world public opinion to the need for general and complete disarmament and, first and foremost, for nuclear disarmament. There is not a single regional organization of the world which has not stressed this need. No summit conference of the Organization of African Unity has been held without a decision or resolution demanding the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. If we had the patience and curiosity to compile all that has been written or adopted as a resolution here in the United Nations on the subject of disarmament, we would be bound to realize the difficult task that lies ahead not only for our generation but for generations to come.

Every year Heads of State and eminent politicians come to the United Nations to convey their message of peace to the world. Last month it was Commander Fidel Castro, current Chairman of the Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned States, the broadest movement of people in the world who addressed the international community urging it to do everything possible to spare the peoples of the world a nuclear confrontation. A few days earlier the Pope had addressed from the rostrum of the United Nations a message of peace to the world.

Need it be stated that the nuclear explosion in South Africa has reduced all that to atomic ash? But if the apartheid régime in South Africa, which has been placed in the dock by mankind, can develop, manufacture and explode a nuclear device with the greatest impunity and serenity, it is because that régime is leaning up against a rock and has incomparably greater and more solid support than its powerful backers are ready to give to decisions and resolutions of the United Nations.

It is unquestionably the collaboration of the powerful protectors of South Africa which alone explains the fact that the apartheid régime now has a nuclear capability. It is impossible to deny these two facts: first,

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the support which the Western Powers have always generously given South Africa; secondly, the nuclear capability of South Africa which has resulted from that support.

I am trying to maintain in these debates all the serenity and seriousness for which consideration of this subject calls. Therefore, I ask all delegations which have not yet done so to be kind enough to acquire document S/13157 of 9 March 1979, which is a United Nations document containing the report of the United Nations Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa. I should like to quote a few extensive passages from that report.

"Letter dated 7 March 1979 from the Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid addressed to the Secretary-General

"I have the honour to transmit herewith, in pursuance of a decision of the Special Committee against Apartheid, the report of the United Nations Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa for the attention of the Security Council.

"I wish to draw your particular attention to the recommendation of the Seminar that the Security Council consider urgently the situation arising from the efforts of the apartheid régime to acquire nuclear-weapon capability. The Seminar has recommended that the Security Council adopt a mandatory decision, under Chapter VII of the Charter, to end all nuclear collaboration with South Africa, to require the dismantling of its nuclear plants and to warn the Pretoria régime that any efforts by it to continue its nuclear programme or to build a uranium enrichment plant would result in further international action, including effective collective sanctions.

"The Special Committee endorses the above recommendation and trusts that urgent action will be taken by the Security Council.

(Signed) Leslie O. HARRIMAN

Chairman

Special Committee against Apartheid" (S/13157, p. 1)



That document continues on page 17:

"The Seminar examined the proposition that the nuclear relations of certain Powers with South Africa are limited to so-called peaceful areas which do not enhance the Pretoria régime's nuclear military capability. It reached the conclusion that it was virtually impossible to have a clear dividing line between nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and that for military capacity.

"There was overwhelming evidence that South Africa had nuclear military capability and potential. It was warned in 1977 by the major Western Powers not to proceed with its planned nuclear explosion in the Kalahari desert. South Africa could never have reached its present nuclear capability without the substantial and comprehensive nuclear assistance it received from the major Western Powers.

"It was alarming that even after the 1977 warning to South Africa to desist from exploding its nuclear device, the Western Powers had not reduced or ended nuclear collaboration with the Pretoria régime. Indeed, there has been even more nuclear collaboration in the meantime and consequently South Africa's capability and potential had been advanced even further.

"The Seminar examined reports on nuclear collaboration with South Africa by several countries and received papers from the anti-apartheid movements in those countries. They showed that a number of Governments and multinational corporations had provided assistance to the apartheid régime for many years in utter disregard of the appeals of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the national liberation movements, and of the enormous dangers to international peace.

"They have thereby treated with contempt the ardent desire of the African States for the denuclearization of the continent.

"Despite the refusal of the apartheid régime to join the NPT, they have recklessly continued to transfer to it technology and equipment to facilitate its nuclear programme.

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"This collaboration has extended to many areas such as assistance in the extraction and processing of uranium; the training of large numbers of South African nuclear scientists; the visits of nuclear scientists to South Africa; participation of South Africa in conferences on nuclear matters; transfer of nuclear technology; and provision of reactors and other equipment.

