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EDITORIAL NOTE

The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook contains a review of the main developments and negotiations in the field of disarmament taking place each year, together with a brief history of the major aspects of the over-all question. The series started with the 1976 edition.

The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook makes no claim to present fully the views of States Members of the Organization, or even the Powers directly concerned; for further information on the official positions of States, the reader should consult the Official Records of the General Assembly and other sources.

For a more detailed account of the work of the Organization in previous years, the reader may consult *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1), and the previous volumes of *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, which are referred to in foot-notes throughout the text simply as *The Yearbook*, together with the appropriate volume number. The complete references are: *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 1: 1976 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.IX.2); vol. 2: 1977 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.4); vol. 3: 1978 (United Nations publication, Sales Nos. E.79.IX.2 (clothbound) or E.79.IX.3 (paperbound)); vol. 4: 1979 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.80.IX.6 or 7); vol. 5: 1980 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.IX.3 or 4).

It should be noted that in the preparation of this as well as all previous volumes of *The Yearbook* identified above, the Secretariat of the United Nations has taken into account General Assembly resolution 2758 (XXVI), of 25 October 1971, entitled "Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations"

ABBREVIATIONS and ACRONYMS

ABM	anti-ballistic missile
ASAT	anti-satellite
ASBM	air-to-surface ballistic missile
CCD	Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
EEC	European Economic Community (referred to throughout this volume as the European Community)
ENDC	Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GNP	gross national product
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ILO	International Labour Organisation
INFCE	International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation
IPIC	image-processing and interpretation centre
ISMA	International Satellite Monitoring Agency
MIRV	multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	non-governmental organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPANAL	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLBM	submarine-launched ballistic missile
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
WHO	World Health Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization

INTRODUCTION

This volume of *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook* describes events at a time when awareness of the problems presented by the arms race is growing among a widening public, as is the realization that measures to limit and reduce armaments are needed more than ever. This awareness has been enhanced by the fact that 1982 is the year of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The information efforts of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament have intensified accordingly.

The sixth volume of *The Yearbook*, covering 1981, is a part of those efforts. While it aims, as have its predecessors, to provide authoritative information about the deliberations and negotiations on disarmament under the auspices of the United Nations during the year, in particular to a readership that is already well informed about the principal problems in the field, *The Yearbook* is apparently consulted increasingly by non-specialists who seek information about the many issues involved. The authors are encouraged to find that the presentation in *The Yearbook*, although aimed at comprehensiveness and precision, also seems to permit non-specialists to obtain an impression of the disarmament activities of the year and some idea of their complexity.

Once more, a year passed in a climate of international tension and suspicion. The debates and negotiations in the field of disarmament were singularly void of tangible results, although virtually all the formal statements of States Members of the United Nations expressed an awareness of the need to agree on various meaningful measures of arms limitation. Progress towards achievement of several important measures, which in past years had seemed to be gaining momentum, such as the conclusion of a comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons and of a convention banning the development, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons and calling for their destruction, appeared to remain essentially as distant as in other recent years, in some cases perhaps even more so.

As for the work of the main disarmament bodies, the Disarmament Commission in 1981 held deliberations covering a broader agenda than ever before, and framed certain recommendations to the General Assembly. Those resulting from its consideration of the various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, however, covered little new ground, and mainly reaffirmed, albeit in some detail, the danger posed by the threat of nuclear war and reiterated what measures ought to be taken to initiate a process of genuine disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field. The Commission's recommendations concerning military budgets requested the

Assembly to have the Commission continue its work on the subject. On the question of elaborating the approach, structure and scope of a study on conventional disarmament, the Commission was unable to reach agreement.

The Committee on Disarmament re-established four *ad hoc* working groups, on: security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States; radiological weapons; chemical weapons; and a comprehensive programme of disarmament. It was unable, however, despite considerable pressure, to establish such groups on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban or on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Perhaps the most clearly positive note reflected in the work of the Committee was that its *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons succeeded in framing 18 draft "elements" of a possible future international instrument banning chemical weapons.

The General Assembly, on the recommendations of its First Committee, adopted 49 resolutions on disarmament subjects, a record number, and some 20 of them concerned questions related to nuclear disarmament. However, in light of the controversy surrounding certain of the substantive ones and the abstentions and negative votes on a number of them, prospects for the implementation of many of the measures advocated are far from bright.

Nevertheless, some encouraging events occurred during the year. The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions of the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects was opened for signature on 11 April; as of the end of the year it had acquired 46 signatures. Several important disarmament studies were concluded and submitted to the Assembly, including those on the relationship between disarmament and development and on the interrelationship between disarmament and international security, which were three years in the making, and one on the organization and financing of a world disarmament campaign. Throughout the year, preparations for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament continued in its Preparatory Committee, on which 78 Member States were represented. During its autumn meetings the Preparatory Committee heard statements from representatives of non-governmental organizations and peace research institutes. Finally, although outside of the auspices of the United Nations, it was encouraging that the major nuclear Powers on 30 November commenced bilateral negotiations on medium-range nuclear weapons systems in the European region.

The foregoing is discussed in the various chapters below, and they are cross-referenced as required. While *The Yearbook* is prepared almost entirely by the Centre for Disarmament, the International Atomic Energy Agency contributed chapter XI and a substantial part of chapter X, and the recently established United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research contributed the annex to chapter XX. The United Nations Environment Programme provided appendix II. The four subsequent appendices — III through VI — were contributed by specialized agencies: the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; the World Health Organization; and the World Meteorological Organization. Appendix III describes UNESCO's plans for

disarmament education, publications and research, training, and co-operation with the United Nations.

Prepared by the Centre, appendix I shows actions taken during the year on multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements and includes, for the first time in *The Yearbook*, a table showing the status of all such agreements as of the end of the year. Appendix VIII contains the list of resolutions and decisions on disarmament and related questions adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session, in 1981, including the voting records thereon and an index showing where the resolutions appear in *The Yearbook* text.

PART ONE

Comprehensive approaches to disarmament

CHAPTER I

General and complete disarmament

Introduction

EFFORTS BY THE UNITED NATIONS through the years to deal with disarmament on a comprehensive basis have envisaged the global reduction of all weapons and armed forces to very low levels — in the words of the Charter, “to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources”¹ By the comprehensive approach, the many issues of disarmament would make up the components of a carefully planned programme aimed towards that end. In addition, various relevant initiatives which do not in themselves deal with disarmament measures but are intended to be conducive to the process of disarmament may be considered in the context of the comprehensive approach to the question.

The problem of reaching agreement on strategies, frameworks and plans through which the international community might work towards general disarmament has repeatedly shown itself to be difficult, but that of the actual implementation of the measures involved in such a process has proved to be even more intractable. The General Assembly, concerned about lack of progress in disarmament, on 20 November 1959 adopted resolution 1378 (XIV) by which it expressed the hope that measures leading towards the goal of “general and complete disarmament under effective international control” would be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time. That goal has ever since remained as the ultimate disarmament objective of the United Nations. Shortly after defining the goal, the General Assembly, by resolution 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, endorsed the composition of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) as a negotiating body and recommended that it undertake negotiations with a view to reaching agreement leading to the newly adopted goal.

A number of initiatives subsequently put forward in that context² called for disarmament to be achieved in defined stages or steps, taking into account the need for maintenance of various conditions, such as stable relative security

¹ See *Charter of the United Nations*, Article 26.

² For details, see *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chap. 4.

and effective international control, throughout the disarmament process. Agreement on procedures for taking the first steps in the process was not forthcoming, however, and emphasis in both the General Assembly and ENDC gradually turned towards specific disarmament issues offering greater promise of near-term results.

The multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements that have been achieved on specific issues over the past two decades must be regarded as important in that they have effectively precluded a number of potentially dangerous developments;³ they have not, however, served to arrest a dynamic general arms race. Similarly, bilateral agreements between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America⁴ have had only limiting or channelling effects on the acquisition of strategic nuclear armaments and related systems.

Accordingly, in light of a widely perceived requirement, there have been continual efforts since the late 1960s in the Assembly and the expanded negotiating body — the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) from 1969 to 1978 and the Committee on Disarmament since that time — to maintain the vitality of the comprehensive approach to ensure that the most serious and central issues are addressed systematically and the desired disarmament objective of the United Nations kept in view. The item entitled “General and complete disarmament” has appeared on the Assembly’s agenda each year and under that item the Assembly on 16 December 1969 adopted resolution 2602 E (XXIV) by which it declared the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade and, in that context, requested the CCD, while continuing to negotiate on collateral measures, to work out a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the arms race as a guide for its further work.

In 1978, the General Assembly, at its first special session devoted to disarmament, once again clearly reaffirmed, by consensus, the goal of “general and complete disarmament under effective international control” and agreed on the need for a comprehensive approach towards that end. In the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,⁵ it included a Programme of Action embracing virtually all disarmament issues and setting priorities for future disarmament efforts. Further, the Assembly reconstituted the Disarmament Commission as a subsidiary deliberative body composed of all States Members of the United Nations and agreed, among other things, that the Commission should make recommendations on the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament which would be conveyed to the Committee on Disarmament to assist that body in negotiations, in accordance with its agenda, on a “Comprehensive programme of

³ See *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.2).

⁴ See, *inter alia*, *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1), chap. VIII, and A/C.1/1026 of 3 November 1972.

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4* (A/S-10/4), sect. III; the Final Document is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, appendix I.

disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control" (see chapter IV below).

In 1980 and 1981, the desirability of the established goal was again frequently recalled, but increased emphasis was placed on the dangers and cost of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and the importance in a difficult international situation of getting a disarmament process started rather than on the final goal of that process.

The United Nations, in its increasingly extensive disarmament efforts in the past two decades, has combined comprehensive disarmament efforts with efforts to achieve agreements on specific issues. While Member States have become increasingly concerned about the dimensions of the arms race, they appear at the same time to have concluded that to halt and reverse it while maintaining the security of States involves a very complex process which allows room for adjustment as it progresses. While the advisability of setting precise time frames within which certain urgent steps should be achieved is a controversial matter, there is a general recognition that the desired ultimate goal cannot be achieved until a rather indefinite time when political and social development and mutual understanding in the world community may be more conducive to the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.⁶

The attempts of the main disarmament bodies in 1981 to work towards the desired United Nations goal in disarmament are dealt with briefly in this chapter.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1981

The United Nations Disarmament Commission held its substantive 1981 session from 18 May to 5 June,⁷ with Mr. Peter Michaelson of Denmark serving as Chairman.

The substantive part of the Commission's agenda largely repeated that of 1980, again containing an item on consideration of various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, with the aim of elaborating a general approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament, and an item on the harmonization of views on the gradual reduction of military budgets and reallocation of resources to development in conjunction with ways and means of achieving satisfactorily verifiable agreements on freezing or restraining military expenditures (see chapter XIX below). For the first time, the Commission in 1981 was able to consider the item appearing on its agenda on the basis of the letter of 8 March 1979 from the Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*,⁸ covering the report of the United

⁶ See *Charter of the United Nations*, Chapter VI; Chapter VII is also relevant.

⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 42* (A/36/42) and A/CN.10/PV.43-54, A/CN.10/PV.54/Add.1, A/CN.10/PV.41-54/Corrigendum and A/CN.10/32.

⁸ A/CN.10/4.

Nations Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa.⁹ An entirely new item, entitled "Elaboration of a general approach to the study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces, as well as its structure and scope", was added to the agenda (see chapter XVII below). Finally, the agenda included another new item on the preparation of a report on the work of the Commission for submission to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, in 1982.

To deal with the items concerning the reduction of military budgets and the study on conventional disarmament, the Commission established informal, open-ended working groups. The Commission concluded the consideration of its substantive agenda during four informal meetings as a committee of the whole and at its two final plenary meetings.

While none of the Commission's agenda items was dedicated specifically to general and complete disarmament, in the general exchange of views held on all agenda items during the first part of the session,¹⁰ a number of delegations again recognized and endorsed that goal and referred to the overall question of disarmament in such contexts as the comprehensive programme of disarmament or the Disarmament Decade.

The Chairman, in his opening remarks, called attention to the responsibilities of the Commission as a deliberative body and to the recommendations it had made to the Assembly. He recalled that the previous year's substantive session had taken place against a background of world tension and stated that the political climate at the time of the 1981 session was similar; nevertheless, he stressed, the Commission should not allow the prevailing difficulties to detract from its universal obligation to strive for real progress in the process of disarmament. The representative of Austria, expressing a parallel view, noted a tendency to consider disarmament as unattainable in existing conditions and to argue that the effort should be postponed; that reasoning, according to Austria's position, was both erroneous and irresponsible because there would not be better times until the arms race was curbed. Thus, rather than a defeatist attitude, circumstances called for efforts to be multiplied to achieve progress towards disarmament.

Among the States which specifically mentioned the goal of general and complete disarmament were Egypt, which reaffirmed its consistent position in support of any effort aimed towards that goal in accordance with the priorities already agreed upon at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, and Bangladesh, which held that all elements necessary to achievement of the goal, including security and economic considerations, should be included in any listing of disarmament measures, and that categories of weapons and agreed priorities should be shown. Algeria also referred to the goal, emphasizing that, in relation to the task involved and the final objective, little progress had been made. In the existing state of affairs, Algeria saw a need for

⁹ *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-fourth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1979*, document S/13157.

¹⁰ A/CN.10/PV.45-50 and A/CN.10/PV.41-54/Corrigendum.

real political will, specific, imperative objectives, and a binding time-table within which intermediate steps would be taken, to lead eventually to general and complete disarmament. It added that conventional weapons and forces could not be viewed in isolation from general international security considerations and the final goal, in part because the nuclear States also had the largest stockpiles of conventional weapons.

The representative of Yugoslavia stressed the view that the evolution and acceleration of the arms race was caused by a security system based on a "balance of power", which made détente limited and fragile. Since the problem did not evolve outside of over-all international relations, disarmament efforts, with the participation of all countries on a basis of equality, should be directed towards extending détente to all regions. Thus Yugoslavia was opposed to the use of force and any encroachment on the freedom, independence and territorial integrity of any country, under any pretext and from any quarter. The non-aligned countries, the representative added, had in fact always advanced genuine efforts towards a new system of international relations, in which the process of disarmament would be integral and all countries and peoples able to develop freely and safely. Other countries which associated disarmament with international security included Pakistan, which saw an intrinsic relationship between security considerations and prospects for disarmament, and Portugal, which emphasized that the final objective of disarmament was to reinforce international security and, noting that some States based their defence on nuclear weapons and others on conventional forces, thought therefore that the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons would not be attainable unless the other problems affecting that goal were addressed at the same time.

The Eastern European States did not stress the ultimate goal as such, but the representative of the USSR drew attention to various proposals his country had initiated for halting the arms race,¹¹ including the broad range of new ones put forward at the Twenty-sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR, and said that the Soviet position was one of readiness to discuss all or any measures to curb the arms race, end the threat of nuclear war, and preserve peace. He added that the USSR did not establish conditions for its participation in disarmament negotiations and took the position that, if the solution to the problem of disarmament were made dependent on other complex international questions (the concept of "linkage"), that would be tantamount to blocking progress. Other Eastern European States, notably Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Mongolia, also referred to their group's disarmament initiatives and the proposals set out at the Twenty-sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR, with Czechoslovakia and Hungary noting that those proposals had been endorsed by their own party Congresses. Bulgaria and the Byelorussian SSR also

¹¹ The USSR referred specifically to documents A/CN.10/10/Add.1 (containing a letter from its Foreign Minister dated 11 April 1980 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations regarding elements for inclusion in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade) and A/35/482 (containing the memorandum of the Soviet Union entitled "Peace, disarmament and international security guarantees").

expressed the view that the concept of "linkage" only served to delay or obstruct disarmament efforts.

China, on the other hand, regarded the contention that disarmament questions alone should be discussed in disarmament forums, without any reference to the international situation, as being absurd. It stressed that disarmament questions were closely linked with the entire international situation and especially with events involving international peace and security.

France, while holding that prospects for disarmament would improve only if States fully respected the fundamental principles of the Charter — particularly those concerning self-determination and non-interference in internal affairs, stated that concern about the international situation should not cause a diversion from the tasks already undertaken in the field of disarmament.

India suggested that nothing else should have as much relevance to the international community as the consequences of the arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect; accordingly that item should be given priority attention by a deliberative body such as the Commission. It held that the reduction of conventional weapons could only be pursued by a global approach within the framework of general and complete disarmament.

Of the several papers submitted to the Commission in 1981, only that of Yugoslavia¹² dealt with the agenda item on consideration of various aspects of the arms race aimed towards a general approach to negotiations. In that paper, Yugoslavia summarized the conclusions of the Commission on the item, stressing the deterioration in the international situation, the nuclear threat and special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States to work for nuclear disarmament, and the responsibility of those States and of all States to intensify efforts to reach a common approach leading to progress in disarmament on the basis of the priorities established by the General Assembly at its tenth special session. Papers submitted to the Commission on the items concerning military budgets¹³ and a study on conventional weapons¹⁴ may also be considered as relevant to the over-all question of disarmament.

In its recommendations to the General Assembly, which were adopted by consensus, the Commission, with regard to the agenda item on various aspects of the arms race,¹⁵ set out more extensively the ideas covered in the paper of Yugoslavia mentioned above, along with many additional views and ideas, including the following paragraph:

4. The Commission is of the conviction that the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, runs counter to efforts to achieving further relaxation of international tensions; that progress in the field of disarmament would be beneficial to the strengthening of international peace and security and to the improvement of international relations, which in turn would facilitate further

¹² A/CN.10/29.

¹³ A/CN.10/26 (Romania and Sweden).

¹⁴ A/CN.10/25 (Denmark), A/CN.10/27 (India), A/CN.10/28 (China), and A/CN.10/31 (German Democratic Republic).

¹⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 42* (A/36/42), para. 19.

progress; and that all nations, nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike, have a vital interest in measures of nuclear and conventional disarmament, as well as in the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons in accordance with the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document. Renewed and co-ordinated actions are necessary so as to halt and reverse the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, with a view eventually to achieving general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. The promotion of disarmament would be facilitated by the strict adherence by all States to the principles of the United Nations Charter, and by measures that would bring about the relaxation of international tensions and the peaceful settlement of disputes among States.

The United States recorded a reservation with regard to the Commission's recommendations on the above-mentioned agenda item. It noted that the working paper on the item had been introduced late in the session, and believed that the deliberations on it had been insufficiently detailed to permit the development of considered judgements on the complicated issues involved.

In all, emphasis on general and complete disarmament was for the second time reduced in the Disarmament Commission in 1981 in favour of emphasis on the difficult international situation and the urgent need to halt and reverse the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race. Moreover, at the end of the session a number of delegations expressed disappointment and even concern that the session had not produced more positive results. Among other things, there was dissatisfaction with the fact that no agreement had been reached on recommendations on the agenda item concerning the letter of the Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*;¹⁶ it was also questioned whether the subject it covered was relevant to the work of the Commission. Furthermore, there was concern among many delegations over the wide divergence of views on the agenda item regarding the general approach to the study on the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces, to the extent that the Commission was unable to complete its work¹⁷ (see chapter XVII below).

On 10 and 11 December the Disarmament Commission held two procedural meetings at which it reviewed the resolutions then before the General Assembly having a bearing on its work and discussed its schedule and agenda for 1982.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1981

The Committee on Disarmament¹⁸ held its 1981 session at Geneva from 3 February to 24 April and 11 June to 21 August. It held 49 formal plenary

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 23 and annexes IV and V.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 21 and annexes II and III.

¹⁸ The 40 States represented in the Committee in 1981 were: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, USSR, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

meetings as well as informal meetings on various subjects, including organization and procedures, agenda and programme of work, and some of the items on its agenda. It continued the practice of rotation of the Chairmanship alphabetically on a monthly basis in accordance with its rules of procedure;¹⁹ also in accordance with the rules, a number of States not members — Austria, Chile, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Finland, Greece, the Holy See, Iraq, Madagascar, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Viet Nam — attended plenary meetings and several of those States, upon request, were invited to participate in the Committee's discussions on various agenda items and in meetings of *Ad Hoc* Working Groups dealing with items of particular concern to them.²⁰ As in previous years, communications received from non-governmental organizations were circulated under the relevant rules.

As detailed in its report,²¹ early in the session the Committee adopted its 1981 agenda and programme of work on the basis of the 10 areas listed in its standing agenda for dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament. The 1981 agenda, substantially the same as that of 1980, was as follows:

1. Nuclear test ban
2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament
3. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
4. Chemical weapons
5. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons
6. Comprehensive programme of disarmament
7. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report as appropriate to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The Committee also agreed on a programme of work to accommodate a general debate, allow for the establishment of subsidiary bodies, and ensure coverage of its substantive agenda. The Committee took its decision regarding subsidiary working groups early in the session; in this connection, it re-established the *ad hoc* groups that had been set up in 1980 on security assurance to non-nuclear-weapon States (see chapter VIII below), chemical weapons (chapter XII) and radiological weapons (chapter XIV), and had the group on the comprehensive programme of disarmament resume its work (chapter IV). The Committee was not, however, able to reach agreement to set up further subsidiary bodies and, in that connection, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan and Sweden submitted a paper²² for possible consideration at the 1982 session whereby the rules of procedure would be amended so that the

¹⁹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27 and Corr. 1)*, appendix I (the rules of procedure are reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 4: 1979, appendix I).

²⁰ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27)*, paras. 12-13.

²¹ *Ibid.*, paras. 6-10.

²² *Ibid.*, *Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27)*, appendix II (CD/228), document CD/204.

requirement for consensus would not be used to prevent the establishment of such bodies.

The Committee, pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Final Document²³ and resolution 35/156 I, also considered the modalities of the review of its membership and proposals to improve its functioning; in the latter connection, a group of socialist countries submitted a working paper.²⁴ The Committee reported²⁵ that many of its members felt the existing membership to be adequate and representative, while some favoured a small increase in membership and others thought that any eventual change could be through expansion, reduction or rotation of members within the established regions or groups.

As in other years, the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly adopted at its previous regular session and other pertinent documents were transmitted to the Committee by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and many members of the Committee submitted papers, some concerning general ideas on disarmament, others relating to specific issues.

At the opening meeting, the Secretary of the Committee and personal representative of the Secretary-General conveyed a message from the Secretary-General in which he stated:

The Committee on Disarmament is resuming its work at a time of strain and uncertainty in international relations. In my message to the Committee last year, I noted disturbing trends in the international situation and expressed the hope that they would not affect ongoing negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament. I am glad that despite these trends, the Committee was able to make some progress through its subsidiary bodies on important substantive questions on its agenda.

But it also has to be acknowledged that the goal of disarmament remains as elusive as ever. While discussions and negotiations continue in various forums, armament expenditures are increasing at an alarming rate and have now risen to 500 billion dollars per year. Never before has so much money been spent on military pursuits.

The tense situation that prevails in the world is reflected in and indeed contributes to the accelerating spiral of military expenditure. What we need now are co-operative endeavours by all nations, and in particular the major military powers, to enter into serious negotiations based upon concrete proposals in order to reach genuine disarmament agreements.

Although a number of States made reference to general and complete disarmament in plenary meetings,²⁶ many of them were in connection with the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade or the item entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament" As in other recent years, greater emphasis over-all was afforded the current dimensions of the

²³ *Ibid.*, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4), sect. III, paras. 28, 113 and 120.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27), appendix II (CD/228), document CD/200; the term "the group of socialist countries", as the "Eastern European States" which are members of the Committee on Disarmament are known in the Committee, means: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and USSR.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27), paras. 15-21.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27), appendix III (CD/228), vols. I-VII.

arms race and urgent need to halt and reverse it than was given to the ultimate goal itself.

Among the representatives of the individual States collectively known as the group of 21 in the Committee,²⁷ that of Sweden stated that part of the excesses and overkill in armaments could be accounted for in the step-by-step approach which, for practical reasons, had been adopted in the absence of general and complete disarmament, and felt that the expression of peoples was required to move Governments to decisive action. The representative of Egypt referred to the "alarming" continuation of the arms race at a time when achievements in the field of disarmament were either insignificant or non-existent. Brazil suggested that for the super-Powers and their alliances "arms control" seemed to mean simply adjustment of the arms race to mutually tolerable levels while the vast majority of mankind, by contrast, had repeatedly called for genuine disarmament, meaning the immediate cessation of the arms race and start of nuclear disarmament; accordingly, Brazil attached great importance to the adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Yugoslavia specifically emphasized general and complete disarmament under effective international control as the single, fundamental goal of the disarmament questions before the Committee and thus regarded reaching agreement on a comprehensive programme in time for the Assembly's second special session on disarmament as a duty. Indonesia regarded the comprehensive programme as only one of the steps leading to the ultimate disarmament goal and viewed that goal not as an end in itself but as a means of achieving yet a further objective: genuine and lasting international peace.

Nigeria recalled that, in declaring the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade, the Assembly, in resolution 2602 E (XXIV), *inter alia*, requested the CCD — the former negotiating body — to work out "a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control" Again at its first special session on disarmament, the Assembly had asked the new negotiating body to undertake elaboration of a programme "to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament becomes a reality" ²⁸ Finally, the Assembly, by resolution 34/83 B, had called for such a programme to be completed before its second special session devoted to disarmament.

The Soviet Union, noting that it had constantly singled out the problem of disarmament as being of prime importance, stated that it was convinced that the world could find genuine security, not through ever more explosive means of warfare, but by restraining and halting the arms race. It regarded as a principle that no international problems existed that could not be resolved through negotiations, and stressed that its many proposals in the disarmament field were practical and achievable, relating to individual measures, particu-

²⁷ That is, the non-aligned and neutral non-nuclear-weapon States members of the Committee not associated with the major blocs, namely, Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

²⁸ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4* (A/S-10/4), sect. III, para. 109.

larly in the nuclear area and, later, to general and complete disarmament. For the Soviet Union, general and complete disarmament implied the equal disarmament of all States of the world, without any hidden advantages for or prejudice to the national security interests of any party, while providing for comprehensive international control. Along with others of the group of socialist States in the Committee, the USSR referred also to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, at which the General Secretary and Chairman of the Presidium, L. I. Brezhnev, had announced initiatives aimed towards achievement of concrete disarmament measures. The socialist group also referred to the comprehensive programme, noting that its ultimate objective was general and complete disarmament.

Bulgaria expressed concern that the advantages of détente were being questioned so as to present it as being a unilateral advantage to one side and in that light it recalled that the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty had affirmed that there were no types of weapons which they would not be willing to limit or reduce on a basis of reciprocity. Along with Czechoslovakia and Hungary, Bulgaria expressed the hope that a European disarmament conference would evolve from the Madrid meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Czechoslovakia blamed NATO for policies hindering the relaxation of international tension and for increasing armament programmes while the socialist countries were making efforts to move disarmament negotiations forward; it subsequently related the basic aspirations of its foreign policy with the goal of general and complete disarmament. The German Democratic Republic similarly berated NATO actions, particularly those regarding deployment of new weapons to close an alleged arms gap, and held that there was, in reality, no such gap, but rather an equilibrium; other socialist countries, notably Hungary and Mongolia, expressed similar views.

China, referring to the widespread concern about the world situation, especially to events in Afghanistan, Cambodia and Europe and their adverse effects on disarmament negotiations, stated that the rivalry between the super-Powers continued to intensify, while the people of the world were calling ever more vigorously for an end to aggression and a halt to the arms race. China felt that, while the few great Powers' monopoly over disarmament negotiations had been reduced, the views and demands of small and medium-sized countries did not yet command the respect that they deserved.

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland similarly felt that the intervention in Afghanistan, among other events, inevitably affected prospects for arms control and stated its firm belief that those prospects were inescapably related to a restoration of international confidence. The United Kingdom felt that the comprehensive programme of disarmament would be useful, not as a legally binding instrument, but rather as a spur to progress in negotiations by helping to keep in focus the difficult path towards the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament and the world community's commitment to verifiable measures of arms control.

The United States explained that its policies on disarmament, security and foreign-policy issues were undergoing an intensive review. It held, however, that while it had exercised restraint in armaments programmes, even

cancelling some of them, the USSR had continued to build up militarily in all spheres, which had led to NATO plans in late 1979 for a military response as the only possible means of maintaining a balance to preserve peace. That response was to a Soviet buildup which in large measure — including nuclear-tipped SS-20 missiles — had already taken place, while the NATO plans to strengthen its nuclear posture would not come to fruition for some years. The United States emphasized that an arms race was neither in its interest nor that of the Soviet society and, together with its allies, it had undertaken serious efforts to negotiate solutions to the regrettable armaments buildup.

The Federal Republic of Germany stated that it attached importance to stable nuclear balance as a requirement for peace and security, and referred to NATO's double-track 1979 decision as being aimed on the one hand at a measured modernization and deployment in Europe of certain nuclear systems, and on the other at arms control negotiations with the objective of equal and verifiable limitations at the lowest possible level. Although realization of the goal of general and complete disarmament would take time, the world had to do all it could to achieve reduced military arsenals and forces, beginning, as a first step, with confidence-building measures. Italy, for its part, observed that the international situation offered no greater cause for optimism than it had a year earlier; however, with the forthcoming second special session in mind, the Committee had to proceed rapidly to create an auspicious climate for its success. Like a number of members, Italy hoped that the Madrid conference referred to above would lead to restored confidence and to the convening of a conference on disarmament in Europe. Towards the end of the session, it stated that the need for a comprehensive programme stemmed, on the one hand, from the impossibility of achieving general and complete disarmament "all at once and immediately" and, on the other, from the desirability of placing any partial or collateral measure within a framework leading to the goal.

Also near the end of the session, the representative of Burma, as co-ordinator of the group of 21, presented a paper²⁹ in which the group explained its views about the various issues before the Committee and its working groups and progress thereon. The group, *inter alia*, considered it imperative that concrete negotiations should be initiated to reduce current international tensions and halt and reverse the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race. A group of socialist countries, in a paper on the results of the 1981 session,³⁰ stated that even in the difficult international situation they had maintained an approach aimed at constructive negotiations and were convinced as never before that it was important to intensify efforts towards the limitation of the arms race and disarmament. Romania, for its part, stated that a balance of forces could be maintained either through the action-reaction sequence and increasing armaments, or through the negotiated reduction of arms and military

²⁹ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27)*, appendix II (CD/228), document CD/222 and Corr.1.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, document CD/224.

expenditures with verification under appropriate international control as an integral element; convinced of every State's responsibility to contribute to increased confidence and the start of a real disarmament process, Romania worked consistently towards those ends. The USSR stated that the results of the 1981 session of the Committee, when viewed from the standpoint of actual achievements, hardly gave grounds for satisfaction. The United Kingdom, however, felt that the steady pace of the work of the Committee should not be denied; in its view the working groups had played an essential role in clarifying and creating an understanding of the positions of all Governments, without which there could be no agreement.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1981

In 1981, the fundamental recognition of general and complete disarmament as the essential objective of all disarmament efforts was reiterated many times during the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, both in plenary meetings and in the First Committee.³¹ Twelve draft resolutions dealing with a variety of topical issues were introduced and discussed in the Committee under the item "General and complete disarmament"; various papers and documents were also transmitted to the Assembly under the agenda item (see pages 27-28 below).

As in other recent years, most general references to disarmament emphasized the need for the beginning of a disarmament process rather than the end result. That theme was put forward in the light of the increasing danger posed by the ongoing arms race in a period of deteriorated international relations. A number of States emphasized the need for confidence-building and preservation of détente, particularly between the major Powers, to create an atmosphere conducive to disarmament.

The United Kingdom, for instance, whose main plenary address was on behalf of the ten members of the European Economic Community (hereinafter referred to as the European Community), stated that Europe contained the greatest concentration of military forces in the world and emphasized the recognition by the Ten of the need to lessen tension by maintaining a dialogue between East and West and to reduce armaments on both sides. Despite disappointments, the Ten believed that there was no substitute for painstaking negotiation of specific agreements resulting in arms control which would increase confidence and the security of all. The German Democratic Republic noted with regret that all pertinent negotiations were interrupted or stalled and emphasized that the dialogue should be oriented towards halting the arms race in all its aspects, to cover, *inter alia*, cessation of development and production, reduction of existing arsenals and prevention of the geographical spread of armaments. That would require a strengthening

³¹ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 33rd and 91st meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 44th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

of confidence and enhancement of international security politically and legally, for instance, through a treaty on the non-use of force. India emphasized the consistent concern of the non-aligned countries about nuclear issues, and held that the vicious cycle of action and response characterizing the upward spiral of the arms race could be broken. It hoped that the new dialogue between the United States and the USSR would result in a fresh start in that regard. Meanwhile, it held, the world was on the brink of disaster. Among the States which referred to the established goal itself was Fiji, which stated that it would continue to work for the realization of general and complete disarmament.

In the First Committee, most of the general views expressed were similar, focusing particularly on the need for the disarmament process to begin through the implementation of concrete disarmament measures. The Chairman, Mr. Golob of Yugoslavia, in his opening remarks affirmed that general and complete disarmament remained as the goal and felt that the Committee would agree as to the magnitude of the problem and that all had an interest in survival. Therefore the First Committee should not limit itself to the assessment that the situation was bad, but should do everything possible to reopen negotiations and improve that situation. Progress would increase trust and, conversely, the restoration of détente would make progress possible. That would require all possible political will. Nigeria observed that the arms race, aside from its destructive implications, had distorted national priorities unproductively. Since the history of disarmament efforts presented a dismal picture, the Committee had a duty to assist the Assembly to brighten the outlook towards the ultimate disarmament objective. Japan hoped that the forthcoming second special session would provide the opportunity for a review and for concrete and constructive discussions, free of polemics, on ways and means of removing obstacles and achieving actual progress in disarmament. The United Kingdom stated that its response and that of its friends to a Soviet arms buildup beyond reasonable defensive needs should include the serious search for arms control agreements with the USSR and its allies. In that connection, it suggested that if the latter would move from their tradition of secrecy towards a freer exchange of information, it would assist the conclusion of disarmament agreements built on a basis of confidence.

The USSR, for its part, stated its belief that it was necessary in the existing difficult circumstances not only to propose new practical ideas but to tackle seriously long-standing questions which indicated various routes towards general disarmament as well as partial measures. The USSR held that meticulous and lengthy past work had created a good basis for expanding arms limitation agreements and adopting real disarmament measures; in its view, all the required conditions existed. Certain States, however, still lacked the political will for this, and indeed the United States even had an "allergy" to arms limitation whereby it distorted facts and dismissed United Nations decisions, including the Final Document.

The United States stressed that it approached the problems of arms control as components of larger problems of stability and security, and

maintained that, despite Article 2 of the Charter³² stating that members shall refrain from the threat or use of force, there had been a rising tide of threats, breaches of the peace and aggression. Peace required more than the drafting of treaties and resolutions, the United States held; it required effective steps to see that the Charter, treaties and binding decisions of the Security Council were obeyed and the ability to verify compliance with their terms. The cause of the eclipse of arms control, in its view, was the expansionist policy and military buildup of the Soviet Union.

Among the many States which referred specifically to and accordingly reaffirmed the continuing viability of general and complete disarmament as the final United Nations goal in the disarmament field were Chad, Ethiopia, India, Ireland, Mongolia, Nepal (on behalf of the Asian Group of States), Peru, the United Republic of Cameroon, Venezuela and Zambia, with some of them emphasizing the crucial need for early concrete action or the primacy of nuclear disarmament, others the role that public opinion could play, and still others the need in all disarmament negotiations to have a planned programme and to keep the comprehensive approach in view.

In 1981, 12 draft resolutions were submitted to the First Committee under the agenda item entitled "General and complete disarmament" between 6 and 18 November and introduced in the Committee at its 28th to 44th meetings, from 10 to 25 November. All of the draft resolutions — some following substantive revision — were adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December as resolutions 36/97 A to 36/97 L. Because 10 of the 12 resolutions deal with specific topical issues, they are covered in other chapters of this volume, as follows:

- (a) Resolution 36/97 A (Study on conventional disarmament) — chapter XVII;
- (b) Resolution 36/97 B (Radiological weapons convention) — chapter XIV;
- (c) Resolution 36/97 C (Preventing an arms race in outer space) — chapter XVI;
- (d) Resolution 36/97 D (Study on institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament) — chapter XXII;
- (e) Resolution 36/97 E (Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present) — chapter VI;
- (f) Resolution 36/97 F (Study on confidence-building measures) — chapter XXII;
- (g) Resolution 36/97 G (Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes) — chapter VI;
- (h) Resolution 36/97 H (Study on all the aspects of regional disarmament) — chapter XVII;
- (i) Resolution 36/97 I (Strategic arms limitation talks) — chapter VI;
- (j) Resolution 36/97 L (Study on disarmament and international security) — chapter XXII.

The remaining two resolutions, 36/97 J (Report of the Committee on Disarmament) and 36/97 K (Disarmament and international security) are discussed in this chapter as are also the pertinent aspects of certain resolutions initiated under agenda items outside the disarmament field but containing

³² See *Charter of the United Nations*, Article 2, para. 4.

elements specifically related to the general question of disarmament. The agenda items concerned in 1981 were entitled "Historical responsibility of States for the preservation of nature for present and future generations" and "Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security"

The draft resolution entitled "Report of the Committee on Disarmament" was sponsored by the Bahamas, Chile, Ghana, Guatemala, the Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritania, New Zealand, the Niger, Portugal, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Spain, the Sudan, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey and Uruguay, and was introduced in the First Committee by Turkey at the 36th meeting, on 19 November. The Turkish representative explained that the draft concerned solely the question of review of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament, as had other recent resolutions, namely 33/91 G, by which the Assembly had recommended completion of the first membership review at its next special session on disarmament, and 35/156 I, by which the Assembly had reaffirmed its request to the Committee on Disarmament to consider and report back to it on the modalities of such a review. The representative stated that the report requested of the Committee on Disarmament, unfortunately, was not satisfactory either as to form or substance, and cited the relevant substantive paragraphs.³³ While the sponsors of the draft understood the tendency of the Committee to maintain a conservative approach, they felt that such an approach did not comply with the consensus wish expressed on the matter in the Final Document.³⁴ Accordingly, the current draft was substantially the same as that of the previous year, except that two paragraphs — those dealing with the Committee's continuing consideration of the matter and with its reporting thereon — had been deleted, first, because the sponsors felt that further consideration by the Committee would probably not lead to better results in the short time remaining before the Assembly's second special session on disarmament and, secondly, on the assumption that a solution satisfactory to all would be found at that session. Thus the draft constituted a restatement of the desire for a periodical review of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament as called for in the Final Document.

The draft resolution was approved by the First Committee on 24 November by a recorded vote of 118 to none, with 10 abstentions. In explanation of its abstention, the USSR stated that the question of membership of the Committee on Disarmament came within the purview of the Committee itself and that many socialist, non-aligned and other members did not favour reviewing the Committee's membership for the next few years. Hungary, which also abstained, held a similar view, adding that the draft prejudged the decision of the second special session and noting that the lack of results in the work of the Committee on Disarmament was not due to its size, composition, working methods or rules. Greece, while recognizing that the question of membership was delicate, had voted in favour of the draft in the

³³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27)*, paras. 15-21; for a summary, see above, p. 15.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, paras. 28 and 120.

hope that it would encourage the Committee on Disarmament to adopt measures without delay to facilitate to the utmost the participation in its work of States outside its membership.

The draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December by a recorded vote of 134 to none, with 12 abstentions (including the Eastern European States, except Romania). Resolution 36/97 J reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recognizing that all the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations,

Recognizing also that all States have the duty to contribute to and the right to participate in disarmament negotiations, as acknowledged in paragraph 28 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Recalling, to that effect, its resolutions 33/91 G of 16 December 1978 and 35/156 I of 12 December 1980,

Noting that under section IX of the rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament non-member States have been invited to participate in the work of the Committee,

Recalling also that the membership of the Committee on Disarmament is to be reviewed at regular intervals in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document,

1. *Takes note* of the relevant parts of the report of the Committee on Disarmament on its session held in 1981 in which various options and different views were stated;
2. *Recommends* that the first review of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament should be completed, following appropriate consultation among Member States, during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;
3. *Reaffirms* that States not members of the Committee on Disarmament should upon their request continue to be invited by it to participate in the work of the Committee.

The draft resolution entitled "Disarmament and international security" was submitted by Cyprus and was subsequently revised; in revised form it was sponsored also by Argentina, the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Kenya, the Niger, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia, and was introduced by Cyprus on 20 November. The changes made in the original draft involved a number of points of formulation, mainly in the preambular part, to gain its wider acceptance.

Before the vote, the draft was further revised orally, as announced by Cyprus, so that operative paragraph 2 would refer to the implementation of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter as a whole rather than to article 43 only, as had been the case in the original version.³⁵

In its introduction, Cyprus stated that the sponsors were convinced that progress on the reduction of arms required first the stopping of the arms race. This was of concern because so much effort was being made to implement disarmament measures without realization of the impossibility of proceeding with disarmament while at the same time arming more effectively. The arms

³⁵ Chapter VII, embracing Articles 39 to 51, deals with "Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression" while Article 43 specifically concerns States Members making available to the Security Council, in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance and facilities for maintenance of international peace and security.

race could not be stopped while the doctrine of deterrence and strategic balance was regarded as the sole means of security. The alternative, the sponsors held, was to develop the measures and modalities for collective security as mandated by the Charter. After explaining the main features of the revised draft, the representative of Cyprus stressed that it was aimed at stimulating co-operation among the members of the Security Council, particularly its permanent members, in implementing the system of international security set out in the Charter.

The First Committee approved the revised draft resolution by a recorded vote of 114 to none, with 9 abstentions. Canada and Japan, while voting in favour, announced that they objected to some of the language in the fifth preambular paragraph (see below), and Italy explained that it had abstained because of the same objection. The General Assembly adopted the draft by a recorded vote of 132 to none, with 11 abstentions. Resolution 36/97 K reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 34/83 A of 11 December 1979 and 35/156 J of 12 December 1980,

Alarmed by the present grave state of international affairs characterized by marked deterioration in the relationship between the major military Powers, which seriously jeopardizes the process of détente and results in the flaring up of new, and in the continuation of old, conflicts in various parts of the world,

Deeply concerned over the long stagnation in the disarmament process, the intensification of the arms race, both quantitative and qualitative, and the increased threat of a nuclear conflagration,

Convinced that for achieving progress on the reduction of arms and armaments, the arms race must first be stopped,

Convinced further that the arms race cannot be stopped as long as the concepts of balance of weapons or of deterrence continue to be regarded as the sole means for the security of nations,

Aware that the best hope for arresting the pernicious spiral of the arms race is by the provision of alternative means of security for nations rather than through reliance on the balance of armaments or of deterrence,

Aware further that the rational alternative means for such security is to move towards a halt in the arms race by developing in a parallel way the measures and modalities for collective security as mandatorily required by the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling paragraph 13 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it is stated that genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces by international agreement and mutual example,

Considering that it is of essential importance to create a climate of confidence in the United Nations which will open the way to co-operation among Member States, in fulfilling the common and basic obligations under the Charter,

Noting with satisfaction the references to statements made by representatives of a number of Member States, including the two major Powers, in the First Committee during the current session of the General Assembly, indicating positive attitudes towards effective use of the United Nations in improving the international situation and preventing war,

Reaffirming its resolution 35/156 J of 12 December 1980, adopted by consensus, in which, *inter alia*, it recommended that the main organs of the United Nations responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security should give early consideration to the requirements for halting the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and developing the modalities for the effective application of the system of international security provided for in the Charter,

Reiterating its request to the permanent members of the Security Council to facilitate the work of the Council towards carrying out this essential responsibility under the Charter,

1. *Calls upon* all States to take prompt action for the implementation of General Assembly resolution 35/156 J, which would render effective the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and thereby be conducive to meaningful disarmament negotiations;

2. *Deems it necessary*, as a first step in this direction, that the Security Council take the required measures towards the implementation of Chapter VII of the Charter, which would reinforce the foundations of peace, security and order through the United Nations and avert the growing threat of nuclear conflagration.

The item entitled "Historical responsibility of States for the preservation of nature for present and future generations" was on the General Assembly agenda for the second successive year, this time in pursuance of resolution 35/8 by which the Secretary-General was asked, with the co-operation of the United Nations Environment Programme, to prepare a report on the pernicious effects of the arms race on nature and, in that connection, to seek the views of States on possible measures to be taken. The Assembly had before it the Secretary-General's report,³⁶ which stated that replies had been received from 34 Governments, showing a great variety of reactions to the matter. The status of the report is reviewed in appendix II to the present volume.

The 1981 draft resolution was again dealt with by the General Assembly without reference to a committee; it was introduced at the 41st plenary meeting by the USSR, and was considered and adopted at the same meeting, on 27 October, by a recorded vote of 80 to none, with 55 abstentions. Among those which explained their vote, the United Kingdom on behalf of the European Community stated that the Ten would abstain because of apparent lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Governing Council of UNEP for the matter and their view that UNEP was not the appropriate forum to deal with issues directly related to the disarmament process. The resolution, 36/7, reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 35/8 of 30 October 1980,

Noting that the continuation and intensification of the arms race are adversely affecting the human environment and damaging the vegetable and animal world,

Attaching great importance to the development of planned and constructive international co-operation in solving the problems of preserving nature,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the historical responsibility of States for the preservation of nature for present and future generations,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General, with the co-operation of the United Nations Environment Programme and on the basis of the studies now in progress and of the views expressed by States on this subject, to complete the preparation of a report containing recommendations for the adoption by States of specific obligations and measures relating to the protection of nature from the pernicious effects of the arms race, and to the limitation and prohibition of the types of military activity which present the greatest danger for nature;

2. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to submit the report referred to in paragraph 1 above to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

³⁶ A/36/532.

Under the item "Review of the Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security", which was assigned to the First Committee in accordance with its mandate, the Assembly adopted three resolutions, 36/102, 36/103 and 36/104, entitled, respectively, "Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security"; "Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States"; and "Implementation of the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace". Many documents — 57 in all — were submitted to the Assembly under the item.³⁷ The three resolutions are disarmament-related and 36/102 makes specific references, as follows:

The General Assembly,

...

5. *Urges* all States, in particular the permanent members of the Security Council, to take all necessary measures to prevent the further aggravation of the international situation and disruption of the process of détente and, to this end:

(a) to seek the peaceful settlement of disputes and the resolution of the focal points of crises and tensions;

(b) to start serious, meaningful and effective negotiations on disarmament and on the halting of the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race, on the basis of the recommendation of the General Assembly at its tenth special session;

(c) to contribute to an urgent solution of international economic problems and the establishment of the new international economic order;

(d) to accelerate economic development of developing countries, particularly the least developed ones;

(e) to proceed without any delay to a global consideration of ways and means for a revival of the world economy and for the restructuring of international economic relations within the framework of the global negotiations;

...

11. *Calls upon* the Security Council to take appropriate effective measures to promote the fulfilment of the objectives of the denuclearization of Africa in order to avert the serious danger which the nuclear capability of South Africa constitutes to the African States, in particular the front-line States, as well as to international peace and security;

12. *Reiterates* its support for the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and expresses the hope that the Conference on the Indian Ocean, which is an important stage in the realization of the objectives of that Declaration, will be held not later than in the first half of 1983 and, to this end, calls upon all States to contribute effectively to the success of this Conference;

13. *Calls upon* all States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, at Madrid, to take all possible measures and exert every effort in order to ensure substantial and balanced results of this meeting in the implementation of the principles and goals established by the Final Act of the Conference at Helsinki, as well as the continuity of the multilateral process initiated by the Conference, which has great significance for the strengthening of peace and security in Europe and in the world;

14. *Considers* that further efforts are necessary for the transformation of the region of the Mediterranean into a zone of peace and co-operation on the basis of the principles of equal security, sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, non-intervention and non-interference, non-violation of international frontiers, non-use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes and just and viable solutions of the existing problems and crises in the area on the basis of the Charter and relevant resolutions of the United Nations, respect for sovereignty over natural resources, and the right of peoples to make their own decisions independently and without any outside pressure or intimidation;

³⁷ A/36/761, para. 4.

15. *Calls upon* all Governments to submit to this effect, before the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, their views on the question of the strengthening of security and co-operation in the region of the Mediterranean and requests the Secretary-General to submit the report on this question to the Assembly at its thirty-seventh session;

The voting patterns on the resolutions under this item — together with those on other disarmament-related resolutions having a bearing on various issues — are contained in appendix VIII to the present volume under the sub-heading “Resolutions on related questions”

The documents placed before the Assembly or the First Committee under the item entitled “General and complete disarmament”³⁸ and not already mentioned are listed here individually for ready reference:

(a) Report of the Secretary-General containing the views of Member States on the study on all the aspects of regional disarmament;³⁹

(b) Report of the Secretary-General on the study of the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament;⁴⁰

(c) Report of the Secretary-General on confidence-building measures containing the comprehensive study of the Group of Governments’ Experts on Confidence-building Measures;⁴¹

(d) Report of the Secretary-General on the study on the relationship between disarmament and international security;⁴²

(e) Letter dated 26 February 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General;⁴³

(f) Letter dated 2 March 1981 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting the documents of the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi from 9 to 13 February 1981;⁴⁴

(g) Letter dated 24 June 1981 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General;⁴⁵

(h) Letter dated 2 July 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Romania to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General;⁴⁶

(i) Letter dated 3 July 1981 from the Chargé d’Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the German Democratic Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General;⁴⁷

(j) Note verbale dated 25 June 1981 from the Permanent Mission of Bulgaria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General;⁴⁸

(k) Note verbale dated 20 July 1981 from the Permanent Mission of Bulgaria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General;⁴⁹

³⁸ A/36/756, para. 4.

³⁹ A/36/343 and Add.1.

⁴⁰ A/36/392.

⁴¹ A/36/474 and Corr.1.

⁴² A/36/597.

⁴³ A/36/112.

⁴⁴ A/36/116 and Corr.1.

⁴⁵ A/36/347.

⁴⁶ A/36/358.

⁴⁷ A/36/359 and Corr.1.

⁴⁸ A/36/364.

⁴⁹ A/36/391 and Corr.1.

(l) Letter dated 5 August 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General containing the final communiqué of the Twelfth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held at Baghdad from 1 to 5 June 1981;⁵⁰

(m) Note verbale dated 4 August 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General;⁵¹

(n) Note verbale dated 26 August 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Viet Nam to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General;⁵²

(o) Letter dated 18 September 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Romania to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General;⁵³

(p) Letter dated 30 September 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General containing the communiqué of the Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegations of the Non-Aligned Countries to the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations held on 25 and 28 September 1981;⁵⁴

(q) Letter dated 5 October 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General containing the resolutions adopted by the 68th Inter-Parliamentary Conference, held at Havana from 15 to 23 September 1981;⁵⁵

(r) Letter dated 9 October 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General containing the final communiqué and declaration of the Meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government held at Melbourne from 30 September to 7 October 1981.⁵⁶

Conclusion

In 1981, the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control was again affirmed in various United Nations bodies as the desired aim of all disarmament efforts. At the same time, as in other recent years, most of the focus on disarmament in the comprehensive sense was directed at stopping the arms race and getting a process of genuine disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, started, or at least at achieving specific measures of arms control. This focus was particularly evident in 1981 in the light of continuing tensions and disturbing developments in the international arena. Strong emphasis was placed on the importance of building confidence and restoring and strengthening détente in order to create an international atmosphere conducive to progress in disarmament.

Also as in other years, the relevant item on the General Assembly's agenda was interpreted flexibly, and within its framework a wide variety of communications, documents and draft resolutions designed to convey ideas to foster disarmament or to cover issues not otherwise on the agenda were submitted to the Assembly. This broad interpretation of the general item may

⁵⁰ A/36/421 and Corr.1.

⁵¹ A/36/422.

⁵² A/36/456.

⁵³ A/36/528 and Corr.1.

⁵⁴ A/36/566.

⁵⁵ A/36/584.

⁵⁶ A/36/587.

be attributed in part to widespread agreement that disarmament can be achieved only in steps or stages involving carefully considered partial measures, and in part to the realization that the distance from the present state of over-armament to a truly disarmed and peaceful world is very great indeed, suggesting the exploration of all worthy ideas. The comprehensive approach, however, generally calls for the partial measures to become elements of a systematic plan which keeps the ultimate goal in sight as its end point.

All these factors and considerations combine to support the view that the Members of the United Nations have a grave and urgent responsibility to work out their differences so that concrete results may be achieved to alleviate the present atmosphere of tension, thus leading to both increased security and lower levels of armaments as the start of the process leading eventually to general and complete disarmament.

CHAPTER II

Follow-up of the tenth special session of the General Assembly

Introduction

FOLLOW-UP ACTION, TO MONITOR AND PRESS for implementation of the agreed disarmament requirements emanating from the 1978 special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, was recognized, even before the session began, as essential to ensuring its practical effectiveness.

This requirement is embodied in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,¹ which states that an item entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session" shall be included in the agenda of the Assembly at its thirty-third and subsequent sessions.

Among the first of the decisions of the special session to be implemented were those concerning the revitalization and strengthening of the disarmament machinery.² Accordingly, substantive follow-up activities since the session have been carried out primarily in the deliberating and negotiating bodies set up in accordance with the Final Document.

The deliberative bodies are, first, the General Assembly, which, in view of the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in disarmament, is called upon to encourage and facilitate the implementation of disarmament measures; secondly, the First Committee of the General Assembly, which, since the tenth special session, has dealt only with disarmament and related security questions; and, finally, the Disarmament Commission, a subsidiary organ of the Assembly whose function is to consider and make recommendations on various disarmament questions, including that of follow-up, to the General Assembly. The multilateral negotiating body is the 40-member³ Committee on Disarmament, which has a special relationship with the General Assembly; the Assembly makes requests to the Committee, and the Committee reports to the Assembly annually. The

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4* (A/S-10/4), sect. III; the Final Document is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, appendix I.

² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4* (A/S-10/4), sect. III, paras. 113-124.

³ See chapter I, foot-note 18, for listing.

Committee may establish subsidiary bodies to deal with specific questions. All of the bodies concerned have undertaken their work in the light of the principles, priorities and procedures set out in the Programme of Action⁴ and other relevant provisions of the Final Document.

In addition, some of the proposals which were listed in the Final Document as deserving further and more thorough study⁵ following the session have led to the establishment of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (see chapter XX below) and to the undertaking by the United Nations of various disarmament studies (chapters XX-XXII).

Other actions taken on the basis of the work of the special session include the establishment in 1979 of the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament⁶ and, in 1980, of the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, whose work is discussed separately in chapter III below.

The follow-up actions mentioned above by no means cover all the bodies whose structure or activities were defined nor all of the disarmament and related initiatives which have stemmed from the 1978 special session because, in connection with both procedural and disarmament undertakings, the Final Document is exhaustive, describing a truly comprehensive approach. As of the end of 1981, however, it may be stated that there has been more progress in respect of machinery and procedural matters than on questions of disarmament.

The concern of many States over lack of progress in disarmament, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document, is evident in the following sections of this chapter.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1981

The Disarmament Commission is identified in the Final Document as being "composed of all States Members of the United Nations" as "a deliberative body, a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly," and is called upon, *inter alia*, "to follow up the relevant decisions and recommendations of the special session devoted to disarmament"⁷ Accordingly, throughout the three substantive sessions it has held since its establishment, most of the items on the Commission's agenda have had relevance to the 1978 special session.⁸ In

⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4* (A/S-10/4), sect. III, paras. 43-112.

⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 125.

⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 108; the programme is discussed in *The Yearbook*, vol. 4: 1979, chap. XXV; see also *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, chap. II.

⁷ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4* (A/S-10/4), sect. III, para. 118.

⁸ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42* (A/34/42), para. 9; *ibid.*, *Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 42* (A/35/42), para. 8, and *ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 42* (A/36/42), para. 7. (The substantive agenda of the Disarmament Commission are summarized in *The Yearbook*, vol. 4: 1979, chap. II, and *ibid.*, vol. 5: 1980, chap. II, and the organization of its work is discussed in *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, chap. 4.)

1981, such items included the major ones carried over from the previous year, namely:

4. (a) Consideration of various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, in order to expedite negotiations aimed at effective elimination of the danger of nuclear war;
- (b) Consideration of the agenda items contained in section II of resolution 33/71 H, with the aim of elaborating, within the framework and in accordance with the priorities established at the tenth special session, a general approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament
5. Reduction of military budgets:
 - (a) Harmonization of views on concrete steps to be undertaken by States regarding a gradual, agreed reduction of military budgets and reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries, noting the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;
 - (b) Examination and identification of effective ways and means of achieving agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain, in a balanced manner, military expenditures, including adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned, taking into account the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 34/83 F and 35/142 A and, in particular, to identify and elaborate on the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military expenditures, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles into a suitable document at an appropriate stage

and two new items, one concerning a study on conventional weapons and the other calling for a report to the Assembly at its second special session (see chap. XVII and p. 35 below). For the third year in a row, the Disarmament Commission reported that it had been unable to consider the item on its agenda⁹ concerning the list of proposals and suggestions contained in the Final Document which the Assembly identified as "an integral part of the work of the special session" and as deserving "to be studied further and more thoroughly";¹⁰ since the special session, however, a number of the proposals in the list have been the subject of separate initiatives and received specific attention in other forums.

During its deliberations in 1981, the Disarmament Commission's concern with effective follow-up and implementation of the measures agreed upon at the Assembly's tenth special session was evidenced repeatedly, both during the general exchange of views in plenary meetings¹¹ and in the Commission's recommendations on its various agenda items, as recorded in its report.¹²

During the exchange of views, the agenda item covering various aspects

⁹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/34/42)*, para. 21; *ibid.*, *Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/35/42)*, para. 23; and *ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/36/42)*, para. 25.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, para. 125 (appears also in *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, appendix I). It should be noted that the list contains 33 items.

¹¹ See A/CN.10/PV.43-54, A/CN.10/PV.54/Add.1, A/CN.10/PV.41-54/Corrigendum, and A/CN.10/32.

¹² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/36/42)*, paras. 19-25.

of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and a general approach to negotiations — the only one to make specific mention of the tenth special session — gave rise to reaffirmation of the need for effective follow-up and that requirement was voiced throughout the general exchange.

The representative of Nigeria advocated that the Commission give special emphasis to providing effective recommendations on the issues which had been already agreed, by consensus, to be most urgent. In that way it could best contribute to the success of the Assembly's second special session devoted to disarmament in 1982. Accordingly, in the light of the emphasis in the 1978 Final Document on nuclear disarmament and the lack of essential achievements in that area, the Commission should make appropriate recommendations to stimulate negotiations on nuclear disarmament in the Committee on Disarmament in which both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States would be expected to co-operate.

Among other States which expressed particular concern about lack of progress since the 1978 special session were Algeria, Egypt, Pakistan and Yugoslavia, all of which noted the clear measures and priorities set out in the Final Document, with Pakistan referring to it as no less than a "blueprint" for disarmament negotiations. None the less, Pakistan added, the goals set forth remained as distant as ever and progress on even the first steps towards nuclear disarmament had been halting and disappointing. Algeria and Yugoslavia placed the blame for non-implementation of the provisions of the Final Document on a lack of political will and resolve, especially on the part of States which had the largest arsenals and hence bore the greatest responsibility.

The German Democratic Republic reiterated its support of the firm foundation for disarmament negotiations set out in the Final Document and of implementation of the Programme of Action; it advocated that, at the second special session, the Assembly should take decisions to promote the implementation of the decisions taken at the 1978 special session. Similarly, Bulgaria felt that in preparing for the second special session, the Commission could and should promote a constructive dialogue on disarmament questions and on the creation of preconditions for a breakthrough which would lead to their settlement.

Bangladesh commented on a general inability of the United Nations to implement either Security Council or General Assembly resolutions but held that, given political will, the Commission could make proposals which would lead to the success of the second special session. It stated that any listing of disarmament measures should show categories of weapons and priorities. It recalled that in the Final Document it was recognized that any disarmament measure, to be effective, had to be verifiable and that there were close relationships between disarmament and international security and disarmament and development.

Denmark, in the general exchange, referred to the working paper which it circulated¹³ on the item concerning a study on the conventional arms race

¹³ A/CN.10/25.

and disarmament, and in that context stressed that the Final Document provided appropriate guiding principles, linking negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures with the balanced reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments.¹⁴ China,¹⁵ the German Democratic Republic¹⁶ and India¹⁷ also submitted working papers pertaining to the item, and the Netherlands, on behalf of the ten members of the European Community, stated that the Ten believed that the Commission should focus on that agenda item and on the item on the reduction of military budgets; Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany endorsed that view. Regarding military budgets, the Commission had before it a report of the Secretary-General,¹⁸ a background paper prepared by the Secretariat¹⁹ and a working paper submitted by Romania and Sweden.²⁰ Conventional disarmament is dealt with in chapter XVII and military budgets in chapter XIX below.

In its recommendations on the item on various aspects of the arms race and a general approach to negotiations, which were adopted by consensus,²¹ the Disarmament Commission stated:

1. On agenda item 4 (a) and (b) there was an exchange of views in the general debate and in an informal meeting of the committee of the whole. Delegations stressed the urgent need for steps to improve the current international situation, for measures of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, and for the implementation of the Programme of Action of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly.

It also included the following paragraphs containing direct references to the Final Document:

8. The Commission noted that the most recent agreements on strategic arms control between the two most heavily armed nuclear-weapon States remain unratified. Further, the Commission deplored the fact that military expenditures are reaching ever higher levels, largely by the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, and emphasized the necessity of releasing such resources to economic and social development in the world, particularly for the benefit of developing countries. The lack of progress in disarmament and the upward spiral in the arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect and the interaction of those factors with further aggravated international tension have adversely affected the realization of the Programme of Action contained in the Final Document and of the objectives of the first Disarmament Decade. In this connexion, the Commission emphasized the urgent need for the early attainment of the objectives of the Second Disarmament Decade.

12. The Commission noted again with profound regret that, although there had been limited progress in certain areas, there continued to be a marked lack of progress, particularly in the priority items in the Programme of Action adopted at the tenth special session of the General Assembly. It called upon all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, urgently to take action

¹⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4* (A/S-10/4), paras. 22 and 28 (cited by Denmark), and paras. 45, 46, 54, 55 and 81-85 (which were not specifically referred to).

¹⁵ A/CN.10/28.

¹⁶ A/CN.10/31.

¹⁷ A/CN.10/27.

¹⁸ A/CN.10/23 and Add.1-6.

¹⁹ A/CN.10/24 and Corr.1.

²⁰ A/CN.10/26.

²¹ The United States expressed a reservation (see chap. I above, page 13).

so as to achieve more rapid progress in the field of genuine disarmament, with particular emphasis on the priorities established by Assembly resolutions and especially in the Final Document of the tenth special session. The Commission expressed the view that the Committee on Disarmament, in conformity with its mandate, should fully discharge its responsibilities in order to promote rapid progress on all items on its agenda, paying due regard to the priorities set out in the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document.

The Commission made the following recommendations on the item on a report to the General Assembly at its second special session:

The Disarmament Commission considered item 7 in a number of formal and informal meetings and agreed to request the Secretariat to prepare the report to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament on the basis of the following outline:

- I. *Introduction*: Establishment of the Disarmament Commission by the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament.
- II. *Organization of Work of the Commission*: Election of the Bureau; duration of the sessions; records and rules of procedure.
- III. *Work of the Commission at its substantive sessions*: Agenda of the substantive sessions.

The part of the report related to conclusions and recommendations will be prepared at the next substantive session of the Commission.

Aside from the foregoing, the Disarmament Commission in 1981 showed that it was genuinely aware of the fundamental importance of follow-up and a successful outcome of the 1982 special session.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1981

The work of the Committee on Disarmament, as compared to that of the Disarmament Commission, is not so intrinsically related to follow-up of the 1978 special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, although that session led to revision of the structure and procedures of the negotiating body. For the major portion of its agenda and annual programme of work, the Committee takes into account the requests contained in pertinent disarmament resolutions of the General Assembly. These embrace mainly the action-oriented issues elaborated in the Final Document²² of the 1978 special session and in resolutions adopted at regular sessions.

A number of general statements heard in the Committee in 1981²³ reflected specific disappointment that the aspirations of the 1978 special session were not being realized; that was in addition to the over-all concern expressed about the course of international events and efforts to curb the arms race. Even more than in 1980, speakers noted that, although there had been little implementation of the Programme of Action contained in the Final Document, the time remaining until the Assembly's second special session on disarmament in 1982 was short; in particular, limited time remained for the

²² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III.

²³ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27)*, appendix III (CD/228), vols. I-VII.

Committee to elaborate the comprehensive programme of disarmament which had been specifically requested for that session (see chapter IV below).

The Secretary-General, in his message to the Committee at the opening meeting, observed that events in the deliberative sphere served to highlight the expectation for results in the negotiating process. Thus parallel progress at both levels was essential to avoid a gap which would adversely affect the functioning of the machinery deriving from the Assembly's first special session on disarmament. The representative of France, in his capacity as Chairman at the same meeting, stated that the Committee on Disarmament must make progress to help maintain the impetus created by the General Assembly at its first special session and thus create conditions for a successful second session.

Among the members which addressed the matter of follow-up directly, Yugoslavia stressed that at the 1978 special session all countries by consensus had opted for the acceleration of negotiations and opening them to new fields. In keeping with the clear mandate given the Committee, Yugoslavia attached particular importance to the principle that the work of the body should be carried out on equitable and democratic bases, recognizing the rights of all its members, and to the requirement for negotiations on specific questions to be conducted with a view to the earliest possible achievement of international agreements. In its third year, Yugoslavia held, the Committee ought to consider whether it had met the expectations of the international community, and what its immediate obligations were with regard to the second special session. Sweden, among others, commented particularly on the long-standing issue of a comprehensive test ban, noting the risk that 1981 could become a near failure in that regard and erode the credibility of the Committee as created at the first special session. Sweden felt that the review and assessment of the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the first special session by the Assembly at the second session might be a gloomy process, considering what the Committee had produced since January 1979. Brazil, while believing that the Committee should step up its efforts, was convinced that its work in the first part of its 1981 session laid a modest basis for some substantive progress; it went on to observe that the international community would undoubtedly expect the Committee to present concrete achievements commensurate with the mandate given it, particularly on priority questions, by the time of the second special session. Brazil as well as Canada singled out a comprehensive test ban on nuclear weapons as a possible achievement which would constitute a significant first step and, along with a number of other members, including China, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic and Pakistan, called attention to paragraph 50 of the Final Document outlining requirements for the achievement of nuclear disarmament. Among others, Belgium observed that the Final Document had identified the negotiation of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons as one of the most urgent measures required.

The Soviet Union regarded the Final Document of the first special session as a reference point for working out the comprehensive programme of disarmament since it reflected all the principal proposals and ideas put

forward by many countries. It attached particular importance to the provision in the Document for disarmament measures to take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security without any State or group obtaining advantages over others at any stage.

Belgium observed that although the Final Document had lost none of its validity, the hopes it had raised had not been fulfilled. It felt that even in the existing political climate, which had not changed since late 1979, possibilities existed for progress, however, and it called attention, *inter alia*, to the successful conclusion of the Convention on certain conventional weapons (see chapter XV below).

Near the end of the session, Romania put forth the view that the Committee at its 1981 session had demonstrated its maturity by maintaining a constructive atmosphere and not getting side-tracked in useless disputes. Thus the Committee had engendered a sense of hope and promise. At the same time, however, it could not be denied that the result obtained had fallen far short of expectations, both generally and in the context of the forthcoming second special session. At the closing meeting, the representative of Indonesia, speaking as Chairman, observed that despite nuclear disarmament having been accorded the highest priority in the Final Document, negotiations on that question had not even been started; regarding security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, the Committee had not gone beyond the pre-negotiating stage; and, regarding chemical weapons, which were also to be treated as a matter of high priority, although significant progress had been made, the Committee had not yet entered the stage of actually drafting an international instrument. He went on to say that in the time remaining until the second special session, the Committee had to strive for concrete results, which he hoped for on one or more priority items during the first part of the 1982 session.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1981

The item entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session", which has been on the Assembly's agenda since 1978, is one under which a number of draft resolutions and documents have been submitted each year, some of them dealing with specific matters covered in other chapters of *The Yearbook*.

In the general debate in plenary meetings as well as in the First Committee,²⁴ various speakers expressed not only disappointment but also concern that implementation of measures agreed upon as essential at the 1978 special session had been unsatisfactory. Emphasis was also placed on the

²⁴ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 33rd and 91st meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 44th meetings; and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

opportunity that the second special session would provide for review and revitalization of the implementation process.

In the plenary debate, for instance, Senegal, noting that the question of implementation would be considered once again at the current session, stated that it could only deplore the slowness of negotiations in accordance with the Programme of Action in respect of nuclear disarmament. New Zealand observed that prospects for disarmament since the first special session had not advanced and may indeed have receded; it went on to assign the principal responsibility for the loss of impetus in negotiations to the nuclear Powers, stating that for New Zealand the greatest disappointment was the failure to achieve a comprehensive nuclear test ban. New Zealand reiterated the same thoughts in the First Committee. Madagascar declared that it could not hide its dismay at the lack of true progress since 1978. The Bahamas, among others, linked the special session with the Second Disarmament Decade, stating that for the hopes of the Decade to be realized, the second special session on disarmament would have to build on the solid foundation set out in the Programme of Action adopted at the first special session.

In the First Committee, the United Kingdom, on behalf of the European Economic Community, stated specifically that the second special session would provide the opportunity to review achievements since 1978 and consider why progress had been so slow, to analyse the underlying causes of the arms race, to consider the work of the Committee on Disarmament, and to look into ways to speed up the implementation of the recommendations that had been agreed upon by consensus. The Ten considered it essential that the forthcoming session take full advantage of the work already accomplished at the first special session. Argentina stated that the cause of the existing situation lay in the inconsistency between the commitments assumed at the first special session and the actions which had occurred since that time. Not only had the well-founded hopes aroused in 1978 not been met, but four years after adoption of the Final Document trends could be observed which implied that basic elements of that important consensus were being called into question; Argentina found that to be alarming. Various other States, among them Guinea and Zaire, simply emphasized the paucity of progress since the first special session on disarmament, with Guinea believing that the 1982 session must deal with implementation of the decisions of the first session in all aspects, and Zaire singling out negotiations on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, a nuclear test ban and nuclear disarmament as having been marking time; in a similar context Uganda noted the lack of progress towards a comprehensive nuclear test ban, limitations on nuclear and conventional arms in Europe, additional nuclear-weapon-free zones, bans on new weapons of mass destruction, and the limitation of the buildup and transfer of conventional arms. The German Democratic Republic regarded the Final Document of the 1978 special session as furnishing a series of bench-marks for United Nations disarmament activities and believed that at its second special session the Assembly should focus on the implementation of its recommendations and decisions as well as on the consideration and adoption of new initiatives.

The draft resolutions under the agenda item on the implementation of the

recommendations and decisions of the Assembly taken at the 1978 special session were introduced in the First Committee between 6 and 20 November at its 27th to 37th meetings. The 13 proposals which were put to the vote were approved by the Committee and adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December at its 91st meeting as resolutions 36/92 A to 36/92 M. The discussion leading to the adoption of seven of the resolutions is summarized in subsequent topical chapters as follows:

(a) Resolutions 36/92 E (Nuclear weapons in all aspects), 36/92 I (Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war), and 36/92 K (Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon) — chapter VI;

(b) Resolution 36/92 L (Programme of research and studies on disarmament) — chapter XX;

(c) Resolution 36/92 G (Study on the relationship between disarmament and development) — chapter XXI;

(d) Resolution 36/92 C (World Disarmament Campaign) — chapter XXII;

(e) Resolution 36/92 J (World-wide action for collecting signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and for disarmament) — chapter XXIII.

The remaining six resolutions initiated under the item, resolutions 36/92 A, B, D, F, H and M, are discussed in this chapter.

In connection with the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament which was established by the General Assembly at its tenth special session,²⁵ the Assembly had before it the 1981 report of the Secretary-General²⁶ and adopted resolution 36/92 A. In the report it was noted that 20 fellowships were awarded. The programme included lectures, seminars, observation of the proceedings of disarmament bodies, submission of research papers, and study visits. The last mentioned item involved visits to the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary and Sweden to enable the participants in the programme to gain insight into various disarmament-related activities in those countries. As in other years, the course also included a week at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.

The draft resolution on the programme was sponsored by 23 States: Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Congo, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia and Nigeria, which introduced it in the Committee on 6 November at the 27th meeting. In his introduction, the representative of Nigeria commended the Secretary-General and the Centre for Disarmament for the efficient manner in which the programme had been organized and conducted. He also expressed the gratitude of the sponsors to the three countries which had invited the fellows for visits as part of their course.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4), sect. III, para. 108.

²⁶ A/36/606. The 20 fellows in 1981 were from: Argentina, Bangladesh, China, Colombia, Congo, Ecuador, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Kenya, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Romania, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic.

Before the First Committee took its decision on the draft resolution, Turkey further commended the programme, stating that while the award of 20 fellowships each year might appear to be a modest figure, the fellows should be perceived as a significant investment towards better handling of disarmament issues in the future.

The draft resolution was approved by the Committee at its 38th meeting on 20 November and adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December, in both cases without a vote. Resolution 36/92 A reads as follows:

The General Assembly.

Recalling its decision, taken at the tenth special session, to establish a programme of fellowships on disarmament,

Recalling also its resolution 35/152 A of 12 December 1980, in which it requested the Secretary-General to make adequate arrangements relating to the programme for 1981 in accordance with the guidelines approved by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session,

Expressing its satisfaction at the fact that Governments, particularly those of developing countries, have continued to manifest serious interest in the programme,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament for 1981,

1. *Decides* to continue the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to make adequate arrangements relating to the programme for 1982 in accordance with the guidelines approved by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session;
3. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament a report containing an assessment of the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament since its inception in 1979;
4. *Commends* the Secretary-General for the diligence with which the programme has been conducted;
5. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary and Sweden for inviting the fellows to their capitals to study selected activities in the field of disarmament, thereby contributing to the fulfilment of the over-all objectives of the programme, as well as providing additional information sources and practical knowledge for the fellows.

The draft resolution entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission" was sponsored by Egypt and Uruguay. In introducing the draft, Egypt recalled that the Commission had been established by the Assembly at its tenth special session and already had been called upon to deliberate and make recommendations on a number of important items. Thus the Commission's output had been the input for efforts in other forums. On some items, further deliberations were required before the Commission could make substantive recommendations. The draft resolution was therefore a procedural one whereby the Assembly would request the Disarmament Commission to continue its consideration of those items, taking into account its workload and schedule in the light of the approaching second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The First Committee approved the text on 20 November without a vote. Following the approval, Brazil stated that it attached great importance to a study on all aspects of conventional weapons and expressed confidence that the Disarmament Commission would be able, under the expected resolution, to complete its discussions of the guidelines for such a study. The Federal

Republic of Germany observed that by its interpretation of paragraph 3 (see below), the Commission would examine in detail what items it would discuss during its 1982 session, which would be shorter than normal. In the Federal Republic's opinion, preparation of the Commission's report to the Assembly at its second special session on disarmament would require high priority among those items.

The Assembly adopted the draft as resolution 36/92 B, which reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Disarmament Commission,

Emphasizing again the importance of an effective follow-up to the relevant recommendations and decisions adopted at its tenth special session,

Considering the important role that the Disarmament Commission has played and the significant contribution it has made in examining and submitting recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and in the promotion of the implementation of the relevant decisions of the tenth special session,

Recalling its resolutions 33/71 H of 14 December 1978, 34/83 H of 11 December 1979 and 35/152 F of 12 December 1980,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Disarmament Commission;
2. *Notes* that the Disarmament Commission was not able to conclude its consideration of the items on its agenda;
3. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to continue its work in accordance with its mandate, as set forth in paragraph 118 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and to continue consideration of the items included in its agenda at its session held in 1981 and, to that end, to meet for a period not exceeding four weeks during 1982;
4. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to submit a substantive report on its work to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament;
5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Disarmament Commission the report of the Committee on Disarmament, together with all the official records of the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly relating to disarmament matters, and to render all assistance that it may require for implementing the present resolution;
6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission"

The draft resolution entitled "International co-operation for disarmament" was sponsored by 28 States.²⁷ The representative of Czechoslovakia, in introducing it, said that its principal purpose was to encourage constructive co-operation among States aimed at the implementation of disarmament objectives, especially those emanating from the first special session. The sponsors felt that such co-operation should be based upon clear principles, reflecting a political will to find acceptable, practical solutions. The draft was based on the 1979 Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament,²⁸ and in drafting the text, the sponsors had taken into account the comments advanced by a number of delegations.

²⁷ Afghanistan, Angola, Benin, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, Indonesia, Jordan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Mali, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Poland, Sao Tome and Principe, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian SSR, Viet Nam and Yemen.

²⁸ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 4: 1979, chap. IV.

Before the First Committee vote, the United Kingdom, on behalf of the European Community, stated that, having abstained on resolution 34/88 (which embodied the 1979 Declaration), members of the Ten believed that the draft proposal added nothing to the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter or carefully formulated in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly.²⁹ They felt that the elaboration of further principles would not add to chances of success in the achievement of balanced and verifiable arms control agreements, and therefore would abstain. China, while favouring co-operation to foster disarmament and regarding certain ideas proposed in the draft as of positive significance, at the same time observed that it contained ambiguous formulations, for example, "not to hinder possible progress in negotiations on disarmament by the discussion of unrelated issues" Questioning the meaning of that reference, China did not agree with the contention that incidents of super-Power aggression had nothing to do with disarmament negotiations; in fact, such incidents undermined the climate of trust essential to negotiations and it was necessary to bring them up as the real reasons for the hampering of disarmament negotiations. Accordingly, China would not participate in the vote.

Following the vote, Pakistan, which voted in favour, stated that it none the less had serious difficulties with the third preambular paragraph, on concern about the arms race (see below), because it was the increasing use of force which led to international tension, and one manifestation of that tension was the arms race. Mexico abstained for the same reasons it had abstained on resolution 34/88 in 1979; its explanation at that time had been that the substance of the Declaration was covered by other international instruments which had been adopted by consensus. Finland had had strong misgivings about certain elements of the 1979 Declaration on which the draft was based, and accordingly had reservations about paragraph 1 (see below), and had therefore abstained. Similarly, Turkey continued to hold views which it had expressed in respect of the Declaration of 1979 which was referred to in the draft, and therefore abstained.

The Committee adopted the draft on 23 November by a recorded vote of 95 to none, with 25 abstentions; the Assembly adopted it by a recorded vote of 116 to none, with 26 abstentions. Resolution 36/92 D reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Stressing again the urgent need for an active and sustained effort to intensify the comprehensive implementation of the recommendations and decisions unanimously adopted at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, as contained in the Final Document of that session,

Convinced that, to this end, effective, constructive and continuing co-operation among all States at all levels, including the highest, on the basis of mutual confidence and political will, is essential,

Deeply concerned over the growing danger of a new round of the arms race, which would seriously jeopardize international stability and increase the danger of a nuclear catastrophe,

²⁹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4* (A/S-10/4), sect. III, paras. 11-42.

Convinced that the halting of the arms race and adoption of effective disarmament measures, particularly in the field of nuclear disarmament, would release considerable financial and material resources to be used for the economic and social development of all States, in particular developing countries,

Taking into consideration the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in combining efforts and in supporting and developing active co-operation among States aimed at the solution of disarmament problems,

Recalling in this context the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament of 11 December 1979,

Noting that the Declaration may play a positive role in concerting efforts for the achievement of effective measures in the implementation of the goals set forth to this end in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session,

1. *Calls upon* all States to observe the principles and make active use of the ideas contained in the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament so as to secure a constructive mutual dialogue aimed at limiting armaments, particularly nuclear weapons, through the conclusion of agreements, keeping in mind the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control;

2. *Calls upon* Member States to be guided in all disarmament negotiations by the generally recognized principles of international law and to submit and constructively to consider, with full responsibility and in the spirit of co-operation, proposals and initiatives aimed at promoting speedy progress in disarmament negotiations and facilitating the achievement of mutually acceptable concrete disarmament measures;

3. *Calls upon* Member States to refrain from any action that could hamper, complicate or render impossible the disarmament negotiations which are under way, the opening of new negotiations or the achievement of specific disarmament agreements and, in particular, not to hinder possible progress in negotiations on disarmament by the discussion of unrelated issues;

4. *Recommends* that the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament should make active use of the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament in the preparations for the special session;

5. *Calls upon* Member States to disseminate widely, in connexion with Disarmament Week, the principles of international co-operation designed to achieve the goals of disarmament.

The draft resolution entitled "Report of the Committee on Disarmament" was sponsored by 27 States³⁰ and introduced by the representative of Yugoslavia. In its introduction, Yugoslavia observed that, on the one hand, the 1981 report of the Committee on Disarmament³¹ had shown that the Committee and its *ad hoc* working groups had worked intensively and striven for progress and, on the other, that once again it was not able to achieve concrete results or even to begin substantive negotiations on the highest priority items on its agenda, namely, those concerning nuclear disarmament. Three and a half years after the establishment of the Committee there was resistance on the part of some of its members, including some nuclear-weapon States, to negotiate in that body on the specific issues concerned, or to establish *ad hoc* working groups for that purpose. Yugoslavia then outlined the draft resolution, stressing that the sponsors had been guided by a desire to enable the Committee on Disarmament to become an effective international

³⁰ Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Congo, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Madagascar, Mexico, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, and Zaire.

³¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27)*.

negotiating body. It noted, *inter alia*, that the draft referred to provision of appropriate negotiating mandates for the Committee's existing *ad hoc* working groups, and the establishment of such groups to deal with the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and with the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

The First Committee adopted the draft on 25 November by a recorded vote of 115 to none, with 8 abstentions.

In explanation of its position, the Soviet Union, although voting in favour, observed with regard to paragraph 4 (see below) that the separate negotiations referred to had been marking time; it also considered the work and mandates of subsidiary bodies to be the prerogative of the Committee on Disarmament itself. Australia, which had also voted in favour, believed similarly that instructing the Committee how to conduct its work constituted unwarranted interference by the Assembly. Turkey, however, regarded the text as procedural for non-members of the Committee which, in its view, could not object to requests — which appeared also in other draft resolutions — aimed at speeding up the Committee's work; it was astonished by the "contradictory" attitude of some members of the Committee. Belgium, France and the United Kingdom, which had abstained, stressed that they supported the work of the Committee but objected to various aspects of the draft resolution, in particular the fact that it dealt with subjects which were for the Committee itself to decide. The United Kingdom emphasized also that the Committee was not the only forum for negotiations, and should not necessarily have primacy on items under negotiation elsewhere; Belgium held that the draft did not sufficiently take into account that the lack of progress in the work of the Committee was due to causes outside of its field of action.

