



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 23rd MEETING

Chairman: Mr. HEPBURN (Bahamas)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.40 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 30 TO 45, 120 and 121 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. ERALP (Turkey) (interpretation from French): In deference to you, Sir, I shall comply strictly with rule 110 of the Rules of Procedure. May I be permitted to point out that it is not without a sense of weariness that I again address the First Committee this year as I survey with bitterness the developments that have occurred in different parts of the world since the thirty-third session of the General Assembly.

Without wishing to nurture a pessimism which would only have adverse effects upon the course of our work, I should nevertheless like to try to explain this state of mind, which apparently seems to be spreading in view of the growing contradiction between the disarmament efforts and the recent politico-military developments throughout the world.

(Mr. Eralp, Turkey)

I have the feeling that in the first part of the century the analysis of international relations and of the evolution of the society of States was a far easier task than it would be if undertaken today because at that time the adversaries at the world and regional levels could be clearly distinguished. Today, however, things seem to be far more confused, except for the two major contemporary contradictions, namely, the North-South division and the East-West distinction. But those two categories are rather highly generalized. If one tries to look at the matter a little more closely and to come to grips with the reality in its complexity and on a day-to-day basis, one fact becomes obvious: the world today rejects the analytical frameworks and definitions of yesterday which we are still trying to use in order to explain and remedy our present difficulties. At the same time, regional wars, aggression of all kinds and military occupation follow each other in the space of a single year, and that precisely in a group of countries fighting sincerely by all means against this kind of action.

The developed world and the developing world are witnessing, with stupefaction and impotence the desperate exodus of hundreds of thousands of human beings, as well as their loss caused by famine or contagious diseases. Should we use the appropriate terminology and say that, to our astonishment and consternation, the "peace-loving countries" continue to accuse each other without respite.

Are not "human rights" vain words for the majority of mankind, condemned to poverty, unemployment and local wars? Moreover, is it not saddening that so natural, elementary and fundamental a thing as freedom of expression and of conviction should be subject in many parts of the world to repression or to revolting and obsolete restrictions? In fact, man today is a prisoner of the international structure which he himself has created, and the national sovereign State is hastening to its own demise. The system of collective security, devised and organized in the image of this unjust and unbalanced world, is seen by opportunists as a platform for propaganda or as an instrument to serve their petty political interests. It is to be noted that everyone seems to be in verbal agreement on the dangers of the arms race, and that everyone seems seriously disturbed at the dark future that awaits mankind if the present trends

(Mr. Eralp, Turkey)

persist. Cries of alarm are increasing, and there is a proliferation of literature characterized by a weepy humanism and by naively benevolent stands, but the action needed to achieve specific measures aimed against the accumulation and improvement of weapons - both nuclear and conventional - that are the most destructive in history, is constantly postponed.

And this ritual ceremony is repeated every year, as we wait for the apocalypse. Such is the politico-military situation in which the world finds itself on the eve of the 1980s.

As for the socio-economic bases of this system, the present situation and its foreseeable developments offer very little hope, like the politico-military developments. Turkey made known its views in detail on this subject on 19 October 1978 before the General Assembly, during the discussion of the report of the Committee of the Whole established in application of resolution 32/174. May I first explain the reasons which lead me to deal with this specific aspect, if only very briefly, in the First Committee. The disarmament of which we speak cannot be dissociated from the security of States. And in the terms of the Final Document of the special session, "... security ... is an inseparable element of peace." (resolution S-10/2, para. 1) Hence peace is and will be in serious danger if the present international order persists and continues to defy any attempt at transformation proposed by the representatives of the great majority of mankind. We have said in the General Assembly that "The maintenance cost of the present system ... is rapidly becoming unbearable even for its proponents"; and that "No order with such a level of maintenance and compliance cost can survive". After having explained the machinery of the present system, we went on to say:

"Developing countries may be forced in the process to opt for extreme alternatives in order to survive. Would it not be hypocrisy to criticize later the excesses of extreme régimes created by extreme domestic elements given birth to by an international order which recognizes no margin of survival for the weak?" (A/34/PV.40, p. 32)

(Mr. Eralp, Turkey)

The moment this system is confronted with a decisive failure, in other words, in the moment of truth, there is no doubt at all that the developing countries will be the first to pay the price. But what is also certain is that with them both the defenders of this system and the onlookers will also be seriously affected. For interdependence has already reached the world level, and no one can reasonably rely on selfish or isolated solutions. Finally, we believe that mankind, at the threshold of the 1980s, has reached a decisive turning point in its history, both as regards politico-military developments and the existing socio-economic structure.

It is in this general context that I should now like to take up the specific problems of disarmament which come within the purview of this Committee. Indeed, is the specific action advocated to such an extent by all the parties concerned possible in such an environment? To this our answer is an optimistic "yes", as long as a responsible attitude prevails over political demagogy, and as long as common medium-term interests are given preference over the petty individual interests of the day. Human reason must transcend in effectiveness the instinctive reactions of political or economic selfishness.

As we prepare to consider the possibility of proclaiming the 1980s as a second Disarmament Decade, it would have been comforting to be able to find subjects for satisfaction in the decade now drawing to its close. But we have to observe that the Disarmament Decade proclaimed at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly has not fulfilled our hopes as did its predecessor, the Development Decade.

Over the decades we have come to the threat of a nuclear holocaust, which is a burning reality that is becoming clearer every day. It is imperative for the fate of the human race that the nuclear arms race should cease. The halting of that race would indeed be only a stage on the road to the progressive elimination of nuclear weapons, which alone could bring a glimmer of optimism to our vision of the future. But we have to admit that very little has been accomplished to stop this senseless race.

(Mr. Eralp, Turkey)

As long as the interaction between nuclear weapons and conventional weapons - which are now capable of enormous destruction thanks to advanced technology -- is not fully recognized, and as long as purely political speeches addressed to public opinion are not replaced by a realistic vision of the relationship of forces and a pragmatic approach oriented towards concrete results, we shall certainly not be in a position to halt this race towards death. My delegation is pleased to note certain recent developments that are positive in this sense and could lead us towards forms of fruitful negotiation.

Another event provides reason for hope. I should like to say that we are pleased by the signing in Vienna by the United States and the Soviet Union of the SALT II Treaty on the strategic arms limitations. The accords must be rapidly implemented so that a genuine process of reduction of the arsenals of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery may follow.

We had hoped that these developments would be accompanied by the depositing within the negotiation body of a draft treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear tests. We therefore share the disappointment expressed in this respect by several previous speakers in this Committee, and we express the hope that the three parties to the negotiations might be in a position to submit the results of their common efforts to the Committee on Disarmament at its next session or at least before the second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is essential that the credibility of that Treaty be preserved, and we all know that the comprehensive banning of nuclear tests is the principal criterion in the eyes of the great majority. Vertical proliferation can be considered to be contained only to the extent that a quantitative limitation at the present nuclear levels will be accompanied by adequate measures designed to prevent the qualitative improvement of such weapons. The continual technical improvement of these weapons must be considered the principal reason for the situation becoming increasingly dangerous and precarious.

Some maintain that the prohibition of nuclear tests would have only a limited effect because the data already gathered and stored are adequate for the carrying out of numerous improvements without it being necessary to have recourse to further nuclear-weapons tests. Nevertheless we feel that,

(Mr. Eralp, Turkey)

even if the prohibition of nuclear tests were not to be totally effective in the attempt to end vertical proliferation, it would definitely have a very positive effect upon international relations and upon the future of disarmament efforts and non-proliferation, both vertical and horizontal, of nuclear weapons.

The conclusion of agreements for the establishment of nuclear-free zones would in our opinion be another step towards non-dissemination of these weapons, and nuclear disarmament would definitely stand to benefit from that.

Nevertheless we must in this respect emphasize that, in order to make such agreements both possible and viable, it is necessary for the initiative to come from the States concerned, for all the States of the region concerned to adhere to it, and for all to take account of the very legitimate security needs of each. The establishment of such zones would, on the other hand, be greatly encouraged and facilitated by recognition of guarantees of real and reliable security for States that have renounced acquisition of nuclear weapons.

A realistic and practical approach to disarmament necessitates the establishment of a correlation between the problems posed by nuclear weapons and those posed by what are called conventional weapons. From this point of view, the situation varies considerably from region to region. Turkey therefore believes in the merits and desirability of a regional approach to the search for and implementation of concrete measures of disarmament. Détente was born on European soil, which makes it possible for us to hope that it might engender a programme of regional disarmament within the framework in which the principal military groups now find themselves face to face. If such a development were to take place, it would very quickly spread beyond its original framework, and its beneficial effects would reach the rest of the world. It seems to us that to some extent the ground has been prepared for such a development thanks to application of the provision relating to military confidence measures contained in the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference. The Madrid Conference to be held in 1980 as a result of the follow-up action of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe could also discuss this subject.

