



CONTENTS

	Page
Agenda item 21: Question of Cyprus: report of the Secretary-General (continued).....	1337

President: Mr. Salim Ahmed SALIM
(United Republic of Tanzania)

AGENDA ITEM 21

Question of Cyprus: Report of the Secretary-General
(continued)

1. Mr. GAUCI (Malta): It is indeed a reluctant admission of abnormality in this Assembly when we can derive some comfort from the fact that Cyprus is not at present still bleeding profusely from the wounds inflicted on it by the foreign armed intervention that took place in 1974. But we must equally recognize that the wounds have not healed, that the pain has not ceased.
2. That otherwise tranquil Mediterranean island still sheds tears of bitter frustration over its unacceptable predicament and in its hour of need still calls to this Assembly for assistance in its attempt to embark on a new start in freedom, reversing the effects of its unhappy past. For six years now the Government and people of Cyprus have shown remarkable restraint and patient persistence in their search for progress. It is in this Organization that they maintain their faith and their hope, as we were reminded by the Foreign Minister of Cyprus in his statement of last week [68th meeting].
3. As a sister island in the Mediterranean, Malta has always responded to their call for solidarity to the fullest extent of our modest capability, and we intend to continue to do so in every forum open to us.
4. Even if we criticize any ill-advised actions of the past, countries with which we maintain excellent relations will appreciate that our motivation is simply to restore to Cyprus that which is the fundamental right of any nation—*independence, unity, economic progress and peace*—and to bring about rapprochement among the island's neighbours.
5. Because peace in Cyprus is not the right of the Cypriot people of both ethnic communities in the island alone; peace will convey equal benefit to the island's immediate neighbours. It is essential for the Mediterranean if regional co-operation is to develop through the process envisaged by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.¹ Otherwise, that much-

¹ The Final Act of the Conference was signed at Helsinki on 1 August 1975.

vaunted process will prove but a mirage, a futile exercise in wishful thinking.

6. The delegation of Malta has stated its comprehensive views on this question in the past. Today we seek only to assess the progress, or more precisely the lack of progress, that has been recorded over the past 12 months since we last discussed the matter. To us here in this Assembly the intervening period merely represents a passage of time. To the people of Cyprus it is a year of continued agony, of legitimate aspiration denied, of families divided, of relatives untraced, of division being visibly enforced.

7. In our review last year we urged that the two communities in Cyprus should make a serious attempt to look towards a better future rather than hark back to the bitter past. We renew that fervent appeal today. It is an essential first step. We also stressed that outside Powers involved in the Cypriot question were in duty bound in their own interests to ease tension rather than inflame old passions. In particular, foreign troops illegally on the island were to be withdrawn and forced demographic changes discontinued. A tiny island would obviously have its economic future jeopardized if freedom of movement for all its inhabitants were to be curtailed. A start was overdue in alleviating the hardship of the refugees uprooted as a result of the fighting.

8. It is greatly to be regretted that none of these essential steps has been fully carried out. They remain essential, and have therefore become all the more urgent. In this Assembly we have to evaluate the situation and make appropriate recommendations.

9. Despite the Secretary-General's consistent and dedicated efforts, his report shows starkly the deplorable lack of progress. Too often in the report we read phrases such as "no meeting of minds had been achieved", or "no agreement could be reached". Perhaps most indicative of all, in the final analysis, he says,

"... this opportunity, like so many others before, was not fully seized and great difficulties have been encountered in sustaining the momentum that had been created" [A/34/620 and Corr. 1, para. 29].

10. It is a great pity indeed that intransigence frustrates progress while people suffer. It is an even greater pity that intransigence, which only breeds further animosity, is officially encouraged from outside the island. The attitude towards the United Nations expressed in the letter of 14 November, reproduced in document A/34/683, is greatly to be regretted.

11. Nevertheless, the hope of progress persists. The good offices of the Secretary-General remain available. The fundamental principles laid down by the resolutions of the United Nations remain the essential guide. The

powers of the Security Council are still there to be utilized if necessary. Certainly the present situation cannot be projected into the indefinite future; the need for change is recognized by all.

12. From my attempts to understand the evolution of the Cypriot question, I believe that there is in the mind of the Turkish Cypriot community one major underlying obstacle to progress. That has been and still is, as they argue, the concern of the Turkish Cypriot minority regarding the full protection of their rights. This genuine concern led in the past to Cyprus inheriting a complicated Constitution, which was often described by constitutional lawyers as unworkable. As a result, occasionally the constitutional provisions were bypassed, and that naturally gave rise to increased apprehension. Cumulative events subsequently took place which led to armed foreign intervention. And the aftermath of suspicion lingers on, generously fed by heated statements that are often taken out of context and that further inflame the mutual suspicions of the two communities.

13. But once this factor is recognized and taken into account, and provided there are no other ulterior motives, a solution should not prove unattainable. It certainly cannot be claimed that it is beyond human ingenuity to devise a workable constitution that would protect the rights of minorities and at the same time provide the guarantees necessary not only for the protection of those rights but also for the permanence of the independence of Cyprus. If this major obstacle to progress were resolved, negotiations on other areas would lead to a rapid result. The United Nations should continue to play a positive role in this regard.

14. If, on the other hand, attempts persist to bring about a permanent, artificial division of the island under the shadow of bayonets and through forced demographic changes against the wishes of the majority, then of course tension will prevail, with potentially very alarming consequences for the island and for its neighbours, now and in the future.

15. In this Assembly we must not allow divergence on a few points—however difficult to resolve—to obscure the existence of a large area of common interest. It is evident that economic prosperity will be severely retarded if uncertainty continues to prevail for long, and the relations between the two communities and between the neighbouring Powers cannot progress in an atmosphere of confrontation.

16. Neither the indigenous population of the island nor the international community itself can accept an artificial solution imposed through armed intervention. The valid basis for the solution of Cyprus has been spelt out by the General Assembly and endorsed by the Security Council on several occasions since 1974. Mandatory resolutions of the Security Council have to be implemented.

17. Since we have been unable to register the desired progress so far with the methods we have used, we must search for new avenues to encourage results. In the first place, the mandate of the Secretary-General should be endorsed, strengthened and given the fullest backing of the Security Council and the General Assembly. The possibilities of fact-finding commissions or of independent good offices could be considered as complementary efforts to assist the Secretary-General. A special United Nations representative, acceptable to

both sides, could be appointed to consider mutually acceptable guarantees of human rights for every single member of the community, so as to assuage the preoccupations of minorities. But certainly further delay should not be condoned.

18. The most effective contribution towards a solution of the deadlock would be a spontaneous, generous gesture from the parties to the issue. One has already been made by the President of Cyprus in his offer to demilitarize the island.² That offer deserves to be encouraged, for its potential is very significant, both internally and externally. If only that offer could be matched by humanitarian alleviation of the refugee problem and the removal of foreign troops stationed on part of the island, then the stage would be set for really significant progress.

19. Conversely, the more time that passes without forward movement—that is, real movement, not the illusion of movement—the more difficult it will be to find an enduring solution. The people of Cyprus have waited long enough. Their patience is commendable, but it is not permanent.

20. The attitude of the delegation of Malta to the draft resolutions presented will be guided by those general considerations.

21. Mr. FERNANDO (Sri Lanka): As this Assembly is aware, since the tragic events of 1974 affecting the Republic of Cyprus, a group of non-aligned countries at the United Nations have, in a Contact Group, made every effort to negotiate with all the parties concerned and to present a draft resolution for the consideration of the Assembly. That Group has given every consideration to the concerns of the Turkish Cypriot community and its difficulties and has made serious endeavours to accommodate its positions to the maximum possible extent. Sri Lanka has been associated in the endeavours of that Group since 1976.

22. The non-aligned movement, since it became seized of this complex issue, has unequivocally supported the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and non-aligned status of Cyprus; and, at the recently concluded Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, the heads of State, while expressing support for the 10-point agreement reached at Nicosia on 19 May 1979 [*ibid*, annex V], reaffirmed the following:

“The Conference reaffirmed its solidarity with and full support for the people and the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, a founding member of the non-aligned movement, and demanded the immediate implementation of United Nations resolutions on the question of Cyprus, especially resolution 3212 (XXIX), unanimously adopted by the General Assembly and endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 365 (1974).” [A/34/542, annex, sect. 1, para. 197.]

23. The Sixth Conference also deplored the fact that part of Cyprus still remained under foreign occupation and demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign forces and the cessation of all

² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 2nd meeting, para. 145.

foreign interference in the internal affairs of Cyprus [*ibid.*, para. 199]. The Conference further called for the immediate resumption of the talks between the representatives of the two Cypriot communities in a result-oriented manner [*ibid.*, para. 198], in accordance with the 10-point agreement of 19 May 1979. In this connexion, I should like to express the warm appreciation of my delegation for the patient efforts of Secretary-General Waldheim, who has continued to provide his good offices for the negotiations between the representatives of the two communities. It was under his personal auspices in May of this year that, after intensive negotiations, it was possible to finalize the 10-point agreement.

24. Why then, in spite of that agreement and a number of United Nations resolutions, including key resolutions which have been unanimously adopted, does a settlement elude the troubled island of Cyprus? Certainly, the issues involved are very complex and the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions and the 10-point agreement is not a matter that can be achieved overnight. The question of Cyprus has a number of complicated aspects—such as the problem of foreign troops, the question of refugees and missing persons, humanitarian problems, the illegal demographic changes that are being effected in the island, various constitutional aspects, territorial questions and so on.

Mr. Gurinovich (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic), Vice-President, took the Chair.

25. The Secretary-General himself has in his report noted that, despite the considerable advance achieved on 19 May at the Nicosia meeting,

“... this opportunity, like so many others before, was not fully seized and great difficulties have been encountered in sustaining the momentum that had been created.” [*See A/34/620 and Corr. 1, para. 29.*]

26. Without hinting in any way at interference in what is primarily a matter for the two communities—the commencement of negotiations—it is also the duty and responsibility of the international community, represented by the United Nations, to assist, encourage and, if necessary, even give a fillip to a settlement of the entire issue.