The General Assembly adopted the draft as resolution 36/92 F by a recorded vote of 136 to none, with 9 abstentions (Western States and Japan). It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 34/83 B of 11 December 1979 and 35/152 J of 12 December 1980,

Having considered the report of the Committee on Disarmament,

Affirming that the establishment of *ad hoc* working groups offers the best available machinery for the conduct of multilateral negotiations on items on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament and contributes to the strengthening of the negotiating role of the Committee on Disarmament,

Regretting that, despite the expressed wish of the great majority of members of the Committee on Disarmament, the establishment of *ad hoc* working groups to undertake multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament and on prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests was prevented during the session of the Committee held in 1981,

Expressing its deep concern that the Committee on Disarmament has not thus far been able to achieve concrete results on disarmament issues which have been under consideration for a number of years,

Convinced that the Committee on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, should play the central role in substantive negotiations on priority questions of disarmament and on the implementation of the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Stressing that negotiations on specific disarmament issues conducted outside the Committee on Disarmament should in no way serve as a pretext for preventing the conduct of multilateral negotiations on such questions in the Committee,

1. *Urges* the Committee on Disarmament to continue or undertake, during its session to be held in 1982, substantive negotiations on the priority questions of disarmament on its agenda, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and the other relevant resolutions of the Assembly on those questions and, in order to reach that goal, to provide the existing *ad hoc* working groups with appropriate negotiating mandates and to establish, as a matter of urgency, *ad hoc* working groups on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and on the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests;

2. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to complete, during the first part of its session in 1982, the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament and to submit the programme in time for consideration and adoption by the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held from 7 June to 9 July 1982;

3. *Also requests* the Committee on Disarmament to intensify its negotiations on priority questions of disarmament, so that it may be in a position to contribute, through concrete accomplishments, to the success of the second special session devoted to disarmament;

4. *Invites* the members of the Committee on Disarmament involved in separate negotiations on specific priority questions of disarmament to intensify their efforts to achieve a positive conclusion of those negotiations without further delay for submission to the Committee and, at the same time, to submit to the Committee a full report on their separate negotiations and the results achieved in order to contribute most directly to the negotiations in the Committee in accordance with paragraph 1 above;

5. *Further requests* the Committee on Disarmament to submit to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament a special report on the state of negotiations on the various questions under consideration by the Committee and also to submit a report on its work to the Assembly at its thirty-seventh session;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Report of the Committee on Disarmament"

A new draft resolution, entitled "Status of multilateral disarmament agreements", was submitted by Bulgaria. In introducing its proposal, the Bulgarian delegation noted that the Final Document in various areas dealt with questions related to multilateral disarmament agreements and it had stated especially that universality of disarmament agreements helped create confidence among States.³² Bulgaria stated that the request to the Secretary-General to prepare a composite table of the status of agreements had various precedents, including the one published in 1978 as a special supplement to *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*,³³ as was noted in the draft resolution. Since similar information contained annually in *The Yearbook* appeared after regular sessions of the Assembly, Bulgaria believed that it would be helpful to have also a clear updated picture at the beginning of each regular session since the status of agreements was continually evolving. In its view, the draft resolution was not controversial.

The draft was adopted by the Committee on 23 November by a recorded vote of 91 to none, with 22 abstentions.

Various States explained their positions. China stated that since it had particular views regarding certain existing disarmament conventions and

³² *Ibid.*, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4), sect. III, para. 40.

³³ *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.2).

agreements, it had not participated in them and accordingly it could neither agree with the draft resolution nor participate in the vote. Brazil abstained because it felt that the draft did not take into full account the sovereign right of States to adhere or not to adhere to agreements and, moreover, that it dealt only with the quantitative aspect of participation, while the absence of compliance by nuclear-weapon States to provisions of agreements to which they were parties was more important. Mexico voted for the draft because the text reaffirmed the importance of universality of multilateral agreements although, for its own part, it did not consider the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (resolution 31/72, annex)³⁴ to be "universally acceptable" as advocated by the Assembly in paragraph 40 of the Final Document. India abstained because it continued to hold its well-known position concerning the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (resolution 2373 (XXII), annex),³⁵ namely, that the Treaty was discriminatory and therefore unacceptable. Finally Guinea, which had voted in favour, announced that, had a separate vote been taken on paragraph 1, it would have abstained.

The Assembly adopted the draft by a recorded vote of 115 to none, with 23 abstentions (including Western States and others). Mexico again referred to its position on the Convention on environmental modification, known as the ENMOD Convention, which it had explained in the First Committee. Resolution 36/92 H reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Having in mind that a number of multilateral disarmament agreements have been concluded so far,

Considering that the participation in the above-mentioned agreements of as many States as possible is of special importance to the attainment of their objectives,

Noting with satisfaction the special supplement to *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook* under the title "Status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements", as well as the information on this matter included in the yearbooks,

1. *Reaffirms* the importance of the provisions concerning the question of the universality of multilateral disarmament agreements contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in particular paragraph 40;

2. *Requests* Member States depositaries of such agreements to furnish the Secretary-General with information regarding their status by the beginning of each regular session of the General Assembly;

3. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to prepare for each regular session of the General Assembly a composite table of signatories of and parties to such agreements with a view to enabling the Assembly to take up the question of their status, if it deems it appropriate.

The draft resolution entitled "Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session" was sponsored, in its final form

³⁴ See *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.2), p. 130.

³⁵ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 729 (1970), No. 10485.

following revision, by 28 States.³⁶ It was initially introduced by Yugoslavia on 17 November.

In its introduction Yugoslavia stressed, on behalf of the original sponsors, that although the ongoing debate indicated the significance attached by all members to the implementation of the measures set out in the Final Document, there was deep concern that many aims of the first special session had not been attained. There was also concern over the international situation, the crisis of détente and the suspension of certain negotiations. Accordingly, the sponsors were convinced that implementation of the decisions taken by the Assembly at its first special session was indispensable, and would be the best way to halt the arms race and create conditions conducive to disarmament. Yugoslavia then expanded on the various terms of the draft resolution.

The revisions to the draft constituted the addition of two new preambular paragraphs (the third and eighth as shown below) and a new operative paragraph 4 (see below) by which the draft incorporated certain ideas contained in an analogous draft resolution, submitted by the German Democratic Republic and sponsored also by Mongolia, entitled "Obligation of States to contribute to effective disarmament negotiations"³⁷ By that proposal the Assembly would have deplored the lack of tangible progress in respect of the Final Document and subsequent follow-up resolutions and, *inter alia*, urged States to intensify their efforts to bring current negotiations to an end and proceed to new ones according to the priorities established in the Final Document; recommended that the Committee on Disarmament concentrate on substantive and priority items on its agenda; and called upon States engaged in negotiations outside the framework of the United Nations to intensify their efforts. The German Democratic Republic stated that, in the light of the ideas incorporated in the 28-Power draft, of which it had become a sponsor, it would not press its proposal to a vote.

Yugoslavia, in introducing the amendments, stated that they reflected the results of contacts aimed at elaboration of a draft which would receive support from all sides. Yugoslavia particularly thanked the delegation of the German Democratic Republic for its contribution in that connection.

The First Committee approved the revised draft on 20 November without a vote. The United States, which joined in the consensus, stated that it strongly supported the general thrust of the resolution in that it called for progress in arms control. It was concerned, however, that the draft failed to acknowledge that genuine progress in arms control negotiations had to take into account the requirements of verification, balance and mutual restraint. Those requirements, it held, must not be obscured by hortatory or unrealistic appeals.

The General Assembly, on 9 December, adopted the draft, without a vote, as resolution 36/92 M, which reads as follows:

³⁶ Algeria, Argentina, Bahamas, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Qatar, Romania, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

³⁷ A/36/752, para. 30.

The General Assembly,

Having reviewed the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the General Assembly adopted at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Recalling its resolutions S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 34/83 C of 11 December 1979, 35/46 of 3 December 1980 and 35/152 E of 12 December 1980,

Reaffirming the importance of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, which constitutes a comprehensive basis for further efforts towards promoting international security, halting and reversing the arms race, and the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Considering it imperative to achieve genuine progress in all negotiations dealing with disarmament issues,

Convinced that the success of disarmament negotiations, in which all peoples of the world have a vital interest, would be achieved through the active participation of Member States in such negotiations, thereby contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security,

Reaffirming that the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament,

Deeply concerned about the continuing arms race and, in particular, the nuclear-arms race, which constitutes a growing threat to international peace and security,

Worried of a growing awareness among States and peoples of the dangers of the continuing arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and of the need to eliminate the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war,

Calling attention to the tasks set forth in the declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, which demand intensified efforts to be taken in the Committee on Disarmament and other appropriate forums,

Stressing the need to promote the development, strengthening and intensification of international co-operation designed to achieve general and complete disarmament, as defined by the General Assembly at its tenth special session,

Noting with concern the lack of tangible progress with respect to the implementation of the measures set forth in the Programme of Action in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Bearing in mind that at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982, the General Assembly will undertake a review of the progress made in the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the first special session on disarmament,

Conscious of the need to contribute to the success of the second special session through concrete accomplishments in the field of disarmament, thereby maintaining and further intensifying the momentum generated by the first special session,

1. *Expresses its deep concern* about the continued arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and about the constantly growing military budgets, which bear negative consequences and pose a growing threat to international peace and security as well as to the development of countries, particularly developing countries;

2. *Urgently calls upon* all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States and other major military Powers, immediately to take steps in order to promote international security and lead to the effective halting and reversing of the arms race and to disarmament;

3. *Urges* those States also to intensify their efforts to bring to a successful end the negotiations which are currently taking place in the Committee on Disarmament and other international forums and to proceed to or resume negotiations on effective international agreements on items of the highest priority as laid down by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

4. *Recommends* that the Committee on Disarmament should concentrate its work on the substantive and priority items on its agenda with a view to achieving tangible results in order to contribute to the success of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and to the accomplishment of the tasks set forth in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade;

5. *Calls upon* all States to refrain from any actions which have or may have negative effects on the implementation of the relevant recommendations and decisions of the first special session devoted to disarmament;

6. *Invites* all States which are engaged in disarmament and/or arms limitation negotiations outside the framework of the United Nations to keep the General Assembly and the Committee on Disarmament informed of the results of such negotiations in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

7. *Also calls upon* States engaged in such negotiations outside the framework of the United Nations to implement the results achieved, so as to create favourable conditions for further progress;

8. *Recommends* that the General Assembly should keep under review at its forthcoming sessions the implementation of its recommendations and decisions on disarmament issues.

In connection with the agenda item covering follow-up, the Assembly had before it a number of documents which have not thus far been mentioned; for ready reference they are:

(a) Report of the Secretary-General on the study on the relationship between disarmament and development;³⁸

(b) Report of the Secretary-General on the World Disarmament Campaign;³⁹

(c) Report of the Secretary-General on Disarmament Week;⁴⁰

(d) Report of the Secretary-General on the programme of research and studies on disarmament;⁴¹

(e) Letter dated 4 November 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Romania to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.⁴²

In addition, certain documents submitted under the item were also circulated under the item on "General and complete disarmament" and hence have been referred to in chapter I.⁴³

Conclusion

In 1981, considerable disillusionment was expressed regarding the paucity of achievements since the 1978 special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and some emphasis was placed on the need for preservation of détente and restoration of confidence as prerequisites for progress. A generally tense international situation prevailed throughout the year and no new hope materialized for early achievement of concrete measures of disarmament in accordance with the Programme of Action set out in the Final Document. The dangers of the nuclear arms race, the special responsibilities of the major Powers, the need for improved political will, the need for military

³⁸ A/36/356 and Corr.1.

³⁹ A/36/458.

⁴⁰ A/36/568 and Add.1.

⁴¹ A/36/654.

⁴² A/C.1/36/8.

⁴³ See chapter I above, foot-notes 43, 44, 53 and 55. It should be noted that documents are frequently placed before the General Assembly and relevant committees under two or more agenda items.

restraint, and the requirement that disarmament agreements to be effective must be verifiable — those were among the major themes put forward by States and groups in the various disarmament bodies.

Those bodies, as revitalized by the General Assembly at its 1978 special session, continued to function as intended despite the generally unfavourable atmosphere in which they carried on their work. In the Committee on Disarmament especially, good use was made of *ad hoc* working groups to negotiate on specific issues. They continued to be regarded by many countries as effective in multilateral negotiations and in fact they made worthwhile progress in certain areas, for example, towards the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament (see chapter IV). In the General Assembly and its First Committee the sharper debate than in previous years had one positive aspect: it helped further clarify the serious differences of perception which exist among the major Powers and groups and thus to demonstrate the complexity and magnitude of the problems on which compromise must be reached if significant measures of disarmament are to be achieved.

Preparatory work for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

Introduction

THE DECISION TO HOLD A SECOND SPECIAL SESSION of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was taken in 1978 at the special session devoted to disarmament held in May/June of that year and was reflected in paragraph 119 of that session's Final Document.¹ In December 1978, by resolution 33/71 H, the General Assembly decided that the second special session devoted to disarmament should be convened in 1982. On 3 December 1980 the General Assembly adopted resolution 35/47, thereby deciding to establish a Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament composed of 78 Member States appointed by the President of the General Assembly on the basis of equitable geographic distribution.

Following the adoption of the resolution, the President announced the appointment, on the basis of appropriate consultations with and among the regional groups, of the following States as members of the Preparatory Committee:

African Group (19): Algeria, Benin, Burundi, Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia;

Asian Group (16): Bangladesh, China, Cyprus, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Turkey;

Eastern European Group (10): Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, Yugoslavia;

Latin American Group (15): Argentina, Bahamas, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Suriname, Venezuela;

Group of Western European and Other States (18): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States.

On 4 and 5 December 1980 the Preparatory Committee held three meetings, during which it dealt with the organization of its work. The

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4* (A/S-10/4), sect. III; the Final Document is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, appendix I.

Committee, by acclamation, elected Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji of Nigeria as its Chairman, and decided to defer the election of its other officers until its first substantive session, to be held in the spring of 1981.

Among its organizational decisions, the Preparatory Committee agreed to be governed by the relevant parts of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly on the understanding that every effort should be made to ensure that decisions on matters of substance would be adopted by consensus. The Committee also agreed that representatives of States not members of the Committee would be entitled to participate in plenary meetings without the right to vote, as had been done by the Preparatory Committee for the first special session on disarmament. Accordingly, the representatives of Ireland and the Holy See participated in the work of the Committee and made statements. The Committee also agreed to follow the practice of the Preparatory Committee of the first special session on disarmament in allowing representatives of non-governmental organizations and peace and disarmament research institutions to be present at meetings of the Committee and to enable the Secretariat to issue lists of communications concerning disarmament received from those organizations. In addition, the Committee decided to invite the International Atomic Energy Agency and specialized agencies interested in disarmament to take part in the work of the Committee as observers.

Recommendations of the Disarmament Commission, 1981

As stated in the preceding chapter, during its general exchange of views the Disarmament Commission in 1981 regarded follow-up of the decisions and recommendations taken by the General Assembly at its tenth special session as a matter of importance, and saw a relationship between the effectiveness of that follow-up and the success of the forthcoming second special session of the Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Besides its basic mandate to follow up requests of and make recommendations to the Assembly, the Commission, in 1981, had an item on its agenda relating specifically to the second special session, namely, the consideration of a report on its work to be submitted to the General Assembly at that session.

The Commission made the following recommendations on that item:²

The Disarmament Commission considered item 7 in a number of formal and informal meetings and agreed to request the Secretariat to prepare the report to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament on the basis of the following outline:

I. *Introduction:* Establishment of the Disarmament Commission by the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament.

II. *Organization of work of the Commission:* Election of the Bureau; duration of the sessions; records and rules of procedure.

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/36/42), para. 22.*

III. *Work of the Commission at its substantive sessions: Agenda of the substantive sessions.*

The part of the report related to conclusions and recommendations will be prepared at the next substantive session of the Commission.

Discussion in the Committee on Disarmament, 1981

Although all members of the Committee on Disarmament were very much aware of the approach and significance of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, there was no specific consideration of the subject as a whole and references to the event were largely made in connection with related subjects on the Committee's agenda. Many members felt that an evaluation of the Committee's work would be one of the important elements of discussion at the forthcoming special session and therefore there was an increased need to show that the Committee could achieve results by multilateral negotiations. Japan considered that with the second special session looming before the members, the Committee on Disarmament had an even greater responsibility than usual. India felt that unless the Committee made sufficient progress in finding solutions to the most urgent problems, its credibility as the sole multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament would be seriously undermined; a similar view was expressed by Pakistan.

There was a widespread opinion that the Committee's principal contribution to a successful second special session should be the presentation of an agreed draft comprehensive programme of disarmament (see chapter IV). Other issues on which members urged that there should be meaningful progress to report to the General Assembly at the special session were security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, and the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, a convention on chemical weapons and a draft treaty on radiological weapons. The details of the Committee's consideration of these items are described in the relevant chapters elsewhere in this volume.

Work of the Preparatory Committee in 1981

During 1981 the Preparatory Committee held two substantive sessions from 4 to 15 May and from 5 to 16 October. The Committee's report³ on its work in 1980 and 1981 was submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

At its 5th meeting, on 5 May, the Committee elected as Vice-Chairmen the representatives of the following delegations: Australia, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Benin, Bulgaria, German Democratic Republic, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, Peru and Yugoslavia. Mr. Omer Ersun of Turkey was elected as Rapporteur.

³ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 49 (A/36/49 and Corr.1)*.

The substantive discussions were devoted to consideration of views concerning the agenda for the forthcoming special session, leading to the preparation of a provisional agenda for submission to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session, and to consideration of other relevant questions relating to the special session. The discussions were greatly facilitated by the responses of Member States to paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 35/47 whereby 49 Member States communicated their views to the Secretary-General and a variety of suggestions were made.

A number of States proposed that the substantive part of the agenda should contain four major items: (a) a general debate; (b) a review of the implementation of the Programme of Action arising from the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, including consideration of a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament, disarmament studies and other proposals; (c) consideration of present and future institutional arrangements in the field of disarmament; and (d) approval of a resolution or final report. The States advocating that approach were Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.

Many States commented on the absence of real progress towards disarmament, despite the consensus achieved at the special session of the General Assembly in 1978 in the Final Document and its Programme of Action, and called for a review of progress. Yugoslavia believed that an analysis and appraisal should be made of the extent to which the decisions and recommendations adopted at the first special session on disarmament had been implemented. Brazil stated that progress on disarmament since 1978 had been virtually non-existent and Argentina considered that in carrying out an evaluation of implementation of the Programme of Action priority should be given to the state of negotiations on nuclear disarmament and on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. Other nations calling for a general review included Austria, Bangladesh, the Byelorussian SSR, Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, the Sudan and the USSR.

There was also much support for the view that the consideration and adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament should be one of the main items of the agenda. Nigeria believed that this item could serve as the centre-piece of the special session and Venezuela considered it to be the session's central task. Among other member States attaching great importance to the comprehensive programme for disarmament were Brazil, China, Egypt, Finland, India, Mexico, Pakistan and Peru. Mexico drew particular attention to the emphasis given by the General Assembly to that subject in the relevant passages of paragraph 109 of the Final Document of the 1978 special session.

The Eastern European countries expressed the hope that the special session would lead to new initiatives to strengthen disarmament efforts and lead to a dialogue on practical measures to halt the arms race and achieve general and complete disarmament. In that context, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and the USSR all drew attention to the proposals put forward by the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR at the Twenty-sixth Congress of

the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held in Moscow in February 1981. The socialist countries also urged, *inter alia*, that at the special session the Assembly should give consideration to the convening of a world disarmament conference.

Among other points frequently mentioned for possible inclusion in the provisional agenda were the adoption of specific treaties or agreements arising from negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament, particularly in respect of nuclear disarmament, and the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests; strengthening of guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones; consideration of disarmament studies; the implementation of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade; the strengthening of institutional machinery and the organizational structure of the United Nations in the field of disarmament; measures to mobilize world public opinion in favour of disarmament; and the organization and launching of a world disarmament campaign.

In the course of its work, the Preparatory Committee heard several views concerning the possible form of the outcome of the forthcoming special session. Venezuela considered that the session should adopt a declaration incorporating or preceding an agreed comprehensive programme of disarmament, whereas Mexico believed that, in accordance with customary conference terminology, a final act should be adopted containing a brief background of the session, a description of the organization of work and the texts of agreed documents, especially that of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. The majority of members expressed support for a more general wording in the provisional agenda, such as "Adoption of final document(s)", in order to leave the matter open for decision at a later stage.

The second session of the Preparatory Committee ended on 15 May 1981 and during that last meeting the representative of Mexico introduced a working paper containing his own annotated preliminary draft of a provisional agenda. The Chairman also drew attention to his own summary of the discussion on the subject which was circulated as a conference room paper and which, he hoped, would assist members in their consideration of the issues between then and the third session in October.

When the Preparatory Committee reconvened for its third session on 5 October 1981, discussions centred around whether and to what extent the provisional agenda should be annotated, particularly the item concerning the general debate. One view was that annotations were useful in order to channel the course of statements, but another was that the item should be stated in general terms without drawing particular attention to specific aspects. A third view was that the wording did not matter greatly as any statements made under the item entitled "General debate" would be very much up to the speakers concerned and so would be wide-ranging in nature. Other aspects which drew particular attention were the order of priority of the various agenda items and whether certain subjects should be items on their own or subsumed by other items on the provisional agenda.

Attention was also given to other relevant questions, including participation by non-governmental organizations, public information activities for

the special session, the level of representation at the special session and the proposed dates for the session.

Pursuant to a decision taken by the Preparatory Committee on 15 May 1981, the Committee heard statements by the representatives of certain non-governmental organizations and peace and disarmament research institutions at its 25th meeting on 9 October.

As the third session of the Preparatory Committee progressed, informal meetings and consultations were held to resolve the differences of view concerning the provisional agenda, resulting in the acceptance by consensus on 16 October 1981 of the Committee's report to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

The substantive part of the provisional agenda of the 1982 special session as adopted by the Preparatory Committee and recommended in its report⁴ reads as follows:

8. General debate including:
 - Review and appraisal of the present international situation in the light of the pressing need for specific generally agreed measures to eliminate the danger of war, in particular nuclear war, halt and reverse the arms race and to achieve substantial progress in the field of disarmament, especially in its nuclear aspects, taking due account of the close interrelationship between disarmament, international peace and security, as well as between disarmament and economic and social development, particularly of the developing countries.
9. Review of the implementation of the decisions and recommendations adopted by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament:
 - Status of negotiations on disarmament as contained in the Programme of Action and bearing in mind the priorities set out in the Programme;
 - Consideration of the report of the Committee on Disarmament, in particular any draft instruments transmitted by the Committee;
 - Consideration of the report of the Disarmament Commission;
 - Consideration of the implementation of resolutions of the General Assembly on specific tasks, in particular studies, aimed at the realization of the Final Document and their follow-up.
10. Consideration and adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.
11. Implementation of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade as well as consideration of initiatives and proposals of Member States.
12. Enhancing the effectiveness of machinery in the field of disarmament and strengthening of the role of the United Nations in this field, including the possible convening of a world disarmament conference.
13. Measures to mobilize world public opinion in favour of disarmament:
 - Disarmament education, seminars and training (United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament);
 - World Disarmament Campaign;
 - Other public information activities.
14. Adoption, in an appropriate format, of the document(s) of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 18.

Concerning the dates of the session, the Preparatory Committee recommended⁵ that the special session should be held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, between 7 June and 9 July 1982. With regard to the election of the President and Vice-Presidents and the establishment of committees, the Preparatory Committee recommended that the practices of the 1978 special session should be followed. The Committee considered that the General Assembly might wish to elect the President of the thirty-sixth session as President of the special session. The Committee also considered that the Vice-Presidents should be the same as at the thirty-sixth regular session of the General Assembly, on the understanding that regional groups might make substitutions of Vice-Presidents allocated to each group. The Preparatory Committee also recommended that at the special session the General Assembly should establish a committee of the whole, a working group on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, and as many open-ended groups or subsidiary organs as might be necessary, and elect the Chairman of the committee of the whole. The other recommendations concerned the election of the Credentials Committee and the General Committee and the rules of procedure, which should be those of the General Assembly without amendments, on the understanding that, regarding the adoption of decisions by the Assembly at the special session, every effort should be made to ensure that, in so far as possible, decisions on matters of substance would be adopted by consensus. It was also recommended that Member States should be represented at the highest possible political level.

The Committee recommended the adoption of the programme of public information activities submitted by the Secretariat⁶ on the understanding that, in so far as possible, such activities should be carried out within the regular budgets of the Department of Public Information and of the Centre for Disarmament of the Secretariat.

Regarding the role of non-governmental organizations and peace and disarmament research institutions, the Committee recommended that they should be accorded the same facilities at the forthcoming special session as those which they had received at the first special session in 1978. However, in view of the importance of world public opinion for progress in disarmament, it was expected that an even greater spectrum of such organizations and their leaders would participate in the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Finally, the Preparatory Committee recommended that it should hold one further session from 26 April to 14 May 1982 to continue consideration of substantive issues related to the special session, including the implementation of the decisions and recommendations adopted by the General Assembly at its special session in 1978, for incorporation in the document(s) to be adopted at the forthcoming special session, and of any remaining organizational and procedural matters.

⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 19 *et seq.*

⁶ A/AC.206/18.

During the course of the Preparatory Committee's work, a number of working papers were submitted by Member States and, in addition, the Secretariat prepared certain background papers. Lists of these papers are given in the report of the Preparatory Committee.⁷

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1981

The approach of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was referred to in general terms by many delegations at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, both in the plenary debate and during the general debate of the First Committee.⁸ After the conclusion of the Preparatory Committee's second substantive session (5 to 16 October), the First Committee began work on its agenda, one item of which concerned the report of the Preparatory Committee.

In addition to the Preparatory Committee's report, the First Committee in connection with the item had before it the following documents:

(a) Letter dated 2 March 1981 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting the documents of the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi from 9 to 13 February 1981;⁹

(b) Letter dated 27 April 1981 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General;¹⁰

(c) Letter dated 18 September 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Romania to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General;¹¹

(d) Letter dated 30 September 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting the communiqué of the Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegations of the Non-Aligned Countries, held in New York on 25 and 28 September 1981, to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;¹²

(e) Letter dated 5 October 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting the resolutions adopted by the 68th Inter-Parliamentary Conference, held at Havana from 15 to 23 September 1981.¹³

A draft resolution sponsored initially by 30 countries, and later by a further 13 Member States,¹⁴ was introduced on 10 November by the

⁷ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 49* (A/36/49 and Corr.1), paras. 12-13.

⁸ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 33rd and 91st meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 44th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

⁹ A/36/116 and Corr.1.

¹⁰ A/36/226.

¹¹ A/36/528 and Corr.1.

¹² A/36/566-S/14713.

¹³ A/36/584.

¹⁴ Algeria, Argentina, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Burma, Canada, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

representative of Yugoslavia. Noting the unanimously expressed view that the second special session would be of great significance to the efforts of the international community in seeking solutions of disarmament issues and questions related to the strengthening of world peace and security, the sponsors expressed the wish that the Committee would adopt the draft resolution by consensus.

Other than a statement by Greece, there was no discussion of the Preparatory Committee's report. Greece considered that one of the main considerations in the handling of disarmament issues was that at all costs Members should avoid being negative. Before the special session Greece hoped to see some progress in bilateral, regional or multilateral negotiations on disarmament questions. In its opinion, the whole credibility of the disarmament process depended on the implementation of the decisions reflected in the 1978 Final Document.

On 25 November the draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee and on 9 December by the General Assembly, in both cases without a vote; resolution 36/81 A reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling section III of its resolution 33/71 H of 14 December 1978, in which it decided to convene a second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1982 at United Nations Headquarters in New York,

Having considered the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament,

1. *Endorses* the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament and the recommendations contained therein for the special session, to be held between 7 June and 9 July 1982 at United Nations Headquarters in New York;

2. *Endorses also* the recommendation of the Preparatory Committee to meet in New York from 26 April to 14 May 1982 in order to continue consideration of substantive issues related to the special session, including the implementation of the decisions and recommendations adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session, for incorporation in the document or documents to be adopted at the second special session devoted to disarmament, and any remaining organizational and procedural matters;

3. *Expresses its appreciation* to the members of the Preparatory Committee for their constructive contribution to its work;

4. *Invites* Member States to submit to the Secretary-General, not later than 31 March 1982, further views on the substantive issues related to the special session, including the implementation of the decisions and recommendations adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session;

5. *Requests* all Member States engaged in bilateral, regional or multilateral negotiations on disarmament issues outside the framework of the United Nations to submit appropriate information on such negotiations to the General Assembly, in accordance with paragraph 27 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, before its second special session devoted to disarmament;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render the Preparatory Committee all necessary assistance for the completion of its work.

A second draft resolution, submitted under the same item, concerned the prevention of nuclear war. It was introduced in the First Committee by Argentina, which emphasized that the issue dealt with in the proposal was

perhaps the most important one facing mankind. By the draft, the Assembly would call upon the nuclear weapon States to inform it, at its forthcoming special session, of their views, proposals and suggestions for ensuring the prevention of nuclear war. For further details of the discussion and voting on this draft resolution, see chapter VI below.

Conclusion

For five weeks, from 7 June to 9 July 1982, the General Assembly at its special session is scheduled for the second time to focus its attention wholly on disarmament matters. A great many of the issues and developments described in this volume will be discussed at length or at least have some bearing on the work of the session, and so at the end of 1981 a wide range of preparations was in hand.

During the final session of the Preparatory Committee, from 26 April to 14 May 1982, the Committee will continue consideration of substantive issues related to the special session, including the implementation of the decisions and recommendations adopted by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament.

Whilst the precedents established at the 1978 special session facilitated agreement in the Preparatory Committee on procedural matters, the same cannot be said regarding its work on the substantive issues that will be before the General Assembly at the second special session devoted to disarmament. There has been wide recognition that the Final Document has not yet led to any achievements of significance in the context of real disarmament and that the international political climate has worsened rather than improved in the past four years. Fundamental differences of view were apparent in 1981 in the discussions which took place in the Preparatory Committee and no doubt will continue in the final series of meetings of the Committee, which must set the scene for the special session itself.

Nevertheless, despite doubts and differing attitudes, there is a deep sense of determination that the disarmament debate must go forward and proposals be found that can be translated into action if humanity is to be saved from itself. In no other aspect of human life are the potential rewards so great or the possible costs of failure so high and during the year this judgement underlay much of the preparatory work for the second special session.

CHAPTER IV

Development of a comprehensive programme of disarmament

Introduction

FOR NEARLY 20 YEARS PARTIAL MEASURES of arms limitation and disarmament have been the focus of attention in disarmament negotiations. While the value of such measures continues to be recognized, recently there has been increasing awareness of the desirability of a comprehensive approach to assure that partial measures would add up to a coherent strategy leading to the effective cessation of the arms race and the achievement of continued progress towards the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament.

In the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization for 1968-1969,¹ the Secretary-General included a proposal for the designation of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade and, in that context, expressed the view that the Assembly could establish a specific programme and time-table for dealing with all aspects of arms limitation and disarmament. The Assembly welcomed and discussed the proposal and, on 16 December 1969, adopted resolution 2602 E (XXIV) by which it declared the 1970s a Disarmament Decade and, among other things, requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, while continuing intensive negotiations with a view to reaching the widest possible agreement on collateral measures, to work out at the same time a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which would provide a guideline to chart the course of future negotiations.

The question of a comprehensive programme was considered in the CCD and the General Assembly in subsequent years and several proposals on the subject were submitted to both organs. In 1976, by resolution 31/68 dealing with the Disarmament Decade, the Assembly urged the CCD to adopt, during 1977, a comprehensive programme covering all aspects of disarmament in accordance with resolution 2602 E (XXIV). However, at the Committee's 1977 session no common view emerged on the content of the proposed

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1 A (A/7601/Add.1).*

programme and the Committee decided that a working group should be set up at the beginning of its 1978 session to consider the question.

In 1978, the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament gave added impetus to the elaboration of a comprehensive programme. Paragraph 109 of the Final Document provided as follows:

Implementation of these priorities should lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which remains the ultimate goal of all efforts exerted in the field of disarmament. Negotiations on general and complete disarmament shall be conducted concurrently with negotiations on partial measures of disarmament. With this purpose in mind, the Committee on Disarmament will undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated. The comprehensive programme should contain appropriate procedures for ensuring that the General Assembly is kept fully informed of the progress of the negotiations including an appraisal of the situation when appropriate and, in particular, a continuing review of the implementation of the programme.

In addition, the Disarmament Commission, as established at the special session, was specifically entrusted with the task of considering the elements of a comprehensive programme for disarmament to be submitted as recommendations to the General Assembly and, through it, to the negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament.

The Disarmament Commission successfully discharged that task at its first substantive session in 1979, by adopting by consensus the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. By resolution 34/83 B, the General Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to initiate at its next session negotiations on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, with a view to completing its elaboration before the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament and, in doing so, to take as a basis the recommendations adopted by the Disarmament Commission.

At its 1980 session, the Committee on Disarmament decided to establish an *ad hoc* working group to initiate negotiations on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, envisaged in paragraph 109 of the Final Document, with a view to completing its elaboration before the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. The *Ad Hoc* Working Group adopted an outline of the comprehensive programme of disarmament consisting of seven chapters — “Introduction or preamble”, “Objectives”, “Principles”, “Priorities”, “Measures”, “Stages of implementation” and “Machinery and procedures” — and held a general exchange of views on the six substantive chapters. Thus, by the end of 1980, the groundwork had been laid for a detailed consideration of the issues involved in the elaboration of the programme.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1981

Consideration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament continued at the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament on the basis of the outline

adopted in 1980. In the course of the discussions that took place in the plenary meetings of the Committee on the relevant agenda item as well as in the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament,² various ideas were expressed on the form and content of the programme. Those ideas were reflected in the numerous working papers dealing with the programme as a whole or with particular aspects of it. Nine such papers were submitted to the Committee³ and more than 30 to the Working Group, including two of those also submitted to the Committee.⁴

The Working Group decided to defer consideration of the introduction or preamble pending the examination of the substantive chapters of the comprehensive programme of disarmament in view of the fact that the form and substance of the latter would determine the character and content of the former. It completed a preliminary examination of all the substantive chapters of the programme.⁵ In the case of the chapters concerning measures and stages of implementation, which were considered in conjunction with each other, the Working Group was also able to have a second round of more detailed discussions on measures for a first stage of the programme. It was understood that in the preliminary phase of the Group's work no definite conclusions would be reached on the matters under discussion.

While a measure of agreement was achieved in certain areas — specifically, the chapters on objectives, principles and priorities — fundamental differences emerged with respect to the main elements of the programme, i.e., measures and stages of implementation, including the question of time frames. Differences of views were also apparent in the case of the chapter on machinery and procedures. In addition to those substantive matters, there was the question of the nature of the programme which gave rise to divergent views, the question at issue being the kind of commitment that the programme would entail.

With regard to the first three chapters, it was generally accepted that the objectives, principles and priorities set out in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should constitute the basis for elaborating the respective chapters of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. However, different trends of thought were discernible in the various working papers submitted with respect to a number of questions, such as the way in which the relevant provisions of the Final Document should be reflected in the programme, whether they should be supplemented, and whether emphasis should be placed on particular provisions and, if so, on which ones. For instance, in the case of principles, the

² *Ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27)*, paras. 7, 10 and 121-127.

³ *Ibid.*, para. 122. The papers themselves are contained in *ibid.*, appendix II (CD/228), documents CD/155 (Italy), CD/160 and CD/166 (USSR), CD/172 and CD/214 (China), CD/198 (Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Japan, United Kingdom), CD/205 (Australia, Belgium, Germany, Federal Republic of, Japan, United Kingdom) and CD/208 and CD/223 (group of 21).

⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 127.

⁵ *Ibid.* The results of the deliberations of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group are contained in para. 127, annex; the Group's report was originally submitted to the Committee in document CD/217 and Corr.1.

group of 21 was of the view that the programme should incorporate *in extenso* all the principles of the Final Document and such other principles as might be deemed appropriate. Western countries, on the other hand, would have preferred a short list of "fundamental" principles which, in their view, would be those concerning such matters as security, stability, balance and confidence. China felt that the principles guiding the disarmament process and the priority order of the various disarmament measures should be determined on the basis of international realities which, in its view, were marked by the super-Powers' arms race and their intensified arms expansion and war preparations. In its view, the most fundamental principle of disarmament should be that those two States be the first to reduce their armaments, conventional as well as nuclear. For their part, socialist countries did not consider it necessary to include in the comprehensive programme of disarmament provisions concerning principles; in their view, it would be sufficient to make reference to the relevant provisions of the Final Document.

It was generally accepted that the measures forming part of the comprehensive programme of disarmament should be divided into stages and that there should be a periodic review of the implementation of the programme — four stages being used as a hypothesis. Beyond that, however, there was a marked divergence of views. The group of 21 considered that the programme should present a sequence of stages covering all the measures necessary to achieve the goal of general and complete disarmament. Accordingly, it proposed a comprehensive set of measures to be implemented in four stages leading ultimately to a situation where solely internal security forces equipped with light firearms would be maintained by States. Socialist countries held that the various stages of the programme should cover the maximum possible number of concrete measures leading to general and complete disarmament. However, their proposals in 1981 tended to focus on partial measures to be implemented in the first stage or, in one or two cases, in the second stage. Western countries, on the other hand, stressing the interrelationship between progress in disarmament negotiations and the international situation and the consequent difficulty of predicting the course of developments in the field of disarmament a considerable time in advance, were of the view that the comprehensive programme of disarmament should only specify measures for a first stage whose objective should be the successful conclusion of current negotiations. In their opinion, plans for subsequent stages should be made in light of the implementation of the measures agreed upon in the preceding stage. Therefore, steps to be taken in later stages should be merely listed without assignment to a particular stage.

In addition, there were differences concerning the measures themselves.⁶ At issue were such general questions as how the measures should be defined, as well as the substance of individual measures and their distribution according to stages. With respect to the first question, the group of 21 maintained that to be meaningful the programme should define the measures

⁶ *Ibid.* The differences of view are clearly indicated by the profusion of brackets and alternative texts in the annex to the report of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group.

in specific terms so as to provide guidelines concerning the nature of the agreements to be achieved in the relevant negotiations. Socialist and Western countries, on the other hand, considered that the specific measures to be negotiated should be determined by the parties concerned and that, therefore, it would be inappropriate to provide a detailed definition thereof in the programme.

The specific measures suggested for inclusion in the programme generally conformed to the views and proposals that Member States had advanced in the past in a variety of contexts. Thus China, in the measures it proposed, stressed the responsibility of the two major nuclear-weapon States for initiating the process of disarmament in both the nuclear and conventional fields; only at a later stage would the other nuclear-weapon States join them in arms reductions. Socialist countries, on the other hand, emphasized the need for the participation of all nuclear-weapon States in disarmament negotiations *ab initio*. Western countries, for their part, stressed the interrelation between measures to be taken in different disarmament fields, the paramount importance of verification in the process of disarmament, and the correlation between arms limitation and disarmament measures and collateral measures, such as measures to build confidence and to achieve transparency and comparability of military postures. It may also be noted that France considered that the programme should essentially be based on agreed texts: the Final Document, the elements defined by the Disarmament Commission, and the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade. The measures proposed by the group of 21, on the other hand, were designed to develop further the provisions of such documents. In general, they emphasized the priority of measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and the primary responsibility of the five nuclear-weapon States, especially the two major ones, and of other militarily significant States.

The question of time frames was only briefly discussed, with no perceptible change in the positions advanced by member States at the 1980 session as reflected in the report on that session.⁷ The group of 21, while recognizing that it would not be realistic to set very precise and inflexible deadlines, considered that, to be meaningful, the comprehensive programme of disarmament must contain concrete disarmament measures leading to the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament within an agreed time frame. Similarly, China was of the view that each stage of the programme could have an "indicative" time-limit to promote its implementation and periodic review. Socialist countries, for their part, believed that the stages of implementation would depend on the measures that were included in the programme. In the opinion of Czechoslovakia, for instance, while it would not be advisable to divide the measures into sharp, clear-cut and unrealistically short stages, it might be possible to agree on some indicative, realistic stages of implementation. Western countries, on the other hand, considered that the

⁷ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/35/27)*, paras. 63-68; the report is contained in para. 68.

stimulus for continued progress in the implementation of the programme would be provided by periodic reviews, the first of which could take place at the conclusion of the Second Disarmament Decade. At such reviews it would be decided whether a current phase could be declared as concluded and consideration would be given to the measures that might be pursued thereafter.

With respect to machinery and procedures, it was held that, in elaborating that chapter of the programme, the Working Group would have to take account of developments since the first special session on disarmament within the framework of the United Nations system related to machinery and procedures. The view was also held that consideration should be given to the need for the development of international institutions, as contemplated in various proposals submitted to the General Assembly at its first special session and listed in paragraph 125 of the Final Document. It was suggested that the structure of the section on machinery and procedures of the elements of the comprehensive programme of disarmament worked out by the Disarmament Commission should serve as a model. It was further suggested that the Working Group should not prejudice the conclusions of the study of institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament that was to be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session (see chapter XXII below). During the consideration of the report leading to its adoption, some delegations held that the question of machinery and procedures had been adequately elaborated in the Final Document of the special session and that, therefore, reference to the relevant provisions of the Final Document in the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament would be sufficient.

As far as the nature of the programme was concerned, most Member States were of the view that, while the programme should in one form or another embody a firm commitment to its implementation, it could not constitute a legally binding instrument. On the other hand, some members of the group of 21, notably India and Pakistan, considered that the programme should be an international instrument that would create legal obligations on the part of all States to implement the measures included therein.

At the conclusion of its work in 1981, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group reported to the Committee on Disarmament that it had been able to make good progress towards the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, but that considerable work remained to be done in resolving several important and complex issues involved in the elaboration of the programme, in particular, issues relating to measures, stages and nature of the programme. Consequently, and bearing in mind that the Committee on Disarmament had been called upon to conclude negotiations on the programme in time for its submission to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, the Working Group agreed to recommend to the Committee that the Group should resume its work on 11 January 1982. At its 145th plenary meeting on 20 August, the Committee adopted that recommendation of the Working Group.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1981

At the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament was mostly discussed in the context of the second special session devoted to disarmament,⁸ with many delegations commenting on the subject and stressing generally that the consideration and adoption of the programme was one of the main items on the agenda of the special session. Beyond that, the deliberations reflected the different positions advanced in the Committee on Disarmament.

In assessing the work of the Working Group, its Chairman, the representative of Mexico, noted that the basic questions on which a diversity of views still existed and to which a solution would have to be found were the following: (a) whether or not to establish the number of stages to be encompassed by the programme; (b) whether or not to determine the duration of all or some of those stages; and (c) what the content of the stages should be and how the Working Group should proceed to decide on that point. The representative of Mexico observed that the proposals submitted by the group of 21 and those submitted by five Western States illustrated two of the positions being taken on those questions in the discussions in the Working Group.

India, commenting on some of the unresolved questions, held that the task before the Committee on Disarmament was to elaborate a self-contained programme. This would involve the listing of specific and concrete measures of disarmament which should be implemented in well-conceived and time-bound phases. Those phases of implementation should follow the priorities laid down in the Final Document and accepted by consensus, which meant that measures of nuclear disarmament should have the highest priority. Beyond that, the programme should have a clear-cut plan for its implementation. Negotiations on concrete and specific issues should take place within a definite time frame which took into account the complexities involved in a practical manner. But, in the opinion of India, the complexity of an issue should not be a pretext for diluting the urgency of concluding negotiations on it. If, for example, the commitment to nuclear disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States was to have any credibility, the concept of a time frame would be essential to emphasize their political will to achieve that objective. Obviously, the vast majority of the non-nuclear-weapon States could not be expected to reconcile themselves to an indefinite division of the world into nuclear-weapon States, on the one hand, and non-nuclear-weapon States, on the other. Noting that some held that the concept of a time frame was unrealistic and that the results of negotiations on specific disarmament issues could not be predetermined, India pointed out that in 1962 both the United States and the USSR had presented draft treaties on general and complete

⁸ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 33rd and 91st meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 44th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

disarmament which were to have been implemented in their entirety within a decade or so. Rejecting the view of those that questioned the wisdom of the programme detailing specific and concrete measures of disarmament, India argued that experience had shown that the conduct of negotiations on broad topics, such as nuclear disarmament or new weapons of mass destruction, were held up precisely on the grounds that they were not specific enough. For that reason, the non-aligned and neutral countries in the Committee on Disarmament had recommended concrete and specific measures which it should be possible to include under each broad heading.

Pakistan considered that, according to the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, the comprehensive programme of disarmament had been envisaged as an international instrument which would create legal obligations on the part of all States to implement and achieve the measures included therein. Those disarmament measures, in Pakistan's view, should be set out in definite stages and lead to the ultimate goal of complete disarmament within an agreed time frame. It considered that the concept of restricting the comprehensive programme to the framework of existing documents and decisions was incompatible with the fundamental purposes as laid down in the Final Document.

The Federal Republic of Germany, referring to the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament that it had submitted to the Committee on Disarmament, jointly with Australia, Belgium, Japan and the United Kingdom,⁹ commented that their draft aimed at moving towards the goal of arms control and disarmament through concrete steps that would be politically feasible "today and tomorrow". In its view, a comprehensive programme of disarmament should, through the definition of goals, the description of principles and the highlighting of focal points, be aimed at facilitating negotiations in order to limit the use of military power and to improve the prospects for crisis management and the prevention of war in a world of persisting antagonisms. Recalling that in the draft programme it was suggested that progress in its implementation should be periodically reviewed with the object of assessing interim results and providing new impulses, the Federal Republic of Germany stated that it regarded such reviews as the centre-piece of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. It was convinced that such a programme could enhance the prospects of achieving concrete and verifiable disarmament agreements, but held that that called for a sense of judgement and an eye for what was feasible and what was not. It considered that the credibility of the programme would depend on how realistic its goals were. Along similar lines, Belgium commented that the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament was designed to enable the Committee on Disarmament to submit a credible instrument that would facilitate negotiations in the field of disarmament. That instrument should, in its view, include a permanent element, namely the major principles that should guide the negotiations, and an element of dynamism, that is, the adaptation of measures envisaged in the programme to changing circum-

⁹ See foot-note 3.

stances. Because of those changing circumstances, Belgium could not envisage a restrictive time-table for the programme. It believed that meetings to review the implementation of the programme should play an important role in giving the needed momentum to its accomplishment. In that connection, Belgium suggested the possibility of having the Disarmament Commission play its role in the framework of the Second Disarmament Decade fully by being entrusted, when the General Assembly saw fit, with a review of the implementation of the programme. It felt that States should also commit themselves to respecting the objectives, principles and priorities of the programme and that that should include the firm will of the international community to implement it through specific and verifiable disarmament measures.

Czechoslovakia recalled that, together with other countries of the socialist community, it had consistently advocated the view that the programme should represent a practical instrument for a comprehensive revitalization of concrete disarmament negotiations in all necessary directions. Poland, stating that it had and would continue to strive to contribute to the work of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group, suggested that, apart from specific priorities, the comprehensive programme of disarmament should unequivocally reaffirm the principles of disarmament negotiations, such as the sovereign equality of States, undiminished security for all, and a balance of rights and obligations. It commented, along with the German Democratic Republic and Mongolia, on the importance of the completion of the comprehensive programme for the Assembly's forthcoming second special session on disarmament. The German Democratic Republic added the view that calls to alter priorities to achieve more realism, especially regarding such issues as verification and so-called "transparency" were actually appeals to sit still and therefore must be rejected.

China, holding that the second special session should analyse the international situation and find the cause for lack of progress in disarmament so as to set a correct course for the future, was among those agreeing that the consideration and adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament should occupy an important place on the session's agenda. In its view, the programme would facilitate the future disarmament process by providing for specific disarmament measures by stages on the basis of the armament situation of the present-day world.

Although no resolution specifically on the question of a comprehensive programme of disarmament was put forward, it should be noted that under the item "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session", the Assembly adopted resolution 36/92 F on the report of the Committee on Disarmament (see chapter II above), in paragraph 2 of which it requested the Committee on Disarmament to complete, during the first part of its session in 1982, the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament and to submit that programme in time for consideration and adoption by the General Assembly at the second special session devoted to disarmament.

Conclusion

In 1981 meaningful progress was made towards the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. Several areas of agreement emerged and the issues that still needed to be resolved were identified. Of crucial importance among the latter were issues concerning the measures and stages of implementation, including the question of time frames. It can be expected that the *Ad Hoc* Working Group of the Committee on Disarmament will focus its attention on those areas in 1982 with a view to reconciling differences so that the elaboration of the programme may be completed in time for its consideration and adoption by the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament. The negotiations will no doubt be difficult as fundamentally different conceptions of the programme must be resolved.

While the outcome cannot be predicted, it is certain that the Working Group will make intensive efforts to accomplish its task, since it is generally recognized that the comprehensive programme of disarmament will occupy a prominent place on the agenda of the second special session.

CHAPTER V

World disarmament conference

Introduction

THE CONCEPT OF A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, as a definite initiative, was formulated at the first Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade in 1961. That Conference recommended in its Declaration,¹ *inter alia*, that the General Assembly decide to convene either a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament or a world disarmament conference under the auspices of the United Nations. The idea was reiterated at several subsequent summit conferences of the non-aligned countries, including at Havana in 1979,² and in the General Assembly, which, as early as 1965 on the basis of a non-aligned proposal, endorsed the idea of convening a world disarmament conference with its adoption of resolution 2030 (XX).

In 1971 the Soviet Union revived the idea, and the Assembly, by resolution 2833 (XXVI), stated that consideration should be given to the convening, following adequate preparation, of a world disarmament conference open to all States. Since then, the item has appeared on the agenda of the Assembly each year.

In 1972, by resolution 2930 (XXVII), the Assembly set up a special committee on the question and in 1973, by resolution 3183 (XXVIII), it established the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference.

Each year since that time, the *Ad Hoc* Committee has submitted reports to the Assembly³ in which it has repeatedly stated that, notwithstanding differences of viewpoint which have been hindering progress towards the convening of a world disarmament conference, there exists a widespread feeling that such a conference would be a useful forum for disarmament efforts.

¹ For an extract from the Declaration, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1* (A/S-10/1), vol. III, document A/AC.187/30 and Corr.1.

² See A/34/542, para. 223.

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session through Thirty-sixth Session, Supplements No. 28*, documents A/9628, A/10028, and A/31/28 through A/36/28.

In 1976, the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee⁴ contained an analysis stating, *inter alia*, that (a) although there was wide support for a world disarmament conference, many Governments believed universal participation as well as adequate preparation were necessary for its realization; and (b) a basic divergence of opinion among the nuclear-weapon States with regard to timing and conditions for the convening of such a conference still persisted. The *Ad Hoc* Committee none the less recommended that efforts to create appropriate conditions for the convening of the conference should continue.

In the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament in 1978⁵ the USSR and other Eastern European States stressed that the special session and a world disarmament conference should be complementary, the latter to become a forum for practical action leading to agreements on disarmament measures. Western States generally held that such a conference should be held only after adequate preparation and with the participation of all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States. The non-aligned States supported its convening at an appropriate time, with universal participation and adequate preparation.

In 1978, the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference held two sessions. Pursuant to resolution 32/89, it reported to the special session,⁶ stating that there was wide support for a world disarmament conference, with varying views as to conditions for its convening, and that consensus still had not been reached among the nuclear-weapon States. In the debate at the special session, the Eastern European and a number of other States supported the convening of a world disarmament conference. Many non-aligned States emphasized the need for the participation of all States. Western States indicated a degree of scepticism as to the value of such a forum, and stressed the importance of adequate preparation and universal participation. China held that there was no need for a world disarmament conference.

After the debate, in the Final Document of the special session, the Assembly stated, "At the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation."⁷ Following the special session, the *Ad Hoc* Committee again reviewed the situation and prepared a report⁸ to the General Assembly at its thirty-third regular session; during that session the Assembly adopted resolution 33/69 requesting the *Ad Hoc* Committee to continue to maintain contact with all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, on the question.

⁴ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 28* (A/31/28). For details of the analysis referred to, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 1: 1976, pp. 28-30; also summarized in *ibid.*, vol. 3: 1978, p. 143.

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1* (A/S-10/1), vol. VII, 21st to 42nd meetings; and *ibid.*, vol. VI, document A/AC.187/114.

⁶ *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 3* (A/S-10/3 and Corr.1).

⁷ *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4* (A/S-10/4), sect. III, para. 122.

⁸ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 28* (A/33/28).

In 1979, the *Ad Hoc* Committee once again reported⁹ that there was no consensus among the nuclear-weapon States with regard to conditions for the convening of a world disarmament conference, and the Assembly, by resolution 34/81, again renewed the Committee's mandate.

The established positions remained unchanged in 1980. However, the subject was also mentioned in the Disarmament Commission which included, in its recommendations on the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, a reference to the relevant paragraph of the Final Document,¹⁰ and the General Assembly included the same reference in the Declaration itself, adopted with its resolution 35/46.

As in previous years, the *Ad Hoc* Committee in 1980 held two sessions and reported to the General Assembly on its work.¹¹ The USSR and other Eastern European States continued to emphasize the need to convene a world disarmament conference. They felt that concrete steps should be taken for the preparation of such a conference to be held as soon as possible after the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Numerous non-aligned States, while generally supportive, reiterated the importance of universal participation and adequate preparation. Western States expressed reservations as to the value of such a conference somewhat more strongly than in other recent years by referring to recent international events; some doubted whether further meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Committee would contribute to progress towards its convening. China and Albania did not consider such a conference to be necessary.

Notwithstanding the different standpoints of Member States, the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session adopted without a vote resolution 35/151, by which it again renewed the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference.

***Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, 1981**

Pursuant to resolution 35/151, the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference continued its work during two sessions in 1981. The Bureau of the Committee was composed of the representative of Sri Lanka as Chairman, the representatives of Burundi, Peru and Poland as Vice-Chairmen and the representative of Spain as Rapporteur. Forty non-nuclear-weapon States continued to be represented on the Committee.¹²

⁹ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 28* (A/34/28).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 42* (A/35/42), para. 19, sect. C, para. 23 (b).

¹¹ *Ibid.*, *Supplement No. 28* (A/35/28).

¹² Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire and Zambia.

The USSR participated in the work of the Committee, and China, France, the United Kingdom and the United States maintained contact with it through its Chairman under the provisions of paragraph 3 of resolution 3183 (XXVIII). The Working Group, first established in 1974 to draft the Committee's report, continued to function, with Sri Lanka added to its membership in April 1981.¹³

During its first session, the *Ad Hoc* Committee held two meetings, on 6 and 8 April 1981, and agreed, as in previous years, that its Working Group should prepare its draft report for consideration by the whole Committee in plenary meetings during the second session. During its second session, the Committee held three meetings between 6 and 10 July and at the closing meeting unanimously adopted its report as drafted by the Working Group.

In its report to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session,¹⁴ the *Ad Hoc* Committee stated that its members were fully aware of the positions previously expressed by the Governments of other States on the convening of a world disarmament conference. They also noted that the idea of convening such a conference had been recently recalled by the General Assembly, in particular in resolution 35/46 entitled "Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade". Furthermore, the Committee reported that during its proceedings some of its members expressed the view that the question of holding a world disarmament conference should be reflected in the output of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and that the Disarmament Commission might take up the question in connection with its recommendations to the Assembly at its special session.

The Committee also reported that, in accordance with its mandate, it had maintained close contact, through its Chairman, with the representatives of the nuclear-weapon States, in order to remain currently informed of their attitudes, and that it had obtained the updated information on their respective positions. The *Ad Hoc* Committee reported as follows on the positions of the five nuclear-weapon States.

China indicated that its position remained unchanged. As indicated in earlier reports,¹⁵ that position has been that, as preconditions, the major nuclear-weapon Powers (a) undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and (b) end all forms of their military presence on the territory of other countries.

France stated that its position had not changed since 1980. In the past, it had adopted an attitude favouring, in principle, the idea of a world disarmament conference which, after a period of adequate preparation, would be attended by, among others, the five nuclear-weapon Powers. France none the less recognized that the present international situation was not conducive

¹³ Burundi, Egypt, Hungary, India, Iran, Italy, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Spain (Chairman) and Sri Lanka. Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Indonesia, Japan, Mongolia, the Netherlands and the USSR participated in the Working Group as observers.

¹⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 28* (A/36/28).

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 28* (A/33/28).

to making real progress in considering such an initiative which, it pointed out, should take into account the achievements of the General Assembly at its 1978 special session devoted to disarmament and the conclusions that would emerge from the second special session, to be held in 1982.

The Soviet Union stated that it stood for the convening of the world disarmament conference on the presumption that such a forum would constitute an important step towards solving the key problem of the present time — the cessation of the arms race and disarmament. The idea of holding the world disarmament conference had gained wide international support, *inter alia*, at the United Nations. That support was witnessed, in particular, by the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, which had been adopted by consensus, and by other resolutions of the General Assembly, including 35/151. In the opinion of the Soviet Union, the world disarmament conference, proceeding on the basis of a detailed study of disarmament questions, could elaborate effective approaches to the question of halting the arms race and to the realization of real disarmament. In its view, the particular importance and usefulness of such a forum lay in the fact that the conference would adopt not mere recommendations but specific decisions that the States would undertake to implement. It also believed that the second special session on disarmament could and should give a new impetus to negotiations on specific urgent problems of the arms race and disarmament and become a milestone towards the convening of a world disarmament conference. In the light of the provision of the Final Document concerning the earliest appropriate convening of such a conference and the possibility of doing this after the second special session on disarmament, the Soviet Union was of the opinion that during the forthcoming session it would be necessary to take a decision in that regard. In the international situation, which demanded decisive efforts to save mankind from war, the Soviet Union was ready to facilitate in the most active way the achievement of real disarmament.

The United Kingdom maintained that, in the light of the deterioration in the international situation over the last two years, it was not useful to continue to consider, for the time being, the idea of a world disarmament conference. Accordingly, it doubted the usefulness of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference continuing to meet and, in any event, did not think it appropriate for the Committee to undertake any substantive work at the current stage.

The United States continued to believe that it was premature to set a date and begin preparations for the convening of a world disarmament conference. As noted in the *Ad Hoc* Committee's 1980 report,¹⁶ the United States believed there was insufficient political agreement on the issues which would presumably be addressed at such a conference. Such lack of agreement would probably hinder rather than assist efforts to reach concrete and verifiable arms control measures.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 28 (A/35/28).

In the conclusions and recommendations of the report, the *Ad Hoc* Committee reiterated that the idea of a world disarmament conference had received wide support by the membership of the United Nations, albeit with varying degrees of emphasis and differences regarding conditions and certain aspects related to the question of its convening, including the deteriorating international situation. Also, the updated indications of positions of the nuclear-weapon States showed that no consensus with respect to the convening of a world disarmament conference under existing conditions had been reached among those States whose participation was widely deemed as essential.

Having regard for the important requirement that a world disarmament conference be convened at the earliest appropriate time, with universal participation and adequate preparation, the *Ad Hoc* Committee stated that the General Assembly might wish to decide that, after its second special session devoted to disarmament, a world disarmament conference would take place as soon as the necessary consensus on its convening had been reached.

Consequently, the *Ad Hoc* Committee suggested that the General Assembly might wish to renew its mandate and request it to continue to maintain close contact with representatives of the nuclear-weapon States as well as with all other States, and to consider any relevant comments and observations which might be made.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1981

At its thirty-sixth session, the General Assembly, during the general debates both in the plenary meetings and in the First Committee,¹⁷ continued to consider the question of holding a world disarmament conference.

A number of Eastern European States, including Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Ukrainian SSR, emphasized the importance they attached to the convening of such a conference following the second special session devoted to disarmament. More specifically, Bulgaria felt that an active role must be played by the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament in speeding up talks on urgent disarmament questions, thus paving the way for a world disarmament conference. The Ukrainian SSR similarly regarded the second special session as a step towards the convening of a world disarmament conference, and Czechoslovakia felt that the session could serve as a "bridgehead" for the conference. Poland felt confident that the comprehensive programme of disarmament would be adopted by the Assembly at its second special session as a practical guide to disarmament efforts in the years to come, and held the view that, to be realistic, the programme must envisage the convening of a world disarmament conference at an early date.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 4th to 33rd and 91st meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 44th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

Among other States which referred to the need for a world disarmament conference, Afghanistan felt that exhaustive efforts should be made in all forums to reach agreement on disarmament measures and their implementation and, in that context, stated that the potential of such a conference should be tapped. Cuba stated that after the second special session, the next logical step would be the convening of a world disarmament conference to establish specific and irreversible commitments. It hoped that the remaining obstacles to the conference might be eliminated in the near future and that it would be convened in due course. Zimbabwe believed that the holding of a world disarmament conference would be in the interest of world peace and security.

In introducing the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference in the First Committee, the representative of Sri Lanka, in his capacity as Chairman, drew attention to the respective positions of the nuclear-weapon States on the subject of the convening of the conference and emphasized the view of the members of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, as reflected in its report, that the General Assembly might wish to decide that, after its second special session devoted to disarmament, a world disarmament conference would take place as soon as the necessary consensus on its convening was achieved.

On 16 November 1981, Burundi, Peru, Poland, Spain and Sri Lanka submitted a draft resolution, subsequently sponsored also by Cuba, Madagascar, Mongolia, the Niger and Panama, which was introduced by the representative of Sri Lanka on 19 November, in conjunction with his introduction of the report. He stated that the draft was based upon the similar resolution adopted by the Assembly at its thirty-fifth session with the difference that the seventh preambular paragraph (see below) referred to the draft agenda for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, noting that it included the subject of the possible convening of a world disarmament conference. Accordingly, by operative paragraph 4, the *Ad Hoc* Committee would be asked to submit a report to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament. The representative acknowledged that there might be a belief that the Committee was some distance away from gaining its objective, especially at a time when almost any approach to disarmament was being viewed with scepticism. Although a world disarmament conference was no exception, he felt that the effort of the *Ad Hoc* Committee should not be discouraged.

On 25 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote.

In explanation of their positions after adoption of the draft, the representative of the United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of the members of the European Community, drew attention to the conclusion in the *Ad Hoc* Committee's report that there was no consensus on the convening of a world disarmament conference and, therefore, the Ten doubted whether further meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Committee at the present stage would lead to the convening of such a conference. The United States, commenting on the question of financial implications, assumed that any expenditure incurred as a result of the adoption of the draft resolution would be made without

prejudice to the zero-growth budgetary policy of the United Nations. Albania dissociated itself from the consensus, stating that it was opposed to the draft resolution since it was against the proposal for a world disarmament conference which, in its view, was put forth by the Soviet Union for propaganda purposes. It held that after many meetings, including two special sessions of the Assembly on disarmament, it would be unnecessary to hold yet another conference which would only be a marathon of unproductive discussions. Moreover, such a conference would adversely affect the significance of other United Nations disarmament activities.

The General Assembly, on 9 December, adopted the draft as resolution 36/91. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2833 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, 2930 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972, 3183 (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973, 3260 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3469 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/190 of 21 December 1976, 32/89 of 12 December 1977, 33/69 of 14 December 1978, 34/81 of 11 December 1979 and 35/151 of 12 December 1980,

Reiterating its conviction that all peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations and that all States should be in a position to contribute to the adoption of measures for the achievement of this goal,

Stressing anew its conviction that a world disarmament conference, adequately prepared and convened at an appropriate time, could provide the realization of such an aim and that the co-operation of all nuclear-weapon Powers would considerably facilitate its attainment,

Taking note of the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference,

Recalling that, in paragraph 122 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, it decided that, at the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation,

Recalling that, in paragraph 23 of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, contained in the annex to its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980, the General Assembly considered it pertinent also to recall that in paragraph 122 of the Final Document it had stated that at the earliest appropriate time a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation,

Further recalling that the subject of the possible convening of a world disarmament conference has been included in the draft agenda for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982,

1. *Notes with satisfaction* that in its report to the General Assembly the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference stated, *inter alia*, the following:

“Having regard for the important requirements of a world disarmament conference to be convened at the earliest appropriate time, with universal participation and with adequate preparation, the General Assembly may wish to decide that, after its second special session devoted to disarmament, a world disarmament conference would take place as soon as the necessary consensus on its convening has been reached”;

2. *Renews* the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee;

3. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee to maintain close contact with the representatives of the States possessing nuclear weapons in order to remain currently informed of their attitudes, as well as with all other States, and to consider any possible relevant proposals and observations which might be made to the Committee, especially having in mind paragraph 122 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

4. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee to report to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament and at its thirty-seventh session;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled “World Disarmament Conference”

Conclusion

In 1981, in their contacts with the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, Western nuclear States again pointed to difficulties in the international situation as a further motive, at the current stage, for their reserved attitude towards the idea of convening a world disarmament conference. China maintained its position, which called for certain specific preconditions before such a conference could take place. The Soviet Union once again repeated its view that there was a need for holding a world disarmament conference, at which effective approaches to the halting of the arms race and the implementation of disarmament measures could be elaborated, and that the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be a milestone towards the convening of such a conference. The role of the special session in that connection was similarly emphasized in various forums by other Eastern European States.

The non-aligned States, while focusing their main attention on preparations for the second special session devoted to disarmament, also supported the decision to have the *Ad Hoc* Committee continue its work of exploring the conditions for the possible holding of a world disarmament conference following the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as soon as the required consensus emerged.

As a result of these developments, the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament recommended that the provisional agenda of the special session should include an item entitled "Enhancing the effectiveness of machinery in the field of disarmament and strengthening of the role of the United Nations in this field, including the possible convening of a world disarmament conference" (see chapter III above).

Pursuant to the Assembly resolution on the subject adopted in 1981, the *Ad Hoc* Committee is to continue its work and submit reports to the General Assembly at its second special session as well as at its thirty-seventh regular session.

PART TWO

Nuclear disarmament

Nuclear arms limitation and disarmament

Introduction

FOR A LONG TIME THE ATTENTION of the international community has focused on the danger posed by nuclear weapons to the very survival of mankind and the consequent need to adopt effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. With a view to reducing that danger, a number of arms regulation agreements have been concluded, both within and outside the framework of the United Nations. Nevertheless, the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear weapons has continued, leading to a staggering growth in the number of nuclear warheads and the development and deployment of ever more complex and destructive weapons systems.

In the light of those developments, many States have criticized the tendency to direct international efforts to limited issues rather than to nuclear disarmament proper — a tendency which in their eyes has always been particularly noticeable in the work of the multilateral negotiating body. In addition, it has been repeatedly emphasized that the nuclear-weapon States, particularly the two major ones, have the primary responsibility for taking effective steps towards nuclear disarmament.¹

A broad range of approaches and measures have been advanced — singly, in various combinations, or as part of comprehensive proposals for general and complete disarmament. Concrete discussions and negotiations have concentrated on certain specific questions which are examined in various chapters of the present *Yearbook*, such as a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon testing, nuclear-weapon-free zones and security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. This chapter is designed to provide an overview of the question as a whole, including an examination of various approaches and measures in respect of the specific aspects of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament which are not covered in other chapters.

The measures proposed over the years cover the entire spectrum of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament problems and include limitations, reductions and/or the elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery

¹ See, for instance, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, para. 48.

systems; the cessation of production of nuclear weapons; the cut-off of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; and the restriction or prohibition of the deployment by nuclear-weapon States of nuclear weapons in the territories of other States.

Many initiatives have been taken concerning the limitation or prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Proposals discussed at different times and in different contexts have ranged from unconditional prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons to prohibition of first use and conditional bans.² Other measures to avert or reduce the danger of nuclear war have been the subject of bilateral negotiations, and a number of agreements have been reached between the Soviet Union and the United States, the Soviet Union and France, and the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom.

The bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which the Soviet Union and the United States first entered into in 1969, should also be mentioned. The first phase of the negotiations (SALT I) ended with the signing of two agreements in Moscow on 26 May 1972: the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty),³ subsequently amended by a Protocol of 3 July 1974,⁴ and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with a Protocol attached.⁵ Both agreements entered into force on 3 October 1972.

In accordance with article VII of the Interim Agreement, which committed the two sides to continue active negotiations, the second phase of the negotiations (SALT II) formally began in November 1972. The primary goal of the negotiations was to replace the Interim Agreement with a more comprehensive agreement, providing broad limits on strategic offensive weapons systems. They were concluded on 18 June 1979 in Vienna with the signing of a Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, a Protocol to be considered as an integral part of the Treaty, and a Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms.⁶ By the end of 1981, the SALT II Treaty had not yet entered into force.⁷

The Final Document adopted at the tenth special session of the General Assembly⁸ affirms that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization, that effective measures of nuclear

² See *The Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977, chap. VI, pp. 68-69.

³ See A/C.1/1026.

⁴ See A/9698, annex III.

⁵ See foot-note 3.

⁶ For the texts of the Treaty, the Protocol, and the Joint Statement of Principles, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27* (A/34/27 and Corr.1), appendix III (CD/53 and Corr.1), vol. I, document CD/28. Detailed discussion of the texts is contained in *The Yearbook*, vol. 4: 1979, chap. VIII, and the texts are reproduced in appendix IX thereof. For further details on the subject, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, chap. VI, p. 90.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

⁸ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4* (A/S-10/4), sect. III, paras. 18, 20 and 45-71.

disarmament have the highest priority, that the ultimate goal in that context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and that, as noted earlier, the nuclear-weapon States, particularly those that possess the largest nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility in the task of achieving nuclear disarmament. The relevant sections of the Programme of Action of the Final Document, paragraph 50 in particular, indicate the direction in which the process of nuclear disarmament should move but allow for considerable flexibility with respect to the manner in which the objective should be achieved and the measures that should be adopted at different stages.

A number of old and new ideas on specific aspects of the question of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament that were put forward at the special session have been under continuing consideration. In addition, attention has focused on the problems involved in multilateral negotiations on the whole spectrum of questions relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The deliberations on the subject, in the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission as well as in the Committee on Disarmament, have revealed significant differences, particularly among the nuclear-weapon States, with respect to a number of fundamental issues. Developments in 1981 are reviewed below.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1981

During its 1981 session,⁹ the Disarmament Commission considered the question of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament mainly in the context of item 4 of its agenda, an item which was carried over from the previous substantive session, held in 1980. It read as follows:

4. (a) Consideration of various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, in order to expedite negotiations aimed at effective elimination of the danger of nuclear war;
- (b) Consideration of the agenda items contained in section II of resolution 33/71 H, with the aim of elaborating, within the framework and in accordance with the priorities established at the tenth special session, a general approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament.

The item was considered in the general exchange of views held by the Commission in the initial stage of its work and recommendations on the subject were later adopted by consensus. However, the Western States members of the Commission, in particular the ten member States of the European Community, without questioning the priorities set out in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, generally took the view that at its 1981 session the Disarmament Commission should focus its attention on the question of a study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed

⁹ See A/CN.10/PV.43-54, A/CN.10/PV.54/Add.1, A/CN.10/PV.41-54/Corrigendum and A/CN.10/32.

forces as well as that of the freezing and reduction of military expenditures¹⁰ and therefore did not speak on item 4 of the agenda. On the other hand, in the exchange of views, many non-aligned, neutral and Eastern European countries felt it necessary to emphasize once again the importance of according priority to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. Some countries felt that measures of nuclear and conventional disarmament should be taken up in parallel. In both contexts, the primary responsibility of the nuclear Powers was repeatedly stressed. At the same time, it was felt that the process of reduction of conventional forces and armaments should especially encompass the non-nuclear States having considerable military significance.

In the discussion on the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, there were persistent references to an increased danger of nuclear war as a result of the intensification of the nuclear arms race and the deterioration of the international situation, and appeals for the continuation and expansion of a nuclear disarmament dialogue between the two major nuclear Powers (SALT negotiations and negotiations with regard to intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe). Indeed, several countries expressed grave concern at the lack of progress in any of the many aspects of nuclear disarmament, in particular the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the conclusion of effective international arrangements to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

In that connection, Brazil stated that the spiralling nuclear arms race and the dangerous trend reflected in the strategic doctrines of the two major nuclear Powers were the dominant concern of the community of nations. The United Nations must, therefore, continue to seek practical means to achieve progress in the solution of those problems, which gravely endangered the security of every nation. The concern of all nations and peoples of the world for their survival in a situation where nuclear confrontation was attaining its highest level ever, Brazil held, was not to be lightly dismissed by a play on words in which "disarmament" was systematically degraded to the level of simple measures designed to "control armaments"

Yugoslavia stated that the intensified arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, was one of the dominant factors of the tense international situation. The arms race was flaring up in all its aspects, qualitatively and quantitatively and also geographically, because of the concentration of military arsenals in geopolitical regions that were focal points of crises.

Argentina held that at the root of the problems affecting the individual security of States and international security was the fact that the system of collective security laid down by the Charter was being replaced by a system based on the threat of the use of nuclear weapons by the countries possessing them, especially the two super-Powers. It had been said, Argentina added, that in the last 30 years all armed conflicts had been carried out with conventional weapons, but conventional weapons, proportional to defence needs, could not be called into question. That was part of the sovereign right

¹⁰ See chapter XVII and XIX below.

of States. The possession of nuclear weapons, on the other hand, was in itself intolerable. There was no symmetry, no possible comparison between the two types of weapons.

Mexico shared the view that nuclear weapons were the most serious threat to international security.

Nigeria held that the danger of nuclear war had never been greater and, although only a handful of States were involved in the nuclear arms race, the security of the entire world was being jeopardized. The doctrine of nuclear deterrence, Nigeria stated, had never been convincing, and the theory of a survivable and winnable nuclear war was even less convincing. The Disarmament Commission should therefore emphasize the need for all States to abandon any doctrine of reliance on nuclear weapons and urge the nuclear-weapon States to co-operate with the non-nuclear-weapon States in the Committee on Disarmament in undertaking concrete negotiations on nuclear disarmament. The Commission should call upon the Committee on Disarmament to submit to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, at the latest, a multilaterally negotiated instrument on a comprehensive test ban — a basic step to open the way towards nuclear disarmament. Reference should also be made to the need to continue the SALT process and to open negotiations on intermediate-range delivery vehicles.

India held that nuclear disarmament as a whole must continue to occupy the priority attention of the Disarmament Commission. It believed that a comprehensive test ban should be negotiated at an early date in the Committee on Disarmament, should be applicable to all countries, and should be of unlimited duration.

Egypt stated that the priorities already agreed upon at the tenth special session of the General Assembly must be adhered to. Unless there was substantial progress on nuclear disarmament, it stressed, the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons could not be effectively pursued.

China reiterated the view that, although nuclear disarmament was important, it could not by itself eliminate the danger of aggression and war. Therefore, conventional disarmament should be given equal importance. This did not mean that China disagreed with the priority given to the question of nuclear disarmament. In its opinion, the promotion of conventional disarmament, far from distracting attention from nuclear disarmament, would only serve to advance the general cause of disarmament, including nuclear disarmament. In that connection, China called attention to the two major Powers always looking upon nuclear and conventional armaments as two inseparable components of their over-all military strength.

The representative of Sweden said that, with the spiralling and senseless nuclear arms race still going on, there could be no alternative to giving nuclear disarmament the highest priority. It could not, however, be disregarded that some four fifths of the world's military expenditures were being devoted to the conventional arms buildup and its pace had been greatly increased by the rapid advancement of military technology. In view of its important impact, Sweden held, that aspect of the arms race should be given

greater attention than in the past. Finland expressed a similar view. Austria viewed the total military strength of the major participants in the arms race as a composite factor, in which nuclear and conventional capabilities played their role. Thus, the relative strengths and weaknesses in the conventional and nuclear fields were one of the most important factors in determining the strategic doctrines of the military alliance systems. For those reasons it seemed evident to Austria that disarmament objectives with regard to one category of armaments could be successfully pursued only if the other category were fully taken into account. Although progress in the one field should not be a precondition for progress in the other, the simultaneous pursuit of both objectives was the only promising approach. In a similar vein, Sri Lanka recalled that it had been agreed in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly that nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently.¹¹

The Eastern European States stressed that the halting of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament should have the highest priority. In the words of the USSR, that implied the earliest possible halting of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of the stockpiles of such weapons, leading to their complete elimination. Concerning the SALT II Treaty, the USSR said that in no way was the Soviet side responsible for the fact that the Treaty, which had already been signed, had not come into force. The USSR also attached great importance to the problem of strengthening the non-proliferation régime and, in the interest of achieving that goal, it favoured the strengthening of security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States. The USSR had also proposed that agreement should be reached on the non-deployment of nuclear weapons in the territories of States where such weapons did not exist at present. It further recalled that in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly¹² it had been recognized that significant progress in nuclear disarmament would be facilitated both by parallel political and international legal measures to strengthen the security of States and by progress in the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments of the nuclear-weapon States and other States in the regions concerned.

France commented on the concerns expressed in the Commission's debate with regard to the nuclear arms race and the risks linked with the existence of nuclear weapons. In that connection, it recalled that the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly had enunciated some fundamental conditions of any disarmament undertaking, which also applied to nuclear disarmament. Among them, France mentioned the following: the maintenance of mutual security; the maintenance or re-establishment of balance at a reduced level of armaments; the taking into

¹¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4* (A/S-10/4), sect. III, paras. 44-45. On the question of priorities, paragraph 45 states: "Priorities in disarmament negotiations shall be: nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduction of armed forces."

¹² *Ibid.*, para 54.

account of regional factors; and effective international verification measures. In the region where France was located, security, and hence peace, was based on an over-all balance in which the nuclear element was combined with the conventional element. Consequently, progress towards disarmament depended on a twofold effort: first, that the two major nuclear Powers come to an agreement on the definition of balance, which was the goal of SALT and then, at a later stage, on a progressive lowering of the defined ceilings; and secondly, on the effort to be made within the geographic area of Europe to improve security conditions and then progressively reduce conventional armaments.

Ultimately, the Commission adopted the following recommendations on item 4 of its agenda:

1. On agenda item 4 (a) and (b) there was an exchange of views in the general debate and in an informal meeting of the committee of the whole. Delegations stressed the urgent need for steps to improve the current international situation, for measures of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, and for the implementation of the Programme of Action of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly.

2. The Commission noted with grave concern that it was meeting at a critical moment of deterioration in international relations. The crisis in the process of détente has once again posed a serious threat to world peace and stability. The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, has escalated to new levels. The independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of countries continue to be under threat, and the rights of peoples under alien and colonial domination to self-determination and independence remain unfulfilled. There has been increasing recourse to the use, or threat of use, of force, military intervention, occupation and interference, in violation of the United Nations Charter and international law. Thus, focal points of aggression and tension, particularly in the Middle East, southern Africa, South-West Asia, South-East Asia, the Caribbean and Central America, continue to exist, while new conflicts among States further aggravate the international situation. In this connection, the Commission stressed the need for urgent measures to improve international relations, conducive to progress towards the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament. The relaxation of tension cannot be fully ensured without the appropriate participation of all countries in vital decisions affecting world peace and security on the basis of equality.

3. Among the greatest perils facing the world today is the threat of destruction as a result of nuclear war. The increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary, weakens it.

4. The Commission is of the conviction that the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, runs counter to efforts to achieving further relaxation of international tensions; that progress in the field of disarmament would be beneficial to the strengthening of international peace and security and to the improvement of international relations, which in turn would facilitate further progress; and that all nations, nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear weapon States alike, have a vital interest in measures of nuclear and conventional disarmament, as well as in the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons in accordance with the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document. Renewed and co-ordinated actions are necessary so as to halt and reverse the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, with a view eventually to achieving general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. The promotion of disarmament would be facilitated by the strict adherence by all States to the principles of the United Nations Charter, and by measures that would bring about the relaxation of international tensions and the peaceful settlement of disputes among States.

5. The Commission recalls the relevant provisions of the Final Document according to which, in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility. That responsibility entails the respect for the security concerns of the non-nuclear weapon nations, refraining from any action conducive to the intensification of the nuclear arms

race and above all the pursuit of concrete measures of nuclear disarmament. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reduction.

6. It is obvious that the most effective assurance of security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and, pending that, the nuclear-weapon States should give appropriate effective assurance to non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Effective international arrangements should be pursued to this end, taking into account all proposals and suggestions that have been made in this regard. Proposals on that subject have been submitted to the Committee on Disarmament.

7. The Commission recommended the strengthening of the existing nuclear-weapon-free zone and the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones as well as the establishment of zones of peace in accordance with paragraph 64 of the Final Document.

8. The Commission noted that the most recent agreements on strategic arms control between the two most heavily armed nuclear-weapon States remain unratified. Further, the Commission deplored the fact that military expenditures are reaching ever higher levels, largely by the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, and emphasized the necessity of releasing such resources to economic and social development in the world, particularly for the benefit of developing countries. The lack of progress in disarmament and the upward spiral in the arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect and the interaction of those factors with further aggravated international tension have adversely affected the realization of the Programme of Action contained in the Final Document and of the objectives of the first Disarmament Decade. In this connection, the Commission emphasized the urgent need for the early attainment of the objectives of the Second Disarmament Decade.

9. Among the views expressed during the course of the Commission's deliberation some members maintained that the easing of international tensions could not be based on the policy of balance of force, spheres of influence, rivalry between power blocks, military alliances and the accumulation of armaments, particularly nuclear weapons. On the other hand, another view was expressed that, for some countries of a particular region, security, hence peace, was indeed based on an over-all balance in which the nuclear element was combined with the conventional element: the aims must be to improve security conditions in the area and then to achieve progressive reductions in arms.

10. There was also some discussion of the validity of the doctrines of nuclear deterrence. One view was that these doctrines lay at the root of the continuing escalation of the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear armaments and led to greater insecurity and instability in international relations, thus endangering international peace and security. Another view was that, while there were limits to a security system based to a great extent on nuclear deterrence, such a system had the merit of existing and of satisfying the security requirements of certain States; peace had been preserved over long years in that part of the world where it applied.

11. Many delegations stressed the need for the early conclusion of a convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament. Another view was expressed that the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons should be agreed upon concurrently with the renunciation of the use of force in international relations.

12. The Commission noted again with profound regret that, although there had been limited progress in certain areas, there continued to be a marked lack of progress, particularly in the priority items in the Programme of Action adopted at the tenth special session of the General Assembly. It called upon all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, urgently to take action so as to achieve more rapid progress in the field of genuine disarmament, with particular emphasis on the priorities established by Assembly resolutions and especially in the Final Document of the tenth special session. The Commission expressed the view that the Committee on Disarmament, in conformity with its mandate, should fully discharge its responsibilities in order to promote rapid progress on all items on its agenda, paying due regard to the priorities set out in the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document.

13. In the light of its deliberations, the Commission strongly urged all States, and particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to continue and intensify the search for a common approach that will lead to progress in the field of disarmament. This is the case especially in areas

with the highest concentrations of armaments, including, *inter alia*, Europe. It is therefore urgent to initiate and intensify appropriate negotiating processes, bilateral, regional or multilateral, towards this end. The initiation of multilateral negotiations on questions of vital interest to nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear weapon States alike is particularly important. The Commission strongly emphasized the importance of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982, and expressed determination for its success so that a process of genuine disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field, could be initiated.

The United States reserved its position on the above recommendations, noting that they were derived from a working paper introduced only in the closing days of the session. Further, it believed that the deliberations of the Commission on the agenda item were insufficiently detailed to permit the development of considered judgements on the important and complicated issues covered by it.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1981

At the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament, the questions relating to nuclear arms limitation and disarmament were discussed in general statements, in the specific context of the consideration of the agenda item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" and also in informal meetings. Numerous documents were submitted on various aspects of the nuclear question.¹³ The debate covered organizational as well as substantive questions, but no progress was made on either. This was largely the result of two different approaches to the question. Several members, expressing grave concern over the continuing arms race, the risks inherent in doctrines of nuclear deterrence, and the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war, urged that the Committee, as a matter of the highest priority, should initiate negotiations on concrete measures of nuclear disarmament. Other members, while emphasizing their belief that efforts should be made to reduce tension and the level of nuclear confrontation, expressed the view that the existence of nuclear weapons had been a critical factor in preserving stability in a large part of the world for many years. They believed that negotiations on matters of nuclear disarmament should be undertaken initially by the nuclear-weapon States concerned, and drew attention to the complexities of undertaking such negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament as a whole.

Specifically, the group of 21,¹⁴ in a written statement,¹⁵ drew attention to the fact that all nations, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, had a vital interest in

¹³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27)*, para. 55. The documents themselves are contained in *ibid.*, *Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27)*, appendix II (CD/228), documents CD/143 and CD/188 (Mexico), CD/171 (Secretariat), CD/180 (group of 21), CD/193 (German Democratic Republic), CD/213 and CD/227 (China), CD/216 (USSR), CD/219 (socialist countries), CD/225 (Cuba) and CD/226 (Mongolia).