I now come to the restructured machinery that has resulted from the special session. Although we cannot say that any major progress has been made

(Mr. Eralp, Turkey)

by the Disarmament Commission so far this year, we must agree that positive results have been attained through the adoption by consensus of a document containing the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. It might therefore be considered that at its first session the Commission carried out the task entrusted to it. It was thus able, while preserving its unity, to contribute to maintaining the impetus engendered by the special session.

It is nevertheless necessary to point out that, precisely in order to maintain an appearance of unity, the Commission was obliged to engage in a number of compromises that are reflected in the comprehensive programme, which we should have liked to be a little more exact and precise.

As for the negotiating body, we have carefully studied the report it has submitted to us, and we all heard the perceptive and extensive presentation of Ambassador Garcia-Robles of Mexico at the very beginning of this debate. Everything seems to indicate that we must await the second session of the Committee before formulating any more detailed judgement in this regard, and we express the hope that it will now be in a position to carry out work worthy of its name, namely the "negotiating body".

On the other hand, we consider that the efforts made within the United Nations in the sphere of study and training aimed at disarmament are highly useful. There is no doubt that in order to tackle as vital a problem as this with any hope for success, the least that can be done is to try to come to grips with the question in all its scope and complexity. An effort at common reflection is therefore essential. It can easily be agreed, on the one hand, that much still remains to be studied and explored, and, on the other, that it is necessary to spread the knowledge that has been acquired thus far and that will be acquired in the future to as wide an audience as possible. In this respect we see with satisfaction that activities such as the fellowship programme on disarmament are profitable for participants and therefore for the international community. It must, however, be noted that, on a broader scale, activities concerning disarmament may be developed and improved so that they may reach the level of the more important role that the United Nations is to play in this field. To that end it is necessary for sufficient means to be devoted to those activities and for adequate machinery to be established.



(Mr. Eralp, Turkey)

Guided by these considerations, Turkey became a sponsor of most of the resolutions prepared along these lines and adopted at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly. We intend to give the matter further attention and possibly to return to this question at some later stage.

The effectiveness of discussion in many cases seems to be inversely proportional to its length. In this general debate, which deals with the majority of the items of our agenda, it has not been my intention to present to the Committee a detailed list of our preferences or to repeat the views that we have recently communicated to the Secretariat in written form in response to the various requests and inquiries formulated by the Secretary-General in conformity with the decisions adopted at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly.

(Mr. Eralp, Turkey)

On the other hand, as its contribution to this Committee's work the Turkish delegation plans to put forward its views on various matters in much greater detail during the discussion of various draft resolutions in November.

In conclusion, I should like to say that, in our view, the time-table for disarmament negotiations, as we enter the 1980s, contains the following points in order of priority: first, the entry into force of SALT II, which would thus open the way to new substantive discussions on disarmament covering the continent of Europe; secondly, the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty by the Committee on Disarmament; thirdly, the drawing up by the Committee on Disarmament of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons.

I refrain from prolonging this list only because, should common efforts succeed in obtaining positive results with regard to these three priority matters within a reasonable period of time, all the other disarmament matters under discussion would be affected in a very positive way, and even our somewhat pessimistic view of the future would begin to modify. I should like to conclude my statement in this sincere hope.

Mr. ROMULO (Philippines): We have completed the ninth year of the Disarmament Decade. But we have not seen one year of disarmament, or even one act of disarmament, in all of that time. Thus, human hopes are set against human actions - our wish for freedom from terror against the design of new weapons systems; our wish for freedom from our fears against the rapid spread of weaponry to more and more States; our wish for the end of poverty against the incredible extravagance lavished on ever more sophisticated and dangerous weapons.

Now, we can take some comfort in events of the past two years and place some hope in small indications of new trends, and to these I will return later. The world and its peoples, however, have a right to expect more and a right to complain that relief from the nuclear arms race and the many other arms races in the world is not much more quickly forthcoming. I am not saying here that our difficulties are caused by the wish of anyone to place themselves and the world in

(Mr. Romulo, Philippines)

dire peril. The factors which are operating are certainly other than a calculated plan to blow up spaceship earth and everything on it. We have seen that kind of madness, but fortunately it is not in evidence in world leadership today - although we must admit, if a solution to the arms race is longer delayed, that circumstance could again arise, perhaps from a totally unexpected quarter, as arms continue to spread.

If the arms race is not due to wilfulness, if it is not due to a grand but insane design, then to what what is it due? If we are to eliminate the arms race, and if our annual chant of "Disarmament" appears to be without effect, then should we not look more deeply for the motivations and causes of the arms race? The biggest cause for hope, I believe, is that we have at last begun to take not only one, but several major steps towards a deeper understanding of the arms race phenomenon through the establishment of an Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, and through the very significant studies which are now in progress.

I was struck by the increasing reference in statements made here in this Committee to problems of trust and confidence, to questions of verification and compliance and to the wider questions of international security within the context of disarmament. It seems to me that in looking at these issues we may begin to identify the problems before us in a new way. I have the honour to serve as Chairman of one of the new task forces on elements of the disarmament problem; I am the Chairman of the Expert Group on the Interrelationship between International Security and Disarmament. This group held its first meeting in the spring of this year, and it will hold its second during this present Assembly. We expect to hold two more meetings during 1980. It is too early to report any specific findings of this Group of Experts. It is not too early, however, to report that its range of concerns includes precisely these questions of trust, confidence, security and insecurity to which a number of members of this Committee have addressed themselves.

If there is not minimum trust among and between States, negotiations are fruitless. If there is not a minimal level of guaranteed international security, States will not disarm. The principles are stark and simple to state, although the task of confronting these attitudinal and psychological problems and their very real causes may be difficult and protracted.

(Mr. Romulo, Philippines)

For many years, not only I, but others as well, have advocated a conscious and deliberate strategy to de-escalate the arms race. May I say that this is the eighteenth statement I have made on this subject throughout these years. De-escalation is not only the absence of escalation, for the arms race - even if arrested temporarily - will not de-escalate by itself. De-escalation has to be planned with the same degree of intensity, effort and planning that escalation has always enjoyed.

Of what does a strategy of de-escalation consist? It consists, first and foremost, of a persistent and consistent effort to avoid steps which appear provocative to possible adversaries. Every step in the arms race has its adequate justifications. But those justifications do not satisfy the party which is on the receiving end of increased military pressure. To him, no matter what the justification, the move is seen as challenging, as provocative, and as requiring some countermove on his part. There is pressure to build, or to threaten to build, new weapons systems because they will theoretically improve the bargaining position at some future arms negotiations table. But the side effects generally are more serious than the sought-after advantages. The disadvantages are that tension is increased, worst possible motives are confirmed, countermoves are provoked and negotiations delayed until the other side once again can match weapon for weapon the power of the first side.

(Mr. Romulo, Philippines)

Secondly, a strategy of de-escalation consists of taking steps which confirm to the other party seriousness of intent to end the race, by a "deeds, not words" approach. Trust is achieved and fears and suspicions allayed over a period of time only when actions of one party consistently demonstrate commitment, from the point of view of the adversary, to a peaceful direction. Almost all de-escalation steps have failed of the desired results in the present arms race precisely because of the lack of consistency and the high ambiguity which occur when a party takes one step towards arresting the arms race while at the same time taking other steps which heighten and inflame tension. The second condition is usually worse than the first. Often, armament steps are taken to offset fears and criticisms from within the initiating society; but necessarily the over-all effect is to destroy completely the value of the initial move towards a freeze or towards de-escalation. There are many examples which could be given, but they are well known and need not be listed here.

Thirdly, a strategy for de-escalation requires preparation for a series of steps to be taken, with or without reciprocation by the second party, and the will to carry them through without ambiguity. The arms race itself has not suffered from ambiguity. Armaments competition has been fierce and consistent. De-escalation without the same consistency is unreal and unconvincing. Small but indicative steps, which cost little or nothing in national security, are a strategy for change - change in the atmosphere, change in the perceived situation, change which makes possible the needed minimum of confidence and trust which alone can make negotiations on large issues possible and fruitful. Under such circumstances, an adversary is challenged - but not to buy or to build new weapons systems; on the contrary, an adversary is challenged to prove that he too wishes to halt and de-escalate the arms race through similar or corresponding steps. The process for de-escalation is the same as the process for escalation, but States are reluctant to follow it.