27. This item has been on our agenda for too long, with consequent suffering, dislocation and hardship for the people of Cyprus and with grave implications for stability in the Mediterranean area and for international peace and security in general. As a non-aligned country, speaking on behalf of a fellow non-aligned country with which we have the closest ties, Sri Lanka would not like to see outside Powers becoming embroiled in this question.

28. It is a matter of particular concern to us that, each year when it comes to operative paragraphs on the implementation of decisions already taken by the United Nations, this Organization fails to take positive action and the question of Cyprus joins the ranks of other unimplemented resolutions as a testament to the inability of the United Nations to implement its own resolutions.

29. In a sense this calls in question the very credibility of the United Nations as an effective institution stand-

ing for justice, freedom and independence, despite our unstinted faith in the United Nations as the only real forum for the settlement of international issues. We deeply regret that progress in the talks has been stalled. We do not apportion blame to this or that party, but express our dissatisfaction that, by the stalling of the talks, the settlement of the entire issue has also been stalled and foreign forces continue to occupy an independent sovereign nation. We cannot compromise on our position that foreign military intervention should never be the means for the settlement of disputes.

30. Together with the other members of the non-aligned Contact Group, Sri Lanka therefore stresses that our major efforts should be devoted to the implementation of the resolutions that have already been adopted by this Assembly and by the Security Council. In his report, the Secretary-General outlines the efforts made by him towards the implementation of the provisions of Assembly resolutions, including provisions which deal with the withdrawal of foreign troops, changes in the demographic structure, the return of refugees and humanitarian assistance. However, he concludes that:

“Since the readiness of both parties to appoint their representatives as provided in resolution 33/172 has not materialized, I have not been in a position to proceed further with the implementation of that resolution.” [*Ibid.*, para. 26.]

31. Draft resolution A/34/L.40, which will be introduced later today, therefore proposes that, in the event of lack of progress in the negotiations between the two communities by March 1980 on the basis of the 19 May 1979 agreement, an *ad hoc* committee should be set up. We feel that such a committee, maintaining the closest contact with the Secretary-General and co-operating with him at his request, should recommend steps to ensure the implementation of all relevant resolutions of the General Assembly on Cyprus. The precise steps to be taken and the action to be pursued will, of course, be the subject of careful consultations. At this stage I have nothing further to add, but wish to reiterate our unstinted support for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and non-aligned status of Cyprus, ideals which were further amplified as point 8 of the communiqué issued at the conclusion of the high-level meeting held at Nicosia under the auspices of the Secretary-General on 18 and 19 May 1979:

“The independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic should be adequately guaranteed against union in whole or in part with any other country and against any form of partition or secession.” [*Ibid.*, annex V, para. 8.]

32. Mr. JOHANES (Czechoslovakia) (*interpretation from Russian*): Once again this year, unfortunately, we are forced to acknowledge the lack of any substantial progress in the recent past towards settling the question of Cyprus. Despite active diplomatic efforts, the Secretary-General had to note in his report that it had still been impossible to achieve any tangible or encouraging progress in implementing the resolutions of our Organization on this matter.

33. The 10-point agreement of 19 May 1979 is still, for the time being, only on paper, and the approaches of

both communities continue to diverge as a result of lack of understanding. There are still foreign troops on the island, and there is a *de facto* division of the country; tens of thousands of Cypriots are still suffering and find themselves refugees in their own country.

34. The reasons for that situation were elucidated here in the statement by the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Kyprianou, on 1 October this year [15th meeting]. The Czechoslovak delegation listened with great understanding and sympathy to his arguments and to his evaluation of the state of affairs as far as the question of Cyprus is concerned.

35. The tireless efforts which have been made by the Cypriots in order to preserve the independence and unity of their State have aroused the genuine sympathy of the Czechoslovak people, an expression of this being the friendly relations and the growing and comprehensive co-operation between our two countries.

36. Not only at sessions of the General Assembly, but also in the Security Council, the Czechoslovak delegation has had frequent occasion to participate actively in the discussions of the question of Cyprus and to expound its position. The question of Cyprus is, in our view, an acute international issue, the solution of which would not only serve the interests of the people of Cyprus but would also be an important stabilizing factor for the entire eastern Mediterranean area, and would help to strengthen in that important area of Europe the principles of peaceful coexistence as contained in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. It is our belief that the resolutions of both the General Assembly and the Security Council on the question of Cyprus contain all the necessary elements for a just and final settlement of this question, because they provide for full respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and the non-aligned policy of the Republic of Cyprus. The resolutions also stipulate the need for the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from the island and also the cessation of any outside interference in Cypriot affairs. As far as the question of the state unity of the Republic of Cyprus is concerned, the resolutions of the United Nations do not allow of any ambiguity in their interpretation.

37. We continue to hold the view that the only reliable way to bring about a durable political settlement of the conflict is by re-establishing a spirit of mutual trust and fruitful co-operation between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. As history has abundantly shown, it is they alone who are to live together on their beautiful island. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic continues to believe not only in the possibility, but indeed in the necessity, of continuing efforts to bring about a just and viable solution acceptable to both national communities.

38. The intercommunal dialogue should be based on judicious respect for the interests and rights of both parties. The talks, of which so much has been said here at the United Nations, can however, achieve constructive and realistic results only if both parties to those talks endeavour to reach the common goal of maintaining a single Cypriot State and of overcoming the obstacles which are now being put in their path by foreign interests.

39. In this connexion, I wish to recall that it was only

last year that certain outside forces, which, incidentally, at one time might have been able to avert the sorry plight of the Cypriot people, tried to circumvent the acknowledged principles for the settlement of disputes as stipulated in United Nations resolutions. In order to achieve their military and political aims, they are trying to impose on Cyprus the kind of decision that would convert the island into a military and strategic base for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO].

40. In the light of this, we share the opinion expressed by the majority of the Members of our Organization, which approved the decision made by the President of Cyprus that Cyprus should be completely demilitarized and disarmed. There can be no doubt that the demilitarization of Cyprus, which would include, together with the withdrawal of all foreign troops, the removal of those obvious vestiges of colonialism — military bases — would serve the interests not only of the people of Cyprus but of the entire region. It is quite obvious that such a proposal should occupy a very important place among those basic and fundamental prerequisites for a settlement of the question of Cyprus.

41. This year, when so much has been said about the need for overcoming the deadlock on the question of Cyprus, we should once again like to emphasize the timeliness of the well-known proposal made by the Soviet Union, and supported by Cyprus,³ that the problem of Cyprus should be considered at a representative international conference under the aegis of the United Nations and on the basis of the resolutions it has adopted. We have always felt and continue to believe that such a conference would help in finding ways and means of bringing about a just solution of the problem [*Ibid.*, para. 47]. We also listened very carefully to the proposal made by the representative of Cyprus that committee should be set up on the question of Cyprus.

42. In conclusion, the Czechoslovak delegation would like to express the hope that the ongoing efforts of our Organization will finally lead to a speedy and peaceful settlement of the question of Cyprus in the interests of its people, security in the eastern Mediterranean and international détente. We are prepared to continue to do everything we can to help this to come about.

43. Mr. ERALP (Turkey): The Cyprus question, which was taken up for the first time by the United Nations General Assembly at its ninth session, in 1954, has today reached a stage where the common desire and purpose of the overwhelming majority of the international community is to encourage an early solution to the problem through intercommunal talks based on the fundamental and legitimate rights of the two Cypriot communities within the framework of the Denktas-Makarios and Denktas-Kyprianou agreements. That in fact is the unanimous or near-unanimous conclusion that emerges from the statements made earlier in the general debate. Equally, this session's general debate once again revealed the fact that the process of intercommunal talks on an equal footing under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations was endorsed by a very important cross-section of the world community as the only sound and viable means of achieving a just and lasting solution of the Cyprus problem.

³ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-ninth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1974, document S/11465.*

44. We are gratified to note that the Secretary-General, who has been entrusted with the mission of good offices, has also time and again stressed the indispensable and irreplaceable role of the intercommunal talks in the search for a peaceful settlement. For instance, the Secretary-General underlined this point in his report to the Security Council in May 1978 by stating:

“As regards the procedural aspects, there may in fact be no alternative to the negotiations between the representatives of the two communities.”⁴

45. In his latest report to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General states:

“There is no alternative to a concrete and effective negotiating process if a mutually acceptable, just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem is to be achieved.” [A/34/620 and Corr. 1, para. 33.]

46. In the light of the overriding view that emerged from the general debate, as well as from the statements so far made on the question of Cyprus, it was to be expected that any draft resolution would, first and foremost, lay stress on the intercommunal negotiating process and the good offices of the Secretary-General and be free from elements that would hamper efforts of the Secretary-General to promote the negotiating process between the two communities. I am compelled, at this stage, to note the fact that the draft resolution that is now before us falls significantly short of meeting the primary concern of the international community in relation to the Cyprus question. It contains elements which are parts of resolutions or declarations adopted in various international forums where the Turkish Cypriot side was either not represented or not given a chance to be heard. It overlooks the fact that what is primarily needed today is the active encouragement of the two communities by the General Assembly to build on the breakthroughs already achieved at the Denktaş-Makarios and Denktaş-Kyprianou summit meetings. Provisions that would lead to the internationalization of the question render the present draft resolution even more unrealistic and will inevitably have devastating effects on the intercommunal negotiating process. In short, it is a draft likely to delay the solution of the problem since it fails to recognize the fact that all aspects of the Cyprus question fall within the purview of the intercommunal talks.

47. The General Assembly must be familiar by now with my Government's stand in the efforts to bring about a just and lasting solution to the problem. As has already been stated on numerous occasions, the Turkish Government unswervingly maintains that it is only through intercommunal negotiations on an equal footing that a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus question can be achieved. The Turkish Government, therefore, gives unqualified support to the mission of good offices of the Secretary-General. My Government is determined to encourage efforts designed to achieve a viable solution within the framework of the Denktaş-Makarios four-point guidelines⁵ and the Denktaş-Kyprianou 10-point agreement, which, in its view, have laid the foundations for a solution based on the fun-

damental and legitimate rights of the two communities within an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal and bi-zonal federal republic.