"Special mention must also be made of provision of finance for South Africa's nuclear programme. A cessation of investment in, and loans to, South Africa, it was felt, would be an essential measure to prevent an expansion of South Africa's nuclear capability. It was pointed out that the apartheid régime was recently obliged to defer or curtail its plans for nuclear enrichment facilities because of difficulties in obtaining finance.

"Of special relevance in this connexion was the stubborn resistance by the Governments concerned to international action to prevent South Africa from obtaining nuclear weapons capability. The importance of mobilization of public opinion in those countries, and of diplomatic action by all States committed to peace, was therefore essential." (S/13157, pp. 17-18)  
The document goes on to say, in Section H:

"In his concluding statement, the Chairman said that the discussion had shown that the Seminar was not dealing with a remote and potential danger but with a threat that existed today - because the apartheid régime either had or could have nuclear weapons.

"Second, it was a danger which would certainly increase tremendously as South Africa acquired greater nuclear capability and expanded its uranium enrichment plant.

"Third, the actions of those Powers which continued nuclear collaboration with South Africa - so-called 'peaceful' collaboration - even after the disclosure of South Africa's plan to stage a nuclear explosion in the Kalahari desert were reckless and intolerable.

(lfr. Fofana, Guinea)

"Fourth, there must not only be a total cessation of all nuclear collaboration with South Africa, but a dismantling of South Africa's nuclear plants, with the threat of collective sanctions, in order to avert a grave danger.

"Referring to the discussion of safeguards and the question of South Africa's adherence to the NPT, he said that the Seminar was not concerned with the merits of the NPT as a step towards total nuclear disarmament. That Treaty should have perhaps included a provision for a total embargo against any State practising apartheid.

"South Africa had not acceded to the NPT, so that it could continue with its nuclear programme and threaten African States. It had challenged OAU's commitment to the denuclearization of Africa.

"Now, after South Africa's planned nuclear explosion in the Kalahari, the Western Powers had come up with the proposal to persuade South Africa to accede to the NPT. The Pretoria régime had indicated that it would consider joining NPT if it was assured of supplies and technology by the Western Powers. It also wanted to keep its enrichment facilities secret.

"If the South African régime wanted to sign the NPT there was no move to prevent that. The Special Committee's position of principle on the illegitimacy of the apartheid régime and the legitimacy of the liberation movement did not change the fact that the treaty was open for signature by South Africa.

"But it must be insisted that the South African régime should not be given inducements to become a party to NPT. It should not be offered free access to nuclear materials and technology.

"Moreover, South Africa's adherence should not be regarded as an adequate reassurance. The apartheid régime was a criminal régime which had proved by its record that it could not be trusted."

(ibid., pp. 35-36)

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The United Nations document on nuclear collaboration with South Africa is an important working instrument. It provides moral and scientific endorsement of binding measures which the Security Council is in a position to take now under Chapter VII of the Charter in order to avoid a nuclear holocaust for all mankind. It is impossible not to acknowledge that the danger of a nuclear war since the South African explosion is more real and more pressing in Africa than anywhere else in the world. It is no exaggeration to say that a local nuclear war would quickly assume regional and planetary dimensions.

At the close of the Disarmament Week organized by the United Nations, knowledge of the facts revealed by the United Nations document on the mechanism of the nuclear collaboration with South Africa constitutes a genuine contribution to the implementation of a global strategy for general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament.

We, the peoples of Africa and of the third world, need more than anybody else peace and disarmament. As far back as the fourteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, Comrade President Ahmed Sekou Toure, President of the People's Revolutionary Republic of Guinea, stated from the rostrum:

"Disarmament is of primary concern to the African continent. Our young and undeveloped States most urgently need peace in order to cope with the many problems which beset them. We have the burdensome legacy of several centuries of colonization to eradicate. We are obliged to do this by mobilizing all our resources under urgent pressure from our people, who crave more than ever for freedom and who legitimately aspire to a better life." (A/PV.896, para. 83)

His message has lost none of its relevance.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): At every step we come upon the fact that the quantitative and qualitative arms race still continues, running far ahead of the efforts being made towards arms limitation and disarmament. That conclusion simply has to be drawn, notwithstanding the fact that there are quite a few declarations of will on the part of States calling, in essence, for a halt to and reversal of this trend. But how is this to come about? This question is on the minds not only of statesmen and diplomats but also, increasingly, of social forces and the public at large.

An answer is provided in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, which demands as a priority the adoption of specific measures aimed at reducing and eliminating weapons, especially nuclear weapons.