Many suitable steps have already been mentioned during this year's debate in this Committee: first, a cessation of production of fissionable materials; secondly, announcement of the non-production or non-deployment of envisaged new weapons systems; thirdly, confirmed cessation of production, and destruction of stockpiles of nerve gases, pending a treaty on their prohibition; fourthly, an end to the absurdity of further nuclear weapon tests, as a spur to completion of a comprehensive test ban.

(Mr. Romulo, Philippines)

Does anyone believe that the impact of such steps would not be to increase trust, allay suspicion, and render arms reduction negotiations more fruitful? And does anyone truly believe that, in the era of redundant killing power in which we now find ourselves, world security would be one whit lessened by such steps? The public and the affected communities within societies need to be instructed on the purposes, the content and the intent of such a programme. Almost without exception, it is the obvious in life that we are called upon to do. De-escalation of the arms race is no exception. The process and strategy of de-escalation are obvious.

No arms negotiations, no arms reductions, no disarmament can go far, however, unless and until States can place their reliance for security on something other than their own arms and armies. The Charter of this Organization has offered us a global security system, but we have not activated it in ways significant enough to provide the alternative to the arms race. The international community is face to face with a fundamental question: Do we want law and order in the world as the alternative to chaos and anarchy, or do we not? It is a question about which we are ambivalent, to which we have given vague, uncertain and half-hearted answers. Yet, the arms race, which may very well doom our civilization, feeds on this ambivalence and fills the "security gap" with machines of utter destruction. The alternative is clear: the security gap must be filled through planned steps and measures which are effective and which enjoy the assent and confidence of the international community. This, in turn, means a re-evaluation of the means which have thus far been employed by the United Nations for mediation and settlement of conflicts, and for the establishment of a truce or tranquillity between combatants. Can these processes be strengthened and extended to provide the alternative to "the world as a perpetual armed camp?" If not, there is little hope for the future. If so, then the talents and resources of humanity can at last be turned to worthy ends.

Turning now to some of the specifics of this year's disarmament efforts, let us first of all register our gratification that the SALT II negotiations have culminated in a signed agreement. This is important.

(Mr. Romulo, Philippines)

It will take on its real significance, of course, only if it leads to SALT III in which a meaningful reduction in nuclear war-making capacities takes place. We welcome, too, the announcement on the part of China that, upon completion of preparations, it will be joining the Committee on Disarmament. It has long been recognized that lasting and significant agreements on nuclear disarmament would require the whole-hearted participation of all concerned parties. Several years ago I ventured to state that the most realistic course for the United States and the Soviet Union would be a rapid decrease in mutual nuclear strength so that the world would not have to wait and tremble while a third major nuclear Power undertook to achieve parity with one or both at a higher level of arms. Thus we were interested to note a similar statement by the representative of China in his presentation to this Committee.

However, the United States, the Soviet Union and China have now entered a "never-never land." "Parity", or equality in forces, is a function of the relationship between two States, not three. Parity is gone forever. There is no way that States in a triangular relationship can achieve parity, each one with arms equal to two of the others. Thus, we have another reason why it is high time to begin rapid and verified cutbacks in arms before the nuclear merry-go-round situation becomes substantially worse.

Any major arms cutbacks will necessarily have to be accompanied by the establishment of a system of verification and compliance in which not only the parties, but the world community as a whole, have confidence; for "nuclear potential" is now widespread, and its restraint will demand a global verification system, not only mutual inspection. Means to assure verification and compliance can be set in place gradually, in keeping with the depth of the arms cutbacks envisaged.

(Mr. Romulo, Philippines)

Indeed, substantial experience can be gained through a system of information exchange and evaluation regarding nuclear tests which will prove useful in the design of approaches to monitoring substantial arms reductions. Further measures bring us to the consideration of the suggestion of the Government of France regarding a United Nations satellite surveillance agency. Objections to this suggestion have been raised by the States now in charge of the necessary technology, for reasons of complexity and of State security. An interim approach which might commend itself would be for them to share with an appropriate unit set up in the United Nations Centre for Disarmament the results of their present surveillance and their interpretations of the data, which the United Nations unit could compare. We look forward to the response of States to the French proposal. Another very interesting suggestion with great importance for the future in my view is that of the Federal Republic of Germany, which looks toward the development of a world-wide system of observance posts. The essential point is that international confidence will only be served by the establishment of impartial agencies for the monitoring of arms reductions and disarmament, and will inevitably lead to the development, probably on an incremental basis, of the long-foreseen international Disarmament Organization.

Turning now to issues at present under negotiation, we share the grave disappointment of other Members that there is as yet no comprehensive test ban. I need not elaborate the advantages of such a ban in restraining horizontal as well as vertical proliferation. I believe it is generally and properly regarded as a scandal that 16 years after the accomplishment of a partial ban, this simple measure has not been completed. It is a scandal. One cannot but share similar sentiments concerning the effort to prohibit and to destroy chemical weapons, meaning primarily nerve gases - those agents whose deadliness is almost unimaginable. Surely the capacity to turn the earth into a cinder is sufficient without adding to it the capacity to drive humans insane with suffering before a painful and ugly death from chemical agents.



(Mr. Romulo, Philippines)

Any proposal and any work on a draft treaty on the matter of chemical weapons should be frequently, if not continuously, before the full membership of the Committee on Disarmament so that it may be apprised of the arguments which shape the draft upon which the Committee is expected to act.

Another disappointment lies in the comprehensive programme of disarmament brought forward by the Disarmament Commission. While the points listed are useful and valuable, one must reluctantly conclude that it is neither comprehensive nor a programme for disarmament. As a shopping list of principles and priorities for action, it may serve us well. We have not, however, seen a "comprehensive programme of disarmament" since the draft treaties of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on General and Complete Disarmament of 18 years ago. Surely we must do at least as well, if not better, today. It is true, of course, that no such programme could possibly be developed in one session of the Disarmament Commission, and it should be directed to take whatever time is required to elaborate all the elements and aspects of a true programme for the achievement of disarmament, together with the accompanying surveillance and security measures appropriate and necessary at each step. If the Disarmament Commission should find that such a programme cannot be elaborated without more specialized work, then let us note that we are now possessed of adequate and appropriate machinery through the system for the conduct of studies in and through the Centre for Disarmament to accomplish those ends.

We have now achieved, since the special session devoted to disarmament, a certain new momentum on this question. States have shown themselves more willing to see the United Nations more fully involved in questions of arms limitation and disarmament. States are also bringing forward imaginative and new proposals for approaching one or another aspect of the control of arms races throughout the world. I was struck for instance by the suggestion of the Government of Italy for a regional approach to the conventional arms races - many of them races to which the word "conventional" can hardly apply with adequacy. The forward motion which we have achieved is like a breath of wind on a becalmed sea. It is still far from being the fresh breeze we require to take us to our goal, and it may turn out to be misleading unless we can consolidate our gains and reinforce our efforts.

(Mr. Romulo, Philippines)

the needed momentum still awaits acts of high statesmanship on the part of leaders of the major Powers that can drastically alter the context in which we are working. It also awaits a clearer understanding on the part of leadership and peoples alike that disarmament is impossible outside a design for international peace and security to which all States are firmly committed: a design which cannot wait until the completion of disarmament, nor even for major steps in disarmament, but which must be developed even as a precursor to real disarmament. The transfer of security responsibilities from the arms and armies of States to the international community requires the elaboration and emplacement of a system for security in which States and their peoples have confidence. Confidence, in turn, derives only from experience. Thus we may find that a certain re-ordering of priorities is called for in our search for disarmament and true international security.

Every decade must be a disarmament decade until the goal is reached. If we do not reach it soon, there will not be many decades in any case. Let us pursue our goal with renewed vigour, for the fate of our world, whether we fully realize it or not, whether we like it or not, is squarely in our hands.

Mr. SUCHARIPA (Austria): In its earlier statement, made a week ago, the Austrian delegation had the opportunity to give its views on some of the global problems posed by the unabated arms race as well as on the most urgent issues of nuclear disarmament. Today I should like to explain Austria's position on a number of other issues to which we attach equal importance.

There is general agreement that a prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons is among the most urgent disarmament measures. Accordingly, efforts in this field have been pursued for many years. Yet, this year again we have to note with deep concern that nine years after the conclusion of the negotiations on the biological weapons convention the actual negotiations on chemical weapons still remain within the domain of the United States and the Soviet Union, and that despite very serious efforts on the part of several member States of the Committee on Disarmament it has not been possible to embark on multilateral negotiations on the complete elimination of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Sucharipa, Austria)

We are of course aware that the United States and the Soviet Union have submitted a joint report on the current status of their negotiations and we appreciate the fact that this report does contain a fair amount of substantial information which gives a clear picture of the areas of agreement and disagreement. Thus we note that the two parties are in agreement on the fundamental goal to be achieved, that is, a general, complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Sucharina, Austria)

They also agree on a determination of the scope of the agreement on the basis of a general purpose criterion and on supplementing this criterion with other criteria, especially those relating to toxicity which will be relevant for the purpose of adequate verification. We also note the agreement that verification of a chemical ban should be based on a combination of national and international measures and that the concept of "verification by challenge" will be part of the verification procedures. At the same time a number of issues, not least in the area of verification, remain to be resolved.