48. I wish to take this opportunity to reiterate, on behalf of my Government, our heartfelt gratitude to Secretary-General Waldheim for his determined and indefatigable efforts in the search for a solution to the problem of Cyprus through the intercommunal talks. Our deep appreciation also goes to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, Mr. Galindo Pohl, to Under-Secretaries-General Urquhart and Pérez de Cuéllar, and to their collaborators, Mr. Sherry and Mr. Picco, and their staff for the devotion and competence they have shown in the discharge of their respective duties. It would be remiss if we did not say a special word of gratitude to Under-Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar, who once again proved himself to be an experienced diplomat possessing exceptional qualities and a deep knowledge of the affairs of Cyprus by successfully contributing to the preparatory work of the summit meeting held at Nicosia on 18 and 19 May.

49. The current debate on the question of Cyprus is taking place at a time when, as reported by the Secretary-General, the island continues to enjoy an unprecedented calm and tranquillity. Moreover, the period under review has been marked by a heartening breakthrough in the search for a negotiated settlement between the two communities. The Secretary-General says the following in his report to the General Assembly:

“The search for a solution of the Cyprus problem through negotiations between the representatives of the two communities produced at one stage distinct progress. The agreement reached under my auspices at the conclusion of the high-level meeting in Nicosia on 19 May was a considerable advance.” [*Ibid.*, para. 29.]

50. As a matter of fact, at that meeting the leaders of the two communities decided on the resumption of the intercommunal talks and established the basis for them. The two community leaders also agreed, in point 6 of the 19 May agreement to accede to a political truce, which, in their view, was necessary for the conduct of the intercommunal talks in a continuing and sustained manner. The concept of a political truce, as embodied in point 6 of the 19 May agreement, was of particular importance since it called on the two communities to refrain from any action which might jeopardize the outcome of the intercommunal talks and to take action to promote goodwill and mutual confidence. The Turkish Government welcomed the convening of the Denktaş-Kyprianou high-level meeting and the 10-point agreement resulting from it.

51. At that crucial stage of the Cyprus dispute, when high hopes were placed in subsequent developments, there was an absolute need for urgent and imaginative action to exploit the opportunity that had been created in Nicosia on 19 May 1979. In the light of the concept of a political truce, it was believed that the time had come for the two communities to talk to each other rather than at each other and to build on the foundation that was already laid by the Denktaş-Makarios four-point guidelines. However, it is a matter of deep regret that, despite the commitment given by the two Cypriot leaders to adhere to a concept of political truce under point

⁴ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1978*, document S/12723.

⁵ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-second Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1977*, document S/12323, para. 5.

6 of the 19 May agreement, the Greek Cypriot side did not desist from its malicious propaganda activities and ambitiously sought to obtain one-sided resolutions in various international gatherings in a deliberate attempt to take the peace-making efforts out of their normal track, namely the talks.

52. As indicated in paragraph 17 of the Secretary-General's report, the first of such attempts took place at the Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries held at Colombo one week before the official resumption of the intercommunal talks, in flagrant violation of point 6 of the newly concluded accord. The Turkish Cypriot community, and my Government, did not fail to bring immediately to the attention of the Secretary-General the initiative of the Greek Cypriot side at Colombo as a concrete sign of its lack of interest in the intercommunal talks, which were due to resume on 15 June 1979.

53. After the Colombo meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries, the Greek Cypriots pursued their insidious propaganda campaign in various international conferences held at Lusaka, Havana and Rio de Janeiro, where the Turkish Cypriot community was neither represented nor even given a chance to be heard. They ambitiously sought to obtain one-sided resolutions in total disregard of the fundamental principles in the existing guidelines and accords reached between the two communities. Their misrepresentations, distortion of facts, vilifications and disparaging remarks about the Turkish Cypriot community, which is supposed to be their negotiating partner, were all part of a vitriolic propaganda campaign aimed at hoodwinking the international community into believing that the Turkish side was intransigent and therefore must be victimized by unpalatable resolutions.

54. What we are witnessing at this session of the General Assembly is that inexorable continuance of the intensive Greek Cypriot propaganda. The Greek Cypriot leadership, in a transparent attempt to gloss over its shameful record of intransigence, is now trying to generate the false impression that the intercommunal talks that started on 15 June this year went into recess because of the intransigence of Turkish Cypriot community. They are alleging that the Turkish Cypriot leadership set pre-conditions for the continuance of the talks, which caused their recess. This is an untruth. The plain fact is that the Turkish Cypriot side sat at the negotiating table in good faith and never put forward any pre-conditions for the continuance of the talks. Since the Turkish Cypriot side had ample evidence that Mr. Kyprianou had reneged on the commitments made by his predecessor, Archbishop Makarios, in the presence of the Secretary-General, in relation to the fundamental concepts which the four-point guidelines were based on, the Turkish Cypriot interlocutor merely requested his Greek Cypriot counterpart to confirm the validity of the concepts of bi-zonality and the security of the Turkish Cypriot community.

55. Although the validity of the concept of bi-zonality was confirmed in a statement made in Vienna on 31 March 1977 by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Kurt Waldheim,⁶ and twice referred to, before the Security Council and the General Assembly,

on 31 August 1977⁷ and 7 November 1977⁸ respectively, by the then Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister, the Greek Cypriot negotiator at the intercommunal talks refrained from confirming that bi-zonality was one of the concepts constituting the basis of the Denktas-Makarios guidelines. Nor did he make any reference to the concept of the security of the Turkish Cypriot community.

56. The reason for this attitude is obvious. It is no longer a secret that the present Greek Cypriot leadership is allergic even to the mention of the Denktas-Makarios four-point guidelines. The latest proof of this is the fact that there was no mention of the four-point guidelines in the lengthy statements which were delivered by Mr. Kyprianou on 1 October [15th meeting] and by Mr. Rolandis the other day [68th meeting]. The columnist of the Greek Cypriot daily *Simerini* Mr. Paulos Angelides, in his article of 2 March 1979, described this aversion of Mr. Kyprianou's to the Denktas-Makarios agreement in the following terms:

“Soon after Kyprianou took over, he led the Cyprus question into a deadlock. He denied whatever Makarios had accepted and abandoned the Denktas-Makarios agreement without putting forward an alternative policy. In fact, he adopted a totally negative attitude. He is refusing everything and proposing nothing, and if he proposes anything he does not support it in practice . . .”

57. On the other hand, if the Greek Cypriot side is sincere in its clamorous complaints about the absence of progress in the intercommunal talks – which it attributes entirely to the Turkish Cypriot side's intransigence – why has it flatly rejected a set of suggestions put forward by the Secretary-General on 23 August, which were accepted by the Turkish Cypriot community in an effort to make possible the continuance of the intercommunal talks? The answer is very simple: it is because it was not interested in negotiations with the Turkish Cypriot side preceding the General Assembly debate on the Cyprus question. Its primary concern was to secure a General Assembly resolution that Mr. Kyprianou could exploit for his domestic political aims. It was for this reason that the Greek Cypriot side, instead of engaging in negotiations on the basis of the 23 August suggestions of the Secretary-General, accused the Turkish Cypriot side of making an ostentatious display and of acting with ulterior motives.

58. The report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly provides us with a clear picture of the respective positions of the two sides vis-à-vis the 23 August suggestions. The Secretary-General, referring to the acceptance by the Turkish Cypriot side of his 23 August approach, states:

“ . . . I considered this to be a constructive step. However, by that time the General Assembly was in session, and the other party resisted a move the motives and timing of which it questioned. On the other hand, it would be regrettable if considerations of this kind were allowed to affect substantive positions.” [A/34/620 and Cor. 1, para. 31.]

⁷ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-second Year*, 2026th meeting.

⁸ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, Plenary Meetings*, 60th meeting, para. 13.

⁶ *Ibid.*, document S/12323, annex I.

This extract from the Secretary-General's report is most revealing about the Greek Cypriot aversion to the intercommunal talks.

59. The Greek Cypriot Administration's aide-mémoire, dated 2 August 1979 and distributed to all Governments, on the alleged imminent proclamation of independence by the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was another typical example of the intensive Greek Cypriot propaganda campaign. In fact, the subject matter of Mr. Rolandis's statement before the General Assembly also was the alleged intention of the Turkish Cypriot leadership to partition the island and unilaterally declare independence. In my brief statement on Thursday in exercise of my right of reply I read out a passage from the statement of the former Greek Cypriot negotiator, Mr. Papadopoulos, in which he referred to such rumours as "the creation of the Greek Cypriot Government and press" [68th meeting, para. 58]. Therefore, I shall not elaborate this point any further at this stage.

60. All this makes it crystal clear that the intercommunal talks did not go into recess as a result of the Turkish Cypriot side's intransigence, as alleged by the Greek Cypriot leadership. The responsibility for this impasse lies solely with the Greek Cypriot side. They not only acted in violation of point 6 of the 19 May agreement, but also made it abundantly evident that they were not guided by the principles and concepts defined at the Denktas-Makarios summit meeting. Their trumpeting for the internationalization of the problem at the expense of the intercommunal talks has almost destroyed the chances of meaningful negotiations.

61. The Greek Cypriot side is constantly alleging, as Mr. Kyprianou did on 1 October during the general debate and Mr. Rolandis did the other day, that all their attempts throughout the last five years to find a just and lasting solution through negotiations have met the so-called stonewalling of Turkish intransigence. In refuting this groundless allegation, it is not my intention to go into the details of the developments that have taken place throughout the last five years. The reports of the Secretary-General are full of concrete examples of initiatives undertaken and proposals put forward by the Turkish Cypriot side with a view to reaching an early solution of the problem within the framework of a federal structure. Suffice it to mention in this connexion that the fact that the summit meetings of 1977 and 1979 came to pass was the result of the personal initiatives taken by Mr. Denktas.