¹⁴ See chapter I, foot-note 27.

¹⁵ See foot-note 13, document CD/180.

measures of nuclear disarmament, because the existence of nuclear weapons, in the arsenals of a handful of Powers, directly jeopardized the security of the whole world. Also it expressed the conviction that the promotion of nuclear disarmament would be facilitated by the strict adherence of all States to the principles of the United Nations Charter and, in particular, by measures that would bring about the relaxation of international tensions and the peaceful settlement of disputes. The group further held that doctrines of nuclear deterrence, far from being responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, were at the root of the continuing escalation of the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear armaments and led to greater insecurity and instability in international relations. Moreover such doctrines, which in the ultimate analysis were founded on the willingness to use nuclear weapons, could not be the basis for preventing the outbreak of a nuclear war. Accordingly, the competitive accumulation of nuclear arms by the nuclear-weapon States could not be condoned on grounds that it was indispensable to their security. Any such argument was viewed by the group as patently false. Consequently, in the task of achieving nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those which possessed the most important nuclear arsenals, bore a special responsibility. That responsibility entailed the fulfilment of commitments entered into in international instruments in the field of disarmament, respect for the security concerns of the non-nuclear nations, refraining from any action conducive to the intensification of the nuclear arms race and the increase of international tensions and, above all, the duty to take positive and practical steps to adopt and implement concrete measures of nuclear disarmament. In the light of this assessment, the group of 21 believed that the Committee on Disarmament, in which all nuclear-weapon States as well as non-nuclear-weapon States were represented, must continue and intensify the search for a common approach that would enable it to discharge the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly.

China, in a working paper,¹⁶ stated that it had always attached great importance to the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament because it had a direct bearing on the vital issue of eliminating the danger of nuclear war and maintaining international peace and security. The two super-Powers, it stated, were the only countries which had the capability to wage a nuclear war, and the race between them for nuclear superiority constituted the key factor which accounted for the lack of substantive progress in disarmament. Under such circumstances, it was impossible to talk about equal security among the countries of the world. Consequently, in order to remove the very real threats to world peace and to assure all the countries of equal security, it was necessary for the two with the largest nuclear arsenals to take action in advance of other countries and halt the nuclear arms race, cease the testing, production and development of all types of nuclear weapons, and drastically reduce their stockpiles of such

¹⁶ See foot-note 13, document CD/213.

weapons. Then the other nuclear-weapon countries would bear their share of responsibility.

The USSR, in a plenary meeting, stated that it had been and was in favour of consideration in the Committee on Disarmament, as a matter of priority, of the question of nuclear disarmament. In 1979, just after the Committee on Disarmament had come into existence, the USSR had submitted, together with the other socialist States, a document containing proposals for negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they were completely destroyed.¹⁷ That document made specific proposals to start negotiations on nuclear disarmament as soon as possible and defined the approach of the socialist States to that subject, to arrangements in preparation for the negotiations, to negotiating stages and to other issues connected with the conduct of the negotiations. It also emphasized the need to reach agreement on appropriate verification measures. The USSR also drew attention to other subsequent documents and statements in which it set forth its position on nuclear disarmament issues. It concluded by saying that the socialist countries considered that the cessation of the production and the reduction of nuclear weapons leading to their elimination should be carried out on a stage-by-stage, mutually acceptable and agreed basis. The degree of participation of individual nuclear-weapon States in measures within each stage should be determined with due regard for the quantitative and qualitative significance of their existing arsenals and those of the other States concerned. At all stages, the existing balance in the matter of nuclear arms should be maintained, with a gradual lowering of their levels. Arguments had often been heard of late to the effect that nuclear disarmament issues were inseparably linked with the highest national security interests of States and that negotiations thereon should not be held without account being taken of those interests. The USSR fully subscribed to such a view, provided it was not used as an excuse for refusing to negotiate on nuclear disarmament.

The United States, reflecting on the interrelationship of the international political climate, the military balance and the reduction of nuclear armaments, called attention to the military buildup of the USSR. The United States was ready to admit that the world could breathe more easily if there were no nuclear weapons in existence, although the danger from modern conventional weapons, which was appalling, would remain. Nuclear weapons, however, did exist, and until a sure means of eliminating them without jeopardizing the security of any State or group of States had been found, a nuclear deterrent must remain a key element in maintaining stability and peace. That did not mean, however, that the United States expected deterrence to serve forever. An arms race was neither in its interest nor that of the Soviet Union. Many exchanges on the subject had taken place between the two countries. As had been indicated by its President, the United States was now willing to move on to the larger area of strategic arms reductions, not just limitations.

¹⁷ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27* (A/34/27 and Corr.1), appendix III (CD/53 and Corr.1), vol. I, document CD/4.

The United Kingdom believed that the only secure route to nuclear arms control could be found in negotiations between the United States and the USSR. For that reason, it attached great importance to a continuation of the SALT process. The relationship between the two Powers was clearly central to the Committee's endeavours in the field of nuclear arms control. The United Kingdom also pointed out that it was a fundamental characteristic of negotiations, such as those on strategic nuclear weapons, that they involved highly technical issues affecting the security of the participants. For this reason, the United Kingdom did not see how the negotiations on nuclear arms control agreements could in the first instance be conducted within the Committee on Disarmament and also questioned whether it was appropriate for the Committee to become a forum for debate on strategic theory.

France again saw the situation as being dominated by two fundamental realities: first, nuclear weapons were to an overwhelming degree in the hands of two Powers; and secondly, the existence of nuclear weapons was a fundamental element of balance, and hence of security, in Europe. Any progress towards the halting of the nuclear arms race and, then, towards nuclear disarmament therefore depended on a twofold effort, which had already begun: (a) the two Powers must agree on the definition of nuclear balance and on ceilings and then, at a later stage, on the lowering of those ceilings; and (b) within the geographical area of Europe, improvement of security conditions and then the gradual reduction of the level of conventional weapons. It was this twofold balance that ensured the deterrent effect. In that connection, France did not consider that deterrence conceived as such inevitably led to an effort to achieve superiority and consequently to an arms race, with the resultant risks of destabilization. The maintenance of deterrence should normally lead to an endeavour to eliminate or prevent any destabilizing effect; it should be compatible with the halting of the armaments race and the gradual reduction of armaments. France hoped, therefore, that the negotiations between the two major Powers would proceed in that direction.

With regard to the role of the Committee on Disarmament, France considered that the Committee's competence covered the examination of the nuclear question. The discussions in which the Committee was engaged with the participation of the five nuclear-weapon Powers was proof of this. However, responsibilities concerning the undertaking of commitments rested principally with the nuclear-weapon countries. What should be considered in the Committee was how that body should express its views on the subject. In that connection, owing to the disproportion between existing arsenals, France would contemplate an undertaking regarding its own weapons only if, as a result of negotiations between the two largest Powers, there was some change in that disproportion. France did not believe there was any justification for the idea of a proportional reduction on the basis of the present ratio of forces. Such a formula would merely perpetuate the present situation of bipolar advantage and extreme inequality, which was not justified either by the scale of responsibilities or by the real needs of security. Finally, France stated that it did not dispute either the inadequacies or the risks of a system of security based largely on nuclear deterrence; but that system was a reality and peace

had been preserved for many years in the part of the world where it was employed.

With regard to procedures, at the beginning of the session the group of 21 reiterated its proposal¹⁸ for the setting up of an *ad hoc* working group to undertake multilateral negotiations on the elaboration of the stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly; the clarification of the issues involved in the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons pending nuclear disarmament; and the prevention of nuclear war. Clarification of the issues would involve the elimination of reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence; measures to ensure an effective discharge by the Committee on Disarmament of its role as the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament; and the Committee's relationship with the negotiations on nuclear disarmament conducted in bilateral, regional and other restricted forums.

Informal meetings

As the proposal did not secure consensus in the Committee, it was decided to hold informal meetings to undertake an examination of the concrete issues involved in respect of the nuclear item. At the informal meetings, held on 23 and 30 March 1981, members generally acknowledged the wide scope and complex character of the item, which involved security concerns and strategic doctrines, and the need for urgent action to reduce tensions and eliminate the danger of nuclear war. They also discussed the question of consultations and preparations for multilateral negotiations. Several members criticized the doctrines of deterrence as tending to escalate the nuclear arms race and increase the risk of nuclear war. Many members stressed that international peace and security would be considerably enhanced by measures of nuclear disarmament, including undertakings on the non-use of nuclear weapons.

The Western nuclear-weapon States held that nuclear disarmament should take place as part of a general process of disarmament involving conventional armaments and armed forces in their entirety; otherwise, serious military and political destabilization could result. They considered that this process of disarmament could not be isolated from the security requirements of States and from the international political and military situation. In their view, the first aim of the maintenance of military capacity, including a nuclear capacity, was to prevent war by demonstrating the ability to defend a State against any level of potential attack, and convincing an adversary that the risks of launching such an attack far outweighed the potential benefits. They considered that deterrence had thus served and continued to serve as an essential component in maintaining a balance between the two major military alliances, and thereby contributed to stability on a global scale.

¹⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/35/27)*, appendix II (CD/139), vol. II, document CD/116.

The USSR expressed its views on issues related to the prevention of nuclear war, the curbing of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, setting forth and submitting specific proposals on those issues,¹⁹ as embodied in an official Soviet document.

Attention came to be focused on the nature of the multilateral action that should be taken by the Committee. It was the position of some members that the item currently provided relatively little scope for useful work by the Committee. While recognizing the widespread concern at the continuous nuclear arms race, they considered that the most effective way to pursue nuclear arms limitation and disarmament lay through negotiations among the nuclear Powers, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union. They also stressed that it was still unclear what aspects of nuclear disarmament were suitable for negotiations in the Committee.

The group of 21 rejected as politically and morally unjustifiable that the security of the whole world should be made to depend on the state of relations existing among the nuclear-weapon States. In the opinion of the group, the existence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of a handful of Powers and the continued escalation of the nuclear arms race directly and fundamentally jeopardized the vital security interests of all States and increased the risk of nuclear war. All States, therefore, had a right to participate in negotiations on nuclear disarmament, even though bilateral and other regional negotiations on such issues might be useful and should be intensified. For that reason, the group was convinced that multilateral negotiations on concrete measures of nuclear disarmament such as those identified in its working paper²⁰ should be initiated without delay and that the Committee on Disarmament provided the most appropriate forum for that purpose.

A group of socialist States, while supporting the establishment of a working group, drew attention to its own 1979 proposals²¹ for starting negotiations on ending the production of nuclear weapons and destroying them and also for the holding of consultations to prepare for such negotiations. In its view, no task was more important than the prevention of nuclear war and in that connection the group said that any attempt to launch a first nuclear strike was bound to provoke a no less powerful retaliatory attack and no part of the world would be spared from the consequences. It was also the socialist belief that cessation of the production as well as the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons should be implemented on a stage-by-stage, mutually acceptable and agreed basis, with the balance of nuclear arms remaining undisturbed at all stages during the gradual lowering of the levels of armaments, and with undiminished security for all States. The measures for the limitation of the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament should be linked to the strengthening of political and legal guarantees of the security of States. As one of the measures in that connection, the group proposed that

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27)*, appendix II (CD/228), document CD/160.

²⁰ See foot-note 18.

²¹ See foot-note 17.

there should be no deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there were currently no such weapons. Finally, the group expressed its continued readiness to begin negotiations on the whole spectrum of issues concerning disarmament.

France again expressed the view, already noted above, that any progress towards the halting of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament depended on a twofold balance affecting the level of both the nuclear and the conventional forces possessed by the two sides. It also repeated that deterrence did not in principle imply an attempt to achieve superiority, nor did it therefore imply an arms race and the risk of destabilization.

Other members held that neither the concept of balance nor of deterrence, however conceived, could ensure peace and security, either regionally or globally. Recourse to nuclear weapons as a means to offset asymmetries in conventional armaments was considered by them as untenable, in view of the fact that nuclear weapons, as weapons of mass destruction, could not be equated with conventional armaments. They also warned that such doctrines could provide justification for the introduction of nuclear weapons in other regions of the world.

A group of socialist States, while making it clear that they opposed any attempt to upset the existing military-strategic balance, did not consider that such a balance, with a high level of military confrontation, should be maintained in the future. The purpose of their policy in matters of disarmament, they said, was to strive for a reduction in the level of military confrontation and to promote general and complete disarmament under effective international control. They considered that the genuine security of States, as well as international security in general, could not be guaranteed by continuing the arms race but rather by limiting it.

China again called attention to the fact that there existed a wide gap in the size and quality of the armaments of the nuclear-weapon States with the largest stockpiles and those of other nuclear-weapon States. The former, therefore, should first take the lead in drastically reducing their nuclear armaments, thereby creating favourable conditions for other nuclear-weapon States to join them in a further reduction of nuclear armaments according to rational procedures and ratios.

In making an assessment of the informal meetings, the group of 21, in a written statement,²² expressed the conviction that the need for urgent multilateral action on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, through the negotiation and adoption of concrete measures, had once again been amply demonstrated. In the light of that assessment, the group urged that the Committee on Disarmament intensify the search for a common approach that would enable it to discharge the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly in the field of disarmament. For its part, the group believed that the immediate objective should be the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group with a mandate to elaborate on paragraph 50 of the Final

²² See foot-note 13, document CD/180.

Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and to identify substantive issues for multilateral negotiations.

The meetings, however, did not lead to agreement on a basis for multilateral negotiations or on the prerequisites for such negotiations.

Subsequent plenary meetings

The Committee, in later plenary meetings, again took up the consideration of the establishment of a subsidiary body for further handling of the item "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". The proposal of the group of 21 for an *ad hoc* working group was submitted to the Committee for decision on 14 July 1981, and there was still no consensus in favour of it.

The United States explained that the item embraced a broad spectrum of complex issues and measures. In its view, the matters proposed for inclusion in the mandate of the working group were already under consideration in other working groups. However, it was prepared, together with other delegations, to co-operate in finding other ways of handling the item, including the holding of informal meetings in place of a separate working group.

China, together with a group of socialist countries, supported the proposal for a working group and favoured the immediate commencement of negotiations on the question.

Other members reiterated that, without prejudice to the role and responsibilities of the Committee, questions relating to nuclear weapons limitation and reduction were primarily matters of a bilateral and regional nature and came within the competence of the States directly concerned, which should undertake the initial negotiations.

At the request of a group of socialist States, the Committee on 23 July considered their proposal²³ on further proceedings of the Committee concerning the nuclear item, and agreed that the Chairman should hold consultations on the subject. The Chairman's consultations revealed that those members who were not in a position to agree to the setting up of a working group were willing to consider the establishment of a contact group to deal with the questions raised in the written statement of the group of 21. In view of the limited available time, the Chairman advised that further consultations might be deferred till the beginning of the 1982 session, and the Committee agreed. Some delegations held that those who could not agree to the establishment of a working group should come forward with concrete proposals for furthering the work of the Committee under the item. In that context, many delegations stressed that the momentum created by the exchange at informal meetings should not be lost.

The Committee on Disarmament agreed to resume intensive consideration at its next session of the item on the cessation of the nuclear arms

²³ *Ibid.*, document CD/193.

race and nuclear disarmament, taking into account the proposals and views presented during its 1981 session.

The socialist and other delegations denounced the decision of the United States Government, in August 1981, to begin production of nuclear neutron weapons and considered it a challenge to world opinion, which had been demanding nuclear disarmament. In their view, that new weapon would increase the danger of nuclear war, exacerbate the threat of a new qualitative arms race, and gravely complicate the solution of disarmament problems. A group of socialist States called upon the Committee to initiate without delay negotiations on the elaboration of a convention prohibiting the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons, and to set up within the Committee an *ad hoc* working group to that end.²⁴ Those States emphasized that they advocated the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons in treaty form.²⁵

Members of the group of 21, in the light of the proposal by the socialist States, felt that there was an increasing need for establishing an *ad hoc* working group to negotiate on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, as it had proposed in both 1980 and 1981, in the first instance on measures to halt and reverse the qualitative and quantitative development of nuclear weapons.

The United States and other Western countries stressed that, since the enhanced radiation weapon was only one particular type of nuclear weapon, it was part of the general problem of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. There was, therefore, no reason for giving it special treatment, or for making specific provisions with respect to it in treaty form. Thus the establishment of a working group for the purpose of negotiations on that subject appeared unjustified.

One country expressed concern about the present and potential escalation in the nuclear arms race in its quantitative and qualitative aspects, including both the deployment of the Soviet SS-20 mobile missile and the American production of the enhanced radiation weapon. It stated that it was not the time for self-serving postures or proposals, but for wise statesmanship, and proposed that the Committee should issue an urgent appeal to the United States and the USSR to open early negotiations to halt and reverse the escalation in their nuclear arms race in both its quantitative and qualitative aspects.

In response, the USSR directed attention to the statement of its head of State to the effect that it was prepared to discontinue the deployment of its medium-range missiles in the European part of its territory on the same day that negotiations on the substance of the question would begin, on condition

²⁴ See foot-note 13, document CD/219.

²⁵ The draft of a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons was first submitted by the USSR, and sponsored by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and Romania in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in 1978 (document CCD/559); the text is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, appendix VIII, and discussed in chap. X.

that the other side acted likewise. Moreover, the USSR made reference to its many concrete proposals in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, including those made in the Committee.

The United States and other Western countries, in opposition to the views expressed against the nuclear neutron weapon, stated that the recent decision of the United States Government was related to developments in the deployment of forces, particularly in the European theatre. The weapon in question, they said, which should properly be referred to as a reduced blast and enhanced radiation weapon, had been designed not to make nuclear war more thinkable, but to make aggression less so. It was designed and intended as a deterrent against mass armoured attack. They therefore rejected categorically the view that the weapon would make it easier to cross the threshold into nuclear war. In their view it was not urgent, for that and other reasons, to establish the proposed *ad hoc* working group to deal separately with that particular weapon.

On 20 August 1981, the Committee formally considered the proposal concerning the urgent establishment of an *ad hoc* working group on nuclear neutron weapons. The Chairman observed that there was no consensus in favour of the proposal and therefore it was not adopted.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1981

Consideration of the problems of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament was resumed at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, both in the plenary general debate and in the First Committee.²⁶

In the course of the deliberations, an overwhelming majority of countries continued to emphasize the primacy of the task of halting the nuclear arms race and moving towards nuclear disarmament, with some, notably Western, countries continuing also to stress the need of tackling problems related to conventional weapons, particularly the question of regulating them in parallel with nuclear weapons.²⁷

The many aspects of the question of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament were considered in the First Committee, and the statements, particularly those of the nuclear-weapon Powers, once more revealed significant differences of view on how to deal with the complexities of the question.

China noted that throughout the world the intensification of the arms race and the growing danger of nuclear war was a cause of deep concern and that

²⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 33rd and 91st meetings; *ibid.*, *First Committee*, 3rd to 44th and 52nd and 53rd meetings. and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

²⁷ For instance, in a statement on 20 October on behalf of the ten member States of the European Community, the United Kingdom stated that the Community was "making the attempt in Europe to tackle the issues of arms control and disarmament across the spectrum of nuclear and conventional forces and in the vital field of confidence-building measures."

more and more countries had come to realize the need for the super-Powers to take the lead in the nuclear disarmament process. Of course, after the super-Powers had taken effective measures for nuclear disarmament, the other nuclear countries, including China, would join them in the reduction of nuclear weapons until such weapons were completely eliminated. As a developing country engaged in a modernization programme, China strongly hoped for the early achievement of the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons.

France, welcoming the opening of negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe, also advocated a resumption of negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons between the USSR and the United States, the object of which should be not only to achieve their limitation but also to bring about their reduction. France viewed the negotiations on those two questions as part of a whole and falling within the same framework. In the meantime, France felt compelled to maintain its means of deterrence at the levels required to ensure their deterrent effect, bearing in mind the quantitative and qualitative increase in the most important arsenals.

The USSR emphasized that the SALT II treaty, which had already been signed, had been set aside and that a new stage in the nuclear arms race might irreparably undermine international stability and thus multiply the danger of a nuclear war. It held that, in the circumstances, the minimum which should be done by the United Nations with a view to exerting a restraining effect on the course of international events, would be to take a firm and unequivocal stand against the first use of nuclear weapons. The adoption by the General Assembly of a declaration on that subject, the USSR stated, would lead to a strengthening of the legal and political bases of international security and at the same time constitute an important step towards the elimination of the threat of nuclear conflict. That, it further emphasized, could be done without prejudice to other efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament, such as the halting of the manufacture of all nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of stockpiles of such weapons leading to their complete elimination.

The United States viewed the effort to bring nuclear weapons under international control as the most important task of those who sought to realize the promise of peace. For many years, the United States had assumed that the Soviet Union shared its view that the objective of arms control negotiations should be to allow each side the same right to maintain deterrence, stability and a retaliatory capacity, but it was no longer possible to assume a mutuality of interests between the two of them. The United States and the Soviet Union had different policies with regard to nuclear and conventional weapons; therefore, they had different objectives in negotiating to limit the spiral of nuclear and conventional arms accumulation. SALT was a case in point. The United States' goal in having a nuclear arsenal was only deterrence and stability, i.e. to maintain a second-strike capability so that the United States itself, its allies and its interests could be protected at all times. The Soviet Union, the United States said, had not yet adopted a parallel position. The Soviet strategic buildup was aimed not at achieving and preserving strategic stability but at threatening the survivability of the United States strategic

forces. As such, it was a repudiation of the doctrine of mutual assured destruction resting on mutual vulnerability which the United States had thought both sides had adopted by signing the SALT I agreements of 1972. The profound changes in the strategic environment since that time had required the United States to review its arms control policies and to take steps to restore its deterrent capability, both nuclear and conventional. The United States would be seeking arms reduction and arms control agreements which would ensure an equal deterrent capacity for both sides at lower levels of armaments, a deterrent capacity which would require both sides to co-operate in assuring compliance. In that connection, the United States stressed that new procedures were needed to make verification processes more thorough and more reliable.

Similarly, the United Kingdom held that in most of the various negotiations now under way or about to begin — in particular the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe — the problem of verification would be near the heart of the discussions. If the common desire for peace and stability at lower levels of force was to be satisfied, the United Kingdom said, efforts for the conclusion of disarmament agreements built on confidence must be redoubled, and confidence could only develop if there was a willingness to move away from secrecy towards a freer exchange of information.

Speaking on behalf of the ten member states of the European Community, the United Kingdom also said that the Ten believed that there was no virtue in any arms control agreement which could not be adequately verified so as to give each party confidence in the compliance of the others. Further, the Ten were encouraged by the prospect of a renewed dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union on strategic arms limitation. That was entirely in keeping with the responsibility of the super-Powers to take the first steps in nuclear disarmament. In that connection, the positive emphasis in American statements on negotiating reductions rather than ceilings had been noted. Such an approach would help to strengthen the non-proliferation régime and also give a much-needed stimulus to other arms control negotiations.

With respect to the specific question of multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, a question pursued every year since the holding of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, a draft resolution was submitted in the First Committee by Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian SSR, the USSR and Viet Nam. Subsequently, the sponsors submitted a revised version and then further oral amendments before it was voted upon. By the draft resolution, the Assembly would express the belief that it was necessary to initiate, as a matter of high priority, multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and on the gradual reduction of their stockpiles up to and including their total destruction, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly.

Further, it would call upon the Committee on Disarmament, as a matter of priority and for the purpose of an early beginning of substantive negotiations, to consider, *inter alia*, the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group, with a clearly defined mandate, on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament.

In introducing the draft resolution in the First Committee, the German Democratic Republic stated that there was every reason that its subject should be the focal point of discussion in the Committee at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly.

On 23 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution, as revised, by a recorded vote of 83 to 17, with 8 abstentions. Four countries explained their position in connection with the vote.

Austria, while finding itself in agreement with the basic thrust of the resolution and supporting the establishment of the proposed *ad hoc* working group, held that the preambular part was burdened by a number of sweeping and unbalanced elements concerning the strategic doctrines and intentions of nuclear-weapon States. Nevertheless, it had voted in favour. In view of the present acceleration of the nuclear arms race and the growing threat of destabilization, Austria held, all approaches that could lead to progress in the nuclear area must be explored. Finland, making reference to the relevant preambular paragraphs of the resolution, stated that it rejected all concepts of limited nuclear war and that its affirmative vote should be regarded as an expression of its concern about all doctrines which might bring nearer the possibility of a nuclear war; it would have preferred, however, more general formulations in the relevant preambular paragraphs. Similarly, Sweden, which had also voted in favour, emphasized its opposition to all formal doctrines as well as measures taken by the nuclear-weapon States in terms of weapons development and deployment which were apt to make them more likely to resort to the use of such weapons in the event of war. However, since one-sided descriptions of those complex matters were of little value in promoting the cause of nuclear disarmament, Sweden would have preferred an accurate and balanced description of the nuclear postures and preparations of both parties.

Belgium, in explaining its negative vote, said that the draft resolution was polemical and took a unilateral view of the problem of nuclear weapons. In particular, it noted with regret that the principles of the Charter, which condemned the threat or use of force in international relations and confirmed just as solemnly the right to self-defence of States, were not mentioned in the preamble to the draft resolution. A reference to those ideas, it said, would have been more relevant than references to so-called new doctrines on the use of nuclear weapons, particularly in view of the fact that one of the sponsors of the draft resolution was the only country to have pursued strategic superiority through the establishment of new nuclear-weapon systems. Belgium also held that the Committee on Disarmament must determine its own working methods and that it was not appropriate at the present stage to consider the creation of a working group on the nuclear question.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by 118 votes to 18 (France, United Kingdom, United States and other Western countries), with 5 abstentions, as resolution 36/92 E. China did not participate in the vote.

Resolution 36/92 E reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming once again that nuclear weapons pose the most serious threat to mankind and its survival and that it is therefore essential to proceed with nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming also that all nuclear-weapon States, in particular those which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility for the fulfilment of the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament,

Stressing again that existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth, and bearing in mind the devastating results which nuclear war would have on belligerents and non-belligerents alike,

Recalling that at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, it decided that effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war had the highest priority and that it was essential to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons,

Recalling further that, in its resolution 35/152 B of 12 December 1980, it noted with alarm the increased risk of a nuclear catastrophe associated both with the intensification of the nuclear-arms race and with the adoption of the new doctrine of limited or partial use of nuclear weapons giving rise to illusions of the admissibility and acceptability of a nuclear conflict,

Noting with alarm that this dangerous doctrine leads to a new twist in the spiral of the arms race, which may seriously hamper the reaching of agreement on nuclear disarmament,

Noting, in this connexion, an urgent need for the cessation of the development and deployment of new types and systems of nuclear weapons as a step on the road to nuclear disarmament,

Stressing again that priority in disarmament negotiations should be given to nuclear weapons, and referring to paragraphs 49 and 54 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 33/71 H of 14 December 1978, 34/83 J of 11 December 1979 and 35/152 B and C of 12 December 1980,

Noting that the Committee on Disarmament, during its session held in 1981, discussed the question concerning the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and, *inter alia*, the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group for negotiations on the subject.

Noting also the proposals and statements made in the Committee on Disarmament, both during its formal and informal meetings, on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, and, *inter alia*, on prerequisites for the conduct of negotiations on nuclear disarmament,

Noting with regret that the Committee on Disarmament, during its session held in 1981, was not able to reach agreement on a basis for multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, or on prerequisites for such negotiations,

Convinced that the Committee on Disarmament is the most suitable forum for the preparation and conduct of the negotiations on nuclear disarmament,

1. *Believes* it necessary to initiate, as a matter of high priority, negotiations on the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and on the gradual reduction of their stockpiles up to and including their total destruction, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

2. *Notes* the decision of the Committee on Disarmament to resume intensive consideration, at its session to be held in 1982, of the item on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament;

3. *Calls upon* the Committee on Disarmament, as a matter of priority and for the purpose of an early commencement of the negotiations on the substance of the problem, to continue consultations in which to consider, *inter alia*, the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and on nuclear disarmament with a clearly defined mandate;

4. *Deems it appropriate*, as envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, that the Committee on Disarmament should proceed, as the first step, to the consideration of stages of nuclear disarmament and their tentative content, *inter alia*, the content of the first stage;

5. *Also deems it appropriate* to consider, within the framework of the discussion on the content of measures to be carried out during the first stage, the question of the cessation of the development and deployment of new types and systems of nuclear weapons;

6. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to report on the results of those negotiations to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

In the area of bilateral negotiations, a resolution was once again adopted by the General Assembly on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the USSR and the United States. A draft resolution on the question was submitted by Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, the Congo, Cuba, Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Romania, Sweden and Yugoslavia and was subsequently revised, with the addition, in particular, of an operative paragraph (para. 6 below) in which the Assembly would stress the need that both parties bear in mind the vital interests of all the peoples of the world in the question.

In introducing the draft resolution, Mexico noted that the text of the draft was very similar to that of resolution 35/156 K, adopted in 1980. This was due to the fact that, unfortunately, the exhortation addressed by the General Assembly in that resolution to the two major nuclear Powers to ratify the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons (SALT II) had remained a dead letter. The interest of the General Assembly in the SALT question, Mexico emphasized, dated back to the very origins of the SALT negotiations in 1969. Since 1972, it had been reflected in an uninterrupted series of resolutions, including that embodying the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly. In that Document, the conclusion of the bilateral agreement known as SALT II was among the measures given the highest priority. The Assembly, Mexico further stated, had never regarded the SALT II Treaty as an end in itself. The Final Document therefore placed stress on the fact that that Treaty should be followed promptly by further strategic arms limitation negotiations between the two parties, leading to agreed significant reductions of and qualitative limitations on strategic arms. The sponsors, Mexico concluded, hoped that the draft resolution would be adopted by consensus like resolution 35/156 K of 1980, its closest antecedent.

On 4 December, at the 53rd meeting, the revised draft resolution was adopted without a vote in the First Committee. Albania disassociated itself from the consensus on the ground that the two Powers had continued to expand the arms race and were not acting in good faith in dealing with strategic arms limitation.

In connection with the adoption of the draft, the USSR stated that it favoured the immediate resumption of talks with the United States on strategic

arms limitation, which should be based on everything constructive and positive that had already been achieved in that area. The United States emphasized that strategic arms limitation was an issue of great importance to it. It was a party to SALT I and was voluntarily abiding by the provisions of article VI of SALT II. Now the two major Powers must look forward to negotiations that would result in substantial and militarily significant reductions in strategic arms, that is, strategic arms reduction talks (START). The United States, as indicated by President Reagan, was committed to negotiating an equitable START agreement.

The Federal Republic of Germany emphasized the importance of the consensus that had been achieved on the draft resolution, which had come at a particularly pertinent moment, i.e. just after the beginning of the negotiations between the USSR and the United States on the limitation and reduction of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe. The position of the United States, as recently formulated by its President, could greatly contribute to progress in those as well as in the SALT or START negotiations. The Federal Republic of Germany was likewise convinced that the USSR was pursuing nuclear arms limitation in good faith. This could lead to the security partnership which was required if a genuine and lasting peace was to be ensured.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft as resolution 36/97 I, again without a vote. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2602 A (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, 2932 B (XXVII) of 29 November 1972, 3184 A and C (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973, 3261 C (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3484 C (XXX) of 12 December 1975, 31/189 A of 21 December 1976, 32/87 G of 12 December 1977 and 35/156 K of 12 December 1980,

Recalling that the SALT I agreement — which bears the official title of “Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms” — entered into force on 3 October 1972 following more than two years of bilateral negotiations and that its text was issued as a document of the General Assembly,

Recalling that the SALT II agreement — which bears the official title of “Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms” — was finally signed on 18 June 1979, after six years of bilateral negotiations, and that its text, together with the texts of the Protocol to the Treaty and the joint statement of principles and basic guidelines for subsequent negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms, both signed on the same date as the Treaty, and the joint communiqué issued also on 18 June 1979, were issued as a document of the Committee on Disarmament,

Reaffirming once again its resolution 33/91 C of 16 December 1978, in which it, *inter alia*:

(a) Reiterated its satisfaction at the solemn declarations made in 1977 by the heads of State of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, in which they stated that they were ready to endeavour to reach agreements which would permit starting the gradual reduction of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and moving towards their complete, total destruction, with a view to a world truly free of nuclear weapons,

(b) Recalled that one of the disarmament measures deserving the highest priority, included in the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, was the conclusion of the bilateral agreement known as SALT II, which should be followed promptly by further strategic arms limitation negotiations between the two parties, leading to agreed significant reductions of and qualitative limitations on strategic arms,

(c) Stressed that in the Programme of Action it was established that, in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility,

Reaffirming that, as stated in its resolution 34/87 F of 11 December 1979, it shares the conviction expressed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in the joint statement of principles and basic guidelines for subsequent negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms that early agreement on the further limitation and further reduction of strategic arms would serve to strengthen international peace and security and to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war,

Recalling that, at its first special session devoted to disarmament, it proclaimed that existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone were more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth, that the increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary weakened it, and that the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race posed a threat to the very survival of mankind, for which reasons the General Assembly declared that all the peoples of the world had a vital interest in the sphere of disarmament,

Recalling also that in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, annexed to its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980, it recommended that special priority be given to the ratification of the SALT II Treaty,

1. *Notes* that the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II) has not yet been ratified;

2. *Urges* that the process begun by the SALT I Treaty and signature of the SALT II Treaty should continue and be built upon;

3. *Trusts* that the signatory States will continue to refrain from any act which would defeat the object and purpose of that process;

4. *Urges* the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with reference to resolutions 34/87 F of 11 December 1979 and 35/156 K of 12 December 1980, to pursue negotiations, in accordance with the principle of equality and equal security, looking towards the achievement of an agreement which will provide for substantial reductions and significant qualitative limitations of strategic arms;

5. *Welcomes* the commencement of negotiations at Geneva on 30 November 1981 between representatives of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on nuclear arms in accordance with the joint communiqué issued by Secretary of State Haig and Foreign Minister Gromyko on 23 September 1981, and trusts that such negotiations will facilitate the enhancement of stability and international security;

6. *Stresses the need* for both parties to bear constantly in mind that not only their national interests but also the vital interests of all the peoples of the world are at stake in this question;

7. *Invites* the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to keep the General Assembly appropriately informed of the results of their negotiations, in conformity with the provisions of paragraphs 27 and 114 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Strategic arms limitation talks"

Three other resolutions adopted at the thirty-sixth session dealt with specific proposals of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament, namely, (a) non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of States where there are no such weapons at present; (b) prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon; and (c) prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Such proposals had been under consideration in previous years, and States in their comments generally reiterated the views they had expressed in the past, in either the General Assembly or the Committee on Disarmament, or both.

A draft resolution entitled "Non-stationing of nuclear weapons in the territory of States where there are no such weapons at present" was submitted by Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian SSR, the USSR and Viet Nam.

In introducing the draft resolution, Hungary considered that the conclusion of an international agreement on the subject of the draft would considerably strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation régime and could contribute to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and to reducing the danger of nuclear war. Recent decisions to deploy nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there were no such weapons at present and to deploy more nuclear weapons on the territories where there were already such weapons had, in the opinion of the sponsors, increased the importance and timeliness of the question. As the report of the Committee on Disarmament indicated, that body had been unable to deal with the question in an appropriate manner. In the light of that situation, the sponsors considered it necessary to continue the efforts aimed at the elaboration and conclusion of an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons. Consequently, by the draft resolution, the General Assembly would request once again that the Committee on Disarmament proceed without delay to talks aimed at elaborating an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons and call upon all nuclear-weapon States to refrain from further action involving the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of other States.

The draft resolution was approved in the First Committee, on 25 November, by a recorded vote of 67 to 17, with 38 abstentions.

Several delegations explained their position in connection with the vote. India said that its affirmative vote on the draft was without prejudice to India's consistent policy calling for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons, wherever they might be deployed. Consequently, it viewed the proposal contained in the draft as only one aspect of the problem of achieving nuclear disarmament and not as an end in itself. Similarly, the Sudan made it clear that its affirmative vote should in no way be construed as acceptance of the present existence of nuclear weapons on some territories or acceptance of any attempt to legalize such existence. Finland stated that, while it had voted in favour of the draft resolution, it took exception to operative paragraph 2 as well as to the last preambular paragraph (see below), inasmuch as they might be detrimental to the Geneva talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe. Finland had emphasized time and again that those negotiations should be conducted in good faith and with the security of Europe as the only goal. The Niger stressed that its vote in favour of the resolution in no way diminished its resolve not to be dictated to by any foreign Power as to what means should be adopted to ensure its security.

Belgium explained its negative vote on the ground that the draft resolution prevented States from exercising their right of collective self-defence as provided for in Article 51 of the Charter. Japan, which also voted

against the resolution, held that the measures proposed in the draft resolution might destabilize the international military balance and thereby prove detrimental to the maintenance of international peace and security.

Brazil, Greece, Ireland, Peru, Sweden and Yugoslavia explained their respective abstentions. Brazil called attention to the fact that the draft resolution failed to include the specific requirement of the withdrawal and elimination of nuclear weapons from the territories of States where they already existed. An international agreement such as that contemplated in the draft resolution could therefore, in Brazil's view, confer legality on the existence of nuclear weapons on the territories of countries that already possessed them. Yugoslavia expressed similar views. Greece had reservations not only because it felt that the subject matter of the resolution should be dealt with in a broader, global context, but also because progress in that area should be founded on the sovereign right of every country freely to decide on questions concerning its own defence, either collective or individual. Ireland viewed the question of where the weapons of the two major Powers should be stationed, and under what kind of control, as a matter of contention between the alliances of which those major Powers were members. Since the sponsors of the draft resolution were mainly members of one of the two alliances and Ireland was not a member of either, it had felt it necessary to abstain, notwithstanding its strong general position on the spread of nuclear weapons to other areas. Peru, as a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, did not agree with the approach taken by the draft. In its view, the right approach was the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other parts of the world, in the way that one had been established in Latin America. Sweden thought that progress in the field covered by the resolution could be achieved only in the context of real disarmament agreements; therefore, it had some doubts and reservations about the idea of seeking the solution of a complex problem through an agreement dealing with only one of its aspects. In that context, the Swedish delegation could not help taking note of the fact that one of the sponsors of the draft, the USSR, had recently been shown to act in a way which sharply contradicted the very idea underlying the resolution, as evidenced by the fact that a Soviet submarine had not only violated Swedish territorial waters and penetrated into a military restricted area of a friendly, non-nuclear neighbouring State, but also, as was later found, in all probability had carried nuclear warheads on board. The Soviet Union, a sponsor of a proposal aimed at preventing the stationing of nuclear weapons on new territories, Sweden concluded, had thus raised a very serious problem of credibility and consistency.

Albania called attention to the fact that it had not participated in the vote and said that the draft resolution, in its opinion, was part of the rivalry between the two major nuclear Powers and intended to secure advantages over the adversary. The proposal, it held, pursued goals contrary to nuclear disarmament.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by 84 votes to 18 (France, United Kingdom, United States and other Western

countries), with 42 abstentions, as resolution 36/97 E. China did not participate in the vote.

Resolution 36/97 E reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Conscious that a nuclear war would have devastating consequences for the whole of mankind,

Recalling its resolution 33/91 F of 16 December 1978, which contains an appeal to all nuclear-weapon States to refrain from stationing nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present, and to all non-nuclear-weapon States which do not have nuclear weapons on their territories to refrain from any steps which would directly or indirectly result in the stationing of such weapons on their territories,

Recalling further its resolution 35/156 C of 12 December 1980, in which it requested the Committee on Disarmament to proceed without delay to talks with a view to elaborating an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present,

Noting with regret that this appeal by the General Assembly remains unheeded,

Considering that the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present would constitute a step towards the larger objective of the subsequent complete withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territories of other States, thus contributing to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons and leading eventually to the total elimination of nuclear weapons,

Bearing in mind the clearly expressed intention of many States to prevent the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories,

Deeply alarmed by plans and practical steps leading to a build-up of nuclear-weapon arsenals on the territories of other States,

1. *Requests once again* the Committee on Disarmament to proceed without delay to talks with a view to elaborating an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present;

2. *Calls upon* all nuclear-weapon States to refrain from further action involving the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of other States;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the discussion of this question by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;

4. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on the question to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present: report of the Committee on Disarmament"

The draft resolution on the prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon was sponsored by Angola, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Hungary, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Romania, Sao Tome and Principe, the Ukrainian SSR and Viet Nam.

In introducing the draft resolution, the German Democratic Republic stressed that it referred to a disarmament measure which deserved the utmost attention and that there was hardly any region in the world where people were not alarmed by the production of the nuclear neutron weapon. That was only natural, it stated, in view of the fact that other regions outside Europe, such as

the Middle East and the Far East, were conceivable as areas for the deployment and use of that weapon. The idea that a qualitatively new type of weapon was to be added to an arsenal of the most dreadful weapons, the German Democratic Republic further stated, had prompted many Governments to call for its prohibition. This showed that they were aware of the fact that the specific characteristics of the nuclear neutron weapon would considerably increase the danger of nuclear war. Because of the relatively low long-term radioactive fall-out caused by it, the nuclear neutron weapon was supposed to be used as a tactical weapon. The decision on its production reflected doctrines concerning a possible limited nuclear war. Unless there was success in prohibiting such a new weapon of mass destruction in good time and reversing this new stage of the arms race, the inclusion of the weapon in other arsenals must be expected. The sponsors of the draft resolution, therefore, believed that the special characteristics of the weapon, its imminent inclusion in military arsenals, and the intention to deploy it rendered its elimination especially urgent. Consequently, the Committee on Disarmament should be requested to start negotiations without delay on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons. The draft resolution focused on those objectives.

The draft resolution was supported in the First Committee on 23 November, by a recorded vote of 58 to 13, with 40 abstentions. China did not participate in the vote. Twenty-two countries, including China, France, the USSR and the United States, explained their position in connection with the vote.

China expressed the view that since the nuclear neutron weapon was just one type of nuclear weapon, the question of its prohibition should be included in negotiations on nuclear disarmament. It was not difficult to see, China said, that the USSR had singled out the question for its own motives, which were dictated, *inter alia*, by the fear that the other side's deployment of the neutron bomb would result in the loss of its own military superiority in Europe.

France, which voted against the draft, held that there was no reason to give the intense-radiation weapon, called the neutron bomb, any special consideration and, consequently, to provide for any specific provisions for a convention with regard to it. The United States, which also voted against, stressed that the so-called neutron weapon should be more accurately called the reduced-blast weapon, and stated that the motivation for the United States to begin to assemble that weapon lay in the massive Soviet buildup sustained over many years — a buildup which had turned the European military balance against democratic societies. Moreover, the production of the reduced-blast weapon, which was an anti-tank weapon and as such purely defensive in purpose, was fully consistent with the United States Government's goal of ensuring the most effective, damage-limiting and credible deterrent possible. Contrary to what the draft resolution stated, the United States emphasized, the reduced-blast weapon, rather than making nuclear war more thinkable, would make aggression less so by adding to the credibility of deterrence and thus reducing the likelihood that nuclear weapons would ever be used in a European or any other conflict. Finally, the draft resolution, the

United States added, conveyed the false notion that the reduced-blast weapons were being deployed. The United States had no plans at the current time to deploy those weapons outside of United States territory.

The USSR stated that it wanted the adoption of a separate resolution banning the neutron weapon not because it feared the United States coming into possession of that weapon, but for the reason that it would open the door to a new spiral in the arms race. For that reason it had made clear its readiness to conclude an agreement prohibiting the manufacture and deployment of the neutron weapon. The whole of mankind would gain from the prohibition of such a weapon of mass destruction. The USSR, for its part, would not begin to manufacture the neutron weapon if it was not possessed by other States.

Cyprus, Indonesia and the Niger explained their affirmative votes as reflecting their support for any measure that would help to prevent the development and production of an additional weapon of mass destruction. Denmark and the Netherlands, which had abstained, said that, while they would not accept the weapon on their soil, it was only too evident that the draft resolution was politically inspired. Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Egypt, India, Ireland, Pakistan, Peru, Sweden, Venezuela and Yugoslavia, which had also abstained, essentially found that the approach of the draft resolution, namely, to single out one particular type of nuclear weapon, did not serve a useful purpose. For similar reasons, Senegal did not participate in the vote. Finally, Albania had not participated in the vote because neither the draft resolution nor the conclusion of a convention pursuant to it would serve any useful purpose, since, it held, neutron weapons were already part of the nuclear arsenals of the super-Powers.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 68 to 14, with 57 abstentions, as resolution 36/92 K. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling paragraph 47 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly stating that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and that it is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons,

Stressing that the termination of the qualitative arms race and the use of scientific and technological achievements solely for peaceful purposes are in the interest of all States and peoples,

Sharing the world-wide concern on the production and intended deployment of nuclear neutron weapons expressed by numerous Member States and by many non-governmental organizations,

Considering that the introduction of the nuclear neutron weapon in the military arsenals of States escalates the nuclear arms race and significantly lowers the threshold to nuclear war, thereby increasing the danger of such a war,

Aware of the inhumane effects of that weapon, which constitutes a grave threat, particularly for the unprotected civilian population,

Recalling the proposals for the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons,

Desiring to contribute to halting the arms race, particularly in the field of weapons of mass destruction,

1. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to start without delay negotiations in an appropriate organizational framework with a view to concluding a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the discussion of this question by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;
3. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on this question to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session;
4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session an item entitled "Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon"

On the question of the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, a draft resolution was submitted in the First Committee by Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Niger, Norway, the Philippines, Romania, Singapore and Sweden. In introducing the draft, Canada recalled that a resolution on the subject had been adopted by the General Assembly each year since 1978 and noted that the objective of the present draft resolution had been set out in paragraph 50 of the Programme of Action of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly the same year. In previous resolutions on the subject of fissionable material, the Assembly had requested the Committee on Disarmament to consider the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, and to keep the Assembly informed of its progress. The 1981 report of the Committee on Disarmament indicated that the subject of prohibition of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes had been addressed on a number of occasions and was one of the most significant areas for nuclear disarmament. Canada believed therefore that it was fitting for the General Assembly to reaffirm its interest in the matter. The adoption of a procedural resolution similar to that of the last three years, it held, would contribute to the realization of the international community's non-proliferation goals.

On 24 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 99 to 13, with 6 abstentions.

Two countries explained their position in connection with the vote. The USSR, which had voted against, held that the solution of the problem of the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes could not be separated from the problem of the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons in all their forms and the gradual reduction of stockpiles of such weapons until they had been completely eliminated, because such a separation would run counter to the aims of nuclear disarmament and the various relevant provisions of the Final Document of the special session. Mexico, which had voted in favour, noted that the draft resolution requested the Committee on Disarmament to pursue the question of cessation of production of fissionable material "at an appropriate stage of its work on the item entitled 'Nuclear weapons in all aspects' ", and stated that at that "appropriate stage" not one but two objectives would have to be pursued: cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of

delivery, and cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. That had been agreed upon by consensus at the 1978 special session on disarmament.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 125 to 14 (Eastern European and other States), with 6 abstentions, as resolution 36/97 G, which reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 33/91 H of 16 December 1978, 34/87 D of 11 December 1979 and 35/156 H of 12 December 1980, in which it requested the Committee on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of the implementation of the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to consider urgently the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration,

Noting that the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament for 1981 included the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects" and that the Committee's programme of work for both parts of its session held in 1981 contained the item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament",

Recalling the proposals and statements made in the Committee on Disarmament on these items,

Considering that the cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and the progressive conversion and transfer of stocks to peaceful uses would be a significant step towards halting and reversing the nuclear arms race,

Considering that the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices also would be an important measure in facilitating the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and explosive devices,

Requests the Committee on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to pursue its consideration of the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the General Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration.

Finally, the General Assembly adopted three resolutions on the prevention of the possible use of nuclear weapons, entitled, respectively: (a) Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe; (b) Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war; and (c) Prevention of nuclear war.

The Declaration was adopted as the result of an initiative of the USSR, which had requested that an item on that subject be put on the agenda of the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly.²⁸ Subsequently, the USSR submitted a draft resolution which was twice revised and sponsored also by Angola, the German Democratic Republic and Mongolia.

Speaking on the subject in the First Committee, the USSR stressed that there continued to be a dangerous growth of tension in the world and that the arms race was assuming unprecedented proportions. All of this was accompanied by the whipping up of an atmosphere of military psychosis and war hysteria. In those circumstances, people were ever more alarmed by the

²⁸ A/36/241.

threat of a nuclear war, which had no analogy in history. Therefore, the task of preventing a nuclear catastrophe and "removing the sword of Damocles hanging over the head of mankind" was a task which should be given the highest priority in international relations. The problem, the USSR added, had become particularly relevant because the United States, banking on force as an instrument for achieving certain political goals, was pursuing the objective of creating for itself a position of military supremacy. In inflating the myth of the Soviet military threat, the USSR stated, the United States was, *inter alia*, sharply increasing military appropriations, accelerating plans for deploying American nuclear medium-range missiles in Europe, preparing to manufacture the neutron weapon, and planning to spend for military purposes in the next five years a total of one and a half trillion dollars. A new stage in the arms race, the USSR stressed, might by itself irreparably undermine international stability and multiply the danger of the outbreak of war, but the danger deriving from the vast accumulation of means of mass destruction was made greater by the development of "first strike" doctrines. In putting forward the doctrine of the admissibility and acceptability of nuclear war, an attempt was in effect being made to legalize the use of nuclear weapons and condition people to the idea that nuclear war could be limited and could be won, an idea which was both adventuristic and suicidal.

The United Nations would, therefore, be taking timely and correct action, the USSR stated, if it issued a warning that there could never be any justification or pardon for statesmen who would take a decision to be the first to use nuclear weapons and that any doctrine endorsing the first use of nuclear weapons would be incompatible with the principles of human morality and the ideals of the United Nations. The Soviet Union also attached importance to having the United Nations state that the nuclear arms race should be halted and reversed by efforts of all the parties concerned, through negotiations conducted on the basis of honesty and equality.

Later in the session, the United States representative noted that a number of delegations, in particular those of France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands, had exposed inconsistencies between the Soviet draft resolution and other statements of the USSR on the issue of the use of its nuclear weapons. The United States also referred to other disarmament initiatives of the USSR over the years, citing several cases to question the aim and reliability of Soviet proposals and pledges. For instance, the United States recalled that on 30 August 1961, a year after its commitment to a moratorium on the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons which it had repeatedly proposed, the USSR had violated the moratorium, initiating a series of some 50 atmospheric tests. In the same connection, the United States emphasized that meaningful arms control became prudently feasible only when all Member States of the United Nations strictly adhered to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter and thus refrained in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial or political independence of any State. Historical evidence, the United States said, demonstrated that words could never be a substitute for deeds.

On 25 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution by a

recorded vote of 67 to 18, with 37 abstentions. Twenty countries explained their position in connection with the vote. Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, India, Jordan, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka, which had voted in favour of the draft resolution, clearly supported the thrust of the resolution, even though some of them, notably India, Nigeria, Pakistan and Sierra Leone, stressed that the prohibition of the first use of nuclear weapons was only one aspect of the larger issue of a total ban on nuclear weapons. Austria, Argentina, the Bahamas, Brazil, Finland, Ireland, Kenya, Senegal, the Sudan and Sweden, which abstained, expressed a number of reservations, either on the character of the resolution as a whole or some of its parts, with several of them expressing doubt that a declaration would bring the world any closer to the goal of reducing the threat of an outbreak of nuclear war. Albania did not participate in the vote as the United Nations was not in need, it said, of a draft resolution that was not aimed at real disarmament and preventing war, particularly nuclear war.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 82 to 19 (France, United Kingdom, United States and other Western countries), with 41 abstentions, as resolution 36/100. The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind that the foremost task of the United Nations, born in the flames of the Second World War, has been, is and will be to save present and succeeding generations from the scourge of war,

Recognizing that all the horrors of past wars and all other calamities that have befallen people would pale in comparison with what is inherent in the use of nuclear weapons capable of destroying civilization on earth,

Reaffirming that the universally accepted objective is to eliminate completely the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons through the cessation of their production, followed by the destruction of their stockpiles, and that, to this end, priority in disarmament negotiations should be given to nuclear disarmament,

Convinced that, as the first step in this direction, the use of nuclear weapons and the waging of nuclear war should be outlawed,

Solemnly proclaims, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations:

1. States and statesmen that resort first to the use of nuclear weapons will be committing the gravest crime against humanity;

2. There will never be any justification or pardon for statesmen who would take the decision to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

3. Any doctrines allowing the first use of nuclear weapons and any actions pushing the world towards a catastrophe are incompatible with human moral standards and the lofty ideals of the United Nations.

4. It is the supreme duty and direct obligation of the leaders of nuclear-weapon States to act in such a way as to eliminate the risk of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict. The nuclear-arms race must be stopped and reversed by joint efforts, through negotiations conducted in good faith and on the basis of equality, having as their ultimate goal the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

5. Nuclear energy should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and only for the benefit of mankind.

The draft resolution entitled "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war" was sponsored by 30 non-aligned countries.²⁹ Its subject-matter had been dealt with in several other General Assembly resolutions, as indicated in the preamble of the new draft. India, in introducing the draft, emphasized that during the general debate in the First Committee there had been an unprecedented and universal expression of concern over the growing danger of a nuclear war. The nuclear arms race in both its quantitative and qualitative aspects had acquired a new momentum and the international situation had worsened to the point that the international community had greater apprehensions than ever before that a nuclear war, with all its catastrophic consequences, might break out. In those circumstances, it was the collective responsibility of the States Members of the United Nations to undertake all possible measures to reduce such a threat. What was at stake was not the security of a handful of countries or military alliances, but the very survival of the human species itself. It was the conviction of the sponsors that, pending the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, an agreement on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of such weapons would reduce the threat of nuclear war.

The draft resolution made it clear, India pointed out, that the ultimate objective, and indeed an objective which had been universally accepted, was nuclear disarmament. Nuclear disarmament alone could provide the only effective guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It was, however, a complex issue and would not be achieved immediately. However, the threat of the use of such weapons created insecurity for all States, including the nuclear-weapon States themselves. The effects of the use of nuclear weapons could not, because of their very nature, be confined to national or regional boundaries. While it was true that the United Nations Charter permitted individual and collective self-defense, it would be making a mockery of the Charter to suggest that, in the pursuit of its individual security concerns, a State might jeopardize the collective survival of all the States and people in the world. A State's choice of weapons and means of warfare, even in the exercise of individual and collective self-defence, was not unlimited.

While the new draft resolution, India noted, was similar to resolution 35/152 D adopted by the General Assembly in 1980, its operative paragraph 2 was different from that of the previous resolution. In fact, it urged the General Assembly, at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982, to consider the question of an international convention or some other agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war, taking into consideration the proposals and views of States in that regard.

The draft resolution was adopted in the First Committee on 23 November by a recorded vote of 99 to 18, with 5 abstentions. In connection with the vote, three countries explained their position. The German Democratic Republic, which had voted in favour, found the draft resolution very timely,

²⁹ Algeria, Argentina, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Colombia, Congo, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Peru, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Yemen and Yugoslavia.

especially in view of the forthcoming second special session. It observed that among those which cast negative votes there were nuclear-weapon States and their closest allies whose co-operation was essential in the endeavour to prevent the danger of nuclear war. Sweden explained that, although it agreed entirely with the objectives of the draft and shared the opinion that the effects of nuclear war most probably would constitute a crime against humanity, it had abstained in the vote because operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution was so worded as to make a particular interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations and thus did not seem to be entirely correct from a legal standpoint. Also, Sweden firmly believed that more resolute efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament were needed; unfortunately, it did not seem realistic to expect that a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons could start such a process. Ireland, which had voted negative, emphasized its opposition to any use of nuclear weapons, but expressed doubts regarding the approach adopted in the draft resolution.

On 9 December, the draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly, by a recorded vote of 121 to 19 (France, United Kingdom, United States and other Western countries), with 6 abstentions, as resolution 36/92 I, which reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Alarmed by the threat to the survival of mankind and to the life-sustaining system posed by nuclear weapons and by their use, inherent in concepts of deterrence,

Convinced that nuclear disarmament is essential for the prevention of nuclear war and for the strengthening of international peace and security,

Recalling its declaration, contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, that all States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed upon and which would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Recalling its resolutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, 33/71 B of 14 December 1978, 34/83 G of 11 December 1979 and 35/152 D of 12 December 1980,

Taking note of the Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons prepared by the Secretary-General with the assistance of a group of experts,

1. *Declares once again that:*

(a) The use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity;

(b) The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should therefore be prohibited, pending nuclear disarmament;

2. *Urges* the consideration, at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, of the question of an international convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war or some other agreement on the subject, taking into account the proposals and views of States in this regard;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war"

Finally, the draft resolution entitled "Prevention of nuclear war" was sponsored by Argentina, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Romania, Sweden and Yugoslavia. It was subsequently revised and also sponsored by Algeria, Bangladesh, Ecuador, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, the Sudan and Venezuela. Argentina introduced the draft in the First Committee and in

doing so emphasized that its subject-matter represented the most acute and urgent task of the present day. There had been no achievements in the field since the 1978 special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in spite of its warnings about the urgent need to stop the nuclear arms race. Therefore, the time had come for the Assembly to focus its attention on the question and to take some steps, however modest, which might help to remove the threat of nuclear war. First, it was necessary for the States possessing nuclear weapons to state clearly their views and suggestions for the prevention of nuclear war, so that the General Assembly, at its second special session on disarmament, would be informed of their positions, be able to study them and arrive collectively at appropriate measures and conclusions. The non-nuclear-weapon States, the sponsors believed, had the right and duty to assess those positions in order to arrive at their own thoughts on the subject, for their own survival was at stake and they could not delegate to others either the quest for or the formulation of solutions on this matter. The prevention of nuclear war was a question of common interest to all States, even though the instruments for unleashing such a war were in the hands of a small number of countries which bore a special responsibility in that connection, as recognized in paragraph 57 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. That first step, Argentina concluded, would be followed by others to be taken at the second special session. Presumably, the road would not end there and subsequent efforts would also be necessary. The process must, however, be triggered, and that was the purpose of the proposal.

The draft resolution was approved on 25 November without a vote in the First Committee. Then, on 9 December, it was adopted, also without a vote, in the General Assembly, as resolution 36/81 B. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race,

Recalling that removal of the threat of a world war, a nuclear war, is the most acute and urgent task of the present day,

Reiterating that it is the shared responsibility of all Member States to save succeeding generations from the scourge of another world war,

Recalling the provisions of paragraphs 47 to 50 and 56 to 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, regarding procedures designed to secure the avoidance of nuclear war.

Considering that prevention of nuclear war and reduction of the risks of nuclear war are matters of the highest priority, which should be considered by the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament,

Reiterating the vital interest of all the peoples of the world in disarmament,

Aware of the special responsibility of nuclear-weapon States,

1. *Urges* all nuclear-weapon States to submit to the Secretary-General by 30 April 1982, for consideration at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, their views, proposals and practical suggestions for ensuring the prevention of nuclear war;
2. *Invites* all other Member States that so desire to do likewise;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament a report containing the views, proposals and practical suggestions referred to in paragraph 1 above, as well as those received from other Member States.

Conclusion

Divergent approaches continued in 1981 to mark the consideration of questions related to nuclear arms limitation and disarmament. The deliberations on the question were, even more than in previous years, characterized by a high degree of controversy.

While there was general recognition of the pressing need for progress towards the objectives set out in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, particularly those stated in paragraph 50, serious differences persisted, especially among the nuclear-weapon States, with respect to a number of fundamental issues, such as: suitable conditions and framework for negotiations; the stages by which nuclear disarmament should proceed; the respective responsibilities of the five nuclear-weapon States at various stages of the process; the relationship between nuclear and conventional disarmament; and the practical implications of the concept of undiminished security at all stages of a disarmament process.

Those differences have been of long standing and therefore the search for common grounds would, under any circumstances, be lengthy and laborious. The search has been further complicated by developments in the international situation which have had adverse effects on virtually all discussions relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament — those in the Disarmament Commission, the Committee on Disarmament and the General Assembly alike, as well as in other forums, notably SALT.

At the same time, the deterioration of international relations has heightened the urgency of the need to come to grips with various questions relating to nuclear arms limitation and disarmament. It may therefore be expected that strenuous efforts will be made at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament to give fresh impetus to efforts to control the nuclear arms race.

CHAPTER VII

Cessation of nuclear-weapon tests

Introduction

THE CESSATION OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON TESTS has been a long-standing item on the disarmament agenda. Over the years increasing pressure has been brought to bear on the nuclear-weapon States and a variety of control measures have been introduced, but as yet the goal of cessation of nuclear-weapon tests has not been achieved. The most significant achievement to date is the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water,¹ known as the partial test-ban Treaty, which was signed on 5 August 1963 by the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States and entered into force on 10 October of that year. Some 110 States are parties to the Treaty, although they do not include two nuclear-weapon States, China and France; the latter, however, has not conducted tests in the prohibited environments since 1974.

Two bilateral treaties between the Soviet Union and the United States subsequently placed further limits on nuclear explosions carried out by the parties concerned. On 3 July 1974, the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests,² known as the threshold test-ban Treaty, was signed. The two countries concerned agreed to limit the yield of underground tests to a maximum of 150 kilotons and to reduce the number of such tests to a minimum. As of the end of 1981, the Treaty had not entered into force but it was generally understood that both parties were observing its basic limitation. On 28 May 1976, the two States signed the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes,³ by which they agreed not to carry out any individual nuclear explosion having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons; not to carry out any group explosion having an aggregate yield exceeding 150 kilotons unless the individual explosions could

¹ See United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480, No. 6964, p. 43; see also *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.2), pp. 19-30, and appendix I below.

² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 27* (A/9627), annex II, document CCD/431.

³ Text transmitted to the Secretary-General by the parties by a letter dated 7 July 1976 (see A/31/125, annex).

be identified and measured by agreed verification procedures; and not to carry out any group explosion having an aggregate yield exceeding 1,500 kilotons. A Protocol to the Treaty sets out arrangements concerning the provision of information by the parties, the rights and functions of observers of peaceful nuclear explosions, and means of ensuring that no weapons-related benefits precluded under the threshold test-ban Treaty would be derived from any peaceful nuclear explosion. At the end of 1981 the Treaty had not entered into force.

In 1977 the Soviet Union and the United States, later joined by the United Kingdom, began negotiations aimed at formulating the text of a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon test explosions in all environments and a protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. In addition to submitting joint progress reports, the three negotiating parties have commented individually in the CCD, in the Committee on Disarmament and in the General Assembly.

In 1978, at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, nuclear disarmament was given the highest priority in the Programme of Action of the Final Document,⁴ and the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States was placed first amongst the measures by which that goal might be achieved. Later in 1978, at its thirty-third session, the General Assembly adopted two resolutions: 33/71 C, by which it called upon nuclear-weapon States to refrain from further tests pending the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty, and 33/60, in which it urged the three States to expedite their negotiations and to present their results to the Committee on Disarmament during 1979.

Many States were dissatisfied with the joint progress report given to the Committee on Disarmament in 1979, and considered that negotiations in the Committee should not await the submission of an agreed text by the three Powers. At its thirty-fourth session, the General Assembly, by resolution 34/73, *inter alia*, requested the Committee on Disarmament to initiate negotiations on a treaty as a matter of the highest priority and called upon the three negotiating States to endeavour to bring their negotiations to a positive conclusion.

Neither in 1979 nor in 1980 was the Committee on Disarmament able to agree on the establishment of a working body to carry out negotiations and there was no clear agreement on what such a group would have done had it been established. On 30 July 1980 the three States presented to the Committee a report on their trilateral negotiations which recorded considerable progress; however, several members criticized the late rendering of the report as well as specific aspects of its content, such as the apparent short duration of the treaty under consideration and the significant authority being reserved for permanent members of the Security Council on such matters as review and amendments.

At its thirty-fifth session, the General Assembly, by resolution 35/145 A, *inter alia*, urged all States members of the Committee on Disarmament to

⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, paras. 45-71.

support the creation of an *ad hoc* working group and called for a halt without delay of all nuclear test explosions, either through a trilaterally agreed moratorium or through three unilateral moratoria. The United Kingdom and the United States voted against the resolution on the grounds that multilateral negotiations would interfere with and complicate the trilateral negotiations; in addition, the United States declared that it could not accept an unverifiable moratorium. The Assembly also adopted resolution 35/145 B, by which, *inter alia*, it called upon the three negotiating nuclear-weapon States to exert their best efforts to conclude their negotiations successfully before the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament and requested that Committee to take the necessary steps, including the establishment of a working group, to initiate substantive negotiations as a matter of the highest priority in order that a draft treaty might be submitted to the General Assembly no later than at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1981

The Disarmament Commission did not specifically address the issue of banning nuclear-weapon tests but in the general exchange of views and in remarks related to item 4 of its agenda, some 12 member States made reference to the subject.

Nigeria stated that the Commission should call upon the Committee on Disarmament to submit to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, at the latest, a multilaterally negotiated instrument on a comprehensive test ban. Cyprus held a similar view. Brazil, seeking to address the priority aspects singled out in the Final Document, urged that the Disarmament Commission focus its attention and energies on ways of expediting negotiations aimed at effective elimination of the danger of nuclear war. In that context, Brazil described the unsuccessful efforts made in the Committee on Disarmament to start substantive discussions on a nuclear-weapon test ban and the various other aspects of reversing the nuclear arms race.

The USSR considered that the proposal for general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon testing was of particular importance and in its view the reason why a treaty had not so far been concluded was the absence of the necessary good will on the part of the other two participants in the trilateral talks. The Soviet Union continued to attach considerable importance to the trilateral talks and, at the same time, believed that the Committee on Disarmament should have an important and active role in resolving the problem of prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests.

The Byelorussian SSR felt that the conclusion of a treaty would be an extremely important and timely measure as it would put an end to the qualitative refinement of nuclear weapons. The Byelorussian SSR as well as Mongolia expressed support for the one-year moratorium suggested at an earlier stage by the USSR. Bulgaria, Egypt, Pakistan and the Ukrainian SSR called for an early conclusion of a comprehensive treaty on the question. India

was firmly convinced that however delicate or sensitive the issues they should be brought to the multilateral forum and negotiated at an early date so that urgent measures could be initiated to achieve a ban on nuclear-weapon testing which would be applicable to all countries and of unlimited duration.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1981

There was no progress on the issue⁵ during the Committee on Disarmament's 1981 session, which gave rise to widespread disappointment and critical comment.

In his message to the Committee at the start of its work, the Secretary-General stated that a nuclear test ban was one of two measures of paramount importance recognized as essential in the Final Document and that the world looked to the forum of the Committee to chart a course towards substantive negotiations. In their opening statements many members emphasized the importance of achieving a comprehensive test-ban treaty and their hope that multilateral negotiations would be commenced during the session. To Mexico it appeared that the Committee on Disarmament should decide to listen to "a universal cry of impatience". Italy stated that conditions were ripe for the opening of concrete negotiations in the Committee. India appealed to the delegations concerned not to stand in the way of the wishes of the vast majority of nations and peoples. Many members, among them Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Czechoslovakia, India, Poland, Romania, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia, urged the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group to consider the matter. Nigeria declared that a nuclear test ban was not only a priority item on the Committee's agenda but should constitute the main contribution of the Committee to the success of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Several members made reference to the trilateral negotiations between the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States, and the most recent report⁶ of those negotiations. Italy stated that the report had marked a very important stage in efforts to reach an agreement and that it outlined a universal type of treaty which could certainly include a truly international verification system. Some nations, however, were more critical. Sweden expressed dislike for the trilateral negotiators' proposal of a treaty of three years' duration, which would amount to only a moratorium on nuclear tests. Pakistan was of a similar view and considered also that the nature of the draft treaty outlined by the trilateral Powers would bear little or no resemblance to the comprehensive test-ban treaty that the General Assembly had demanded for so long, nor was it likely to attract the wide adherence emphasized by the Assembly. Australia

⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27)*, paras. 29-94.

⁶ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/35/27)*, appendix II (CD/139), vol. II, document CD/130.

and Japan were among those which expressed disappointment at the slow progress of the tripartite negotiations.

The representative of the Soviet Union stated that his country had consistently believed that the Committee on Disarmament should play an active part in the solution of the problem; an appropriate working group should be set up whose activities could be productive provided that all the nuclear-weapon Powers actively participated. At the same time, the Soviet Union continued to attach great importance to the tripartite negotiations and reaffirmed its readiness to commence the next round of discussions between the three Powers.

The United Kingdom maintained that the confidential tripartite negotiations were the best way forward on such a vital issue and it followed that the United Kingdom did not support the creation of a working group in the Committee at that time.

Several members did not accept that a working group would impede the trilateral talks: Brazil, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic and India expressed that view. Japan called for substantive consideration of the question to complement the trilateral negotiations, while Australia stated that there was already a role for the Committee on Disarmament in the area of seismic detection and also, as proposed by Australia in 1980, in the consideration of administrative and institutional arrangements for verification.

As the meetings progressed, a hardening of attitudes became apparent on the part of some members. Venezuela expressed deep disappointment at the United Kingdom's earlier statement and, on behalf of the group of 21, repeated the firm conviction that an *ad hoc* working group should be established without delay. Peru observed that "flexibility" should not be confused with "docility", and Brazil could not accept the argument that substantive talks in the Committee on an item of an agenda agreed upon by all could prejudice or preclude restricted talks on the same subject.

Japan called for a resumption of the trilateral negotiations and, having suggested a working group to complement those talks, asked to hear views from the tripartite negotiators on what could profitably be discussed. Japan also joined those members who had earlier asked for responses to questions that had been raised in connection with the report of the trilateral talks rendered to the Committee in July 1980.

At various times during the first part of the session, the Committee held informal meetings on the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group on item 1 of its agenda, entitled "Nuclear test ban". After informal consultations, at the 116th meeting on 19 March the Chairman made a statement to the effect that the Committee would regularly hold informal meetings to undertake a substantive examination of concrete issues relating to items 1 and 2 (nuclear disarmament) of the agenda. The Committee subsequently devoted two informal meetings to the consideration of item 1, taking into account paragraph 51 of the Final Document, in particular the General Assembly's recommendation that the trilateral negotiations should be concluded urgently and the result submitted for full consideration by the multilateral negotiating

body with a view to the submission of a draft treaty to the General Assembly at the earliest possible date.

As the first part of the Committee's session drew to close, on 24 April Algeria presented a paper⁷ on behalf of the group of 21: in the document the group again recommended the creation of an *ad hoc* working group and suggested a mandate, and also drew attention to 12 unanswered questions which had been addressed jointly or separately to the three States taking part in the trilateral negotiations.

On two occasions during the session, the Committee was addressed by Dr. Ulf Ericsson, Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, who presented his Group's eleventh and twelfth progress reports.* Dr. Ericsson reported that under its most recent mandate the Group had started to consider, review and assess a number of national investigations into the sending of seismological messages around the globe, involving in particular the use of the World Meteorological Organization's (WMO) communication network. Some tests had been made and others were due to be carried out later in 1981. In addition, a large effort was being put into the design of data centres. A number of States, including Australia, the German Democratic Republic, Japan, Sweden and the United Kingdom, expressed gratitude for the Group's work. Canada emphasized the importance of verification issues and considered the work of the Group to be a singular contribution, in practical terms, towards realization of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. At the 113th and 147th plenary meetings on 10 March and 18 August the Committee adopted the recommendations contained in the two progress reports of the Group.

During the second part of the session criticism mounted of the Committee's continued inability to find consensus on the creation of an *ad hoc* working group. The USSR asserted that the United States and the United Kingdom were stubbornly opposed to the proposal, while China and France stated that they were not opposed to the idea of a group but added that they were not at present ready to end tests themselves. Brazil reminded the Committee of the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon Powers in several international documents to engage in serious negotiations to achieve a comprehensive test-ban treaty, e.g. the Final Document, the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 and article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty. Pakistan considered that, as it appeared unlikely that the kind of arrangements being negotiated trilaterally would provide the basis for a treaty that could gain universal adherence, it should be evident why the members of the group of 21 disagreed that those negotiations offered the best way forward. India and Mexico called for the Committee to take a formal decision on the proposal contained in the paper submitted by the group of 21, and Mexico stated that if the result were negative then it believed the Committee would have to conduct

⁷ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27)*, appendix II (CD/228), document CD/181.

⁸ *Ibid.*, appendix II (CD/228), document CD/150, and *ibid.*, document CD/210.

a searching examination of the significance and scope of the term "consensus" as used in article 18 of its rules of procedure. At the 136th meeting on 9 July that view was given the full support of the group of 21 in a further paper,⁹ presented by Brazil, which also pointed out that an adequate response, either jointly or individually, was expected from the tripartite negotiators to the questions submitted in the group's earlier paper.

On 13 July a statement¹⁰ was submitted by a group of socialist countries which, *inter alia*, supported the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States, appealed for the immediate resumption of the trilateral negotiations, and recommended that the tripartite negotiators jointly elaborate answers to the questions posed to them by the group of 21 in its earlier paper.

The proposal of the group of 21 for the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group was formally put to the Committee on 14 July at the 137th plenary meeting. The United States explained that the review of its policy concerning nuclear testing, including the question of negotiations on a test ban, had not yet been completed and in the circumstances it could not agree to the establishment of a working group. The United Kingdom reaffirmed its view that the confidential tripartite forum offered the most realistic way forward. In the light of those two statements the Chairman noted that there was at the time no consensus for the proposal; that conclusion was drawn again by the Chairman on 23 July when, at their request, the Committee considered the document submitted by a group of socialist countries.

In its second paper, the group of 21 had expressed the belief that, if it were not possible to reach a positive decision on its proposal for the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group, it would be necessary to examine what further steps should be taken by the Committee to ensure that its rules of procedure were not used in such a way as to prevent the Committee from taking procedural decisions enabling it to conduct negotiations on the items included on its annual agenda. On 4 August, Mexico presented a working paper,¹¹ sponsored also by Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia, containing a proposal to the effect that the rule of consensus should not be used in such a way as to prevent the establishment of subsidiary organs of the Committee.¹²

In their final statements to the Committee, several members expressed their disappointment at the failure of the Committee to make progress on item 1 of its agenda. Burma spoke of dismay and profound regret, Egypt expressed disappointment at not achieving any procedural progress. Ethiopia and Nigeria declared great disappointment that despite repeated calls by many delegations two nuclear-weapon States remained opposed to the establishment of a working group, and Pakistan stated that the disappointment at failure even to commence multilateral negotiations was genuine and widespread.

⁹ *Ibid.*, document CD/192.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, document CD/194.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, document CD/204.

¹² See chapter I above, pp. 14-15.

Mongolia, on behalf of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the USSR, stated that the socialist countries attached great importance to the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and had proposed, as had the group of 21, the setting up of an *ad hoc* working group. Unfortunately, certain nuclear-weapon States had prevented the Committee on Disarmament from beginning multilateral negotiations. The socialist countries, Mongolia went on, appealed to the United States and the United Kingdom to resume the tripartite negotiations without delay.

Speaking for the group of 21, Burma stated that the Group was deeply disturbed at the fact that the Committee on Disarmament had not been able to make any significant progress on most of the items on its agenda, especially a nuclear test ban. It was also regrettable that the parties engaged in the trilateral negotiations had not responded, either jointly or individually, to the questions submitted by the group of 21.

Thus, the Committee on Disarmament in 1981 remained at an impasse in its consideration of a possible comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1981

In all, 27 Member States included in their opening statements at the thirty-sixth session remarks on the subject of the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests.¹³ Several States recalled that reaching agreement on a comprehensive nuclear test ban had been declared the most urgent task. New Zealand expressed keen disappointment that a treaty had not been achieved as it would be a step which could serve to check both horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Samoa all expressed great concern at the continuation of nuclear weapon tests in the Pacific Ocean area and elsewhere.

Japan was of the view that a treaty would constitute the first step in halting the nuclear arms race. Nepal stated that the peoples of the world were justifiably impatient over the failure of the big Powers to negotiate such a treaty, a failure which had had disastrous consequences for both horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation. Morocco and Pakistan noted that the Committee on Disarmament had not been allowed to open negotiations on the issue, and Pakistan also commented that the prime negotiators seemed determined to reserve for the nuclear-weapon States the prerogative of conducting nuclear explosions.

Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland and the German Democratic Republic, among others, called for progress towards a treaty. The Soviet Union and the Ukrainian SSR charged the United States with the responsibility for delaying or even wrecking negotiations on the matter.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Thirty-sixth Session, Plenary Meetings, 5th to 33rd and 91st meetings.

Disappointment and frustration were widely expressed in the First Committee.¹⁴ The failure to establish a working group within the Committee on Disarmament, compounded by the halt in the tripartite negotiations between the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, gave rise to much critical comment.

Japan noted that to date more than 1,200 nuclear tests had been conducted, of which more than 780 had taken place since the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963. Over a decade following that Treaty, two bilateral agreements had been reached, on the limitation of underground nuclear tests and on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes; although signed by the Soviet Union and the United States, Japan regretted that neither country had ratified those two agreements. Japan requested the resumption of the trilateral talks at an early date and strongly hoped that the Committee on Disarmament would establish a working group to begin consideration of the issue.

Many delegations drew attention to the relationship between a comprehensive nuclear test ban and strengthening of the non-proliferation régime. Austria stated that it was the inseparable link between disarmament and non-proliferation that made the conclusion of a test ban treaty a matter of such importance and urgency; since such a treaty would contribute greatly towards controlling both vertical and horizontal proliferation, it was a logical first step towards nuclear disarmament and a safer world. Australia, Denmark, Egypt, Italy and New Zealand made similar references, and some countries expressed themselves more strongly on the same point: Jamaica believed that as long as the nuclear Powers failed to honour their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, States not parties would continue to be discouraged from acceding to that Treaty. Oman declared that the nuclear Powers concerned had not assumed their responsibility to the international community and the result would be that the concept of non-proliferation would become meaningless.

Mexico explained in detail the circumstances behind the proposed amendment of the group of 21 to the Committee on Disarmament's rules of procedure.¹⁵ Brazil said that two parties to the interrupted tripartite negotiations had blocked consensus on the establishment of a working group within the Committee on the basis that their restricted negotiations offered the best way forward. As those negotiations had not yet resulted in any concrete agreements, Brazil found that attitude puzzling unless the objective was a treaty to which they would be the only subscribers. Sweden accused certain Powers of using the consensus rule to deny the Committee on Disarmament its unequivocal right to start negotiations through the establishment of a working group. In view of the abuse of the rules of consensus, Sweden maintained, some members of the Committee on Disarmament had felt compelled to suggest a modification to correct that anomalous practice by prohibiting the rule of consensus to be applied to matters of procedure.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Thirty-sixth Session, First Committee, 3rd to 41st meetings; and *ibid.*, First Committee, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27), appendix II (CD/228), document CD/204; CD/181 and CD/192 are also relevant.

A number of Eastern European and other countries held that the lack of progress was due to the attitude of two particular nuclear-weapon Powers. The Lao People's Democratic Republic and Mongolia held that obstructionism and negativism on the part of certain nuclear Powers and their allies was the main reason for continued failure. Cuba declared that the United Kingdom and the United States had in effect imposed a double veto on the work of the Committee on Disarmament, as if they were in the Security Council. The Ukrainian SSR stated that it was not the fault of the Soviet Union that the trilateral talks had been halted and the creation of a working group within the Committee on Disarmament had been blocked. The USSR observed that in the tripartite negotiations it had been possible to reach agreement on a majority of treaty provisions, and that had included many very important substantive provisions on control; the fact that there was no treaty was not due to difficulty in resolving the outstanding issues but rather due to the lack of political will and readiness to conclude a treaty on the part of the United States. The USSR added that it had demonstrated flexibility regarding the organizational forms of negotiations and expressed readiness to hold consultations within the Committee on Disarmament, but counteraction by the United States and the United Kingdom had blocked all talks on banning nuclear tests. The USSR believed that mankind was really interested in a general and complete ban on nuclear weapon testing; mankind did not want some countries to stop such testing and others to continue.

The United States reaffirmed its support for the long-term goal but stated that a test ban itself could not end the threat posed by nuclear weapons. The United States would co-operate fully in appropriate procedures to examine the problems concerned; international conditions, however, had not been, and continued not to be, propitious to immediate action. In addition, for a nuclear test ban to be effective it must be verifiable and it must be concluded under conditions which would enhance, rather than diminish, international security and stability. Several States referred to the verification aspect: Japan, stating that it was the principal difficulty, urged as many other countries as possible — notably the nuclear-weapon States including China, France and the Soviet Union — to participate in the forthcoming exercise on the exchange of seismic data. Canada and Spain believed the work of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts had been extremely positive and the Netherlands was sure that verification problems could be overcome by, amongst other measures, drawing on the Group's experience.

China stated that a nuclear test ban was an integral part of the whole process of disarmament. It had to be linked with other measures, such as a ban on the development, production and use of nuclear weapons and the reduction and destruction of those weapons, before it could help to end the nuclear arms expansion of the super-Powers. France believed that nuclear negotiation remained the responsibility of the major Powers. The prohibition of tests could not be isolated from, or precede, nuclear disarmament as such, and so such a ban must find its rightful place in a process of nuclear arms reduction.

On 13 and 16 November, two draft resolutions were submitted to the First Committee under the agenda items entitled "Cessation of all test

explosions of nuclear weapons: report of the Committee on Disarmament” and “Implementation of General Assembly resolution 35/145 B: report of the Committee on Disarmament” respectively.

On 17 November, Mexico introduced the first draft resolution which was sponsored by Ecuador, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sweden and Yugoslavia, and subsequently also by Bangladesh, the Niger and Panama. Mexico observed that the background to the question, briefly summarized in the preamble, made it obvious why the non-nuclear-weapon States in the Committee on Disarmament had exhibited impatience, not to say justifiable indignation, at the inexplicable reluctance of some of the nuclear-weapon States to respond to the repeated appeals made by the General Assembly. By the draft resolution's operative paragraphs the General Assembly would, *inter alia*, reiterate its grave concern that nuclear weapon testing continued unabated, reaffirm the highest priority of a test-ban treaty, urge all States members of the Committee on Disarmament to bear in mind that the consensus rule should not be used to prevent the establishment of subsidiary bodies and also to support the creation of an *ad hoc* working group to begin multilateral negotiations, and call upon the trilateral Powers to halt tests without delay, either trilaterally or unilaterally.

Voting took place on 23 November, and a separate vote was requested on operative paragraph 5. Speaking before the vote, New Zealand stated that it would abstain since the draft resolution called for the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests rather than a comprehensive test ban, and advocated only a partial moratorium rather than one covering peaceful nuclear explosions as well. Samoa would also abstain, as the draft resolution condoned, by omission, test explosions of nuclear weapons by some States in some environments; Australia and Japan were of a similar view. France declared its intention to abstain on the grounds that such a measure would not represent a step forward towards nuclear disarmament and, furthermore, would essentially lead to the consecration of the qualitative and quantitative advantages secured at present by the two major nuclear Powers. France, Greece and Japan also intended to abstain because of the challenge contained in the draft to the basic procedural principle of consensus in the Committee on Disarmament.

The Committee adopted operative paragraph 5 by a recorded vote of 84 to 2 (United Kingdom and United States), with 38 abstentions, and then proceeded to adopt the draft resolution as a whole by a recorded vote of 103 to 2 (the same two States), with 21 abstentions.