This year has also seen an intensified level of activity within the Committee on Disarmament, and we welcome the substantive and interesting contributions made, particularly on behalf of the delegations of Poland and the Netherlands. It is our considered view that on the basis of these developments the time has come to proceed without any further delay to multilateral negotiations. The Austrian delegation will therefore lend its support to an appropriate resolution of this General Assembly calling on the Committee on Disarmament to initiate such negotiations when it meets again next year.

My delegation has taken note of the joint draft submitted to the Committee on Disarmament by the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union containing the main elements of a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons. We see this, first of all, as evidence that the difficulties posed by the existence of two conflicting approaches to the problem of a prohibition of weapons of mass destruction can successfully be resolved in a pragmatic way. We can, however, not overlook the fact that this initiative, welcome as it is, concerns only an arms control measure which, for the time being, is at best of secondary importance. Nevertheless, the Austrian delegation believes that the joint draft merits a thorough examination by the Committee on Disarmament in the course of next year in order to enable the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly to take definite action on it.

For a country like Austria, which is situated between the two major military alliances, not only nuclear weapons - we referred to this issue at some length in a previous intervention - but also the massive concentration of conventional armed forces and armaments in Central Europe constitute matters of most serious concern. It is, therefore, one of the chief objectives

(Mr. Sucharipa, Austria)

of Austria's security policy to support a reduction of the vast arsenals of conventional weaponry in such a way that a genuine balance of forces could be achieved at a lower level. In this context I wish to refer primarily to the Vienna negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe. These negotiations have now been going on for more than six years and, more than ever before, tangible results are of essential importance.

We hope that the successful completion of SALT II will stimulate efforts to break the existing deadlock in these negotiations, and that the announcement concerning a withdrawal of Soviet troops from Central Europe made by President Brezhnev at the beginning of this month will prove to be a first sign of renewed efforts on the part of all negotiating partners. Still on issues of regional arms control in Europe, we consider that initiatives such as the plan for a European disarmament conference submitted by France and the proposals made by the Warsaw Pact States in May of this year and again earlier this October lend some justification to hopes for progress, if only in a first phase within the context of initiatives for confidence-building measures, an issue to which I intend to revert in a moment.

On a more general level the increasing build-up of arsenals of conventional weapons in many parts of the world during the last years and the related problem of arms transfer have become a grave and legitimate concern to the international community. Effective measures to curb this particular aspect of the arms race will most likely succeed at regional levels, and with the co-operation of arms suppliers and recipients alike. In order to find suitable solutions to this problem, it seems to be essential to deal with all its aspects. Thus, we recognize that the question of arms transfer does not lend itself easily to broad and general restraining measures unless such measures are co-ordinated with general progress towards disarmament.

It is well known that Austria attaches particular importance to the question of prohibitions or restrictions on the use of those conventional weapons which cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. Our active interest in this question is based on the understanding that it is a special

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mission of a permanently neutral country to ensure - without overlooking relevant military and economic aspects - that humanitarian considerations prevail as far as possible in the conduct of armed conflicts, that the dignity of the human person is preserved even during hostilities and that all victims of warfare are protected against unnecessary suffering.

Therefore, we regret that the Geneva conference which was held in September this year, despite the persistent efforts of many delegations, failed in its endeavours to conclude a formal agreement on the pressing issues which were on its agenda. We are especially disappointed that it was not possible to bridge the existing gap in the positions of Governments concerning restrictions of the use of incendiary weapons. On the other hand, we note with satisfaction that the conference came very close to elaborating a draft agreement on land mines and booby traps, and also that a consensus could be reached on the convening of a follow-up conference next year. Austria is prepared to continue its active participation in the further work which is ahead of us, and we sincerely hope that next year's conference will come to a successful conclusion. It would indeed be an ominous sign for the future fate of disarmament if it should prove beyond the reach of the international community to agree even on limited restrictions or prohibitions of weapons which are of an especially cruel and inhuman nature.

In the course of the last two years the concept of confidence-building measures which earlier had been elaborated within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe has also become an item for discussion in this universal forum. My delegation welcomes this fact and supports the relevant efforts made by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany. In our view, confidence-building measures can serve two interrelated purposes. Such measures as, for instance, advance notification on military manoeuvres and movements, the invitation of observers to manoeuvres and other steps leading towards an enhanced openness and predictability in relation to national defence policies, can effectively contribute to achieving greater rationality and stability in international relations and reduce the danger of surprise attacks. This, of course, constitutes an important goal in itself. At the same time, however, confidence-building measures can also, through the increase of mutual trust, improve to a considerable extent the negotiating climate and thus improve the chances for the success of disarmament efforts.

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With these considerations in mind, Austria, together with other neutral and non-aligned States, advocated within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe the inclusion of such confidence-building measures in the Final Act of the conference and continues to exert efforts for the full implementation and further expansion of these measures.

Austria has also noted with interest various proposals for the consideration of new confidence-building measures which have been submitted since last year and which could, within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, be considered also at the Madrid follow-up meeting of the conference.

The relevant experience gained until now within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe has shown that the regional level is particularly suited for the introduction and implementation of such measures, because in such a way confidence-building measures can best be tailored towards the special requirements of the area concerned. Therefore we are pleased to note that this regional aspect has been taken into account in last year's General Assembly resolution as well as in many of the most valuable comments made by Governments in pursuance of this resolution.

However, we should not forget that confidence-building measures cannot replace concrete results in disarmament negotiations. If it is not possible to obtain such results over a longer period of time and if the arms race continues unabated, confidence-building measures by themselves will certainly not be **sufficient** to make up for the distrust created by the continuing arms race.

Last year, when my delegation presented its preliminary evaluation of the results of the special session, we expressed the hope that, on the basis of the Final Document, a new momentum of progress in disarmament would develop. Unfortunately, if we now want to assess the relevant developments that have occurred since last year, we are faced with a situation in which there is very little material for stocktaking.

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Certainly we welcome the signing of SALT II as a most significant political event with important but limited disarmament effects. Beyond that, however, there are no real results to be reported. I should like, nevertheless, to say a few words concerning those areas where decisions of the special session have already been fully implemented. I am, of course, referring to the question of the multilateral disarmament machinery which has been restructured by the special session, and especially to the Disarmament Commission and the Committee on Disarmament.



(Mr. Sucharipa, Austria)

The Disarmament Commission, in which my delegation had the honour to serve as one of the Vice-Chairmen, adopted by consensus its recommendations on the elements proposed for inclusion in a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Although these recommendations also reflect the fact that the Commission could not arrive at complete agreement on some important issues, the Austrian delegation considers that the Commission, at this first substantive meeting, has already evolved into an important body for disarmament deliberations on a universal level, and we are therefore looking forward to the next substantive meeting of the Commission in 1980. It will be for this General Assembly to give its guidance as to the concrete disarmament issues to be discussed at that meeting. In this connexion, last year's General Assembly resolution 33/71 H already contains a number of interesting ideas, and my delegation is prepared to consider, together with other interested delegations, these points as well as other suggestions which have already been made or might yet be made for inclusion on the Commission's agenda. In this connexion my delegation was interested to hear the ideas advanced the other day by the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Adeniji.

We believe that it will be of paramount importance to structure the future role of the Commission around a careful selection of topics which are of an urgent nature and of universal interest. Thus we would ensure that the Commission will affirm its role as an important disarmament body in which all United Nations Member States can effectively contribute to the over-all disarmament effort.

I should now like to turn to the other important element of the multilateral disarmament machinery as restructured by the special session, that is, the Committee on disarmament. Austria, as a country which, due to its geographic position, is particularly interested in concrete results of disarmament negotiations, has followed very closely the proceedings of the Committee during its first two sessions. We note that the Committee, on the basis of the decisions of the special session, was able to agree after lengthy negotiations on its over-all agenda and programme of work as well as on its rules of procedure. We are convinced that these decisions are a solid foundation for the future work of the Committee. At the same time, however, we cannot hide our regret about the apparent lack of substantial results in this year's deliberations of the Committee. Certainly, this disappointing fact can, at least to some extent, be attributed to the time-consuming efforts which the Committee had to expend on its own organization. I might add that we found the comments made in this connexion by Ambassador Fein of the Netherlands to be very relevant indeed.