62. The account of developments in the course of the last five years leads us to the conclusion that, in order to conceal their real intentions, the Greek Cypriot leadership have committed themselves to a propaganda campaign under the slogan of "Turkish intransigence". But, no matter how intensive and vociferous their propaganda, it will not help the Greek Cypriot leadership to dissemble the fact that they do not want a solution to the Cyprus problem. Why should they? They are treated in all international forums as "the Government of Cyprus"; they deny to the Turks of Cyprus the benefits of government revenues and foreign assistance; they impose an economic blockade on the Turkish Cypriot community. On the one hand, the Greek Cypriot community is economically prosperous, whereas the members of the Turkish Cypriot community are labouring under the economic strictures placed upon them by their fellow islanders. Under this circumstances

the Greek Cypriot leadership sees no reason to negotiate and to arrive at a solution.

63. In an article published in the *New York Times* on 23 April 1978, Mr. Nicolas Gage described the economic prosperity of the Greek Cypriot community in the following terms. Referring to the events of 1974, Mr. Gage wrote:

"The most striking result . . . is the economic renaissance which has made Greek Cyprus, only four years after its disastrous defeat, more prosperous than ever before. The hastily expanded airport at Larnica now handles twice the freight and as many passengers as the . . . Nicosia Airport once did. The gross national product for southern Cyprus—the Greek part—"grew by 15 per cent in both 1976 and 1977."

64. The following excerpt from the editorial by Martin Wallacott in the British daily newspaper, *The Guardian*, on 15 June 1979, the very day when the intercommunal talks were resumed, reveals the intentions of the Greek Cypriot leadership:

"The grants, loans and foreign military spending provide a comfortable, although rarely acknowledged, base for the dynamic little Greek Cypriot economy. But since much of the money is directly related to the division of the island, they also create a vested interest in that division. A Western diplomat said: 'There is no economic need for a settlement which might indeed dry up certain flows of aid money'. The political risks for any Greek Cypriot leader trying to move toward a settlement are already great, with extremists of several colours waiting in the wings to denounce the slightest concessions to the Turkish side . . . With the help of foreign aid, partition continues to be an economic success story for the Greek Cypriots . . . Finally, the Greek Cypriots' greater access to aid remains a weapon that can be used against the north and encourages a reversion to the strategy of boycott and the loan struggle."

65. These quotations explain in a nutshell why the Greek Cypriot leadership is tempted to cling to the *status quo* at the expense of progress towards a solution. They realize the fact that a federal solution would not only involve the sharing of a power which is now absolutely in their hands, but also result in the sharing of their economic prosperity with the Turkish Cypriot community. Thus, they have opted for what they call "the long-term struggle". They count on the eventual collapse of the Turkish community in Cyprus. This is, of course, a delusion.

66. A few pertinent excerpts from a sermon preached by the prelate of the Greek Cypriot Orthodox Church, Archbishop Chrysostomos at Kykko Monastery on 8 September 1979, which was published the next day in most of the local Greek Cypriot daily newspapers, are enough to reveal the ultimate aim of the Greek Cypriots and their approach to the intercommunal talks:

"As to why we have agreed to take part in the intercommunal talks, we can say that we are doing this in order to prove that the negotiations are a fiasco. Therefore, we must give up believing that the intercommunal negotiations will lead to any settlement

...
"So long as there are international forums and as

our recourse to such forums increases, the number of our supporters will also increase . . .

“We must wage a struggle of ‘To be or not to be’. We must turn every place into a bastion, a battleground.”

67. In the light of these facts, the Greek Cypriot accusation that the stumbling-block to meaningful negotiations is the lack of political will on Turkey's part to abandon its partitionist and expansionist policy appears very flimsy indeed. It is a typical case of attempting to confuse the innocent with the guilty by distorting or glossing over the facts. Hypocritical allegations of this sort not only fail to cover up the truth, but are also unfortunate from the point of view of finding a just and realistic solution to the Cyprus problem, in that they cast serious doubts on the Greek Cypriot side's ability to face the truth.

68. I should like to state firmly once again that Turkey does not have any expansionist aims, nor does it pursue a partitionist policy with regard to Cyprus. My Government believes that the only viable solution to the Cyprus problem is the one that would secure the fundamental and legitimate rights of the two communities in Cyprus within an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal and bi-zonal federal republic. Any other solution would neither serve the interests of the parties concerned nor would it help to bring stability to the region as a whole. But could the Greek Cypriot leadership categorically state that they are not for *enosis*—that is, annexation to Greece—and abrogate the *enosis* resolution passed by the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives on 26 June 1967 which is still in force?

69. As a part of their propaganda campaign, we very often hear the Greek Cypriot leaders alleging that the Cyprus problem came into existence with the so-called “aggression” or “invasion” of Turkey on 20 July 1974 and that the Turks and Greeks of Cyprus lived in peace and harmony before that date. Certainly it would be too much to expect the Greek Cypriot leaders to admit what had been the course of events in Cyprus between 21 December 1963 and 20 July 1974 that eventually led to Turkey's intervention under the Treaty of Guarantee.⁹ But I need not stress that the continuing references by the Greek Cypriot leaders to the existence of “peace and harmony” between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots before 20 July 1974 have a cynical ring.

70. Those words reflect their yearning for the good old days—as they call them—which existed prior to 20 July 1974, when the Greek Cypriot leadership had the monopoly of power and exercised it in a most ruthless and inhuman manner. The following is a passage from the book entitled “Cyprus, the Unfinished Agony” written by a Greek Cypriot, Mr. P. N. Vanezis, which in my view depicts objectively the Greek Cypriot attitude and behaviour towards the Turkish Cypriots during the period before July 1974:

“The Cypriots' outlook is influenced too much by religious and racial ethnic differences and this has aggravated conflict between the Greek and Turkish communities. The Greek Cypriots have overlooked this in their single-minded pursuit of ‘*enosis* and only *enosis*’. The majority of the Greek Cypriots, until it

was too late, hardly ever gave a serious thought to compromising with their Turkish co-citizens. Too many Greek Cypriots did not mind confronting the Turks in the name of the ‘Megale Idea’.”

71. The Greek Cypriot representatives once again stressed the need for the implementation of the United Nations resolutions on Cyprus. In dealing with this question we must not lose sight of the fact that the objectives of those resolutions have been affected and modified by subsequent developments on the island, as well as by agreements reached between the two communities. Thus it is not realistic to call for the implementation of those resolutions in all their aspects without taking into account subsequent developments. Moreover, since the adoption of those resolutions the basis for the solution of the Cyprus problem has been outlined in the four-point agreement between Denktas and Makarios, which provides for the establishment of an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal, bi-zonal federal republic through intercommunal talks.

72. We are happy to note that in his report on the question of Cyprus to the thirty-third session of the General Assembly the Secretary-General stated:

“It continues to be my belief that the key to any substantial progress towards the several goals set out in the resolutions of the General Assembly lies in the initiation of an effective negotiating process designed to achieve a just and peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem based on the legitimate interests of the two communities . . .”¹⁰

The Secretary-General also stated in the same report:

“The question of the return of refugees to their homes, as well as other agreed elements of an eventual settlement, are touched upon in the Makarios-Denktas guidelines of 12 February 1977.”¹¹

73. At this session of the General Assembly we have once again listened to the commonplace uttered by the Greek Cypriot representatives about the so-called Turkish aggression and the occupation of a part of the island by Turkish military units. In this connexion I shall refer to the following words used by the late Archbishop Makarios before the Security Council on 19 July 1974, in the aftermath of the tragic events that started on 15 July 1974—and here he was referring to the Greek invasion of Cyprus:

“The coup did not come about under such circumstances as to be considered an internal matter of the Greek Cypriots. It is clearly an invasion from outside, in flagrant violation of the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus.

“ . . .
“And the invasion is continuing so long as there are Greek officers in Cyprus . . . the events in Cyprus do not constitute an internal matter of the Greeks of Cyprus. The Turks of Cyprus are also affected. The coup . . . is an invasion, and from its consequences the whole people of Cyprus suffers, both Greeks and Turks. The United Nations has a peace-keeping force stationed in Cyprus. It is not possible for the role of that peace-keeping force to be effective under conditions of a military coup”.¹²

¹⁰ See document A/33/348, para. 23.

¹¹ Ibid., para. 20.

¹² See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-ninth Year, 1780th meeting.*

⁹ Signed at Nicosia, on 16 August 1960, between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Greece and Turkey and Cyprus. (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 382, No. 5475).

74. It was under those circumstances that Turkey decided to exercise its Treaty rights and obligations in order to protect the independence of Cyprus from destruction through the unilateral declaration of *enosis*, and to save the Turkish community from extermination. It is thanks to the lawful and timely peace operation of Turkey that the two national communities of Cyprus are now provided with the opportunity to reshape their relations in a framework in which the bitter experiences of the near past will never be repeated and the potential dangers to the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus may be avoided for good.

75. I should like to reiterate that the Turkish forces were sent to the island in conformity with the Treaty guaranteeing the status of Cyprus as an independent State and to stop an invasion from outside and protect the Turkish Community of Cyprus. They cannot, therefore, be considered to be forces of occupation. Turkey has no intention of retaining its forces in the island. Nor does it have any intention of partitioning the island. Turkey seeks no territorial advantages whatsoever from Cyprus. As has already been stated on numerous occasions, the Turkish Government, in line with its efforts to contribute to peace and tranquillity in Cyprus, has to date withdrawn 19,000 troops from the island as a gesture of goodwill, and it commits itself to withdrawing all its armed forces from the island, with the exception of those that will be mutually agreed upon by the parties concerned, when a final solution to the problem is found.

76. In his report to the General Assembly last year, the Secretary-General drew our attention to the fact that there were in Cyprus Greek national military personnel whose number "including the Greek national contingent, is . . . not known accurately to UNFICYP".¹³

77. In his report to the present session of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General states that the situation in that respect remains as described in his previous reports. He further notes in this connexion that

"As UNFICYP does not have independent sources of information on this matter, accurate figures on the numbers of Greek national military personnel . . . in Cyprus are not available." [A/34/620 and Corr. 1, para. 21.]