That task requires the achievement of a new quality of international co-operation, for proposals and initiatives can lead to tangible results only if there develops around them a fabric of co-operation among States which is marked by openness, trust and the will to succeed for the sake of the commonly stated goals. That is why the German Democratic Republic welcomes the draft declaration proposed by the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in document A/34/134/Add.1 and declares itself in favour of its adoption.

The history of disarmament reveals experiences that should not be left out of consideration.

As early as the 1950s, far-reaching proposals emerged which were aimed at countering the on-going arms build-up. The "cold war" confrontation prevented them from being seriously discussed. Any co-operation on issues like disarmament, which most immediately concern the destinies of mankind, was impossible then. That in turn had grave consequences, especially in the sphere of nuclear arms. Now, with the process of détente, more favourable conditions have emerged also for solving the problems of disarmament. To turn them to best account requires the effective application in all its aspects of the principle of international co-operation, as codified in the Charter of the United Nations. This is, in our judgement, the basic intent of the Czechoslovak proposal. In comparison with the development of co-operation

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co-operation among States in the economic, scientific-technical and cultural fields and in view of their great significance, the issues of disarmament show a considerable backlog demand for effective co-operation.

The tenth special session of the General Assembly established important prerequisites for improving the situation. The adoption of the proposed declaration would be a further significant step in the same direction.

The text of this document combines methodological guidelines and substantive elements of the disarmament process and, as a conclusion from this, clear-cut demands on States are stipulated.

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Thus the rights and duties of States under the United Nations Charter have been precisely defined with respect to disarmament, and the responsibility of States, stressed in the final document of the tenth special session, has been made more specific. In a clear and distinct manner the text sets standards for the action of States.

In the proposed declaration, States will receive a useful and urgently needed instrument, which will help make their mutual co-operation on arms limitation and disarmament more effective and stable.

The Czechoslovak initiative touches on many aspects of co-operation in the field of disarmament. I would refer to two of them in particular.

One is the correlation between confidence-building and disarmament. There are tendencies to take an isolated view of confidence-building, but this contradicts the real facts.

Confidence-building, to be real, can and should be furthered by special measures, but it acquires the necessary breadth and strength mainly in the process of co-operation among States, geared consistently to practical results. Nothing indeed can make the will to achieve peace more credible and do more to promote confidence-building measures than constructive co-operation in reducing and eventually eliminating the existing means of recourse to military force.

And nothing, on the other hand, calls this will more into question than the pursuit of policies that constantly seek to discredit and block initiatives aimed at tangible progress, policies in which words and deeds are at variance.

The declaration proposed by Czechoslovakia underlines the need for successful negotiations as one aspect. The German Democratic Republic feels that it is of special importance at this particular time to activate and intensify the conduct of disarmament negotiations. It therefore urges the adoption by the General Assembly at this thirty-fourth session of a special resolution in this sense.

Already in its first statement made here in this Committee, our delegation referred to the great significance our country attaches to measures designed to bring about disarmament and military détente in Europe. I may inform members that the National Council of the German Democratic Republic's National Front, which embraces all political parties and mass organizations of our country, has called upon all citizens of the German Democratic Republic to support, with their signature, the far-reaching proposals put forward by the

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General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Leonid Brezhnev, in his speech delivered in Berlin on 6 October of this year.

Together with the other socialist States, we are making all efforts to prevent an escalation of the arms race in our continent.

The deployment of modern medium-range missiles in central Europe would critically disturb the military equilibrium and would entail threats to the security of the European peoples. Negotiations should be started. Then, we are convinced, both the opponents and sceptics would be convinced of the seriousness of the proposals I have mentioned, which are of mutual advantage.

The German Democratic Republic has always supported regional efforts directed towards arms limitation and disarmament in other parts of the world too. We view the establishment of nuclear-free zones as a method designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. A decisive prerequisite for these zones to live up to the purpose of their establishment is that no loop-hole whatsoever must be left open for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The remarkable progress made in efforts to establish such a zone in Latin America must be highly appreciated. The German Democratic Republic also advocates the establishment of a zone of peace in the region of the Indian Ocean. Our country maintains close political and economic relations with many States in that region. Therefore it is in our interest that peace in that region be strengthened.

My country has always supported the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. In this connexion we wish to express the strongest opposition to the alarming nuclear activities of South Africa aimed at the possession of nuclear weapons. We speak out in favour of strong and effective - I underline effective - action by the United Nations against the ambitions of the racist régime.