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However, one cannot avoid the conclusion that, despite the serious and imaginative contributions to its work made by a number of its members, the Committee did not quite live up to the expectations and hopes expressed by many delegations last year. To us, this fact is the true reflection of a well known reality: real progress in disarmament depends largely, if not solely, on the willingness of the two super-Powers to heed the appeals made to them by the international community. Obviously, this reality could not be changed by the mere abolition of the institution of the co-chairmanship.

I must also express my delegation's dissatisfaction with the structure and content of the Committee's report, which only reflects procedural issues relevant to the Committee's work and contains hardly any information on the substance of its deliberations or the content of the statements made. Of course we know about the difficulties which would be encountered in preparing a more substantive and analytical report. However, we hope that the Committee will confront these difficulties in preparing its report next year because adequate substantive information to the General Assembly on its proceedings is a necessary corollary to its claim to be the most important multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament.

The current international debate on disarmament issues reflects an increased and renewed interest in adequate procedures for verification in order to give adequate assurances concerning compliance with the terms of a given treaty.

My delegation is satisfied that Austria's initiative in this field in the course of the special session has been, at least to some extent, at the origin of this increased interest. We are particularly glad to note the decision of the Committee on Disarmament to include the question of verification on its agenda as well as the parallel decision of the Disarmament Commission to include verification methods under the measures proposed for inclusion in a comprehensive programme for disarmament. We interpret these decisions as recognition of the fact that the question of verification is the crux of most, if not all, disarmament efforts and therefore deserves further and in-depth study.

In that connexion Austria has noted with interest the positive preliminary conclusions contained in the progress report of the expert group on the technical, legal and financial implications of establishing an international satellite monitoring agency and we would actively endorse a decision of this General Assembly to renew the mandate of the group. In our view one of the considerable merits of the French proposal for the establishment of such an agency lies in the fact that it would constitute a concrete step towards meeting the requirement of the Final Document

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that all parties to disarmament agreements should have the opportunity to participate in the verification process. We also follow with great interest and we support the persistent efforts made by the delegations of the Netherlands and Sweden to convince the international community of the ultimate need for an international disarmament organization which would, inter alia, assume important functions in the area of verification.

May I finally be allowed to address myself to a problem which does not figure among the long list of agenda items of this Committee, but which certainly merits discussion in this framework. Together with a number of other delegations, the Austrian delegation has, during recent years, referred on numerous occasions to the most disturbing phenomenon posed by the proliferation of the arms race into outer space. This concern relates in particular to current developments in the relevant programmes of both of the two major space Powers, which seem to be moving towards a new phase in space militarization characterized by the emplacement of weapons systems in space around the earth and by the development of capabilities to interfere with observation satellites or other space systems.

We therefore note with some satisfaction that, on the basis of paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the special session, the Disarmament Commission decided unanimously to include in its recommendations on the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament a reference to the necessity of agreeing on "Further steps to prevent an arms race in outer space" (A/34/42, p.12). We are also aware of the understanding reached among the members of the Committee on Disarmament that item IX of the Committee's agenda, dealing, inter alia, with "collateral measures", will also include the question of further measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. In this connexion, special reference has to be made to the initiative taken by the Government of Italy in submitting to the Committee on Disarmament the draft of an additional protocol to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty providing for a further demilitarization of outer space. The Austrian delegation hopes that multilateral negotiations on this basis will soon be taken up in an appropriate forum.

My delegation appreciates the fact that bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union have been taken up and that President Carter and President Brezhnev have agreed in their joint communiqué issued on 18 June 1979 in Vienna

"to continue actively searching for mutually acceptable agreement in the ongoing negotiations on anti-satellite systems". (A/34/414, p. 3)

Given the direct implications of these efforts for international peace and security as a whole, we should like to reiterate our hope, expressed last year, that the negotiating partners will provide us with substantive information on the current status of these negotiations. In the absence of such information we have to rely on published reports in the press, from which one can conclude that the main difficulties in these negotiations concern the question of inclusion of the United States space shuttle in the scope of an eventual agreement, the question of the applicability of an agreement in relation to third space Powers and the definition of the term "hostile act" and its relationship to the principles of freedom of information. In any case, we might have reached the point where both the dangers inherent in a further development of the military uses of outer space and the international awareness of this problem as expressed in the aforementioned actions by various United Nations bodies would warrant some kind of reaction by the General Assembly.

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At the conclusion of our contribution to this year's general debate on disarmament questions, permit me to restate a number of considerations of a more general nature which in the opinion of the Austrian Government must apply to all disarmament efforts.

First, disarmament measures in individual sectors must be based on a global and comprehensive concept which aspires ultimately - even though this is clearly a long-range objective - to general and complete disarmament. At the same time, we do not fail to support a pragmatic approach giving priority to those measures which not only are meaningful but also hold prospects of realization in the short term. Such partial measures should, however, be evaluated within the framework of their possible contribution to more far-reaching disarmament objectives.

Secondly, in military planning, different armament systems are closely interrelated. This fact must be taken into account in all phases of disarmament efforts. This holds true, in particular, for the interdependence of conventional and nuclear armaments.

Thirdly, disarmament must be considered in relation to the existing balance of power; it must not jeopardize national and international security by giving one country or group of countries advantages or military benefits over others.

Fourthly, given the enormous dimensions of the current arms race, disarmament measures, in order to have any meaning at all, will have to be concrete and have a significant impact on the military balance sheet.

Fifthly, disarmament measures must include appropriate procedures for verification to give adequate assurances concerning compliance with the terms of a given disarmament treaty.

Lastly, the primary responsibility for disarmament rests with the great Powers, and especially with the two major nuclear-weapon States. We cannot expect genuine progress towards disarmament on the global or even on the regional level unless those Powers are ready to take important and concrete steps.

Mr. FRANCIS (New Zealand): It is not my intention in this statement to address the full range of items before the Committee in this general disarmament debate. At a later stage I may ask to take the floor again to comment on other issues, but this morning I simply wish to focus on certain nuclear disarmament questions and to offer a brief comment on conventional arms control.

It is now over a year since the tenth special session provided a new framework for redoubled efforts in the field of disarmament. Regrettably, the momentum generated by that session has not been fully sustained. At the thirty-third session, my delegation expressed disappointment that it was not possible at that time to discuss disarmament in terms of agreement reached rather than agreements hoped for. This year we can only reiterate our disappointment that so little progress has been made in implementing the broad strategy outlined in the Final Document of the tenth special session. It is particularly worrying that this should be the case in relation to that section of the Programme of Action to which highest priority was given, namely, that relating to nuclear weapons.

It has been the consistent view of my Government that nuclear weapons are the greatest single threat to world peace. Nuclear technology is here to stay, and nuclear weapons, it is clear, will be around for the foreseeable future. Over the years a good many agreements aimed at reducing the risk of nuclear war have been concluded. Some of them have incorporated a measure of arms control. But they have been limited in scope, and they have not removed the threat of nuclear war. If the risks of nuclear disaster are to be reduced, renewed efforts will be needed to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race. This objective can be achieved only by negotiated and verifiable agreements. And, as has so often been said, primary responsibility for initiating and carrying forward negotiations to this end lies with the nuclear-weapon States.

Earlier this year New Zealand welcomed the announcement that agreement had been reached on SALT II. That treaty is an important milestone in the search for effective measures of nuclear arms control.

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Nevertheless, it will not prevent the development and improvement of existing weapons systems. As a contribution towards nuclear arms control, its promise thus lies in the future, in the positive outcome of talks still to be held and treaties yet to be signed.

Among other negotiations under way but not yet concluded are those on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, a matter to which we have always attached the greatest importance. For several years my delegation has taken an active part in preparing and sponsoring resolutions which have called for the speedy conclusion of negotiations between those three nuclear-weapon States which, in the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty, as in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, pledged themselves to seek "to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions for all time" and to continue negotiations to that end. It was with great satisfaction that we learned of the initiation of trilateral negotiations on this issue in 1977. It has been with no less profound disappointment that we have seen that the expectations of the General Assembly, as recorded in resolutions 32/78 and 33/60, both of them supported by the three negotiating States and by the overwhelming majority of Member States, have not been fulfilled.

We do not doubt that there have been good reasons for the delay in the submission by the negotiating States of their joint proposals for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We realize, too, that the negotiating process tends to be slow and time-consuming. We accept that the issues are complex and that the outstanding difficulties may not admit of easy solution. Nevertheless, given that the Second Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference is scheduled for the latter part of next year, we believe that positive action towards the conclusion of such a treaty in 1980 is of especial importance. In this respect we have considerable sympathy with the approach proposed by the representative of Nigeria. We urge the negotiating States to co-operate with the Committee on Disarmament in efforts to make progress on a comprehensive test-ban treaty before the Review Conference begins.