In the same report, the Secretary-General arrives at the following conclusion:

". . . I consider that the chances of reviving the intercommunal talks will depend on keeping it [the approach] alive and pursuing the path of concrete negotiations. . . . It is up to the parties to pursue that process or face the prospect of an indefinite continuation of the *status quo* . . ." [Ibid., paras. 32 and 33].

78. My Government fully agrees with that assessment by the Secretary-General. We have serious misgivings, however, as to whether General Assembly resolutions like the one now before the Assembly for decision may be conducive to the revival of concrete and effective negotiations between the two communities. So long as

one of the parties to the intercommunal negotiating process continues its efforts within and outside the United Nations, in the absence of the Turkish Cypriot community, in search of resolutions that totally disregard the basic elements of the intercommunal agreements and accords, chances for progress towards a comprehensive solution will inevitably continue to elude us. The record of the intercommunal talks shows very clearly that it has never been possible to engage in serious negotiations during the summer, preceding United Nations General Assembly proceedings. This fact certainly cannot be explained by the need of the negotiating parties in Cyprus for summer vacations. Nor is it a mere coincidence that the two major breakthroughs in the intercommunal negotiations have taken place in winter and spring, well in advance of General Assembly sessions. It is particularly in the light of that fact that we should like to underline the view expressed by the Secretary-General in his latest report that "it would be regrettable if considerations of this kind were allowed to affect substantive positions" [Ibid., para. 31].

79. Mr. TIKHONOV (Beylorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*interpretation from Russian*): The question of Cyprus continues to remain among those international problems that cause serious concern to peace-loving forces.

80. The results of the discussion of the problem of Cyprus by the General Assembly last year gave grounds, provided that the United Nations resolutions were followed up, for some hope of substantial progress for settling this problem on the only correct and just basis, that is by observing the principles of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, the withdrawal from Cyprus of all foreign troops and respect for the status of Cyprus as a non-aligned State. As the Assembly knows, in the resolution which was adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session [resolution 33/15], it was recommended that the Security Council should play a more active role in the discussion of the question of Cyprus and also that the relevant United Nations resolutions on Cyprus should be implemented. Reference was also made to the need to establish a time-frame for that process. In response to the urgent appeal of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as is clear from his report which we now have before us [A/34/620 and Corr. 1], made tireless efforts in order to bring about the resumption of the intercommunal talks, and succeeded in so doing. However shortly afterwards the talks once again became bogged down. It is a matter of regret that to a large extent this was the result of the activities of those outside groups that have once again become extremely active, are anxious that the problem of Cyprus should remain unresolved and complicate the difficulties that impede its resolution. They stop at nothing to circumvent the decisions of the United Nations on Cyprus, to move the whole question of Cyprus outside the framework of the United Nations and to attempt to find a solution to that problem within the framework and in the interests of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]. The activities of those groups have led to the maintenance of a *de facto* partition of Cyprus and of a threat to the independent existence of a sovereign and unified Cypriot State, and have meant that the island has been turned into a military beach-head for NATO in the eastern Mediterranean. Particularly alarming is the recent news of new plans to make use of military bases in Cyprus for purposes which run counter to the interests of peace.

¹³ See document A/33/348, para. 15.

81. The crisis in Cyprus is the result of the ongoing, overt and covert intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign State Member of the United Nations. The fact that the problem of Cyprus remains unsolved causes increasing tension in the Mediterranean and has a detrimental effect on the development of the international situation as a whole.

82. It is precisely for that reason that the United Nations, since the beginning of the crisis in Cyprus, has focused its attention on the need to bring about a just settlement. Even then, in 1974, the General Assembly, and thereafter the Security Council, in resolutions 3212 (XXIX) of 1 November 1974 and 365 (1974) of 13 December 1974, demanded that all States should respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus.

83. In subsequent years the provisions in the United Nations resolutions on Cyprus have been confirmed and made more specific, and they provide a basis for finding a solution to the problem of Cyprus. Those decisions are in accordance with the interests of the Cypriot people and they reflect the will of the international community, which has come out so firmly in favour of a speedy solution being found to the problem of Cyprus.

84. Support for the full implementation of United Nations resolutions on Cyprus was given recently by the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held recently at Havana. That Conference:

“ . . . called on all States to strictly respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, unity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus; and demanded the cessation of all foreign interference in its internal affairs as well as the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and every other military presence from the Republic of Cyprus.” [A/34/542, annex, sect. I, para. 199.]

85. The Byelorussian SSR, like the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations, is convinced that the United Nations decisions on Cyprus represent an excellent basis for a just solution and settlement of the problem of Cyprus. It is necessary now to ensure the immediate and consistent implementation of the resolutions that have been adopted.

86. We are convinced that the internal aspects of the problem of Cyprus can be resolved at intercommunal talks, as laid down in the United Nations decisions. A peaceful and just settlement of the internal contradictions in Cyprus can and should be achieved with due account being taken of the interests of both the Greek and the Turkish communities. It is obvious that the inalienable right of the Cypriots themselves to decide questions concerning the internal structure of their State can be ensured only provided that an end is put to outside interference in the internal affairs of Cyprus, which is contrary to the interests of the Cypriot people.

87. Together with a number of other delegations of States Members of the United Nations that have already spoken here, the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR would once again confirm its support for the proposal put forward by the Soviet Union five years ago that an international representative conference should be convened in Cyprus, under the aegis of the United Nations,

which could become an important factor in bringing about a just settlement of the problem of Cyprus and strengthening peace in the eastern Mediterranean area. Support for holding such a conference was also expressed by the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Kyprianou, who spoke at the plenary meeting of the present session of the General Assembly on 1 October.

88. Like other countries in the socialist community, the Byelorussian SSR favours a settlement of the problem of Cyprus based on the principles of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity for the Republic of Cyprus and respect for its policy of non-alignment. We favour a demilitarized Cyprus where there would be no foreign troops or foreign military bases. We hope for the success of the intercommunal talks and for the implementation of the decisions of the United Nations on Cyprus.

89. Mr. STAYKOV (Bulgaria) (*interpretation from French*): It is regrettable that again this year we have to note that the problem of Cyprus remains unresolved and the negotiations undertaken have had very meagre results. The concern of the international community in this respect is strengthened by the observation which the Secretary-General has just made in his report on the work of the Organization, that the *status quo* on the island is hardly satisfactory, remains precarious and tends to create a dynamic of its own, which does not necessarily facilitate an agreed solution [see A/34/1, sect. III].

90. In other words, Cyprus remains a hotbed of tension, which represents a potential threat to peace not only in the eastern Mediterranean but on a far larger scale. It is thus quite understandable that the situation on the island warrants the concern of the international community and of all countries that are sincerely interested in strengthening world peace, international security and détente.

91. The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, for its part, considers that there are a great many reasons for wishing that the problem of Cyprus should be settled quickly and in a peaceful and equitable way. Above all, since my country is located close to that hotbed of tension, it quite obviously cannot remain indifferent to how and when it will be extinguished.

92. As a country located at the centre of the Balkans, Bulgaria pursues a consistent policy designed to promote relations of good-neighbourliness with all its neighbours near or far, so as to transform the Balkans into a region of lasting peace, good-neighbourliness and sincere co-operation. In a wider perspective, Bulgaria has the utmost interest in the elimination of hotbeds of tension throughout the world, since that is itself an indispensable condition for the ending of the danger of a new conflagration and the development and deepening of détente and its transformation into an irreversible process. Obviously, none of those aims, which accord with and are based on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Final Act of Helsinki, can be fully realized if the Cyprus situation remains explosive.

93. The position of the People's Republic of Bulgaria on the problem of Cyprus and the means of arriving at a solution is well known. Our position has been stated repeatedly at the United Nations as well as in other

multilateral and bilateral forums. It reflects a policy of principle that does not yield to circumstantial considerations. As the President of the Council of State, Comrade Todor Zhivkov, emphasized before the National Assembly in May last,

"The People's Republic of Bulgaria has consistently supported and will continue to support all efforts to arrive at a peaceful and just settlement of the question of Cyprus that will preserve the sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence and non-alignment of the Cypriot State."

94. It is therefore not merely due to a happy stroke of fate that relations between Bulgaria and the Republic of Cyprus are constantly evolving in a spirit of sincere friendship in the political, economic and cultural fields. Similarly, the People's Republic of Bulgaria sincerely hopes that our neighbours, Greece and Turkey, will coexist in a spirit of mutual understanding with each other and with Cyprus. As for my country, I would say that not only have we never sought to derive selfish advantages from the crisis, but, on the contrary, we have already given proof of our goodwill in contributing to the efforts undertaken by the parties concerned to solve the Cyprus problem.

95. We are aware that the quest for a just and lasting solution to the problem of Cyprus is a complicated and difficult process, but at the same time we believe that if the prerequisites and the necessary context exist, they are likely to ensure rapid and substantial progress along that path. Such a basis is provided by the statements of the representatives of the two communities, which have lived together for centuries in a spirit of peace and understanding. Those statements bear witness to the existence of a common objective: the building of a sovereign, independent and non-aligned Cyprus whose territorial integrity is to be respected.

96. The appropriate framework for the achievement of that end was laid down in the resolutions of the United Nations on the question of Cyprus, in particular General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), which was adopted unanimously, accepted by the two communities and endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 365 (1974). In brief, the essential elements of a mutually acceptable foundation for a just and peaceful solution are well known. The most important are respect by all countries for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and policy of non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus, the immediate withdrawal from Cyprus of all armed troops and foreign military personnel, and the halting of any form of interference in the internal affairs of the island.

97. But it must be said that no advance in the settlement of the question of Cyprus has been perceived. Resolutions remain unimplemented, while the situation on the island remains tense, an important part of the population continues to live the hard life of refugees, and the presence of foreign troops persist.