In explanation of vote, India and the Soviet Union said that they had abstained on operative paragraph 5, but voted for the draft resolution as a whole, because they did not support the selective nature of the moratorium requested in paragraph 5. The Soviet Union also had reservations concerning the reference in the draft resolution to the organization of the work of the Committee on Disarmament as that matter, as well as the application of the Committee's rules of procedure, were the exclusive prerogatives of the Committee itself. Fiji and the Federal Republic of Germany had abstained in both votes, the former because a truly comprehensive nuclear test ban was not being called for, and the latter because no useful purpose was served by the

deliberate singling out of some nuclear-weapon States for accusation. Belgium had also abstained because of certain formulations harmful to the consensus rule that was so indispensable in disarmament negotiations; the Federal Republic of Germany had similar reservations. The United States said that it had voted against the draft resolution because it contained a number of unacceptable provisions, in particular a call for an unverified moratorium.

On 18 November, Australia introduced the second draft resolution on behalf of the sponsors: Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Canada, Ecuador, Finland, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sweden and Thailand, and subsequently also Denmark, Fiji, Ireland and Niger. After recalling the terms of resolution 35/145 B, Australia expressed the deep disappointment of the sponsors that the Committee on Disarmament had not begun consideration of the question in 1981 and their concern that the trilateral negotiations had not been resumed. By the operative paragraphs of the draft resolution, the General Assembly would reiterate its grave concern that nuclear weapon testing continued unabated, reaffirm that a test-ban treaty was a matter of the highest priority, call upon the Powers concerned to bring their tripartite negotiations to an early successful conclusion and invite them to prepare a report on the state of negotiations in good time for submission to the Assembly at its forthcoming special session. In addition, the Assembly would request the Committee on Disarmament to take action to establish a working group, to initiate substantive negotiations and to determine the institutional and administrative arrangements necessary for establishing, testing and operating an international seismic monitoring network and an effective verification system.

On 24 November, the Committee adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 121 to none, with 5 abstentions (Argentina, China, France, United Kingdom and United States).

In explanation of vote, the United States said that it had abstained because of the reference to the method of work in the Committee on Disarmament, in that it was inappropriate for the General Assembly to suggest how that Committee should handle its agenda items. Belgium and the USSR, although voting for the draft resolution, had similar reservations. The USSR also had misgivings about a number of other provisions, in particular the appeal to the three Powers concerned for a report on their negotiations: in the Soviet Union's view this was at variance with paragraph 114 of the Final Document, especially as such negotiations were not at that time taking place. Brazil, although voting in favour, stressed the importance it attached to a multilateral treaty on the prohibition of further testing of nuclear weapons. In Brazil's view, any treaty should contain an unequivocal commitment to nuclear disarmament and promote the freedom of access by all nations to the scientific and technological application of nuclear energy to peaceful purposes. Bulgaria felt that in certain respects the draft resolution could have been improved, for example, if a clear distinction had been drawn between the true positions of the nuclear Powers regarding their willingness to negotiate and readiness to conclude a treaty.

The General Assembly, at its 91st plenary meeting, on 9 December, considered the draft resolution entitled "Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons" In a recorded vote operative paragraph 5 was adopted by 95 votes to 2 (United Kingdom and United States), with 42 abstentions. The draft resolution as a whole was adopted as resolution 36/84 by a recorded vote of 118 to 2 (the same States), with 23 abstentions. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind that the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, which has been examined for more than twenty-five years and on which the General Assembly has adopted more than forty resolutions, is a basic objective of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, to whose attainment it has repeatedly assigned the highest priority,

Stressing that on seven different occasions it has condemned such tests in the strongest terms and that, since 1974, it has stated its conviction that the continuance of nuclear-weapon testing will intensify the arms race, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war,

Reiterating the assertion made in several previous resolutions that, whatever may be the differences on the question of verification, there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of an agreement on a comprehensive test ban,

Recalling that since 1972 the Secretary-General has declared that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement, that when the existing means of verification are taken into account it is difficult to understand further delay in achieving agreement on an underground test ban, and that the potential risks of continuing underground nuclear-weapon tests would far outweigh any possible risks from ending such tests,

Recalling also that the Secretary-General, in his foreword to the report entitled "Comprehensive nuclear-test ban", reiterated with special emphasis the opinion he expressed nine years ago and, after specifically referring to it, added: "I still hold that belief. The problem can and should be solved now",

Noting that in the same report, which was prepared in compliance with General Assembly decision 34/422 of 11 December 1979, the experts emphasized that non-nuclear-weapon States in general have come to regard the achievement of a comprehensive test ban as a litmus test of the determination of the nuclear-weapon States to halt the arms race, adding that verification of compliance no longer seems to be an obstacle to reaching agreement,

Taking into account that the three nuclear-weapon States which act as depositaries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water undertook in that Treaty, almost twenty years ago, to seek the achievement of the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and that such an undertaking was explicitly reiterated in 1968 in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Recalling that in its resolution 35/145 A of 12 December 1980 it urged all States members of the Committee on Disarmament to support the creation, as from the beginning of its session in 1981, of an *ad hoc* working group which should begin the multilateral negotiations of the treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests,

Deploing that the Committee on Disarmament, as stated in paragraph 44 of its report to the Assembly, was prevented from responding to that exhortation owing to the negative attitude of two nuclear-weapon States,

1. *Reiterates once again its grave concern* that nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States;

2. *Reaffirms* its conviction that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the highest priority and constitutes a vital element for the success of efforts to prevent both vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and a contribution to nuclear disarmament;

3. *Urges* all States that have not yet done so to adhere without further delay to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and, meanwhile to refrain from testing in the environments covered by that Treaty;

4. *Urges likewise* all States members of the Committee on Disarmament:

(a) To bear in mind that the consensus rule should not be used in such a manner as to prevent the establishment of subsidiary bodies for the effective discharge of the functions of the Committee;

(b) To support the creation by the Committee, as from the beginning of its session in 1982, of an *ad hoc* working group which should begin the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests;

(c) To exert their best endeavours in order that the Committee may transmit to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament the multilaterally negotiated text of such a treaty;

5. *Calls upon* the States depositaries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, by virtue of their special responsibilities under those two treaties and as a provisional measure, to bring to a halt without delay all nuclear-test explosions, either through a trilaterally agreed moratorium or through three unilateral moratoria;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons"

At the same meeting, on 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the other draft resolution by 140 votes to none, with 5 abstentions, as resolution 36/85. In explanation of vote, Argentina stated that it had abstained since the resolution left a shadow of doubt about the right of nations to access to peaceful applications of nuclear power. France had also abstained, on the grounds that, whilst it did not oppose any possible consensus in the Committee on Disarmament on dealing with the issue in a working group, France could not participate in such a negotiation. In France's view, the prohibition of tests could be considered only if real, balanced and verifiable progress was made in the reduction of the nuclear weapons of the two greatest Powers.

Resolution 36/85 reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous resolutions on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, in particular resolution 32/78 of 12 December 1977, paragraph 51 of resolution S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, resolution 33/60 of 14 December 1978, section IV of resolution 33/71 H of 14 December 1978, resolution 34/73 of 11 December 1979 and resolution 35/145 B of 12 December 1980,

Reaffirming its conviction that it is in the interest of all people that nuclear-weapon testing by all States in all environments should cease, as this would be a major step towards ending the qualitative improvement, development and proliferation of nuclear weapons, a means of relieving the deep apprehension concerning the harmful consequences of radioactive contamination for the health of present and future generations and a measure of the utmost importance in bringing the nuclear arms race to an end,

Recalling that the parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons expressed their determination in those treaties to continue negotiations to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time,

Expressing the belief that, to be effective and capable of attracting the widest possible adherence, a treaty prohibiting nuclear testing should include provision for an effective verification system,

Recognizing, accordingly, the importance to such a treaty of the work assigned by the Committee on Disarmament to the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events on a global network of stations for the exchange of seismological data,

Deeply concerned that the three negotiating nuclear-weapon States have not resumed their negotiations on a treaty prohibiting nuclear-test explosions in all environments and its protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes,

Emphasizing the urgent need for a complete cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing the indispensable role of the Committee on Disarmament in the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty capable of attracting the widest possible international support and adherence,

Expressing regret that it did not prove possible for the Committee on Disarmament to commence negotiations on such a treaty,

Convinced that the proceedings of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982, would benefit substantially from positive progress towards the conclusion of such a treaty,

1. *Reiterates its grave concern* that, despite the express wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States, nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated;

2. *Reaffirms* its conviction that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon-test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the greatest urgency and highest priority;

3. *Expresses* the conviction that such a treaty constitutes a vital element for the success of efforts to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race and the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries;

4. *Calls upon* the three negotiating nuclear-weapon States to resume their negotiations and to exert their best efforts to bring them to an early successful conclusion and invites them to prepare a report on the state of negotiations in good time for submission to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament;

5. *Reiterates* its conviction that the Committee on Disarmament has an indispensable role in the negotiation of a treaty prohibiting nuclear testing;

6. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to take the necessary steps, including the establishment of a working group, to initiate substantive negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty as a matter of the highest priority at the beginning of its session to be held in 1982;

7. *Also requests* the Committee on Disarmament to determine, in the context of its negotiations on such a treaty, the institutional and administrative arrangements necessary for establishing, testing and operating an international seismic monitoring network and an effective verification system;

8. *Further requests* the Committee on Disarmament to exert all efforts in order that the draft of such a treaty may be submitted to the General Assembly at the earliest possible date;

9. *Urges* all members of the Committee on Disarmament, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to co-operate with the Committee in fulfilling its mandate;

10. *Calls upon* the Committee on Disarmament to report on progress to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament and at its thirty-seventh session;

11. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session an item relating to the implementation of the present resolution.

Conclusion

In the eyes of many States, 1981 was a year of continued deadlock: not only did it prove impossible to start negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, but the tripartite negotiations between the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, which halted in 1980, were not resumed. Furthermore, a series of questions, asking for more information, were posed to the three Powers but remained unanswered.

Although there was some discussion of verification matters and on the valuable work being done by the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, it was widely felt that a major bar to progress was the refusal of two nuclear-weapon States to resume the tripartite negotiations and to allow the Committee on Disarmament to commence multilateral negotiations. The frustration thus engendered among some members of the Committee gave rise to a move to make an addition to the rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament so that the consensus rule could not be used to prevent the establishment of subsidiary bodies; this was subsequently reflected in resolution 36/84. It was clear, however, from several statements, that the proposed move caused misgivings on the part of several members of the Committee on Disarmament, who felt that the principle of consensus in such disarmament matters was of fundamental importance.

Even so, it was clear from the two resolutions adopted by the General Assembly that the stalemate caused the great majority of Member States deep concern, not simply because of the lack of progress but also because of the apparent absence of any prospect of a breakthrough in a matter which repeated resolutions have declared to be of the highest priority.

It would therefore seem likely that in 1982, particularly in view of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, there may be further expressions of criticism and persistent pressure from the many States which do not accept the continued absence of progress on this major item.

Strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States

Introduction

FOR MORE THAN THREE DECADES the continued nuclear arms race has caused ever-growing concern, particularly among the many States not possessing nuclear weapons or belonging to alliances which possess them. The non-nuclear-weapon States therefore have called repeatedly for effective measures to assure them against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The question of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States has been discussed most extensively in the context of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968.¹ Since the negotiation of that Treaty, the non-nuclear-weapon States have argued that the undertakings to forego the acquisition of nuclear weapons on their part should be accompanied by reliable security assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear Powers.

Immediately after the commendation of the non-proliferation Treaty by the General Assembly on 12 June 1968, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States sponsored in the Security Council a draft resolution, which had already been under consideration in ENDC and the Assembly, on security assurances. It was adopted by the Council on 19 June as resolution 255 (1968). By that resolution, the Security Council recognized that aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat thereof, against a non-nuclear-weapon State would call for immediate action by the Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon States permanent members. It welcomed the intention expressed by certain States to assist any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the non-proliferation Treaty that was a victim of an act or threat of nuclear aggression,² and reaffirmed the right of collective self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter. A number of States, however, were apprehensive as to the effectiveness of the assurances under the Security Council resolution. Accordingly, the consideration of the question of security assurances was

¹ For details, see *The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chap. 13.

² The commitment to assist represents what is known as a "positive" assurance; pledges by nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States are known as "negative" assurances.

continued in various forums, for example, at the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States in 1968, the first Review Conference of the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty in 1975, and repeatedly in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The non-nuclear-weapon States continued to call for reliable and binding assurances that nuclear weapons would not be used against them.

In 1978, at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the five nuclear-weapon States, China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, individually made declarations designed to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.³ There emerged during the course of the special session, however, general agreement that more formal and concrete assurances were desirable and in its Final Document the Assembly urged the conclusion of effective security arrangements.⁴

Following the special session, two major approaches to the question have emerged. One approach seeks the conclusion of an international convention on the subject. To that end, the Soviet Union and Pakistan initiated draft resolutions in the General Assembly at its thirty-third session, in 1978, which, after some revision, were adopted as resolutions 33/72 A and 33/72 B. In 1979, the respective sponsors submitted working papers containing draft international conventions⁵ to the Committee on Disarmament for its consideration. Further resolutions reflecting this basic approach were adopted by the General Assembly in 1979 and, in 1980 as resolutions 34/84 and 35/154^{and 36/155} initiated by the USSR and other Eastern European States, and 34/85, and 35/155, initiated by Pakistan.

The second approach, supported by the United States and other Western countries, is based on the premise that the widely varying situations and concerns which must be taken into account by the five nuclear-weapon States probably preclude conclusion of a generally acceptable world-wide treaty. Accordingly, at the Assembly's thirty-third session in 1978, the United States submitted a letter⁶ in which it stressed the importance of the non-use pledges given by the nuclear Powers at the special session as an effective and practical way of enhancing the confidence of non-nuclear-weapon States, and suggested, although not as the only possibility, that the Security Council should take formal note of them. In 1979, the United States submitted a working paper to the Committee on Disarmament⁷ in which it proposed, as another alternative,

³ For details, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, chap. XI.

⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4* (A/S-10/4), sect. III, paras. 57-59.

⁵ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27* (A/34/27 and Corr.1), appendix III (CD/53 and Corr.1), vol. I, documents CD/10 and CD/23; for details, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 4: 1979, chap. XI and appendix X; *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, appendix IX also reproduces draft conventions proposed by Pakistan and the USSR as submitted to the Assembly at its thirty-third session.

⁶ See A/C.1/33/7, annex; the letter is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, appendix IX.

⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27* (A/34/27 and Corr.1), appendix III (CD/53 and Corr.1), vol. I, document CD/27.

that the General Assembly adopt a resolution incorporating the pledges of the nuclear Powers. Subsequently, in the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session, the United States initiated a draft resolution reflecting its proposal to the Committee on Disarmament, which was adopted as resolution 34/86. The United States, however, did not submit a draft resolution on the question in ~~1980~~ ^{the following years}.

In both 1979 and 1980 the Committee on Disarmament established *ad hoc* working groups on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Most of the substantive discussion took place in the 1980 *Ad Hoc* Working Group, which focused its attention primarily on the scope and nature of the arrangements. While there was agreement that the object should be adequate assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, there were divergent views as to scope, and various criteria were suggested for the application of the arrangements. The Group recognized that the search should continue for a common approach, acceptable to all, which could be included in a legally binding international instrument.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1981

At the 1981 session of the Disarmament Commission, particularly during the general exchange of views,⁸ a number of delegations made reference to the question of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

The Soviet Union continued to believe that one of the most effective means of providing the required assurances would be the conclusion of an international convention. However, in the light of the negative stance taken by some States regarding that solution, it also expressed its readiness to consider another possible alternative. The USSR recalled its proposal that all nuclear States should make solemn declarations, either identical or similar in context, to the effect that they would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States that did not have such weapons on their territories. In its view, such declarations could be buttressed by an authoritative decision of the Security Council. The USSR also recalled its proposal that agreement should be reached on the non-deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where such weapons did not exist at present, and reaffirmed that it would never use nuclear weapons against States that renounced the manufacture or acquisition of such weapons and had none on their territories. That position was supported by Bulgaria, Mongolia and the Ukrainian SSR, as well as by the Byelorussian SSR which, in the same connection, regarded the conclusion of a universal treaty on the non-use of force in international relations also as being of importance.

Bangladesh, speaking in the context of nuclear disarmament measures, stated, *inter alia*, that the Commission should call on the nuclear Powers to

⁸ See A/CN.10/PV.45-50 and A/CN.10/PV.41-54/Corrigendum.

give security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States, and Egypt, in connection with achieving the objectives of the non-proliferation Treaty, stated that the nuclear-weapon States should provide legally binding negative security guarantees against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States, with a view to preventing horizontal proliferation.

Although specific consideration of the question was limited and rather general, the Disarmament Commission in its report to the General Assembly⁹ included the following paragraph in the recommendations set out under the item on considerations of various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and a general approach to negotiations:

6. It is obvious that the most effective assurance of security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and, pending that, the nuclear-weapon States should give appropriate effective assurance to non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Effective international arrangements should be pursued to this end, taking into account all proposals and suggestions that have been made in this regard. Proposals on that subject have been submitted to the Committee on Disarmament.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1981

The item on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"¹⁰ was considered in plenary meetings during the periods of 16 to 20 March, 13 to 17 April and 27 July to 7 August. It was also discussed in closed meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group re-established by the Committee for the purpose of continuing negotiations on the subject.

In plenary addresses almost all members of the Committee as well as a number of non-members — in accordance with the Committee's rules of procedure — took part in the discussion of the issue.

In its statements the Soviet Union pointed out, as before, that it favoured the conclusion of a multilateral convention, while at the same time accepting the possibility, as an interim measure, of achieving an appropriate agreement in the form of a Security Council resolution. Its formula for security guarantees, it stressed, made no distinction between non-nuclear-weapon States which participate in military alliances and those which do not, and it granted assurances both to participants and to non-participants in nuclear-weapon-free zones. Thus, the Soviet Union stated, it was willing to give guarantees of the non-use of nuclear weapons, among others, to non-nuclear-weapon NATO countries on whose territories no nuclear weapons were stationed. The Soviet Union also declared its preparedness to conclude at any time a special agreement with any non-nuclear country if that country in turn undertook not to have nuclear weapons on its territory. The main difference,

⁹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 42* (A/36/42), para. 19.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27), paras. 95-101.

the USSR stated, between its formula and those of the United Kingdom and the United States was the fact that the latter were not prepared to give security guarantees to those non-nuclear-weapon States which were in a military alliance with another nuclear-weapon Power. However, the Soviet Union felt, an acceptable solution could be found, and it expressed its readiness to seek such a solution in a constructive spirit.

A number of States, among them Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Morocco, Mongolia and Poland, supported the idea that as a first step towards the conclusion of a treaty, an appropriate solemn declaration should be made by the five nuclear Powers and confirmed by the Security Council.

With regard to the future proceedings of the Committee, Bulgaria, in a working paper which it submitted, suggested concentration on identifying the common elements in the various assurances.¹¹ An effort could then be made to develop the basic elements of either a common formula to be included in a legally binding international instrument or of a general basis for identical declarations by the nuclear-weapon States. Referring to the existing non-use assurances given by the nuclear-weapon States, Bulgaria observed that only one provided specifically for security guarantees to the non-nuclear-weapon States which could in no way become a source of nuclear threat. The minimal necessary qualification stipulated therein was the absence of nuclear weapons on the territory of the State to be assured. That understanding, according to Bulgaria, already covered practically all non-aligned countries, since they did not as a rule accept nuclear weapons on their territories. The German Democratic Republic, sharing that position, stated that the non-stationing formula should not be regarded as a condition, but rather as a basic element of a common approach to security assurances, because it was obvious that a State having foreign nuclear weapons on its territory could become a source of nuclear threat.

Romania suggested that the Committee concentrate on working out a formula, acceptable to all nuclear-weapon States, whereby those States would undertake "never and under no circumstances" to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons, or force in general, against States which did not have such weapons. Mongolia stressed the equal responsibility of all nuclear-weapon States regarding security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States, and in that connection attached great importance to the question of the renunciation of the use of force in international relations, which it considered as inseparably linked with the prohibition for all time of the use of nuclear weapons.

Pakistan, for its part, considered that the most fundamental difficulty in evolving a common approach was that some of the nuclear-weapon Powers did not seem prepared to go beyond unilateral declarations. It continued to believe that the non-use assurances should be provided to non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of some nuclear-weapon States. But, at the same time, Pakistan was open to suggestions for

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27), appendix II (CD/228), document CD/153.

further refinement of that formula and, in a working paper, it identified alternatives which it thought could be explored in the search for a common approach or formula.¹² While adhering to the position that the most appropriate framework for such assurances would be an international convention, Pakistan also agreed to explore other possible alternatives, including the adoption, as an interim measure, of an appropriate resolution of the Security Council. In its view, the most effective action which the Security Council could take would be to call on the nuclear-weapon Powers to give categorical and unconditional assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them. The view that assurances should be given without conditions or restrictions was also shared by Algeria, in particular with regard to non-nuclear-weapon States which pursued a line of foreign policy independent of the alliances organized around the principal nuclear-weapon Powers.

Brazil pointed out that a ban on the use of nuclear weapons must not be interpreted in any way as legitimizing the possession of such weapons and must therefore contain an explicit, binding commitment to nuclear disarmament. Accordingly, any interim arrangement should be conceived as a twofold obligation on the part of the nuclear-weapon Powers, first, a clear, binding commitment to nuclear disarmament, and secondly, an equally clear commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons during the period between the acceptance of the first obligation and the achievement of nuclear disarmament. The link between non-use assurances and nuclear disarmament was stressed by a number of other non-aligned States also, among them Argentina, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Nigeria and Yugoslavia. India, for example, reaffirmed its position that the only effective assurance to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was nuclear disarmament. In the interim, India suggested, a convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons would not only increase confidence and trust among States but would also facilitate negotiations on measures of nuclear disarmament. With regard to the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States currently having no such weapons, Indonesia believed that the general concept should be broadened to cover also the transportation of nuclear weapons through lands and seas falling within the jurisdiction of non-nuclear-weapon States where there were no nuclear weapons. Nigeria believed that as a corollary to the legally binding assurance that the non-nuclear-weapon States would not be attacked or threatened by nuclear weapons, they would have to undertake an obligation not to develop or acquire such weapons. That undertaking should be embodied in a legally binding instrument.

With respect to the legal framework for negative security assurances, Sweden reiterated its position that it had serious reservations about the idea of an international convention which would impose obligations on non-nuclear-weapon States. It held that all non-nuclear-weapon States which were legally committed to their nuclear-weapon-free status were entitled to unambiguous

¹² *Ibid.*, document CD/161.

assurances that nuclear weapons would not be used against them. That view was also shared by Austria and Switzerland, not members of the Committee, but participating in the consideration of the subject. Other States, in that connection, referred to the interrelationship between security guarantees and the non-proliferation Treaty. Yugoslavia regarded specific guarantees as complementary to the Treaty. It felt that by assuming obligations under the Treaty, the non-nuclear-weapon States were fully entitled to demand not only fulfilment of the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States parties to it, but also to be given firm guarantees against any threat or use of nuclear weapons. Egypt held that there should be a definite interest on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The most effective approach would be for those States to come up with a formula capable of reassuring the non-nuclear-weapon States and encouraging them to continue to renounce the nuclear option, thereby promoting the non-proliferation régime.

The non-proliferation question, among others, was also discussed in the context of assurances by a number of Western and other countries, among them Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands and Norway. Australia, for example, held that, in establishing the non-nuclear status of countries which were to benefit from security assurances, it would be important that they undertook through effective non-proliferation arrangements not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. Instead of seeking a general formula, Australia suggested, it might be more useful to work for a consensus embodying different formulations reflecting the different areas of concern. Australia, like others, had chosen alliance with nuclear-weapon States as the most appropriate means of ensuring its security, and full effectiveness of the alliance should be maintained; similarly, Canada felt that each assurance had its own purpose and had been issued under specific circumstances, and there was not much evidence that those purposes could be reconciled by drafting. Japan and the Netherlands, on the other hand, felt that a common formula, even though difficult to achieve, was feasible. The Netherlands, in discussing the Security Council option, felt that the five nuclear-weapon States should first place on record their own views on negative security assurances, which would not necessarily be identical but should contain certain common elements; those elements could then be put in a Security Council resolution, reflecting what they had in common. A Security Council resolution, in the view of the Netherlands, would therefore be an important stepping-stone, possibly leading later to a convention and ultimately to a total dismantling of the nuclear option. The formula proposed by the Netherlands was also supported by the United Kingdom, which, in a working paper,¹³ examined aspects of the British assurance in relation to other security assurances and to various proposals for further action. The United Kingdom reaffirmed that its security assurance had been in force since it was made at the time of the Assembly's special session in 1978 and remained fully operative.

Belgium, for its part, made two suggestions for progress, first, that the

¹³ *Ibid.*, document CD/177.

individual assurances of the nuclear-weapon Powers should be approved by the Security Council and, secondly, that a safeguards formula be found which would provide the maximum assurance for the non-nuclear-weapon States.

China, in its statements as well as in a working paper submitted to the Committee,¹⁴ held that the fundamental security guarantee to be provided by the nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States should be the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of that objective, all nuclear-weapon countries should undertake unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and to proceed on that basis to negotiate and conclude an international convention to that effect as soon as possible.

As noted above, the Committee, on 12 February, re-established the *Ad Hoc* Working Group, which had been set up at its 1980 session, for the duration of the 1981 session, to continue to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The group concentrated its attention essentially on the examination of the substance of the assurances. Accordingly, the Chairman, Mr. Ciarrapico of Italy, submitted a programme of work containing two main stages: first, identification of the various features of the assurances not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and, secondly, consideration of possible alternatives which could be explored in the search for a common approach or formula. The Working Group held 23 meetings between 17 February and 13 August.

Following the conclusion of its work on 13 August, the Group submitted its report to the Committee.¹⁵ With regard to the objective outlined in stage one of the programme of work, the report stated that various views were expressed and different proposals were submitted with a view to identifying systematically those elements contained in the undertakings already assumed by the nuclear-weapon States, and in the proposals put forward by non-nuclear-weapon States. According to the report, it was generally felt that deeper understanding of the various positions, their similarities and differences, had been reached as a result of the discussion.

Regarding the task outlined in stage two of the programme of work, the Group examined possible alternatives for a common approach or formula with a view to concentrating efforts on the most promising among them. The Group stated in its report that different approaches to the question of developing a common formula became apparent in the discussion, and that divergent views on those approaches and criteria persisted throughout its work. Although there was no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention, the difficulties involved were also pointed out. Furthermore, the idea of interim

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, document CD/207.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, *Supplement No. 27* (A/36/27), para. 101 (the original report was contained in *ibid.*, appendix II (CD/228), document CD/215 and Corr.1); the report consists of four integral parts, entitled "I. Introduction"; "II. Organization of work and documentation"; "III. Substantive negotiations"; and "IV. Conclusions and recommendations", and two annexes.

arrangements was considered, particularly the proposal for an appropriate Security Council resolution.

In its conclusions and recommendations, the Working Group regarded the efforts devoted to the search for a common approach or formula as a positive step towards an agreement, and it recommended that they be continued. For that purpose, it recommended that a working group should be established at the beginning of the 1982 session. At its plenary meeting on 20 August the Committee adopted the report of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group.

Near the end of the session, Mongolia, speaking on behalf of a group of socialist countries, stated that those countries had consistently advocated an international convention on security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States and regretted that it had not been possible for the Committee to proceed to the drafting of the text of such a convention.

Also late in the session, Burma, in a plenary statement on behalf of the group of 21, reaffirmed the group's support for agreement on a common approach or formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. The group was of the view that an agreement was possible before the second special session on disarmament in 1982, provided certain nuclear-weapon States revised their positions, based on their nuclear strategic doctrines, which so far had prevented progress towards a common approach acceptable to all.

France, in assessing the results of the Committee's work during the year, stated that the discussions on negative security assurances had illustrated once again the difficulty of finding a common approach. France assured the Committee that it would continue to participate in the search.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1981

Two items, entitled "Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons: report of the Committee on Disarmament" and "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons: report of the Committee on Disarmament", were included in the agenda of the thirty-sixth session pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 35/154 and 35/155, respectively.

In the debates, both in plenary meetings and, particularly, the First Committee,¹⁶ States maintained the same general approaches and positions expressed previously, especially those heard in the Committee on Disarmament in 1981.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 33rd and 91st meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 44th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

The Soviet Union continued to hold that, in the absence of nuclear disarmament, the most effective means of resolving the problem would be an international convention to assure the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States which had no such weapons on their territories. As a first step, all the nuclear Powers could speak out in favour of a common approach towards that objective, as they had been called upon to do under resolution 35/155. The Soviet Union reaffirmed that it would never use nuclear weapons against those States which had foregone the acquisition and production of such weapons and did not have them upon their territories. It also reiterated its readiness to conclude special agreements with any such country on that basis. As for the security of those States which made their territories available for the deployment of nuclear weapons by others, the Soviet Union held that those States thereby undermined their own security because they did not guarantee that a nuclear strike would not be launched from within their territories, and therefore could not expect to have guarantees against a retaliatory nuclear strike.

Poland stated that, in view of the differing perceptions of the scope and form of assurances, serious consideration should be given to the adoption, as an interim measure, of identically worded declarations by the five nuclear Powers, confirmed in a solemn Security Council resolution. That approach was also supported by Afghanistan, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Nepal.

In evaluating the work of the Committee on Disarmament in 1981, Pakistan pointed out that despite the fact that serious efforts had been made to investigate possible ways in which a common formula might be developed, the nuclear-weapon States had not modified their positions. Pakistan considered the Soviet proposal relating to the non-first-use of nuclear weapons, however, as having a positive content that deserved serious consideration. In the search for effective guarantees, Pakistan stressed, it could not accept any proposition which provided the illusion rather than the substance of security assurances while attempting to secure additional obligations on the part of non-nuclear-weapon States.

A number of States, including Algeria, Indonesia, Mongolia, Nepal, Romania, Sweden, the Ukrainian SSR and the Soviet Union, specifically expressed regret that more progress had not been made in the Committee on Disarmament.

Austria held that the lack of progress in the Committee's *Ad Hoc* Working Group was largely due to the fact that too much emphasis had been placed on the security concerns of the nuclear-weapon States. If attention were to focus on the interests of non-nuclear-weapon States, Austria believed, it would prove easier to reach agreement on a common approach. A similar view was expressed by Algeria. The Byelorussian SSR felt that the assertion of certain Western States, that drafting a mutually acceptable convention was an unpromising and unachievable approach did not reflect a position caused by the difficulty of the problem, but rather by the lack of desire and political will to give clear-cut guarantees. The Soviet Union, for its part, held that the reason more progress had not been made so far was that the United States and

its NATO allies wanted to retain a broad choice of possibilities with regard to the use of nuclear weapons.

Some States expressed hope for the conclusion of an agreement on negative security guarantees in connection with the second special session on disarmament to be held in 1982. The United Republic of Cameroon, for example, hoped that the special session would provide for the effective implementation of international arrangements regarding such assurances, and Romania called for resolute action in the coming year to work out international arrangements in order to arrive at a system of real guarantees covering all non-nuclear-weapon States.

A number of States, mostly non-aligned, among them Kenya, Lebanon, Qatar and Uganda, emphasized the necessity of unconditional guarantees, which would be unequivocal, legally binding and of an international character.

Sweden, as a country outside all military alliances and a party to the non-proliferation Treaty, regarded itself as covered without exception by the existing security assurances of the nuclear-weapon States. It was clear, none the less, that the final objective was agreement on arrangements satisfactory to all States, for which no interim measure could be regarded as a substitute. However, as efforts to reach agreement or a common formula were at a dead end, Sweden, in an attempt to make some progress, proposed as an interim measure that the General Assembly consider urging the Security Council to embody present negative security assurances in a formal resolution in order to make them legally binding.

The Netherlands, for its part, found the progress in the Committee on Disarmament not to be discouraging. It hoped that new elements which its delegation had put forward would be taken into account by the nuclear-weapon States and was convinced that, with some good will, positive results might be achieved in the not too distant future. Italy also confirmed its interest in identifying a common formula to be incorporated in an international instrument of binding character and stressed the necessity of a realistic and balanced approach.

France emphasized that in the absence of nuclear disarmament, assurances relating to the non-use of nuclear weapons could only be granted to States which did not possess such weapons. In its view, nuclear-weapon-free zones established by treaty had a special claim to such assurances. France recalled that it had declared its readiness to enter into formal commitments with States belonging to such zones as well as its readiness to continue the quest for a positive solution in the Committee on Disarmament.

Norway held that the question of assuring the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against nuclear attack was an important condition for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and that the nuclear-weapon States bore a special responsibility for finding a solution. The non-proliferation aspect of the problem was also stressed by Austria, New Zealand and Oman.

China supported the legitimate demand of the small and medium-sized countries for interim measures, such as a ban on the use of nuclear weapons,

especially on the use or the threat of use of those weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon countries, before the achievement of nuclear disarmament. Since many of the non-nuclear-weapon States were facing a serious nuclear threat, the nuclear-weapon countries, in the opinion of China, should unconditionally guarantee not to use or threaten to use such weapons against any such State.

On 12 November, under the agenda item on the conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, Angola, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Mongolia, Nicaragua and the Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution subsequently sponsored also by the Congo. Bulgaria, in introducing the proposal, emphasized the sponsors' conviction that total nuclear disarmament would be the most effective and credible security guarantee to non-nuclear-weapon and all other States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending attainment of that objective, banning the use of nuclear weapons and concurrently renouncing the use of force in international relations would resolve the problem. While resolutely calling for the elaboration and conclusion of an international convention, Bulgaria stated, the sponsors were at the same time ready to give consideration to other parallel or interim arrangements such as a Security Council resolution approving solemn declarations, identical in substance, of all the nuclear-weapon States on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States having no such weapons on their territories.

Before the vote on the draft in the First Committee, Sweden explained its position on both the proposal introduced by Bulgaria and that introduced by Pakistan under the alternative agenda item, described below. Sweden stressed that it favoured in principle the idea of negative security assurances, but expressed the view that the responsibility for formulating co-ordinated assurances acceptable to all States must rest primarily with the nuclear-weapon Powers themselves. Such assurances should be made in a legally binding form. That form could be, for example, a co-ordinated declaration submitted in the Security Council or a treaty between the nuclear-weapon States. With regard to proposals favouring an international convention whereby nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States would enter into mutual obligations, Sweden expressed reservations. First, the vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon States had adhered to the non-proliferation Treaty, and there was no reason for them to undertake further obligations. Secondly, the idea of an international convention bore a relationship to Sweden's policy of neutrality, and one of the draft conventions proposed seemed incompatible with that policy. As it had suggested earlier, a Security Council resolution registering the existing assurances might serve as an interim measure; Sweden emphasized, however, that in no way could negative security assurances substitute for nuclear disarmament. Accordingly, as things stood at the time, Sweden would abstain on both proposals.

Thereafter, on 23 November, the First Committee approved the draft introduced by Bulgaria by a recorded vote of 93 to 16, with 14 abstentions.

Following the vote, Brazil, which had voted in favour, reiterated its position with regard to the reference in the draft to non-stationing of nuclear weapons on territories of States where none existed at present, stressing that the reference should not be understood as legitimizing the presence of such weapons in States where they did exist. Also, the need for negative security guarantees should not be approached from the viewpoint of the nuclear-weapon States, but rather in the context of nuclear disarmament; otherwise the guarantees would in effect legitimize the continued nuclear-weapon status of those States. Argentina, also voting in favour, none the less had doubts about the value of either unilateral declarations or a Security Council resolution; accordingly, had separate votes been held on paragraphs referring to those concepts, such as paragraph 5 (see below), it would have abstained in those votes. Austria, which had abstained, noted the conditions attached to the existing declarations of the nuclear-weapon States and therefore supported the efforts of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group of the Committee on Disarmament, but believed that the Group's difficulties in finding a common approach stemmed from too much emphasis being placed on the security concerns of the nuclear-weapon States. Austria held that efforts should concentrate on substantive issues rather than the legal form of the commitment and it had reservations about utilizing the form of a convention since that would imply obligations on the part of non-nuclear-weapon States. Ireland explained its abstention on the grounds that the draft resolution failed to take into account the various approaches possible or the balance of opinions expressed in the Committee on Disarmament and, furthermore, clearly favoured the idea of a convention — an approach about which Ireland had doubts. Turkey voted against the draft because it contained elements relating to the defense posture of the two alliances, for example the seventh and eighth preambular paragraphs.

On 9 December, the draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly by a recorded vote of 115 to 17 (mainly Western States), with 12 abstentions, as resolution 36/94. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Convinced of the need to take effective measures for the strengthening of the security of States and prompted by the desire shared by all nations to eliminate war and prevent nuclear conflagration,

Taking into account the principle of non-use of force or threat of force enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and reaffirmed in a number of United Nations declarations and resolutions,

Noting with satisfaction the desire of States in various regions to prevent nuclear weapons from being introduced into their territories, including through the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and being anxious to contribute to the attainment of this objective,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

Recognizing that effective measures to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can constitute a positive contribution to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

Mindful of the statements made and views expressed by various States on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States,

Concerned at the continuing escalation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, and the increased danger of recourse to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Deeply concerned at the plans for further stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States that could directly affect the security of non-nuclear-weapon States,

Desirous of promoting the implementation of paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it urged the nuclear-weapon States to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Recalling its resolutions 33/72 of 14 December 1978, 34/84 and 34/85 of 11 December 1979, 35/154 and 35/155 of 12 December 1980 and the relevant provisions of its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980,

Noting the consideration by the Committee on Disarmament in 1981 of the item entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" and the setting up of an *ad hoc* working group to continue the negotiations on this item,

Recalling the drafts of an international convention submitted on that item to the Committee on Disarmament in 1979, and noting with satisfaction that the idea of concluding such a convention has received widespread international support,

Taking note of the report of the Committee on Disarmament, including the report of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons,

Wishing to promote an early and successful completion of the negotiations on the elaboration of a convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Noting further that the idea of interim arrangements as a first step towards the conclusion of such a convention has also been considered in the Committee on Disarmament, particularly in the form of a Security Council resolution on this subject, and recalling the recommendation made in that respect by the General Assembly in paragraph 6 of its resolution 35/154,

Mindful of the second special session devoted to disarmament, at which the General Assembly will review the progress achieved in the field of disarmament, including the implementation of paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

1. *Welcomes* the conclusion of the Committee on Disarmament that there is continuing recognition of the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

2. *Notes with satisfaction* that in the Committee on Disarmament there is once again no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention on this subject;

3. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to continue the negotiations on the question of the strengthening of the security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States during its session in 1982;

4. *Calls upon* all States participating in these negotiations to make efforts for the elaboration and conclusion of an international convention on this matter;

5. *Calls once again upon* all nuclear-weapon States to make solemn declarations, identical in substance, concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States having no such weapons on their territories, as a first step towards the conclusion of an international convention, and recommends that the Security Council should examine such declarations and, if they all meet the above-mentioned objective, should adopt an appropriate resolution approving them;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"

On 12 November, under the agenda item on the conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the

use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, Pakistan submitted a draft resolution which it introduced on 17 November; it subsequently revised several of the preambular paragraphs and operative paragraph 2 in which the final clause was changed from the original "although there has been lack of progress in the Committee towards evolving a common approach acceptable to all;" to "although the difficulties as regards evolving a common approach acceptable to all have also been pointed out;" (as shown below).

In introducing the draft resolution, Pakistan stressed that the most effective assurance against the nuclear threat would be the complete prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and their eventual elimination. But until that goal was realized, it would be equally important to adopt effective interim measures to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It observed that in the effort to arrive at a common formula, the strategic doctrines of the major nuclear Powers had thus far presented insurmountable obstacles. Pakistan regarded those Powers' unilateral declarations as expressing their own narrowly conceived security concerns, while effective assurances would have to be unconditional and legally binding. While it would be receptive to any proposal relating to the form of negative security guarantees, Pakistan stated that it continued to believe that the most reasonable modality might be the adoption of an international convention. Moreover, it did not agree with the suggestion that the existing multilateral declarations of the major nuclear Powers be incorporated in a Security Council resolution, much less a General Assembly resolution, or that such a procedure could serve as the effective arrangement sought by the non-nuclear-weapon States and envisaged by the General Assembly at its first special session on disarmament.

On 25 November, before the vote in the First Committee, Pakistan explained that the thrust of the draft in its revised form remained the same as in the original; the changes were purely in drafting or had been incorporated to bring the text more exactly into line with the current state of discussions. Canada announced that it would vote for the draft because it supported its general thrust and Pakistan's efforts to make the language more widely acceptable; however, Canada had reservations about operative paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 (see below) since they could appear to prejudice the responsibility of the Committee on Disarmament for determining its own working procedures.

Following the Committee's approval of the draft resolution, by a recorded vote of 121 to none, with 4 abstentions, additional States explained their positions.

France, which had voted in favour, stated that it particularly supported the efforts of the Committee on Disarmament in the search for a common approach, but emphasized that operative paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 should not be interpreted as giving preference to any particular legal form or prejudging any solution. Austria had been able to vote in favour of the draft because its reference to the idea of a convention was more balanced and moderate than those in the relevant proposal introduced by Bulgaria or in resolutions adopted by the Assembly at the thirty-fifth session. Sweden, recalling that it had announced its intention to abstain on both draft resolutions, stated that

because Pakistan had amended its proposal in such a way as to diminish considerably the emphasis on an international convention, it had voted in favour. Finland had voted in favour of both resolutions because it believed the question to be a most legitimate concern of non-nuclear-weapon States, and believed that all approaches to non-use assurances should continue to be explored, including the further development of unilateral declarations and multilateral agreements. Japan had voted in favour despite reservations (similar to those of Canada) on operative paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 because the trend of the work of the Committee on Disarmament had been reflected in the revised text. Finally, the Ivory Coast, while favouring security assurances, had abstained because it believed that the best guarantee lay in disarmament.

On 9 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 145 to none, with 3 abstentions (India, United Kingdom, United States). The resolution, 36/95, reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the need to allay the legitimate concern of the States of the world with regard to ensuring lasting security for their peoples,

Convinced that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization,

Deeply concerned at the continuing escalation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war,

Taking into account the principle of the non-use of force or threat of force enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,

Deeply concerned about the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing that the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States need to be safeguarded against the use or threat of use of force, including the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

Recognizing that effective measures to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can constitute a positive contribution to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

Recalling its resolution 3261 G (XXIX) of 9 December 1974,

Further recalling its resolution 31/189 C of 21 December 1976,

Bearing in mind paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it urged the nuclear-weapon States to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Desirous of promoting the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 33/72 of 14 December 1978, 34/85 of 11 December 1979 and 35/155 of 12 December 1980,

Further recalling paragraph 12 of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, contained in the annex to its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980, which states, *inter alia*, that all efforts should be exerted, therefore, by the Committee on Disarmament urgently to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement, and to submit agreed texts where possible before the second special session devoted to disarmament, on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Welcoming the in-depth negotiations undertaken in the Committee on Disarmament and its *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, with a view to reaching agreement on this item,

Noting the proposals submitted under that item in the Committee on Disarmament, including the drafts of an international convention,

Taking note of the decision of the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana from 3 to 9 September 1979, as well as the relevant recommendations of the Eleventh and Twelfth Islamic Conferences of Foreign Ministers, held at Islamabad from 17 to 22 May 1980 and at Baghdad from 1 to 5 June 1981, respectively, calling upon the Committee on Disarmament to elaborate and reach an agreement on an international basis to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Further noting the support expressed in the Committee on Disarmament and in the General Assembly for the elaboration of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as the difficulties pointed out in evolving a common approach acceptable to all,

1. *Reaffirms* the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

2. *Notes with satisfaction* that in the Committee on Disarmament there is no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, although the difficulties as regards evolving a common approach acceptable to all have also been pointed out;

3. *Appeals* to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character;

4. *Recommends* that further intensive efforts should be devoted to the search for such a common approach or common formula and that the various alternative approaches, including in particular those considered during the session of the Committee on Disarmament held in 1981, should be further explored in order to overcome the difficulties;

5. *Recommends* that the Committee on Disarmament should actively continue negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"

Conclusion

In the course of 1981, the two major approaches to the problem of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons remained basically unchanged. Some States continued to emphasize the importance of the unilateral declarations issued by the nuclear Powers in 1978. A majority, however, regarded them as no substitute for a common commitment embodied in a legally binding international instrument.

The Committee on Disarmament concentrated its endeavours in 1981 on the search for a "common approach" or "common formula" which, later on, could be included in such a legally binding international instrument. There was no objection in principle to the idea of an international convention, and the idea of an interim arrangement was also considered, particularly an

appropriate Security Council resolution. The negotiations revealed a number of specific difficulties in respect of differing perceptions of various States, both nuclear and non-nuclear, and the complex nature of the issues to be taken into account in evolving a "common formula" acceptable to all. Although little tangible progress was made by the *Ad Hoc* Working Group of the Committee on Disarmament, the efforts devoted to the search for a single, acceptable formula were generally regarded as a positive step towards reaching agreement, and the Group recommended to the Committee that a similar body be established at the beginning of its 1982 session to continue those efforts.

During the debates in the General Assembly, a number of delegations expressed the hope that positive results on the question might be achieved in connection with the Assembly's second special session on disarmament in 1982. The two resolutions adopted by the Assembly on 9 December, *inter alia*, ensure that the Committee on Disarmament will continue negotiations on the subject in 1982.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

Introduction

THE CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES has been developed over the course of years in disarmament negotiations at the United Nations and in other international forums as a means of halting the spread of nuclear weapons. The idea of denuclearized zones has stemmed from the realization that a number of States in various regions could develop a nuclear capability within a relatively short period and the possibility that more States might decide to do so. The absence of nuclear weapons from various regions would spare the countries concerned from the threat of nuclear attack or involvement in nuclear war, and make a substantive contribution to the achievement of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly reaffirmed that conviction; it states, in part: "The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure. The process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons."¹

The first nuclear-weapon-free zone was established with the entry into force of the Antarctic Treaty, on 23 June 1961, which demilitarized that vast area.² The opening for signature in 1967 and subsequent entry into force of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)³ has encouraged other proposals at one time or another for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in many important areas, including Africa, the Balkans, Central Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Nordic countries, South Asia and the South Pacific. In 1975 a comprehensive study on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones was carried out by an *ad hoc* group of governmental experts and transmitted to the General Assembly

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4* (A/S-10/4), sect. III, paras. 60-61.

² United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 402, No. 5778, p. 72; text and status are also given in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements* (United Nations Sales No. E.78.IX.2); see also appendix I of the present volume.

³ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634, No. 9068, p. 326.

at its thirtieth session later that year.⁴ In recent years, the General Assembly has considered agenda items concerning four particular zones, namely, the full implementation of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the establishment of such zones in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. To a lesser degree, the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Committee on Disarmament have also considered the subject at recent sessions.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1981

The question of nuclear-weapon-free zones was considered by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1981 substantive session, held from 18 May to 5 June, under its agenda item 4:⁵

- (a) Consideration of various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, in order to expedite negotiations aimed at effective elimination of the danger of nuclear war;
- (b) Consideration of the agenda items contained in section II of resolution 33/71 H, with the aim of elaborating, within the framework and in accordance with the priorities established at the tenth special session, a general approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament.

Once again, in the course of discussions,⁶ a large number of delegations stressed the importance of the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various geographical regions and regarded such zones as practical and feasible measures which would contribute to the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. In particular, they considered the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as an effective, even principal, method of curbing the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and strengthening the non-proliferation régime. The Byelorussian SSR, for example, stressed that a territorial limitation on the deployment of nuclear weapons in non-nuclear zones and in various other regions of the world deserved support. The Sudan was of the view that the implementation of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones, coupled with the respect and compliance by the nuclear-weapon States with the institutional arrangements and agreements freely arrived at among the States of such zones, would constitute an important area of disarmament measures. Costa Rica believed the Treaty of Tlatelolco could serve as an inspiration for similar proposals in other regions of the world. Egypt recalled its initiative at the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly that led for the first time to the consensus adoption of a resolution, 35/147, on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. Encouraged by such a development Egypt had completed the process of

⁴ *Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Free-Zones in All Its Aspects* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.I.7); the study includes a review of early initiatives.

⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 42* (A/36/42), para. 7.

⁶ A/CN.10/PV.43-54, A/CN.10/PV.54/Add.I, A/CN.10/PV.41-54/Corrigendum, and A/CN.10/32.

ratification, on 26 February 1981, of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

In the light of various reports, several delegations, including those of Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, the Sudan and Zambia, expressed deep concern over South Africa's nuclear capability which in their view posed a grave danger to international peace and security and jeopardized, in particular, the security of the African States. The question of the denuclearization of Africa was discussed in the Disarmament Commission primarily in connection with its agenda item 9 concerning the letter, dated 8 March 1979, from the Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* addressed to the Secretary-General⁷ transmitting to the Disarmament Commission the report of the United Nations Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa that was held in London in February 1979.⁸ It was stressed by Zambia in that connection that South Africa's plan and capability to produce nuclear weapons ran counter to the objective of curbing the nuclear arms race in general, as well as the goals of non-proliferation and the collective aspiration of African countries to achieve the denuclearization of Africa. Zambia, in its statement, pointed out that it referred to the development of nuclear weapons "in" South Africa, rather than "by" South Africa to emphasize the fact that it was not by its own ingenuity that South Africa acquired a nuclear capability. A number of African countries had repeatedly expressed alarm about South Africa's increased nuclear sophistication and recommended that South Africa be denied all technology for uranium enrichment and its enrichment plant be dismantled.

Following the general exchange of views, the question of establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones was taken up in informal meetings which the Commission held as a Committee of the Whole in connection with its agenda item embracing the general question of nuclear disarmament, cited above, and related items. On 5 June, the Disarmament Commission adopted by consensus a text containing a number of recommendations for submission to the General Assembly, which included the following paragraph:⁹

7. The Commission recommended the strengthening of the existing nuclear-weapon-free zone and the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones as well as the establishment of zones of peace in accordance with paragraph 64 of the Final Document.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1981

In 1981, the question of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones was considered in the Committee on Disarmament mainly in connection with its agenda items¹⁰ on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament in the context of nuclear non-proliferation, security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and the comprehensive programme of disarmament. The idea

⁷ A/CN.10/4; the non-aligned States circulated document A/CN.10/30 on the item.

⁸ S/13157.

⁹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 42* (A/36/42), para. 19; also, para. 23, pertaining to agenda item 9, discussed above.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 27* (A/36/27), para. 7.

of creating such zones in various regions, as a practical and feasible measure towards nuclear disarmament, continued to receive general support in the Committee.

Many delegations, including those of Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, India, Kenya, Norway, Pakistan, Sweden and Zaire, emphasized the importance of the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a significant element of a non-proliferation régime. Several delegations stressed the importance of such arrangements being based on the voluntary agreement of the countries concerned and the special circumstances prevalent in the region in question. The establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) was cited as a good example to be followed in future efforts.

Other delegations emphasized the important relationship between the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the question of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. China maintained that the nuclear-weapon States should undertake at the least not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones and reaffirmed its own long-standing unconditional declaration to that effect. Finland pointed out that, since the main objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone was to strengthen the security of the zonal States, it was inherent to the concept that, as a minimum, the status of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should be respected by all States outside the zone, particularly by the nuclear-weapon States. Equally important, if not more so, was the provision of assurances by nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against countries of the zone.

Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union attached special importance to the conclusion of an agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there were no such weapons at present. They considered such a measure as conducive to the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, particularly in politically and strategically sensitive areas. However, some delegations, including that of the Netherlands, held the view that the non-stationing requirement was superfluous, and that moreover it was uncalled for because it would implicitly legitimize the threat and the use of nuclear weapons against certain non-nuclear-weapon States, even when not engaged in an armed conflict. In addition, the non-stationing plan, in the Netherlands' view, was non-verifiable, in particular on the eve of or during any such conflict, when it would be especially important.

The proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was generally supported in the Committee, particularly by members from that region. Egypt, in informing the Committee of its ratification of the non-proliferation Treaty, observed that security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East were also related to the cessation of the nuclear arms race. Noting that Security Council resolution 255 (1968) did not provide genuine guarantees, Egypt appealed to the nuclear-weapon States to exert

efforts to conclude an agreement prohibiting once and for all the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any State. It also expressed satisfaction, as it had in the Disarmament Commission, about the consensus adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 35/147 by which the countries of the Middle East were invited, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the area, to declare solemnly that they would refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring or possessing nuclear weapons. Egypt believed that adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty by all countries of the region and placing their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards would avert the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.

Stressing the inherent right of States to develop technology for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the principle of non-use of force in international relations, some 30 members of the Committee, representing all political groupings and geographical regions, condemned the air attack by Israel on Iraq's nuclear reactor, located near Baghdad. The incident was regarded by many as a new and dangerous escalation of tensions in the Middle East which jeopardized the chances for creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. Many delegations, including those of Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Japan, Nigeria and Pakistan, regarded the Israeli attack as a serious challenge to the fundamental right of every country to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and to the established international safeguards system under IAEA.

A number of delegations made reference to the proposal for the denuclearization of Africa. China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan and Zaire supported the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone on the continent and expressed deep concern in that connection over the nuclear programme of South Africa, which they considered to be a serious threat to the peace and security of African States in particular, and to the objective of nuclear disarmament in general. Kenya, among others, expressed regret over nuclear collaboration with the South African régime by certain nuclear exporting countries which considered themselves among the strong non-proliferation advocates. In Kenya's view, the economic self-interest of those countries seemed to have overridden the vital environmental and security interests of the people of the region, as well as those of the world community. Furthermore, such collaboration cast some doubt on the credibility of those countries' pronouncements and efforts concerning nuclear disarmament. Nigeria suggested that, if a country like South Africa continued to persist in its refusal to undertake a legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons, it should not expect to be entitled to the security assurances currently under negotiation. Later in the session, Zaire, attaching importance to the Assembly resolutions which had repeatedly called for the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa and the cessation of all nuclear co-operation with South Africa, stressed that the introduction of nuclear weapons on the African continent, and particularly in a region as tense as southern Africa, would not only be a severe blow to global non-proliferation efforts but would also undermine the efforts to keep the African continent out of the nuclear arms race.

With regard to other proposals for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, Finland recalled its proposals, as early as 1963, for such a zone in northern Europe, and for related special arrangements for arms control in the Nordic region in order to isolate the Nordic countries as far as possible from the effects of nuclear strategy in general and the consequences of the new nuclear weapons technology in particular. The Soviet Union recalled a recent statement of its President, L. I. Brezhnev, in which he had stressed that the Soviet Union was ready to proceed to a possible consideration of questions concerning several measures relating to the Soviet Union's own territory in the region adjoining a nuclear-weapon-free zone in northern Europe. The Soviet delegate stated that President Brezhnev's statement reflected a new development as no other nuclear-weapon State had expressed readiness to consider measures on its own territory. Bulgaria welcomed the Soviet initiative regarding the USSR's readiness to assume a legally binding obligation providing security assurances to parties to a northern European nuclear-weapon-free zone. Such a security assurance might be either in the form of a multilateral agreement or of bilateral agreements with each participating zonal State.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1981

As in previous years, in 1981 the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones and specific proposals for their establishment again received considerable support from Member States in the general debate in plenary meetings and in the First Committee of the General Assembly.¹¹ While the consideration of the subject was along the lines of previous years, two new elements were added to the discussion in 1981. First, a new item directly related to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was included in the Assembly's agenda. It was entitled "Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations and its grave consequences for the established international system concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and international peace and security" The General Assembly adopted a resolution on the item on the basis of its consideration in plenary meetings¹² without reference to a main Committee. By resolution 36/27 the General Assembly, among other things, strongly condemned Israel for its premeditated and unprecedented act of aggression in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct, requested the Security Council to investigate Israel's nuclear activities, and reiterated its request to the Security Council to institute effective enforcement action to prevent Israel from further endangering international peace and security through acts of aggression (see pages 172-175 below).

¹¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 33rd and 91st meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 53rd meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

¹² *Ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 52nd to 56th meetings.

The other new development concerned the implementation of General Assembly resolution 35/143 of 1980 relating to the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, also known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco. By resolution 36/83 the General Assembly noted with satisfaction that the United States, on 23 November 1981, had also become a party to Additional Protocol I through the deposit of its instrument of ratification. However, the Assembly expressed its regret that the signature of Additional Protocol I by France, which had taken place on 2 March 1979, had not yet been followed by a corresponding ratification notwithstanding the time already elapsed and the invitations addressed to that country by the Assembly in previous years.

In the First Committee, delegations from all political and geographical groupings supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in regions of their particular concern. A number of them saw the Latin American Treaty of Tlatelolco as a model for the realization of similar proposals in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and possibly other regions.

In supporting the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones, China stated that the basic difficulty in creating such zones had been the super-Powers' rivalry for hegemony and their military expansion in various parts of the world, while the main obstacle to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and the Middle East was the attempt to develop nuclear weapons by South Africa and Israel. In the case of the Middle East, the recent Israeli military attack on the Iraqi nuclear installations had created new difficulties for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. China stressed that in order to establish such zones in various parts of the world it was necessary to oppose the aggressive policies of the super-Powers and of the racists and the expansionists, put an end to super-Power interference and infiltration and remove all forms of foreign military presence and occupation.

The Soviet Union regarded the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones as one of the measures that could reduce the threat of nuclear war and strengthen the non-proliferation régime and regional military détente. In addition to supporting the proposed zones for Africa and the Middle East, the Soviet Union also supported the proposals for the creation of such zones in other parts of the world, in particular in northern Europe and the Balkan regions. Moreover, the strengthening of security and stability would also be promoted considerably by the implementation of the proposals for the creation of zones of peace and co-operation, in particular in South-East Asia and the Mediterranean.

The United Kingdom, on behalf of the ten member States of the European Community, stated that they had consistently supported the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones, as their establishment, with the full agreement of all the States of the region concerned, could considerably enhance regional security, stimulate arms control efforts both on a regional basis and more widely, and help to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The United States, in affirming its support for the concept, believed that effective nuclear-weapon-free zones negotiated and supported by the appropriate parties could enhance the security of their participants and reinforce

non-proliferation goals on a regional basis. It reiterated its criteria for judging the effectiveness of a nuclear-weapon-free zone as follows: (a) the initiative for the creation of a zone should come from States of the region concerned; (b) all States whose participation was deemed important should participate in the zone; (c) the arrangement should provide for adequate verification of compliance with the zone's provisions; (d) the establishment of the zone should not disturb existing security arrangements to the detriment of regional and international security; (e) the arrangement should effectively prohibit parties from developing any nuclear explosive device for whatever purpose; (f) the arrangement should not seek to impose restrictions on the exercise by other States of rights recognized under international law, particularly the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas, in international air space and in straits used for international navigation and the right of innocent passage through territorial seas; and (g) the establishment of a zone should not affect the existing right of its parties under international law to grant or deny transit privileges, including port calls and overflights to other States.

India stated that the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world would make sense only if accompanied by measures of nuclear disarmament. If a nuclear war should break out, nuclear-weapon-free zones would not escape its cataclysmic effects. Similarly, in India's view, regional measures of disarmament would have relevance only if conceived within a framework for achieving general and complete disarmament. Moreover, the initiative for the creation of such zones must come from the countries of the region concerned and must follow a process of mutual consultations among them. In addition, the region to be covered by any such zone must be viable in the sense that it should be a well-defined geographical and geopolitical unit.

Sweden also was of the view that one of the most fundamental prerequisites for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones was that general agreement thereon existed among all the States concerned. Other conditions would be: the non-possession of nuclear weapons by zonal States; the non-development or non-presence of nuclear weapons in the zone and the withdrawal of such weapons as could only be used against targets in the nuclear-weapon-free zone; and the commitment by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against targets within the zone. In connection with the proposal for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in northern Europe, the representative of Sweden stated that, in accordance with the resolution adopted by the Swedish Parliament, the Swedish Government would continue to keep in close contact with the other Nordic Governments on this issue with a view to finding out if there was common ground between the Nordic countries for the creation of such a zone in the Nordic area as part of efforts for a nuclear-weapon-free Europe.

Finland reiterated its proposal for creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Nordic region, stating that it would be of advantage to the entire region if the absence of nuclear weapons were confirmed by a contractual arrangement. It referred to the meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Nordic countries in Copenhagen in September 1981 at which they had informed each

other of the prerequisites that should apply to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Nordic area, and agreed to keep in contact concerning their future work on that question. Finland stressed that the minimum requirement for such a zone would be that the status of the zone was respected by all States, especially by the nuclear-weapon States. Finland, too, held that the creation of such zones should be based on arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned and that the initiative for negotiations had to come from the States in the region, which must conduct the necessary talks in good faith, without coercion or pressure.

Yugoslavia pointed out that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, as well as zones of peace and co-operation, would become difficult if the arms race was not halted and if there was not a gradual withdrawal of nuclear weapons and armed forces from foreign territories and from seas and oceans. In its view, such zones should be established and expanded, first of all, by undertaking effective measures for the reduction of existing nuclear weapons, through restricting the area of their deployment and by prohibiting and eliminating them. Romania, for its part, recalled its proposals over the years for transforming the Balkans into a nuclear-weapon-free zone — a zone of friendship, peace and good neighbourliness.

A. *Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America*

Since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 34/74 in 1979, by which the General Assembly welcomed the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco by all the five nuclear weapon States, only one item on that Treaty has remained in the Assembly's agenda: the signature and ratification of its Additional Protocol I which concerns the application of the Treaty to territories in the zone for which outside States have *de jure* or *de facto* responsibility.

On 16 November, 21 Latin American and Caribbean area countries¹³ submitted a draft resolution concerning Additional Protocol I, which was introduced by Mexico, on behalf of the sponsors, on 19 November. Mexico noted that the draft had a paragraph wherein the Assembly would note with satisfaction that the United States had announced that it would ratify Additional Protocol I in the very near future. Mexico added that it was the hope of the sponsors that France, which had so many historic, cultural and economic ties with the countries of Latin America, would heed the invitation which the Assembly was addressing to it in the draft resolution by ratifying Additional Protocol I by the time of the Assembly's thirty-seventh session.

In explaining its position, France recalled that it had signed Additional Protocol I of the Treaty on 2 March 1979. However, France could not agree that its responsibility in that regard be called into question while the Treaty

¹³ Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.

itself had not been ratified, or even signed, by all the States in the region it covered. Moreover, for some of those States, the implementation of the Treaty's provisions remained subject to the implementation of all the conditions making possible the creation of the zone. Finally, France felt that the sponsors would agree that it was not for the General Assembly to interfere in the procedures which each sovereign State decided to follow with regard to ratification of international treaties.

In affirming its support of the draft resolution, the United States representative stated that on 13 November 1981 the United States Senate had consented to ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and on 23 November 1981 the United States had, in fact, deposited the instrument of ratification with the Government of Mexico. He added that the Treaty could serve as a possible model for other regions of the world exposed to the threat of nuclear proliferation. The United States goal continued to be to see the Treaty in force for all of the countries of the region.

Guyana explained its abstention in the vote, despite its commitment to the Treaty's objective, because of a clause in the Treaty¹⁴ which in its view discriminated against Guyana and excluded it from being a party.

The draft resolution was approved by the First Committee on 25 November by a recorded vote of 121 to none, with 3 abstentions (Cuba, France and Guyana), and adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December by a non-recorded vote of 138 to none, with 5 abstentions, as resolution 36/83. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967, 3262 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3473 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 32/76 of 12 December 1977, S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 33/58 of 14 December 1978, 34/71 of 11 December 1979 and 35/143 of 12 December 1980 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco),

Taking into account that within the zone of application of that Treaty, to which twenty-two sovereign States are already parties, there are some territories which, in spite of not being sovereign political entities, are nevertheless in a position to receive the benefits deriving from the Treaty through its Additional Protocol I, to which the States that *de jure* or *de facto* are internationally responsible for those territories may become parties,

Recalling with satisfaction that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Netherlands became parties to Additional Protocol I in 1969 and 1971, respectively,

Noting with satisfaction that the United States of America likewise became a party to Additional Protocol I on 23 November 1981, when its instrument of ratification was deposited,

1. *Regrets* that the signature of Additional Protocol I by France, which took place on 2 March 1979, has not yet been followed by the corresponding ratification, notwithstanding the time already elapsed and the pressing invitations addressed to France by the General Assembly and which it reiterates with special urgency in the present resolution;

¹⁴ Article 25, paragraph 2 of the Treaty, which states "The General Conference shall not take any decision regarding the admission of a political entity part or all of whose territory is the subject, prior to the date when this Treaty is opened for signature, of a dispute or claim between an extra-continental country and one or more Latin American States, so long as the dispute has not been settled by peaceful means."

2. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session an item entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 36/83 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)"

B. *Denuclearization of Africa*

Pursuant to resolutions 35/146 A and B of 12 December 1980, the item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa: report of the Secretary-General" was again included in the agenda of the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session. Many States reiterated their concern about the nuclear plans and capability of South Africa which, in their view, could constitute a serious threat to international peace and security, particularly that of the African States, and increase the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. A number of African States, including Angola, Chad, the Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, the Sudan, Uganda and the United Republic of Cameroon regarded their fears as having been reinforced by the report of the Secretary-General, which was prepared with the assistance of the Group of Experts on South Africa's Plan and Capability in the Nuclear Field,¹⁵ and the possibility that South Africa might indeed have acquired nuclear weapons. A large number of African States denounced the technological and military assistance in the nuclear field that they believed was being given to South Africa by certain States and which could assist in its development of nuclear weapons. They called upon the States concerned to terminate forthwith any nuclear collaboration with South Africa, and urged also that the Security Council intensify its efforts to prohibit all forms of co-operation and collaboration with, and institute effective enforcement action against, South Africa, so as to prevent it from endangering international peace and security through the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Two draft resolutions were submitted in connection with the item. The first, entitled "Nuclear capability of South Africa", was submitted on 12 November by 14 African States and was subsequently also sponsored by 14 other countries.¹⁶ In introducing the draft resolution, Nigeria reaffirmed on behalf of the sponsors that the objective of a denuclearized Africa remained fundamental to the efforts of the continent towards collective self-defence, and expressed the hope that all countries, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, would consider and respect the African continent as a nuclear-weapon-free zone and refrain from any action or inaction which might frustrate that objective, particularly in the light of the increasing threat and danger of South Africa's nuclear plans and capability to the African States. According to the

¹⁵ A/35/402 and Corr.1; the report was subsequently published as a United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.I.10.

¹⁶ Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burundi, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Qatar, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, United Republic of Cameroon, Zaire and Zambia.

sponsors, it was unacceptable that the glitter of gold or other geopolitical or geostrategic interests of certain countries should become a greater consideration than the lives, the liberty and the well-being of Africans. Nigeria regarded the use of veto in the Security Council by certain States in connection with the issues of southern Africa as an ominous trend, and held that it was the duty and obligation of the Security Council under the Charter of the United Nations to promote international peace and security.

The draft resolution was approved by the First Committee on 24 November by a recorded vote of 108 to 4, with 9 abstentions, and by the General Assembly on 9 December 1981 by a recorded vote of 129 to 4 (France, Israel, United Kingdom and United States), with 10 abstentions, as resolution 36/86 A. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 34/76 B of 11 December 1979 and 35/146 A of 12 December 1980,

Bearing in mind the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964,

Recalling that, in its resolution 33/63 of 14 December 1978, it vigorously condemned any attempt by South Africa to introduce in any way whatsoever nuclear weapons into the continent and demanded that South Africa refrain forthwith from conducting any nuclear explosion in the continent of Africa or elsewhere,

Alarmed by the content and growing sophistication of South Africa's military and nuclear programme,

Alarmed also at the fact that South Africa's nuclear programme has enabled it to acquire nuclear-weapon capability enhanced by the continued support and collaboration which certain Western countries and Israel have given to it,

Noting with grave concern that South Africa's capacity to produce nuclear weapons has been established, *inter alia*, by the content of its nuclear programme, as well as by the report of the Secretary-General on South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field following the reported detonation by that country of a nuclear device on 22 September 1979, and that it might indeed have acquired nuclear weapons,

Taking note of the report of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of South Africa on ways and means of making the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa more effective, as well as its report pursuant to Council resolution 473 (1980),

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General of 9 September 1980, as well as his report of 3 September 1981, submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 35/146 A of 12 December 1980 on the nuclear capability of South Africa,

Noting with concern that South Africa has persistently refused to conclude adequate and comprehensive safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices,

Gravely concerned that South Africa, in flagrant violation of the principles of international law and the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, has continued its military attacks against independent States of southern Africa, in particular Angola, and has increased its acts of subversion aimed at destabilizing those States,

Equally concerned that the acquisition of military equipment and nuclear-weapon capability by the racist régime of South Africa, with its abhorrent system of *apartheid* and its record of violence and aggression, poses a serious danger to international peace and security,

Recalling its decision taken at the tenth special session, devoted to disarmament, that the Security Council should take appropriate effective steps to prevent the frustration of the decision of the Organization of African Unity for the denuclearization of Africa,

Expressing its indignation at the fact that some Western countries, by a ready recourse to the use of the veto, have continually frustrated every effort at the United Nations to deal with the question of South Africa,

1. *Deplores* the massive build-up of South Africa's military machine, including its frenzied acquisition of a nuclear-weapon capability for repressive and aggressive purposes and as an instrument of blackmail;

2. *Reaffirms* that the racist régime's plans and capability in the nuclear field constitute a very grave danger to international peace and security and, in particular, jeopardize the security of African States and increase the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

3. *Requests* the Security Council to intensify its efforts to prohibit all forms of co-operation and collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa in the nuclear field and, in particular, to institute effective enforcement action against that régime so as to prevent it from endangering international peace and security through its acquisition of nuclear weapons;

4. *Calls upon* all States, corporations, institutions and individuals to terminate forthwith all military and nuclear collaboration with the racist régime, including the provision to it of such allied materials as computers, electronic equipment and related technology;

5. *Demands* that South Africa submit all its nuclear installations to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to follow closely South Africa's evolution in the nuclear field and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa"

The other draft resolution, on the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa — based on the 1964 Declaration of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and appearing as an item on the Assembly's agenda annually since 1974 — was submitted on 12 November by 17 African States and subsequently sponsored also by 12 additional States.¹⁷ It was introduced by Nigeria on behalf of the sponsors on 13 November in the same intervention in which it had presented the first draft resolution.

In the First Committee, on 24 November, the United States called for a separate vote on operative paragraph 4 of the draft (see below) before it was voted on as a whole. That paragraph was adopted by a recorded vote of 101 to 6 (Belgium, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, United Kingdom and United States), with 16 abstentions. The draft resolution as a whole was then approved by the Committee by a recorded vote of 113 to none, with 11 abstentions, and by the General Assembly on 9 December 1981 by a recorded vote of 132 to none, with 12 abstentions (Western States, Guatemala and Israel), as resolution 36/86 B. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964,

¹⁷ Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burundi, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Togo, United Republic of Cameroon, Zaire and Zambia.

Recalling its resolutions 1652 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, 32/81 of 12 December 1977, 33/63 of 14 December 1978, 34/76 A of 11 December 1979 and 35/146 B of 12 December 1980, in which it called upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa, comprising the continental African States, Madagascar and other islands surrounding Africa, as a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Recalling also that in its resolution 33/63 it vigorously condemned any attempt by South Africa to introduce in any way whatsoever nuclear weapons into the continent and demanded that South Africa refrain forthwith from conducting any nuclear explosion in the continent of Africa or elsewhere,

Reaffirming that the nuclear programme of the racist régime of South Africa constitutes a very grave danger to international peace and security and, in particular, jeopardizes the security of African States,

Noting with concern that South Africa has persistently refused to conclude adequate and comprehensive safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices,

Taking note of the report of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of South Africa on ways and means of making the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa more effective, in particular its recommendation that all forms of nuclear collaboration with South Africa should cease, and the report of the International Conference on Sanctions against South Africa, held in Paris from 20 to 27 May 1981,

Gravely concerned over the possibility that South Africa has acquired nuclear weapons,

Convinced that the acquisition of such weapons by South Africa would endanger the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa as well as the maintenance of international peace and security,

Expressing its indignation that certain Western countries and Israel have continued to collaborate with South Africa in the nuclear field despite the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons which the South African nuclear programme represents,

Recalling its decision taken at the tenth special session, devoted to disarmament, that the Security Council should take appropriate effective steps to prevent the frustration of the decision of the Organization of African Unity for the denuclearization of Africa,

1. *Once again reiterates* its call upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa, comprising the continental African States, Madagascar and other islands surrounding Africa, as a nuclear-weapon-free zone;

2. *Reaffirms* that the nuclear programme of the racist régime of South Africa constitutes a very grave danger to international peace and security and, in particular, jeopardizes the security of African States and increases the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

3. *Condemns* any form of nuclear collaboration by any State, corporation, institution or individual with the racist régime of South Africa since such collaboration frustrates, *inter alia*, the objective of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Organization of African Unity to keep Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone;

4. *Calls upon* such States, corporations, institutions and individuals, therefore, to terminate forthwith such military and nuclear collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa, including the provision to it of such allied materials as computers, electronic equipment and related technology;

5. *Requests* the Security Council, in keeping with the recommendation of its Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of South Africa, to prohibit all forms of co-operation and collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa in the nuclear field;

6. *Demands* that South Africa submit all its nuclear installations to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render all necessary assistance to the Organization of African Unity towards the realization of its solemn Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa"

In the First Committee, a number of States explained their positions in connection with the voting, the majority of them — Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Turkey — stating that they supported both draft resolutions because of their general agreement with the main thrust of the proposals, although they objected variously to the language used in certain paragraphs of the texts as being intemperate or overly polemical; for similar reasons Japan and New Zealand had abstained on the first draft resolution and Canada, the Netherlands and Portugal on both, with Canada objecting particularly to the request to the Security Council for enforcement action and the Netherlands holding that the texts failed to distinguish between peaceful and military nuclear capabilities. France, Israel, the United Kingdom and the United States, again for similar reasons, voted against the first draft resolution in the Committee and abstained in the vote on the second, with France stressing the failure of the texts to distinguish between peaceful and military uses of nuclear energy. The United States felt that the drafts as formulated would, rather than serving their intended purposes, in fact discourage South Africa from implementing a non-proliferation policy. The United Kingdom, for its part, emphasized that it did not collaborate in any way with South Africa towards that country's development of a nuclear-weapon capability. Israel, recalling that it had voted in favour of the resolution on the denuclearization of Africa at the Assembly's thirty-third session, pointed out that it had since then been singled out by name in corresponding resolutions for alleged nuclear collaboration with South Africa. Referring to such accusations as unfounded and false, it stressed that the relevant reports of the Secretary-General¹⁸ had described such charges as mere speculation, and had cited no specific examples because none had occurred.

In connection with the item on denuclearization of Africa it may be noted that the General Assembly in 1981 also adopted two disarmament-related resolutions under the agenda item entitled "Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa". By the first resolution, 36/172 E, entitled "Military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa", the Assembly, *inter alia*, condemned all States which violated the arms embargo and continued to collaborate with South Africa in the military and nuclear fields, in particular certain Western States and Israel, and requested the Security Council to take mandatory measures to strengthen the arms embargo and secure the immediate cessation of any form of collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa in the military and nuclear fields. By resolution 36/172 F, entitled "Arms embargo against South Africa", the Assembly urged the Security Council to consider effective measures to reinforce and strengthen the arms embargo against South Africa and called upon all States to take effective measures to ensure that governmental and non-governmental organizations within their jurisdiction ceased any relations with the military and police forces, military industry and nuclear institutions of South Africa. Some other resolutions adopted under the item on *apartheid* also included references to disarmament-related considerations.

¹⁸ A/35/402 and Corr.1 (see foot-note 15 above) and A/36/431.

C. *Proposed nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East*

In accordance with resolution 35/147 of 12 December 1980, the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East" was again included in the agenda of the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

Two draft resolutions were submitted in connection with this item, one of them by Egypt, in the First Committee as is usual practice, and the other by Iraq, directly in the General Assembly after the Committee had finished its consideration of the item. A third draft resolution was submitted in connection with agenda item entitled "Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations and its grave consequences for the established international system concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and international peace and security", which was included at the request on 12 August¹⁹ of a large number of States. It may also be noted that the Security Council took up the issue and adopted its resolution 487 (1981) on 19 June, by which, *inter alia*, it condemned the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear installations.

Many countries, both in the plenary debate and the First Committee, expressed their support of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East as a practical approach towards the enhancement of security of the States in the area. A number of States in the region, including Bahrain, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates, expressed their deep concern that the development of nuclear weapons by Israel would constitute a serious threat to the security of the region and jeopardize the effort for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The proposal was put forward by a number of delegations that, pending the establishment of such a zone, all parties concerned in the region should declare solemnly that they would refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices. The Assembly also had before it a number of letters on the question, two from Egypt, four from Israel, and one each from Iraq, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.²⁰

On 16 November, Egypt submitted its original draft resolution, and its representative introduced it on 20 November, emphasizing that the consensus, reflected for the first time among all parties at the 1980 session of the Assembly with its adoption of resolution 35/147 on the question, constituted a turning-point which must be utilized to the utmost in order to give an impetus towards the establishment of such a zone. Accordingly, Egypt's proposal sought to translate the theoretical concept into a practical one by, *inter alia*, having the Secretary-General appoint a special representative who would

¹⁹ A/36/194 and Add.1 and 2.

²⁰ A/36/112-S/14387 and A/36/220 (Egypt), A/36/298, A/36/315, A/36/610-S/14732 and A/36/630 (Israel), A/36/421 and Corr.1 (Iraq), A/36/60 (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), A/36/92 (Pakistan) and A/36/138 (Saudi Arabia).

contact all parties concerned to ascertain their attitudes as to necessary procedures, and request the Secretary-General to submit an interim report to the Assembly at its second special session on disarmament and report to the Assembly at its thirty-seventh session and also to the Security Council.²¹ In Egypt's view, nuclear disarmament in the Middle East should be dealt with in all wisdom, free of any moves that would create unnecessary obstacles to its implementation.

On 23 November, Qatar submitted a number of amendments to the Egyptian draft resolution²² which would have added a number of paragraphs pertaining to Israel, including a reference to its attack on the Iraqi nuclear installations, and deleted the idea of the Secretary-General appointing a special representative. In light of the proposed amendments, Egypt, on 24 November, submitted a revised draft resolution, changing it to a strictly procedural one whereby the Secretary-General would merely transmit the previous year's resolution 35/147 to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

On 25 November, the First Committee approved the revised draft resolution without a vote.

Following the approval, Finland, Iraq, the United Kingdom on behalf of the member States of the European Community, and the United States explained their positions, all of them reaffirming their support of the proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Finland, the United Kingdom and the United States regretted that it had not proved possible to consider the draft that would have dealt with the matter in a substantive way, all of them indicating that they would have supported Egypt's original proposal. Iraq called attention to the Israeli attack on its nuclear installation and the international action which had been taken as a result. It stressed that the original proposal had not taken account of those developments, while the amendment proposed by Qatar had attempted to do so. While it regarded the revised draft as unsatisfactory, it had gone along with the consensus.

On 9 December, the draft was adopted by the Assembly, again without a vote, as resolution 36/87 A. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3474 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/71 of 10 December 1976, 32/82 of 12 December 1977, 33/64 of 14 December 1978, 34/77 of 11 December 1979 and 35/147 of 12 December 1980 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit General Assembly resolution 35/147 to the Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament;

2. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East"

²¹ See A/36/747, para. 5.

²² *Ibid.*, para. 6.

On 9 December, Iraq, on behalf of the group of Arab States, introduced the separate draft resolution on the item in the plenary meeting of the General Assembly, pointing out that the draft resolution already approved by the First Committee on 25 November was purely procedural and did not take due account of the very dangerous developments in the region, particularly the unprecedented Israeli act of aggression of 7 June 1981 against the Iraqi nuclear installations, which had grave effects on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the safeguards régime of IAEA. Iraq stated that Israel, having taken the law into its own hands, should not be allowed to repeat such destructive actions. Nor was Israel to be allowed to dictate its own formula for what it considered to be the proper modalities for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

In connection with the vote on the agenda item at the 91st plenary meeting, a number of countries explained their positions. Before the voting, Israel recalled that it had joined the consensus the previous year on resolution 35/147 and, moreover, had submitted an alternative proposal of its own on the question.²³ In 1981, it had indicated its readiness to support the original draft submitted by Egypt. Subsequently, Qatar, acting on behalf of additional countries, had submitted amendments designed to cause considerable opposition and reservations. The Iraqi draft resolution, Israel held, reflected a revival of those amendments. Since no zone would be established without consensus, that raised doubts about Iraq's intentions.

The United States stated that the Iraqi draft resolution was improper and disruptive, as ideas at variance with those before the First Committee should be introduced and considered in that body. It felt that the draft did not introduce any new facts; rather it focused on the June attack which had already been dealt with at length by the Security Council.

Following the vote, India reiterated its position against discriminatory and inequitable agreements, such as the non-proliferation Treaty and, while condemning the Israeli attack, found certain formulations, explanations and concepts not directly related to the question under consideration to be unacceptable, and therefore had abstained in the vote on the Iraqi proposal.

Argentina had not participated in the vote as it did not share the principal operative criterion of the resolution, because it aimed at imposing full-scope safeguards on a country by means of a General Assembly resolution. Brazil, while supporting the condemnation of the attack, added that the non-proliferation Treaty could not, in its view, constitute the basis for serious steps to achieve the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Canada, likewise condemning the Israeli attack, did not believe that it should be allowed to affect either the future of the non-proliferation Treaty in the region or the prospects of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone; rather, the attack provided an immediate reason for initiating the process of establishing such a zone. It regretted therefore that the original proposal by Egypt had not reached fruition at the 1981 session. Finland observed that the

²³ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, chap. X.

Assembly had already concluded its consideration of the item dealing with the Israeli attack, discussed below. Like Canada, it felt that the attack made the establishment of the zone more urgent, while the additional resolution did not contribute to that objective.

Costa Rica, while supporting the establishment of the zone, had abstained both because of the procedure and stage of introduction of the proposal and because of its content. It did not believe that the Israeli attack was the only endangerment to the non-proliferation Treaty in the region.

Finally, Albania, which had voted in favour in order to condemn the attack, reaffirmed that it none the less continued to hold reservations in respect of nuclear-weapon-free zones and to consider the non-proliferation Treaty to be the result of bargaining by the two imperialist Powers.

The draft resolution introduced by Iraq was adopted by a recorded vote of 107 to 2 (Israel and United States), with 31 abstentions, as resolution 36/87 B. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Recalling also the recommendations in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East consistent with paragraphs 60 to 63, in particular paragraph 63 (d) thereof,

Recalling further Security Council resolution 487 (1981) of 19 June 1981,

Taking into consideration the resolution adopted on 12 June 1981 by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency and resolution GC (XXV)/RES/381 adopted on 26 September 1981 by the General Conference of the Agency,

Recalling further the report of the Secretary-General concerning Israeli nuclear armament,

Realizing that adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by all parties of the region will be conducive to a speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Deeply concerned that the future of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the region has been gravely endangered by the attack carried out by Israel, which is not a party to the Treaty, on the nuclear installations of Iraq, which is a party to that Treaty,

1. *Considers* that the Israeli military attack on the Iraqi nuclear installations adversely affects the prospects of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East;

2. *Declares* that it is imperative, in this respect, that Israel place forthwith all its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit the present resolution to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

In addition to the established item on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the Assembly also dealt with the new item, mentioned at the beginning of this section, dealing specifically with the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear installations. In the course of debate, which was conducted in plenary meetings,²⁴ Iraq charged that on 7 June 1981 Israeli aircraft had bombarded the Iraqi nuclear installations near Baghdad, which were in full conformity with the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

²⁴ See foot-note 12.