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There is in our view no subject to which at this time higher priority should be accorded. Tests are still being conducted, including some in the South Pacific, and, as several delegations have observed, the number of weapons tests carried out has in recent years increased. But it is not only for this reason that we consider that tests should be halted. A comprehensive test-ban treaty also has an important contribution to make in restraining vertical proliferation as well as in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. These are objectives that are shared, we hope, by all Member States. And in this context there is, it seems to us, a curious inconsistency in the major nuclear-weapon States' seeking to persuade other States that nuclear weapons are unnecessary and undesirable while they themselves continue their test programmes.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty has received wide though not, unfortunately, unanimous support. It is clear that the spread of nuclear weapons is not in anyone's interests. Whatever defects it may have, the Treaty is the only comprehensive non-proliferation instrument available to the international community. There clearly are ways in which it can be strengthened and made more effective. Among additional measures that could be taken to strengthen the non-proliferation régime, two have been under consideration by the Committee on Disarmament during the year.

The first of these, which was referred to in the Final Document, is an agreement prohibiting the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and other explosive devices. We urge the Committee on Disarmament to keep this matter, including the question of the verification of such an agreement, under review.



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Of perhaps more immediate relevance to the objective of non-proliferation is the question of negative security assurances. There will clearly be difficulties in reconciling the several unilateral declarations of intent not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. We believe nevertheless that the attempt must be made. We urge the Committee on Disarmament to continue its negotiations in order to reach a common formula having internationally binding force.

I should like to make a brief comment on the involvement of the Committee on Disarmament in the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In the Final Document it is emphasized that all States have a duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament and a right to participate in disarmament negotiations. If the comprehensive test-ban treaty is to be multilateral, as it must be if it is to be fully effective, then the Committee on Disarmament clearly has a role to play in its negotiation. Similarly, if verification is to be multilateral, as we believe it must be, then all States parties should be entitled to take part in the international system for verification being developed by the Ad Hoc Group of seismic experts. In the latter connexion, New Zealand is playing its part in developing the seismic verification system. As we are not members of the Committee on Disarmament, we shall not, as a matter of course, be able to take part in negotiations. Nor, at present, is the Committee on Disarmament directly involved. In the circumstances, given the primary responsibility of the three negotiating nuclear-weapon States, this is to be expected. But the Committee has responsibilities to the international community. We see one of those responsibilities being that it should contribute as effectively as it can to helping ensure the success of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. It cannot do that, however, without the co-operation of the negotiating nuclear-weapon States.

Though it is right for the Assembly to concentrate on nuclear disarmament as a first priority, we cannot afford to ignore the issue and implications of the spread of conventional weaponry and the expansion of conventional forces in many parts of the world. The expenditure incurred is often a heavy economic burden which for many countries requires the diversion of scarce resources from

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other priority tasks. All States are, of course, entitled to maintain armed forces for their defence. In many cases arms transfers meet legitimate security needs and may in some areas be a factor in restraining conflict. In others, however, the effect is to increase the potential for conflict. We believe there is a need for greater concentration by this Organization on the scope for conventional arms control in all its aspects. It is a complex and sensitive area, and none of us would minimize the difficulties that would be involved, but we consider that a start should be made.

Mr. EGEBJERG (Denmark): The disarmament process cannot be measured by clock and by calendar. Nevertheless, some recurring features of the process will be still more noticeable in the future because, following the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held 18 months ago, the international disarmament machinery was partly reactivated and partly changed. Between the last session of this Committee and now, the new bodies of the reformed and reactivated disarmament machinery have been convened for the first time, and a cycle of deliberations and negotiations has been established which is likely to recur year after year.

The first report to the General Assembly of the Committee on Disarmament is now before us. The Danish delegation would like to pay a tribute to our colleagues from Geneva for their strenuous and conscientious efforts which gathered in the first harvest of the new Committee on Disarmament. It was an encouraging early outcome of the session that the Committee agreed on its rules of procedure as well as on the contents of a detailed programme of work, not only for its first session but, given the necessarily protracted character of disarmament negotiations, also for years to come. In doing so the Committee on Disarmament has established its work on a consistent basis according to agreed priorities. Even though a decisive breakthrough has not been achieved on any of the substantive agenda items during the first session, it is nevertheless encouraging that the Committee did not stop short of initiating a thorough exchange of views on various aspects of its programme of work. Experience has shown that certain difficulties must be overcome before the Committee can proceed to a conclusive stage of negotiations on any subject

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on the agenda. A certain flexibility in choosing methods of work might be more conducive to substantial results than a rigid approach based on precedents. This was borne out during the first session of the Committee on Disarmament. Even though many high hopes were disappointed during the first session, it is a fact that work has been progressing both on negative security assurances and on chemical weapons, where different but flexible methods of work were applied.

In another development, the first substantive session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission took place this year. Denmark played an active part during the deliberations of the Commission and intends to continue doing so during forthcoming sessions. The outcome of its first substantive session was encouraging because the principle of consensus was maintained as the basis of its recommendations. In spite of difficulties encountered, the Commission succeeded in fulfilling one of the tasks explicitly entrusted to it under the Final Document of the special session, that of elaborating the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. These elements were agreed by consensus and will now form part of the basis for negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on this subject, if the General Assembly so decides after having reviewed the report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Credit for the constructive outcome of the first substantive session is largely due to the untiring efforts of the Chairman of the Commission, Mr. Vellodi of India.

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When assessing the results of this first substantive session of the Commission we must not overlook the fact that, under its terms of reference as stated in the Final Document, the United Nations Disarmament Commission is a deliberative body. As such, it must, inter alia, consider and make recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and follow up the relevant decisions and recommendations of the first special session of the Assembly devoted to disarmament. It is still far from clear how the framework thus established for the work of the Commission can best be utilized. On previous occasions the Danish delegation has expressed the view that the United Nations Disarmament Commission should focus on a few specific issues which have high priority on the international disarmament agenda. If we look ahead in the disarmament calendar for the next few years, some specific issues of this kind immediately come to mind.

We are approaching the next special session of the General Assembly to be devoted to disarmament, which is to be held in 1982. Preparation for that important event could be part of the work of the session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in 1981. One specific subject that might already be taken up next year is the question of conventional disarmament, to which I shall revert presently. In order to play its full part within the division of labour in the international disarmament process, the United Nations Disarmament Commission could also at some stage take up other specific well-defined issues. For instance, the Commission might base its deliberations on one or more of the United Nations studies already under way.

In spite of the improved deliberative and negotiating machinery now operating within the disarmament field, substantial progress in real disarmament negotiations has been scarce since the First Committee last had the opportunity to take stock of developments within the disarmament field. We still face a situation in which a general military clash between the great Powers would be tantamount to the collective suicide of mankind. Against this sombre background, the main strategic preoccupation of all parties concerned should be to avoid war - not only a major war, but also local conflicts that may too easily escalate into a major war. In the nuclear perspective, there is a common interest in arriving at tacit or formal agreements aimed at reducing the risk of conflict. It is also generally recognized that the short-

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term objective of international disarmament negotiations is to achieve enhanced security at a lower arms level.

In his statement in the general debate of the plenary Assembly, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ireland, speaking on behalf of the nine States members of the European Community, welcomed the SALT II agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. He expressed the hope that the agreement would give a new impetus to the process of détente and make a positive contribution to the atmosphere in which international disarmament negotiations are pursued. The Danish Government has repeatedly stated the same view and expressed the hope that the SALT II agreement will be ratified by both countries in the near future and followed up by renewed negotiations - that is, SALT III - aimed at further limitations and significant reductions of nuclear arsenals. We also look forward to the speedy conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests.

The continuing world-wide arms race is fraught with such dangers and has such grave implications for world resources that it imposes not only on the great Powers but on all countries of the world a responsibility to contribute to the international disarmament effort.

In the view of the Danish delegation, this is particularly true in the field of nuclear disarmament. All the countries of the world share the responsibility for containing the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is the most important multilateral arms-control agreement so far, in our view remains the most effective instrument against the danger of proliferation. The continuing significance of the Treaty is underlined by the recently increased adherence to it. Denmark is firmly committed to the purposes and principles of the Treaty. It is our strongly held hope that no non-nuclear weapon State will endeavour to develop or otherwise to acquire nuclear-explosive capability. The achievement of such capability by any additional State would mean that a decisive threshold had been crossed and would immensely aggravate the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Next year the grave problems of the spread to additional States of the political control of nuclear weapons will come up for deliberation at the Second Review Conference of the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The two first sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference were held in Geneva this summer in a constructive atmosphere, which augurs well for the Conference proper. It is,

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however, well known that criticism has been voiced by many countries about certain elements in the implementation of the Treaty. In the view of the Danish delegation, the Conference should give full emphasis to the right of States to develop their peaceful non-explosive nuclear programmes under appropriate safeguards. The same applies to the right of States to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The continued exercise of these rights would, however, become more difficult if any additional State or States should acquire nuclear explosives. Accordingly, the implementation of all elements of the Treaty should be seen in the context of the overriding importance of the fundamental goal: to halt a further spread of nuclear weapons.