98. However, a slight glimmer of hope for some progress in the settlement of the difficulties was seen in May of this year, when the 10-point agreement was concluded between the representatives of the two communities thanks to the mediation of Mr. Kurt Waldheim, our Secretary-General. Regrettably, that hope was premature because once again the negotiations came to a standstill.

99. In noting the obstacles that hampered the quest for a peaceful solution, we must recognize that particular weight must be given to the violation of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cyprus. What is more, certain circles seem to derive some profit from the present deadlock in the intercommunal talks, and use it as a pretext for the imposition of a solution outside the framework of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council and running counter to the principles and provisions of those resolutions. Can there, then, be any doubt that those attempts contravene the will and firm determination of the Cypriot people to preserve the territorial integrity of their island republic as a sovereign, independent and non-aligned State?

100. My country is profoundly convinced of the importance of the role that the United Nations is called upon to play in both the effective settlement of the crisis through the facilitating and encouraging of talks and the ensuring of political guarantees for the free existence of the Republic of Cyprus as a sovereign, independent and non-aligned State. In our considered opinion, the Cyprus problem must be solved politically through serious talks between the two communities without any outside interference. We are convinced that the lasting and legitimate interests of the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are far more important and substantial than the temporary disagreements between the two communities.

101. At the same time we remain convinced of the importance and utility of the Soviet proposal, which has been supported by the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Kyprianou, regarding the convening of an international conference, under United Nations auspices, on the problem of Cyprus. That proposal opens up real possibilities of overcoming the present stagnation. Such a conference would also doubtless contribute to a considerable strengthening of the prestige of the United Nations.

102. In conclusion, I should like to recall that the Government and people of Bulgaria sincerely hope that very soon a just and lasting solution of the Cyprus problem will be found, a solution that accords with the interests of the Cypriot people - both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots - and with the interests of peace and security in the region and throughout the world, and with the purposes of détente.

103. The PRESIDENT: I call upon the representative of Algeria to introduce draft resolution A/34/L.40.

104. Mr. BEDJAOUI (Algeria) (*interpretation from French*): The Contact Group of the non-aligned countries given the task of following the question of Cyprus and made up of Guyana, India, Mali, Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, Cuba - as current chairman of the non-aligned countries - and Algeria, has again this year submitted a draft resolution, which is contained in document A/34/L.40.

105. Our concern has always been to single out all constructive elements likely to restore an atmosphere of mutual confidence for the solution of the problem of Cyprus, a problem which, regrettably, has persisted for six years in the eastern Mediterranean zone, where the situation is already explosive. More than ever, it seems to us that only a policy of non-alignment will enable Cyprus to recover its cohesion, its unity and its ter-

territorial integrity. We have therefore given our full attention to the legitimate claims of the representatives of Cyprus, without thereby ignoring the complaints of the spokesman of the Turkish Cypriot community.

106. Negotiations were not easy this year and several times we despaired of ever issuing this draft resolution, because we had to overcome the indifferent coexistence of two communities, their antagonism, misunderstanding and suspicion which seemed to remove them further and further from the merger which, we are sure, every inhabitant on the island aspires to.

107. We have examined the problem in all its aspects, without being completely neutral, because in this specific case strict neutrality can only mean indifference. We are not indifferent to the entire Cypriot people whose independence and policy of non-alignment must be safeguarded. The non-aligned countries believe that Cyprus should be protected against any foreign intervention and all outside pressures, and therefore they attach genuine importance to the inter-communal negotiations as the only course capable of putting an end to a disastrous situation that generates insecurity, frustration and danger. The search for a solution to the problem of Cyprus by means of negotiations between the representatives of the two communities finally led to an agreement concluded on 19 May 1979 under the auspices of the Secretary-General. That burst of activity seems to have faded away since, but we continue to believe that any valid settlement must be arrived at by means of dialogue on a footing of strict equality between the two Cypriot communities, Greek and Turkish.

108. So as to aid the two parties concerned in overcoming their difficulties and deep-rooted antagonisms, the necessary conditions must be created to enable each community to feel reassured as to its present and its future and to encourage a solution acceptable to all.

109. All those concerns of the non-aligned countries, it seems to us, are reflected in our draft resolution, the preamble of which—with the exception of three paragraphs—is identical to the one submitted and adopted at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly. The sponsors believed it useful to recall, in the third preambular paragraph, the inadmissibility of acquisition of territories by force, and the idea of holding an international conference on Cyprus in the fourth. In the seventh preambular paragraph they welcome the 10-point agreement of 19 May last.

110. In operative paragraph 2 we support that agreement, and in operative paragraph 3 we draw inspiration from the Political Declaration of the Sixth Conference of Heads of State of Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana in which the Conference

“reaffirmed the right of the Republic of Cyprus and its people to full and effective sovereignty and control over the occupied area of Cyprus and its natural and other resources and called upon all States to support and help the Government of Cyprus to exercise the above-mentioned rights” [A/34/542, annex, Sect. I, para. 20].

111. Operative paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 11 are taken from resolution 33/15, adopted last year. Operative paragraph 10 welcomes the proposal of President Kyprianou of the Republic of Cyprus for the total demilitarization of Cyprus.

112. We do not want to be accused again this year of opening “false windows”; thus we have avoided a weakness against which we were powerless last year: repetition. This will indicate to what degree we are concerned at the gap which separates the two communities owing to their lack of reciprocal confidence.

113. In operative paragraph 12 the Secretary-General is requested to report to the General Assembly, by 31 March 1980, on the progress achieved in the negotiations between the representatives of the two communities. And, in the event of the Secretary-General's noting a lack of progress during those talks, in operative paragraph 13, the President of the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly would be authorized to appoint an *ad hoc* committee composed of no more than seven Member States. The word “States” should be added at the end of that paragraph. The role of the *ad hoc* committee would be, first, to maintain contact with the Secretary-General to facilitate the successful conclusion of the negotiations between the two communities, as stated in operative paragraph 14; and, secondly, to promote, in consultation with the Secretary-General, the implementation of all the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly on Cyprus, as provided in operative paragraph 15.

114. The Contact Group of the non-aligned, called upon to follow the question of Cyprus, expresses the hope that the draft resolution which it is submitting today for representatives' consideration will receive broad support in the Assembly. We hope that the people of Cyprus will be able to forget the difficulties of the past, so as resolutely to turn to the future, a future that can be envisaged only in a Republic of Cyprus which has all the attributes of sovereignty based on the will expressed by the entire people to safeguard their independence, territorial integrity and policy of non-alignment.

115. Mr. ROA KOURI (Cuba) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The Cyprus question has always been a source of particular concern to Cuba because of our ties of friendship with the people and Government of Cyprus and because of the tragic situation they have been facing for more than half a decade as a result of the occupation of a part of their country by foreign troops. My delegation, like many others of the non-aligned movement—of which the Republic of Cyprus has been a member since its inception—has participated actively in all General Assembly debates on the question.

116. It is no idle statement to say that Cuba firmly supports the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus. The Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana, expressed its unequivocal support for those principles. In recalling this a few weeks ago in his address to the General Assembly, President Fidel Castro affirmed that the Conference had reasserted and expanded on its resolutions of solidarity aimed at the fulfilment of the aspirations of the people of Cyprus, “an island still partially occupied by foreign troops” [31st meeting, para. 30].

117. In our opinion, it is essential once again to demand the immediate, unconditional withdrawal of those troops and a cessation of all foreign interference in the affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, as well as the implementation, without further delay, of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), of 1974, which was endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 365 (1974).

118. Our people, which are suffering the occupation of part of their territory by a North American naval base contrary to their express will and desires, could not fail to be in close solidarity with the just demands of the Cypriot people.

119. Indeed, as Marxist-Leninists, we believe that there must be the strictest respect for the rights of national minorities in any State, but this can never mean that we condone foreign interference for the benefit of one or another community, much less attempts at partition or separation with foreign support. Safeguarding the unity of the Republic of Cyprus is an essential duty of the United Nations and figures prominently in the resolutions of this Assembly.

120. Nor, as a matter of principle, can we accept the fait accompli of foreign aggression and occupation as a source of any right. Cuba, together with the non-aligned countries, continues to condemn both as violations of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law. Yet we are in favour of achieving a peaceful solution, negotiated on a footing of equality by the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, without foreign interference.

121. For that reason, my delegation unreservedly subscribed to the expression of support of the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries for the 19 May 1979 10-point agreement signed by President Kyprianou and Mr. Denktas on behalf of the two communities, under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

122. Regrettably, the negotiations, which we had hoped would be significant and constructive, have bogged down once again, without having solved the acute problems of the internal situation and the illegal presence of foreign troops. In his report to the Assembly, the Secretary-General gives an account of the difficulties encountered and the present impasse.

123. As an *ex officio* member of the Contact Group of the non-aligned States since Cuba is the current Chairman of the movement, my delegation has spared no effort to help in the drafting of a resolution [A/34/L.40] that will enable the Secretary-General and the parties to the conflict to add new momentum to the efforts at resuming the negotiations and achieving a just and lasting solution to the problem of Cyprus. In our view, this draft should lead to precisely that result.

124. With that objective in mind, we supported the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee, to be made up of no more than seven member States, which could cooperate with the Secretary-General in the event of there being no progress in the negotiations scheduled for January 1980, so as to facilitate a resumption and successful conclusion of the negotiations between the representatives of both communities.

125. My delegation wishes to express its complete support for the Secretary-General in the important task he has been discharging for a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem.

126. Cuba will unflinchingly strive to help to preserve the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus, so that, sooner rather than later—to quote the Minister for

Foreign Affairs, Nicos Rolandis—it may be able to build its prosperity “in the fields and on the mountains of peace, in a free and unified Cyprus” [68th meeting, para. 38.].

Mr. Gurinovich (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic), Vice-President, took the Chair.