Nuclear Weapons and the IAEA safeguards system. In its view, the Israeli military aggression, a dangerous precedent, was also an attack on IAEA, the international safeguards system, the non-proliferation Treaty and the internationally established principles concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. After reviewing the conditions under which its nuclear programme was being developed and the extent of action taken by the Security Council, Iraq maintained that the General Assembly should strongly condemn Israel and again call upon all States to cease forthwith any provision to Israel of arms and related material. Further, Iraq added, the Assembly should also reiterate its request to the Security Council to institute effective enforcement action.

In response, Israel stated that on 7 June 1981 it had performed an elementary act of self-preservation on the ground that the decision to destroy the installations was taken only when it had become absolutely certain that the Iraqi nuclear reactor was on the verge of going operational, with a view to producing nuclear weapons, the principal target of which would have been Israel. In its view, Israel was exercising its inherent right of self-defence, as understood in general international law and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. It also believed that the non-proliferation Treaty could not prevent a country like Iraq from acquiring all the components required for the development of nuclear weapons. Consequently, Israel's approach advocated the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East through a multinational treaty reached by direct negotiation among the States concerned.

A large number of States, including the Observer of the League of Arab States, the United Kingdom on behalf of the ten member States of the European Community and some 50 countries representing all political and geographical groupings, reiterated their condemnation of the Israeli attack on Iraqi nuclear installations and a number of them rejected the interpretation of the Israeli action as an exercise of the right of self-defence under the United Nations Charter.

On 11 November, the representative of Iraq introduced a draft resolution on the item, which in its final version was sponsored by 36 Member States.²⁵ At the same plenary meeting, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a roll-call vote of 109 to 2 (Israel and United States), with 34 abstentions, as resolution 36/27. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Having considered the item entitled "Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations and its grave consequences for the established international system concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and international peace and security",

Expressing its deep alarm over the unprecedented Israeli act of aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations on 7 June 1981, which created a grave threat to international peace and security,

²⁵ Algeria, Bahrain, Cape Verde, Chad, Comoros, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Gambia, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen and Yugoslavia.

Recalling its resolution 33/71 A of 14 December 1978 concerning military and nuclear collaboration with Israel and its resolution 34/89 of 11 December 1979 on Israeli nuclear armament,

Further recalling Security Council resolution 487 (1981) of 19 June 1981 and noting with concern Israel's refusal to comply with the said resolution,

Taking note of the resolution adopted on 12 June 1981 by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency and of resolution GC (XXV)/RES/381 adopted on 26 September 1981 by the General Conference of the Agency, in which the Conference, *inter alia*, considered that the Israeli act of aggression constituted an attack against the Agency and its safeguards régime and decided to suspend the provision of any assistance to Israel,

Fully aware of the fact that Iraq, being a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, has subscribed to the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards régime, and that the Agency has testified that these safeguards have been satisfactorily applied,

Noting with concern that Israel has refused to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and, in spite of repeated calls, including that of the Security Council, to place its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards,

Alarmed by the increasing information and evidence regarding Israel's activities aimed at the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons,

Gravely concerned over the misuse by Israel, in committing its acts of aggression against Arab countries, of aircraft and weapons supplied by the United States of America,

Condemning the Israeli threats to repeat such attacks on nuclear installations if and when it deems it necessary,

Affirming the inalienable sovereign right of all States to develop technological and nuclear programmes for peaceful purposes, in accordance with the internationally accepted objectives of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

1. *Strongly condemns* Israel for its premeditated and unprecedented act of aggression in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct, which constitutes a new and dangerous escalation in the threat to international peace and security;

2. *Issues a solemn warning* to Israel to cease its threats and the commission of such armed attacks against nuclear facilities;

3. *Reiterates its call* to all States to cease forthwith any provision to Israel of arms and related material of all types which enable it to commit acts of aggression against other States;

4. *Requests* the Security Council to investigate Israel's nuclear activities and the collaboration of other States and parties in those activities;

5. *Reiterates its request* to the Security Council to institute effective enforcement action to prevent Israel from further endangering international peace and security through its acts of aggression and continued policies of expansion, occupation and annexation;

6. *Demands* that Israel, in view of its international responsibility for its act of aggression, pay prompt and adequate compensation for the material damage and loss of life suffered as a result of the said act;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep Member States and the Security Council informed of progress towards the implementation of the present resolution and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations and its grave consequences for the established international system concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and international peace and security"

D. *Proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia*

The item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia: report of the Secretary-General" was included in the agenda of the

thirty-sixth session pursuant to resolution 35/148 of the previous year by which, *inter alia*, the Secretary-General was requested to render such assistance as might be required to promote the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to report on the subject to the Assembly in 1981.

In his report,²⁶ the Secretary-General stated that he had been in contact with countries of the South Asian region and that there had been no request by the States concerned for his assistance regarding the subject. In the course of those contacts a view was expressed to the Secretary-General that he should continue to be available for that purpose. In the debate, a number of countries continued to express support for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, which, they believed, could promote peace and security for that region as well as for the world as a whole.

Pakistan emphasized that it had taken various initiatives to promote non-proliferation in its region and, in connection with its initiative for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, it was encouraged by the further formalization of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and emerging consensus on a zone in the Middle East.

India, for its part, continued to stress the view that such initiatives must be conceived as a part of a nuclear disarmament programme, emanate from the countries of the region concerned and involve a well-defined geographical and political unit. South Asia, on the other hand, was an integral part of the Asia-Pacific region in which foreign bases were being maintained and different countries held different perceptions and security concerns. For those reasons India had maintained a clear-cut opposition to the proposal.

On 12 November, Pakistan submitted a draft resolution, which its representative introduced on 16 November. He stressed that the initiative for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia was rooted in Pakistan's commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and the concern it shared with other South Asian States to keep the region free of nuclear weapons, as well as the over-all effort to reduce the threat of a nuclear holocaust. According to Pakistan, South Asia was a distinct region and fully qualified for the pursuit of such an objective. Moreover, in light of the fact that countries of the region had more than once unilaterally declared their commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, it should be possible to translate those commitments into a joint declaration. Such a declaration would have to contain a demand for appropriate security assurances from the nuclear-weapon States. Pakistan was willing to undertake any discussions necessary to achieve that objective. It noted that the draft resolution was almost identical to the one previously adopted by the Assembly on the subject; *inter alia*, it called upon the States concerned to extend the necessary co-operation in the effort to reach the goal.

Before the vote in the First Committee, Bangladesh, in explaining its intention to cast an affirmative vote, stated that it believed the necessary

²⁶ A/36/408.

contacts and consultations must take place among the States concerned in order to ensure unanimity on the issue, including such aspects as defining the limits of such a zone. Sri Lanka also believed that such a zone could be viable provided that it had the consent, support and co-operation of all countries in the zone, and, as in previous years, it would support the draft. The Bahamas, because of the continuing lack of agreement among all States of the region, would again abstain, although it accepted the main thrust of the text. India, in explaining its intention to cast a negative vote, stated that the draft resolution did not meet the basic principles for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, particularly in that the initiative for such zones should come voluntarily from the States of the region concerned. It reiterated its view that South Asia was a contiguous and integral part of the Asia-Pacific region and could not, on grounds of history or culture, be treated in isolation. In addition, the deployment of nuclear weapons in the region of which South Asia was a part and the military bases of some nuclear-weapon States in the immediate neighbourhood complicated the security environment of the region, making the situation inappropriate for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Netherlands, supporting the proposal, expressed the hope that the peoples of South Asia would succeed in keeping their countries free from nuclear weapons, including also other nuclear explosive devices. Sweden stated that its reason for abstaining was that the draft did not enjoy unanimous regional support.

After the vote, Bhutan, which voted against the draft, stressed the importance of a process of appropriate consultation to bring about an agreement among all the States concerned, which even after eight years had not been achieved. Australia, Brazil and Sweden, which abstained in the vote, considered it essential that the participation of all States of the region concerned should be on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at and negotiated among themselves, and Brazil added that there should also be a commitment among the nuclear Powers not to interfere in such a negotiating process. The United States and Japan reiterated their support of nuclear-weapon-free zones and of the draft resolution, believing that under the appropriate conditions it could contribute to the international non-proliferation effort and the promotion of peace and security.

On 25 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 82 to 2 (Bhutan and India), with 38 abstentions, and on 9 December 1981, the General Assembly adopted it by a recorded vote of 93 to 3 (Bhutan, India and Mauritius), with 44 abstentions, as resolution 36/88. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3265 B (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3476 B (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/73 of 10 December 1976, 32/83 of 12 December 1977, 33/65 of 14 December 1978, 34/78 of 11 December 1979 and 35/148 of 12 December 1980 concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,

Reiterating its conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world is one of the measures which can contribute most effectively to the objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and general and complete disarmament,

Believing that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, as in other regions, will strengthen the security of the States of the region against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Noting the declarations issued at the highest level by Governments of South Asian States reaffirming their undertaking not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons and to devote their nuclear programmes exclusively to the economic and social advancement of their peoples,

Recalling that in the above-mentioned resolutions it called upon the States of the South Asian region and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as might be interested to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the meantime, from any action contrary to this objective,

Further recalling that, in its resolutions 3265 B (XXIX), 31/73 and 32/83, it requested the Secretary-General to convene a meeting for the purpose of the consultations mentioned therein and to render such assistance as might be required to promote the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,

Bearing in mind the provisions of paragraphs 60 to 63 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly regarding the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including in the region of South Asia,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,

1. *Reaffirms* its endorsement, in principle, of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

2. *Urges once again* the States of South Asia and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as may be interested to continue to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the meantime, from any action contrary to this objective;

3. *Calls upon* those nuclear-weapon States which have not done so to respond positively to this proposal and to extend the necessary co-operation in the efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render such assistance as may be required to promote the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to report on the subject to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament as well as at its thirty-seventh session;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia"

Conclusion

The majority of Member States continued in 1981 to believe that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was a feasible, practical and effective measure for enhancing regional security, promoting international peace and complementing the non-proliferation régime. The proposals for the establishment of such zones in various parts of the world continued to enjoy general support in the various international disarmament forums: the Disarmament Commission, the Committee on Disarmament and the General Assembly.

During 1981, a forward movement was made with regard to the Treaty of Tlatelolco with the United States becoming a party to Additional Protocol I on 23 November by depositing its instrument of ratification; thus the consideration on the subject was narrowed down to the question of the ratification of Protocol I by France, the only outside State not party to the Protocol having responsibility for territories in the Latin American region. On the question of

denuclearization of Africa, most of the African States reiterated their concern about the threat of South Africa's nuclear plan and capability to the peace and security of the continent. The proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East continued to be overwhelmingly supported by Member States, and the Israeli military attack on the Iraqi nuclear installations in June of the year, although the subject of intense debate, was equally as strongly condemned. The proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia continued to receive the support of most Member States, and the General Assembly adopted a resolution despite the differences in views that persisted, particularly between India and Pakistan, and the recognition that all States of the region should be in accord if the proposal for such a zone was to be implemented.

It may be expected that discussion of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the four regions under active consideration will continue through the Assembly's second special session on disarmament as well as at its thirty-seventh session in 1982.

International co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy

Introduction

QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY have, over the years, occupied a prominent place in international debates, both within and outside the framework of the United Nations. As a result of those discussions an awareness developed of the pressing need for an international consensus in the field. In the process, however, it also became clear that there were substantial differences as to the best ways and means of arriving at such a consensus. All this has been due to the fact that the issue is approached from different standpoints.

One group of States places the emphasis on the need to guard against any possibility of the spread of nuclear weapons, and defines its policies with regard to peaceful uses of nuclear energy primarily within that context. This attitude is particularly supported by the major suppliers which believe, as a consequence of their position, that stringent export policies governing the transfer of nuclear technology, equipment and materials are necessary to ensure that international co-operation does not become an avenue for the proliferation of nuclear-weapon capabilities.

In contrast, the other group of States emphasizes the economic benefits that may be derived from the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and considers that the possibilities in this regard should not be unduly limited under the pretext of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. This view is largely maintained by recipient countries, mainly developing States. They insist that the principles of non-discrimination and unrestricted access to nuclear technology and the right of all countries to develop peaceful nuclear programmes in accordance with their interests, needs and priorities should constitute the foundation on which the new international consensus on the question must be built. In their opinion, the fear of its misuse for military purposes should not be used as a justification for measures that restrict their full access to peaceful nuclear technology.

Both groups of States, in recent years, have initiated various actions in order to give effect to their respective positions. Thus, at the initiative of a group of suppliers taken in 1974, an understanding on common safeguards

requirements was reached among a number of them.¹ Those requirements were further developed in the framework of a Nuclear Suppliers Conference (the so-called "London-Club"). In September 1977, the 15 countries by then participating in those meetings (Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, USSR, United Kingdom and United States) agreed on a set of principles and guidelines to govern nuclear exports. The guidelines are based on a list of equipment and materials whose transfer to a non-nuclear-weapon State triggers the application of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In addition, the transfer of items on the "trigger list" requires formal assurances from recipient countries that they will not employ such items for the manufacture of any nuclear explosive device and the application of effective physical protection measures to prevent unauthorized use. Those requirements also apply to facilities utilizing technology directly transferred by the supplier, or derived from transferred facilities or major critical components thereof. The guidelines call for restraint in the transfer of "sensitive" facilities and technology and weapons-grade materials. The agreed control measures also include restrictions on re-export and reprocessing and enrichment activities.²

Some suppliers, however, have adopted national export policies which go beyond the requirement set out in the London guidelines. The additional controls, *inter alia*, involve, singly or in varying combinations, an embargo on the transfer of "sensitive" facilities and technologies, and the application of IAEA safeguards to all peaceful activities, rather than only to the exported items and installations.³

Beyond that, as a means of strengthening the proliferation resistance of the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear suppliers have been placing an emphasis on technical measures and the development of institutional arrangements to limit the dissemination of "sensitive" technologies and facilities and of weapons-grade materials (plutonium 239 and uranium highly enriched in the isotope 235).

In 1977, the United States launched the idea of an international evaluation of the nuclear fuel cycle designed to provide data and options regarding less proliferation-prone nuclear fuel cycles. The Conference on the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), which first met in October 1977, completed its work in February 1980, with 66 States having taken part in the evaluation work in one form or another. The report of the Conference was submitted to the Governments of participating States for their consideration in developing their nuclear energy policies and in international discussions concerning co-operation in the dissemination of nuclear energy and related controls and safeguards.⁴

¹ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 1: 1976, pp. 123-124.

² *Ibid.*, vol. 2: 1977, pp. 133-134, provides a detailed outline of the guidelines.

³ A more detailed discussion of the export policies of individual suppliers may be found in *ibid.*, vol. 1: 1976, pp. 124-128; vol. 2: 1977, pp. 134-139; and vol. 3: 1978, pp. 250-253.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. 5: 1980, pp. 201-202.

In connection with one of the aspects of the fuel cycle considered at INFCE, namely, assurances of supply of nuclear fuel, services and technology, there was a follow-up development. On the suggestion of the Director General of IAEA and following informal consultations, the Board of Governors of IAEA decided, on 20 June 1980, to establish a Committee open to all member States of the Agency to deal with the question. The Committee on Assurances of Supply (known as CAS) was requested to consider and advise the Board on (a) ways and means by which supplies of nuclear materials, equipment and technology and fuel cycle services could be assured on a more predictable and long-term basis in accordance with mutually acceptable considerations of non-proliferation and (b) the Agency's role and responsibilities in relation thereto. The Committee held an organizational meeting in September of that year.

The developing countries, notably the non-aligned, largely reacting to prevailing trends on the supply side, have been attaching increasing importance to possibilities offered by mutual assistance, self-reliance and co-ordinated action in the United Nations and other international organizations, especially IAEA. Furthermore, they have taken the initiative of proposing the convening of an international conference to promote international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development.

In that connection, the General Assembly in 1980 decided, by its resolution 35/112, to convene in 1983 the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, and to establish for that purpose a Preparatory Committee for the Conference.

Work of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference, 1981

Pursuant to resolution 35/112 of 5 December 1980, the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy held an organizational session at Vienna from 3 to 7 August 1981, primarily for the purpose of preparing its programme of work. In accordance with the relevant provision of the resolution, the members of the Preparatory Committee² were appointed by the President of the General Assembly.

The Committee elected the representative of Yugoslavia as its Chairman

² Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Peru, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Turkey, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

and the representatives of Argentina, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ghana, Iraq, the Netherlands, Peru and Sweden as its Vice-Chairmen, while the representative of Indonesia was elected as Rapporteur of the Preparatory Committee.

In his opening statement, the Chairman stressed the importance, magnitude and complexity of issues which had to be resolved in order to ensure a successful United Nations Conference. He pointed out that a substantial part of the international community, in particular, developing countries, had no alternative other than to resort to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in order to satisfy their energy requirements. He further noted that scientific achievements, accomplished know-how, and technological and industrial capability in a growing number of developed countries were making the harnessing of nuclear potential for peaceful uses an accessible alternative. All previous experience had demonstrated that meaningful international co-operation in that field could only be achieved within the framework of internationally agreed principles. In that context, the Chairman also emphasized the need for the Conference to consider with all due attention the serious concern being expressed about the dangers of further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

With regard to the work of the session, many delegations were of the opinion that even though the Committee had been requested by the General Assembly to deal initially with organizational matters, it should, nevertheless, exchange views on the substantive matters concerning the United Nations Conference, particularly regarding its agenda. Other delegations felt, however, that the Committee should concentrate its work at its first session on organizational matters and take up substantive preparations only at its next session.

Following its deliberations in the course of seven formal meetings and a number of informal consultations, the Committee took a decision containing a number of recommendations which were included in its report to the General Assembly.⁶ The Committee recommended to the Assembly, *inter alia*, that the United Nations Conference be held at Geneva from 29 August to 9 September 1983, and that the Preparatory Committee should hold a second session from 21 to 25 June 1982 in Vienna, with a possibility of a further one-week session at Vienna in the latter part of the year if it were deemed necessary. In 1983, the Preparatory Committee would hold a final session at Vienna, with a duration of one week, unless it were to decide otherwise in 1982. In addition, the Preparatory Committee approved the provisional agenda for its own second session.

Work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply, 1981

In the course of the year, the Committee on Assurances of Supply held three sessions: 2 to 4 March, 15 to 17 June and 9 to 11 November. Pursuant to the

⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 48 (A/36/48).*

decision taken at its organizational session in September 1980,⁷ the Committee began consideration of substantive questions.

With regard to its programme of work, the Committee decided to follow a flexible, open-ended approach which would allow consideration of any topic of particular importance to participating States. In this connection, the Committee agreed to begin with deliberations on two topics: (a) principles of international co-operation in the field of nuclear energy in accordance with its mandate; and (b) emergency and back-up mechanisms. For this purpose two open-ended working groups were established. The Committee further specified that Working Group I, which was entrusted with consideration of the first topic, should attempt to organize the proposed principles within a framework, in accordance with the mandate of the Committee, to synthesize proposed principles where possible, and to present options and alternatives in other cases. The two Working Groups held organizational meetings on 10 December.

The Committee reported regularly on its work to the Board of Governors of the Agency.⁸ In addition, in the course of the twenty-fifth regular session of the Agency's General Conference which was held from 21 to 26 September, a number of States addressed questions pertaining to the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply.⁹

An overwhelming number of those which mentioned the Committee spoke in support of the work it was doing and expressed the hope that it would greatly facilitate the development of an international system of nuclear supplies. Among others, all three nuclear-weapon States participating in the General Conference expressed views on the Committee's role. In the opinion of the Soviet Union, the Committee's recommendations concerning the supply of nuclear materials, equipment, technology and fuel cycle services could provide important assistance to many countries, particularly developing ones, in promoting their national interests in the field of nuclear power development. For its part, the United States regarded the Committee on Assurances of Supply as a potentially valuable instrument for achieving better mutual understanding and confidence in the field of nuclear trade. Similarly, the United Kingdom was confident that the Committee would greatly assist in the development of improved arrangements which would permit nuclear trade to flow more freely under reliable and equitable non-proliferation arrangements.

A number of States, including Australia, Austria, Poland, Qatar and Yugoslavia, placed strong emphasis in their statements on the importance of peaceful applications of nuclear energy in general. The discussion in that area centred around two established concerns of member States: (a) adequate safeguards against any possible proliferation of nuclear weapons as a consequence of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and (b) assurances of uninterrupted nuclear supplies. On those matters, the Federal Republic of

⁷ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, p. 228.

⁸ IAEA documents CAS/5, CAS/8 and CAS/11.

⁹ *Ibid.*, documents GC(XXV)/OR.228-237.

Germany stressed that predictable and reliable supply conditions were generally recognized to be of paramount importance for stable international relations in the nuclear field, but that it was also clear that assurances of supply and safeguards against proliferation were complementary, indeed, two sides of the same coin. That view was shared by Japan.

The need for adequate safeguards was particularly stressed by Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the United Kingdom and the United States. In addition, Canada pointed out that, as a reliable supplier of nuclear items, its role was inseparable from the existence of a sound and effective international régime of safeguards which, in fact, made nuclear exports possible. Thus, Canada regarded IAEA safeguards operations as a key element in its own nuclear trade. The United States was also quite explicit in stressing that the application of IAEA safeguards to "all nuclear activities" in non-nuclear-weapon States should be a condition for any significant new nuclear supply commitment. Italy, for its part, while fully agreeing on the ultimate necessity to achieve the general application of "full-scope safeguards" to all importers of nuclear material and technology on a non-discriminatory basis, was strongly convinced that the unilateral adoption of new and more stringent safeguards measures by exporting countries parties to the non-proliferation Treaty was in no way justified. In fact, such measures could on the one hand slow down unduly the development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy and, on the other, weaken the credibility of the Treaty. Similarly, Mexico felt that, although the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty had scrupulously fulfilled their obligations thereunder, some nuclear exporting countries had unilaterally imposed restrictive measures going beyond the safeguards required under the Treaty on the pretext of preventing horizontal proliferation. Mexico was most anxious that the supply of nuclear materials, equipment and technology and the provision of fuel cycle services be assured. Japan and Romania expressed similar concerns with regard to unnecessarily strict safeguards measures which would hamper the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The need of uninterrupted nuclear supply figured prominently in statements made by Egypt, Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the Republic of Korea, Lebanon, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Tunisia and Turkey. Finland, for instance, argued that it was vital for the future of the international non-proliferation régime that those countries which accepted stringent non-proliferation conditions got, in return, adequate supplies and services on a most-favoured basis, and were not put in a less advantageous position than those countries which did not commit themselves to non-proliferation obligations or might even be working on a nuclear explosive device. In the opinion of Norway, there was a need to discuss how nuclear supplies could be assured on a predictable and long-term basis and in strict accordance with an efficient non-proliferation régime, since reliable nuclear supplies could discourage any trend towards nuclear anarchy. Otherwise, if they found it advantageous to establish their own complete fuel cycles, countries would have less interest in accepting international safeguards.

In considering assurances of supply, several States emphasized also the importance of taking into account existing agreements and arrangements. Thus India, while agreeing that discussion on the subject should certainly take place at the multilateral level, believed that the crux of the problem affecting many countries was at the bilateral level and felt strongly that any multilateral solution for assurances of supply must unequivocally take into account existing bilateral rights and obligations. Similarly, the USSR pointed out that in following the recommendations to be worked out by the Committee on Assurances of Supply, it would be necessary to take into account existing agreements for the regulation of nuclear exports and be mindful of the task of further strengthening the nuclear-weapon non-proliferation régime.

Many States, including Australia, Finland, Greece, Japan and Sweden, referred in their statements to the relationship between the work done in the Committee on Assurances of Supply and the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, pointing out that the two were closely interrelated. The Netherlands, for instance, felt that the Committee must produce the framework for a new international nuclear consensus, which the 1983 United Nations Conference would have to clarify.

Consideration by the General Conference of IAEA, 1981

At the twenty-fifth session of the General Conference of IAEA, which was held in Vienna from 21 to 26 September 1981,¹⁰ a number of questions pertaining to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were discussed at length.

Apart from references to the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply referred to above, the subjects dealt with most frequently were two different aspects of the same problem: the potential dangers involved in and the potential benefits to be derived from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

As in previous years, emphasis on the potential dangers marked the comments of Eastern European and Western countries. They stressed the need for measures to guard against the spread of nuclear weapons: the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones; universal adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty; the full effectiveness of the Treaty of Tlatelolco; and the strengthening and improvement of IAEA safeguards, particularly in the light of the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear research centre (see chapters IX and XI). It was suggested that a study be made on the feasibility of significantly reducing response times of Member States and institutions to a signal from the Agency that a diversion may have occurred.

Developing countries, on the other hand, continued to emphasize the importance of peaceful nuclear technology for scientific, technological and economic advancement and self-reliance. They stressed the need to promote international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and criticized

¹⁰ *Ibid.* The text for this section was contributed by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

the stringent conditions imposed on the export of nuclear equipment, technology and material, which, they held, were not conducive to the implementation of nuclear energy programmes in those countries. They reiterated the view that too much emphasis was being placed on the regulatory activities of IAEA to the detriment of its functions in the area of technical assistance, and therefore called for redressing the imbalance by increasing technical assistance.

In order to make nuclear energy accessible to the smaller or poorer countries, Bangladesh and Ireland, for example, suggested that the problem be alleviated by providing regional or multilateral reprocessing and enrichment plants in collaboration with the Agency. As part of its promotional and safeguards activities, the Agency could also be involved in developing fuel cycle centres and an international fuel banking system. Additionally, acknowledging that it was essential that countries which made large investments in nuclear plants should enjoy long-term security of supplies, some States, in particular the United States, expressed their intention to take up again their role as reliable suppliers of nuclear equipment, fuel services and technology under appropriate safeguards and controls.

The ongoing studies on international plutonium storage were supported by many countries. Some developing countries, however, felt that the Expert Group on International Plutonium Storage¹ had gone beyond its mandate and should report to the Board. There were some reservations about financing the activities concerned from the regular budget. Certain problems, such as return procedures and end-use verification, discrimination between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, and compatibility with other treaties (e.g. the EURATOM Treaty), were identified.

The financing of technical assistance continued to figure prominently in the debate. Developing countries expressed the wish to have technical assistance financed from the Agency's regular budget. They added that the amount involved should not be smaller than that provided for administration of safeguards. Other problems aired were late deliveries of materials and equipment, shortages in Agency technical assistance staff, and the need to seek additional resources from other funding bodies, including the Interim Fund for Science and Technology for Development. The intention to rename the Department of Technical Assistance and Publications to put emphasis on co-operation was welcomed, and the name was subsequently changed to Department of Technical Co-operation. The importance of manpower training programmes was stressed. It was suggested that IAEA consider establishing training centres in developing countries.

As to other administrative matters, with regard to the amendment of article VI.A.2 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, concerning the membership of the Board of Governors, some countries believed that an increase in regional representation could alter the Board's efficiency. Brazil and Mexico indicated that its efficiency could be maintained

¹ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, p. 205.

and, moreover, that if the membership on the Board were enlarged for one region, it should be enlarged for others too.¹² Several developing countries noted that an adequate representation of the developing countries on the staff of the Agency would be regarded as a very positive step and welcomed developments in the Agency's staffing policy.¹³ On the recommendation of the Board of Governors, the regular session of the Agency's General Conference approved the application of Zimbabwe as a new member State. And, in accordance with article VII.A of the Statute, the General Conference approved the appointment of Mr. Hans Blix of Sweden as Director-General for a term of four years starting from 1 December 1981 to 30 November 1985.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1981

At the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, in presenting the report of the Committee,¹⁴ stressed that the decisions and documents that would result from the 1983 Conference would undoubtedly have a strong and lasting impact on the conditions of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The recommendations of the General Assembly would, therefore, be of great value for the future work of the Preparatory Committee.

The deliberations of the General Assembly on the subject of the Conference centred around two draft resolutions: one was submitted under the recurrent basic item "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency" and the other, under the same item, dealt with the specific subject of the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. Both were considered in plenary meetings, without reference to a main committee.¹⁵

By the former, which was sponsored by Czechoslovakia, Indonesia and Japan, the General Assembly would, *inter alia*, note with satisfaction that substantive work had commenced in the Committee on Assurances of Supply established by the Board of Governors of IAEA and express the hope that progress in its work would contribute to the success of the 1983 Conference; and that IAEA was prepared, pursuant to Assembly resolution 35/112 of 5 December 1980, to fulfil its appropriate role at all stages of preparation of and during the United Nations Conference by contributing to discussion of relevant issues, by providing technical data and documentation as needed,

¹² *Ibid.*, documents GC(XXV)/OR.231, para. 53, and GC(XXV)/OR.233, para. 112, and GC(XXV)/RES.389.

¹³ *Ibid.*, GC(XXV)/OR.235, paras. 8, 30 and 74.

¹⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 48 (A/36/48)*; the work of the Preparatory Committee is discussed above in the separate section of this chapter.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 50th to 52nd and 90th meetings.

particularly in relation to the progress of the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply, and by participating in the secretariat of the Conference. On 10 November, in introducing the draft resolution, Japan observed that in the draft due note was taken of the distinguished services of Mr. Sigvard Eklund, in directing the successful evolution of IAEA during the last 20 years, and also of the work of the Agency in promoting the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, rendering technical assistance to developing countries, and steadily improving its safeguards system. Japan added that a new element in the 1981 draft resolution on the report of IAEA was the reference to the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply and the contribution it could make for the success of the 1983 United Nations Conference. Also on 10 November, Iraq submitted amendments, consisting of two additional paragraphs to the draft resolution relating to the Israeli air attack of 7 June 1981 on the Iraqi nuclear installations, which were subsequently adopted (see below).

The other draft resolution was submitted jointly by Argentina, Bangladesh, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, Guyana, Indonesia, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Romania, Yugoslavia and Zaire, and later revised and sponsored additionally by Austria, Belgium, Chile, Colombia, Italy, Japan, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Turkey and Venezuela. By the draft, the General Assembly would take note with appreciation of the report of the Preparatory Committee and endorse the recommendations contained therein; decide that the Conference would be held in Geneva from 29 August to 9 September 1983; and provide guidelines for the preparation and organization of the Conference. On 10 November, Yugoslavia introduced the draft resolution, emphasizing that the promotion of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which was essential for countries that were deficient in other energy resources, had so far constantly been confronted with monopolistic tendencies and with efforts to control the development of nuclear technology in non-nuclear-weapon States. The action taking place was being justified as part of the effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, although the view that the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes automatically led to proliferation was unfounded. While such a danger did exist, it should be eliminated by appropriate internationally agreed policies and enforcement of the safeguards system of IAEA. The most urgent task was the elimination of obstacles which prevented full co-operation among States in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the 1983 Conference should help find agreed solutions to that problem.

In the debate on the two draft resolutions, several countries addressed themselves to the goals of the forthcoming Conference and, in particular, to the question of how further international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy could be promoted without increasing the danger of nuclear proliferation.

On those matters, Finland stated that there was nothing inherently contradictory between broader co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and a more effective non-proliferation régime; on the contrary, those goals were interlinked and could be pursued only in conjunction with each

other. Finland also saw the United Nations Conference as closely connected with related questions dealt with by IAEA, and considered the Committee on Assurances of Supply to be particularly important in that respect. Austria hoped that the negotiations between supplier and recipient countries would make it possible to reach agreement on more predictable and long-term arrangements for supplies of nuclear material, equipment, technology and fuel cycle services, while precluding the misuse of nuclear technology for military purposes. Mexico held that the dangers of nuclear proliferation resulting from access to nuclear development for peaceful purposes had been exaggerated; in its view, the danger could result only from the political decision of whomever might opt for the military use of the atom.

India emphasized that any non-proliferation régime must be universal and non-discriminatory and that the proliferation of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States was the real threat being posed to the world community. Mankind, India held, had to be protected from the misuse of nuclear energy for military purposes everywhere. The objective, therefore, should be nuclear disarmament, but the Agency was concerning itself only with limited non-proliferation activities in the non-nuclear countries. As to the question of assurances of supply, India stressed that existing bilateral rights and obligations must be respected.

Pakistan reiterated its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation; once again it declared that its nuclear programme was devoted to the technological, industrial and economic development of the country. Pakistan believed that international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should develop under agreed international safeguards effectively applied by IAEA on a non-discriminatory basis. Similarly, Egypt held that a balance had to be maintained between assuring access to nuclear technology by all States and the need to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States, Egypt stated in that connection, had yet to meet their obligations to stop the vertical proliferation of such weapons, to ensure that potential benefits derived from the peaceful application of nuclear explosions be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States on a non-discriminatory basis, and to promote international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, stressing that it was a party to the non-proliferation Treaty, denounced all the hindrances that were being placed in the way of the efforts of the developing countries to emerge from underdevelopment by using all available means, including nuclear power for peaceful purposes. Yugoslavia, while supporting efforts to place all nuclear facilities without exception under IAEA safeguards, stressed that the development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes was the most important task of IAEA and on that account the Agency should provide the approach to all safeguards measures and related provisions.

The United States expressed its determination to be a major participant in international nuclear affairs and to co-operate actively with other nations in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy within a framework of appropriate safeguards. It believed that the full benefits of nuclear energy could be realized only if the international nuclear non-proliferation régime, constructed over many years,

was maintained and strengthened. Accordingly, it was committed to the strengthening of its role as a dependable supplier of nuclear equipment, fuel services and technology to other countries, so as to facilitate long-term programme planning and, at the same time, to adhere to a vigorous policy of countering risks of nuclear proliferation. The United States was pleased that the Committee on Assurances of Supply was beginning to focus on practical steps to improve the security of supply in the short term and hoped that the Committee's progress would clear the way for an international consensus on conditions for supply in the longer term.

The USSR stated that it fully understood the desire of many countries to establish their own source of atomic energy. Accordingly, it maintained broad international scientific and technical co-operation on a bilateral basis and with international organizations and shared its achievements in atomic energy with many countries, in particular with developing countries. The USSR also supported the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply and felt that its recommendations could be of great assistance to many, especially developing, countries. Existing agreements regulating nuclear exports and the need to further strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation régime, however, should be borne in mind. In that connection, the USSR and other Eastern European States stressed that one of the most important international tasks facing the world community was the establishment of a strong bulwark against nuclear proliferation. Romania made clear that the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons could not be viewed in terms of a policy designed to limit the access by States to the benefits of atomic energy, but rather of one consisting of measures of nuclear disarmament and the outlawing of nuclear weapons.

The United Kingdom, on behalf of the ten member States of the European Community, reiterated their fullest possible support for the acceptance of IAEA safeguards by all States Members of the United Nations on all their peaceful nuclear activities and their confidence in the international safeguards system. They also proclaimed the right of any Member State to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under effective and non-discriminatory non-proliferation arrangements, and urged all States to recognize and respect that right.

Sweden fully supported the IAEA safeguards system and was prepared to participate actively in all efforts that could lead to a strengthening of the system and to additional guarantees against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. One step in that direction, Sweden stated, had already been identified many times, namely, the application of IAEA safeguards to all nuclear facilities in non-nuclear-weapon States as well as to civilian facilities in the nuclear-weapon States. There was no valid reason, Sweden held, not to accept such full scope safeguards.

Australia, calling attention to the fact that it was entering the international uranium market as a major supplier, stated that, out of its concern for the risks of proliferation of nuclear weapons, it had decided that uranium sold to non-nuclear-weapon States should be limited to those which were parties to the non-proliferation Treaty and, as such, complied with IAEA requirements and abided by the terms of special bilateral treaties. Australia had also decided

that exports of uranium to nuclear-weapon States for peaceful purposes should be subject to undertakings that the uranium would not be diverted to military or explosive purposes and would be covered by IAEA safeguards. In addition, Australia would give preference to parties to the non-proliferation Treaty in its provision of nuclear technological assistance outside the regular programme of IAEA.

Turkey held that neither unilateral measures nor discriminatory practices of some States could properly counter the danger deriving from the scarcity of energy resources and the ever growing world population. The only way to pre-empt such a dangerous development would be through effective international co-operation. The decision of the General Assembly to convene the United Nations Conference on the subject in 1983 was one of the most important endeavours in that respect.

On 11 November, the Iraqi amendments to the draft resolution on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency referred to above were adopted in separate votes taken before the vote on the draft as whole. The United States, in an explanation of its position, emphasized that it regretted trends towards politicization in the United Nations and its bodies and agencies. It regarded the amendments as such politicization and as superfluous to the topic at hand. The attack referred to in the proposed additional preambular paragraph had been thoroughly dealt with in the Security Council; moreover it was the subject of another agenda item. With regard to the proposed additional operative paragraph, while the United States considered it to be unnecessary, it would not oppose it. Should both amendments be approved, the United States would not be able to accede to the usual consensus adoption of the resolution as a whole. Israel regarded the amendments as politicizing, discriminatory and arbitrary, and also regretted that the usual consensus on the item would be broken.

The additional preambular paragraph (see below, ninth preambular paragraph) was adopted by a recorded vote of 119 to 2 (Israel and United States), with 10 abstentions (non-aligned, developing countries). The proposed new operative paragraph 7 (see below) was adopted by recorded vote of 129 to none, with 2 abstentions. Thereafter, the draft resolution, as amended, was adopted by a recorded vote of 128 to 1 (Israel), with 4 abstentions (Guatemala, Jamaica, Malawi and United States), as resolution 36/25.

There were further explanations of vote, nine in all, including one by the United Kingdom on behalf of the European Community, following the adoption of the resolution. Generally, the speakers, although having voted for both the amendments and the draft as a whole, regretted that it had not been possible to reach a consensus on an item which traditionally had been considered to be uncontentious, and felt that it would have been preferable to have considered the question of the Israeli attack on Iraqi nuclear installations only under the appropriate agenda item, as had already been done.¹⁶ Brazil

¹⁶ See chapter IX above, section entitled "Consideration by the General Assembly, 1981" especially under subheading "C. *Proposed nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East*", pages 160 and 170, respectively.

also had reservations about the reference, in paragraph 6, to a specific convention, as had Argentina about the reference to the non-proliferation Treaty (sixth preambular paragraph), both of them holding that IAEA should give greater emphasis to technical assistance. Iraq, in exercising its right of reply, held that its amendments were closely connected with the resolution, particularly the third, fourth, fifth and eighth preambular paragraphs and paragraphs 3 and 5, and with the whole item under discussion.

Resolution 36/25 reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Having received the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the General Assembly for the year 1980,

Taking note of the statement by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency of 10 November 1981, which provides additional information on developments in the Agency's activities during 1981,

Conscious of the urgent need to develop all sources of energy, with a view to helping both developing and industrialized countries to mitigate the effects of the energy crisis, and bearing in mind the fact that nuclear energy remains the main readily available alternative to fossil fuel for the generation of large amounts of electric power,

Recognizing the importance of enhancing the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the promotion of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

Considering that the International Atomic Energy Agency will be called upon to play an increasingly important role in making the benefits of nuclear energy available to all nations, in particular the developing countries,

Conscious of the continuing need to protect mankind from the perils resulting from the misuse of nuclear energy and noting with appreciation in this connexion the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other international treaties, conventions and agreements designed to achieve similar objectives,

Noting the excellent safety record of nuclear power generation, but aware of the need to pay continuing attention to the questions of nuclear safety and waste management,

Bearing in mind the special needs of developing countries for technical assistance by the International Atomic Energy Agency in order to benefit effectively from the application of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes as well as from the contribution of nuclear energy to their economic development, and the need to assure a satisfactory and effective source of financing to implement adequate and effective technical assistance programmes,

Considering that the premeditated Israeli air attack on Iraqi nuclear installations on 7 June 1981 constitutes a serious threat to the entire International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and to the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

Conscious of the importance of developing ways and means in which supplies of nuclear material, equipment and technology and fuel cycle services could be assured on a more predictable and long-term basis, in accordance with mutually acceptable considerations of non-proliferation, and of the importance of the role and responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency in this regard,

Noting that the present Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Dr. Sigvard Eklund, will retire on 30 November 1981 after twenty years of service as Director General and that the General Conference of the Agency has decided to confer upon him the title of Director General Emeritus of the International Atomic Energy Agency,

Noting further that the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency approved the appointment by the Board of Governors of the Agency of Dr. Hans Blix as Dr. Eklund's successor,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency;

2. *Notes with satisfaction* that:

(a) The International Atomic Energy Agency is continuously making efforts to strengthen its activities in the field of technical assistance to the developing countries;

(b) Assistance provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency is playing a significant role in the introduction of nuclear power for peaceful purposes as well as in the application of nuclear science and technology, particularly in the fields of agriculture, medicine and industry in the developing countries;

(c) The International Atomic Energy Agency is considering appropriate measures for funding technical assistance through predictable and assured resources and for enabling progress in technical assistance to keep pace with progress in other main activities of the Agency;

3. *Commends* the International Atomic Energy Agency for its continuing efforts to ensure the safe and secure use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes throughout the world, notes with satisfaction the steady improvement of the Agency's safeguards system and welcomes the conclusion that in 1980, as in previous years, nuclear material under Agency safeguards remained in peaceful nuclear activities or was otherwise adequately accounted for;

4. *Notes with appreciation* the steps taken by the International Atomic Energy Agency to expand and strengthen its programmes in nuclear safety and enhance its ability to deal with emergencies;

5. *Urges* all States to continue to support the endeavours of the International Atomic Energy Agency, pursuant to its statute, in furthering the peaceful uses of nuclear power, improving the effectiveness of safeguards and promoting nuclear safety;

6. *Urges* all States that have not already done so to ratify the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which was opened for signature on 3 March 1980;

7. *Calls upon* all States to respect fully their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, including in particular any armed attack on its nuclear installations;

8. *Notes with satisfaction* that:

(a) Substantive work has commenced in the Committee on Assurances of Supply established by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency in June 1980, and expresses the hope that progress in its work will greatly contribute to the success of the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, to be held in 1983;

(b) The International Atomic Energy Agency will convene a conference on nuclear power experience at Vienna in September 1982, which could also provide a useful technical input to the United Nations Conference;

(c) The International Atomic Energy Agency is prepared, in response to paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 35/112 of 5 December 1980, to fulfil its appropriate role within the scope of its responsibilities at all stages of preparation of the United Nations Conference, and during the Conference itself, by contributing to the discussion of relevant issues, by providing technical data and documentation as needed, particularly in relation to the progress of the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply, and by participating in the secretariat of the Conference;

(d) There is continuing progress in the studies by the International Atomic Energy Agency aimed at establishing a system of international storage of plutonium and the international management of spent fuel;

9. *Notes* that the matter referred to in paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 35/17 of 6 November 1980 was considered by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency at its twenty-fifth regular session and expresses the hope that it will be brought to an early conclusion;

10. *Pays tribute* to Dr. Sigvard Eklund for his distinguished services in guiding and directing the successful evolution of the International Atomic Energy Agency during the past twenty years and for the outstanding contribution he has made to the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the cause of peace;

11. *Extends its congratulations and good wishes* to Dr. Hans Blix who has been appointed to succeed Dr. Sigvard Eklund;

12. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency the records of the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly relating to the Agency's activities.

On 9 December, the revised draft resolution on the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy was voted upon. The revisions consisted of the addition of a number of considerations in the preamble, the principles by which the Conference would be guided (in a new operative paragraph 3), and a number of other refinements. The draft, as revised, was adopted without a vote as resolution 36/78.

In connection with the adoption of the resolution, statements were made by the United Kingdom on behalf of the ten member States of the European Community, the United States, Canada and Finland. The speakers generally held that the resolution as adopted by consensus was a significant improvement on the original version, particularly with regard to its reference to the role of the Committee on Assurances of Supply (paragraph 11 below). The United Kingdom, on behalf of the Ten, stressed that they attached great importance to the preparatory process for the 1983 United Nations Conference: it was now for the Preparatory Committee to take all decisions with regard to that process, working within the consensus principle. The United States made it clear that its willingness to join in the consensus on the resolution should not be taken as signifying that it subscribed in all respects to the principles reaffirmed or recalled therein from prior consensus resolutions on the subject. It hoped that the further deliberations of the Preparatory Committee would facilitate balanced, constructive and mutually satisfactory results. Canada saw the Conference as an act of consolidation rather than as a point of departure for the unknown. As a reliable supplier of nuclear material and exporter of a proved and original reactor technology, Canada was vitally interested in both the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and of an effective international non-proliferation régime. Finland reiterated that international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime were interlinked and was pleased that IAEA, the main international body responsible for both promotion and regulation, would have a major role in the 1983 Conference.

Resolution 36/78 reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 33/4 of 2 November 1978, 34/63 of 29 November 1979 and 35/112 of 5 December 1980, in which it decided to convene in 1983 the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,

Reaffirming the principles and provisions of its resolution 32/50 of 8 December 1977 on the peaceful use of nuclear energy for economic and social development,

Stressing, in particular, the relevance of the principles set forth in paragraph 1 of resolution 32/50 for the preparation of the Conference and for the Conference itself,

Recalling also the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Recalling further the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency set out in General Assembly resolution 34/63,

Recognizing the increasing significance of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development, in particular its important role in accelerating the development of the developing countries,

Reaffirming the responsibility of States that are advanced in the nuclear field to promote the legitimate nuclear energy needs of the developing countries by participating in the fullest possible transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis in order to prevent effectively the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Expressing its conviction that the Conference, through the promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, should contribute greatly to meeting the increasing energy and other requirements of many countries, particularly developing ones,

Further expressing its conviction that progress in the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply will greatly contribute to the success of the Conference,

Stressing the need for timely and adequate preparations for the Conference,

Having considered the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference,

1. *Takes note with appreciation* of the report of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy;

2. *Endorses* the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee contained in the annex to its report;

3. *Decides* that the Conference shall be held at Geneva from 29 August to 9 September 1983;

4. *Considers* that the outcome of the Conference should be embodied in appropriate documents, in a suitable format, pertaining, *inter alia*, to ways and means of promoting international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

5. *Recognizes* that the Preparatory Committee, in order to advance its work, including as appropriate the preparation of the documents referred to in paragraph 4 above for submission to and approval by the Conference, may need to extend the duration of its second session, to be held at Vienna in 1982, and also to hold a further session of appropriate duration in 1982;

6. *Reaffirms* its decision, as contained in paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 35/112, to take account of the results of the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply;

7. *Requests* the President of the General Assembly to finalize the appointment of the members of the Preparatory Committee, in accordance with the principle of equitable geographical representation, not later than 30 April 1982;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements for the establishment, at the appropriate time, of a small secretariat for the Conference, to be headed by a Secretary-General of the Conference;

9. *Urges* all States to contribute to the successful preparation of the Conference by, *inter alia*, making available, in conformity with international obligations, information on their scientific and technological achievements and practical experiences in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

10. *Calls upon* all States which have not yet done so to communicate to the Secretary-General, not later than 30 April 1982, their views on the matters relevant to the preparation and organization of the Conference;

11. *Invites* the International Atomic Energy Agency to fulfil its appropriate role within the scope of its responsibilities at all stages of preparation of the Conference, and during the Conference itself, by contributing to the discussion of relevant issues, by providing technical data and documentation as needed, particularly in relation to the progress of the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply, and by participating in the secretariat of the Conference;

12. *Further invites* specialized agencies and other relevant organizations in the United Nations system to contribute effectively to the preparations for the Conference by, *inter alia*, making available studies, reports and other appropriate documents concerning the applications of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as well as the results and future prospects of such applications;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the Preparatory Committee all the communications received from Member States and to assist the Committee by providing it with all necessary facilities for its work;

14. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session an item entitled "Preparation of the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy: report of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy"

Conclusion

In 1981, the search for solutions to the political and technological problems related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy continued to be actively pursued, both within and outside the framework of the United Nations.

Following the decision of the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session to convene in 1983 the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, the Preparatory Committee for the Conference was established and preparatory work was started in earnest. The Committee's report to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session provided a valuable opportunity for broadening the understanding between recipient and supplier countries on the problems ahead. On the whole, the debate also contributed to clarification of the positions of the parties on basic questions, particularly that of how to further international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without increasing the dangers of nuclear proliferation.

It may be expected that efforts will be intensified in 1982 to reach harmonization of views on ways of restoring confidence at the international level in the security of supplies of nuclear materials, equipment, services and technology for the promotion of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes within the framework of an effective non-proliferation régime.

CHAPTER XI

IAEA safeguards and related activities

Introduction

THIS CHAPTER HAS BEEN PROVIDED by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It deals primarily with safeguards and other activities of the Agency during 1981 and describes the situation at the end of the year. IAEA safeguards against the diversion of nuclear materials and other equipment or information for military and other prohibited activities, however, have been evolving almost since the establishment of the Agency in 1956, and accordingly the methodology employed is described briefly in earlier editions of *The Yearbook*.¹

The status of safeguards, 1981

Safeguards under the non-proliferation Treaty

As of 31 December 1981, non-proliferation Treaty safeguards agreements had entered into force for 70 of the 111 non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty at that time. The non-nuclear-weapon States having safeguards agreements in force under the Treaty are shown in annex I to this chapter.² For 41 non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty the relevant safeguards agreements had not, as of the end of the year, entered into force; however, 38 of those States had no significant nuclear activities. For the remaining three, the procedures required for bringing the specific agreements with the Agency into force had not been entirely completed as of the end of the year. In two of these three cases, all nuclear activities of which the Agency was aware in the States concerned were covered by safeguards under previous

¹ See, for instance, *The Yearbook*, vol. 4: 1979, pp. 208-210, or *ibid.*, vol. 5: 1980, pp. 220-222; *ibid.*, vol. 2: 1977, pp. 183-188, also refers to the evolution of safeguards, particularly under the non-proliferation Treaty.

² A reference to a party in this chapter, including its foot-notes and annexes, does not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the secretariat of IAEA or of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country or of its authorities or of its designation or concerning the limitation of its frontiers.

agreements.³ Safeguards agreements had been negotiated, pursuant to offers made by the United Kingdom and the United States, for the Agency to apply safeguards to all nuclear installations in those countries except those related to national security. A similar agreement had been negotiated with France, pursuant to which selected facilities of the nuclear fuel cycle would be submitted to safeguards. All three agreements had entered into force.

Agreements providing for safeguards other than those in connection with the non-proliferation Treaty

By the end of 1981 the Agency was applying safeguards in 10 non-nuclear-weapon States which were not parties to the non-proliferation Treaty but which had substantial nuclear activities, namely Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa and Spain. In 6 of the 10 countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Spain), all substantial nuclear activities of which the Agency was aware were covered by a mosaic of individual safeguards agreements. For a completed list of the status of the agreements concerned as of 31 December 1981, see annex II to this chapter.

Safeguards agreements concluded under the Treaty of Tlatelolco

Article 13 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco requires States parties to that Treaty to enter into full-scope safeguards agreements with the Agency. The terms of the safeguards agreements under the Treaty of Tlatelolco are practically identical to those of non-proliferation Treaty safeguards agreements, with some variations to take account of the different terms of the two Treaties. States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco are under an obligation to submit all their nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards. The provisions contained in INFCIRC/153 were considered suitable for use in that context and the relevant safeguards agreements have therefore been concluded on that basis. Three States, Colombia, Mexico and Panama, have negotiated safeguards agreements with the Agency pursuant to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Mexico's agreement had entered into force but was suspended upon the subsequent conclusion of an agreement in connection with both the non-proliferation Treaty and the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The agreements with Colombia, signed 27 July 1979, and with Panama, signed 15 February 1977, had not yet entered into force at the end of 1981.

On 23 November 1981 the United States Government ratified Additional Protocol I of the Tlatelolco Treaty. Its ratification entailed the obligation to

³ Egypt had a small unsafeguarded research reactor.

keep Guantánamo, the Panama Canal Zone, Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands free of nuclear weapons.

Additional Protocol II had been ratified by all five nuclear-weapon States, the last ratification being that of the Soviet Union on 8 January 1979.

Related activities

International plutonium storage

The concept of international plutonium storage was incorporated into the statute of the Agency in 1957 under article XII.A.5. Its aim is the international physical control of plutonium at the most sensitive fuel cycle stage of all — the storage and handling of plutonium in separated form after reprocessing and before use. International plutonium storage would reinforce and complement safeguards on reactors, reprocessing plants and fuel fabrication. The placing of separated plutonium in internationally controlled stores would alleviate the fears of those who claim that safeguards alone cannot offer sufficient reassurance that plutonium stored in significant quantities, for long periods and in readily weapons-usable form, is not subject to clandestine diversion.

Plutonium has been separated for many years in the civilian fuel cycle and significant stocks of it already exist. Despite progress towards fast reactor programmes, for at least the next 20 or 30 years the supply of plutonium is not likely to be matched by immediate demand and it will be stockpiled, under either national or international auspices. Information supplied by States (excluding those with centrally planned economies) indicate that by the year 2000 over 400 metric tons of plutonium will have been separated. How much of this material will be in stock rather than in use is highly speculative, but predictions suggest that at least 25 per cent may be in stock.

In December 1978 an expert group was established on international plutonium storage, consisting of experts from 25 States members of the Agency. It was decided at the beginning that for any scheme to be generally acceptable it should be non-discriminatory and provide a realistic balance between non-proliferation objectives and non-interference with national energy programmes.

The Expert Group, in which 34 member States of the Agency participated in 1981, has developed procedures for the registration, deposit, storage and return of separated plutonium, and for the verification of use of returned plutonium. It has also discussed the designation and status of stores and the preparation of relevant host State agreements. The measures to be applied should, to the maximum extent possible, be based on existing safeguards reporting and inspection procedures. The deliberations of the Expert Group and its sub-groups so far suggest that it should be possible to achieve this objective. The Group is expected to report early in 1983.

Spent-fuel management

The subject of international co-operation in spent-fuel management has also gained importance during recent years. Spent-fuel storage will be needed, regardless of how a country chooses to structure the back end of its nuclear fuel cycle. For the foreseeable future a shortage of both reprocessing capacity and spent-fuel disposal capability will dictate that large quantities of spent fuel be placed in storage. In the near term, the problem could be handled by expansion of capacity at existing facilities and by the addition of further national storage facilities. But for the longer term (it is estimated that the amount of unprocessed spent-fuel storage will be of the order of 200,000 tons by the year 2000), multinational co-operation in spent-fuel management might offer advantages over purely national solutions, particularly in the case of countries that may have problems in the economic and technical management of spent fuel.

IAEA established an expert group to examine the technical/economic aspects as well as the institutional issues involved in the management of spent fuel. The Expert Group's study has concentrated on an examination of ways to provide a necessary fuel cycle service through international or multinational co-operative efforts. Although the emphasis of the study has not been on non-proliferation matters, the results of the study may have important implications for non-proliferation. It is expected that a final report of the Group can be completed by early 1982.

Physical protection of nuclear material

For some time there has been growing recognition of the need for an appropriate multilateral international convention on physical protection. While physical protection of nuclear material is not part of the IAEA safeguards system, some physical protection and safeguards measures may overlap — for example, containment and surveillance. In 1977, the Agency published recommendations prepared by experts from member States on the physical protection of nuclear material. Since that time, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which, among other things, will establish levels of physical protection to apply to nuclear material in international transport, has been negotiated. Parties to the Convention will co-operate in preventive measures and information exchange with regard to such acts as theft, sabotage and extortion involving nuclear material.

The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was opened for signature on 3 March 1980, and has since been signed by 33 countries plus EURATOM. As of 31 December 1981 the Convention had been ratified by three States; 21 ratifications are needed to bring it into force.

Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear research installations

In a statement delivered to the Board of Governors on 9 June 1981, the

Director General of IAEA expressed his concern at the reported Israeli air force attack on the Iraqi Nuclear Research Centre, near Baghdad, on Sunday 7 June 1981. The Agency had previously inspected the Iraqi reactors and had not found evidence of any activity not in accordance with the non-proliferation Treaty.

On 12 June 1981, the Board of Governors passed resolution No. 2040 strongly condemning Israel. Following a statement given by the Director-General on 19 June 1981, the United Nations Security Council adopted its resolution 487 (1981) in which it called upon Israel to place its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards and considered that Iraq was entitled to appropriate redress for the destruction it had suffered.⁴

The General Conference of IAEA adopted resolution 381 in which it requested the immediate suspension of all assistance to Israel under the Agency's technical assistance programme. By the resolution it also decided to consider, at its twenty-sixth regular session, the suspension of Israel from the exercise of the privileges and rights of membership if by that time it had not put its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards. Furthermore, it called upon the member States of the Agency to end all transfer of fissionable material and technology to Israel which could be used for nuclear arms.⁵

At a subsequent inspection, made from 15 to 17 November 1981, no non-compliance with the safeguards agreement concluded between Iraq and IAEA was revealed.

Outlook

The non-proliferation Treaty remains the cornerstone of all non-proliferation efforts. At the same time, as evidenced in chapter X above, all States should have access to and be free to acquire technology, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy — that is, there must be adequate assurances of supply of nuclear materials for nations which agree to submit their nuclear activities to full international control.

The vast majority of nuclear facilities in the non-nuclear-weapon States are already under non-proliferation Treaty safeguards, and most others are under non-Treaty safeguards. Moreover, almost all the more complex and sophisticated facilities in the countries concerned are safeguarded. Accordingly, universalization of the non-proliferation Treaty régime would add little to the technical safeguards responsibilities of the Agency; in most cases it would represent a transition from non-Treaty to Treaty safeguards.

⁴ These actions (including the text of the Director-General's statement) are described in GC(XXV)/INF/196/Rev.1.

⁵ For full text, see GC(XXV)/RES/381.

ANNEX I

Non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty having safeguards agreements in force under the Treaty

The following 70 non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have concluded safeguards agreements — now in force — pursuant to the Treaty.^a

Afghanistan	Iceland	Nicaragua
Australia	Indonesia	Norway
Austria	Iran	Paraguay
Belgium	Iraq	Peru
Bulgaria	Ireland	Philippines
Canada	Italy	Poland
Costa Rica	Jamaica	Portugal
Cyprus	Japan	Republic of Korea
Czechoslovakia	Jordan	Romania
Denmark	Lebanon	Samoa
Dominican Republic	Lesotho	Senegal
Ecuador	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Singapore
El Salvador	Lichtenstein	Sudan
Ethiopia	Luxembourg	Suriname
Fiji	Madagascar	Swaziland
Finland	Malaysia	Sweden
Gambia	Maldives	Switzerland
German Democratic Republic	Mauritius	Thailand
Germany, Federal Republic of	Mexico	Turkey
Ghana	Mongolia	Uruguay
Greece	Morocco	Yugoslavia
Holy See	Nepal	Zaire
Honduras	Netherlands	
Hungary	New Zealand	

^a In 34 cases, the application of safeguards has been held in abeyance because the State concerned does not yet have any significant nuclear activities. Full application will begin as soon as the State concerned acquires nuclear material or plant requiring the application of safeguards.

[Annex II overleaf]

ANNEX II

Agreements providing for safeguards, other than those in connection with the non-proliferation Treaty, approved by the Board as of 31 December 1981

(While the Agency is a party to each of the following agreements the list only mentions the State(s) party to them.)

Party(ies) ^a	Subject	Entry into force	IAEA document No. INFCIRC
(a) Project agreements			
Argentina	Siemens SUR-100	13 March 1970	143
	RAEP Reactor	2 December 1964	62
Chile	Herald Reactor	19 December 1969	137
Finland ^b	FiR-I Reactor	30 December 1960	24
	FINN sub-critical assembly	30 July 1963	53
Greece ^b	GRR-I Reactor	1 March 1972	163
Indonesia ^b	Additional core load for TRIGA Reactor	19 December 1969	136
Iran ^b	UTRR Reactor	10 May 1967	97
Japan ^b	JRR-3	24 March 1959	3
Malaysia ^c /US	TRIGA Mark II Reactor	22 September 1980	287
Mexico ^b	TRIGA-III Reactor	18 December 1963	52
	Siemens SUR-100	21 December 1971	162
	Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Plant	12 February 1974	203
Pakistan	PRR Reactor	5 March 1962	34
	Booster rods for KANUPP	17 June 1968	116
Peru ^c	Research Reactor and fuel therefor	9 May 1978	266
Philippines ^b	PPR-I Reactor	28 September 1966	88
Romania ^b	TRIGA Reactor	30 March 1973	206
Spain	Coral I Reactor	23 June 1967	99
Turkey	Sub-critical assembly	17 May 1974	212
Uruguay ^b	URR-Reacto	24 September 1965	67
Venezuela	RV-I Reactor	7 November 1975	238
Viet Nam	Research Reactor and fuel thereto	12 June 1981	
Yugoslavia ^b	TRIGA-II	4 October 1961	32
	KRSKO Nuclear Power Plant	14 June 1974	213
Zaire ^b	Trico Reactor	27 June 1962	37
(b) Unilateral submissions^d			
Argentina	Atucha Power Reactor Facility	3 October 1972	168
	Nuclear material	23 October 1973	202
	Embalse Power Reactor Facility	6 December 1974	224
	Equipment	22 July 1977	250
	Nuclear material, material, equipment and facilities	22 July 1977	251

<i>Party(ies)^a</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Entry into force</i>	<i>IAEA document No. INFCIRC</i>
Argentina (<i>cont'd</i>)	Atucha Nuclear Power Reactor II	15 July 1981	
	Heavy Water Plant	14 October 1981	
	Heavy Water	14 October 1981	
Chile.....	Nuclear material	31 December 1974	256
China, Republic of	Taiwan Research Reactor Facility	13 October 1969	133
Cuba.....	Nuclear Research Reactor and fuel thereto	25 September 1980	
	Nuclear Power Plant and nuclear material	5 May 1980	281
Democratic People's Republic of Korea.....	Research reactor and nuclear material for this reactor	20 July 1977	252
India.....	Nuclear material, material and facilities	17 November 1977	260
Pakistan.....	Nuclear material	2 March 1977	248
Spain.....	Nuclear material	19 November 1974	218
	Nuclear material	18 June 1975	221
	Nuclear facilities	11 May 1981	
United Kingdom ..	Nuclear material	14 December 1972	175
<i>(c) Treaty of Tlatelolco</i>			
Colombia.....	All nuclear material		
Mexico ^b	All nuclear material, equipment and facilities	6 September 1968	118
Panama.....	All nuclear material		
<i>(d) Agreements concluded with nuclear-weapon States on the basis of voluntary offers</i>			
France.....	Nuclear material in facilities submitted to safeguards	12 September 1981	
United Kingdom ..	Nuclear material in facilities designated by the Agency	14 August 1978	263
United States.....	Nuclear material in facilities designated by the Agency	9 December 1980	
<i>(e) Other agreements^d</i>			
Argentina/United States of America.....		25 July 1969	130
Australia ^b /United States of America.....		26 September 1966	91
Austria ^b /United States of America.....		24 January 1970	152
Brazil/Germany, Federal Republic of ^b		26 February 1976	237
Brazil/United States of America.....		31 October 1968	110
China, Republic of/United States of America.....		6 December 1971	158
Colombia/United States of America.....		9 December 1979	144
India/Canada ^b		30 September 1971	211

[Continued overleaf]

<i>Party(ies)^a</i>	<i>Entry into force</i>	<i>IAEA document No. INFCIRC</i>
India/United States of America	27 January 1971	154
Indonesia/United States of America.....	6 December 1967	109
Iran ^b /United States of America.....	20 August 1969	127
Israel/United States of America	4 April 1975	249
Japan ^b /Canada ^b	20 June 1966	85
Japan ^b /France	22 September 1972	171
Japan/United States of America	10 July 1968	119
Japan ^b /United Kingdom.....	15 October 1968	125
Japan ^b /Australia ^b	28 July 1972	170
Korea, Republic of/United States of America	5 January 1968	111
Korea, Republic of ^b /France	22 September 1975	233
Pakistan/Canada	17 October 1969	135
Pakistan/France.....	18 March 1976	239
Philippines ^b /United States of America.....	19 July 1968	120
Portugal ^b /United States of America ^b	19 July 1969	131
South Africa/United States of America	28 June 1974	98
South Africa/France.....	5 January 1977	244
Spain/United States of America	28 June 1974	92
Spain/Canada ^b	10 February 1977	247
Sweden ^b /United States of America.....	1 March 1972	165
Switzerland ^b /United States of America ^b	28 February 1972	161
Turkey/United States of America	5 June 1969	123
Venezuela/United States of America	27 March 1968	122

^a See foot-note 2 of main text of this chapter.

^b Application of Agency safeguards under this agreement has been suspended in the State indicated, as the State has concluded an agreement in connection with the non-proliferation Treaty.

^c The requirement for the application of safeguards under this agreement was satisfied by the application of safeguards pursuant to the agreement concluded by the State in connection with the non-proliferation Treaty.

^d The designations of parties utilized in this section of the annex are the exclusive responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

PART THREE

**Prohibition or restriction of
use of other weapons**

Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons

Introduction

A UNITED NATIONS EXPERT GROUP observed in a 1969 report¹ that chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons stood in a class of their own as armaments which exercised their effects solely on living matter. The fact that some of them are potentially unconfined in their effects, both in space and time, and that their large-scale use could conceivably have deleterious and irreversible effects on the balance of nature, has added to the sense of insecurity and tension which the existence of these weapons engenders.

The general conclusion of the Experts' report can be summed up in a few of its lines, as follows:

... Were these weapons ever to be used on a large scale in war, no one could predict how enduring the effects would be and how they would affect the structure of society and the environment in which we live. This overriding danger would apply as much to the country which initiated the use of these weapons as to the one which had been attacked, regardless of what protective measures it might have taken in parallel with its development of an offensive capability. A particular danger also derives from the fact that any country could develop or acquire, in one way or another, a capability in this type of warfare, despite the fact that this could prove costly. The danger of the proliferation of this class of weapons applies as much to the developing as it does to developed countries.

The momentum of the arms race would clearly decrease if the production of these weapons were effectively and unconditionally banned. ...

The potential for developing an armoury of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons has grown considerably in recent years, not only in terms of the number of agents but in their levels of toxicity and the diversity of their effects. Chemical weapons are, generally speaking, chemical substances, whether gaseous, liquid or solid, which may be employed in warfare because of their toxic effects on man, animals and plants. Bacteriological (biological) agents of warfare are living organisms, whatever their nature, or infective material derived from them, which are intended to cause disease or death in man, animals or plants, and which depend for their effects on their ability to multiply in the person, animal or plant attacked.

¹ *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.24).

Chemical weapons were widely used in the First World War: according to official reports, gas casualties numbered about 1,300,000, of which 100,000 were fatal. That use of toxic gases generated so powerful a sense of outrage that countries were encouraged to adopt measures prohibiting both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. The result was the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925,² which prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, as well as bacteriological methods of warfare. The Protocol has established a general rule of international law, and in practice has generally been adhered to by States.

In recent years, negotiations have continued towards a convention which would add to the rules contained in the 1925 Protocol, which bans the use of chemical weapons, by a prohibition also of their development, production and stockpiling as well as a call for their destruction. Among the issues that long impeded progress on the question was whether chemical and biological weapons should be considered jointly. In 1971, agreement on separating the two issues was reached in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) and, as a result of negotiations in that body, on 16 December 1971, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2826 (XXVI) by which it commended the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, which was annexed to the resolution. The Convention was opened for signature on 10 April 1972 and entered into force on 26 March 1975.

Since 1971, the question of chemical weapons has been discussed as a separate issue. The discussions have involved a number of highly complex matters. Briefly, the principal ones have been the scope of a prohibition — i.e., whether or not its full implementation should be immediate or spread over some time and what activities and agents would be subject to the prohibition — and the question of verification. Also since 1971, the General Assembly has each year adopted a resolution³ by which it has expressed the need for negotiations to continue as a matter of high priority with a view to reaching agreement at an early date on effective measures on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction. And at its tenth special session in 1978, the Assembly, by its Final Document,⁴ considered the conclusion of such a convention as one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations.

On 3 July 1974,⁵ the Soviet Union and the United States announced to

² League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138.

³ Resolutions 2827 A (XXVI) of 16 December 1971; 2933 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972; 3077 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973; 3256 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974; 3465 (XXX) of 11 December 1975; 31/65 of 10 December 1976; 32/77 of 12 December 1977; 33/59 A of 14 December 1978; 34/72 of 11 December 1979; 35/144 B of 12 December 1980; and 36/96 A of 9 December 1981.

⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4* (A/S-10/4), sect. III, paras. 21 and 75.

⁵ *Ibid.*, *Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 27* (A/9627), annex II, document CCD/431.

the CCD that they had agreed in principle to consider a joint initiative with respect to the conclusion, as a first step, of an international convention dealing with the most dangerous lethal means of chemical warfare. From then through 1980, bilateral negotiations on the question were held between the two Powers in an effort to reach agreement on a text of such a convention. In 1979 and 1980 the two countries submitted substantial joint reports to the Committee on Disarmament on the progress achieved in their bilateral⁶ negotiations.

A significant development in 1980 was the decision of the Committee on Disarmament to establish the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons, with a mandate to define, through substantive examination, issues to be dealt with in the negotiations on a new chemical weapons convention. A new element was added to the discussions in the international forums that year when allegations, giving rise to controversy, were made on the basis of reports of use of such weapons in certain regions of the world. That led to an intense exchange in the First Committee during which eight Western States submitted a proposal for an impartial investigation into the reports, while a number of Eastern European and other countries pressed for extensive amendments which would have involved, among other things, the consent of the countries concerned in the carrying out of any investigation. Following the debate, the Assembly adopted resolution 35/144 C by which it decided to have an impartial investigation carried out by the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified medical and technical experts, to ascertain the facts about the reports, including on-site with consent of the countries concerned; and the Assembly called upon all States to co-operate in the investigation.

With regard to bacteriological (biological) weapons, the first Review Conference of the Parties to the 1972 Convention was held in March 1980 with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention were being realized.⁷ In the Final Declaration of the Conference⁸ the States parties reaffirmed their strong support of the Convention, their continued dedication to its principles and objectives and their commitment to implement effectively its provisions.

Over-all, the efforts of the international community in the various forums since the conclusion of the biological weapons Convention have been mainly directed towards negotiating a similar treaty for chemical weapons. Questions relating to chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons were not discussed in a substantive way in the Disarmament Commission in 1981.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1981

In accordance with its programme of work and in pursuance of General

⁶ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27* (A/34/27 and Corr.1), appendix III (CD/53 and Corr.1), vol. II, document CD/48, and *ibid.*, *Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 27* (A/35/27), appendix II (CD/139), vol. II, document CD/112.

⁷ For details, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, chap. XIV.

⁸ See BWC/CONF.1/10, sect. II.

Assembly resolution 35/144 B, the Committee on Disarmament continued negotiations towards a multilateral instrument on the total prohibition of chemical weapons. Most of the work in 1981 was conducted in closed meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons re-established by the Committee at the beginning of the year with the same mandate which it had had the previous year.

In the discussions that were held in plenary meetings there was general concurrence that a ban on chemical weapons should be comprehensive in scope, that existing stockpiles should be destroyed and that production and storage facilities should be dismantled. Once again many delegations stressed the need to provide, in an agreement, adequate measures of certainty that the parties were complying with its provisions.

Belgium and the Netherlands believed verification to be of primary importance as it would increase the credibility of the treaty and help build confidence. Australia stated that new technologies held out prospects for the monitoring of many aspects of a chemical plant with the minimum need for actual visits by outsiders. Canada, the Netherlands and the United States were among those that sought a combination of national and international verification measures to provide adequate assurance that States parties to the proposed treaty were fulfilling their obligations. According to the United States, what was needed was a detailed complex of different provisions carefully tailored to specific activities and obligations; one general formula would not suffice for everything.

The United Kingdom considered that verification measures would be necessary for each stage of implementation of all the provisions of the convention relating to the declaration and destruction of stockpiles and of production facilities, and thereafter for monitoring the compliance of States with the provisions banning development and production. The United Kingdom also considered it essential that the convention should have an effective complaints procedure. Japan was of the view that the verification measures should be primarily directed against activities that were military or oriented to chemical warfare, and that any intrusion into the normal operations of chemical industries should be limited to the minimum necessary. It shared the view of Brazil that the convention should be conceived according to the principle that civil industrial activities and the full use of technology for peaceful purposes should not only be allowed but actually encouraged; the production, development, stockpiling and transfer of chemical agents for warlike purposes would be the exception that must be prohibited, rather than the other way around. According to Japan, the activities of chemical industries for peaceful purposes should not be submitted to on-site inspection, except in cases where the industry was suspected of producing prohibited chemical agents and no convincing explanations to the contrary had been put forward.

France stated that the insistence on the need for all parties to accept, where necessary, inspections on their territory should not be interpreted as a sign of systematic distrust. On the contrary, the opening of frontiers to international inspection should be regarded by all as a pledge of the mutual

trust that should exist between the parties to a disarmament convention. The Federal Republic of Germany was convinced that only international verification measures could give States a credible assurance that a ban on chemical weapons was indeed being observed by all parties. To be effective, however, such measures must include mandatory on-site inspections which were indispensable if the international verification body was to satisfy itself as to the non-existence of activities contrary to a convention. Canada and China were among many additional States that believed on-site inspection was indispensable to a chemical weapons régime. Burma, Denmark, Switzerland and Venezuela were among those which wished to see a balanced combination of national and international control systems which would involve the minimum element of intrusion.

India stressed that large quantities of lethal chemicals were produced for legitimate and peaceful purposes. The search should therefore be for methods of verification which verified not the presence or absence of such chemicals, but rather their diversion for the purpose of developing and producing chemical weapons. India was not convinced that on-site inspection or other intrusive methods of verification would necessarily ensure compliance.

The German Democratic Republic stated that the whole complex of verification methods, ranging from national control to international inspection by challenge, would provide a high degree of assurance that any violation of the convention could be detected. It doubted that a militarily important violation could be concealed. Hungary stated that the verification system should not unnecessarily intrude into the peaceful activities of the chemical industry or cause damage to the security interests not related to chemical warfare. Such a system should be by a combination of national and international means and provide for the possibility of on-the-spot inspection whenever it was indispensable, but on a voluntary basis, which could be achieved through a consultative committee. The Soviet Union shared that view, stating that it was against giving absolute pre-eminence to verification and carrying it to absurd lengths. It favoured reasonable, balanced verification on the scale that was truly necessary — no more, no less.

A major area where there was divergence of views was on the question of restating in the proposed new convention the prohibition of use of chemical weapons since the Geneva Protocol already contained such a prohibition. Many delegations were of the view that the new treaty should limit itself to the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and the provisions for their destruction. Arguing against the inclusion of prohibition of use in a new treaty, France stated that the existing rules were a valuable achievement and should be left intact. The Federal Republic of Germany stated that a duplication of the 1925 prohibition might lead to doubts concerning the obligations of States which had adhered to the Geneva Protocol but not to the new convention. In any case, the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons was already universally accepted as international customary law. Belgium was also anxious not to tamper in any way with the existing rules. If it appeared possible or necessary for the new convention to venture into the area of the prohibition of use, it should in that case confine

itself to a simple reference to the 1925 Protocol and a renewed affirmation of its entire validity. Along the same lines, Poland stated that raising anew the question of the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons could start a dangerous practice of undermining, by way of a new regulation, existing international treaties, if they happened to become politically inconvenient. That view was supported, among others, by the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia and the Soviet Union.

Some members, on the other hand, insisted on having the prohibition of use restated in the future convention on the grounds that the 1925 Protocol contained neither a definition of the term "chemical weapons" nor verification clauses. Indonesia, for example, stated that since 1925 new scientific and technical developments had led to the improvement of chemical and bacteriological weapons, thereby creating new situations and problems. It believed that the 1925 instrument would only be strengthened if the future convention also contained provisions prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. China stated that the new convention, if it were to be truly comprehensive in nature, should prohibit the use of chemical weapons. In that connection, it shared the view that the Protocol did not fully respond to current realities in that it only provided for the prohibition of use of those weapons in wars and not in other types of armed conflicts. Pakistan also believed that a reaffirmation of the prohibition of use was necessary if the convention was to be truly comprehensive in nature. Australia stated that by incorporating the ban in the new convention the existing lack of a verification mechanism would be redressed. Far from creating ambiguities about the 1925 Protocol, it would ensure that no such ambiguity could arise. Argentina, Canada and Japan also saw no legal or other difficulties in including a ban on use in the new convention. Argentina added that it should not be very difficult to find a formula linking the two instruments without weakening either.

A relatively new concept was discussed for the first time in 1981. Sweden proposed the extension of the scope of a new treaty to cover areas of offensive "chemical warfare capability" such as planning, organization and training in the use of such weapons. Sweden saw an obvious advantage in such a measure in that it would close the loopholes and would increase confidence among the parties to the convention. Sweden conceded that as long as the stockpiles existed, parties to the convention could be expected to claim that they would need "chemical warfare capability" to retaliate against an attack with such weapons. But once all stockpiles were destroyed, there could be no justification for maintaining such a capability. It therefore proposed that the prohibition of such activities as planning, organization and training should become effective at a later stage, but not later than 10 years after the entry into force of the convention itself. A number of delegations expressed misgivings about the Swedish proposal. The United Kingdom, for example, doubted whether the measures would ever be acceptable to a number of States whose accession to the convention would be absolutely essential. The Soviet Union stated that the work on chemical weapons was complicated enough without the introduction of attempts to prohibit certain types of activity which could not be separated from general questions relating to defence, such as military planning and training. France, expressing its

reservations, stated that the concept of a chemical warfare capability was too difficult to define precisely, and was liable to too broad a range of interpretations to be included in a legal text. Switzerland also questioned the wisdom of seeking a prohibition on such activities.

In the course of discussions in the Committee, a number of delegations, including those of Hungary, Japan, the Netherlands and Romania, appealed to the Soviet Union and the United States to resume the bilateral negotiations on chemical weapons as early as possible.

In addition to a number of documents submitted in previous years, the Committee in 1981 had before it several new documents and working papers on the item on chemical weapons.⁹

As mentioned above, a large part of the work in 1981 on chemical weapons was conducted in the *Ad Hoc* Working Group, which was re-established on 12 February under the chairmanship of Mr. Curt Lidgard of Sweden. Many delegations, including those of Argentina, Brazil, China, Pakistan, Romania and Yugoslavia, expressed regret that the Group's mandate was not widened as compared to that given it in 1980 to enable it to initiate negotiations on the text of a convention on chemical weapons. Nevertheless, the progress achieved by the *Ad Hoc* Working Group in 1981 was substantial. For the first time wordings for future articles of the convention were formulated and discussed. Those texts were called "elements" rather than "articles" to accommodate delegations which had not received a mandate from their Governments for the actual negotiation of the text of a convention. The wordings chosen, however, were those generally found in legal instruments, although in order not to give the impression that treaty texts were being drafted, the customary term "a State party to this convention *shall* undertake..." was replaced by "a State party to this convention *should* undertake...", and certain other conditional formulations were used.

The *Ad Hoc* Working Group held 23 meetings between 18 February and 17 August as well as additional informal consultations. As a result of its work the Group submitted a report¹⁰ which was adopted by the Committee as a whole on 20 August. It was structured in four parts, entitled: "Introduction"; "Organization of work and documentation"; "Substantive considerations during the 1981 session", and "Recommendations and conclusions"

In the report, the Group stated that in carrying out its mandate it had taken into account, as well as resolution 35/144 B, the provisions of paragraph 75 of the Final Document of the 1978 special session of the General Assembly

⁹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 27* (A/36/27), para. 103. The documents and papers themselves are contained in *ibid.*, *Supplement No. 27* (A/36/27), appendix II (CD/228), documents CD/142 (Sweden), CD/164 (Finland), CD/167 (Canada), CD/168 and CD/169 (China), CD/173 (Canada), CD/178 (Finland), CD/124/Rev.1 (Indonesia), CD/195 (Yugoslavia), CD/196 (Finland), CD/197 (Romania), CD/199 (Czechoslovakia), CD/203 (Netherlands) and CD/212 (China). In addition to the foregoing, 19 working papers and 14 conference room papers were submitted in the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on chemical weapons whose work is discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, *Supplement No. 27* (A/36/27), para. 110; the report was originally distributed as document CD/220.

devoted to disarmament which stated, *inter alia*, that the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represented one of the most urgent measures of disarmament.

In the early part of its work, the Working Group carried out a detailed examination of the issues to be dealt with in the negotiations on a multilateral convention. It then considered the draft elements of a chemical weapons convention suggested by its Chairman. Subsequently, revised versions of those draft elements were prepared by the Chairman on the basis of statements and comments by delegations. While the report of the Group contained comments including dissenting views on the elements,¹¹ it was also pointed out that all the positions were not reflected in the report, as some delegations did not deem it advisable or timely to enter into discussions on them. Moreover, some delegations considered the "elements" merely as points for negotiation.

The report of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group contains the following elements for inclusion in a chemical weapons convention:

I.

General provision

Each State Party to this Convention should undertake, as set forth in the following Elements, never under any circumstances to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer chemical weapons and to destroy or otherwise dispose of existing stocks of chemical weapons and means of production of such weapons.

II.

General definition of chemical weapons

1. Chemical weapons, as referred to in Element I, would comprise:

(a) Super-toxic lethal, other lethal, and other harmful chemicals as well as precursors of such chemicals, intended for hostile or military purposes involving the utilization of the toxic properties of such chemicals as weapons, provided their types are compatible with and that their quantities are sufficient for such purposes;

(b) Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through toxic properties of chemicals released from them as well as equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of such munitions or devices.

2. Definitions of super-toxic lethal chemicals, other lethal chemicals, other harmful chemicals and precursors would be given in annex I.

ANNEX I

Definitions and criteria

1. Definitions, criteria and methods in this annex would be agreed upon for the purpose of this Convention.

2. A "super-toxic lethal chemical" is any toxic chemical, however produced, with a median lethal dose which is less than or equal to 0.5 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 2,000 mg-min/m³ (by inhalation), when measured by the methods set forth in paragraph 6 of this annex.

¹¹ *Ibid.*; the comments, because they are extensive and indicate only the various views expressed without attribution, are not included in this volume.

3. Any "other lethal chemical" is any toxic chemical, however produced, with a median lethal dose which is greater than 0.5 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 2,000 mg-min/m³ (by inhalation) and which is less than or equal to 10 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 20,000 mg-min/m³ (by inhalation) when measured by the methods set forth in paragraph 6 of this annex.

4. Any "other harmful chemical" is any toxic chemical, however produced, with a median lethal dose which is greater than 10 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 20,000 mg-min/m³ (by inhalation) when measured by the methods set forth in paragraph 6 of this annex.

5. "Precursors" are sets of chemicals which, when made to react chemically with each other, form among others also such chemicals as are mentioned in paragraphs 2 to 4 of this annex.

6. Methods for toxicity determinations and identification of chemicals.

[to be elaborated]

III.

Prohibition of transfer

Each State Party to this Convention should undertake:

- (a) Not to transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, any chemical weapons;
- (b) Not to transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, except to a State Party, any super-toxic lethal chemicals produced or otherwise acquired for permitted purposes, of types and in quantities which are suitable for chemical weapons purposes;
- (c) Not to assist, encourage or induce, directly or indirectly, anyone to engage in activities from which the State Party itself would be obliged to refrain under the Convention.

IV.

Declarations

1. Each State Party to this Convention should undertake to declare within 30 days after the Convention has entered into force or the State Party has adhered to it:

- (a) Its possession or non-possession of chemical weapons;
- (b) Its stocks of chemical weapons and means of production of such weapons;
- (c) Its plans for the destruction or, where appropriate according to Element V, diversion for permitted purposes of declared stocks of chemical weapons;
- (d) Its plans for the destruction, dismantling or, where appropriate according to Element V, conversion of declared means of production of chemical weapons.

2. Super-toxic lethal chemicals, acquired for non-hostile military purposes, should be declared. The location of facilities where super-toxic lethal chemicals are produced for such purposes should also be declared. Matters concerning the content and form would be set forth in annex II.