This serious dilemma is one aspect of the wider problem of political control in view of technological developments in the military field. Another aspect will be considered by yet another important Review Conference next year: that on the Convention prohibiting biological (bacteriological) weapons.

Still further aspects of the problem are currently being dealt with in the context of the prohibition of chemical weapons, both in the bilateral negotiations in Geneva and in the Committee on Disarmament. It is a matter of the greatest urgency to reach agreement on a complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. This is an issue of direct interest to a very large number of countries, to members of the Committee on Disarmament and to non-members alike. Even though not a member of the Committee on Disarmament, Denmark made a contribution to the work of the Committee this year by stating its views on a convention prohibiting chemical weapons, thus utilizing the possibility accorded to States not members of the Committee to participate in its work.

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We recognize the overriding importance of the bilateral negotiations on chemical weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union, but we believe that it should be possible at this stage to identify certain aspects on which discussion in the Committee on Disarmament might usefully focus. This need not unduly complicate the bilateral negotiations. The initiative taken by the Netherlands in the Committee on Disarmament, in identifying various problems in a questionnaire, is a constructive effort which should lead to renewed progress in this field.

There is great merit in the carrying out of joint, informal discussions between diplomats, scientists and military experts, as was recently demonstrated by the chemical workshop visits to the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom. It is the view of the Danish delegation that further contacts and meetings of this kind should be encouraged, since they may not only add to a clarification and broader understanding of the many complex problems involved in establishing a convention on chemical weapons, but also point to practical approaches to the solution of these problems.

It would lead us too far if we were to go into more particulars on this matter, but one aspect mentioned in the Danish statement in the Committee on Disarmament could bear repetition. It is the scope of a chemical weapons convention. Chemical warfare agents not covered in a convention might prove attractive for inclusion in what one might call a permissible chemical inventory. It is therefore essential that a ban on chemical weapons should be as comprehensive and well defined as possible. It should include the military use of herbicides and defoliants - in the case of defoliants not only because of their immediate effect on the battlefield, but also because of their possibly prolonged, and at present unknown, distant ecological effect on man, animals and soil.

There is a close interrelationship between all aspects of the arms race. Accordingly, disarmament measures, both in the nuclear and in the conventional field, should go hand in hand. For some time, the Danish Government has emphasized the need for disarmament problems not now being negotiated to be taken up in an appropriate forum. In accordance with a Danish suggestion, the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission earlier this year, contain the following reference:

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"The international disarmament machinery should ensure that all disarmament issues are being dealt with in an appropriate context." (A/34/42, para. 16)

A particularly important subject which needs closer attention is the question of the world-wide build-up of conventional weapons. In the view of the Danish Government, this question, in some form or another, should be placed on the agenda of the international disarmament debate. The efforts to halt the arms race must cover all weapons, including conventional weapons which - as is well known - account for more than 80 per cent of the world's total military expenditure. Growing concern at the build-up of conventional weapons was reflected in the Final Document of the special session devoted to disarmament. In paragraph 81 of the Final Document, it is stated that:

"Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament." (General Assembly resolution S-10/2, p.17)

Paragraph 85 of the Final Document refers to the possibility of bilateral, regional and multilateral consultations on various aspects of conventional weapons.

There are obvious reasons for the growing concern over the world-wide build-up of conventional weapons. Whereas nuclear weapons have not been used since the Second World War, we have witnessed since then a great number of conflicts in which conventional weapons have been employed. At the same time, transfers of conventional weapons have increased considerably.

Recognizing the importance of the problem of conventional weapons, the Danish delegation believes that the consideration of the conventional arms race, including international arms transfers, could now usefully be undertaken within the framework of the United Nations. The appropriate body for the initial consideration of this problem would appear to be the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and the Danish delegation would favour the inclusion in the agenda of the forthcoming second substantive session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission of an item concerning the consideration of the conventional arms race.



(Mr. Egebjerg, Denmark)

It may be hoped that this would make it possible to identify ways and means of dealing with this important aspect of the arms race within the machinery of the United Nations.

Mr. MARINESCU (Romania) (interpretation from French): At the beginning of the general debate in the First Committee, the Romanian delegation emphasized the particular urgency for the initiation of an effective process of disarmament that it attaches to the adoption of determined measures designed to bring a halt to the arms race. The facts prove that we can make little progress in disarmament without putting an end to the quantitative accumulation and continual improvement of weapons - both conventional and nuclear - and to the stockpiling of increasingly powerful destructive weapons. Many delegates, in statements in the First Committee and the General Assembly, have expressed their concern at the constant growth in military expenditures and at the serious economic and social consequences and the danger to mankind inherent in the enormous world military budget that has risen to more than \$400 billion. The conviction has often been expressed that the balance necessary to ensure the security of all States cannot be achieved by an escalation of the arms race and the stockpiling of weapons, but that, on the contrary, it must be realized through disarmament measures, particularly measures of nuclear disarmament, under effective international control.

Today, I should like to make a few additional comments on a matter we believe to have priority among the practical measures designed to put an end to the arms race, namely, the freezing and reduction of military budgets.

The level of military expenditures throughout the world is especially alarming owing to its magnitude, to its rate of growth and to the many negative consequences of such expenditures. At a time when there are no large-scale armed conflicts, the rate of growth in military budgets shows that the escalation of weapons expenditure has become uncontrolled. While encouraging the accumulation of an enormous destructive potential that is a serious threat to human civilization, military budgets represent an onerous daily burden on the economy of every country and on the world economy as a whole.

(Mr. Marinescu, Romania)

Military expenditures are destructive in themselves, even if the arms they purchase are not used. Military expenditures stand in the way of economic and social growth and the development of economic co-operation among States, while at the same time they hinder efforts to eliminate underdevelopment and to solve other major problems on which the very future of mankind hinges. Thus material, technical, energy and human resources essential to the development of all countries, particularly the developing ones become diverted to non-productive purposes.

Furthermore, military expenditures endanger world peace and security and encourage the resort to the threat or use of force in relations among States. It is unconscionable and inhuman that more than \$425 billion a year are squandered for military purposes, while a major portion of the world's population is suffering serious economic underdevelopment. It is sadly significant, in this regard, that world military expenditures last year, according to recently published information, rose to \$92 per capita, while expenditures under the humanitarian programmes of the United Nations amounted to barely 57 cents per capita.

As is generally known, the question of the limitation of military budgets has, over the years, been the subject of many debates, proposals and initiatives. But despite those initiatives and the efforts of many States, neither negotiations nor more thorough debates on these matters have been undertaken on a freezing and reduction of military budgets, even though, with the encouragement of research and the constant technological improvements made by the major military Powers, military expenses have been on the rise.

As a European country, we cannot overlook the fact that it is our continent that has the heaviest concentrations of armaments and troops, concentrations that absorb the greatest portion of the funds allocated to military purposes all over the world.

I have stressed this state of affairs to bring out the fact that the specific action taken so far falls far short of what is required by the gravity of the situation. Hence the freezing of military budgets and their subsequent gradual reduction has become an imperative task.

(Mr. Marinescu, Romania)

The report submitted by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in 1977 entitled "Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security" stressed that:

"/a/ major task of immediate urgency is to bring about substantial reductions in the military budgets of all countries, and particularly of those whose military budgets are the highest. All countries share responsibility for taking prompt steps in this direction." (A/32/88, para. 181)

The Programme of Action adopted at the end of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament, also stressed that:

"Gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage points, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would be a measure that would contribute to the curbing of the arms race and would increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries" (General Assembly resolution S-10/2, para. 89)

To that end,

"The General Assembly should continue to consider what concrete steps should be taken to facilitate the reduction of military budgets". (ibid., para. 90)

At its thirty-third session the General Assembly adopted resolution 33/67, which:

"Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of an ad hoc panel of experienced practitioners in the field of military budgeting:

"(a) To carry out a practical test of the proposed reporting instrument with the voluntary co-operation of States from different regions and representing different budgeting and accounting systems".

We attach great importance to the successive studies made by groups of experts, including experts from my own country, on the many technical aspects of military budgets.

(Mr. Marinescu, Romania)

At the same time, we feel that the question of the freezing and reduction of military budgets must remain among the active political concerns of all States, particularly the most powerfully armed, as well as of international deliberative and negotiating bodies.