In the light of the increased challenges in solving disarmament questions, the preparation and convocation of a world disarmament conference is becoming ever more significant and a pressing need. The report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the world disarmament conference contains three points of interest, which have to be taken into particular account. The United Nations Disarmament Commission pointed out in its recommendations regarding the elements of a



(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

comprehensive programme of disarmament that:

"At the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation". (A/34/42 p. 14, para. 17)

In this context, it was stated in the joint Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-United States communiqué after the summit meetings in Vienna that

"The sides noted their support for a second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament and for that session to be followed by the convocation of a World Disarmament Conference with universal participation, adequately prepared and at an appropriate time." (A/34/414, p. 4)

In close connexion with this, it had been stressed in the political declaration adopted at Havana, which calls for a second special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament questions to be held in 1982, that the Havana Conference

"supported the proposal to call for a world disarmament conference at the appropriate time with universal participation and adequate preparation."

These three quotations underline the fact that necessary measures must be taken at an early stage to ensure the adequate and thorough preparation of such a world disarmament conference. This includes the setting of a date for holding that conference after the second special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament and the establishing of a preparatory body. It is our opinion that this Assembly, which is to discuss important tasks of the forthcoming decade, should make the necessary arrangements concerning the world disarmament conference.

## ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN: If all draft resolutions were submitted to date, it would be somewhat of an easy matter of putting forward a concrete plan of action for the next phase of our work. Since that is not the case, it follows that draft resolutions will be introduced not according to chronological agenda items or distribution number, but rather on a first come first served basis. At the moment five draft resolutions have been submitted. Draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.1, which deals with the question of hegemony, will be introduced at the end of November and, therefore, the Committee will begin its deliberations next Tuesday with A/C.1/34/L.2 or whichever draft is introduced and ready for discussion. That is what is meant by not introducing draft resolutions "according to chronological agenda items or distribution number".

Secondly, while representatives are urged to observe the 16 November deadline - which, by the way, cannot be extended - for submitting draft resolutions, this does not mean that submission of draft resolutions should be held up until the last moment. In fact the reverse is desired: drafts should be submitted and distributed as soon as possible; but, most importantly, priority consideration ought to be given to those draft resolutions with financial implications.

Thirdly, further to the Committee's plan of work for this second phase of our deliberations, representatives are urged to inscribe their names in advance whenever possible. However, since this may not be feasible in all cases and as this is to be a discussion rather than a general debate, representatives may ask to speak, when time permits, on the draft resolution or resolutions under consideration.

Fourthly, at the beginning of our work I indicated that the treatment of draft resolutions ought to be considered as the more important of the two phases of our debate on disarmament items. Therefore, to allow for the maximum consideration of all drafts, I do not propose to fix a closure date for the list of speakers on any specific draft resolutions. However, it must be borne in mind that a time-limit will be fixed each week for

(The Chairman)

voting on drafts on which discussions have already been concluded. It would seem that such a procedure of not having to hold drafts until the end of consideration of all resolutions on disarmament items would help to facilitate greatly the progress of the work of the Committee. This proposal would also mean that planning should be made in advance so that a room with a mechanical voting system could be reserved. But more importantly and for obvious reasons, representatives would need to know in advance the time and place for voting.

Fifthly, in the light of the foregoing, I find it advisable to allocate extra time for serious consultations and negotiations. For example, next Thursday, 8 November, will be reserved for precisely that purpose. Of course further time will be given as the need arises. Representatives are urged, however, to use that time to gain maximum agreement in advance, thus ensuring minimum confrontation when drafts are introduced in the Committee for final consideration.

To put in a simple summary all that I have just said: first, draft resolutions will be taken on a first come, first served basis for submission and introduction; secondly, they should be brought in as soon as possible, especially those with financial implications; thirdly, there will be no closure of the list of speakers, rather it will remain open so that all representatives will have a chance to express their views on draft resolutions since that is the more important phase of our work on disarmament items; fourthly, a special period will be allotted for negotiations and consultations - the first of these will be Thursday, 8 November - and I am willing to set aside any other period that may be necessary to bring about the kind of agreement that will not cause any problems when we deal with the draft resolutions in the Committee; and, finally, in the interest of promoting meaningful dialogue and perhaps true consensus on many of these items, I plan to apply strict adherence only to deadlines, to decorum and to rules of procedure. Again I am emphasizing the point that we shall give maximum coverage to draft resolutions, and

(The Chairman)

we hope that, wherever possible, names will be inscribed. When that is not possible, the Chair will allow representatives to speak on these items.

Any additional information with reference to the organization of work will be communicated from time to time.

If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee agrees to the plan that I have just outlined.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.