ANNEX II

Declarations of possession of stocks of chemical weapons and means of production of chemical weapons, plans for their destruction or diversion for permitted purposes and time frames as well as forms for making such declarations

1. The declarations stipulated in Element IV should contain information about:

- (a) Types and amounts of stocks of chemical weapons and of their location;
- (b) Location and capacity of means of production of chemical weapons, including specialized facility for permitted production of super-toxic lethal chemicals;
- (c) Plans for destruction or diversion of stocks of chemical weapons, including timing and specification of types and amounts and the location of plants for destruction and diversion;
- (d) Plans for the destruction, dismantling or conversion of means of production of chemical weapons, including their location and capacity.

2. Declarations as stipulated in Element IV should be forwarded to the Depositary, who would distribute them to the other States Parties to the Convention within one week after having received them.

3. Declarations should be sufficiently informative to allow independent verification of the information by national and international means of verification available to other States Parties to the Convention.

V.

Destruction, diversion, dismantling and conversion

1. Each State Party to this Convention should undertake to:

- (a) Destroy or divert for permitted purposes its stocks of chemical weapons;
- (b) Destroy or dismantle its means of production of chemical weapons.

2. Means of production of chemical weapons could be converted temporarily, before final destruction or dismantling, for the purpose of destroying stocks of such weapons. The destruction, diversion and dismantling stipulated in this Element should be completed within 10 years after the Convention has entered into force or a State Party, which has to fulfil these provisions, has adhered to it.

3. Matters concerning procedures, including notifications, in connexion with what is stipulated in this Element would be set forth in annex III.

ANNEX III

Destruction, dismantling or diversion for permitted purposes of declared stocks of chemical weapons and their means of production

1. Preparation for the destruction or diversion for permitted purposes of stocks of chemical weapons should start immediately after the entry into force of the Convention. So-called mothballing of means of production of chemical weapons should be undertaken immediately at the entry into force of the Convention and remain until their destruction, dismantling or diversion for permitted purposes would begin.

2. The provisions given in Element V should be performed in a manner allowing their verification through national and international means of verification.

3. The progress of destruction or diversion of stocks of chemical weapons and of destruction, dismantling or conversion of their means of production should be notified on a yearly basis to the Depositary until the State Party declares the final abolition of its stocks and means of production. The Depositary would transmit such notifications to the other States Parties to the Convention within one week after having received them.

VI.

Super-toxic lethal chemicals for non-hostile military purposes

Each State Party should undertake not to possess super-toxic lethal chemicals for non-hostile military purposes in an aggregate quantity, which at any time exceeds one thousand kilogrammes. A State Party producing super-toxic lethal chemicals for non-hostile military purposes shall carry out such production at a single specialized facility, the capacity of which shall not exceed . . .

VII.

Relationship with other treaties

Nothing in this Convention should be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, or under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature on 10 April 1972, or any other international treaty or any existing rules of international law governing armed conflicts.

VIII.

International co-operation

1. This Convention should be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international co-operation in the field of peaceful and protective chemical activities, including the international exchange of chemicals and equipment for the production, processing or use of chemical agents for peaceful and protective purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.

2. Each State Party to this Convention should undertake to facilitate, promote and participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of chemicals for peaceful and protective purposes consonant with the aims of this Convention.

3. Each State Party to this Convention should undertake to allocate a substantial part of possible savings in military expenditures as a result of disarmament measures agreed upon in this Convention to economic and social development, particularly of the developing countries.

IX.

General provision on verification

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Convention, the States Parties should agree that verification would consist of national as well as international measures which should be considered as complementary to each other, as set forth in the following.

2. Such verification would be carried out through:

(a) Monitoring of compliance with the obligations in Elements I to IV concerning prohibition of development, production, other acquisition, stockpiling, retention and transfer of chemical weapons;

(b) Monitoring of compliance with the obligations in Elements I and V concerning:

— destruction or diversion for permitted purposes of stocks of chemical weapons;

— destruction or dismantling of means of production of chemical weapons;

— temporary conversion of means of production of chemical weapons for the purpose of destroying stocks of such weapons;

(c) Monitoring of compliance with the obligations in Element VI concerning super-toxic lethal chemicals for non-hostile military purposes;

(d) Enquiry into facts, including where necessary on-site inspections, concerning alleged ambiguities in or violations of the compliance with the Convention.

3. National measures of verification would be carried out by a national verification system, organized, designated or employed by each State Party in accordance with its own legislation.

4. As regards international measures of verification a Consultative Committee of experts should be established in order to provide a permanent body for the monitoring of the implementation of and compliance with the provisions of this Convention on behalf of the international community by ensuring the availability of international data and expert advice to provide a basis for assessing such compliance.

X.

National legislation and verification measures

1. Each State Party to this Convention should undertake to take any measures it considers necessary in accordance with its constitutional processes to prohibit and prevent any activity in violation of the provisions of the Convention anywhere under its jurisdiction or control, including a national verification system according to Element IX.

2. Recommendations and guidelines concerning the functions and organization of the national verification system would be set out in annex IV.

ANNEX IV

Recommendations and guidelines concerning the functions and organization of the national verification system

[The contents of this annex remain to be elaborated.]

XI.

National technical means of verification

1. Each State Party to this Convention should undertake to use national means of verification, including national technical means, at its disposal for the purpose of monitoring compliance with the provisions of this Convention only in as far as it is consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each State Party to this Convention should undertake not to impede, including through the use of deliberate concealment measures, the national technical means of verification of other States Parties operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Element.

XII.

Consultation and co-operation

1. The States Parties to this Convention should undertake to consult one another and to co-operate, especially through the Consultative Committee, referred to in Element IX, in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objectives of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention.

2. Any State Party to this Convention which has reason to believe that any other State Party is acting in breach of its obligation under this Convention should have the right to request information either bilaterally or through the Consultative Committee in order to clarify the situation. Such a request should be accompanied by appropriate explanations of the reasons for concern.

3. Consultation and co-operation pursuant to this Element could also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. These international procedures could include the services of appropriate international organizations, in addition to those of the Consultative Committee.

XIII.

Consultative Committee

1. The Consultative Committee, referred to in Elements IX and XII, should be established at the entry into force of this Convention. Each State Party to this Convention could appoint one representative to the Committee. The representative could be assisted by one or more advisers. The Depositary or his personal representative should serve as President of the Committee and convene it at least once a year, or immediately upon receipt of a request from any State Party.

2. Each State Party to this Convention should undertake to co-operate fully with the Committee in carrying out its tasks. Each representative should have the right, through the Chairman, to request from States Parties, and from international organizations, such information and assistance as the representative considers desirable for the accomplishment of the Committee's work.

3. The Consultative Committee should:

(a) Monitor the destruction and diversion for permitted purposes of stocks of chemical weapons, as well as the destruction, dismantling and temporary conversion of means of production of chemical weapons as stipulated in Element V;

(b) Monitor permitted production of super-toxic lethal chemicals in accordance with Element VI;

(c) Make appropriate findings of facts and provide expert views relevant to problems raised pursuant to the provisions of the Convention by a State Party, in particular concerning alleged ambiguities in, or violations of the compliance with the Convention at the request of a State Party;

(d) Facilitate compliance with the Convention, e.g. by developing international standardization of methods and routines to be applied by national and international verification organs;

(e) Receive and distribute data relevant to the provisions of this Convention, which may be made available by national verification systems;

(f) Otherwise closely co-operate with national verification systems and provide them with necessary assistance.

4. The Committee should, after consultation with the State Party concerned, be competent to undertake on-site inspections:

(a) In order to confirm received information concerning planned, on-going or effected measures according to subparagraph 3 (a) of this Element;

(b) In order to carry out monitoring according to subparagraph 3 (b) of this Element.

5. Any State Party which has reason to believe that any other State Party is acting in breach of its obligations deriving from the provisions of this Convention would have the right to request an investigation by the Committee of the circumstances which have given rise to concern. Such a request could include a request for an on-site inspection to determine, in accordance with subparagraph 3 (c) of this Element, the facts of the situation and should be accompanied by an appropriate explanation of why an investigation is considered necessary. On-site inspection should take place only after consultation with the State Party concerned. If that State Party does not agree to on-site inspection, it should give appropriate explanations to the effect that an on-site inspection would at that time jeopardize its supreme national interests. The requesting Party could in this case pursue the complaint within the framework of the United Nations in accordance with Element XII, paragraph 3.

6. The work of the Committee should be organized in such a way as to permit it to perform its functions in an effective, fair and impartial manner. It could for specific tasks set up sub-committees and verification teams. The Committee should decide procedural questions relative to the organization of its work, where possible, by consensus, but otherwise by a majority of those present and voting. There should be no voting on matters of substance. If the Committee is unable to provide for a unanimous report of findings of fact or in giving expert views; it should present the different views of the experts involved.

7. The Committee should present an annual report of all its activities to the States Parties to the Convention. The Committee should further, whenever it has been requested by a State Party to carry out fact-finding or provide expert views concerning a specific question, transmit to the Depositary a summary of its findings or expert views incorporating all views and information presented to the Committee during its proceedings. The Depositary should distribute the summary to all States Parties.

8. The Committee should at all stages consider the possibility of a bilateral solution to any dispute and be prepared to assist therein. Nothing should impede the right of a State Party to request information from the State Party concerned as regards presumed treaty violations.

9. Details of the organization and procedures of the Committee, rights and duties of members, rights and duties of designated personnel for inspection, inspection procedures and rules for reports would be set out in annex V.

ANNEX V

Consultative Committee

[The contents of this annex remain to be elaborated.]

XIV.

Amendments

Any State Party could propose amendments to this Convention. Amendments should enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it.

XV.

Review conferences

1. Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by a majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary, a conference of States Parties to the Convention should be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Convention are being realized. Such review should take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention. Proposed amendments to the Convention could also be considered at the conference.

2. Further review conferences should be held at intervals of five years thereafter, and at other times if requested by a majority of the States Parties to this Convention.

XVI.

Duration and withdrawals

1. This Convention should be of unlimited duration.

2. Each State Party to this Convention should in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Convention, if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Convention have jeopardized its supreme interests. It should give notice of such withdrawal to the Depositary three months in advance. Such notice should include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

XVII.

Signature, ratification, accession

1. This Convention should be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Element could accede to it at any time.

2. This Convention should be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification or accession should be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

3. This Convention should enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by 20 Governments, in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Element.

4. For those States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Convention, it should enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary should promptly inform all signatory States and States Parties the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention and of any amendments thereto, as well as of the receipt of other notices.

6. This Convention should be registered by the Depositary in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations

7. Annexes I to V should be considered an integral part of this Convention.

XVIII.

Distribution of the Convention

This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, should be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who should send duly certified copies thereof to the Governments of States Members of the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

In the "Recommendations and conclusions" of its report, the Group stated that a convergence of views on many chemical weapons issues had

emerged through its work in 1980 and 1981, but some important divergencies of opinions still existed on certain elements. The Group included a recommendation, subsequently adopted by the Committee, that it be re-established at the beginning of the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament with an appropriately revised mandate so as to enable it to achieve agreement on a convention at the earliest date.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1981

In its consideration of the item on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons at its thirty-sixth session, the General Assembly had before it, among other things, the report of the Committee on Disarmament including the *Ad Hoc* Working Group's progress report;¹² the report of the Secretary-General¹³ containing that of the Group of Experts to Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons; and a number of communications, some 20 in all, from Governments concerning the allegations of the use of such weapons.¹⁴

Discussion on chemical weapons treaty negotiations

In the general debate in the plenary meetings of the General Assembly, many States — Afghanistan, Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Finland, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Morocco, Nepal, the Netherlands and Turkey — urged that negotiations be expedited towards the prohibition of chemical weapons, a sentiment that was shared in the First Committee by an additional number — Bangladesh, Bulgaria, China, Greece, Kenya, New Zealand, Pakistan, Spain, Sudan and Tunisia.¹⁵ The urgency of the matter was emphasized by Japan which stated that chemical weapons could, depending on the way in which they were used, become weapons of mass destruction second only to nuclear weapons.

Bulgaria, Hungary, Japan, the Netherlands and Poland urged the Soviet Union and the United States to exert their utmost efforts to reopen their suspended bilateral negotiations at an early date.

While the United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of the European Community, emphasized the good progress in the negotiations in 1981, Austria viewed the year as one of mixed results. On the one hand it regretted the interruption of the bilateral Soviet-United States negotiating process but on the other it noted positive developments in the Committee on Disarmament

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ A/36/613.

¹⁴ See document A/36/743, para. 4, for the listing as of the date of the document.

¹⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 33rd and 91st meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 53rd meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

where "elements" of a chemical weapons convention, constituting a suitable framework and valuable basis for actual negotiations, had been drafted.

Many delegations, including those of Austria, Belgium, Egypt, France, Japan, Romania, Sweden and Venezuela, supported the proposal, contained in the report of the Committee on Disarmament's *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons, to revise its mandate in order to permit negotiations on the actual text of a convention in 1982. Furthermore, Japan hoped that in 1982 the Group would concentrate its efforts on finding solutions to the question of the scope of the prohibition and the problem of verification and achieve greater progress in those crucial fields. On the question of verification, Japan noted that there was general agreement, both in the Committee on Disarmament and in bilateral Soviet-United States negotiations, that the system should be based on a combination of national and international means and that the international verification organ should take the form of a consultative committee. Japan, among a number of other delegations, saw the question of on-site inspections as one of the more difficult problems awaiting solution.

India stated that concrete provisions of verification must be commensurate with the scope of application of the treaty and not go too far beyond its horizons. It again emphasized that presence of lethal or toxic chemicals by themselves was not conclusive evidence of the production of chemical weapons and that the purpose of a ban was not to regulate the production of such chemicals, which might have perfectly legitimate peaceful uses, but rather to prevent their diversion for chemical weapons production. Poland believed that a broadly acceptable agreement must provide for a comprehensive and verifiable ban that neither overlapped with nor detracted from other multilateral arms limitation or disarmament agreements. In Australia's view, what was needed was established procedures for verifying the use of such weapons and for exposing their users to the international community.

China stated that, since the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons was at the heart of the question, the Committee on Disarmament should proceed speedily with the negotiations for the formulation of a convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons which included a ban on their use. Hungary, for its part, did not agree. In its view the insistence of some delegations on the inclusion of the prohibition of use was a major stumbling block to achieving more substantial progress. Hungary and several other delegations noted that the prohibition of use was already fully covered by the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

As in the Committee on Disarmament, Sweden again stressed that the effectiveness of a chemical weapons convention would be significantly improved if loopholes that would allow maintaining a "chemical warfare capability" were closed. Such an expansion of the scope of the convention would increase confidence in the convention and among its parties.

Austria expressed concern about reports of measures by some States to upgrade and increase their chemical warfare capabilities since such actions could undermine the negotiating process. It appealed to all nations to refrain from any activities that would be incompatible with the endeavours to reach an agreement in the negotiations.

Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and Viet Nam held that the reasons for the repeated delays in elaborating an agreement were linked intimately with the growing military chemical arsenals of the United States and other NATO countries and the launching of large-scale programmes for the production of chemical weapons, including binary gases. According to Czechoslovakia and the Ukrainian SSR, the obvious intention behind the dissemination of reports of alleged use of chemical weapons was to erect a new barrier to the conclusion of a treaty and to justify the United States' plans for manufacture and deployment of such weapons. The German Democratic Republic estimated that the United States was allocating \$600 million for the production of binary weapons over the next five years.

The United States responded to these charges by stating that it had voluntarily ceased production of chemical weapons in 1969 and had unilaterally renounced biological weapons, there being no such weapons in stock at the current time. On the other hand, the Soviet Union had actually increased its chemical weapons programme in an effort to create a massive imbalance against the United States. According to the United States, the armed forces of the Soviet Union and its allies were better equipped, better organized and better trained to conduct chemical warfare operations than any other military force in the world.

The question of biological weapons received little attention at the thirty-sixth session except for charges and countercharges. Cuba stated that it was convinced that such weapons had been used against it by the United States. Afghanistan stated that if the allegations of Cuba were confirmed it would mark the beginning of a new era in the war policy of the United States against small, progressive countries. That viewpoint was shared by Democratic Yemen, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Viet Nam. In reply, the United States stated that the allegations were outlandish, totally false, and without foundation. The United States had destroyed all its biological weapon stocks and ceased all production some five years before the entry into force of the biological weapons Convention, to which it was a party. Democratic Kampuchea, referring to one of the communications it had submitted to the Assembly, alleged that its enemy recently was using new procedures for poisoning by toxic chemicals and that, since October 1981, "the Vietnamese invaders" had resorted to a new type of bacteriological substance to use against the Kampuchean population.

Two draft resolutions pertaining to chemical weapons negotiations were submitted in the First Committee in 1981, both on 16 November. The first of these received sponsorship from 37 countries representing all political and regional groupings.¹⁶ The proposal was introduced on behalf of the sponsors on 19 November by Canada, which stated that the purpose was to embody a text which could be agreed to by consensus. Canada conceded that for many

¹⁶ Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Chile, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mali, Mongolia, Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Poland, Qatar, Spain, Ukrainian SSR and Viet Nam.

delegations the text might not go far enough, as some wished to see the Assembly give more precise direction to the Committee on Disarmament as to the nature of the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons while others wished to see the draft resolution strengthened on the question of resuming the bilateral discussions. However, the sponsors believed that those considerations had been suitably taken into account.

Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sweden and Yugoslavia, also on 19 November, proposed an amendment to operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution of Canada and others to make it read:

Urges the Committee on Disarmament to continue, as from the beginning of its session to be held in 1982, negotiations on such a multilateral convention as a matter of high priority, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives and in particular to re-establish its *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons with an appropriately revised mandate enabling the Committee to achieve agreement on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest date;

The paragraph in its original form had read:

Urges the Committee on Disarmament to continue, as from the beginning of its session to be held in 1982, negotiations on such a multilateral convention as a matter of high priority, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives.

In introducing the amendment on 20 November on behalf of the sponsors, Sweden acknowledged that it emphasized that the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons should be re-established with an appropriately revised mandate enabling the Committee on Disarmament to achieve agreement on a convention at the earliest date. Sweden recalled that the neutral and non-aligned countries in the Committee on Disarmament had for the past two years exerted all efforts to obtain a mandate for the Working Group that would enable it to carry out genuine negotiations. That those efforts had so far not succeeded was a matter of great disappointment for those countries.

Canada, Japan and Poland, while not disagreeing with the aim of the proposed amendment, expressed concern that its wording would hinder the attainment of a consensus on the draft resolution as a whole. Canada stated that it would vote against the amendment while Japan and Poland indicated that they would abstain.

On 24 November the First Committee took a separate vote on the proposed amendment and approved it by a recorded vote of 101 to 2 (Canada and United States), with 19 abstentions.

After the vote, Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union explained that they had voted for the amendment with reservations as they believed that it was inappropriate for the Assembly to give specific instructions to the Committee on Disarmament. Together with Finland, which had abstained, Belgium and the Federal Republic of Germany regretted that because of the amendment there was no consensus on the draft as a whole.

Thereafter the Committee approved the draft resolution, as amended, by a recorded vote of 127 to none, with 1 abstention.

After the vote, the United States, having abstained, expressed regret at the lack of consensus. It considered the substance of the amendment as inconsistent with the independent status of the Committee on Disarmament.

On 9 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution as recommended by the First Committee by a vote of 147 to none, with 1 abstention (United States), as resolution 36/96 A. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming its resolutions 2454 A (XXIII) of 20 December 1968, 2603 B (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, 2662 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, 2827 A (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, 2933 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972, 3077 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, 3256 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3465 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/65 of 10 December 1976, 32/77 of 12 December 1977, S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 33/59 A of 14 December 1978, 34/72 of 11 December 1979 and 35/144 B of 12 December 1980, relating to the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and to their destruction,

Reaffirming also the necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction,

Having considered the report of the Committee on Disarmament, which embodies, *inter alia*, the report of its *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons,

Taking note of the recommendation in the report of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons that the Committee on Disarmament at the beginning of its session to be held in 1982 should re-establish the *Ad Hoc* Working Group with an appropriately revised mandate, which would enable the Committee to build upon the areas of convergence and to resolve the differences of views which were identified by the Group during its sessions held in 1980 and 1981, so as to achieve agreement on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest date,

Considering it necessary that all efforts be exerted for the resumption and successful conclusion of the bilateral and multilateral negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction,

1. *Notes with satisfaction* the work of the Committee on Disarmament during its session held in 1981 regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons, in particular the progress in the work of its *Ad Hoc* Working Group on that question;

2. *Expresses its regret* that an agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been elaborated;

3. *Urges* the Committee on Disarmament to continue, as from the beginning of its session to be held in 1982, negotiations on such a multilateral convention as a matter of high priority, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, and in particular to re-establish its *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons with an appropriately revised mandate enabling the Committee to achieve agreement on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest date;

4. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to report on the results of its negotiations to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982, and at its thirty-seventh session.

The other draft resolution on the chemical weapons negotiations was sponsored by Afghanistan, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR and Viet Nam. In introducing the original draft on 19 November on behalf of the sponsors, the German Democratic Republic stated that it in no way

contradicted the proposal of Canada and others. Rather, both drafts contained statements and initiatives which made them complement each other. This draft urgently requested the resumption of the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States, which, in the past, had been fruitful. The two types of negotiations taking place at the same time might enhance the effectiveness of both. The draft also requested States to refrain from action which could impair negotiations; in this regard, the sponsors referred especially to such actions as production of new types of chemical weapons. The adoption of the two draft resolutions by the Assembly could illustrate an approach to the conclusion of an urgently required convention. On 20 November, the sponsors submitted a revised draft¹⁷ in which, *inter alia*, they added a new operative paragraph specifically urging the Committee on Disarmament to continue its work and re-establish its *Ad Hoc* Working Group (paragraph 3 below).

On 24 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution, in its revised form, by a recorded vote of 95 to 1, with 30 abstentions.

The United States explained its negative vote, stating that it had unilaterally ceased production of chemical weapons 12 years earlier and was not producing such weapons at the current time, although in view of the continuing Soviet chemical weapons programme it had no choice but to take steps soon to redress the situation. It added that the United States had only one chemical weapons production facility, which was inactive, while the USSR was maintaining and operating 14 such facilities, and had a much larger chemical warfare organization in its armed forces. Accordingly, the proposal was an attempt to inhibit countermeasures required by the Soviet programme. It not only was superfluous, in the United States view, but it was clearly one-sided.

The General Assembly adopted the draft resolution on 9 December, as resolution 36/96 B, by a recorded vote of 109 to 1 (United States), with 33 abstentions (mainly Western States). The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling that, in paragraph 75 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, it stated that the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represented one of the most urgent measures of disarmament,

Convinced of the need for the earliest conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, which would contribute to general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Taking into consideration the work done in this area in the Committee on Disarmament as well as in the bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which regrettably had been suspended and did not take place in 1981,

Deeming it desirable for States to refrain from taking any action that could delay or further complicate such negotiations.

Expressing profound concern over the production of new types of chemical weapons and other actions that would intensify the chemical arms race and compromise international efforts on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction,

¹⁷ See A/36/743, para. 8.

1. *Reaffirms* the necessity of the earliest elaboration and conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;

2. *Appeals* to all States to facilitate in every possible way the conclusion of such a convention;

3. *Urges* the Committee on Disarmament to continue, as from the beginning of its session to be held in 1982, negotiations on such a multilateral convention as a matter of high priority, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, and in particular to re-establish its *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons with an appropriately revised mandate enabling the Committee to achieve agreement on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest date;

4. *Calls upon* the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to resume at the earliest possible date bilateral negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction and to submit their joint initiative to the Committee on Disarmament;

5. *Calls upon* all States to refrain from any action which could impede negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically to refrain from production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons, as well as from stationing chemical weapons in those States where there are no such weapons at present.

Report of the Group of Experts

By its resolution 35/144 C of 12 December 1980, the General Assembly had decided to have the Secretary-General carry out an impartial investigation regarding the alleged use of chemical weapons in order to: (a) seek relevant information from all concerned Governments, international organizations and other sources necessary; (b) collect and examine evidence, including on-site investigations with the consent of the countries concerned, to the extent relevant to the purposes of the investigation.

Pursuant to the resolution, a group of qualified experts was appointed after consultation with Member States, and held three sessions: from 20 to 24 April, from 13 to 28 July and from 20 October to 19 November 1981. As noted above, the Assembly had before it the report of the Group of Experts to Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons.¹⁸

At an early stage, the Group decided that, to ascertain the facts and help reach scientific conclusions, a questionnaire, which it formulated, should be addressed to the Governments which had submitted substantive information in response to a note verbale of the Secretary-General requesting further details to clarify the reports mentioning alleged use of chemical agents. Accordingly, the questionnaire was transmitted to Canada and the United States; their replies were available for the Group's second session. At that session, the Group also examined new material on alleged instances of the use of chemical weapons. In addition, it discussed technical and medical aspects and methods, definitions and parameters concerning its investigation. The Group held its third session, during which it visited Thailand from 31 October to 10 November, in New York. During that session, the group examined some new submissions and adopted its report. The visit to Thailand was made by the Group, pursuant

¹⁸ A/36/613, annex.

to the acceptance of the Government of Thailand, to visit holding centres for refugees from Indo-China.

The report of the Group, containing eight main sections and five annexes, included background on the problem of the alleged use of chemical weapons and sources of information on the subject, general observations on such weapons and parameters of the investigation, and evaluation of written submissions, a section on mycotoxins, a section on on-site collection and examination of evidence, and, finally, conclusions. In the report the Group stated that, from the submissions it had received and on the basis of its assessment of the individual cases presented to it, it had found itself unable to reach a final conclusion as to whether or not chemical warfare agents had been used.

The Group noted that it had expressed the desire to carry out investigations on the territories where chemical attacks had allegedly occurred, and also where alleged victims and eyewitnesses of such attacks were being hosted, but that up to the time of the submission of the report it had only been able to visit some refugee camps in Thailand. During those visits, it made an effort to meet particular individuals who were mentioned in the United States submissions, but had been unable to locate them. The medical personnel interviewed in the refugee camps had stated that they did not come across cases which could be attributed to chemical warfare agents. Refugees interviewed by the Group, however, had related stories similar to those appearing in the submissions of Canada and the United States. All of them gave accounts of alleged chemical attacks that had occurred several months earlier, and consequently the Group was unable to detect signs and symptoms suggestive of exposure to chemical warfare agents. The only alleged victims of recent exposure (23 days prior to the interviews) to alleged chemical warfare agents claimed that they walked through an area contaminated by "yellow powder". No clear characteristic physical findings of exposure to chemical agents could be recorded, and routine blood biochemical, hematological and urine analyses obtained by the Group yielded no significant abnormalities. The Group was given some samples for analysis by qualified, impartial laboratories, but since it could not ascertain their actual source, it could not base its final conclusions on such analyses.

In the opinion of the Group, its report was inconclusive. It stated that any investigation designed to lead to definitive conclusions regarding the alleged use of chemical weapons and an assessment of the extent of the damage caused by such weapons would require timely access to the areas of alleged use. Such an exercise had so far not been possible.

The draft resolution relating to the report of the Group of Experts was submitted on 24 November and introduced by New Zealand the following day on behalf of Australia, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Turkey and its own delegation. New Zealand recalled that the delegations which had initiated the 1980 resolution had done so because they considered that the international community had an obligation to look into the reports of alleged use of chemical weapons and to try to ascertain the facts. Such action, they believed, was essential if the continued

authority of the 1925 Protocol was to be upheld. The sponsors welcomed the systematic way in which the Group of Experts had gone about its task, the objectivity of its inquiry and the integrity of its conclusions. The report was a landmark in the history of the United Nations, a precedent for further involvement of the Organization in inquiries of this sort, should any be necessary, and a pattern for the future. New Zealand noted that the report referred to certain aspects of the investigation which could not be completed in the time available including the fact, *inter alia*, that the results of laboratory analysis of samples were not available. It was accordingly clear that the Experts should be given the additional time needed to permit them to complete their investigations and to report the results of their work to the Secretary-General for submission to the Assembly at its next session; that was the purpose of the draft.

Canada, as a sponsor, subsequently added that because the Geneva Protocol of 1925 was of fundamental importance to individuals, as well as to States, it was essential to address in a sustained manner any allegations that its provisions were being breached. The United Nations, representing the international community, had therefore an obligation to conduct an impartial and thorough investigation into the allegations, and the Group's work, in various aspects, remained incomplete. China, Fiji, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Nigeria and Senegal were among others that believed that, because its work had not been completed, the Group's mandate should be extended.

Other States did not share that view. According to Czechoslovakia, the situation had reached a stage when it was necessary to close the chapter in the activities of the Assembly on the matter, and thereby release the resources needed for the solution of other, much more important and quite real problems. In its opinion, the investigation of the so-called reports of the alleged use of chemical weapons did not in the least help in the solution of the main issue, which was the conclusion of an international treaty on the complete prohibition of those weapons and destruction of their stockpiles. It added that the reports were a smoke-screen aimed at complicating international life and justifying a new round of the arms race. Czechoslovakia stated that the Group of Experts had not discovered a single piece of material or other evidence in support of the propagandistic assertions concerning the alleged use of chemical weapons, although surprisingly enough they continued to be disseminated not only by the mass media but even by official authorities of some countries.

Similar views were expressed by Afghanistan, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, the German Democratic Republic, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR, the USSR and Viet Nam, none of which saw need or justification for extending the mandate of the Expert Group. The Soviet Union addressed various aspects of the matter, stating, for instance, that it was obvious that there were quite serious divergencies between assertions made by the United States and the conclusions of the Group of Experts. It added that the report of the Group and many other documents, facts and actual events all led to the following conclusions:

first, none of the Governments was in possession of any data that could confirm the assertions made by the American side about the alleged use of chemical substances in Kampuchea, Laos and Afghanistan; secondly, there was no single, competent international organization in possession of such facts; and thirdly, the United States did not possess any data that would confirm its allegations. All the old and new arguments, when put to the test, had been shown to be fabrications and outright falsehoods.

Viet Nam stated that despite slanders of every kind, the alchemist procedures in the analysis of samples and the procedural pressures and manoeuvres during the vote on General Assembly resolution 35/144 C in 1980, the United States and its allies had been unable to compel the international community to accept as true what did not in fact exist. The reality was that at the current time there was no use of chemical weapons in Kampuchea, Laos or Afghanistan. Had such weapons been used, no one could have concealed the devastating consequences, which would last for generations, on human life and the environment — as was the case with the use of American chemical weapons in Viet Nam. There was no question, Viet Nam added, of fear or lack of fear, of guilt or innocence. Rather it was a matter of slanders, of unfounded accusations, of gratuitous assertions and of lies pure and simple that all self-respecting sovereign Governments must reject and condemn.

Counter-responding to the several statements made in that vein, New Zealand observed that some delegations had referred to the fact that the Group had been unable to reach any firm conclusions or that it had not reached the conclusions expected. New Zealand could not accept that attitude. It recalled that the sponsors of the previous year's resolution had made their approach absolutely clear: if there were serious allegations of the use of chemical weapons or the flouting of the Geneva Protocol, then the international community had an obligation to try to ascertain the facts, and any investigation to be carried out should be structured to ensure impartiality, not a particular result. Among other things, some had referred to uncertainties in the evidence, and others had suggested that if there had been any evidence it would have been obvious and could not have been overlooked. In that regard, New Zealand referred to the Group's report¹⁹ where the Group had concluded that the required timely access to areas of alleged use of chemical agents was not possible, and cited a Finnish scientific report²⁰ indicating that without on-site access possibilities for verification were very small, while early analysis of samples could lead to definite conclusions. New Zealand regretted that it had not been possible for the Group of Experts to conduct such timely on-site inspections. However, it did not wish to express any views as to whether or not chemical weapons had been used: that responsibility had been assigned to the Group, and by the draft resolution before the Committee, it was being asked to complete its task.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 98.

²⁰ The report, entitled *Trace Analysis of Chemical Warfare Agents*, was transmitted to the Committee on Disarmament on 16 July 1981; see foot-note 9, document CD/196.

On 4 December, the draft resolution was approved by the First Committee by a recorded vote of 74 to 18, with 30 abstentions.

Surrounding the voting, 13 countries further explained their positions. Seven which voted in favour — Bangladesh, China, Fiji, Ivory Coast, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal — stated variously that the Group of Experts should be allowed to continue its work with the hope of completing its mandate. Four States abstaining — Guinea, Mexico, Peru and Yugoslavia — had done so, as they had the previous year, because in general they regarded the draft as containing confrontational or inconsistent elements which they could not accept. Afghanistan and Mozambique, which voted against, reiterated that they regarded the proposal as insincere and saw no reason to renew the mandate of the Group of Experts.

The General Assembly adopted the draft resolution on 9 December, as resolution 36/96 C, by a recorded vote of 86 to 20 (Eastern European States and others), with 34 abstentions (mainly non-aligned States). After the vote, the United States stated that it considered the resolution to be one of the most important — perhaps the most important — adopted at the thirty-sixth session. It considered that by 1980 the reports being received from refugees and others were too compelling for the world to ignore; thus the Organization had accepted the responsibility to conduct an immediate impartial investigation of the use of chemical weapons, and that responsibility had again been accepted.

Resolution 36/96 C reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 35/144 C of 12 December 1980 in which, *inter alia*, it decided to carry out an impartial investigation to ascertain the facts pertaining to reports regarding the alleged use of chemical weapons and requested the Secretary-General to carry out such an investigation with the assistance of qualified medical and technical experts,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General, to which is annexed the report prepared by the Group of Experts to Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons,

Noting that, as indicated by the conclusions of its report, the Group of Experts has not yet completed the investigations called for under paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 35/144 C,

Noting also the views of the Group of Experts concerning the importance of prompt on-site investigations of allegations of the use of chemical weapons and the need to devise appropriate procedures for impartial collection and analysis of samples that may be obtained in the course of any such investigations,

Considering, accordingly, that the Group of Experts should continue its investigations,

1. *Takes note with appreciation* of the report of the Secretary-General;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General, with the assistance of the Group of Experts to Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons, to continue his investigations pursuant to General Assembly resolution 35/144 C and to report to the Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

Conclusion

In 1981, for the first time in many years, the resolution on the continuation of negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on a chemical weapons ban

(resolution 36/96 A) did not achieve consensus in the General Assembly. The United States abstained in view of the explicit request made by the Assembly to the Geneva Committee for a renewal of the mandate of the Working Group entrusted with those negotiations.

As Austria pointed out in the First Committee, the year brought mixed results. The bilateral negotiating process between the Soviet Union and the United States was interrupted, with both countries making acrimonious charges and countercharges, and the United States voted against a resolution, initiated by Eastern European States and others, calling, *inter alia*, for the resumption of the bilateral talks and for States to refrain from production of new types of chemical weapons, since it regarded the proposal as designed to preclude it from redressing an existing imbalance. On the other hand, positive results were achieved in the Committee on Disarmament where, for the first time, wordings of future "elements" of a convention were formulated and discussed. While many delegations were conscious of the importance of the extensive differences of views remaining, in particular with regard to the scope of the convention and its system of verification, the achievements of the Committee on Disarmament offered hope that a chemical weapons convention might indeed be concluded on a multilateral basis.

The investigation begun in 1981 by the Secretary-General, with the help of experts, to ascertain the facts pertaining to reports on alleged use of chemical weapons in certain parts of the world was inconclusive and the Assembly asked that the investigation continue in 1982. The United States, in particular, considered that decision to be very important. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and its allies believed that investigation of what they viewed as constructed allegations and unfounded rumours was intended to draw public attention from the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban and to justify the development by the United States of new types of such weapons. The interventions on this subject were, at times, quite as sharp as those of the major Powers in the discussions on the question of achieving a ban.

CHAPTER XIII

New weapons of mass destruction

Introduction

BEARING IN MIND THAT MILITARY RESEARCH may result in new weapons of mass destruction, the international community reacted as early as 1948 in the first resolution adopted by the Commission for Conventional Armaments. By that resolution the Commission, in defining the bounds of its jurisdiction, advised the Security Council that "weapons of mass destruction should be defined to include atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future with characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above"¹

In 1969, the General Assembly adopted two relevant resolutions, 2602 A and D (XXIV), by which it invited the CCD to consider certain implications of radiological warfare and military applications of laser technology. However, in 1970, the CCD discussed the subject only briefly and did not find those areas to be of immediate concern.²

The specific question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons was first included as an item on the agenda of the General Assembly in 1975 on the basis of an initiative of the Soviet Union.³ The Soviet proposal included a draft international agreement indicating that the definition of the new types or systems of weapons to be prohibited would be specified through negotiations. The General Assembly subsequently adopted resolution 3479 (XXX), by which it requested the CCD to proceed to work on such an agreement.

Since 1976, the USSR and other Eastern European States have held that it is essential to adopt a general prohibition of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction since it is more difficult to eliminate weapons once they are deployed than to ban their development at

¹ For details, see *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations Publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chap. 2, p. 28.

² See *The Yearbook*, vol. I: 1976, pp. 201-202; see also chapter XIV below.

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Annexes*, agenda items 31, 34-38, 120, 122 and 126, document A/10243.

earlier stages. According to their approach, new types of weapons of mass destruction would include any types of weapons based on qualitatively new principles of action, according to the method of use, the target to be attacked, or the nature of their impact. Most Western countries have taken a different approach, namely, that new scientific developments should be dealt with individually as they arise and appear to have a weapons potential. They also claim that some developments exemplified as potential new weapons of mass destruction fall within categories that already exist and should be covered in that context. The same States have sought further clarification in respect of the definition of the weapons to be prohibited.

The USSR submitted a revised draft agreement at the 1977 session of the CCD,⁴ which, in addition to providing for a general agreement on the prohibition of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, would also allow special agreements to be concluded on the prohibition of particular types of such weapons, and for a list of the types and systems of weapons to be prohibited to be annexed to the agreement; that list could be extended as new areas of development emerged.

The question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons was considered extensively at the tenth special session of the General Assembly in 1978, where more than 60 Member States expressed views on it.⁵ The USSR, other Eastern European States, and a number of non-aligned countries stressed the urgency of the conclusion of a general treaty. The General Assembly, in its Final Document, included a paragraph⁶ by which it called for the pursuit of efforts aimed at preventing the emergence of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and at their prohibition, at the same time allowing for specific agreements on such weapons which may be identified. It stated also that the question should be kept under continuing review.

In the discussions in the CCD at its 1978 session as well as in the Committee on Disarmament at its 1979 and 1980 sessions, the subject was given substantial consideration with members generally reiterating their established views. In response to the Western position that it was difficult to reach a comprehensive agreement because possible areas of development of new weapons of mass destruction could not be foreseen, the USSR in 1978 pointed out that an agreement in principle was needed, followed when necessary by additional specific agreements to ban particular types of weapons. The same year, the USSR proposed⁷ the setting up, under auspices of the CCD, of an *ad hoc* group of qualified experts to consider the question of possible areas of development and of new types and systems of weapons of

⁴ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/32/27)*, vol. II, document CCD/511/Rev.1; see also *The Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977, appendix X.

⁵ For details see *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, chap. XVII, pp. 330-333.

⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, para. 77.

⁷ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, vol. II, document CCD/564.

mass destruction. At the same session, the Eastern European States in the CCD advanced a new initiative concerning the conclusion of a convention on the specific prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon as a particularly inhumane weapon of mass destruction⁸ and Hungary submitted a separate working paper on infra-sound weapons.⁹ In 1979, the USSR submitted a working paper¹⁰ regarding certain possible new weapons of mass destruction and summarizing the negotiations on the question.

The Western States each year maintained their conviction that the most effective approach to the question of new weapons of mass destruction would be, first, to keep the question under review and, secondly, to negotiate individual agreements on potential new types of weapons if any based on new scientific principles were identified. The United States and other Western countries viewed the neutron weapon as a nuclear weapon and held that, as such, it had to be dealt with in the context of negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

In 1980, the USSR again proposed the establishment of an *ad hoc* group of experts which could prepare a draft comprehensive agreement and consider the question of concluding special agreements on individual types of weapons of mass destruction. Despite considerable discussion on the matter and the active interest of some members in the group of 21 in the Committee on Disarmament in a compromise to facilitate the setting-up of such a working group, no consensus was reached on the matter.

In the General Assembly, the two approaches were reflected at the thirty-third session in 1978 in its adoption of separate resolutions, 33/66 A and 33/66 B, sponsored, respectively, by Western States and Eastern European States.¹¹ The following year, the Assembly adopted only one resolution, 34/79, on the basis of an Eastern European proposal. By that resolution, the Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations on a draft comprehensive agreement and, where necessary, on specific types of the weapons in question.¹²

At the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, in 1980, 26 Eastern European and non-aligned States sponsored a draft resolution by which the Committee on Disarmament would again be requested to continue negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, with a view to preparing a draft comprehensive agreement and possible draft agreements on particular types of such weapons. The draft was subsequently adopted as resolution 35/149 with the Western States again abstaining,¹³ as they had in 1979. They continued to agree that the question should be kept under review

⁸ *Ibid.*, document CCD/559; for details, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, chap. X.

⁹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, vol. II, document CCD/575.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27 and Corr.I)*, appendix III (CD/53 and Corr.I), vol. II, document CD/35.

¹¹ For details, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, chap. XVII, pp. 338-340.

¹² *Ibid.*, vol. 4: 1979, chap. XVI, pp. 244-247.

¹³ *Ibid.*, vol. 5: 1980, chap. XV, pp. 284-286.

and, while recognizing the need to preclude the development of new weapons of mass destruction, held that a general agreement would be unverifiable and ineffective in distinguishing between peaceful and military research. As in 1979, the States holding that view did not submit an alternative proposal.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1981

During the general exchange of views in the Disarmament Commission in 1981¹⁴ the question of the prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction was raised by delegations of the Eastern European States.

Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR and Poland supported the general prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, with the Byelorussian SSR regarding the problem as acute. Parallel with a comprehensive agreement, the Byelorussian SSR specifically did not exclude the possibility of drafting agreements on separate types of such weapons. It regretted that, in spite of the inclusion of both possible approaches in the most recent draft resolution on the subject, the General Assembly had not been able to adopt it by consensus.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1981

The Committee on Disarmament, in accordance with its programme of work, considered the agenda item entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons" during various periods between 6 April and 21 August.¹⁵

The Eastern European States reiterated their established position that, while they favoured a comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of new types and systems of mass destruction, they were also ready to accept the conclusion of special agreements for the prohibition of individual types of such weapons.

The Soviet Union stated that rapid and profound changes were taking place in the development of military technology. Qualitatively new types of weapons of mass destruction were being developed, and they were of such a nature that control and agreed limitation over them would be extremely difficult, if not impossible. The German Democratic Republic, Mongolia and Romania drew attention to the contrast between the slow pace of disarmament negotiations and the rapid rate at which science was perfecting existing weapons and creating new ones. Mongolia stated that if a solid barrier to the appearance of new types of weapons of mass destruction was not created in

¹⁴ A/CN.10/PV.45-50 and A/CN.10/PV.41-54/Corrigendum.

¹⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 27* (A/36/27), paras. 111-112 and 118-120.

time, a serious situation might arise in which the arms race would reach a point of no return, and the measures achieved so far in the sphere of arms limitation, as well as current negotiations, would become meaningless.

In 1981, the Soviet Union and a number of socialist States in the Committee called, as in other recent years, for the establishment of an *ad hoc* group of experts to undertake the preparation of a draft comprehensive agreement and to consider the question of concluding special agreements on individual types of weapons of mass destruction. The Soviet Union stated that the question of the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction had specific aspects which required a high level of scientific-technological expertise beyond the competence of the Committee on Disarmament. Discussions on the question would therefore be much more effective if Committee members had at their disposal the views of a group of qualified experts from various countries. The German Democratic Republic regarded the Convention on prohibition or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons and its Protocols (see chapter XV) as a useful precedent for the work of such an *ad hoc* group since it offered a good example of a general treaty with more detailed agreements concluded separately. The German Democratic Republic saw great merit in setting up an *ad hoc* group of experts which, it held, could consider possible areas of development of new weapons while the Committee on Disarmament could concentrate on its main task of bringing about the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

Hungary recognized that there were differing approaches with regard to organizational aspects for dealing with the item as well as to the basic substantive approaches to the question. It therefore proposed that the Committee should hold informal meetings with the participation of experts during the second part of its 1981 session, since such an intermediate step could promote the consideration of the issue in accordance with the General Assembly's request contained in resolution 35/149, namely, in the light of existing priorities and with a view to preparing a draft comprehensive agreement. Furthermore, Hungary was of the view that the contributions of the experts at such informal meetings would promote the substantive consideration of the subject. The results of this procedure could provide the Committee with a scientifically substantiated basis for a fresh review of the whole issue, including the possibility of finding a mandate for the proposed *ad hoc* group which would be acceptable to all.

As it had done repeatedly in the past, Italy again expressed reservations, which were shared by a number of other delegations. In their view, the most effective approach to the problem was to negotiate separate agreements on specific types of such weapons as soon as they were identified. It pointed out that, for many years, discussions had been held in the United Nations in an unsuccessful attempt to arrive at an adequate definition of the terms associated with the problem. Italy and the others also feared that, given the limited time available, the adoption of the proposal would be at the expense of other topics of greater priority and urgency. Along similar lines, Spain emphasized that it was necessary to avoid drafting texts that were too general, as well as to delimit the sphere of their application. It regarded the 1980 Conference on

weapons deemed to have excessively injurious or indiscriminate effects (chapter XV) as providing a worthwhile example, if subjects could be divided up and limited protocols drafted, which might show a way to achieve partial progress.

India stressed that the pace of progress in weapons technology was constantly outstripping the slow and halting pace of disarmament negotiations. It recalled the historical experience of the last several decades when, as soon as a new military application of some scientific or technological breakthrough had been identified, efforts to apply control had been largely discouraged. It noted that new weapons systems had been used as bargaining counters in negotiations on arms control. India therefore regarded the Soviet proposal for the setting up of an *ad hoc* group of experts as a constructive one, although perhaps not the only way to deal with the problem. In its view, the Committee could hold periodic meetings at which scientists and technologists could acquaint it with new military applications of recent advances in science and technology. At the same time the Committee could consider setting up an *ad hoc* working group to negotiate effective international arrangements dealing with the problem. For its part, Nigeria was in favour of the emergence of an agreed text on even "non-existent" but not totally inconceivable weapons of mass destruction, if only to prevent activities in that regard and to save human and material resources from unproductive uses on arms. However, such a "negative" disarmament measure would have to be supplemented quickly by positive measures if the Committee on Disarmament were to justify its existence.

On 7 April Hungary submitted a working paper¹⁶ in which it formalized its proposal for the holding of informal meetings of the Committee on Disarmament with the participation of experts during the second part of the 1981 session. Hungary stated that the experts could address themselves to the major aspects of the subject, such as the definition of new types of weapons of mass destruction; trends in technological development, especially in the military field; and recommendations to the Committee on Disarmament with regard to working methods and negotiations, including the possibility of setting up an *ad hoc* group of experts. Hungary further suggested that the Committee, on the basis of the results of the proposed discussions, could consider making recommendations for the conduct of negotiations on agreements to prohibit the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and, in particular, on the mandate of an *ad hoc* group of governmental experts on the question. The Hungarian proposal received immediate support from a number of delegations.

On 30 June the Committee agreed by consensus to hold informal meetings as proposed, with the understanding, as pointed out by some members, that it was a normal practice for every delegation to have the right to utilize experts at any time. The German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union stated that every effort should be made to provide the meetings

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, paras. 112 and 118; the document itself is contained in *ibid.*, appendix II (CD/228), document CD/174.

with the necessary expertise which would contribute to their successful outcome. Romania observed that the advantages to be derived from such informal meetings should include the opportunity to analyze the difficulties that might arise with respect to basic research and that kind of research which could be used to produce new weapons. The Netherlands, welcoming the adoption of the Hungarian proposal as a positive step, recalled that in 1980 it had originally proposed holding informal meetings, with the assistance of qualified experts, on new weapons of mass destruction. Mexico indicated that it continued to favour the establishment of a new group of experts which would work independently, as the Group of Seismic Experts had been doing, and submit reports to the Committee on Disarmament (see chapter VII).

Pursuant to the Hungarian proposal as adopted, three informal meetings were held, and experts from various member States made statements concerning possible areas of new weapons development and gave an account of their potential in certain fields. No new weapons were reported to have thus far made their appearance, and the possibility of their development continued to be a matter of controversy.

The proposal to establish a group of governmental experts, on the grounds that that would be the best way to keep the question of new weapons of mass destruction under continuing review, failed to obtain consensus agreement. Another proposal put forward was for the establishment, by the General Assembly, of a group of experts to review the recent trends in scientific developments, to identify any possible new weapons of mass destruction and to recommend the most appropriate means to prevent their emergence. It was also proposed, as an alternative idea, that informal meetings with experts should be held annually under the relevant agenda item in the Committee on Disarmament.

As indicated in several statements towards the end of the session, including one by Mongolia on behalf of a group of socialist countries, and as reported by the Committee, it was generally agreed that the question of new weapons of mass destruction should be kept under continuing review.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1981

Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 35/149 of 12 December 1980, the item entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Committee on Disarmament" was included in the Assembly's agenda in 1981. The views expressed by delegations in the general debate in plenary meetings and in the First Committee on the question reflected, in general, positions stated in the same forums in other years and in the Committee on Disarmament earlier in the year.¹⁷

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 33rd and 91st meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 40th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

Once again many countries, mainly Eastern European and non-aligned, called for the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty on the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. Additionally, the Soviet Union proposed that the permanent members of the Security Council and other militarily important States should, as a first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement, make similar or identical statements renouncing the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. The Security Council could later adopt appropriate decisions approving such renunciations.

On the other hand, Western States, as voiced, for example, by the United Kingdom on behalf of the European Community, maintained the position that a comprehensive treaty on the prohibition of all new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction would not be realistic. They believed that new weapons of mass destruction and their technologies, if they were to be effectively and permanently prohibited, must be the subject of specific, verifiable agreements.

The Byelorussian SSR stated that, as a result of the position of certain States, the Committee on Disarmament had not even begun talks on the subject. Before the point of no return was passed it was essential that agreements be elaborated to prohibit the development and manufacture of the weapons in question. Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR and Mongolia stated that it would be helpful if the Committee on Disarmament made it possible for a competent group of governmental experts to work on the problem. The Soviet Union also was of the view that it was vital that negotiations should be held within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament and with the assistance of qualified experts. The USSR continued to believe that a comprehensive agreement on mass-destruction weapons, as well as agreements on individual aspects of weapons in that class, should be concluded.

Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic specifically endorsed the Soviet proposal mentioned above for statements renouncing the weapons in question, sharing the view that the deadlock in the talks could be overcome by adopting that proposal. Czechoslovakia added that there was an urgent need to prevent the emergence of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and their introduction into arsenals in the light of the decision by the United States to commence manufacture of the nuclear neutron weapon. Hungary stated that the discussion held with the participation of experts during the informal meetings of the Committee on Disarmament had shown that many delegations were seriously concerned about the possibility of the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction, and were ready to agree on measures to prevent that from happening. It was also of the view that an *ad hoc* group of governmental experts should deal with the elaboration of a comprehensive agreement, as well as special agreements on individual weapons.

Bhutan, for its part, stressed that the diversion of tremendous resources to such purposes as the production of ever more sophisticated weapons of mass destruction would diminish further the already inadequate resources available for combating poverty in the developing countries. Afghanistan and

Uganda expressed concern at the lack of progress in such an important area as a ban on new types of weapons of mass destruction.

On 12 November, 24 Eastern European and non-aligned States submitted a draft resolution which was subsequently sponsored by four additional countries.¹⁸ Introducing the draft resolution on 19 November, the Byelorussian SSR stated, on behalf of the sponsors, that the proposal took into account both of the existing approaches to the solution of the problem, that is, the preparation of a comprehensive agreement to prohibit the development and manufacture of all new types of weapons of the kind in question and the drafting of agreements on particular types of such weapons. The two approaches were being treated as complementary to each other in the draft resolution, it added.

Before the vote, the United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of the ten members of the European Community, explained their intention to abstain and stated that the approach adopted by the draft resolution was not a realistic one. While there was no dispute concerning the need to prohibit any and all new weapons of mass destruction which were identified as such, the Ten believed that specific, verifiable agreements were necessary if new weapons and their technologies were to be effectively prohibited. The special importance given in the proposal to the negotiation of a single blanket prohibition did not appear to be warranted. The Ten considered that a comprehensive agreement on the subject could not distinguish between peaceful research and those areas of research which could eventually be given military application. Its verification would require detailed international supervision of the civil research activities beyond what was feasible or realistic, and in the absence of such verification there would be uncertainty, and perhaps suspicion and divisive debate. Each weapon and weapons system had specific characteristics which required separate negotiations, and only through the conclusion of individual agreements could there be a distinction between peaceful research and weapons development. In addition, the Ten did not regard the proposed action in and by the Security Council as a first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement or as an effective measure in itself to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements.

Portugal, which also abstained in the vote, observed that the draft resolution made no reference to the problem of verification. It believed that the objectives of disarmament would be better served by concrete measures relating to well-defined and clearly identified weapons rather than by a comprehensive agreement. Finally, it remarked that the concept of weapons of mass destruction had not yet been sufficiently defined. The United States dismissed the draft resolution as another in a "seemingly endless series of propagandistic ploys" Its abstention should not mask the reality of what had

¹⁸ Afghanistan, Benin, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Guinea, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Romania, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, Viet Nam, Yemen; and subsequently Angola, Jordan, Niger and Sao Tome and Principe.

been going on in the world in the area of mass-destruction weapons. The Soviet Union, according to the estimate of one American research institute, had from 1973 to 1980 outspent the United States in the strategic nuclear realm alone by some 100 billion dollars.

In explaining its abstention, Japan stated that it was not appropriate for the Committee on Disarmament to negotiate on a comprehensive draft agreement because the scope of such an agreement regarding the weapons it would encompass was far from clear and would present difficulties, for example, in verification. Moreover, an approach which called for permanent members of the Security Council and others to make declarations concerning the refusal to create new types of weapons of mass destruction seemed unrealistic for similar reasons. Japan still believed that the question should be kept under review. Sweden, which abstained, recalled that on many occasions it had expressed doubts concerning the idea of concluding a comprehensive agreement in the field of new weapons of mass destruction while, on the other hand, it would support all efforts to elaborate specific agreements relating to such weapons as were identified.

India stated that although it had voted in favour, that should not be construed as support for the setting up of an *ad hoc* working group of governmental experts under the aegis of the Committee on Disarmament, since the means of dealing with the question was a matter for the Committee itself to decide. India expressed reservations also concerning the relevance of the call for declarations which the draft contained since interim steps were of dubious value. Argentina, which had also voted in favour, recalled its position concerning unilateral and non-verifiable declarations and stated that it would have abstained had a separate vote been taken on paragraph 3 (see below). Finally, Finland, in explaining its support of the draft, held that all approaches to the problem under consideration should be explored.

On 23 November, the first Committee adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 95 to none, with 27 abstentions, and on 9 December the General Assembly adopted it as resolution 36/89 by a recorded vote of 116 to none, with 27 abstentions, mainly Western countries. China did not participate in the vote. The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3479 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/74 of 10 December 1976, 32/84 A of 12 December 1977, 33/66 B of 14 December 1978, 34/79 of 11 December 1979 and 35/149 of 12 December 1980 concerning the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction,

Bearing in mind the provisions of paragraph 39 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, according to which qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are both important for halting the arms race and efforts to that end must include negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction, and the development of new means of warfare,

Recalling the decision contained in paragraph 77 of the Final Document to the effect that, in order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements might ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements, and that efforts aiming at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction should be appropriately pursued,

Expressing once again its firm belief, in the light of the decisions adopted at the tenth special session, in the importance of concluding an agreement or agreements to prevent the use of scientific and technological progress for the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

Noting that in the course of its session in 1981 the Committee on Disarmament considered the item entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons",

Noting with satisfaction that in the course of its session in 1981 the Committee on Disarmament held informal meetings on this item with the participation of qualified governmental experts,

Convinced that all ways and means should be utilized to prevent the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

Taking into consideration the part of the report of the Committee on Disarmament relating to this question,

1. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament, in the light of its existing priorities, to intensify negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, with a view to preparing a draft comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and to draft possible agreements on particular types of such weapons;

2. *Once again urges* all States to refrain from any action which could adversely affect the talks aimed at working out an agreement or agreements to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons;

3. *Calls upon* the States permanent members of the Security Council, as well as upon other militarily significant States, to make declarations, identical in substance, concerning the refusal to create new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, as a first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement on this subject, bearing in mind that such declarations would be approved thereafter by a decision of the Security Council;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this item by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;

5. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on the results achieved to the General Assembly for consideration at its thirty-seventh session;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Committee on Disarmament"

Conclusion

As in previous years, proposals concerning the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons received considerable recognition and support in 1981, particularly in the Committee on Disarmament and the General Assembly. Nevertheless, the two established approaches to the question remained divergent as in other recent years and no substantial progress was made. The Eastern European and a number of non-aligned countries continued to press for the conclusion of a comprehensive general agreement prohibiting the development and manufacture of such weapons and systems, at the same time accepting the possibility of specific agreements on particular types of weapons. The Western States, on the other hand, continued to feel that the concept of a general agreement was not a realistic one on several grounds and therefore supported the conclusion of separate conventions on specific new

types of weapons of mass destruction when such weapons were clearly identified, which could be assured by keeping the question under review.

In the Committee on Disarmament a proposal to establish a group of governmental experts on the question failed to obtain consensus. Instead, the Committee agreed to hold informal meetings, with the participation of qualified governmental experts; in those meetings, possible areas of new mass-destruction weapons development and their potential were discussed. No new types of such weapons were reported to have made their appearance, and whether their development was likely remained a controversial issue.

In the General Assembly, the Eastern European States supported a proposal of the Soviet Union that States permanent members of the Security Council and other militarily significant States should make declarations, identical in substance, renouncing the creation of such new weapons and systems as a first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement on the subject. Western States, while recognizing the need to preclude the development of new weapons of mass destruction, held that such declarations would not be meaningful and that any general agreement would inevitably be vague and unverifiable. They continued to favour agreements on specific weapons as the possibility of their emergence could be clearly identified.

Indications as of the end of the year were that future consideration of the subject would continue to reflect the same two approaches.

CHAPTER XIV

Radiological weapons

Introduction

A REFERENCE TO THE POSSIBILITY of “radioactive material weapons” can be found in a United Nations document adopted as early as in 1948,¹ but radiological weapons — as they have been called in recent years — are not known to have been developed as yet. These weapons, if they were produced, would be intended to disperse radioactive substances in the target area in order to cause injury to humans independently of nuclear explosions. With regard to that possibility, the international community has perceived a chance to ban a weapon of mass destruction before its actual construction.

In 1969 the CCD was invited by the General Assembly in resolution 2602 C (XXIV)² to consider methods of control against radiological methods of warfare conducted independently of nuclear explosions and the requirement for effective control of nuclear weapons designed to maximize radioactive effects. The Committee reported in 1970³ that the possibilities of radiological warfare did not seem to be of much practical significance and that further consideration of the issue did not at the time appear to be useful. The subject was brought up again in the General Assembly in 1976 when the United States, noting the continuing accumulation of nuclear materials as a result of the operation of reactors, suggested that an agreement to prevent their use as radiological weapons should be considered.

In 1977, bilateral discussions on the question of radiological weapons were opened between the USSR and the United States and the subject was also considered in the CCD. In 1978 both parties to the bilateral talks informed the Committee that progress had been made towards the prohibition of radiological weapons. The General Assembly at its tenth special session in 1978 included a paragraph in its Final Document⁴ stating that a convention should

¹ See *The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), p. 28.

² *Ibid.*, chap. 4, and *The Yearbook*, vol. 1: 1976, chap. XVI.

³ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1970*, document DC/233, para. 26.

⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4* (A/S/-10/4), sect. III, para. 76.

be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.

On 9 July 1979, the Soviet Union and the United States submitted an agreed joint proposal to the Committee on Disarmament.⁵ It was decided to continue consideration of the proposal at the Committee's next annual session. The same year, they also submitted a draft resolution in the General Assembly which was adopted without a vote on 11 December as resolution 34/87 A. By the resolution the Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to proceed as soon as possible to achieve agreement through negotiations on the text of a convention on such a prohibition and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session on the results achieved.

During the consideration of the joint proposal by the Committee on Disarmament in 1980, the sponsors and some other delegations expressed initial optimism concerning the possibility of early finalization of a draft treaty. The *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Radiological Weapons was established on 17 March for that purpose. During the course of its work, differences in concept regarding approach, priority, definition, verification, and certain other matters emerged. Sweden raised the problem of definition, calling attention to the need for a consistent use of the term "nuclear explosive device" and to the need to consider the so-called particle-beam weapons in developing the definition. India, expressing major reservations, called, *inter alia*, for the deletion of the expression "other than a nuclear explosive device", as that might be interpreted as licensing the use of nuclear explosive weapons. In order to help obviate that interpretation, Venezuela proposed that the treaty should concentrate on the prohibition of the use of radioactive materials for military purposes and of radiological methods of warfare. Some of the proposals were welcomed or considered acceptable by the Soviet Union and the United States but, regarding others, which they viewed as altering the basic idea and content of the joint initiative, they expressed disappointment. In its report to the Committee,⁶ the *Ad Hoc* Working Group recommended the establishment of another working group in 1981 to continue negotiations. Several delegations, including Poland on behalf of the socialist States, expressed regret at the failure to work out an agreed text.

At the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, Hungary submitted a draft resolution entitled "Conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons" The draft resolution, as amended according to a proposal by India which changed the emphasis from completion of a treaty to the continuation of negotiations, was adopted by the General Assembly on 12 December 1980 without a vote as resolution 35/156 G. By its terms the General Assembly, *inter alia*, called upon the Committee on Disarmament to "continue negotiations with a view to elaborating a treaty" prohibiting radiological

⁵ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27* (A/34/27 and Corr.1), appendix III (CD/53 and Corr.1), vol. II, documents CD/31 and CD/32.

⁶ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 27* (A/35/27), para. 61; the original report, as submitted to the Committee, is contained in *ibid.*, appendix II (CD/139), vol. II, document CD/133.

weapons, and to report on the results to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1981

There was no discussion on radiological weapons *per se* during the 1981 session of the Disarmament Commission. The only reference to them was made by Bulgaria, which stated that, in addition to nuclear weapons, it gave priority attention to the efforts to prohibit other types of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons and new types of weapons of mass destruction, among which it included radiological weapons.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1981

The item on the agenda entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons" was considered by the Committee on Disarmament at various times during the periods 6 to 17 April and 6 July to 7 August.⁷

At the outset of the 1981 session many delegations expressed optimism concerning the possibility of early agreement on a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons, or at least held positive attitudes towards negotiations on such a convention. India, for instance, believed that a reasonable solution could be found to certain important points of principle on the definition of radiological weapons which it had raised the previous year. Australia regarded the topic as being unequivocally in the hands of the Committee, and the Federal Republic of Germany recalled that it was the only item having the elements for a treaty already on the table, and which could thus be negotiated. Some Eastern European States, notably Bulgaria, Hungary and the Soviet Union, held the view that a draft convention should be completed without delay, preferably before the end of the session. That opinion was also voiced by Belgium provided, however, that agreement could be reached on a realistic definition. It emphasized that this was the first field constituting a prohibition in which all States could undertake to pursue negotiations with a view to achieving further significant results. The socialist States and others, including the Federal Republic of Germany, believed that the joint proposal by the United States and the Soviet Union was a solid basis for the finalization of a draft convention. Some members, including the German Democratic Republic, Mexico and Poland suggested the establishment without delay of a working group on the agenda item. Other delegations, among them those of Australia and Brazil, expressed the belief that the envisaged convention was an arms control measure of lesser importance; Brazil hoped that the Committee would concentrate its efforts on items to which higher priority had been assigned.

⁷ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27)*, paras. 111-120.

At its 105th meeting, on 12 February 1981, the Committee decided to re-establish, for the duration of its 1981 session, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Radiological Weapons which had been established for its 1980 session, so that it might continue its work on the basis of its former mandate, i.e. with a view to reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. The Committee further decided that the *Ad Hoc* Working Group should report to the Committee on the progress of its work at any appropriate time, and in any case before the conclusion of its 1981 session. The *Ad Hoc* Working Group, under the chairmanship of Mr. Imre Kőmives of Hungary, held 21 meetings between 20 February and 14 August, and also undertook informal consultations during that period. Delegates of all member States of the Committee participated in the work of the Group, as well as representatives of Austria and Spain, which were not members. In the conduct of its work, the Working Group had before it over 40 working papers and documents, in addition to which the Secretariat compiled, in 15 conference room papers, proposals made by various delegations.⁸ While the Working Group was able to narrow the existing differences, it turned out during the course of its work that divergencies still existed, particularly on the scope of the prohibition, the definition of radiological weapons, the procedure for verifying compliance, peaceful uses, and the relationship of the proposed treaty with other international agreements and other measures in the field of disarmament, including nuclear disarmament.⁹

During the negotiations in the Working Group, the subject of radiological weapons was frequently discussed by the delegations in plenary meetings, where the same divergencies emerged and other aspects of the envisaged treaty were also dealt with.

A considerable part of the discussion in the Committee revolved around the question of the adequacy of the 1979 joint proposal by the United States and the Soviet Union as a basis for the negotiations on a radiological weapons treaty.¹⁰ Some delegations, for instance, Pakistan, expressed the hope that the sponsors of those "main elements" would prove more responsive to the concerns and proposals advanced by other States. While many Eastern European and Western delegations, including, among others, Denmark which was not a Committee member, continued to support the joint proposal and recommend that the Committee make full use of it, other delegations expressed significant reservations concerning it.

Sweden saw danger in the argument that the Committee must prove its capacity to negotiate disarmament agreements by rapidly approving the draft elements. In order to avoid criticism, the Committee, in Sweden's opinion, had to be careful not to submit disarmament agreements to the United Nations

⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 117.

⁹ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, chap. XVI, for a discussion of views put forward that year.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, vol. 4: 1979, which, in appendix XI, contains the text of the proposal initially submitted to the Committee on Disarmament that year, as documents CD/31 and CD/32 (see footnote 5).

which it could not honestly state to be of any importance, and was thus placed in a difficult position. Studies which had been undertaken by competent scientific and technical institutions in Sweden since the early 1950s showed the development of specific radiological weapons to be a very remote possibility. After citing data on amounts of radioactive substances necessary to produce an effective radiological weapon, Sweden argued that such a bulk of deadly dangerous material could not be handled for dissemination without first killing one's own personnel. After criticizing some of the arguments presented to substantiate the view that radiological weapons were a possibility in warfare, Sweden called for an open discussion of that fundamental question, stating it was the obligation of those who held that view to present their arguments in scientific and technical terms. It observed that there existed a very real risk of mass destruction from the dissemination of radioactive substances in war in the case of military attacks on nuclear power installations, because in that case the main obstacles, namely, production and delivery problems, were bypassed. The danger already existed in industrialized countries with a developed nuclear power industry, and in the future it could materialize also in developing countries. In Sweden's view, the draft elements, besides exempting the use of nuclear weapons — the most effective way of waging radiological warfare — risked also exempting the second most effective way, if its proposal for banning military attacks on nuclear power stations was not accepted. In conclusion, Sweden dealt with some points made during the discussion in the Working Group on its relevant working paper. Among others, the view had been presented that the Swedish proposal had been taken care of in the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. Sweden found those provisions to be limited in two respects: they covered only nuclear electrical generating stations and their purpose was limited to providing protection for the civilian population in the vicinity of those installations, permitting military considerations to take priority over humanitarian ones. In Sweden's view, a general prohibition of radiological warfare should cover all important risks and have no loopholes.

The Swedish proposal and the reflections presented in connection with it were acknowledged by several delegations as thought-provoking. A number of States, mostly non-aligned, including India, Nigeria and Pakistan, expressed at an early stage various degrees of support of or appreciation for it. In the opinion of Argentina, Morocco, Nigeria, Sweden itself and Venezuela, the Israeli action to disable the Iraqi nuclear installations, near Baghdad, on 7 June made the Swedish proposal more relevant.

Other reactions to the Swedish proposal indicated that many socialist and Western States had doubts concerning the feasibility of its incorporation in a radiological weapons treaty. Belgium, while it agreed that the Israeli attack made the proposal pertinent, believed that its incorporation would substantially alter the scope of a convention and raise problems both of a legal nature and with regard to verification procedures. Belgium suggested that the principle contained in the Swedish proposal be contained in a convention, while the Committee would undertake to negotiate on all its implications at a later date. Czechoslovakia stated that it shared the concern regarding the importance of

the protection of civilian nuclear facilities, but had doubts whether the radiological weapons convention would be the right place for solving the problem, for three main reasons: (a) the Committee had a clear mandate to elaborate a convention prohibiting, specifically, radiological weapons; (b) any new treaty dealing with questions already covered by other instruments of international law would have implications in areas of international law outside the competence of the Committee; (c) the character of measures to protect nuclear facilities remained unclear, at least in respect of industrially developed countries, with nuclear facilities becoming more and more an integral part of large industrial centres. The Soviet Union, while sympathizing with the idea underlying the Swedish proposal, referred to the complexity of the problem and its time-consuming legal, technical and political implications and felt that the solution should be sought within the framework of other international agreements.

The Netherlands professed readiness to examine the Swedish proposal seriously, both nationally and internationally. It recalled that it had always believed it unlikely that radiological weapons could be developed or be of any great military value; it was of the view, however, that the launching of an attack on nuclear installations in an opponent's territory constituted one of the few feasible methods of radiological warfare. It held that, since the joint proposal, in article III, provided not only for the prohibition of radiological weapons as such, but also for a general prohibition of radiological warfare, there was sufficient ground to try to include at least the essence of the Swedish proposal. The Netherlands also suggested a wording which, although it was meant to replace the Swedish formulation, shared with it the position that the provisions of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention of 1949 were more restrictive than the present proposals. To establish a link, there could be a reference to those provisions in the preamble of the radiological weapons convention. The Dutch proposal was aimed at making the distinction — in comparison with actions which the Swedish proposal sought to prohibit — that military actions against nuclear installations, provided that they were not specifically designed to use released radiation, would be admissible — for instance, the capturing of such installations with a view to halting the production of energy.

In the course of the negotiations in the Working Group, a consolidated paper by the Chairman emerged which sought to take into account elements of the original joint draft proposal as well as the others submitted by delegations. Although the Soviet Union initially failed to see any elements in the Chairman's text that would substantially improve the joint proposal, it was prepared to work towards agreed decisions on the basis of that text. Several other socialist and Western delegations also considered the Chairman's text an appropriate basis for continuing negotiations which many hoped would be concluded before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The concurrent discussion in plenary meetings also reflected problems on which delegations had to take a stand in discussing the Chairman's text; many of those problems were not new.

Accordingly, the definition of radiological weapons was again comment-

ed on by several delegations. Yugoslavia held that the definition of such weapons should contain the basic characteristics of this type of weapon of mass destruction and must clearly differentiate between it and other types of weapon having similar characteristics. Yugoslavia stressed that radiological weapons were different from nuclear weapons which freed large quantities of mechanical energy, thermal energy and visible light, in that the former acted on living matter through their ionizing radiation. Thus Yugoslavia believed that the most acceptable definition should link the essential characteristics of radiological weapons to ionizing radiation and not in any way imply the direct or indirect legitimization of nuclear weapons. Brazil also favoured defining radiological weapons by their characteristics and opposed the so-called exclusion clause, that is, a clause that would explicitly exclude nuclear weapons from the purview of the convention. A disclaimer that would state that nothing in the convention could be interpreted as legitimizing nuclear weapons would, in Brazil's opinion, only emphasize the assumption that the very real nuclear weapons were considered a viable option, while the non-existent radiological weapons were prohibited. Such an exclusion clause was also found unacceptable by India and Morocco as well as by Burma, which spoke on behalf of the group of 21. On the other hand, some socialist and Western States expressed support for the definition contained in the joint proposal. Belgium, for instance, stated that justification of the use of nuclear weapons was clearly not the intention of the bilateral negotiators, any more than it was their intention to settle the question of the legitimacy of nuclear weapons. Mongolia believed that the future convention should have the clear aim of prohibiting radiological weapons, adding that the inclusion of various elements connected with nuclear weapons might create additional obstacles to reaching agreement. The Netherlands held that the definition should leave no ambiguity whatsoever: the convention should relate exclusively to radiological warfare aimed at spreading radiological material other than by means of nuclear explosion.

Although the question of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology was the object of some disagreement in the Working Group, statements made by some delegations in the plenary meetings reflected mostly a favourable attitude towards including a clause in the convention which would state in positive terms — as suggested by Nigeria — the right of all States to peaceful uses of nuclear energy for development. Yugoslavia recalled that the use of nuclear energy played an especially significant role in the process of establishing the new international economic order and, therefore, made it desirable that international instruments offer adequate solutions to the problem — one such instrument could be the radiological weapons treaty. In a similar context, Brazil, commending corresponding proposals of the Federal Republic of Germany and Romania, preferred a positive formulation for the corresponding article of the instrument, rather than simply stating that the provisions of the convention would not hinder or prejudice the use of radioactive material for peaceful purposes. That view was shared by Argentina, Belgium, Burma (on behalf of the group of 21), Cuba and Italy. With regard to the concern that the convention might lead to possible discrimination against non-party states, Italy pointed out that the problem was inherent in any international agreement

and had been traditionally dealt with in accordance with the legal principle that *pacta tertiis neque juvant neque nocent* (treaties neither benefit nor harm third parties).

The question of control and verification of compliance with provisions of the treaty was also commented upon in plenary meetings. Morocco found the relevant articles in the joint proposal — which provided that (a) a consultative committee of experts be established to consult parties and to undertake appropriate findings of fact, and that (b) complaints in cases of breach of obligation could be lodged with the Security Council — to be emasculated and unacceptable. Indonesia stated that in the case of alleged non-compliance, the mechanism to be adopted should make a speedy examination of the matter possible and all States parties should have the same right to participate in the consideration of the matter. Brazil found the complaints procedure discriminatory, in that it could easily be blocked by a handful of nations, including those that possessed the technological means to produce radiological weapons. Also, the question of the review conferences of the convention was dealt with briefly. Poland observed that interventions of several delegations in the Working Group which suggested review conferences every five years seemed to confirm the assumption that unexpected qualitative changes in the development of radiological weapons could occur. It found that position difficult to reconcile with the contention that such weapons were purely hypothetical.

Comments were made by some delegations on the relationship between a radiological weapons treaty and nuclear disarmament. Brazil, supported by Burma on behalf of the group of 21, held that the treaty provided the international community with an opportunity to give formal expression, in an internationally binding document, to the commitment to nuclear disarmament. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, stated that the work on the convention should not be artificially slowed down by introducing questions which, although important ones, bore no direct relation to the subject under discussion.

The *Ad Hoc* Working Group presented its report to the Committee at its 147th meeting on 18 August. As the Working Group had not been able to accomplish the elaboration of a treaty, the Chairman expressed the Group's recommendation that the Committee, at the beginning of its 1982 session, set up an *ad hoc* working group, under an appropriate mandate, to continue negotiations on such a treaty. At its 148th meeting on 20 August 1981, the Committee adopted the report of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group.¹¹ There was no consensus, however, for a proposal, made by the Netherlands, that the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency be invited to provide information on the possible relationship between the draft radiological weapons convention and the Vienna Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

¹¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27), para. 117; the original report, as submitted to the Committee, is contained in *ibid.*, appendix II (CD/228), document CD/218.

In their final statements, several delegations expressed regret that the Working Group had not been able to accomplish the elaboration of a treaty.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1981

While the question of radiological weapons was mentioned briefly by a few delegations in plenary meetings of the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session, the main discussion on the subject — mostly a reiteration of views already stated in the Committee on Disarmament — took place in the First Committee.¹² Twenty-three delegations participated in the exchange of views in the Committee.

Both of the sponsors of the joint proposal on the prohibition of radiological weapons declared their support for an early finalization of the text of a convention. The United States stated that it was prepared to participate constructively in the work of the Committee on Disarmament with a view to concluding successfully the negotiation of a radiological weapons convention. The Soviet Union held the view that it would be advisable for the General Assembly to express its support for an acceleration of the talks on the subject in the Committee on Disarmament in order that a draft treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons could be presented to the General Assembly at its second special session on disarmament, in 1982. The conclusion of the talks on radiological weapons, in the opinion of the Soviet Union, would promote the success of that session and would indicate that, even in the current complicated international situation, it was possible to solve problems of disarmament.

The idea that the negotiation of the draft agreement should be concluded before the second special session devoted to disarmament, or at least in the near future, was supported by Bulgaria, France, Hungary and the Ukrainian SSR. The Ukrainian SSR hoped that the existing difficulties, which in its opinion were often artificial in nature, would be soon eliminated, but Hungary, represented by the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Radiological Weapons, conceded that serious difficulties continued to exist on vital questions. France hoped that difficulties raised by proposals aimed at settling in the convention questions alien to its purpose might in fact be set aside for consideration in another framework. Poland adhered to the belief that the joint Soviet-American document remained a good starting point.

Major dissension concerning the above views was again expressed by Sweden. It noted that the negotiations on radiological weapons had to a considerable degree focused on its proposal to include in an agreement the prohibition of attack against civilian nuclear installations in order to prevent the massive release of radioactive material. That proposal had been submitted as a serious effort to improve the USSR-United States joint proposal, which,

¹² *Ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 8th to 19th and 91st meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 40th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

in Sweden's view, lacked substance. To Sweden's consternation, the authors of the joint proposal were at the forefront of efforts to discredit its proposal although it was based on realistic scenarios for conflict and on well-documented security interests of many States. After the alarming attack on the Iraqi reactor (see chapters IX and XI), however, the realism, relevance and justification of the proposal could no longer be contested, Sweden believed. It doubted, moreover, that an obviously defective treaty would help to restore the credibility of the Committee on Disarmament and believed that its proposal was by no means so complicated that agreement on it would be impossible to achieve before the second special session. The importance of the Swedish proposal was acknowledged, and the view expressed by Egypt, Finland, Japan, Pakistan and Somalia that the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear installations had rendered it all the more relevant.

Belgium, in a statement devoted entirely to the question of radiological weapons, noted that for several months there had been no progress on the matter, although the Committee on Disarmament had for two years devoted a substantial part of its work to it. While it was true that the different views put forward on the subject all had their merits, the constant repetition of divergent positions could rapidly be transformed into a dialogue of the deaf. Belgium preferred that the Committee on Disarmament make greater efforts to seek the necessary compromises inherent in any negotiating process. Although it was aware of the importance of the problem raised by Sweden, Belgium also attached great importance to the arguments of those who felt that the inclusion of such a prohibition in the convention on radiological weapons posed complex juridical questions as well as difficulties relating to the need for a relevant verification procedure. Thus there would be advantages to following a different course, namely, to conclude the negotiations on the prohibition of the radiological weapons and to embody in the convention the principle contained in the Swedish proposal and a commitment to negotiation of a legal instrument covering all possible implications at a later date.

Nepal supported the recommendation of the group of 21 that the definition of radiological weapons should not include an exclusion clause with respect to nuclear weapons. In connection with its expression of support of the Swedish proposal, Somalia believed that the relevant provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty must be elaborated and strengthened to provide protection for all States developing atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

On 12 November Hungary introduced a draft resolution entitled "Conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons". In the introduction, Hungary stated that as a consequence of the spread of nuclear energy production, the material which could be used in the radiological weapons was now found in many facilities and in many countries. Thus the prevention of the appearance of a new type of weapon of mass destruction had become a timely and important task. The report of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Radiological Weapons had shown that some progress towards the elaboration of a treaty had been made, but the bulk of the work remained to be completed. Despite the existing divergent views, there was a widespread desire to

conclude a radiological weapons treaty. The draft resolution was practically a reproduction of the previous year's resolution, and was of a procedural nature, designed to enable the Committee on Disarmament to continue its work on radiological weapons in 1982.

On 20 November, Argentina, supported by China, India and Yugoslavia, orally proposed an amendment to operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution, by which the words "if possible" would be inserted after the words "may be submitted" in the original which read, in part, "the elaboration of a treaty...in order that it may be submitted to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982." In Argentina's opinion, it was more realistic not to make a request of the Committee on Disarmament that it might not be able to fulfil. Argentina was convinced that accepting the proposed amendment would facilitate the adoption by consensus of the draft resolution. Although Hungary did not believe there was a need to emphasize the matter, as it was known that the question of radiological weapons had a limited priority in the work of the Committee on Disarmament in comparison with other problems, Hungary accepted Argentina's proposal in the spirit of compromise.

At its 38th meeting on 20 November, the First Committee approved the revised draft resolution without a vote. After its adoption, India stated that while joining the consensus, it wanted to put on record that serious divergencies still existed, particularly concerning the scope of the future treaty and the definition of radiological weapons. India therefore wanted to make it clear that the adoption of the resolution should in no way be used for upsetting the existing priorities among the various items under consideration and negotiation in the Committee on Disarmament.

The General Assembly adopted the draft resolution on 9 December as resolution 36/97 B, without a vote. The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling the resolution of the Commission for Conventional Armaments of 12 August 1948, which defined weapons of mass destruction to include atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or the other weapons mentioned above,

Recalling its resolution 2602 C (XXIV) of 16 December 1969.

Recalling paragraph 76 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it is stated that a convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons,

Reaffirming its resolutions 34/87 A of 11 December 1979 and 35/156 G of 12 December 1980 on the conclusion of such a convention,

Convinced that such a convention would serve to spare mankind the potential dangers of the use of radiological weapons and thereby contribute to strengthening peace and averting the threat of war,

Noting that negotiations on the conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons have been conducted in the Committee on Disarmament,

Taking note of that part of the report of the Committee on Disarmament which deals with these negotiations, including the report of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group,

Recognizing that divergent views continue to exist in connection with various aspects relating to a convention prohibiting radiological weapons.

Noting with satisfaction the wide recognition of the need to reach agreement on the text of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons,

1. *Calls upon* the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations with a view to an early conclusion of the elaboration of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, in order that it may be submitted if possible to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982;

2. *Takes note*, in this connection, of the recommendation of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group, in the report adopted by the Committee on Disarmament, to set up at the beginning of its session to be held in 1982 a further *ad hoc* working group, under an appropriate mandate to be determined at that time, to continue negotiations on the elaboration of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the discussion by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session of the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons"

Conclusion

As in the previous year, the Committee on Disarmament started its work in 1981 with a certain amount of optimism concerning the possibility of concluding the negotiations on a radiological weapons convention on the basis of the 1979 joint proposal by the Soviet Union and the United States, but it turned out that divergent views on the matter were serious enough to prevent that possibility from materializing.

The main new development was the Swedish proposal on the prohibition of attack on civilian nuclear installations in order to prevent the possibility of a massive release of radioactive material. That proposal was supported by a number of States, but others objected to its incorporation in the text of the envisaged convention, partly because it would enlarge the scope of the convention beyond what had been originally intended and partly because it would involve time-consuming negotiations with various new implications.

Nevertheless, some narrowing down of the differences was achieved during the course of the negotiations, and some hope remained at the conclusion of the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly that the agreed text of a draft convention might be submitted to the Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, in 1982.

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

Introduction

ATTEMPTS TO PROHIBIT THE USE OF WEAPONS OF WARFARE considered to be too cruel in their effects began long before the modern era and, in the name of the laws of humanity, have continued. The St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 stated that nations should not use weapons which aggravated the suffering of the disabled. When the “dumdum” bullet (which expands or flattens more easily than other bullets, causing more serious wounds) was developed a few years later it was viewed as contrary to the 1868 Declaration, and participants in the 1899 Hague Conference prohibited the use of such bullets. The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 also prohibited the use of poison or poisoned weapons, projectiles for diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases, and discharge of projectiles and explosives from balloons, and restricted the use of underwater contact mines. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 renewed the ban on use of poison gases and prohibited use of analogous materials and bacteriological methods of warfare.