The inclusion of this item among the urgent, priority questions of disarmament is amply justified by the advantages that would result from its consideration. Thus, for example, regardless of how it is accomplished, the freezing and subsequent reduction of military budgets depends to a greater extent than other disarmament measures on the political will of States; it would represent immediate economic relief for peoples; it would speed up the economic and social progress of all States, while supporting the efforts of the developing countries; it would stimulate and strengthen confidence among States and improve the international climate. It would also open the way to political decisions in other fields of disarmament.

It would undoubtedly be of great importance to international peace and security if the freezing and subsequent reduction of military budgets were to begin with those States that possess the largest military arsenals and allocate the greatest amount of money to armaments.

For its part, Romania has striven, both within the United Nations and in other international bodies, to ensure the adoption of concrete measures to this end.

In the course of the special session devoted to disarmament, my country proposed that all participating States should agree to the freezing of military expenditures and levels of armed forces and armaments at the 1978 base level and undertake, as of 1979, to proceed to their gradual reduction.

After the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, Romania spoke out in favour of halting the escalation of military expenditures and of taking a first resolute step towards stemming the arms race. That was also the purpose of the appeal addressed on 1 December 1978 by the Grand National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Romania to all Parliaments and Governments of the world, when it drew their attention to the proposal to freeze military expenditures, troops and weaponry at that year's level as a first step in the transition to a longer range, more extensive programme for disarmament and a progressive winding down of the arms race.

(Mr. Marinescu, Romania)

Bearing in mind the proposals made and the action undertaken so far in the matter of reducing military budgets, Romania, together with the delegations of other States, will present in the course of the present session of the General Assembly a draft resolution aimed at encouraging the beginning of a process of freezing and reducing military budgets. My country intends to contribute in this way to the application of some of the basic provisions in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, on disarmament. In our view, the progressive reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis could be expressed either in absolute figures or in terms of percentage and, regardless of the form decided upon, should give priority to the reduction of the military budgets of the heavily armed States.

Obviously, in the course of this process of reducing military budgets, any measure that might modify the military balance to the detriment of the national security of one country or another must be avoided.

It is appropriate to recall also that by saving the funds now being squandered on means of destruction we would be able to channel extra resources to economic and social development, for the benefit of the developing countries in particular.

We believe that it is imperative that the General Assembly reaffirm without any ambiguity the vital need for each State and every international body to redouble their efforts to give a new impetus to efforts to implement the provisions of the Final Document of the special session regarding the freezing and reduction of military expenditures. The Romanian delegation believes that the United Nations Commission on Disarmament, in which, as the Committee knows, all States participate, should be asked to work from 1980 onwards on identifying ways and means of adopting practical measures to arrive at an agreement on the freezing of military budgets and on their progressive reduction by significant amounts.

(Mr. Marinescu, Romania)

The matter to which we refer depends above all on the political will of all States, and this obviously applies particularly to the political will of the powerfully armed States. The Romanian delegation considers that it would be useful for the General Assembly to appeal for that political will to ask that States work towards limiting their own military expenditures within the framework of the policy of reciprocity pending the conclusion of a general negotiated agreement on the freezing and reduction of military budgets.

In proposing the initiative which I have just mentioned to the present session of the General Assembly the Romanian delegation feels that it is encouraging the setting in motion of a process vitally necessary to international life. We venture to hope that our proposals, which serve the cause of disarmament, will be welcomed sympathetically and will enjoy the necessary support.

Mr. CAMPS (Uruguay) (interpretation from Spanish): The item before us is one which causes the greatest concern to the nations and peoples of the world.

Given the interdependence of nations, the process of disarmament affects us all. Thus, solidarity in this case is no longer a choice; it has become a need, and an imperative one, that we all participate actively.

To meet this responsibility we have today asked to speak in the debate in this matter. When, in 1969, the General Assembly proclaimed the 1970s as the Disarmament Decade it created the hope and the illusion that in the course of that Decade the aspirations to disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field, that had existed since the end of the Second World War would finally be realized.

That hope was generated not only by a desire to strengthen the maintenance of international peace and security but also by the need to ensure the very survival of mankind, which is threatened with extinction in the event of an outbreak of nuclear warfare.

(Mr. Camps, Uruguay)

Furthermore, since peace, security and economic and social development are indivisible, the Disarmament Decade enhanced the hopes of many peoples of the world that the 1980s would begin with a new and better prospect of a more just world in which no State would ignore the fate of others and the resources now used to increase the formidable accumulation of nuclear and conventional weapons would be devoted instead to the achievement of development goals and the solution of other basic problems that now face mankind.

Today, with the Disarmament Decade almost ended, we must assess what has been done and consider the urgent measures that must be adopted. Unfortunately it must be noted that not only have the objectives which the General Assembly set for itself in 1969 not been achieved, but, on the contrary, the arms race has speeded up considerably.

That is the bitter conclusion that was reached at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, which was devoted to disarmament, and it is equally true that during the same period the sufferings of the peoples of the world, particularly in the developing countries, also increased appreciably.

At the same time, we note that we are still far from any possibility of achieving the real understanding that would offer the likelihood of agreement, within a reasonable period of time, on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

However, we must say that we optimistically support and welcome the steps that have been taken towards achieving détente in international relations. We refer specifically to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the President of the United States, Jimmy Carter, and the President of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, which led to the signing of the treaty on the limitation of offensive strategic weapons. We venture to hope that very soon the instruments of ratification will be deposited.

Furthermore, we are hopeful that the questions relating to SALT III will be settled speedily, and that both parties will be ready to comply with the Joint Communiqué of 18 June 1979, which implies that positive intention.

(Mr. Camps, Uruguay)

We welcome the terms of that Communiqué as containing positive elements, including the following: (a) the statement by each of the parties that it

"is not striving and will not strive for military superiority"

(A/34/414, annex) -

we would have preferred that in addition to this manifestation of the intention to end the arms race they had expressed the intention of reversing it; (b) the clear proposal for co-operation with the United Kingdom to conclude the preparation of an international treaty totally prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests - my country hopes that that goal can soon be reached; (c) the joint determination to prepare a proposal for submission to the Committee on Disarmament to ensure the general, complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons; (d) the announcement confirming that they have reached a bilateral agreement on the main elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons to be submitted to the Committee on Disarmament; and (e) their interest in a just, general and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Unfortunately, a series of objectives that the General Assembly had set for the Disarmament Decade were omitted from the Joint Declaration.



(Mr. Camps, Uruguay)

We also note that no mention whatever is made of the relationship that exists between disarmament and development, nor of the inalienable right of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful use of nuclear energy for economic and social purposes in accordance with their own priorities, interests and needs as well as the right to have access to the technology, equipment and materials needed and to be free to acquire them for those ends.

My country shares the views expressed in resolution S-10/2 of the special session on disarmament. We understand that its terms reflect the aspirations of all States, and thus of all the inhabitants of the world. However, the basic element is missing. I refer to the political will of States, basically the nuclear-weapon States, to implement the plans outlined so that the desired aim of general and complete disarmament can be achieved. We view as a judicious move the revitalization of the disarmament machinery by setting up different bodies for deliberation and negotiation. We feel that this will lead to greater effectiveness.

The recommendations of the Disarmament Commission as a subsidiary deliberative body of the General Assembly, composed of all States Members of the United Nations will allow that body to set guidelines for the negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament. The Committee on Disarmament, composed of a limited number of members, namely the nuclear-weapon States and 35 other elected members, will be responsible for finding a method that will lead finally to general and complete disarmament. The peoples of the world await the results that will emerge from the discussions in that body and they will be able to discern the honest intentions of States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States.

With regard to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America - the Tlatelolco Treaty - we hope that in the not too distant future all States in that region will accede to it because of its direct link with nuclear disarmament. Equally, and for the same reasons, we trust that very soon the additional protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco applicable to those States which have not yet ratified it will enter into force.

(Mr. Camps, Uruguay)

My country strongly supports the establishment of nuclear-free zones in other parts of the world, convinced as we are that by so doing we shall contribute to the objectives of disarmament since this would guarantee the total absence of such weapons at least in the zones concerned.

In conclusion, I wish to express the view that my country will support all resolutions which, drawing inspiration from the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and fitting within the framework of that document, will ensure the implementation of effective disarmament and limitation of armament measures as well as of those that will lead to a slowing down of the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, so that we may make a determined effort to achieve progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The CHAIRMAN: I wish to make the first in a series of appeals to representatives to submit draft resolutions as early as possible.

A statement on the proposed plan for the second phase of our deliberations will be made at a later date.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.