127. Mr. FILLIE-FABOE (Sierra Leone): In its contribution to the debate on the Cyprus question last year, during the thirty-third session of the General Assembly [49th meeting], the Sierra Leone delegation expressed the hope, *inter alia*, that by this time this year the Greek and Turkish negotiators would have arrived at a consensus and that the Cyprus problem would be well and truly on the way to a just and lasting solution. It was in this spirit of optimism that my delegation supported General Assembly resolution 33/15, of 9 November 1978, and wished the Secretary-General well in using his good offices in order to bring about a settlement in accordance with the many resolutions adopted here and in the Security Council on the matter.

128. My delegation had envisaged a settlement based primarily on General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), which was unanimously adopted on 1 November 1974, with both Greece and Turkey voting. That resolution significantly and pointedly calls for respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of Cyprus; it also urges the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from the Republic, the cessation of all foreign intervention in its affairs and the safe return of all refugees to their homes. It will no doubt be recalled that in resolution 33/15, adopted in November last year, the Assembly specifically recalled resolution 3212 (XXIX), adopted in 1974, and deeply regretted that the resolutions of the United Nations on Cyprus had not been implemented. It went even further and recommended that the Security Council should adopt, “if necessary, all appropriate and practical measures” to ensure that the United Nations resolutions on Cyprus would be implemented.

129. It was against this background that my delegation has followed the strenuous efforts of the Secretary-General throughout this year to get the intercommunal talks going again. Indeed, we have carefully studied his report [A/34/620 and Corr.1] giving details of his attempt to induce both sides to come together and to negotiate a settlement and we have noted in particular his observations. The Secretary-General says:

“The search for a solution of the Cyprus problem through negotiations between the representatives of the two communities produced at one stage distinct progress. The agreement reached under my auspices at the conclusion of the high-level meeting in Nicosia on 19 May was a considerable advance. However, this opportunity, like so many others before, was not fully seized and great difficulties have been encountered in sustaining the momentum that had been created.” [Ibid., para. 29.]

130. It is with a growing sense of frustration and disappointment that the Sierra Leone delegation views the fact that the advance made and the momentum generated by the accord of 19 May have not been sustained. As is well known, following intensive diplomatic moves and consultations, the Secretary-General personally arranged a high-level meeting in Nicosia on 18 May 1979, which culminated on 19 May, after intensive

negotiations by the parties, in an agreement on a 10-point communiqué stating the agreed basis, priorities and procedures for the resumed talks.

131. The first point of the communiqué stated that intercommunal talks were to resume on 15 June 1979, and they were so resumed. However, we find that, instead of taking the bull by the horns and going into the substance of the problem, one or other of the interlocutors raised preliminary issues and set preconditions which seemed calculated to ensure that the talks would never get off the ground. For instance, we learn from the Secretary-General's report that the Turkish Cypriot interlocutor, Mr. Umit Suleyman Onan, insisted that point 2 of the communiqué should be dealt with first, even though point 5 makes it clear that:

“Priority will be given to reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under United Nations auspices simultaneously with the beginning of the consideration by the interlocutors of the constitutional and territorial aspects of a comprehensive settlement”. [*ibid*, annex V, para. 5.]

132. Furthermore, the Turkish Cypriot interlocutor, as a preliminary issue, wanted the Greek Cypriot interlocutor to acknowledge that, in addition to the published text of the Makarios-Denktaş guidelines of 12 February 1977, the agreement comprised also the concepts of bi-zonality and the security of the Turkish Cypriot community. It seems to the Sierra Leone delegation that those issues, purported to be preliminary, were designed to thwart any progress in the talks and were meant to bring about, and did bring about, a stalemate, so that on 22 June the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, after consulting the two interlocutors, had no alternative but to announce that the talks were being adjourned. For one reason or another, the talks have still not been resumed. My delegation fully supports the Secretary-General in his assessment of the situation when he states:

“While I would not question the importance of problems such as bi-zonality and security, it seemed evident to me at the time—and has since been borne out by events—that an abstract debate about them was bound to be unproductive.” [*A/34/620 and Corr.1, para. 30.*]

133. My delegation is convinced that there will be no progress if one or other of the participants in the negotiating process continues to renege on its commitment as contained in the 19 May accord. We feel strongly that those matters that the accord states will receive priority must be given priority. The negotiating parties agreed to this; they cannot now go back on their agreement. We feel that, as was agreed, priority must be given to reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under United Nations auspices.

134. At this juncture, I must state that my delegation does not agree that, as has been alleged by the Turkish Cypriots, discussion of the Cyprus question in international forums is in violation of point 6 of the 19 May accord, which states: “It was agreed to abstain from any action which might jeopardize the outcome of the talks . . .” [*ibid*, annex V, para. 6]. Surely it would be absurd, if not worse, to suggest, for instance, that discussion of the question in the United Nations, an interna-

tional forum, might jeopardize the outcome of the talks. In any event, there ought not to be any fear or compunction about publicizing one's case to the whole world where one has a good, just and moral case that can stand up to the most searching scrutiny. It is otherwise if one has a bogus case or if one has something to hide.

135. The Sierra Leone delegation lends its full support to the Secretary-General in his use of his good offices to revive the intercommunal talks. We unreservedly endorse the Secretary-General's understanding of the present status of the talks—that they deal with four items—and look forward to his reconvening the talks on the basis of the 10-point communiqué not later than January 1980.

136. Turning now to the question of the refugees and the withdrawal of foreign forces of occupation from the territory, my delegation once again calls for the speedy implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions on the matter. We note with despondency, that, while about 200,000 Greek Cypriot refugees continue to live far from their homes—that is to say, have been forced to leave the north and move to the south—a large number of immigrants have been brought in to settle in the north, so that the Turkish Cypriot population is reputed to have swelled from 120,000 in 1974 to over 150,000 in 1978. It has been alleged that this is a deliberate policy aimed at changing the demographic structure of the island; it is difficult to refute this, having regard to the recent history of Cyprus.

137. My delegation is particularly unhappy about the fact that Greek Cypriot schoolchildren from the north who are attending secondary school in the south were unable in 1979 to visit their families in the northern area known as the Karpas. In the summer of 1978 they were allowed such visits, but now the Turkish Cypriot authorities insist that the children should sign entry request forms issued by what they call the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

138. Despite intensive and persistent efforts by the Secretary-General's Special Representative to get out of this impasse, the deadlock remains. My delegation pleads, on humanitarian grounds and bearing in mind that the season of goodwill is now upon us, that the children should be allowed to visit their parents in the same way as they did in the summer of 1978.

139. We wish to reiterate our position that, in accordance with United Nations resolutions on the subject, all refugees should be given the option of returning to their homes. Where they choose not to exercise this right they should be paid sufficient and adequate compensation for the land and other properties which were seized from them. Until this is done, the provisions relating to refugees in United Nations resolutions will clearly remain relevant, and the Turkish Cypriot side cannot be heard to say unilaterally that certain clauses embodied in the United Nations resolutions on Cyprus have clearly become no longer relevant.

140. Finally, we wish to pay a tribute to UNFICYP for the excellent work it has been doing and continues to do in Cyprus. The very fact that in the past 12 months “there have been no serious breaches of the cease-fire by shooting or movement forward”¹⁴ is eloquent

¹⁴ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-fourth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1979*, document S/13369, para. 59.

testimony to the Force's effective and successful peace-keeping.

141. While we salute the officers and men, we must not forget that the Force has been on the island for the past 15 years, at a huge cost to those who have contributed voluntarily to its upkeep. Indeed, the Secretary-General, in his report of 31 May 1979, states that there is a current deficit of \$64.8 million in the funding of the Force.¹⁵ Obviously, this is one more reason why the Cyprus problem should be solved without any further delay.

142. I should like, before ending this statement, to thank our indefatigable Secretary-General, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, for his untiring efforts in trying to ensure the implementation of the United Nations resolutions on Cyprus so as to bring about a just solution of the problem in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. In this connexion I must also express appreciation to the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, for his unceasing efforts in seeking a consensus between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot interlocutors. Once again, despite past experience, let me, on behalf of the Sierra Leone delegation, express the hope that by this time next year the Cyprus problem will have been well and truly solved.

143. Mr. LANE (United Kingdom): Earlier in the debate, the representative of the Republic of Ireland made a statement on behalf of the nine member States of the European Community [71st meeting]. My delegation is in full agreement with that statement. In view, however, of the close links which the United Kingdom has had with Cyprus for more than a century, I should like to make a brief statement to underline the importance which my Government attaches to an early settlement of the Cyprus problem.

144. It is now nearly 16 years since the crisis of December 1963 and it is more than five years since the crisis of July 1974. Yet, despite the efforts of the Secretary-General, we seem no nearer a solution to the problem of that divided island. We warmly welcomed the agreement reached at the high-level meeting held at Nicosia on 18 and 19 May under Mr. Waldheim's auspices, which owed a great deal to his skill and statesmanship. Yet the intercommunal talks were adjourned in June shortly after they had been resumed, and the difficulties which led to the recess have still not been overcome. The Secretary-General's report [A/34/620 and Corr.1] indicated clearly that this was not for lack of effort or ingenuity on the part of Mr. Waldheim, the Secretariat or the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Cyprus, to all of whom I pay tribute.

145. My delegation would like to reiterate the call by the representative of Ireland for an early resumption of the intercommunal talks on the basis of the guidelines to which the parties have already agreed, in accordance with the proposals made by the Secretary-General and outlined in his report. We also urge both sides to observe in all its aspects, including point 6, the 10-point agreement reached at the high-level meeting in May. For there is no substitute for direct negotiations between the two Cypriot communities. It is they who will have to

make a settlement and it is they who will have to live with it. There is no alternative to the intercommunal talks. We do not lack institutional machinery. We can do without personal abuse of those whose duty it is to carry on the intercommunal talks. What is needed is the political will to negotiate a settlement which guarantees the territorial integrity, the independence and the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus.