More recently the question of prohibiting other inhumane weapons has been considered by the United Nations, the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Since 1972, the First Committee of the General Assembly has discussed the subject under various agenda items concerning disarmament, and the Sixth Committee has considered it with regard to legal implications.¹ At the invitation of the General Assembly, contained in its resolution 3076 (XXVIII) of 1973, the Diplomatic Conference took up the subject during four sessions from 1974 to 1977, with regard to the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons, as well as other specific conventional weapons which might be deemed to cause unnecessary suffering or to have indiscriminate effects. The aim of the Diplomatic Conference in that connection was to seek

¹ For a brief review of early initiatives and considerations, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, pp. 348-349; for a more detailed account, see *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1), chap. X.

agreement on rules prohibiting or restricting the use of such weapons. The International Committee of the Red Cross also made a considerable contribution to the study of the subject at the expert level from 1973 to 1976.

In 1977, following a recommendation of the Diplomatic Conference, the General Assembly adopted resolution 32/152, by which, *inter alia*, it decided to convene in 1979 a United Nations conference, with a view to reaching agreements on prohibitions or restrictions of use of certain categories of conventional weapons. After three years of strenuous efforts, first in the Preparatory Conference, which convened in 1978 and 1979, and then in the Conference itself, which held two sessions, in 1979 and 1980, the following international Convention and three annexed Protocols were agreed upon by consensus:

(a) Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects;

(b) Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I);

(c) Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-traps and Other Devices (Protocol II); and

(d) Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III).²

The Convention and the three Protocols are the first international arms regulation agreements negotiated through a specific United Nations Conference. They provide new rules for the protection of military personnel and, particularly, civilians and civilian objects from injury or attack under various conditions by means of fragments that cannot readily be detected in the human body by X-rays, land-mines and booby traps, etc., and incendiary (flame or heat) weapons. The rules in question range from a complete ban on the use of such weapons to restrictions on their use in conditions which would cause incidental loss of life, injury to civilians, or unnecessary damage to civilian objects. The Convention, which serves as the legal framework for the Protocols, envisages a review mechanism which, in the future, will facilitate the development of rules on prohibitions or restrictions on further categories of conventional weapons.

On 12 December 1980, by resolution 35/153, the General Assembly commended the Convention and its three Protocols to all States, with a view to achieving the widest possible adherence. The Assembly requested the Secretary-General, as the Depositary of the Convention and its Protocols, to inform it from time to time of the status of adherence.

Opening for signature of the Convention, 1981

Under the provisions of its article 3, the Convention was opened for signature on 10 April 1981, at a ceremony at United Nations Headquarters, at which

² For the text of the Convention and its Protocols, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, appendix VII.

representatives of 34 States signed it.³ In a statement at the ceremony, the Secretary-General said that the agreements were a significant step forward in efforts by the international community to prohibit or at least restrict the use of especially cruel and inhumane conventional weapons. The agreements were a practical expression of the renewed commitment by Member States to the objectives outlined by the General Assembly in the Final Document of its first special session devoted to disarmament. Noting that the Conference had adopted the Convention and the Protocols by consensus, the Secretary-General stated that it was possible, given the necessary good will and spirit of accommodation, to reach meaningful agreements which not only would strengthen international humanitarian law, but also serve as encouragement in the broader field of disarmament.

Article 5, paragraph 1, of the Convention provides that it shall enter into force six months after the date of deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. Under paragraph 3 of the same article, each of the three Protocols annexed to the Convention shall enter into force six months after the date by which 20 States have notified their consent to be bound by it. Expression of consent to be bound by particular Protocols is optional for each State, provided that, at the time of the deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, the State notifies the Depositary of its consent to be bound by any two or more of such Protocols.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1981

In pursuance of General Assembly resolution 35/153 of 12 December 1980, the item entitled "United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects" was included in the Assembly's agenda at its thirty-sixth session. The Convention and the three annexed Protocols having been commended to all States in 1980, and given the fact that those instruments had been opened for signature on 10 April 1981, there was relatively little discussion on the item.⁴

Among the delegations that made statements on the subject, Afghanistan, Democratic Yemen and the Federal Republic of Germany welcomed the conclusion of the negotiations leading to the Convention and the annexed Protocols on inhumane weapons. The Federal Republic of Germany viewed

³ The Convention, as of 31 December 1981, had been signed by 46 countries: Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Kingdom, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia; see also appendix I.

⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 33rd and 91st meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, First Committee*, 4th to 53rd meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

the agreements as one of the tangible achievements concluded since the first special session on disarmament in 1978. It stated that the great number of signatory States to the Convention justified the hope that, following the necessary ratifications, the instruments would soon enter into force. In its opinion, the Convention represented a further step towards protecting civilians and combatants in the case where an armed conflict could not be prevented. Denmark, Finland and Sweden also expressed the hope that as many States as possible would accede to the Convention so as to make it generally applicable. Ecuador stated that the adoption of the Convention demonstrated that the United Nations could be an effective forum where it was possible, given a spirit of conciliation and political will on the part of Member States, to arrive at agreements which not only strengthened humanitarian international law, but also contributed to promoting and encouraging the control of weapons and disarmament.

China was of the view that the conclusion of the Convention and the related Protocols would help to limit the use of other weapons by aggressors for massacring their military and civilian victims. It hoped that the inadequacies that now existed in the agreements, such as the failure to provide for the verification of violations, could be rectified in due course. Ireland stated that further efforts should be directed towards the establishment of a consultative committee of experts which could hold consultations and investigate the facts if doubts should arise regarding adherence to the undertakings set out in the Convention. Ireland was convinced that the establishment of such a committee could be of great value in increasing the trust and confidence of the States parties to the Convention.

The United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of the European Community, expressed the firm conviction that an adequate mechanism for the proper investigation of alleged breaches of the Convention would deter possible violations and contribute to strict and effective observance of its provisions. The members of the Community hoped that the matter would be pursued further at the next session of the General Assembly. This viewpoint also received support individually from the delegations of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany and New Zealand. Sweden stated that a central issue for consideration at a later stage would be the Protocol on incendiary weapons which, so far, offered no protection to combatants. It stated that further consideration should also be given to reaching agreement on the use of small-calibre projectiles. Sweden also attached great importance to the provisions for review contained in the Convention.

On 18 November, a draft resolution relating to the item was introduced in the First Committee by Nigeria on behalf of 22 countries representing all geographical regions and political groupings: Belgium, Bulgaria, Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Spain, Sweden, USSR, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia. The draft was subsequently also sponsored by Bangladesh, Mongolia, Panama and Viet Nam. On behalf of the sponsors, Nigeria stated that the Convention and Protocols were not disarmament measures but were useful in view of

their humanitarian considerations. In view of the fact that the Convention and Protocols had not yet come into force, Nigeria stated that nothing should be done at that stage to disturb the delicate balance achieved during the negotiations. Any proposals or amendments could be taken into consideration later, when the instruments had entered into force. It drew attention to article 8 of the Convention which dealt extensively with the review mechanisms.

The draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee on 23 November without a vote. After its adoption the United States stated that it believed that the Convention could serve real humanitarian interests but emphasized that formal adherence by States to such agreements would be of little purpose if the parties were not at the same time formally committed to taking every appropriate step to ensure compliance with the restrictions after their entry into force. The United States continued to regret that the proposal for the creation of a special consultative committee of experts had not been adopted. It reserved the right to return to that idea at some appropriate time in the future.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, also without a vote, as resolution 36/93. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 32/152 of 19 December 1977, 33/70 of 14 December 1978, 34/82 of 11 December 1979 and 35/153 of 12 December 1980,

Recalling the successful conclusion of the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, which resulted in a convention and three protocols, adopted by the Conference on 10 October 1980, namely, the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, the Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I), the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) and the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III),

Reaffirming its conviction that the suffering of civilian populations and of combatants would be further significantly reduced if general agreement could be attained on the prohibition or restriction for humanitarian reasons of the use of specific conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects,

Taking note with satisfaction of the report of the Secretary-General, in which indication was given that many States had already signed the Convention, which was opened for signature in New York on 10 April 1981,

1. *Urges* those States which have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to sign and ratify the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible so as to obtain the entry into force of the Convention, and ultimately its universal adherence;

2. *Notes* that, under article 8 of the Convention, conferences may be convened to consider amendments to the Convention or any of the Protocols annexed thereto, to consider additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing annexed Protocols, or to review the scope and operation of the Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto and to consider any proposal for amendments to the Convention or to the existing Protocols and any proposals for additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing annexed Protocols;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General, as Depositary of the Convention and the three Protocols annexed thereto, to inform the General Assembly from time to time of the state of adherence to the Convention and its Protocols;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects"

Conclusion

The rules embodied in the Convention on certain inhumane weapons and the three annexed Protocols fall short of the original hopes and expectations of many countries. Nevertheless, the results achieved may be regarded as optimum in the prevailing international situation and can be considered a significant step in the development of humanitarian law to reduce the suffering of victims of armed conflicts.

They represent the result of intensive negotiations and delicate but balanced compromises on the part of the participants in the Conference. The rules attempt to bridge the gap between the effects of rapid advances in military research and technology and progress in international law relating to the conduct of war. When they enter into force, the rules will further supplement the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions that focused on war victims, and the Hague Convention of 1907 which sought to regulate the use of weapons. In all the conventions, the main objective has been humanitarian.

A large number of countries signed the Convention at the time of its opening for signature on 10 April 1981, and others between then and the end of the year. Many delegations have expressed the hope that States become parties to it as soon as possible so that it might enter into force in the near future.

Some have complained that inadequate consideration was given to the question of how to ensure that the Convention will be fully implemented and its obligations honoured in times of actual conflict. Fact-finding and complaints mechanisms of a binding nature have been proposed to give greater assurance of compliance. These questions as well as others are likely to be taken up at some later stage, under article 8 of the Convention, which deals with the question of review and amendments.

Prohibition of the stationing of weapons and prevention of an arms race in outer space

Introduction

IN OCTOBER 1957, THE FIRST MAN-MADE SATELLITE was launched into outer space and the people of the world witnessed the beginning of a new era — the space age. The following year, an item dealing with the peaceful uses of outer space was for the first time placed on the agenda of the General Assembly, at its thirteenth regular session. At the same session, the Assembly established the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which, one year later, became a permanent body.

Since that time, the question of the peaceful uses of outer space has been actively discussed in the United Nations: in the *Ad Hoc* Committee mentioned above,¹ and in its Legal Sub-Committee, its Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee, and its four working groups of the whole. These discussions have led or contributed to the adoption of several important international instruments,² some of which relate solely to the use of outer space for peaceful purposes, while others have military implications.

The first, dealing partially with outer space, was the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (see chapter VII above). It calls upon each of its parties, *inter alia*, to

¹ The Committee at the end of 1981 was composed of the following 53 States: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, USSR, United Kingdom, United Republic of Cameroon, United States, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia.

² Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, 1963. see *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.2); Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1967 (*ibid.*); Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 1968 (resolution 2345 (XXII), annex); Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 1972 (resolution 2777 (XXVI), annex); Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 1976 (resolution 3235 (XXIX), annex); and Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1979 (resolution 34/68, annex). (Years shown are years of entry into force.)

undertake "to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control: (a) in the atmosphere; and beyond its limits, including outer space; . . ." ³ By the end of 1981 this Treaty had been ratified by some 111 countries.

Four years later, on 10 October 1967, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, entered into force. It specifically prohibits the placing in orbit around the earth or stationing in outer space in any other manner any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, the Treaty provides for the use of the moon and other celestial bodies exclusively for peaceful purposes, and also expressly prohibits the establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, and the testing of any type of weapons and the conducting of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies.⁴ By the end of 1981, some 81 countries were parties to the Treaty.

In 1978, the General Assembly, in the Final Document of its tenth special session, recognized the inherent dangers of a potential arms race in outer space and called for further measures to be taken and appropriate international negotiations to be held in order to prevent such an occurrence.⁵ Thereafter, in December 1979, the General Assembly commended, by its resolution 34/68, a further instrument of international law concerning outer space, namely, the Agreement Governing Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, and annexed the text of the Agreement to the resolution. That Agreement describes the moon and its natural resources as the common heritage of mankind, and elaborates in greater detail than the 1967 Treaty the obligations of States to ensure that the moon and other celestial bodies within the solar system are used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The Agreement was opened for signature on 18 December 1979. By the end of 1981, it had been ratified by three countries, Chile, the Philippines and Uruguay. According to its terms, the Agreement will enter into force 30 days following the ratification by five countries.

In 1968 a United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space — the first ever — was held in Vienna. In recent years, the General Assembly has adopted a series of resolutions regarding the holding of a second United Nations Conference on the same subject. The first of these was resolution 33/16 of 10 November 1978,⁶ by which the Assembly decided to convene the second United Nations Conference and to have the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space act as the Preparatory Committee for the Conference. As a result of the action taken under the item

³ For complete text see *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.2).

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4* (A/S-10/4), sect. III, para. 80.

⁶ Subsequent resolutions on the subject were 34/67 of 5 December 1979, 35/15 of 3 November 1980, and that of 1981 mentioned in the text.

by the General Assembly in 1981, with its adoption of resolution 36/36 of 18 November, the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was scheduled to be held in Vienna from 9 to 21 August 1982.

While the question of the peaceful uses of outer space was being discussed in the United Nations, the USSR and the United States commenced parallel bilateral discussions on the control of their anti-satellite (known as ASAT) activities, following a United States proposal in March 1977 that the two form a joint group to discuss the question. The first meeting of the group took place in June 1978 at Helsinki, and the last in a series of three, in June 1979. For a number of reasons the talks were suspended without the two countries having reached agreement on the issue.

In 1981, by a letter dated 10 August,⁷ addressed to the Secretary-General, the Soviet Union requested that an item entitled "Conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space" be included in the agenda of the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session. In the letter, the USSR stated that none of the international legal instruments which hitherto had been agreed upon had excluded the possibility of the stationing in outer space of the kinds of weapons which were not covered by the definition of weapons of mass destruction. Consequently, in the opinion of the Soviet Union, the danger of the militarization of outer space still existed and had recently been increasing. A draft treaty on the subject, consisting of nine articles, was annexed to the letter. The text of the Soviet draft treaty is reproduced in appendix VII below.

Pursuant to the Soviet proposal, the Assembly included on its agenda a separate item dealing with the question as requested and considered it solely in the context of disarmament. Subsequently, under the established item on general and complete disarmament, a group of Western States submitted a draft resolution entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" in which they referred, *inter alia*, to the question of agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space and the negotiation of a specific verifiable agreement to prohibit anti-satellite systems.

Accordingly, in 1981 there was a fresh consideration by the General Assembly of the possibility of the arms race extending to outer space, which was dealt with under the disarmament agenda. The issue was not initiated in time or in such a manner as to be considered by the Disarmament Commission or the Committee on Disarmament.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1981

In the course of the debates in the General Assembly and, especially, the First Committee,⁸ a number of Member States expressed concern that rapid

⁷ A/36/192.

⁸ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 33rd and 91st meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 39th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

advances in science and technology had made the extension of the arms race into the region of outer space a very real possibility. Several noted that in spite of the existence of a number of international agreements, such as the outer space Treaty of 1967 prohibiting nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction from being placed in fixed orbit, new kinds of weapons were still being developed. The majority of speakers who addressed the issue felt that the time had come to consider seriously further measures to halt the trend towards the militarization of outer space. The fear was generally expressed that not only was an arms race in outer space of itself potentially destructive, but, as stated by Sweden, any such competition would eventually adversely affect the economically and socially important international co-operation which had developed over the past two decades in fields such as space communications, meteorology and navigation.

Early in the debate, the Soviet Union presented its proposal⁹ to the First Committee for consideration. In doing so, it recalled the many ways in which the world had benefited from the peaceful uses of outer space and the part which the USSR had played in helping to bring those endeavours to fruition. In speaking of the urgency and immediacy of the need to keep that newly discovered sphere restricted solely to peaceful uses, the representative of the Soviet Union reiterated his country's contention that the spread of the arms race to outer space would bring additional destabilizing factors into the strategic situation, as well as sharply reduce and lead ultimately to the total curtailment of all international programmes of co-operation. Thereafter, he highlighted some features of the draft treaty his country had put forward with its request for the new agenda item (see appendix VII below). The Soviet Union, he stated, was presenting a proposal the essence of which was to prevent the further militarization of outer space and to exclude the possibility of the region becoming an arena for the arms race and a source of heightened tension in relations between States.

A number of delegations, particularly those of Eastern European countries, welcomed the Soviet initiative, regarding it as a constructive approach to an important issue of arms limitation and disarmament. The Ukrainian SSR, for example, expressing the belief that further measures had to be taken immediately to erect a reliable barrier to the further militarization of outer space, hailed the Soviet proposal as being both timely and urgent. The proposed international legal instrument, it stated, was designed to take into account the spiralling pace of scientific and technological progress in outer space and new military technology. Its aim of preventing outer space from becoming a theatre for the arms race was a task which would be much easier to accomplish before the danger became a *fait accompli*.

Other delegations, including those of the Byelorussian SSR, Bulgaria and Hungary, sharing similar views, noted in particular that the increase in the production of "potential" weapons, especially by the United States, made the general approval of the proposed draft of utmost importance. Both the Byelorussian SSR and Bulgaria alluded to the launching, in the spring of

⁹ See foot-note 7.

1981, of the American reusable manned space vehicle Columbia (known as the space shuttle), accompanied by widespread press reports of American intentions to place, in outer space, new weapons such as laser and ray weapons and certain kinds of mines. In their view, such systems were intended to be used, among other things, for the destruction of satellites and rockets. A treaty was therefore needed to halt such dangerous trends by prohibiting the stationing of any and all weapons in outer space. Hungary, similarly referring to the possible military use of the American space shuttle and the use of laser and particle beams as weapons in space, held the view that this new initiative by the Soviet Union was the next logical step following the conclusion in 1979 of the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. In its estimation, those two treaties combined would ensure the use of outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes.

Statements supporting the intentions behind the Soviet proposal were made by several other delegations. In general, they agreed that the time had come for an intensification of efforts to conclude further measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. However, some felt that the Soviet draft, as it stood, fell short in so far as it did not take into account several pertinent aspects of the situation. The Netherlands, while welcoming the draft, stressed that its scope should be carefully studied inasmuch as the text appeared to allow for dangerous arguments that could undermine the provisions of the draft and perhaps even provisions of treaties already in force, and the adequacy of its verification provisions would have to be scrutinized. Another important point, in the Netherlands' view, was that a clear definition of the term "weapon" was lacking. A similar view was put forward by Sweden, which felt that the Soviet draft left out certain aspects of the question of the militarization of outer space which were of equal importance as some which it covered; the draft would also have to be complemented in the important areas of verification of compliance and of procedures concerning complaints and review.

Several countries, including Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands and Norway, referred to the anti-satellite talks which had taken place between the USSR and the United States. A number of them urged the resumption of meaningful discussions at the earliest possible opportunity. Finland, stating its regret that those negotiations had been inconclusive, stressed the special responsibility of the two Powers, which had the major technological capability for using outer space, and called for further steps to be taken and the necessary negotiations to be held in an appropriate forum, which would be assigned by the General Assembly. Ireland also expressed regret that no meeting on that very important question had been held between the two countries since June 1979, and requested the USSR and the United States to resume discussion of the issue since they were essentially the only two States which, at the moment, were involved in the area of anti-satellite systems. In Ireland's opinion, while no progress on the question could be achieved without the participation of those two countries, such bilateral discussions should not preclude the questions from also being considered in a multilateral forum such as the Committee on Disarmament. Norway recalled that further negotiations

aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space had been requested in paragraph 80 of the Final Document and held that a treaty on anti-satellite systems would have stabilizing effects and enhance verification possibilities. The Netherlands, for its part, expressed concern about possible future military uses of outer space, but felt that the negotiations held in 1978 and 1979 between the two countries mainly concerned constituted a clear indication of their mutual recognition of the relationship between space systems and military stability. Therefore it was of the utmost importance that the two countries resume their bilateral negotiations as soon as possible, preferably in parallel with similar discussions which, it hoped, would commence in the Committee on Disarmament from the beginning of its 1982 session.

The majority of the additional countries which made mention of a suitable forum for multilateral discussions on the preventing of an arms race in outer space, suggested the Committee on Disarmament as the most likely body. Among those which referred specifically to the Committee were Canada and Mongolia, which felt that concrete consideration of this question and the drafting of an international treaty in that body would constitute an important starting point, and the Ukrainian SSR, which expressed the hope that the General Assembly would be able to take a decision at its current session so that work could be started immediately in the Committee on Disarmament to produce the text of a proposed treaty.

Brazil, however, pointed out that the Committee on Disarmament was currently seized of six substantive questions on its annual agenda, including two high priority subjects.¹⁰ It felt, therefore, that the Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which had negotiated the 1967 Treaty, would be in a better position to tackle the problem immediately, thus allowing the Committee on Disarmament to concentrate its efforts on the priority items already on its agenda.

On 12 November, Mongolia introduced a draft resolution which was also sponsored by Angola, the Byelorussian SSR, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR, the USSR and Viet Nam. Mongolia, in its introduction, indicated that the draft resolution took into account the agenda item requested and draft Treaty submitted by the Soviet Union as well as views and comments expressed during consideration of the item. By its operative paragraphs the Assembly would request the Committee on Disarmament to start negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on the text of a treaty to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space and call for the inclusion of the item once again on the agenda of the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session. The representative of Mongolia, in introducing the draft resolution, recalled that the main purpose of the proposal was to draw the attention of States to the need for new and effective measures to protect outer space as well as to draw attention to the existing opinions and ideas on the subject. The complexity of the task, he stated, and the provisional

¹⁰ See chapter I above, page 14. The Committee on Disarmament has regarded as its highest priority the first two items on its agenda: "Nuclear test ban" and "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament"

nature of the discussions which had already been held, had encouraged the sponsors to decide to include in the draft the request that the Committee on Disarmament embark on negotiations.

On 13 November 1982, Italy, on behalf of itself and a number of Western States: Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Netherlands, New Zealand and United Kingdom, introduced in the First Committee the draft resolution referred to above, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". The draft was later sponsored also by the Barbados, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Japan, the Niger, Norway, Spain and Uruguay. The proposal, initiated for the first time in 1981, came under the item on general and complete disarmament. By it, the General Assembly would, *inter alia*, urge all States, particularly those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space and would request the Committee on Disarmament to (a) consider, from the beginning of its 1982 session, the question of negotiating effective and verifiable agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space; (b) give priority attention to negotiating an effective and verifiable agreement prohibiting anti-satellite systems; and (c) report on its consideration of the subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

The sponsors, Italy stated in introducing this alternative proposal, were expressing their conviction that a much broader involvement of the international community was desirable on an issue such as the question of outer space, which was liable to affect the future security of the whole world. The representative of Italy also noted the complexity of the subject matter, and recommended that elements be singled out which, because of their urgency, should be tackled as a matter of priority. Chief among those elements was the development of anti-satellite systems, which were fundamentally destabilizing, and therefore called for prompt international action. Although the control of such systems had already been a subject of discussion between the Soviet Union and the United States, the fact that anti-satellite capabilities were still in a comparatively early stage of development presented the international community with an opportunity to negotiate a realistic and verifiable agreement.

In explaining their positions in connection with the voting in the First Committee on the two resolutions, several delegations expressed the desire to see an amalgamation of the two drafts into a single resolution, since having two different resolutions on the same subject was not only redundant but, by adopting the two drafts, the Committee would be giving permanence to a questionable situation in that both resolutions contained decisions to include items, with different titles, in the provisional agenda of the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session. Argentina, Ghana and Sweden, in particular, appealed to the sponsors to consult among themselves before items were considered in the plenary meeting and, if possible, to submit one draft resolution combining both texts. Both Italy and Mongolia, however, although agreeing to consider the suggestion to consult before the vote in the Assembly, shared the view that each resolution had its own identity and covered its own respective approach, and was therefore appropriate for discussion as a discrete

item. In their view, both resolutions could be useful for the future work of the Committee on Disarmament.

Other States, in the same connection, made specific reference to certain portions of both drafts which, in their opinion, needed particular attention. Sierra Leone felt that, in the draft resolution introduced by Italy, the General Assembly should request the Committee on Disarmament to "embark upon serious negotiations", rather than "request" the Committee on Disarmament to "consider" the question, since merely to consider the question of negotiating an item could mean an indefinite shelving of that item. The question of preventing an arms race in outer space was in its view too important to be left unattended and should be negotiated immediately. India, Mexico and Yugoslavia all voted in favour of both resolutions, but with the understanding that the consideration of the subject in the Committee on Disarmament would have to be determined in the light of the existing priorities before the Committee. Egypt, pointing out that it had voted in favour of both resolutions, stated that its support stemmed from its concurrence with the objective of the drafts, rather than with their contents. The USSR explained that it had abstained in the vote on the proposal of Italy and others because it gave too much emphasis to the prohibition of anti-satellite systems, thus tending to shift the focus away from resolving the whole problem of preventing an arms race in outer space in general, which, in the case of the Soviet proposal, was the main goal — as reflected in the draft resolution introduced by Mongolia. Furthermore, it stated, in the preambular part of the alternative draft resolution there was a suggestion that talks between the USSR and the United States on limiting anti-satellite systems were in progress. That was not so, the USSR stated, since those talks had been broken off by the United States, and the prospects of their resumption still remained unclear.

China stated that, like many other countries, it was concerned about the increasing military rivalry between the super-Powers in outer space and therefore supported any effort which might lead to its peaceful use and against its militarization. Since the two resolutions were basically of a procedural nature, it had voted in favour of both.

The United States, in explaining its favourable vote for the draft resolution introduced by Italy and its abstention in the vote on that introduced by Mongolia, expressed the belief that the former was an adequate basis for future consideration of the question in the Committee on Disarmament; the United States was prepared to participate fully in that body in all discussions on the need for outer space arms control measures. The other draft resolution, while its purpose was worthy, was inappropriate since, according to the United States, the Soviet Union was in fact the only country which had already deployed a weapons system for destroying satellites; in any discussions on the question of arms control in outer space in the Committee on Disarmament, primary emphasis would therefore have to be placed on the threat posed by the Soviet anti-satellite system.

On 23 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution sponsored by Western and other States by a recorded vote of 110 to none with 14 abstentions.

Subsequently the General Assembly adopted the resolution, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". at its 91st meeting, as resolution 36/97 C, by a recorded vote of 129 to none, with 13 abstentions (Eastern European States (except Romania) and Afghanistan, Cuba, Lao People's Democratic Republic and Viet Nam).

The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of man's entry into outer space,

Believing that any activity in outer space should be for peaceful purposes and carried on for the benefit of all peoples, irrespective of the degree of their economic and scientific development,

Recalling that the States Parties to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, have undertaken in article III to carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding,

Recalling also article IV of the said Treaty,

Recalling further paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it is stated that, in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,

Noting the important and growing contribution of satellites both for civilian purposes and the verification of disarmament agreements and aware of the possibilities of their use to promote peace, stability and international co-operation,

Mindful of the widespread interest expressed by Member States to ensure that the exploration and use of outer space should be for peaceful purposes, *inter alia*, in the course of the negotiations on and following the adoption of the above-mentioned Treaty and taking note of proposals submitted to the General Assembly at its tenth special session, devoted to disarmament, and at its regular sessions and to the Committee on Disarmament,

Aware of the need to prevent an arms race in outer space and in particular of the threat posed by anti-satellite systems and their destabilizing effects for international peace and security,

Convinced that further measures are needed to prevent outer space from becoming an area of military confrontation, contrary to the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,

Considering it necessary for the international community to give attention to specific measures regarding the question of anti-satellite systems in the Committee on Disarmament,

Bearing in mind that the restraint of anti-satellite systems has already been a subject of negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America,

1. *Considers* that further effective measures to prevent an arms race in outer space should be adopted by the international community;

2. *Urges* all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space and to refrain from any action contrary to that aim;

3. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to consider, as from the beginning of its session in 1982, the question of negotiating effective and verifiable agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space, taking into account all existing and future proposals designed to meet this objective;

4. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to consider as a matter of priority the question of negotiating an effective and verifiable agreement to prohibit anti-satellite systems. as an important step towards the fulfilment of the objectives set out in paragraph 3 above;

5. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to report on its consideration of this subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this subject by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session an item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space and prohibition of anti-satellite systems"

On 23 November, the First Committee also approved the draft resolution sponsored by Eastern European and other States; it was endorsed by a recorded vote of 105 to none, with 20 abstentions.

The General Assembly adopted it as resolution 36/99 by a recorded vote of 123 to none, with 21 abstentions (Western States and Australia, Israel, Japan, New Zealand and Tunisia).

The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Guided by the goals of strengthening peace and international security,

Expressing the common interest of all mankind in the further exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes for the good of all States and in the interest of developing friendly relations and mutual understanding between them,

Conscious of the danger which would threaten mankind if outer space became an arena for the arms race,

Desiring not to allow outer space to become an arena for the arms race and a source of strained relations between States,

Taking into account the draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Stationing of Weapons of Any Kind in Outer Space, submitted to the General Assembly by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the views and comments expressed during the consideration of this item at its thirty-sixth session,

1. *Considers it necessary* to take effective steps, by concluding an appropriate international treaty, to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space;

2. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to embark on negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on the text of such a treaty;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space"

Conclusion

In the First Committee, it was generally accepted in 1981 that the time had come to call a halt to what many saw as the beginning of a potential arms race in outer space in areas not already covered adequately by existing international instruments. To that end many States desired a concerted effort in the Committee on Disarmament, although several drew attention to the large number of priority items which that body already had on its agenda.

All speakers saw a clear requirement that outer space continue to be used for peaceful and practical purposes. On that aspect of the question, the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, scheduled to be held in August 1982, is expected to focus on and

assess the rapid progress made in peaceful uses of space technology since the first United Nations Conference on the subject in 1968.

The two resolutions adopted by the Assembly on the disarmament aspect of the question indicate the possible emergence in the future of somewhat different approaches by Eastern European States on the one hand and Western States on the other to the question of precluding an arms race in outer space. The Eastern European approach, derived from the Soviet request for a specific new agenda item on the subject, focused in 1981 on a broad treaty to prohibit the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space, and the Assembly, by the resolution adopted under the item, called specifically for the Committee on Disarmament to embark on negotiations on such a treaty. The Western approach, on the other hand, placed emphasis on the contribution of satellites in the verification of disarmament agreements and in promoting peace, stability and international co-operation, and also on the specific question of anti-satellite systems. By the corresponding resolution the Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to consider the question of negotiating verifiable agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space, taking into account existing and future proposals and, as a matter of priority, to consider the question of an agreement to prohibit anti-satellite systems.

The year 1982 may therefore witness renewed discussion not only on both aspects of outer space — its peaceful uses as well as the question of preventing an arms race in that environment — but may also see discussion on the question of approaches to the disarmament aspects of the matter.

PART FOUR

**Other approaches to disarmament
and arms limitation**

Limitation of the buildup and transfer of conventional armaments on a world-wide and regional basis

Introduction

THE WORLD TODAY IS MORE MILITARIZED than at any other peace-time period in history. More than one hundred countries in all regions are engaged to some degree in some type of arms race or at least the acquisition of additional arms. Indeed, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)¹ calculates that during 1980 some 130 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, North America, Oceania and South America, together devoted nearly \$500 billion to military expenditures, with China, Japan and the member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization together accounting for an estimated 80 per cent of that amount. In that light and against the occurrence of incidents of armed conflict in many regions, a seemingly unfavourable international economic situation, and the apparent weakening of détente, particularly among the great Powers, the requirement for arms restraint and disarmament during 1981 was indeed urgent.

It is a reflection of the unique destructive potential of nuclear weapons that international disarmament efforts so far have been concentrated in that area, although nuclear forces account for no more than 20 per cent of total world military expenditures, there are only five known nuclear-weapon States, and such weapons have not been used in conflict since 1945. Several, largely non-aligned, developing countries have argued that nuclear weapons are particularly dangerous because, unlike the other weapons existing today, they directly threaten the very survival of civilization. Thus they most strongly believe that nuclear disarmament deserves the top priority which the General Assembly accorded it at its tenth special session. The emphasis on nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction has meant, however, that the conventional arms race has received relatively little attention, and existing disarmament-related agreements as well as those under negotiation deal largely with nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. An exception is the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate

¹ SIPRI, ed. *World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1981* (London, Taylor and Francis, 1981), pp. 147-175.

Effects, which was opened for signature in April 1981 (see chapter XV above).

In recent years, however, the global prevalence of conventional armaments, high frequency of their use, high percentage of military expenditures they consume, and technological advances raising their destructive capabilities — in some cases blurring the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons — have led to an increased consciousness of the conventional arms race. In fact, nuclear and conventional disarmament efforts may be regarded as complementary aspects of the common objective of general and complete disarmament. The view that conventional conflict frequently involves some risk of escalation into nuclear war has further contributed to an increased awareness of this complementary relationship.

Accordingly, the international community has witnessed, especially in recent years, the initiation of a number of efforts aimed at achieving concrete arrangements to restrain the buildup and transfer of conventional armaments.

Consideration of the question by the United Nations intensified significantly during 1980, especially in the Disarmament Commission and at the thirty-fifth regular session of the General Assembly where the discussions, for the first time in United Nations history, led to the adoption of a resolution — 35/156 A — specifically on a conventional disarmament matter, namely, a study of the subject.² Prior attempts — the first initiated by Malta in 1965, the second by Denmark in 1968, and the third by Japan in 1976 — to have the Assembly adopt a resolution on the arms transfer aspect of the question had failed because of opposition by several countries, in particular the non-aligned, which felt that restraints on such transfers without restraints on production would operate against recipient countries needing the weapons to defend their independence and territorial integrity.³ Those countries held that priority attention should be devoted to what they regarded as the central arms race between the two principal nuclear-weapon States and their allies. The General Assembly at its tenth special session, however, included in the Final Document various references to and recommendations on conventional disarmament covering both transfers and regional considerations.⁴ The Document, adopted by consensus, sought to reconcile the main differences of opinion between supplier countries and recipients regarding priorities and emphasis relating to nuclear vis-à-vis conventional disarmament and to conventional disarmament as such. For instance, the Assembly sought to accommodate the views of States regarding possible approaches to conventional arms restraint by recommending “bilateral, regional and multilateral” approaches.

Another possible approach is the unilateral one; for example, the United States in 1977⁵ announced a conventional arms transfer policy aimed at

² For details, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, chap. XVIII.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. 1: 1976, chap. XIX.

⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4* (A/S-10/4), sect. III, paras. 22-23, 54-55 and 81-85. The Final Document is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, appendix I.

⁵ *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, vol. 13, No. 21 (23 May 1977), p. 756.

curtailing arms transfers, by, *inter alia*, imposing unilateral restraints on United States arms supplies under certain specified conditions, promoting co-operation between supplier and recipient nations, and encouraging regional co-operation among the latter. During the 1978 special session, however, the United States and other countries observed that a unilateral approach was ineffective in the absence of action by all supplier countries. An example of the bilateral approach was the talks known as the conventional arms transfer talks between the Soviet Union and the United States held during 1977 and 1978 with the goal of curtailing the volume of armaments transferred by the two major supplier Powers.⁶

The suggested approach that has so far attracted most attention is the regional approach. Although not generally viewed as offering a final solution in itself, this approach is regarded as an aspect of the step-by-step process towards disarmament, conventional as well as nuclear. It derives from the view that in certain cases arms limitation and disarmament efforts might more easily be handled within a narrower framework than by attempting to apply broad concepts to widely differing situations on a global basis. As the United States observed in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in 1976,⁷ the regional approach could offer more promise than a world-wide scheme because States generally tend to establish their military requirements primarily on the basis of the military capabilities of their neighbours. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 33/91 E, adopted in December 1978 on the basis of a Belgian initiative, the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts, carried out a comprehensive study on regional disarmament⁸ which was submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session, in 1980. That study, among other things, concluded that "Cessation of the conventional arms race is a domain in which the inclusion of a regional aspect in the approach to disarmament is particularly important." Furthermore, the study held, "Conventional disarmament is a field in which the number of possible measures and the scope for regional initiatives is virtually unlimited."⁹

While the regional approach has been supported by countries of all geographical, political and socio-economic backgrounds, it is mainly such developed Western States as Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the United States that have stressed its value in the pursuit of conventional disarmament. Non-aligned supporters of the approach have generally emphasized the need to take into account, among other things, the special characteristics and security situations existing in each region concerned.¹⁰ India, for instance, has pointed out that because of its size and refusal on principle to align itself with any military bloc, it could not accept regional

⁶ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, chap. XXII. and *ibid.*, vol. 4: 1979, chap. XIX.

⁷ For details, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/31/27)*, vol. I, paras. 209-213; see also *The Yearbook*, vol. 4: 1979, chap. XIX.

⁸ A/35/416; the study was subsequently published as a United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.IX.2.

⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 198.

¹⁰ For details, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, chap. XVIII.

concepts in the absence of mutual trust and confidence among regional countries.

It has also been argued that the conventional arms race, particularly its international transfer aspect, has gone far beyond local or regional levels, and therefore efforts, if they are to be effective, must be pursued at broader multilateral levels, involving both supplier and recipient countries.¹¹

The existence of these varying and seemingly differing approaches illustrates a basic characteristic of the conventional disarmament question, namely, that it is very complicated and, therefore, in the view of certain States, requires further clarification.

By its resolution 35/156 A of 12 December 1980, adopted on the basis of a Danish initiative, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, approved in principle the carrying out, by the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of qualified experts, of "a study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces" By the same resolution, the Assembly agreed that the Disarmament Commission, at its 1981 substantive session, should elaborate the general approach to the study, its structure and scope, and requested the Commission to convey to the Secretary-General the conclusions of its deliberations, which should constitute the guidelines for the study; finally, it requested the Secretary-General to submit a progress report on the study to the Assembly at its second special session on disarmament, and a final report to the Assembly at its thirty-eighth session.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1981

During its 1981 substantive session, the Disarmament Commission voiced views on the question of the conventional arms race and conventional disarmament both in its general exchange and in the context of two agenda items,¹² namely, that embracing elaboration of a general approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament and, more directly, the one entitled "Elaboration of the general approach to the study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces, as well as its structure and scope". The latter was included pursuant to General Assembly resolution 35/156 A, summarized above. The following relevant papers were also submitted:

(a) "General approach, structure and scope of the United Nations study on conventional disarmament", by Denmark;¹³

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 42* (A/36/42); see also A/CN.10/PV.43-54, A/CN.10/PV.54/Add.1, A/CN.10/PV.41-54/Corrigendum and A/CN.10/32.

¹³ A/CN.10/25.

(b) "Essential elements for deciding on the scope and structure of the proposal for a study on disarmament relating to conventional weapons", by India;¹⁴

(c) Working paper entitled "Views of the Chinese delegation on conventional disarmament", by China;¹⁵

(d) "Basic elements for general approach, structure and scope of a study on conventional disarmament", by the German Democratic Republic;¹⁶ and,

(e) "Conclusions of the third substantive session of the Disarmament Commission on agenda item 4 (a) and (b)", by Yugoslavia.¹⁷

In its paper, Denmark recommended that, with respect to the general approach, structure and scope of the study, the expert group to assist the Secretary-General in carrying out the study should:

— Work on the basis of consensus;

— Be guided by the principles and perspectives contained in the Final Document;

— Seek to ascertain the facts of the conventional arms buildup, risks and costs involved, prospects for disarmament, and capabilities and effects of present and foreseeable future weapon systems;

— Examine the implications of the conventional weapons and forces existing in various regions;

— Take into account the relationship between the conventional and nuclear arms race;

— Draw upon results of the *Study on All the Aspects of Regional Disarmament*¹⁸ and other relevant studies;

— Consider the general principles and guidelines applicable to conventional disarmament;

— Seek out areas in which measures are most urgent and seem most feasible;

— Take into account the principle that disarmament should take place in an equitable and balanced manner to ensure the right of each State to security and that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage;

— Take into account the special responsibility of States with the largest military arsenals in pursuing conventional armaments reductions and the need to achieve an acceptable balance of the responsibilities and obligations of all States.

In its working paper, India presented, among other things, the view that a United Nations study on the conventional arms race would need to take into account the primary responsibility for disarmament that rested with States having the largest military arsenals, specifically the nuclear-weapon States and their allies. Regarding the international trade in conventional weapons, India stated that all kinds of military alliance arrangements pertaining to conventional weapons — gifts, offsets, deployments, prepositioning, co-production, standardization and technological co-operation — would need to be carefully examined. It would be one-sided to consider merely those transfers of conventional arms that affected the non-aligned and developing States which had only recently emerged from alien and colonial domination. Furthermore, such a study should not limit itself to the superficial aspects of

¹⁴ A/CN.10/27.

¹⁵ A/CN.10/28.

¹⁶ A/CN.10/31.

¹⁷ A/CN.10/29 [relevant in part].

¹⁸ See foot-note 8.

arms transfers but should address the underlying causes that led to acquisition of arms by States. Consideration of the question of the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons should, therefore, be based on the principle of ensuring the security of all States. Finally, alliance arrangements and doctrines pertaining to conventional weapons should be examined. Any partial study would lack credibility and serve no useful purpose, India stressed.

China, in its working paper, listed the following considerations regarding principles and steps: the two super-Powers, possessing the largest arsenals, have a major responsibility with regard to conventional disarmament; conventional disarmament should be closely linked with the safeguarding of international peace and security and against hegemonism; conventional disarmament should serve to strengthen rather than weaken the sovereignty, independence and security of small and medium-sized countries; and, besides general measures, attention should be given to partial, particularly regional, measures and zones of peace and neutrality which should be established wherever feasible, preventing dominance and hegemony in such zones and involving withdrawal of occupation forces, dismantling of foreign military bases, and termination of all forms of foreign military presence and aggression, expansion, interference and control. China held that international supervision should be prescribed for all conventional disarmament agreements. In its view, studies on the various aspects of conventional disarmament were necessary and useful; they should focus on the crux of the matter — the conventional arms race — emphasizing the super-Powers' involvement and, on the basis of findings, exploring possible ways of ending it.

The German Democratic Republic, in its paper, stated that the proposed study should search for ways and means of intensifying existing negotiations and starting new ones in order to achieve concrete results on measures of conventional disarmament. It stated that the work of the group of experts should be based on the following: the Final Document; the fact that nuclear disarmament had the highest priority; the principle of equal and undiminished security of all States and their right to self-defence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; and the principle of consensus. It further stated that the work of the group of experts should concentrate on: the growing danger of the conventional arms race and importance of achieving concrete results on both a global and regional basis; the relationship between nuclear and conventional disarmament; analysis of proposals and suggestions of States and recommendations for their implementation; freezing and reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments of permanent members of the Security Council and their allies; prohibition of conventional weapons with high destructive capability; the international transfer of arms; and measures which can facilitate disarmament (such as non-use of force and confidence-building measures). The German Democratic Republic also stated that: the group should be composed on an equitable geographical basis; work on the study should not delay or interfere with ongoing or new negotiations; and it should utilize only data officially provided by States or groups of States.

In its working paper on the general approach to negotiations on nuclear

and conventional disarmament, Yugoslavia concentrated on the nuclear aspect; while conventional considerations were implicit, the only reference the paper contained was "Attempts were being made by some nuclear-weapon States to promote the highly dangerous concept of limited nuclear war and to minimize the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons. At the same time, the so-called 'balance of deterrence' among the great Powers had not prevented their involvement in regional conflicts."

While speakers generally welcomed the working papers, their contents as well as the over-all debate revealed the complexity of the problem and persistent difficulties faced in efforts to resolve it.

Although there was general support for the idea of limiting the buildup and transfer of conventional armaments, significant differences of opinion remained among States, especially between Western and non-aligned States, on certain specific aspects of the problem. Those differences crystallized in the Commission's inability to reach a consensus which would have produced the guidelines upon which the study on conventional arms and disarmament would be based.

In general, Western States favoured the simultaneous pursuit of nuclear and conventional disarmament, especially regional conventional disarmament, while non-aligned States largely saw nuclear disarmament as the highest priority in disarmament efforts and favoured a broader approach to conventional disarmament within the framework of general and complete disarmament. Thus, the idea of a study on conventional disarmament was supported more readily by Western States. Non-aligned States, viewing the idea as a possible diversion from the priority concern of nuclear disarmament, were generally less supportive.

In the course of the general exchange of views, several Western and some non-aligned countries, among them Bangladesh, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands (on behalf of the European Community), Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, the United States and Zambia, welcomed the General Assembly's approval, in principle, of the carrying out of the study. They referred to the world-wide character of the conventional arms race and the frequent use of conventional weapons in conflict and reiterated their call for the simultaneous pursuit of nuclear and conventional disarmament. Several put forth the view that work relating to conventional disarmament should not be dependent upon or made conditional on progress in nuclear disarmament. Canada, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway specifically supported Denmark's proposals on the general approach to the study, including its structure and scope. The Western States in particular continued to stress the value of the regional approach, and endorsed the suggestion that it be examined in the study. France proposed that the study include recommendations on the most appropriate principles, conditions and methods for carrying out regional conventional disarmament. The Federal Republic of Germany shared the view, contained in India's working paper, that the study should be global and comprehensive.

A number of non-aligned countries, among them Chile, Costa Rica and Pakistan, also supported the regional approach while acknowledging the global scope of disarmament, nuclear as well as conventional. Chile regarded the approach as "realistic" and Pakistan stressed its "usefulness". Costa Rica felt that regional measures could help eliminate interference, intervention and violation of the territorial integrity of States, and strengthen the security of a given region at a lower level of armaments.

Other non-aligned and socialist countries, including Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cuba, Cyprus, Egypt, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, the USSR and Yugoslavia, while not opposing the study in question, emphasized certain reservations and factors which they held should be taken into account in the consideration of any proposal for a study on conventional armaments and conventional disarmament; among them were the following: (a) nuclear disarmament remained the highest disarmament priority and any work to be undertaken in the conventional field should neither divert nor dilute attention from the danger posed by nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction; (b) the primary responsibility for conventional disarmament lay with the nuclear-weapon States which, together with their military allies, possessed the largest arsenals and produced and exported most conventional armaments; (c) a distinction must be made between conventional arms requirements of non-producing States for defence of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, and acquisitions for aggression, domination or oppression; (d) the resources devoted to the conventional arms race, especially by the major military Powers, should be documented, and an examination made of the socio-economic effects of such expenditures and of the possibilities for reallocation of such resources; (e) attention must be paid to the qualitative aspect of the conventional arms race, including research, and development activities.

Cuba stated that such a study must also consider such issues as "the dismantling of foreign military bases, the provocation of local conflicts, the use of mercenaries in aggression against sovereign States, the destabilization of established Governments and the carrying out of military manoeuvres which threaten and intimidate neighbouring States". Mexico said such a study should take into account, *inter alia*, "the inherent right of self-defence", the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter regarding the sovereign equality of States and the prohibition of recourse to the threat or use of force. It called attention to the sovereignty which States should legitimately enjoy over their natural resources, in accordance with the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order.¹⁹ adopted by the General Assembly in 1974 at its sixth special session, which was devoted to economic issues. Brazil suggested that such a study examine special arrangements between major arms producers and recipients parties in such arrangements.

Several non-aligned States, for varying reasons, also opposed the emphasis given to the regional approach by certain Western and other States,

¹⁹ See General Assembly resolution 3201 (S-VI), para. 3 (e).

with Algeria urging avoidance of over-emphasis on that approach, since international security was of world-wide relevance. Sri Lanka observed that the countries focusing attention on regional conventional disarmament were those with some of the largest conventional arsenals and suggested that their regions might therefore take the lead. Argentina questioned the value of the regional approach since, in its view, the military might of the great Powers enabled them to station and rapidly deploy their forces to all areas of the world, which would place any State attempting to restrict its arsenals under a regional approach in an even more disadvantageous position. India observed that the regional approach to conventional disarmament had already been examined in a recent United Nations study,²⁰ and therefore held that a comprehensive study on the conventional arms race and conventional disarmament should be global in character and not concerned unduly with the regional perspective.

Among the Eastern European countries, which also expressed some reservations, the USSR stated that its position was based on the belief that the usefulness of all studies such as that under consideration should be determined primarily by the extent to which they promoted, in practical terms, the elaboration and conclusion of arms limitation agreements. Bulgaria shared that position, stating that it was important to promote, in every way possible, "practical steps" to limit conventional armaments.

In light of the evident differing views among Member States on the study in question, the Disarmament Commission, in pursuance of its mandate under resolution 35/156 A, established an informal working group with the following terms of reference:

The Disarmament Commission decides to establish a working group to elaborate the general approach to the study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces, as well as its structure and scope.

In this task the working group will take appropriate account of various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and the ongoing work aimed at elaborating, within the framework and in accordance with the priorities established at the tenth special session, a general approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament.

The Netherlands, on behalf of the ten Member States of the European Community, and the United States expressed reservations on the formulation of the working group's mandate because of the reference in it to the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The United States thought that such references should be avoided unless they were directly relevant to conventional disarmament and the Netherlands similarly stressed that the mandate for the study should concentrate on the question of conventional weapons.

In the course of the working group's deliberations, the Chairman produced and submitted, at the group's request, a working paper synthesizing various views expressed with a view to elaborating an agreed text on the subject in question; he subsequently submitted a revised version.²¹

²⁰ See foot-note 8.

²¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 42* (A/36/42), annexes II (original) and III (revised) (both reproduced overleaf).

According to the Chairman's original paper:

...

4. The general approach of the study should take full account of the following principles:

(a) The provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament are of primary importance, particularly those in paragraphs 54 and 55, and 81 to 88.

(b) Within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament, the achievement of nuclear disarmament has been accorded the highest priority, and it is clear that the achievement of disarmament measures cannot be predicated solely upon progress in conventional disarmament. However, it would be beneficial to world peace and the security of small and medium-sized countries if progress could be made simultaneously in the fields of conventional and nuclear disarmament.

(c) The primary responsibility for disarmament rests with States having the largest military arsenals. Nevertheless, other countries are also important in the context of promoting conventional disarmament, and their contribution in this regard could be invaluable in lessening world tension.

(d) Consideration of the question of the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons should be based on the principle of ensuring the security of all States. Therefore it is essential that the adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and that no individual State or group of States should obtain advantage over others at any stage.

(e) Negotiations on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armament should be based on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level.

(f) The study should make a detailed account of both global and regional aspects, recognizing that these are often complementary and that the understanding of their interdependence could do much to lead to acceptable measures of arms limitation and control.

(g) The expert group should be guided by the principle of consensus in its reporting, with sufficient flexibility to allow the reflection of differing viewpoints.

5. The scope and structure of the study should include the following elements:

(a) The root causes of the arms race in conventional weapons;

(b) A factual assessment of the conventional arms buildup, including the costs involved, the size of conventional arsenals, the capabilities and effects of present weapons systems and foreseeable developments;

(c) The nature of military alliances, the extent of foreign deployments, bases and pre-positioning of men or materials;

(d) The question of international conventional arms transfers;

(e) The use of conventional arms for interference in internal affairs of other States;

(f) A description of the relevant social, economic and political effects and consequences of the conventional arms race on the international situation.

6. In addition to other sources, it is recommended that the expert group should make full use of the studies by the Secretary-General already completed or in preparation, as well as the three working papers submitted to the Disarmament Commission (A/CN.10/25, 27 and 28).

According to the revised version:

...

4. The general approach of the study should take full account of the following provisions and principles:

(a) The relevant provisions in connexion with principles and priorities set out in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament are of primary importance and should be strictly observed.

(b) Effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the

highest priority. To this end it is imperative to remove the threat of nuclear weapons, to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race until the total elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems has been achieved, and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, it would be beneficial to world peace and the security of all countries if progress could be made in the field of conventional disarmament within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament.

(c) The special responsibility for disarmament rests with States having the largest military arsenals. Nevertheless, the contribution of other countries is also invaluable in the context of promoting conventional disarmament and in lessening world tension.

(d) Consideration of the question of the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons should take into account the need of all States to protect their security. The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and so that no individual State or group of States obtain advantage over others at any stage.

(e) Based on the principle of undiminished security of the parties, negotiations on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armament should aim at promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level.

(f) Agreements on reduction of armed forces and armaments should include appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements.

(g) The study should take account of both global and regional aspects of the conventional arms race bearing in mind that their complementary and interdependent nature could do much to lead to acceptable measures of arms limitation and disarmament.

(h) The study should seek appropriate ways and means conducive not only to perpetuating current but also initiating new negotiations that would produce concrete results in the field of conventional disarmament.

(i) The expert group should be guided by the principle of consensus in its reporting, with sufficient flexibility to allow the reflection of differing viewpoints.

5. The scope and structure of the study should include the following elements:

(a) The identification of principal underlying causes of the arms race in conventional weapons;

(b) A factual account of all aspects of the conventional arms buildup on the basis of available data, particularly the cost involved, the size of conventional arsenals, theatre nuclear weapons, the capabilities and effects of present weapons systems and foreseeable technological research developments;

(c) The nature of military alliances, political doctrines and arrangements having military implications;

(d) The question of international conventional arms transfers;

(e) Use of conventional arms against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence of any State and for intervention and interference in the internal affairs of States;

(f) Impact of technological advance and research and development upon the conventional weapons capability of States, and upon the arms race both in the nuclear and conventional fields;

(g) A description of the relevant social, economic and political effects and consequences of the conventional arms race on the international situation;

(h) Contribution of confidence-building measures to further progress of conventional disarmament.

6. In addition to other sources, it is recommended that the expert group should make full use of the studies by the Secretary-General already completed or in preparation, as well as the three working papers and two conference room papers submitted to the Disarmament Commission (A/CN.10/25, 27 and 28; A/CN.10/81/WG.II/CRP.1 and 2).

7. In their findings, the members of the expert group should include their assessments of the effects of the conventional arms race on the prospects for disarmament. They should also identify areas in which measures to curb the conventional arms race and to achieve conventional disarmament are most urgent and seem most feasible.

The working group was unable to reach a consensus on either of the Chairman's papers, resulting in the Disarmament Commission's adoption of the following substantive recommendation²² to the General Assembly on the subject:

...
6. The intensive discussions and consultations revealed a significant divergence of views on the matters before the Commission on this item and it became clear that it was not possible at this stage for the Commission to discharge the responsibility assigned to it by the General Assembly in resolution 35/156 A. In the circumstances some delegations expressed the desire for further time to consider the nature of the study, particularly in the light of the valuable discussions that had taken place. Some other delegations expressed their readiness to accept the Chairman's paper as a mandate for the study. The Commission, therefore, decided to recommend to Member States to give the matter further consideration in the light of all the papers presented to the Working Group, with the aim of reconciling the differences of views.

The recommendations adopted by the Commission in connection with its agenda item on the arms race and a general approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament²³ included the following paragraphs:

5. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reduction.

...
9. Among the views expressed during the course of the Commission's deliberations, some members maintained that the easing of international tensions could not be based on the policy of balance of force, spheres of influence, rivalry between power blocs, military alliances and the accumulation of armaments, particularly nuclear weapons. On the other hand, another view was expressed that, for some countries of a particular region, security, hence, peace, was indeed based on an overall balance in which the nuclear element was combined with the conventional element: the aims must be to improve security conditions in the area and then to achieve progressive reductions in arms.

The Disarmament Commission's inability to work out guidelines for the study on conventional disarmament as requested by the General Assembly in resolution 35/156 A meant, in effect, that the specific question of the study as well as the over-all subject of conventional disarmament would be referred back to the General Assembly for further consideration.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1981

During 1981, the Committee on Disarmament did not have an item on its agenda dealing specifically with conventional disarmament. This reflected, as noted above, that the question of international conventional disarmament is mainly at a deliberative, rather than negotiating, stage. Most references to the

²² *Ibid.*, Supplement No. 42 (A/36/42), para. 21 (section entitled "Recommendations on item 6").

²³ *Ibid.*, para. 19 (section entitled "Recommendations on agenda item 4 (a) and (b)").

subject in the Committee were made in the general debate in plenary meetings and in the discussions on a comprehensive programme of disarmament.²⁴ Frequently, they reflected known differing positions of States or groups, similar to those summarized above.

Several speakers of non-aligned delegations in the Committee, while saying conventional disarmament was important, continued to stress that nuclear disarmament deserved the highest priority and the greatest attention of international disarmament efforts; for instance, India argued, "nuclear weapons cannot in any manner be equated to conventional weapons" Other non-aligned delegations noted that nuclear weapons were weapons of mass destruction, while conventional arms were not. That of Mexico, for example, said "exaggerating the size and the dangers of arsenals of conventional weapons is certainly not the best way of achieving the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament"

Other, largely Western, members of the Committee, among them the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, as well as China, called again for conventional disarmament measures, with the United Kingdom holding that disarmament efforts should not give "undue prominence to nuclear weapons" Italy favoured a balance between nuclear and conventional disarmament measures on the basis of its established position that balance was fundamental for the attainment and preservation of security, especially in Europe. China declared that, while nuclear disarmament should be emphasized, conventional disarmament should not be overlooked and both should be pursued simultaneously.

Romania stated that it did not deny the existence of a link between nuclear and conventional weapons but at the same time held that the idea of such a link should be discussed with a view to elucidating all its implications, because the lack of consequent action merely strengthened the arguments of those States that said they produced nuclear weapons to ensure their security.

Differences were apparent also on the question of the approach to conventional disarmament. Belgium and Pakistan reaffirmed their support of the regional approach. In Pakistan's view, peace and security in certain areas would be enhanced by the establishment of a military equilibrium between the States in the regions concerned. Pakistan reiterated its readiness to enter into negotiations with its neighbours to agree on a mutually acceptable and balanced ratio of forces.

India continued to express reservations about the regional approach, declaring that its value should not be "unduly exaggerated" According to India, what happened in one region affected another, and therefore to try to concentrate on certain regions without due regard to the global situation would be "unrealistic" Regional disarmament measures therefore should first address the removal of foreign military presence and interference, particularly by major outside Powers in regions far from their own shores. In that connection, India saw the nuclear-weapon States and their military allies as

²⁴ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27)*, particularly paras. 6-11 and 121-127.

primarily responsible for the conventional arms race and hence for conventional disarmament. The German Democratic Republic, for its part, reaffirmed the proposal of the socialist countries for the permanent members of the Security Council and their military allies to undertake not to increase their conventional armaments and armed forces as a first step towards their reduction. China re-emphasized its view that the two super-Powers should take the lead in conventional and nuclear disarmament.

Europe, the region with the largest concentration of armaments and forces in the world, continued to attract special mention in the discussions relating to conventional disarmament. Several European States, Eastern as well as Western, stressed the importance of mutually balanced arms restraint and confidence building in the region and, in that connection, referred to the ongoing Madrid review Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe²⁵ and the Vienna Talks on Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe. Belgium, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania and the USSR, among others, hoped that the Madrid Conference would reach a consensus regarding the holding of a subsequent European disarmament conference. In that connection, the German Democratic Republic and Poland specifically supported the proposal of the parties to the Warsaw Treaty that such a conference, to deal with military détente and disarmament in Europe, be held in Warsaw with the participation of all the countries taking part in the Madrid meetings. Belgium and the Federal Republic of Germany, for their part, specifically supported a French proposal that such a conference be held within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to consider, at the first stage, militarily significant, binding and verifiable confidence-building measures applicable to the entire European continent.²⁶

Regarding the Vienna talks on mutual force reductions in Central Europe, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy pointed out that individually and collectively with their other NATO partners in the talks they sought a mutually balanced and stable relationship of forces at a lower level as a means, in the words of the Federal Republic of Germany, "of achieving genuine parity in military manpower in the form of a common collective ceiling for each side on the basis of agreed data" Belgium and the Federal Republic explained that, collectively, the Western participants in the Vienna talks had proposed an interim first-stage agreement on reductions in Soviet and United States forces and had also submitted a set of associated measures designed to strengthen confidence among the participants; they were still awaiting reactions to their concrete proposals from the Eastern European side.

Among the Eastern European States participating in the Vienna negotiations, Poland and the Soviet Union said they were dedicated to the early

²⁵ The review Conference opened at Madrid on 11 November 1980 and continued, with various recesses, during 1981. The original Conference was held at Geneva and Helsinki between 3 July 1972 and 1 August 1975.

²⁶ For further details see *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, chap. XVIII, pp. 346-347.

attainment of mutual reductions of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. Hungary, which pointed out that it was not a full participant in those talks, stated that it attached great importance to them and hoped they would lead to positive results. The Soviet Union considered, furthermore, that constructive discussions in the Committee on Disarmament would be conducive to progress in the Vienna talks and other related negotiations.

Pakistan thought that differing perceptions with regard to the existing situation regarding armaments and armed forces in Europe constituted a hindrance to the realization of an agreement at Vienna on mutual balance at a lower level in Central Europe. In Pakistan's view, a more in-depth explanation of those differing perceptions could produce a fuller understanding of the difficulties confronting the Vienna negotiations and assist in the evolution of more precise guidelines regarding the relationship between nuclear and conventional disarmament in that region.

During the Committee's debate on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, scheduled to be submitted to the General Assembly at its second special session on disarmament in 1982 (see chapter IV above), speakers generally supported the inclusion of conventional disarmament in such a programme. China, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and Poland particularly urged that conventional disarmament should be fully reflected in the programme; they were joined by two States, Denmark and Finland, which were not members of the Committee but were invited upon request to participate in certain of its meetings, including those of its *Ad Hoc* Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. Finland stressed that conventional and nuclear disarmament should be included in the programme in a "balanced" way, while Denmark called for its "proper" inclusion. Poland, for its part, emphasized the need for serious efforts to be made to end the conventional arms race and reduce conventional armaments and armed forces. China proposed that in formulating the programme, "serious attention" should be given to partial measures, including regional measures.

For its part, India stressed anew that emphasis in the comprehensive disarmament programme should be given to nuclear and not conventional disarmament, in keeping with the existing order of priorities in disarmament negotiations. While it was not against conventional disarmament, it could not agree that nuclear and conventional disarmament efforts should proceed "hand in hand".

Although the Committee's discussions on conventional disarmament remained general, prospects for a more concentrated and detailed examination advanced somewhat in 1981 in that several members, including China, Italy, and Pakistan, expressed a hope that the Committee would take up the question more specifically in the future. China held that that would be beneficial to the cause of disarmament as a whole, Italy felt that it would serve the interests of the balance and efficiency of the Committee's work, and Pakistan suggested that it would help the Committee clarify the relationship between nuclear and conventional disarmament.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1981

At the General Assembly's thirty-sixth session, a large number of countries from diverse economic, political, ideological and geographical backgrounds referred to and supported, in varying degrees, the limitation of the buildup and transfer of conventional armaments.²⁷ For the second consecutive year, the discussions led to the adoption of a relevant resolution, namely, resolution 36/97 A of 9 December 1981, entitled "Study on conventional disarmament". In addition, resolution 36/97 H of the same date dealt with follow-up of the 1980 report entitled "Study on all the aspects of regional disarmament"²⁸

In general, Western States continued to see conventional arms control and disarmament as an important question that should be pursued simultaneously with that of nuclear disarmament, while developing and non-aligned countries largely regarded it as a problem secondary to nuclear disarmament, which should be considered in the context of efforts towards general and complete disarmament. According to the non-aligned view, in a world where a handful of States produced and controlled the bulk of armaments, the legitimate rights to security of States, especially newly independent ones, could only be protected through such a broadly based approach. Furthermore, conventional weapons, no matter how sophisticated, and nuclear weapons could not be seen in the same light because only the latter threatened mankind's very survival. Thus, while conventional disarmament was desirable, nuclear disarmament remained the highest priority item in global disarmament efforts. India, in that context, stated that if conventional disarmament were not considered with caution, not only might the goal of nuclear disarmament be downgraded, but a discriminatory régime might be brought about in the area of conventional weapons, as currently existed in the nuclear field.

A number of other, largely Western, States, among them Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, emphasized the importance of balance between nuclear and conventional armaments, especially in Europe, with Italy explaining that the parallel pursuit of nuclear and conventional disarmament would help maintain a military balance compatible with the principle of undiminished security throughout the process. Ireland and Italy saw also a direct relationship between the nuclear and conventional arms races, since the growth of conventional arsenals of one side could provide an impetus for the other side to expand its nuclear arsenals to redress a substantive imbalance. Belgium expressed a similar concern, holding that the uncontrolled growth of conventional weapons could lead to a risk of nuclear proliferation, and Ireland expressed the view that some nuclear-weapon States would be unprepared to accept major reductions in nuclear armaments unless similar measures were also taken in the conventional field.

²⁷ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 33rd and 91st meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 44th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

²⁸ See foot-note 8.

As on previous occasions, States which advocated conventional disarmament reiterated their well-known views pointing out, in particular, that the conventional arms race consumed the bulk of world military expenditures; diverted resources from the socio-economic development, particularly of the developing countries; created or exacerbated tensions in many parts of the world; and was responsible for the death and destruction resulting from the many armed conflicts that had continued to confront mankind since the end of the Second World War. The speakers generally took the position that the conventional arms race could not be ignored, and some of them, including representatives of Austria, the Netherlands and Spain, regretted that the problem had so far not received sufficient attention within the United Nations.

A number of supporters of increased consideration of conventional disarmament emphasized the destabilizing economic and other consequences of armaments, especially in the developing countries. In that connection, the Philippines explained that, by destabilizing the economies of those engaged in it, the arms race jeopardized internal stability and well-being and therefore served to increase insecurity. The Philippines also contended that increased acquisitions of conventional arms could raise the level of fear and threat in the minds of neighbours and possible adversaries, and thus be counter-productive by encouraging neighbours to adopt measures to eliminate the dangers they perceived in the other's increased levels of armaments. Zambia saw the quantitative and qualitative conventional arms race, especially in the developing areas, as threatening world peace and security "in no small measure". New Zealand, while observing that all States were entitled to maintain armed forces for defence, which in some cases had a restraining effect, considered that in other cases conventional armaments and armed forces increased the potential for conflict, with the risk of great-Power involvement and consequent threat to international security. China saw the super-Powers as using not only nuclear but also conventional weapons to threaten world peace and the independence and security of States and, accordingly, it called for the simultaneous pursuit of nuclear and conventional disarmament. The Byelorussian SSR considered that the reduction of conventional weapons would be an important measure for peace and would contribute to confidence-building and military détente.

Several other countries stressed the socio-economic advantages that would accrue from the adoption of effective measures of conventional arms restraint. Greece expressed a widely shared viewpoint when it stated that progress in conventional disarmament would have favourable consequences on the economies and development efforts of all countries, especially the smaller ones.

An aspect of the conventional arms race that continued to provoke considerable discussion was the question of the international transfers of weapons through trade and other arrangements. Most delegations which referred to that question, including those of Chile, the German Democratic Republic, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Rwanda, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the Ukrainian SSR, the USSR and the United States, generally supported the limitation of sales and other types of transfers of conventional

armaments. Chile held that such transfers influenced the formation of profitable military-industrial complexes, thereby stimulating the arms race in countries not possessing competitive weapons factories. Ireland observed that the international arms trade had been growing at an average annual rate of \$5 billion since 1975. According to Sweden, which cited estimates of the Group of Governmental Experts that had studied the relationship between disarmament and development (see chapter XXI below), that trade had grown to be worth some \$35 billion per year. Sweden noted, furthermore, that 75 per cent of that amount represented imports by developing countries, with some five Middle Eastern States accounting for about a third of all major weapons imported by the third world during the 1977-1980 period. According to the same figures, Sweden explained, eight countries — Czechoslovakia, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Poland, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States — had supplied an estimated 90 per cent of the weapons involved in the international arms traffic each year, with France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States together supplying 80 per cent.

Several developing countries, including Barbados, Bhutan, Jamaica, Lebanon, Nigeria and Rwanda, deplored transfers of armaments to developing countries in particular, because they consumed limited resources vitally needed for socio-economic development, and provided potential opportunities for mistrust, tension and conflict at the regional level. In that connection, several States made reference to developments in specific regions. Iraq, Jordan and Syria believed that what they saw as "massive" United States arms deliveries to Israel were threatening to both Middle Eastern and world peace and security. Israel, for its part, contended that the Arab countries were engaged in an extensive and costly programme of arms acquisition aimed at Israel. Papua New Guinea expressed concern over weapons deliveries to the Middle East in that such transfers promoted tensions in that region. Viet Nam condemned United States arms transfers to certain countries in Asia, arguing that they encouraged subversion and destabilization, particularly in the south-east Asian subregion. Cuba and Nicaragua similarly deplored United States arms supplies to certain Latin American countries. At the same time, Cuba denied allegations that weapons it had acquired from the USSR for its defence had been redistributed in Latin America.

For its part, the United States contended that in the transfer of conventional weapons to developing countries, the USSR surpassed any other country. It stated that in 1980 the USSR had signed agreements worth \$15 billion in arms sales to those countries, and that since 1977 it had supplied to those areas "twice as many tanks — 5,750 compared to 3,030; thrice as many artillery pieces — 7,150 compared to 2,780; four times as many fighter jets — 2,290 compared to 540; and twice as many anti-aircraft missiles — 11,400 compared to 4,960 — as any other single supplier" As mentioned earlier, the USSR and the United States had held bilateral talks in 1977 and 1978 aimed at limiting conventional arms transfers. In that connection, the Soviet Union stated that it was the United States which had unilaterally broken off those talks at the end of 1978, as it had done also in respect of talks on other issues. Ireland observed that with a few exceptions the weapons used in

the many armed conflicts in the developing world during the past decade had been supplied by the industrialized countries.

Without opposing the limitation of arms transfers, several developing countries re-emphasized their established position that restraints should also be applied on weapons production because to limit only supplies would place recipient countries — largely newly independent States with limited or no weapons production capability — at a disadvantage vis-à-vis producer States. That would infringe on the rights of all States and peoples to self-determination and to the protection of their sovereignty and territorial integrity. In that connection, Djibouti called for the provision of material and other assistance to liberation movements in southern Africa.

With regard to approaches to the limitation of the buildup and transfer of conventional arms, various suggestions were advanced. The regional approach continued to attract support from countries of all geographical, economic and political backgrounds. The Byelorussian SSR, among others, pointed out that the regional approach was aimed at supplementing global efforts by combating the arms race in individual regions. Furthermore, States generally planned their military programmes on the basis of the military capabilities of their neighbours.

France, which held that the conventional arms race lent itself to regional solutions, suggested that potential confrontations might be mitigated through the establishment of a regional or subregional system for the evaluation of military forces, or by concluding agreements, backed by appropriate control and verification measures, on the self-limitation of armaments in a regional framework.

Europe, with the world's largest concentration of armed forces and armaments, conventional as well as nuclear, was again frequently mentioned as a specific and exceptional example of a region offering opportunities for the regional approach, particularly to conventional disarmament. Several European countries, Eastern as well as Western, reaffirmed their support for a European disarmament conference and re-emphasized the importance of the Vienna Talks on Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe. The United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of the ten Member States of the European Community, and the Federal Republic of Germany separately, saw the goal of the Vienna Talks as mutual reductions in conventional forces in the region to improve military stability and rid Central Europe of the fear of possible surprise attack. Turkey viewed the proposed European disarmament conference as providing an opportunity to deepen the military dimension of the détente process begun at the 1975 Helsinki Conference²⁹ — for instance, through the advance notification of military manoeuvres and troop movements and mutual military visits for the purpose of building confidence and trust in Europe. France, which had made a specific proposal in 1978 for a European disarmament conference to be attended by the parties to the Helsinki accords, explained that, by its plan, the first stage of such a conference would deal with militarily significant, restraining and

²⁹ Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe held at Helsinki and Geneva between 3 July 1972 and 1 August 1975: see also foot-note 25.

verifiable confidence-building measures for all of Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals", and the second stage would cover the reduction of conventional weapons.

Apart from regional initiatives, other approaches, including the bilateral approach, have also been undertaken towards curbing the world-wide buildup and transfer of conventional armaments.

Among other previously suggested measures for limiting conventional armaments that were reiterated at the thirty-sixth session of the Assembly were (a) the Federal Republic of Germany's proposal for the creation by the United Nations of two registers, one on conventional arms transfers, and the other on the amount which industrialized countries spent annually per capita on arms and on development assistance; (b) the Warsaw Treaty members' proposal to freeze the conventional armaments and armed forces of the permanent members of the Security Council and their military allies as the first step towards their reduction; (c) Italy's proposal for the establishment of a United Nations body structured in regional commissions composed of suppliers and recipients, for the purpose of monitoring, controlling and limiting, through agreed procedures, the international arms trade; and (d) Turkey's call for concrete measures to control small arms sales involving private companies, in order to counter terrorist activities at all levels. In addition, widely held views were re-emphasized, particularly by developing countries, to the effect that the peaceful settlement of disputes, the expansion of the process of détente, the non-introduction of bloc rivalries into local conflicts, the creation of zones of peace, and non-interference in the internal affairs of States could help obviate the buildup of armaments. India restated its position that, since the nuclear-weapon Powers produced, stockpiled and sold the bulk of conventional weapons, they not only bore primary responsibility but also had to take the lead in measures of conventional disarmament. Ireland also observed that the nuclear Powers, in particular the USSR and the United States, were the major suppliers, and stated that it had "considerable sympathy" with those who argued that the major responsibility for the conventional arms race and restraint therein lay with those Powers.

As was the case at its thirty-fifth session of the Assembly in 1980 and in the Disarmament Commission in 1981, the discussions on conventional disarmament at the thirty-sixth session of the Assembly also covered the question of a comprehensive United Nations study on the subject. The proposal for such a study had been initiated by Denmark and led to the adoption of resolution 35/156 A of 12 December 1980, the first General Assembly resolution on conventional disarmament since the early days of the Organization. By that resolution, the Assembly approved in principle the carrying out of the study and requested the Disarmament Commission to work out the general approach to the study, its structure and scope. As indicated above, the Commission was unable to reach a consensus on those guidelines, and recommended in its report³⁰ that Member States give the matter further consideration.

³⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/36/42).*

While no State specifically opposed the Danish proposal, support expressed for it in the general debate came largely from Western countries, among them Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain and the United Kingdom speaking on behalf of the ten members of the European Community. The Netherlands and the United Kingdom saw the proposed study as complementing the United Nations study on nuclear weapons³¹ while France and Italy regarded it as helping to clarify the complexity of the conventional disarmament question, and New Zealand viewed it as a first step towards enlarging the role of the United Nations in the field of conventional arms restraint. Spain thought that the carrying out of the study would be favourably received by world public opinion which could not understand how the conventional arms race, which fueled numerous armed conflicts, could have been so ignored. Greece felt that commencing the study as soon as possible would enable the Assembly at its second special session on disarmament to have sound technical information in the form of an interim report on which it could base its consideration of conventional disarmament problems. Nepal believed that the study could form the basis for efforts to control international conventional arms transfers. For its part, Ireland, which supported the study, believed that it should be placed in the over-all context of disarmament and that the relationship between conventional and nuclear disarmament should also be examined. Egypt felt that the proposed study must be conducted "within the correct perspective"; it should therefore first recognize that priority rested with nuclear disarmament, secondly, take into account the root causes of the conventional arms race and, thirdly, not be used to infringe on the rights of peoples and States to self-determination, sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence.

On 5 November, Denmark submitted a draft resolution entitled "Study on conventional disarmament" under the Assembly's agenda item on general and complete disarmament. By the draft, the Assembly, among other things, would request the Secretary-General to initiate the work of the expert group which would assist him in carrying out the study, taking as guidance for the general approach, structure and scope of the study the deliberations of the Disarmament Commission in 1981, as reflected in the Commission's report.³² It would request the Secretary-General to submit a progress report on the study to the Assembly at its second special session on disarmament, in 1982, and a final report at its thirty-eighth session, in 1983.

In introducing the draft resolution at the 28th meeting, on 10 November, Denmark observed that although "the necessary total consensus" had not been reached in the Disarmament Commission on guidelines for the study, the Commission's deliberations had nevertheless provided a good basis on which to proceed with the study.

In commenting on the Danish draft, Brazil, India and Peru saw it as

³¹ *Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons* (United Nations publication, Sales No.E.81.I.11); the study was initially distributed as document A/35/392.

³² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 42* (A/36/42), para. 21 and annex III (annex III appears on pp. 288-289 above; see also p. 287).

eroding the competence of the Disarmament Commission to which the General Assembly, in resolution 35/156 A, had assigned the responsibility for working out the general approach, structure and scope of the proposed study. Since the Commission had been unable to reach a consensus on the matter and nothing had happened since its substantive session to indicate that the divergence of views had been reconciled, India wondered what the scope or the terms of reference for such a study would be if an expert group were to be set up to proceed with it, as provided for by the draft. Brazil and India both believed that proceeding on the basis of the Danish draft would exacerbate the divergent views that remained among Member States. India held that a study conducted without clear-cut and agreed guidelines would have limited relevance and virtually no practical impact.

Emphasizing their support for the enhancement of the role of the Disarmament Commission, the same three States, Brazil, India and Peru, called upon Member States to avoid actions that might adversely affect that body's role. In that connection, India, and subsequently Brazil, recommended that the draft resolution be withdrawn so as to allow the Disarmament Commission, at its subsequent session, to give further consideration to the question of working out guidelines for the study which would meet with the approval of all. India stated that, pending the elaboration of such agreed guidelines, Member States, at the second special session, might put forward their own ideas and recommendations on conventional disarmament measures.

Greece, Spain and the United Kingdom on behalf of the ten Members of the European Community supported the Danish proposal providing for the establishment of the expert group and proceeding with the study. Greece and the United Kingdom stated that to commence the study without further delay would, among other things, permit the Secretary-General to submit an interim report to the General Assembly at its second special session. Spain added that referring the question back to the Disarmament Commission would be tantamount to preventing the study from being carried out. Moreover, the United Kingdom stated, the deliberations of and working papers submitted to the Disarmament Commission had provided a "very good basis" on which the study could begin. Since expert studies contributed to policy decisions taken by Governments, the experts should be allowed to carry out the study taking as their starting point the views already expressed by Member States. There should not be an attempt to impose rigid guidelines on every aspect of the experts' work. In the view of the European Community, the study would assist Member States in their further reconsideration of the question of conventional disarmament as a whole. Regarding the concerns expressed that adoption of the draft resolution would detract from the standing of the Disarmament Commission, the Ten did not share those concerns since the draft provided that the deliberations of the Commission at its 1981 substantive session should be taken into account in the preparation of the study. Furthermore, to refer the question back to the Commission could in itself detract from that body's standing.

In the light of the substantive divergence of views on its proposal, Denmark, after consulting with several Member States, submitted a revised

version to the First Committee on 23 November. By the revised draft, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, would request the Secretary-General to establish the group of experts; request the Disarmament Commission to complete, at its 1982 substantive session, its consideration of guidelines for the study and transmit its conclusions to the group; and agree that the expert group should pursue its work following that session.

In introducing the revised text, Denmark, on 24 November, explained that the new draft was being offered in a spirit of compromise in order to secure the broadest possible support among Member States for the proposed study. Denmark reiterated its view that the question of conventional armaments should be given "a proper place" in international disarmament efforts and that the proposed study could form a solid basis for future discussions on the subject.

Brazil, which appreciated that the sponsor had made efforts to take into account the difficulties of several Members, re-emphasized that the Disarmament Commission must be allowed to complete its deliberations on the guidelines for the study. At the same time, it proposed an amendment to the revised draft consisting of the addition of the words "if necessary" between the words "and" and "deliberations" in operative paragraph 3 so that the amended paragraph would read as follows:

Agrees that the expert group should pursue its work after the above-mentioned session of the Disarmament Commission taking into consideration such conclusions as the Commission may submit to it, and, if necessary, the deliberations at the 1981 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission, in particular those reflected in paragraph 21 and annex III of the report on that session.

The amendment was accepted by Denmark. The First Committee, on 25 November, at its 43rd meeting, approved the revised draft, as amended, by a recorded vote of 98 to none, with 21 abstentions. Western States as well as China supported the proposal; Eastern European and other States abstained.

In explaining their positions, a number of delegations, among them the Bahamas, Ecuador, Pakistan and Peru, agreed that the revised draft, as amended, had removed the preoccupations the initial version had created regarding the mandate of the Disarmament Commission to work out the general approach to the study, including its structure and scope, in accordance with resolution 35/156 A of 12 December 1980, and welcomed the fact that the Commission would continue its work on those guidelines. The Bahamas regarded support for the revised draft resolution as a strengthening factor for the mandate and purpose of the Disarmament Commission; it considered, furthermore, that the experts need not be bound solely by the guidelines emanating from the Disarmament Commission but should also incorporate their own views in order to ensure a comprehensive report. The Bahamas, Ecuador and Pakistan believed also that the proposed study could contribute to a better understanding of the various aspects of the conventional arms race.

India, which abstained in the vote, felt that, although the revised text had addressed some of its preoccupations, the study should be undertaken only after the Disarmament Commission's guidelines on the general approach, scope and structure of the study had been fully discussed and agreed upon in

that body. It reiterated its view that nuclear disarmament remained the highest priority and must not be based upon progress in conventional disarmament, which must be pursued within the framework of general and complete disarmament. It held that the nuclear-weapon States and their allies bore primary responsibility for the conventional arms race and accordingly had to take the first step towards conventional disarmament.

The Soviet Union, in explaining its abstention, referred to annex III of the report of the Disarmament Commission containing proposals on the scope and structure of the proposed study. It could not agree with those proposals because it regarded them as one-sided in that they emphasized such questions as the nature of military alliances, political doctrines, and questions related to the qualitative aspects of the conventional arms race. Such proposals emphasized the collection of data on alliances and armaments rather than measures towards limiting and reducing conventional arms.

At its 91st plenary meeting on 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the revised draft resolution by a recorded vote of 114 to none, with 26 abstentions, as resolution 36/97 A. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 35/156 A of 12 December 1980 in which it approved, in principle, the carrying out of a study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces, to be undertaken by the Secretary-General with the assistance of a group of qualified experts appointed by him on a balanced geographical basis,

Recalling the discussions at the substantive session of the Disarmament Commission in 1981 on the general approach, structure and scope of the study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces.

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to establish the Group of Experts on All Aspects of the Conventional Arms Race and on Disarmament relating to Conventional Weapons and Armed Forces, in accordance with the provisions contained in paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 35/156 A;

2. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission at its substantive session in 1982 to complete its consideration of the general approach to the study, its structure and scope and to transmit the conclusions of its deliberations to the Group of Experts;

3. *Agrees* that the Group of Experts should pursue its work after the above-mentioned session of the Disarmament Commission, taking into consideration such conclusions as the Commission may submit to it, and, if necessary, the deliberations at the substantive session of the Commission in 1981, in particular those reflected in paragraph 21 and annex III of the report on that session;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General in accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 35/156 A to submit a final report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session.

On the question of the regional approach to disarmament, an approach concerned to a large extent with regional security, the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces and the non-use of force, a draft resolution sponsored by 31 Member States,³³ entitled "Study on all the aspects of regional

³³ Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Chile, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Guatemala, Greece, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and Viet Nam.

disarmament", was introduced in the First Committee by Belgium on 17 November. In its statement, Belgium recalled that, at its previous session, the General Assembly had adopted by consensus resolution 35/156 D dealing with the study on all aspects of regional disarmament³⁴ and that, pursuant to that resolution, the Secretary-General had now submitted a report³⁵ which contained the views of various States concerning the study. In that connection, Belgium observed that from the views expressed by States it appeared that there were broad areas of agreement on a number of essential points. First, it was at the regional level that security requirements were most easily perceived. Secondly, in accordance with the "golden rule of regional disarmament", States of a region would themselves have to take the initiative for regional measures of disarmament. Finally, the regional context should not be dissociated or divorced from the global, and relations with third States should be closely examined.