146. Such a solution is long overdue and urgently needed. Time is on no one's side. The longer the problem remains unresolved, the deeper the divisions between the two communities will grow and the more embittered relations between them will become. A generation has grown up in Cyprus which has had little or no contact with members of the other community. Moreover, as long as the Cyprus problem remains unresolved, it will be an impediment to stability and good relations between countries in the area with which Britain has long-standing ties of friendship, as well as a continuing and heavy burden on the resources of the United Nations.

147. In conclusion, I should like to echo the appreciation expressed in the statement of the nine member States of the European Community to UNFICYP for its work.

148. Mr. REDONDO-GOMEZ (Costa Rica) (*interpretation from Spanish*): My delegation joins in the expressions of appreciation in this debate, which have emphasized the patient and energetic work of the Secretary-General of this Organization since the time when the question of Cyprus veered towards courses dangerous for international peace and security. My delegation is also pleased to note that, thanks to the good offices of the Secretary-General, it has been possible to prevent matters from deteriorating. Little by little the conditions have been created that are needed if, after constructive and tolerant dialogue between the two parties, peace is to return to Cyprus and if the spectre of a new conflict between two sister communities is to be dispelled.

149. Although the progress made so far is not as encouraging as we had hoped it would be, particularly taking into consideration the time which has elapsed since 1965 and the major efforts made to find a just and lasting solution, my delegation has not lost hope that, under the efficient auspices of the Secretary-General, and when they heed the voice of reason, the two Cypriot communities will return to that concord which, under the sign of a single nationality, characterized the life of that country before its independence from the United Kingdom.

150. The conditions established under resolution 3212 (XXIX), adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session, which has been endorsed and strengthened by numerous Security Council resolutions, as the Assembly knows, and reiterated in General Assembly resolution 33/15 of 9 November 1978, not only continue to be valid but also are essential if peace and harmony are to return to Cyprus.

151. Peace is nothing other than the exercise of justice. Without justice, peace is a transient state, lacking a genuine foundation and liable to lead at the slightest opportunity to the outbreak of violence. There is no doubt that, if peace is to be restored to Cyprus,

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 66.

that sister nation will have to recover sovereignty over its entire territory. The forces that occupy an important part of the territory of that country, whatever the explanation for their arriving and remaining, must return to their original quarters. The Turkish Cypriot community must be guaranteed the exercise of its rights, as we have been maintaining since our first statement on this item in 1965.¹⁶

152. On the other hand it is quite true that when it comes down to reality the only just and genuine way of settling the situation in Cyprus lies in negotiations between the representatives of the two Cypriot communities, and the usefulness of those negotiations depends on the interested parties being prepared to act with the necessary flexibility. The contents of Security Council resolution 430 (1978), of 16 June 1978, could hardly have been more to the point in this respect.

153. My delegation finds it incomprehensible that, while the achievements of science and technology have proved that there are no obstacles man cannot overcome in solving the most intricate material problems, he has not been able to find the road to peace, which, viewed in a humanitarian sense, is the easiest and most beautiful of all roads: the practice of justice above and beyond ephemeral human ambitions.

154. Since we believe that draft resolution A/34/L.40 reflects the feelings of the majority of the Members of this Organization and is on the lines indicated in this statement, the delegation of Costa Rica is very pleased to sponsor it.

155. In conclusion, my delegation in common with many others, expresses the hope that the parties involved in this painful controversy will resume as soon as possible the dialogue that has been interrupted and, under the skilful and impartial guidance of the Secretary-General, will be able to strike a balance between the aspirations of the two communities so that peace will once again reign under the beautiful skies of Cyprus, a country to which universal culture owes so much.

156. Mr. DORJI (Bhutan): Here we are, once again, dwelling on the question of Cyprus, which looks as though it will turn into yet another perennial feature of General Assembly debate—an obstinate problem with no encouraging signs of a just solution in the offing.

157. Cyprus first became a focus for United Nations attention 26 years ago, when the citizens of that country were engaged in their struggle for liberation from colonial domination. The happy state of independence was achieved, but once again Cyprus is on the conscience of the international community as a land threatened by civil strife and the danger of foreign domination. Since the events of 1974, when the sovereign territory of Cyprus was invaded by a foreign force, we have held an annual debate on the matter, culminating each year in a resolution, the latest being General Assembly resolution 33/15.

158. The first General Assembly resolution—2312 (XXIX) of 1974—called for respect for the in-

dependence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-aligned status of Cyprus. It urged the speedy withdrawal of all foreign troops and military personnel from the country and non-interference in its affairs by foreign Powers. It recommended the return of all refugees to their homes in safety, and called for negotiations between the warring factions, the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable political settlement. This resolution was not only unanimously approved by the General Assembly but agreed upon by the parties involved. In these circumstances, therefore, it seems as though the framework for a solution already exists. However, with all these worthy resolutions before us, we have failed to implement their provisions and successfully remove this item from our annual agenda.

159. The Security Council, too, has been actively involved in the question of Cyprus. Security Council resolution 365 (1974) endorsed and reinforced General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) and the Security Council has passed a number of other resolutions on the matter. This comes as no surprise, since the problem has dangerous implications not only for Cyprus itself but for international peace and security, and hence is very much in the realm of Security Council concern.

160. Among the significant initiatives taken by the Security Council in the matter has been the stationing in Cyprus of UNFICYP, which was first mandated by the Security Council as early as 1964 by resolution 186 (1964). Recognizing the value of the Force in the troubled area, in June 1979, by resolution 451 (1979), the Security Council yet again extended the duration of the Force for another six-month period, ending 15 December 1979.

161. We commend the work of UNFICYP, which is doing its part to ensure freedom from unrestrained bloodshed between the violent elements, so that citizens of the country can pursue their lives with a degree of normality. But more important is the attainment of the ultimate solution, for which we in the United Nations have charged the Secretary-General with a special responsibility.

162. Outside the forum of the United Nations, too, the problem of Cyprus has been a matter for debate and distress. Cyprus is not only one of the founder-members of but an active participant in the Non-Aligned movement. So it is not surprising that the sufferings of that country drew considerable attention during the Ministerial Conference of Non-Aligned Countries at Belgrade from 25 to 30 July 1978. The Conference's Final Declaration¹⁷ deplored the fact that parts of the country should be under the occupation of foreign military forces. The Declaration expressed solidarity with and support for the island State, and called for the immediate implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions. This year, the Conference of Heads of State of Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana, expressed support for the Declaration and called for respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus [see A/34/542 annex, sect. I, paras. 197-205].

163. The present situation in Cyprus continues unchanged. A part of its territory still remains under

¹⁶ For a summary of this statement, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, First Committee, 1411th meeting, paras. 20-24.*

¹⁷ See document A/33/206.

foreign military occupation; the refugee problem continues to take its toll, denying to many Cypriots their homes and their human rights; the *de facto* partition of the island compromises its independence and territorial integrity, while the two communities are becoming increasingly bitter towards each other. Without doubt the continuing presence of foreign forces is perpetuating and inflaming the hatred between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, rendering their reconciliation and mutual co-operation ever more difficult.

164. The leaders of Cyprus have stated that it is their desire to achieve order and happiness for all the country's citizens by peaceful means. This is indeed commendable, and in keeping with the ideals of the United Nations, but thus far efforts seem to have come to naught. There have been several rounds of talks between the leaders of the two communities but, unfortunately, we have seen that the momentum and optimism generated by those talks have been illusory. The trust and co-operation between the two communities, essential to any successful solution of the problem, are still far from being achieved. The United Nations role therefore cannot be dismissed.

165. We in the General Assembly owe thanks to the Secretary-General and his able representative, who have not spared any effort towards fulfilling the responsibility which we have placed upon them.

166. Last December the Secretary-General held consultations with the Foreign Minister of Cyprus in connexion with certain specific suggestions designed to provide a framework for the settlement of the problem and to contribute to the resumption of intercommunal negotiations. Pursuant to those consultations, tentative working papers were submitted to all parties concerned. Despite intensive efforts, however, wide differences between the two parties remained on several important points. Further efforts culminated in the holding, on 18 and 19 May of this year, of a high-level bi-party meeting under the personal auspices of the Secretary-General, resulting in the issuing of a 10-point communiqué. In our opinion, this seemed like an important breakthrough. As long as the concerned parties kept talking, there was a chance of finding a solution.

167. We regret, however, that the talks unfortunately recessed, and the suspicion and hostility which have built up between the two communities cannot be expected to dissipate without neutral and well-meant guidance. It is here that the United Nations resolutions, with their impartial and judicious provisions, must play

a part. For negotiations to succeed, they must be based on the relevant United Nations resolutions and conducted without foreign interference.

168. A peaceful settlement by negotiation under the auspices of the Secretary-General seems to be the only way out, and to offer the best hope for Cyprus to retain its non-aligned status, together with its sovereignty and territorial independence.

169. An encouraging feature in this troubled spot is an observation by the Secretary-General in a recent report that "the substantive positions of the parties are in certain respects not as far apart as they may appear at first glance".¹⁸

170. It is not as though the Greeks and the Turks have always been at loggerheads. Left to themselves, they managed for years to live together in amity. We even have formal evidence in the form of the Greek-Turkish Treaty of Friendship, neutrality, conciliation and arbitration, signed at Ankara on 30 October 1930,¹⁹ and a Pact of Cordial Friendship, signed three years later, on 14 September 1933.²⁰

171. For centuries the climate of tolerant coexistence prevailed in Cyprus. Why, then, can it not continue to do so—scoring from memory the events of the last years as an unfortunate interlude?

172. As a co-founder of the non-aligned movement, Cyprus certainly needs and deserves the full support of that movement. And as a member of that same movement, as a fellow small and developing country, indeed as a member of the international community which transcends all and binds together every one of us here, my delegation supports the General Assembly's taking every possible step to resolve the tragedy of Cyprus finally and successfully. My delegation will therefore support the draft resolution before us in document A/23/L.40, so eloquently introduced by the representative of Algeria at this meeting.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

¹⁸ See document A/33/348, para. 20.

¹⁹ League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. CXXV, No. 2841.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, vol. CLVI, No. 3600.