A number of topics, Belgium further emphasized, had also been drawn to the attention of Member States as being particularly suitable for action at the regional level. Among them the following could be singled out: (a) the creation of denuclearized zones; (b) the cessation of the conventional arms race, the study of which had been provided for in resolution 35/156 A and would give attention to possibilities inherent in the regional approach; and (c) the implementation of confidence-building measures, which was the subject of a report presented by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly at its current session.³⁶ The comments by States had also focused on the various ongoing efforts at the regional level, more specifically in Europe, in the context of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, and in the Vienna Talks on the Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe. It was precisely in the light of those efforts that Belgium had been prompted to advocate a regional approach, and it could already be seen that there were many possibilities for action in other parts of the world, as a number of States themselves had pointed out.

That broad areas of agreement had been identified in the report of the Secretary-General,³⁷ Belgium concluded, was an encouraging sign. That was why Belgium, together with the other sponsors of the draft resolution, wished the Assembly to take note of the report and also make the necessary arrangements for the Assembly at its second special session to carry out a fruitful examination of the regional approach in order to promote its implementation. It was their hope that the draft resolution, which was largely procedural, would make it possible for the Assembly to repeat the previous year's consensus in a resolution on the regional approach to disarmament.

On 20 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote. Subsequently, on 9 December, the General Assembly adopted it, as resolution 36/97 H, again without a vote; the resolution reads as follows:

³⁴ See foot-note 8.

³⁵ A/36/343.

³⁶ A/36/474 and Corr.1.

³⁷ See foot-note 35.

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 35/156 D of 12 December 1980 concerning the study on all the aspects of regional disarmament,

1. *Takes note with appreciation* of the report of the Secretary-General containing the views of Member States on the study;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit the study on all the aspects of regional disarmament and his report containing the views of Member States to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, so that it may consider their substance and any action on them that may be required.

Relating in varying degrees to the question of conventional armaments, the Assembly also adopted resolution 36/93 dealing with prohibitions or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons (see chapter XV above); and resolutions 36/172 E entitled "Military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa" and 36/172 F entitled "Arms embargo against South Africa", adopted under the Assembly's agenda item on the Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (see chapter IX).

Conclusion

The question of the limitation of the buildup and transfer of conventional arms on a world-wide and regional basis is as important as it is complex. With the conventional arms race extending to all parts of the globe and consuming the bulk of the world's annual military expenditures, and with such weapons being used frequently in armed conflict, the question can neither be ignored nor belittled. Accordingly, the adoption at the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, in 1980, of a resolution approving, in principle, the carrying out of a study of the question of conventional disarmament within the United Nations framework, may be regarded as a positive development.

Also in this connection, the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 36/97 A calling for the actual initiation of a comprehensive United Nations study on conventional disarmament is of considerable significance as the resultant study could influence the course of future United Nations involvement in the field of conventional disarmament.

The adoption of resolution 36/97 H concerning the recent study on regional disarmament may also contribute to prospects for the more substantive consideration of that question following the Assembly's second special session on disarmament. It may be recalled that the 1980 study on regional disarmament stated:

198. Cessation of the conventional arms race is a domain in which the inclusion of a regional aspect in the approach to disarmament is particularly important. Due to the ubiquity of conventional weapons and armed forces and their technical and functional diversity, and due to the central role of conventional forces in the security perceptions of the countries in a region, the question of conventional disarmament is highly complex, and the possible approaches highly dependent on regional conditions. . . .

It is thus apparent that relaxation of tensions and progress in the solution of outstanding problems in each region — and a strengthening of the system

of international security — could help to create an atmosphere in which States would show greater willingness to accept reductions of conventional arms. Conversely, balanced reductions of conventional arms and armed forces would greatly increase security in regions and, as a consequence, reduce the likelihood of war at the international level. These effects would probably apply increasingly where there are high levels of armaments, such as in Central Europe.

Finally, even though it represents only a limited part of global weapons production, the international transfer of conventional arms constitutes a serious problem which must be viewed from both supplier and recipient viewpoints. Progress towards curbing arms transfers by suppliers would not only have a restraining effect on the global arms race but would also contribute to the strengthening of international security. On the other hand, legitimate security requirements of recipient countries must be taken into account.

From the foregoing it can be seen that further and more intensive consideration of the question of the conventional arms race and conventional disarmament, both within and outside of the United Nations framework, may be expected, with that activity taking into account relevant studies already submitted to the General Assembly³⁸ and that on conventional disarmament which is expected to commence in 1982.

³⁸ See foot-notes 8 and 36; also see chapter XXII below, subheadings "Study on confidence-building measures" and "Study on the relationship between disarmament and international security"

Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

Introduction

THE QUESTION OF ESTABLISHING A ZONE OF PEACE in the Indian Ocean, though there had been prior discussions in other forums outside of the United Nations, was considered by the General Assembly for the first time in 1971. The item entitled "Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace" was placed on the agenda at the request of Sri Lanka, later joined by the United Republic of Tanzania. As a result of that initiative, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2832 (XXVI), in which it declared that the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, together with the air space above and the ocean floor subjacent thereto, was designated for all time as a zone of peace. The Assembly called upon the great Powers, in conformity with the Declaration, to enter into consultations with the littoral States of the Indian Ocean with a view to halting the further expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean and eliminating from the area all bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great-Power military presence conceived in the context of great-Power rivalry. It also called upon the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to enter into consultations aimed at the implementation of the Declaration by taking necessary action to ensure that: (a) warships and military aircraft might not use the Indian Ocean for any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of any littoral and hinterland State of the Indian Ocean in contravention of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; (b) subject to the foregoing and to the norms and principles of international law, the right to free and unimpeded use of the zone by the vessels of all nations was unaffected; and (c) appropriate arrangements were made to give effect to any international agreement that might ultimately be reached for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

In 1972, by its resolution 2992 (XXVII), the General Assembly established a 15-member *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, consisting of Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen and Zambia, to study practical measures to be taken in furtherance of the objectives of the Declaration. Two years later, the Committee was

expanded with the addition of three new members: Bangladesh, Kenya and Somalia, and in 1978 it was further enlarged by the addition of Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Greece, Mozambique and Oman.

Since 1973, consideration of the Indian Ocean issue by the General Assembly has generally concentrated on the annual reports of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. In 1974, the General Assembly requested the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to enter into consultation with a view to the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean, and in 1975 it noted that agreement in principle on such a Conference had emerged among those States. One year later, all States, in particular the great Powers and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, were invited to co-operate with the *Ad Hoc* Committee. In 1977, the Assembly requested the *Ad Hoc* Committee to make preparations for a meeting of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to be held as a step towards the envisaged conference.

The proposal for the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean was referred to in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in 1978.¹ The same year, at its regular session, the Assembly, by resolution 33/68, decided to convene a meeting of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean in 1979. In addition to setting out recommendations concerning the convening of a full conference on the Indian Ocean, the Final Document of that Meeting² included a list of principles for the implementation of the Declaration.

Also in 1979, the General Assembly, by resolutions 34/80 A and B, decided to convene the Conference on the Indian Ocean in 1981 at Colombo, Sri Lanka, and in that connection decided to enlarge the *Ad Hoc* Committee further, inviting the permanent members of the Security Council and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to serve on it and participate in the preparation of the Conference. Subsequently, Canada, Bulgaria, Djibouti, Egypt, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Liberia, the Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Poland, Romania, Seychelles, Singapore, the Sudan, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States joined the *Ad Hoc* Committee in 1980, and Sweden attended its meetings as an observer. The same year, the General Assembly, by resolution 35/150, requested the *Ad Hoc* Committee, in pursuance of the decision to convene the Conference on the Indian Ocean during 1981, to continue its efforts for the necessary harmonization of views on the issues related to the convening of the Conference and to make every effort, in consideration of the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean area, to finalize all preparations for the Conference, including the dates for its convening. In 1980 — as in 1981 — the discussions in the General Assembly and other bodies as well as in the *Ad Hoc* Committee reflected the

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4* (A/S-10/4), sect. III, para. 64; the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, appendix I.

² *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 45* (A/34/45); the Final Document of the Meeting is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 4: 1979, chap. XX, annex.

unfavourable developments in the international situation and the sensitivity and complexity of the issues involved.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1981

At the 1981 session of the Disarmament Commission, during the general exchange of views³ mention was made by some delegations of the proposed Conference on the Indian Ocean. India⁴ stated that it was painfully aware of the threat caused by the arms race and the worsened international situation to peace and security in the Indian Ocean area and the littoral and hinterland countries. It stressed that the security of all States could not be subjected to the whims of the nuclear-weapon States or the vagaries of the fluctuating state of relations among those States and their allies. The creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean was regarded by Pakistan as a measure which would require non-intervention and non-interference undertakings on the part of the great Powers, as well as appropriate steps by the regional States for the reduction of their military forces and armaments, and commitments by them to respect each other's sovereignty. Bangladesh held that the Disarmament Commission should call upon all concerned to pursue actively the goal of holding the proposed Conference on the Indian Ocean as soon as possible. In a similar vein, the Seychelles stated that the Commission should condemn those who were blocking the convening of that Conference.

The Disarmament Commission, in its report to the General Assembly, made a general reference to the problem by including the following paragraph in the recommendations under its agenda item 4 (a) and (b),⁴ dealing with various aspects of the arms race:

7. The Commission recommended the strengthening of the existing nuclear-weapon-free zone and the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones as well the establishment of zones of peace in accordance with paragraph 64 of the Final Document.

Consideration by the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, 1981

Pursuant to resolution 35/150, by which the General Assembly renewed its general mandate, the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean in 1981⁵ held two sessions as a preparatory committee for the Conference on the Indian Ocean from 17 February to 6 March and 1 to 19 June, one regular session

³ See A/CN.10/PV.45-50 and A/CN.10/PV.41-54/Corrigendum.

⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 42* (A/36/42), para. 19.

⁵ Australia, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Poland, Romania, Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, USSR, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia.

from 17 to 28 August, and additional meetings in October and November to conclude its work for the year — 50 formal meetings in all, and a number of informal meetings. At the conclusion of its work for the year, on 16 November, the Committee adopted its report to the General Assembly.⁶ As in previous years, the report contained a draft resolution recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Committee for adoption by the Assembly. In accordance with resolution 34/80 B, the *Ad Hoc* Committee had decided to recommend Thailand, which had applied for membership, for appointment to the Committee, and the President of the General Assembly, on 5 March 1981, appointed Thailand as an additional member. The Committee was unable, in the time available, to reach consensus on applications for membership made by Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Hungary, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Swaziland and Viet Nam.

A great part of the activity during the *Ad Hoc* Committee's preparatory sessions was devoted to the harmonization of views on issues related to the convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean and the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean area. During the course of discussion, it became clear that there were two broad views concerning the dates for the holding of the Conference. A large number of Committee members favoured the convening of the Conference in 1981 as scheduled. While conceding that further harmonization of views was preferable, those holding that view felt that complete harmonization of views was not essential since the Conference itself would be a stage in the process of reaching the objective of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. They also felt that the grave deterioration of the political and security climate in the area was the very reason which compelled the urgent convening of the Conference. In that connection, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Madagascar, Pakistan and Sri Lanka submitted, on behalf of the non-aligned members, a working paper entitled "Nucleus of draft agenda for the Conference on the Indian Ocean to implement the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace".⁷ The "nucleus" of the draft agenda included a review of the political and security climate with particular reference to the continued dangers posed by the military presence of the major Powers in the Indian Ocean area; principles and characteristics of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace; and modalities and a programme of action for the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

Other members, on the other hand, felt that it was premature to set the dates for the Conference. They considered that before a conference could be convened it would be necessary for adequate progress to be made on the harmonization of views. Furthermore, they felt that the adverse current political and security climate in the area militated against the early convening of a Conference. Their view was that a conference convened in such circumstances would be unlikely to succeed and would therefore place in jeopardy the eventual realization of the concept of a zone of peace in the

⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 29 (A/36/29)*.

⁷ A/AC.159/L.35.

Indian Ocean. Due to that divergence of views, the *Ad Hoc* Committee, in 1981, could not reach a decision on the date for convening the Conference on the Indian Ocean.

At its regular session, the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee was mainly devoted to considering its report to the General Assembly, including its recommendation to the Assembly in the form of a draft resolution. The Committee had before it a proposed text for the draft resolution which was submitted by Sri Lanka on behalf of the group of non-aligned countries in two documents,⁸ covering, respectively, the introduction and the operative parts. Two amendments to that draft were submitted by China,⁹ reaffirming General Assembly resolutions ES-6/2 of 14 January and 35/37 of 20 November 1980, and calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops from a hinterland State of the Indian Ocean. The German Democratic Republic submitted an amendment calling for an increase in the intensity of preparations and for the Conference to be held by the end of 1982.¹⁰ The Committee, furthermore, had before it some suggestions for an alternative draft, which were introduced by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, on behalf of a number of delegations holding similar views, and set out in an informal paper on the text of the draft resolution.¹¹

The non-aligned draft would ask for renewal of the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee and call for the Conference on the Indian Ocean to be convened not later than the first half of 1983. Further, by the draft, the *Ad Hoc* Committee would hold a special meeting in 1982, at an appropriately high political level, in an Indian Ocean State. The suggestions presented informally by the Federal Republic of Germany, in contrast, did not contain any specific time frame for a Conference, but would request the *Ad Hoc* Committee to continue its efforts to reach a consensus on the concept of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and the convening of the Conference.

The Committee met as an open-ended informal drafting group to consider and finalize its recommendation to the Assembly, and additional consultations were held with the Chairman. It could not agree, however, on a consensus text by the end of its regular session, and decided that the Chairman, during the intersessional period, should continue his consultations to resolve the outstanding points. In its report, which the Committee agreed upon as a result of those consultations, it was stated that, while there was agreement on the need to hold the Conference on the Indian Ocean, the question of fixing a new date for the Conference was open. It was also noted that, unless there was a consensus for changing it, the mandate of the Committee should be maintained. Some delegations, however, believed that this estimation did not accurately reflect the range of views expressed in the Committee on the question of the Conference or the discussion about the Committee's mandate.

⁸ A/AC.159/L.36 and A/AC.159/L.39.

⁹ A/AC.159/L.40 and A/AC.159/L.41.

¹⁰ A/AC.159/L.37.

¹¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 29* (A/36/29), para. 16.

Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegations of the Non-Aligned Countries to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session

A Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegations of the Non-Aligned Countries to the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly was held at United Nation Headquarters in New York, on 25 and 28 September 1981, with a view to considering their actions in connection with the items to be discussed during the session which were of special concern to the non-aligned countries. In a communiqué,¹² the Meeting noted with regret that the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean had been prevented by some great Powers and major maritime users from finalizing a date for the convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean, scheduled to be held in Sri Lanka, to achieve the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. The failure of the Committee to take a decision, it was stated, had frustrated the desire of all non-aligned littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean who, supported by all other non-aligned countries, had been working persistently for nearly 10 years in pursuit of their goal of realizing the objectives contained in the non-aligned initiatives on the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, first adopted by the General Assembly in 1971.

The ministers and heads of delegations reaffirmed their determination to work for the convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean not later than the first half of 1983, and reiterated their hope and expectation that all the great Powers and other major maritime users would participate in that Conference in a constructive spirit while at the same time initiating the process of reducing their military presence in the Indian Ocean area.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1981

In its consideration of the question of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, the General Assembly had before it, among other things, the 1981 report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean and the communiqué of the Meeting of non-aligned countries discussed above, and documents of the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries, held in New Delhi from 9 to 13 February 1981,¹³ resolutions adopted by the 68th Inter-Parliamentary Conference held at Havana from 15 to 23 September 1981,¹⁴ and documents of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting held at Melbourne from 30 September to 7 October 1981.¹⁵

The report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee was introduced by its Chairman, the representative of Sri Lanka, on 19 November, in the First Committee. He

¹² A/36/566-S/14713, annex, sect. VII.

¹³ A/36/116 and Corr.1.

¹⁴ A/36/584.

¹⁵ A/36/587.

stated that, while there was agreement on the need to hold a conference on the Indian Ocean, the Committee had been unable to reach a consensus in 1981 on finalizing the dates of the Conference. Given the circumstances, the Chairman pointed out, the report and the draft resolution were the best the *Ad Hoc* Committee could achieve. He then reviewed the content of the draft resolution recommended by the Committee, noting that, *inter alia*, the Assembly would thereby request the *Ad Hoc* Committee to continue its work and to make every effort to accomplish the necessary preparatory work for the Conference, including consideration of its convening not later than the first half of 1983.

During the course of the debate in the First Committee,¹⁶ a large number of delegations discussed the failure of the *Ad Hoc* Committee to finalize the dates for convening the Conference in 1981 and its implications for the Committee's future work. Several States explained their substantive positions at the time of the voting process in the Committee. Non-aligned States generally regretted the lack of progress in the Committee's work and its inability to set a date for the Conference in 1981, as had been requested in resolution 35/150. They also strongly reaffirmed their commitment to the 1971 Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and to the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee.

India, for example, recalled that in successive resolutions since 1971 the General Assembly had reiterated the call upon the great Powers to enter into consultations with the littoral and hinterland States, and observed that the expansion of the *Ad Hoc* Committee had been designed to secure the co-operation of the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users in the implementation of the mandate of the Committee. India pointed out that there had been no question of the objectives and mandate of the Committee being changed. India found that the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee had been subjected to a systematic attempt to whittle away at its very basis in order to suit the interests of a few new members which were contrary to the expressed will, interests and aspirations of the overwhelming number of the littoral and hinterland countries of the Indian Ocean. The *Ad Hoc* Committee could not go about examining or changing its mandate, but should instead concentrate on its urgent implementation. The setting up of preconditions with regard to the harmonization of views or the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean area were, in the view of India, merely pretexts to kill the proposal for a conference. While deeply regretting that the Committee had been precluded from arriving at an arrangement on the finalization of dates for the convening of the Conference in 1981, India hoped at least that the new deadline, the first half of 1983, could be adhered to.

Ethiopia stated similarly that the littoral and hinterland States had consistently supported the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace because in it they found a reflection of their common historical heritage, aspirations, apprehensions and determination. Those elements, as contained in General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI), had been providing and

¹⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 44th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

continued to provide the basis for the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean. Iran, also addressing the question of the Committee's mandate, said it was its understanding that those States using the argument that they were not members when the mandate was agreed upon were aware of the Committee's mandate when they decided to join it, and if they did not fully agree with it they should not have joined.

The United States and a number of other Western countries questioned the validity of the existing concept on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, and called for a change in the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. The United States pointed out that it had never accepted the 1971 Declaration because it regarded the declaration as "faulty and outmoded", as inconsistent with the right of all States, under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, to individual and collective self-defence, and difficult to reconcile with internationally recognized rights to freedom of navigation. It held that its position was consistent with resolution 35/150, which called for the harmonization of views on the relevant issues before deciding on a date for the Conference. The United States added that there was no harmonization of views on the basic issues in the *Ad Hoc* Committee, and, because the Soviet Union refused to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, the climate of confidence needed for the holding of a successful conference was lacking. Regarding the removal of Western naval forces and facilities from the Indian Ocean region, the United States held that, even if accompanied by a similar removal of Soviet forces, such a move would enhance the great preponderance of Soviet land and air power in the region. The future participation of the United States in the *Ad Hoc* Committee would be guided by the ability of the Committee to continue to operate on the basis of consensus. Harmonization of views on basic issues — taking into account the actual political and security climate in the region as called for by the draft resolution — would provide, in the United States view, a framework for a new, more realistic approach.

Taking a similar position, Australia felt that a conference held in the existing political and security climate would be most unlikely to succeed, while failure at such a conference would almost certainly end the prospect of achieving a zone of peace, at least for the foreseeable future. While remaining committed to the concept of a conference, Australia questioned the assumption that resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 1971 provided the sole mandate for the Committee. The *Ad Hoc* Committee should therefore consider how its mandate might best be developed and broadened.

Speaking on behalf of the ten member States of the European Community, the United Kingdom stated that it would be inappropriate to convene a conference on the declaration of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean area while a non-aligned State of the region continued to be occupied by foreign troops and in the absence of any real progress in the harmonization of views on the many fundamental issues which remained to be resolved. Furthermore, the Ten believed that the lack of any real progress was due to a large extent to the limitations imposed upon the Committee by the insistence that it should not stray beyond the very limited definition of the concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace contained in General Assembly resolution

2832 (XXVI). The approach suggested in that resolution did not adequately reflect the realities of the current geopolitical situation in the Indian Ocean region. The Ten therefore felt strongly that the *Ad Hoc* Committee should consider whether more progress might not be made if the mandate of the Committee were developed.

The suggestion for changing the established concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace was also supported by Canada, Japan and the Netherlands. To be effective, Canada stated, the concept had to be contained within a broader framework of economic, social and political understanding designed to contribute towards removing some of the root causes of tension and insecurity and as poverty, lack of mutual comprehension and communication, and inequality of individual rights. Accordingly, any decision pertaining to the framework for the concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace should be made in the light of accompanying measures designed to improve regional trust and confidence.

France, for its part, expressed the hope that the *Ad Hoc* Committee would make substantive progress in 1982, in particular with respect to the harmonization of views on the question of goals to be set for the Conference so that its convening might not be deferred indefinitely.

The non-aligned countries, for their part, did not agree with the position that the Conference should not be held in the current political and security climate, and that more harmonization of views was necessary before its convening. Sri Lanka, for example, pointed out that it was not the expectation of the non-aligned that the convening of the Conference in Colombo would establish overnight a viable and effective zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. It was, however, their conviction that given the tension and insecurity prevailing in the area, the Conference could help greatly in defusing that tension and reaching broad agreement on a set of principles and practical modalities for the implementation of the Declaration, to which all countries concerned could subscribe. The non-aligned regarded the argument that the insecurity and instability in the region necessitated the postponing of the Conference as incomprehensible.

Madagascar stressed that the harmonization of the views of the different parties was a continuous process, and that complete agreement need not be achieved before the opening of the Conference which, after all, could be held in several stages. It could not accept that the developments in Afghanistan justified the postponement of the Conference. The non-aligned members of the Committee, Madagascar held, were thus justified in rejecting those "arguments of convenience", and in maintaining that the deterioration of political and security conditions in the region, which was admitted by everyone, in fact favoured an early convening of the Conference, not its postponement. Viet Nam held that the failure of the *Ad Hoc* Committee to determine the date for the Conference was due to the dilatory and obstructionist attitude of the United States and its close allies, which had sought to impose prior conditions related to what they called the harmonization of views on objectives for the Conference; that attitude reflected the desire of the United States to oppose the creation of a zone of peace in the

region. Viet Nam added that since the adoption of the 1971 Declaration the United States had unceasingly increased its military presence in the region.

In the same connection, Iraq called upon all the major Powers to dismantle their military bases in the area, particularly the Diego Garcia base, and referred to threats by successive United States Administrations to use so-called rapid deployment forces against coastal and hinterland States, particularly the oil-producing countries. The attempts by certain countries to impede efforts to convene the Conference on the Indian Ocean were, in Iraq's view, designed to consolidate their military presence in the area within the framework of the rivalry between the major Powers. Afghanistan similarly observed that the United States had been building up its military presence in the region. It had stepped up efforts to expand its military base at Diego Garcia, and established new staging areas for intervention in the internal affairs of African and Asian States. It was not surprising therefore that the United States and its allies were impeding the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee and were against the convening of the Conference. Support for the convening of the Conference as soon as possible was expressed also by the Congo, Cuba, Democratic Yemen, Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Oman and Yemen.

The Eastern European States generally supported the position of the non-aligned. The Soviet Union categorically rejected the view of the United States, stating that it amounted to a renunciation of the 1971 Declaration. It added that the United States was using the events in Afghanistan as a pretext to justify the introduction of its military, naval and air forces into the region. Facts made it clear that long before those events, the United States had broken off talks with the Soviet Union on the limitation of their military presence in the Indian Ocean, and had begun to create the base on Diego Garcia, bringing aircraft carriers and other ships into the Persian Gulf, preparing plans for forming a rapid deployment interventionist force, and laying down a broadly based infrastructure for military bases. The Soviet Union was ready to discuss, in international negotiations, the question of the situation concerning Afghanistan, together with the problem of ensuring security in the Persian Gulf region, or separately. Upon agreement with the Government of Afghanistan, it would withdraw its troops from that territory, given the necessary international guarantees, as soon as a halt was called to the undeclared war being waged against that country. It added that the United States had not said when it intended to withdraw its armed forces from the Indian Ocean region. The Soviet Union believed that there had to be an easing of tension in the Indian Ocean region and the early convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean would promote the attainment of that objective.

That view was also shared by other Eastern European States. Czechoslovakia supported the efforts by the States in the region of the Indian Ocean to establish a zone of peace and liquidate foreign military bases. It stressed that it was in favour of the earliest possible convocation of the international Conference on that question, as already approved by the General Assembly, but blocked by the United States obstructiveness. The German Democratic

Republic held that the Conference would ease tensions. It was resolutely opposed to any attempts towards preventing its convening. It noted that the draft resolution, agreed to by the *Ad Hoc* Committee itself, reaffirmed that the project for the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean and the mandate of the Committee should remain unchanged.

On 25 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution, as recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Committee, without a vote, and on 9 December the General Assembly adopted it,¹⁷ also without a vote, as resolution 36/90. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, contained in its resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, and recalling also its resolutions 2992 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972, 3080 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, 3259 A (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3468 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/88 of 14 December 1976, 32/86 of 12 December 1977, S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 33/68 of 14 December 1978, 34/80 A and B of 11 December 1979 and 35/150 of 12 December 1980, and other relevant resolutions,

Recalling also that at its tenth special session, devoted to disarmament, it stated that the establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world under appropriate conditions to be clearly defined and determined freely by the States concerned in the zone, taking into account the characteristics of the zone and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in conformity with international law, can contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and to international peace and security as a whole,

Recalling further the report of the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean,

Reaffirming its conviction that concrete action for the achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace would be a substantial contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security,

Recalling its decision at the thirty-fourth session in resolution 34/80 B to convene a Conference on the Indian Ocean at Colombo during 1981,

Recalling further its decision at the thirty-fifth session in resolution 35/150 to make every effort, in consideration of the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean area, particularly recent developments, as well as the progress made in the harmonization of views, to finalize, in accordance with its normal methods of work, all preparations for the Conference, including the dates for its convening.

Recalling the exchange of varied views in the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean and noting that, while progress has been made, a number of issues remain to be resolved.

Noting the exchange of views on the adverse political and security climate in the region,

Noting that the *Ad Hoc* Committee has failed to reach consensus on the dates for the convening, during 1981, of the Conference on the Indian Ocean at Colombo,

Convinced that the continued military presence of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean area, conceived in the context of their confrontation, gives urgency to the need to take practical steps for the early achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace,

Considering that all other foreign military presence in the area, whenever it is contrary to the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, further gives greater urgency to the need to take practical steps towards the early achievement of the objectives of the Declaration,

Considering also that the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean requires the active participation of and full co-operation among the littoral and hinterland States, the permanent

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Thirty-sixth Session, Plenary Meetings, 91st meeting.

members of the Security Council and the major maritime users to ensure conditions of peace and security based on the purposes and principles of the Charter as well as the general principles of international law,

Considering further that the creation of a zone of peace requires co-operation and agreement among the States of the region to ensure conditions of peace and security within the area, as envisaged in the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, and respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the littoral and hinterland States,

Calling for the renewal of genuinely constructive efforts through the exercise of the political will necessary for the achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace,

Deeply concerned at the danger posed by the grave and ominous developments in the area and the resulting sharp deterioration of peace, security and stability which particularly seriously affect the littoral and hinterland States, as well as international peace and security,

Convinced that the continued deterioration of the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean area is an important consideration bearing on the question of the early convening of the Conference and that the easing of tension in the area would enhance the prospect of success being achieved by the Conference,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean and the exchange of views in the Committee;

2. *Regrets* that the *Ad Hoc* Committee has failed to reach consensus on the finalization of dates for the convening, during 1981, of the Conference on the Indian Ocean;

3. *Emphasizes* its decision to convene the Conference at Colombo as a necessary step for the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, adopted in 1971;

4. *Emphasizes also*, in pursuance of that decision and in consideration of the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean area, its decision to request the *Ad Hoc* Committee to continue its efforts for the necessary harmonization of views on the remaining issues related to the convening of the Conference;

5. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee to continue its work on the necessary harmonization of views on the relevant issues, including those set forth in paragraph 4 above, and to make every effort to accomplish the necessary preparatory work for the Conference, including consideration of its convening not later than the first half of 1983;

6. *Renews* the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee as defined in the relevant resolutions;

7. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee to hold further sessions in 1982 of a total duration of six weeks, including the holding of a Meeting at a venue outside New York to be decided upon;

8. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee to submit to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament and at its thirty-seventh session reports on its work and on the implementation of the present resolution;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to render all necessary assistance to the *Ad Hoc* Committee, including the provision of summary records.

Conclusion

Despite many endeavours in various forums to encourage the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, the achievement of that objective seems to have been little closer to realization in 1981 than it had been 10 years earlier, when the Declaration was adopted by the General Assembly. Although the General Assembly, in 1979, decided to convene a conference on the Indian Ocean in 1981, in Colombo, to consider ways of implementing the Declaration, the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean was continuing to face difficulties in its role as the Preparatory Committee for the Conference.

Two basic positions emerged in the *Ad Hoc* Committee in 1981 with regard to the Conference. The majority of delegations, including most non-aligned and Eastern European States, favoured the convening of the Conference as soon as possible. While conceding that the prior harmonization of views would be preferable, those delegations felt that such a harmonization of views — which was an ongoing process — should not constitute a precondition for the convening of a conference which in itself would be a stage in the process of reaching the objective of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. They also felt that the deterioration of the political and security climate, far from being an obstacle, was an added reason for the early convening of the Conference.

The Western States and others, on the other hand, held that unless there was a sufficient harmonization of views and an improvement in the political and security climate in the area, it would not be feasible to hold the Conference on the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, they called for the revision of the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee.

If those two basically divergent positions should continue in 1982 — and notwithstanding the consensus achieved in the General Assembly on the draft resolution as recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Committee — there is little likelihood of the Committee making substantive progress in its efforts to make preparations for the Conference on the Indian Ocean.

Reduction of military budgets

Introduction

THE EFFORTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO COPE with the question of limitation of military expenditures date back to 1950; since then, 20 resolutions¹ have been adopted by the General Assembly and 11 studies² have been made under United Nations auspices on the subject and closely related problems.

Consideration of specific approaches to the subject began after a 1973 initiative by the Soviet Union which led to the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 3093 A (XXVIII), calling for 10 per cent reductions by the five permanent members of the Security Council, and the allocation of part of the funds thus saved to provide development assistance. The other permanent members of the Council objected to the Soviet proposal on various grounds. The same year, on the basis of a proposal by Mexico, the Assembly also adopted resolution 3093 B (XXVIII) pursuant to which the Secretary-

¹ The resolutions adopted up to 1980 were the following: 380 (V) of 17 November 1950; 914 (X) of 16 December 1955; 1516 (XV) of 15 December 1960; 1837 (XVII) of 18 December 1962; 2387 (XXIII) of 19 November 1968; 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969; 2667 (XXV) of 7 December 1970; 2685 (XXV) of 11 December 1970; 2831 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971; 3075 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973; 3093 A and B (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973; 3462 (XXX) and 3470 (XXX) of 11 December 1975; 31/68 of 10 December 1976; 32/75 of 12 December 1977; 33/67 of 14 December 1978; 34/83 F of 11 December 1979; and 35/142 A and B of 12 December 1980.

² *Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.62.IX.1); *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.72.IX.16); *Disarmament and Development* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.IX.1); *Reduction of Military Budgets of States Permanent Members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and Utilization of Part of the Funds Thus Saved to Provide Assistance to Developing Countries* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.75.I.10); *Reduction of Military Budgets: Measurement and International Reporting of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.I.6); A comparative study of global military expenditures and development assistance since 1945 as stated in available official and unofficial sources (Background paper prepared by the Secretariat). *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1* (A/S-10/1), vol. V, document A/AC.187/73; Reduction of military budgets: report of the Secretary-General (A/32/194 and Add.1); *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.1); Reduction of military budgets: report of the Secretary-General, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 6* (A/S-10/6 and Corr.1 and Add.1); *Reduction of Military Budgets, International Reporting of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.I.9); and Study on the relationship between disarmament and development: report of the Secretary-General (A/36/356 and Corr.1).

General prepared, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts, a report on the issue.³ Since 1973, the General Assembly has sought to develop, through further studies and surveys, an acceptable international measurement and reporting system. At its thirty-first session, in 1976, it considered, on the basis of another report,⁴ a matrix to be used as an instrument for a standardized reporting system. An intergovernmental group of experts then analyzed the comments which all States, by resolution 31/87, were invited to provide on the reporting system. On the basis of the group's recommendation, which resulted from an analysis of comments by 14 States,⁵ the Assembly, by resolution 32/85, requested the Secretary-General to ascertain which States would be prepared to participate in a pilot test of the reporting instrument. It also requested the preparation of a compilation of proposals and recommendations for the 1978 special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In two paragraphs of its Final Document,⁶ the Assembly advocated the reduction of military budgets and further consideration of steps to be taken. In accordance with those paragraphs, the Disarmament Commission, in 1979, included in its recommendations on the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, the item "Reduction of military expenditures" ⁷

In 1978 at its thirty-third session, the Assembly, by resolution 33/67, requested the Secretary-General, (a) to carry out a practical test of the proposed reporting instrument; (b) to assess the results of the practical test; and (c) to develop recommendations for further refinement and implementation of the reporting instrument, and to report to the General Assembly thereon. For those purposes, the Secretary-General established the *Ad Hoc* Panel on Military Budgeting, consisting of experts from seven countries: Indonesia, Japan, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Sweden and the United States.

During the following year, 1979, the *Ad Hoc* Panel of experts initiated the practical test of the standardized reporting of the military expenditures of Member States and agreed to a set of guidelines to assist them in filling out the proposed reporting instrument. All Member States were invited to complete and return the reporting instrument, which was circulated by the Secretary-General. In addition, the General Assembly, on an initiative by Romania, adopted resolution 34/83 F by which it considered that a new impetus should be given to efforts leading to the reduction of military expenditures and requested the Disarmament Commission to undertake an examination of the problem.

Accordingly, the Disarmament Commission in 1980 had an item on the reduction of military budgets on its agenda. In an extensive exchange of views, the Western States and a number of non-aligned States supported the

³ A/9770, later published as E.75.I.10 (see foot-note 2).

⁴ A/31/222, later published as E.77.I.6 (see foot-note 2).

⁵ A/32/194 and Add.1 (see foot-note 2).

⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4* (A/S-10/4), sect. III, paras. 89 and 90.

⁷ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42* (A/34/42), para. 19, sect. III, A, para. 4; the elements are reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 4: 1979, appendix II.

utilization of the reporting instrument which was being tested, while several Eastern European States expressed considerable reservations on it. A number of recommendations on the item, which reflected this considerable divergence of views, were adopted by consensus and included in the report of the Commission to the General Assembly.⁸

Also in 1980, the *Ad Hoc* Panel on Military Budgeting held three sessions and prepared a report⁹ for submission to the General Assembly through the Secretary-General. The report contained, *inter alia*, an overview of the replies received from 14 countries; a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the replies, including computerized tables; and suggestions concerning minor modifications of the reporting instrument and its instructions. Furthermore, the report dealt with problems of the comparability of military expenditures and, finally, presented conclusions which were generally favourable as to the viability of the reporting instrument. In view of the successful completion of the practical test, the Panel also concluded that a practical stage for decision-taking to implement the standardized system had been reached, and recommended that a further study should be undertaken on the problems of comparison and verification.

At its thirty-fifth session, the General Assembly adopted, without a vote, resolution 35/142 A, initiated by Romania, by which it requested the Disarmament Commission to continue in 1981 its consideration of military budgets in order to elaborate principles to govern further actions of States. It also requested the Secretary-General to invite Member States to express their views on such principles, and that he report on that basis to the Disarmament Commission at its 1981 session. It also adopted, by a recorded vote of 113 to none, with 21 abstentions, resolution 35/142 B, initiated by Sweden; by that resolution it requested the Secretary-General to give wide distribution to the report of the *Ad Hoc* Panel; recommended that all Member States should make use of the reporting instrument and report annually to the Secretary-General on their military expenditures; and requested the Secretary-General to report annually to the General Assembly. By the same resolution, the Assembly also requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of an *ad hoc* group of qualified experts in the field of military budgets, (a) to refine further the reporting instrument on the basis of future comments and suggestions received from States during the general and regular implementation of the reporting instrument, and (b) to examine and suggest solutions to the question of comparing military expenditures among different States and between different years as well as to the problems of verification that would arise in connection with agreements on the reduction of military expenditures. The Secretary-General was requested to report on the implementation of the task given to the *ad hoc* group of qualified experts to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/35/42), sect. IV, para. 21; the recommendations are reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, chap. XX, annex II.

⁹ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.I.9 (see also foot-note 2); the reporting instrument referred to is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, chap. XX, annex III.

The work of the Group of Qualified Experts in the Field of Military Budgets, 1981

Pursuant to resolution 35/142 B and upon nomination by their Governments, the Secretary-General appointed the *ad hoc* Group of Qualified Experts in the Field of Military Budgets, consisting of eight experts representing eight countries, as detailed in annex I to this chapter, and chaired by Mr. Hans Christian Cars of Sweden. The mandate of the Group is mentioned above in connection with resolution 35/142 B. The Group of Experts met twice in New York, from 9 to 13 February and from 6 to 17 July, and once in Geneva, from 16 November to 4 December 1981, and is scheduled to meet again in New York from 1 to 12 March 1982, to finalize its report to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament. During its work, the Group of Experts was assisted by Professor J. Fontanel of the University of Grenoble as consultant and by representatives of the United Nations Statistical Office, the United Nations International Comparison Project and the World Bank. Seven guest speakers representing various research institutions also made contributions to the work of the Group of Experts.

During its work the Group of Experts concentrated mainly on three aspects of its mandate: (a) analyzing the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the reporting of States on military expenditures; (b) intertemporal and international comparisons of military expenditures; and (c) the problems of verification.

In response to a note verbale dated 13 January 1981, communicated by the Secretary-General to all Member States, in pursuance of resolution 35/142 B, requesting them to present their reports on military expenditures preferably not later than 30 April 1981, the replies of 21 States were received during 1981.¹⁰

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1981

At its third substantive session, held in May and June 1981, the Disarmament Commission, pursuant to resolution 35/142 A, included a twofold item concerning military budgets on its agenda¹¹ following the pattern of that adopted in the previous year, but reformulating sub-item (b). The item was as follows:

5. Reduction of military budgets:
 - (a) Harmonization of views on concrete steps to be undertaken by States regarding a gradual agreed reduction of military budgets and reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries, noting the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;

¹⁰ The replies are compiled in document A/36/353 and Corr.1 and 2 and Add.1 and 2.

¹¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 42* (A/36/42), para. 7.

- (b) Examination and identification of effective ways and means of achieving agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain in a balanced manner, military expenditures, including adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned, taking into account the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 34/83 F and 35/142 A and, in particular, to identify and elaborate on the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military expenditures, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles into a suitable document at an appropriate stage.

At the outset of its work, the Commission had before it a number of documents concerning military expenditures, including a report of the Secretary-General¹² containing the replies received from Member States to a note verbale dated 20 January 1981 by which the Secretary-General, pursuant to resolution 35/142 A, had invited them to express their views and suggestions on the principles which should govern their actions in the field of the freezing and reduction of military expenditures. The other documents were a letter dated 15 May 1981¹³ from the permanent representatives of Romania and Sweden to the United Nations which contained a working paper concerning the above-mentioned principles, and a background paper prepared by the Secretariat¹⁴ concerning proposals by Member States, resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and studies undertaken within the United Nations framework concerning the question of reduction of military budgets. This wealth of proposals and information contributed to a many-faceted discussion on the subject, from which the Commission found it difficult, however, to draw conclusions.

At the beginning of the general exchange of views,¹⁵ Romania introduced the working paper which it had submitted jointly with Sweden. Among other things, the paper called for moderation in States' military expenditures until agreements on the freezing and reduction of military budgets had been concluded. One of the basic principles put forward was that the freezing and reduction of budgets should begin with nuclear-weapon and other heavily armed States. Furthermore, the sponsors advocated reallocation of the human and material resources released through the envisaged reductions for economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries. They attached importance to unilateral measures to freeze and reduce military budgets, which could contribute to the establishment of conditions favourable to the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements in the field. They also included the idea that success of the efforts made within the framework of the United Nations to solve technical problems, including the drawing up of agreed methods to compare military expenditures at different periods of time and between different countries, could facilitate the conclusion of such agreements. The central role of the United Nations and need for the co-operation of all Member States were stressed and it was envisaged that the adoption of the proposed principles

¹² A/CN.10/23 and Add.1-6.

¹³ A/CN.10/26.

¹⁴ A/CN.10/24 and Corr.1.

¹⁵ See A/CN.10/PV.45-50 and A/CN.10/PV.41-54/Corrigendum.

should be regarded as a political commitment to start negotiations on the subject as soon as possible. In the opinion of the sponsors, such an adoption could take the form of a declaration.

The other sponsor, Sweden, also referred to the idea of a declaration, but added that the question of form should be resolved at an appropriate moment with the consent of all States. It stressed the importance of exerting every effort to arrive at an early agreement on the subject.

A considerable part of the discussion during the exchange reflected the reactions of other delegations to the joint initiative of Romania and Sweden. It was welcomed by a number of delegations, namely, those of Algeria, Bangladesh, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Finland, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia stated that the whole concept of reduction of military budgets deserved full attention, with regard to both substance and the method through which reductions would be achieved. Bangladesh, among others, agreed with the principle that the reduction and freezing of military expenditures should begin with the most heavily armed States. Algeria believed that the joint initiative was aimed at surmounting difficulties which had so far made it impossible to achieve substantial progress, and that the initiative also suggested an approach that would make it possible for the Commission to move forward in the matter.

Other delegations did not comment on the Romanian-Swedish paper, and still others expressed more reserved opinions on it. France, noting that only some States had provided data in respect of the provision of resolution 35/142 B concerning standardized reporting of military expenditures despite the efforts of the sponsors to achieve generally acceptable wording, held that the working paper tended to minimize the results reached by the *Ad Hoc* Panel on Military Budgeting, since it did not present, as a necessary condition, a successfully harmonized presentation of military budgets. Consequently, France doubted that a discussion on the basis of the working paper could lead to a consensus on a draft declaration. For essentially similar reasons, Italy did not see any basis for a useful discussion on the preparation of a declaration. Without expressly referring to the working paper, Portugal stated that it did not favour the adoption of declaratory measures that did not contribute to workable results.

A theme which again dominated the exchange was the matter of the standardized reporting instrument itself. As in the previous year, the Western States and a number of non-aligned and neutral States spoke in favour of such an instrument, whereas the Eastern European States took a critical attitude towards it.

In a statement reflecting the general Western view, the Federal Republic of Germany held that the availability of a reliable reporting instrument constituted a precondition for agreements on the freezing and reduction of military budgets. It added that an important step towards enhancing transparency in the field would be the establishment of United Nations registers, as it had suggested in the Assembly the previous year. Australia regarded it as essential that the Commission address the twin problems of comparability and verifiability, and was unable to agree with those who saw

those aspects of the military budgets issue as unnecessarily delaying the eventual implementation of reductions. In similar terms, the Netherlands, on behalf of the ten member States of the European Community, as well as several of the Ten individually, and Bangladesh, Canada, Chile, Portugal and Sri Lanka supported the use of the instrument. This need for procedures for comparing expenditures was also recognized by Finland and Sweden; Finland, among many others, believed that widest possible participation in the work relating to defining and reporting military expenditures in a standardized way by countries with different social systems and budgetary practices could contribute to the devising of tangible measures in the field, and Sweden felt that the reporting instrument, if properly implemented, would help foster negotiations. China stated that it was in principle in favour of the verified reduction of military budgets and suggested that the actual expenditure of the super-Powers must first be ascertained.

As the main exponent of the opposite view, the Soviet Union regretted that in spite of various Soviet initiatives over the years, the matter of actual reduction of military budgets had so far not moved from dead centre. The reason, in its opinion, was that a number of States had refused to achieve practical agreements, and had adopted a course of unprecedented inflation of those budgets. Attempts to produce a system for standardized accounting systems were frequently exploited by certain States as camouflage for their reluctance to agree to a reduction of military expenditures. The Soviet Union assured the Commission that it was ready to embark without delay on the work of defining concrete dimensions for reductions, either in percentages or in absolute terms. The German Democratic Republic believed that it was useless to try to establish a principle of comparison between systems of accounting with regard to military budgets, since such comparisons would not lead to results that would be accepted by all States and would not promote the ending of the arms race. Hungary claimed that the abstract and irrelevant studies carried out in recent years could not contribute to the reduction of military expenditures; instead, they diverted attention from the substance of the matter. Poland, in view of the numerous controversies over the publication and comparability of military budgets, advocated a search for the least controversial "small-steps" solution, as more complicated ones would be extremely difficult to negotiate.

Reservations concerning the standardized reporting instrument were also expressed by Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia and Mongolia. They, and other Eastern European States, referred instead to the 1973 Soviet initiative concerning 10 per cent reductions by the five permanent members of the Security Council, mentioned above. That initiative, in the opinion of Czechoslovakia, contained the key elements on which a realistic approach should be based. In a similar context, some of the socialist States favoured reducing military budgets on a regional basis, while maintaining strict observance of the principle of equal security. According to Mongolia, that approach would prevent reductions by some States from being compensated by increased expenditures on the part of their allies.

On the other hand, China considered it obviously unfair to call on all five

permanent members to assume equal obligations in respect of reductions, and criticized the 1973 Soviet initiative as hypocritical and as harbouring ulterior motives.

A number of non-aligned States as well as Norway, Romania, Sweden and the USSR mentioned the importance of diverting a part of the funds saved through reductions of military budgets to economic development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries. India, observing that a secure world could not be built on the foundation of human misery, stated 40 per cent of the total population of two thirds of Member States lived in a state of absolute misery while the richer countries continued to lavish resources on strengthening their military. Many delegations pointed out that the reduction of military budgets should begin with the most powerful States; Brazil, for instance, held that action on reductions agreed upon must be taken first of all by the countries responsible for the highest expenditures in weapons. Chile advocated the concept of self-monitoring by States while awaiting the conclusion of the relevant agreements, a measure which should promote the reallocation of resources to development; that idea was shared by Costa Rica.

Following the general exchange of views, the Commission decided on May 28 to set up a working group to deal with the item on the reduction of military budgets and make recommendations thereon. The Working Group held three meetings between 28 May and 4 June. In addition, its Chairman, Mr. Mahmoud of Egypt, had consultations with various delegations on some of the proposals put forward and compiled a background paper, covering the principles and ideas suggested in the replies received from Governments, in the Romanian-Swedish working paper¹⁶ and during the course of the discussion, which is reproduced as annex II to this chapter. The discussion in the Working Group, however, did not lead to agreement in respect of the contents of the paper. The Working Group could thus only recommend that further consideration be given by the Commission to the working paper and other proposals.

At its final plenary meeting on 5 June, the Commission adopted by consensus the recommendation that the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session should request the Disarmament Commission to continue the consideration of the question of reduction of military budgets on the basis of the working paper and other proposals and ideas put forward on the issue. That substantive recommendation is contained in the report of the Commission,¹⁷ as follows:

7. In the light of its consideration of agenda item 5 (a) and (b), reflected in the present report, the Disarmament Commission recommends that the General Assembly, at its thirty-sixth session, after examining the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets", should request the Disarmament Commission to continue at its next substantive session the consideration of this agenda item, including consideration of the background paper, as well as other proposals and ideas on this subject matter, with a view to identifying and elaborating the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military expenditures,

¹⁶ See foot-notes 11 and 12.

¹⁷ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 42* (A/36/42), para. 20.

keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles in a suitable document at an appropriate stage.

After the adoption of the recommendation, some delegations made further comments on the subject.¹⁸ Romania regretted that some texts suggested by it, *inter alia*, the substance of the Romanian-Swedish document, had not been included in the report of the Commission. China felt that the report could have been improved by stressing the main responsibility of the super-Powers. The United States found the discussion on the subject instructive, but believed that there was no possibility of moving towards general reduction of military outlays until their causes were eliminated and there was some assurance of receiving full, accurate and comparable data from different countries.

India believed that the differences within the working group had to an extent been thrashed out and that only a few basic points remained on which further harmonization would be necessary. On the other hand, France had serious doubts as to whether progress could be made in the future because of the objections raised to two conditions it found essential to any commitment: comparability and verification. Sweden agreed as to the need to solve those problems, but pointed out that considerable progress had in fact been achieved: the reporting instrument existed, and what was needed was the political will to make full use of it. The German Democratic Republic stressed that, in its view, every negotiation on reduction of military budgets needed, in advance, the declared willingness to take the required steps.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1981

Even in the absence of an agenda item on the reduction of military budgets, delegations expressed concern about the question in the Committee on Disarmament, primarily in plenary meetings.¹⁹ Many of them commented on the continuing ominous international atmosphere and concomitant increase in annual military expenditures, believed to have reached a level of some \$500 billion.

Romania noted three reasons why the question was particularly important: present-day weapons were a source of insecurity; the arms race was harmful to world economy; and the proliferation and refinement of weapons caused the maintenance of attitudes based on the threat or use of force. Romania therefore attached special importance to the question of the freezing and reduction of military budgets.

Other States criticized the doctrines of the "balance of terror" and nuclear deterrence. Algeria believed that it was unrealistic to wait for a hypothetical relaxation of international tensions, and that work should be

¹⁸ A/CN.10/PV.54 and Add.1, A/CN.10/PV.41-54/Corrigendum and A/CN.10/32.

¹⁹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 27* (A/36/27), appendix III (CD/228), vols. I-VII.

commenced on their prime cause, namely, the more and more advanced research on weapons of mass destruction, their accelerated production, and their incessant testing and stockpiling — all of which perpetuated the upward spiral of the “balance of terror”. Peru observed that even if the nuclear Powers used only half of their arsenals, they would do away with all forms of life on earth; in its view, that illustrated a theoretical limit to the doctrine of deterrence and called for a different system of relations. Many States, particularly the non-aligned, emphasized the detrimental effect of military expenditures on the process of development.

The United States observed that there was a tendency in the Committee to adopt a high moral tone in preaching about the evils of deterrence, which might be satisfying to the psyche, but did not lead to other results. According to the United States, the plans of NATO to strengthen its military posture in Europe were a response to a Soviet buildup which in large measure had already taken place. The United States questioned whether the level of international tension would have been so high if that buildup had not occurred or if it had been more moderate.

The socialist States held an opposing view. Czechoslovakia, for instance, found it disquieting that the process of the relaxation of international tension — the prevailing tendency of the previous decade — was being called into question. It blamed that on the policy of NATO, which was endeavouring to reverse the historically established relationship of forces in the world to its advantage. Citing some NATO actions, Czechoslovakia referred, *inter alia*, to a May 1978 decision of the NATO council concerning the increase of its members’ military budgets up to the year 2000.

Relatively few delegations dealt with specific measures related to the question of the reduction of military budgets. The Federal Republic of Germany supported the ongoing activities in the United Nations system for achieving transparency and comparability of military potentials, regarding them as a basis for current and future disarmament efforts and a contribution to confidence-building. The reliability and comparability of data on military potentials could also be assisted by establishing appropriate registers within the United Nations system. Poland envisaged a broad-based campaign, perhaps under the auspices of the United Nations Secretariat — for instance, the Centre for Disarmament and the Department of Public Information — through which educators, the professions and conceivably the media would publicize the ideals of peace and co-operation of nations while, at the same time, familiarizing public opinion in the world at large with the difficulties, objectives and rewards of creating a world where human and material resources were not diverted to wasteful military purposes, but were directed to meet the daily needs of every human being.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1981

The tense international situation was reflected in the debate on the reduction of military budgets during the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly,

particularly in the First Committee.²⁰ In several statements, the United States criticized what it regarded as a unilateral Soviet arms buildup of great proportions in the 1970s; it denied that there had been a "race", stating that the military expenditures of the United States had declined in real terms by 25 per cent since 1968. It also pointed out that the United States published extensive data on its military budget and equipment and activities in other military areas, and it called on the Soviet Union to do the same in order to establish the basis for enduring agreements in the arms control field. The Soviet Union, for its part, held that by inflating the myth of the Soviet military threat as an ideological underlay for the buildup of its defence potential, the United States was sharply increasing military appropriations, thus nudging the world in the direction of increasing danger of the outbreak of war. Cuba and several Eastern European States presented assessments similar to those of the USSR about the United States and NATO.

China and Albania found fault with both major Powers, holding that they were causing difficulties in disarmament negotiations and seeking military superiority. Brazil expressed astonishment about the super-Powers' particular perception of security. In Pakistan's view, the return to the logic of a balance of terror, if allowed to persist, could lead mankind to accidental if not deliberate suicide. The United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of the ten members of the European Community, emphasized that the massive increase in world-wide expenditures on armaments demonstrated the need for control and reductions and the tackling of social and economic problems. The Ten believed that enhancement of international security required realistic, balanced and verifiable agreements and that disarmament would come about only through serious and painstaking negotiation, resulting in concrete measures for the limitation and reduction of armaments, taking into account the principles of parity and equality.

As in the previous year, the dimensions of military expenditure in the world and its harmful consequences to development efforts were touched upon by many delegations. Jamaica, speaking on behalf of the Latin American States, believed that world military expenditure was in the region of \$600 billion annually, and found it tragic that the world's resources should be so squandered when so much need existed for that wealth to be put to constructive use to meet mankind's social and economic needs. Angola, speaking for the African Group, stated that the cost of one modern tank alone could help build clinics, classrooms or health programmes for the poor in developing countries and the deprived and exploited in developed countries. Mrs. Inga Thorsson of Sweden, in introducing the final report of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development²¹ of which she had been Chairman (see chapter XXI), put the figure for world-wide military expenditures in 1981 at

²⁰ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1st to 33rd and 91st meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 38th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

²¹ A/36/356 and Corr.1.

\$520 billion. Speaking on various aspects of military outlays, she stated, *inter alia*, that military budgets were dead-end expenditures in all types of economies — market, centrally planned, or mixed. Through its inflationary effects and the malaise to which it contributed, military spending inhibited the capital investment required for development. The United States, although believing that there was much in the Experts' report that deserved commendation, considered that some aspects of the report did not adequately reflect a consensus. For example, the United States, as well as some other delegations according to its statement, opposed the idea of a direct institutional link between disarmament and development, and believed that other factors, such as legitimate security concerns and the role of international trade, must be considered.

In two statements, Romania spelt out what it termed a constructive and flexible approach to the question which could assist in the effort to reach a common position. It felt that the international community was rightly disappointed at the sterility of the recent negotiations. Referring to the burden of military expenditures on all peoples, Romania emphasized how important a decision it would be to reach, at the thirty-sixth session, an agreement on the freezing of military budgets at the 1981 level. A declaration, along the lines suggested in the Romanian-Swedish working paper²² submitted to the Disarmament Commission (see above), if adopted by the Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, would be a major contribution to the cessation of the escalation of military expenditure. Romania, for three successive years, had unilaterally reduced its own military expenditures. Two principles had guided its proposals on the issue: first, that the freezing of military budgets should in no way affect the right of States to equal security and a balance of forces at the regional or world level and, secondly, that that balance should be sought and established at ever lower levels of military expenditure. Further efforts should proceed along three possible lines: first, all States should refrain from taking steps which would undermine future negotiations; secondly, the Assembly should request the Disarmament Commission to continue its efforts to identify and elaborate on principles concerning the reduction of military budgets; and, thirdly, there should be a consistent and close consideration of all technical aspects involved in the freezing and reduction of military budgets, including those relating to verification and comparability. However, those matters could not be regarded as a prerequisite for any practical action in the field.

Both in its plenary address and in the First Committee, the Federal Republic of Germany discussed United Nations efforts to make military budgets more transparent and comparable on a world-wide scale, which it regarded as a particularly important requirement for the process of confidence-building. It repeated its proposal that the United Nations set up two registers: one which would record the per capita expenditure on armaments of each industrial country and how much it spent on development assistance, and a second which would serve to list arms exports and imports. Italy also stressed

²² See foot-note 12.

the problems of comparability and verifiability, believing that reductions in defence expenditure could be achieved without excessive difficulties if States were able to rely on the absolute reciprocity of neighbouring countries, or at least of those countries from which they perceived a potential threat. Egypt held the view that the General Assembly had been engaged in only a marginally worthwhile exercise in its efforts regarding the accounting and reporting on military budgets, and believed that reductions must not be solely dependent on the comparability of military expenditures. Portugal, while attaching importance to the principle of the openness of military budgets, pointed out that it entailed many practical problems, not only between States having different political and social systems, but even between States having similar systems. For instance, differences between price determining mechanisms created distortions in figures given in national accounts, and the transformation of figures into a common accounting unit created another set of problems. A document on principles should therefore show how to solve at least the major problems; otherwise the international community might waste its time in an exercise in futility.

Poland, in commenting on behalf of the Eastern European States on the report on the relationship between disarmament and development mentioned above, which they appreciated on the whole, viewed as unfounded the contention that the lack of information about the military efforts of States was one of the main factors contributing to the arms race. Those countries did not share the positive assessment of United Nations efforts to set norms for military budget cost accounting. In their view, such an assessment and the recommendation concerning a fuller compilation and dissemination of data on the cost of the military preparations of States and the military use of human and material resources tended to obfuscate what they considered the true cause of the continuation of the arms race, namely, the lack of political will on the part of some States to undertake genuine disarmament measures. The socialist States regarded various cost-accounting methods as divorced from reality. They held that such an approach made it impossible to tackle the problem of reducing military budgets, and was being used by some countries to cover up their unwillingness to agree to reductions.

On 16 November, Austria, Bangladesh, Ecuador, Indonesia, Ireland, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sweden and Uruguay submitted a draft resolution which was subsequently also sponsored by the Niger and the Sudan. The draft resolution was introduced on 18 November by the representative of Romania who emphasized that the proposal envisaged action at two levels. First, the General Assembly would renew the appeal to all States, in particular those most heavily armed, to exercise self-restraint in their military expenditures pending the conclusion of agreements on the reduction of such expenditures. Secondly, the General Assembly would request the Disarmament Commission to pursue its activities with a view to identifying and elaborating on the principles on reductions, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles into a suitable document. Since only non-controversial provisions had been included in the draft resolution, Romania hoped that it would be adopted by consensus. On 20 November, Romania orally revised the first preambular paragraph of the original draft

by deleting the word "unprecedented" before the word "growing" (see below). The draft resolution, as orally revised, was approved by the First Committee, also on 20 November, without a vote.

On 16 November, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Romania, the Sudan and Sweden submitted a second draft resolution, which was subsequently also sponsored by Rwanda. The draft resolution was introduced on 18 November by the representative of Sweden, who believed that efforts were urgently needed to arrive at agreements about the freezing and reduction of military expenditures and that such agreements could be concluded without affecting the military balance to the detriment of the national security of any State. Sweden further believed that agreements on such measures would have the advantage of exerting constraints, not only on certain kinds of weapons, but on all kinds of military activities. It recalled that a standardized system of international reporting had been developed and tested, and that the General Assembly had recommended that all Member States make use of the reporting instrument and report their military expenditures to the Secretary-General annually. The draft resolution accordingly placed emphasis on the need to increase the number of States reporting with a view to achieving the broadest possible participation, and reiterated the recommendation to all Member States that they report annually. Furthermore, by the draft the Assembly would request the Secretary-General to examine ways and means to make the collection and assembling of data on the reported expenditures an integral part of his normal statistical services and to arrange and publish those data according to statistical practice.

On 20 November, the Committee approved the draft resolution introduced by Sweden by a recorded vote of 102 to none, with 15 abstentions (including Eastern European States (except Romania) and India).

Before action was taken on the two draft resolutions, the United Kingdom, again on behalf of the European Community, commented positively on them, stressing that a pragmatic approach, based upon the valuable work of the *Ad Hoc* Panel and on what had already been achieved through the use of the standardized reporting instrument, should be developed. The Ten noted with regret that as yet no contributions to the reporting system had been made by those States with centrally planned economies. In an explanation of its voting position on both drafts, the United States also expressed a similar regret regarding the second draft, and elaborated at length on comparisons of American and Soviet military expenditures. The United States also expressed a reservation about the draft introduced by Romania to the effect that, in its opinion, the need for verification had regrettably been relegated to a position of lesser importance by being placed in the preambular section. Brazil, in explaining its position, held that the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States should take the lead in utilizing the reporting instrument, thus showing their willingness to reduce their expenditures on armaments.

India explained that had a vote been taken on the draft introduced by

Romania, it would have abstained. In its opinion, concepts such as military balance and so-called parity could not serve as the basis for measures of arms limitation or disarmament as such, and they were equally untenable as the basis for reduction of military budgets. India held that the five or six militarily significant States that accounted for over 80 per cent of global military expenditures must take the lead in cutting military budgets. Regarding the draft introduced by Sweden, India stated that for those same reasons, it had abstained. Yugoslavia had voted in favour of that draft resolution, but believed that the action which it recommended could be useful and efficient only if all members of the international community participated in use of the reporting instrument. The Soviet Union had abstained, although it was a constant advocate of reducing military expenses. It recalled its initiative in 1973 aimed at reducing the military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and the allocation of part of the funds thus released to developing countries. In the past few years it had proposed various alternatives, and expressed the will to seek flexible solutions acceptable to all. Nevertheless, the effort for the real reduction of military budgets had not progressed, and the abstract research conducted in recent years by the United Nations was, in the Soviet Union's opinion, removed from reality, and did not serve the cause of the reduction of those budgets.

On 9 December, the draft resolution initiated by Romania was adopted by the General Assembly, without a vote, as resolution 36/82 A, and that initiated by Sweden by a non-recorded vote of 120 to none, with 19 abstentions, as resolution 36/82 B.

Resolution 36/82 A reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned about the ever-spiralling arms race and growing military expenditures, which constitute a heavy burden for the economies of all nations and have extremely harmful consequences on international peace and security,

Reaffirming the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, according to which gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would contribute to curbing the arms race and would increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries,

Reaffirming that it is possible to achieve continued and systematic reductions in military budgets without affecting the military balance to the detriment of the national security of any State,

Recalling its resolution 34/83 F of 11 December 1979, in which it considered that a new impetus should be given to endeavours to achieve agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain, in a balanced manner, military expenditures, including adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned,

Recalling also the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, which provides that during this period renewed efforts should be made to reach agreement on the reduction of military expenditures and the reallocation of resources thus saved to economic and social development, especially for the benefit of developing countries,

Recalling further its resolution 35/142 A of 12 December 1980, in which it requested the Disarmament Commission to continue at its session to be held in 1981 the consideration of the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets" and, in particular, to identify and elaborate on the

principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military expenditures, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles into a suitable document at an appropriate stage,

Having considered the report of the Disarmament Commission on the work accomplished during its session in 1981 and taking into account the proposals and ideas submitted by States concerning the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military expenditures, as contained in the working document annexed to the Commission's report,

Aware of the various proposals submitted by Member States and of the activities carried out so far within the framework of the United Nations in the field of the reduction of military budgets,

Considering that the identification and elaboration of the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military budgets and the other current activities within the framework of the United Nations related to the question of the reduction of military budgets should be regarded as having the fundamental objective of reaching international agreements on the reduction of military expenditures,

1. *Reaffirms* the urgent need to reinforce the endeavours of all States and international action in the area of the reduction of military budgets, with a view to reaching international agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain military expenditures;

2. *Reiterates* the appeal to all States, in particular the most heavily armed States, pending the conclusion of agreements on the reduction of military expenditures, to exercise self-restraint in their military expenditures with a view to reallocating the funds thus saved to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of developing countries;

3. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to continue at its session to be held in 1982 the consideration of the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets", taking into account the provisions of General Assembly resolution 35/142 A as well as those of the present resolution and other relevant proposals and ideas, with a view to identifying and elaborating on the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military expenditures, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles into a suitable document at an appropriate stage;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets"

Resolution 36/82 B reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned about the arms race, its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security and its deplorable waste of human and economic resources,

Alarmed by present tendencies to increase further the rate of growth of military expenditures,

Considering that gradual reductions of military expenditures on a mutually agreed basis would be a measure that would contribute to curbing the arms race and would increase the possibilities of reallocating resources, now being used for military purposes, to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries,

Convinced that such reductions could and should be carried out on a mutually agreed basis without affecting the military balance to the detriment of the national security of any country,

Reaffirming its conviction that provisions for comparability and verification will have to be basic elements of any agreement to reduce military expenditures,

Recalling the fact that these matters are being studied by the Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets, established in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 35/142 B of 12 December 1980, and that this Group is expected to submit its report before the second special session of the Assembly devoted to disarmament,

Recalling further that a standardized system for international reporting of military expenditures has been recommended for use and that the first national reports have been received this year,

Emphasizing the value of a full implementation of such a reporting instrument and of its further refinement as a means to increase confidence between States by contributing to greater

openness in military matters, which is particularly important for arriving at international agreements to reduce military expenditures,

Reaffirming also its convictions that the reporting of military data and the examination of problems concerning comparability and verification have the fundamental objective of making possible the conclusion of international agreements to reduce military expenditures,

Noting with appreciation the first report of the Secretary-General on these matters,

Considering that the activities related to the reporting of military expenditures as well as to the questions of comparability and verification and other ongoing activities within the framework of the United Nations related to the question of the reduction of military budgets should be regarded as having the fundamental objective of reaching international agreements on the reduction of military expenditures,

1. *Stresses* the need to increase the number of reporting States with a view to the broadest possible participation from different geographic regions and representing different budgeting systems;

2. *Reiterates* its recommendation that all Member States should make use of the reporting instrument and report annually, by 30 April, to the Secretary-General their military expenditures of the latest fiscal year for which data are available;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to examine ways and means to make the collection and assembling of data on military expenditures, reported by States on the basis of the reporting instrument, an integral part of the regular United Nations statistical services and to arrange and publish these data according to statistical practice;

4. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to include these matters in his next annual report on military budgets to the General Assembly.

Conclusion

The idea of the reduction of military budgets was the subject of extensive discussions by the Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly in 1981. Although all delegations agreed in principle on the significance of that goal and its potentially beneficial impact on both the political and security as well as the economic spheres of international relations, the growing lack of confidence with which the super-Powers tended to observe each other's activities in the military field, and their divergent views on many aspects involved in the question of the reduction of military budgets, tended to work against the possibility of any constructive or in-depth consideration.

With regret, many States, particularly the non-aligned, continued to emphasize the ever increasing discrepancy in global expenditures for military purposes on the one hand, and development on the other, a grievance which was also emphasized in the United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and development. Romania and Sweden advocated an urgent decision to freeze and reduce the military outlays and some measure — for instance, a declaration by the Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament in 1982 — which would govern the actions of States in that endeavour. Some Western States expressed reservations on such declaratory measures. The Eastern European States continued to support the implementation of the 1973 resolution calling for 10 per cent reductions by the permanent members of the Security Council.

Although the work on the improvement of the standardized reporting instrument on military expenditures continued through the Group of Qualified

Experts appointed in 1981 and a number of States reported on their expenditures, no change took place in the principal attitudes towards the use of such an instrument. The Western and some non-aligned States laid considerable emphasis on its use and the need for it to be used more widely, especially by States having different political and economic systems, to achieve what is termed greater transparency of military budgets. The socialist States found the use of the instrument and related measures concerning it to be irrelevant to the solution of the problems in question.

In accordance with the two resolutions adopted by the General Assembly in 1981, the Disarmament Commission will continue its work on the question at its 1982 session and the Secretary-General will report to the General Assembly on the use of the reporting instrument by Member States, as well as on improvements in statistical services concerning the data reported. The Group of Qualified Experts is expected to submit a report on its work to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

ANNEX I

Group of Qualified Experts in the Field of Military Budgets

Isaac E. Ayewah, Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the United Nations

Vito Caporeso, Ministry of Defence, Italy

Hans Christian Cars, Ministry of Defence, Sweden

José Encinas del Pando, University of Lima, Peru

Daniel Gallik, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, United States

Traian Grozea, Centre for Studies and Research of History and Military Theory, Romania

Kenji Nozu, Defense Agency, Japan

Benjamin Parwoto, Department of Defence and Security, Indonesia

ANNEX II

Background paper on some of the proposed principles and ideas which should govern further actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military expenditures*

1. Concerted efforts should be made with the objective of concluding international agreements to freeze and reduce military budgets, including adequate verification measures acceptable to all parties. Such agreements should result in genuine reductions of armaments and armed forces of States parties with the aim of strengthening international peace and security at the lowest possible level of military forces and armaments.

2. All efforts in the field of freezing and reduction of military expenditures should take into account the principles and provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament as well as other fundamental principles applied to disarmament.

* Reproduced from the 1981 report of the Disarmament Commission (*Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/36/42), annex I*).

3. Pending the conclusion of agreements to freeze and reduce military expenditures all States should exercise self-restraint in such expenditures.

4. (a) The freezing and reduction of military expenditures should be implemented in a balanced manner by gradually lower military levels in order to ensure the right of all States to undiminished security, self-defence and sovereignty;

(b) The problem of the countries that are without adequate defence capabilities and subject to aggression is not to reduce their military budgets but to strengthen their defence capabilities.

5. (a) In view of the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States and their decisive role in determining the pace of the arms race, the freezing and reduction of the military expenditures should begin with them;

(b) The reduction of military budgets should primarily involve all States which are permanent members of the Security Council and also other States with major economic and military potential;

(c) The question of reducing military budgets can only be solved by checking the super-Powers' arms race and rivalry for hegemony, thereby eliminating the root cause of international tension and effectively ensuring the security of all countries. Those nuclear-weapon States who have the highest military budgets should bear a special responsibility in reducing military budgets. They should take the lead in this matter and undertake to cut back their enormous military expenditures in excess of defence needs. Thereafter, the other nuclear-weapon States and militarily significant countries can join them in further reducing their respective military expenditures according to a reasonable ratio and appropriate schedule;

(d) The reduction of world-wide military expenditures should be effected in accordance with the principle of greatest responsibility. The great Powers should be the first to begin the process of reducing military expenditures, in particular in the field of nuclear weapons.

6. (a) Human and material resources released through the reduction of military expenditures should be reallocated for economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries;

(b) The resources released as a result of implementing measures aimed at banning the production of nuclear weapons and reducing stockpiles should be diverted, on the basis of an agreement, to peaceful purposes and not for use on other items in the military budgets of nuclear States.

7. Transparency of military budgets is an important first step in the move towards agreed and balanced reduction of military budgets.

8. Since estimates of military expenditures of States vary according to the sources considered, it is necessary to use an instrument capable of reporting in a standardized manner the actual military budgets.

9. (a) Agreements on reduction of military expenditures would be facilitated by the elaboration of agreed methods of comparing military expenditures between different periods of time and between different countries;

(b) Comparability is a necessary condition for meaningful negotiations on balanced reduction of military budgets, including freezing of such budgets.

10. The identification of armaments and military activities, which will be the subject of physical reductions within the limits provided for in any agreement to freeze and reduce military expenditures, should be established by every State party to such agreements.

11. (a) Agreements on the freezing and reduction of military expenditures should be subject to strict and efficient verification. The agreements to freeze and reduce military expenditures should, therefore, contain adequate measures of verification, satisfactory to all parties, in order to ensure that the provisions are strictly applied and fulfilled by all States parties;

(b) Agreements on the freezing and reduction of military budgets should be verifiable: for such agreements the availability of a reliable reporting instrument constitutes a necessary precondition although not sufficient in itself.

12. Unilateral measures, such as decisions of Parliaments or Governments, concerning the freezing and reduction of military expenditures, especially when they are followed by similar measures adopted by other States on the basis of mutual example, could contribute to favourable

conditions for the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements to freeze and reduce military expenditures.

13. Confidence-building measures could help to ensure a political climate conducive to freezing and reduction of military expenditures.

14. The United Nations Organization should play a central role in orienting and stimulating the negotiations on freezing and reducing military expenditures, and all Member States should co-operate with a view to solving the problems implied by this process.

15. The reduction of military expenditures of States may also be achieved on a regional or other basis.

16. Where appropriate, initiation of dialogue should take place among States at regional or subregional levels, particularly where political tension exists, with a view to strengthening their security through elimination of military threat to each other's sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity.

17. Initiation of dialogue should take place among States at a global or regional level, where feasible and with the agreement of all the States concerned, with a view to strengthening their security through elimination of military threats to their sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity.

18. The reduction of military budgets should be complementary to other arms control agreements and should not be considered as a substitute for such agreements.

19. Specific amounts of reduction should be on either a percentage or an absolute basis during an initial period and acceptable to everyone.

20. The reduction of military budgets of some States must not be accompanied by an increase in the military expenditure of allies in their blocs.

21. This declaration should be regarded as a firm political commitment to start negotiations on the freezing and reduction of military expenditures as soon as possible.

PART FIVE

Studies and information

Work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies

Introduction

THE ADVISORY BOARD ON DISARMAMENT STUDIES was established following a decision of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978.¹ The Board consists of 30 persons, among them current and former foreign ministers, high-level foreign ministry officials, permanent representatives to the United Nations and senior academic personalities. Mr. Agha Shahi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, served as the Chairman of the Board from the beginning of its activities and, commencing at its fourth session, in May 1980, Mr. Eugeniusz Wyzner, Permanent Representative of Poland to the United Nations, has acted as its Vice-Chairman. The composition of the Advisory Board is set out in annex I to this chapter.

The work of the Advisory Board in the three years of its existence has been based on the following major decisions of the General Assembly:

(a) Paragraph 124 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, by which the Secretary-General was requested to set up an advisory board of eminent persons to advise him on various aspects of studies to be made under the auspices of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and arms limitation, including a programme of such studies;

(b) Resolution 33/71 K, by which the Secretary-General was requested to seek the advice of the Advisory Board on possible ways of establishing, operating and financing an international institute for disarmament research, under the auspices of the United Nations; and

(c) Resolution 33/71 N, in which the Secretary-General was requested, with the assistance of the Advisory Board, to study ways and means whereby "all the new ideas, new proposals, new thinking and new strategies set forth in the broad range of general debates preceding and following the adoption of the Final Document of the tenth special session be formulated into a single comprehensive and co-ordinated system, into a new philosophy on disarmament..."

With regard to studies undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations in the area of disarmament and arms limitation, the Board formulated the purposes to be served as assisting in ongoing negotiations, identifying possible new areas of negotiation and promoting public awareness of the problems involved; it recognized that studies might serve several of those

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4* (A/S-10/4), sect. III, para. 124.

purposes at once. The Board also formulated criteria for the selection of studies. They included the consideration that studies should be realistic in the sense that they should deal with areas that lent themselves to research. The Board recognized as the decisive criterion the extent to which studies could be expected to help promote disarmament, in particular the negotiating process. In the light of those criteria, the Board submitted to the Secretary-General a number of proposals for new studies. Those proposals were conveyed by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly, which adopted two of them for implementation, namely, the study on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban and that concerning a world disarmament campaign.

From the outset of its activities, the Advisory Board recognized that one of its principal tasks would be the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament studies. The Board discussed the nature and purposes of such a programme as well as some of its possible elements. It took into account, however, that the task of working out a comprehensive programme of disarmament studies must be a continuing process, the result of which should be integrated into the comprehensive programme of disarmament. Once a comprehensive programme of disarmament had been elaborated, the Board felt, it would be able to prepare a comprehensive programme of disarmament studies.

In the course of 1979, the Advisory Board discussed possible ways of establishing, operating and financing an international institute for disarmament research under the auspices of the United Nations, with a view to advising the Secretary-General on that matter, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 33/71 K. It submitted a series of recommendations which were welcomed by the Assembly in its resolution 34/83 M. Following the adoption of that resolution, the Advisory Board, in the course of 1980, had several discussions on the United Nations institute, in particular, on the question of its mandate and the appropriate composition of an advisory council of the institute. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research was established with effect from 1 October 1980 within the framework of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) as an interim arrangement for the period until the second special session on disarmament. The Advisory Council of the Institute comprises 17 members, 8 of whom are members of the Advisory Board. It is chaired by the Board's *ex officio* Chairman.

After the Advisory Board had rendered its advice to the Secretary-General with regard to a new philosophy on disarmament, as requested in resolution 33/71 N, it had a series of further discussions on the subject, in 1980. In the course of those discussions, a number of proposals were made for means to achieve novel approaches to hitherto intractable problems of disarmament.

1981 sessions of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies

The Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies held its sixth and seventh

sessions at the United Nations Headquarters in New York, from 4 to 15 May and from 28 September to 9 October 1981, respectively.

The 1981 sessions of the Board were mainly devoted to the consideration of (a) proposals for new studies; (b) the mandate and functions of the Board; (c) the work of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research; and (d) a new philosophy on disarmament.

Proposals for new studies

In the report of the Secretary-General entitled "Programme of research and studies on disarmament"² it is stated that, at previous meetings, the Board had considered nine proposals for studies and had cited four studies from among them, which should be undertaken in the near future.³ The General Assembly, in its resolution 35/152 I, requested the Secretary-General to carry out one of the proposed studies, on the organization and financing of a world disarmament campaign under the auspices of the United Nations.⁴ The Board reported to the Secretary-General that it continued to attach importance to the implementation of the remaining studies and noted that they could be considered in due course in the context of a comprehensive programme of disarmament studies, which would be drawn up in connection with a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Mandate and functions

There was general agreement in the Advisory Board that, with the approach of the second special session devoted to disarmament, and in the light of the fact that the terms of appointment of the present members would be expiring at the end of 1981, it would be appropriate if the Board apprised the Secretary-General of the experience it had gained in the first three years of its existence and conveyed to him its views on possible future activities. The Board accordingly devoted a substantial part of its 1981 sessions to the question of its mandate, functions and future direction.

In assessing the role of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, members stressed that its functions were exclusively advisory and quite different from those performed by other bodies within the disarmament machinery. On the nature of those functions, different views were expressed. However, in the end it was generally agreed that the wording of paragraph 124 of the Final Document of the tenth special session left sufficient flexibility to cover additional activities, as had been shown by the Board's work in connection with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

² A/36/654.

³ For details, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, chap. XXI.

⁴ A/36/458, annex.

One possible area of expansion proposed in the functions of the Advisory Board was that it should not only deal with studies but might become an advisory body for the Secretary-General in the field of disarmament. In its report, the Board noted that a consensus was reached that, since the Board was in the unique position of discussing and formulating conceptual aspects in the field of disarmament, it could be requested by the Secretary-General, and by the General Assembly through the Secretary-General, to give advisory opinions in that field. It was generally felt that the name of the Board did not adequately reflect its range of functions.

With respect to its activities regarding disarmament studies, the Board expressed the view that it was within its mandate to: (a) initiate and recommend studies; (b) elaborate a comprehensive programme of disarmament studies; (c) advise the Secretary-General on planning and executing studies proposed and under way as well as to comment on completed studies; (d) render advice, if specifically requested, to delegations intending to submit proposals for studies; (e) co-ordinate the study activities of the United Nations system of organizations in the area of disarmament; (f) recommend approaches to studies in order to achieve greater efficiency and cost savings; (g) continue to comment upon and promote the work of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research; and, finally, (h) provide valuable assistance to the Secretary-General in connection with the World Disarmament Campaign.

Work of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

At both of its 1981 sessions, the Board considered the question of the programme of work of the Institute for Disarmament Research, so as to enable those of its members who participate in the Advisory Council of the Institute to reflect adequately the views of the Advisory Board. Subsequently, the Board was advised that the Advisory Council had approved the programme of work of the Institute, which is described in annex II to this chapter, the text of which was contributed by the Institute.

The Board, furthermore, took note of a list of 17 proposals for possible future research projects, that might be undertaken by the Institute, which had been submitted to the Advisory Council. After the deliberations of the Advisory Council, the Board was informed that the Council had approved two items from among the 17 referred to, as explained in annex II. It was hoped that all approved projects would be completed in time for the second special session on disarmament.

New philosophy on disarmament

The Advisory Board had a substantive exchange of views on the question of a new philosophy on disarmament. The member who had taken the initiative of retaining the topic on the Board's agenda repeated his previous proposal, that a group of wise persons should be established to formulate such a new

philosophy or that the task might be entrusted to an individual of world-wide prestige. The Board recognized the subject as vast, complicated and at times nebulous. In the course of the exchange of a wide range of views, a series of pragmatic approaches was heard and, in an attempt to construct a single, comprehensive and co-ordinated system, emphasis was laid, *inter alia*, on the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly. Some members, on the other hand, suggested that a more metaphysical, spiritual and future-oriented approach should be adopted, under which — while by no means conflicting with the decisions of the Assembly and specifically with the Programme of Action contained in the Final Document — basically novel concepts could be developed. Several Board members felt that the two approaches could be considered as complementary.

In its report to the Secretary-General, the Board came to the conclusion that it could not, within the time at its disposal, complete a fruitful discussion on the subject, and it agreed to recommend to the Secretary-General that further consideration should be given to the idea of a new philosophy on disarmament.

Action by the General Assembly, 1981

In the First Committee, on 18 November, Argentina, Canada, Pakistan, the Philippines and Poland submitted a draft resolution entitled “Programme of research and studies on disarmament”. By the proposal, the General Assembly, taking note with appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies in 1981, would request the Secretary-General to submit the report to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament for its further consideration. In introducing the draft resolution at the Committee’s 37th meeting, on 20 November, the representative of Pakistan stressed that it was purely procedural and was necessary because of the fact that one of the tasks of the second special session on disarmament would be to review the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament.

The draft resolution was approved by the First Committee, on 23 November, without a vote. At its 91st plenary meeting, on 9 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, also without a vote, as resolution 36/92 L. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Taking note with appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies in 1981,

Requests the Secretary-General to submit that report to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament for its further consideration.

Conclusion

The establishment of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies on the basis of a decision of the General Assembly taken at its first special session

devoted to disarmament demonstrated the desire of the majority of States to follow both a more comprehensive and longer-term approach to study activities in the field of disarmament and arms limitation under the auspices of the United Nations.

From the beginning of its activities, the Board was aware that one of its main tasks would be to elaborate a comprehensive programme of disarmament studies. The Board found it difficult, however, to consider such a comprehensive programme of studies in the absence of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, which should incorporate the study programme. The Board, because of that situation, has concentrated its activities over the three years of its existence on the consideration of ideas for new studies, and has submitted a number of proposals for studies to the Secretary-General. While the Board can advise the Secretary-General, it is up to the Secretary-General to transmit corresponding recommendations to the General Assembly. Furthermore, in the Assembly, each delegation can submit its own proposals for new studies. It would therefore seem desirable to establish certain modalities for the co-ordination of proposals for new studies and their integration into a comprehensive programme of disarmament studies.

In accordance with a specific request, the Board gave advice on possible ways of establishing, operating and financing the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. The Board is closely linked with the Institute's operations through its representatives on the Advisory Council of the Institute. As specifically requested by the General Assembly, the Board has also discussed problems of formulating a new philosophy on disarmament. In those discussions, a number of proposals have been made for means to achieve novel approaches to problems whose solution has always seemed elusive.

At the second special session devoted to disarmament, the General Assembly is expected to consider the subject of disarmament studies, including the matter of the Advisory Board. Accordingly, the General Assembly, at its thirty-sixth session, formally requested the Secretary-General to submit the 1981 report on the work of the Board to the Assembly at the special session.

ANNEX I

Members of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies

Erich Bielka-Karltru, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Austria

Abdulla Bishara, former Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations

O. N. Bykov, Deputy Director of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, Academy of Science, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Vice-Chairman, Research Council on Peace and Disarmament

Frank Edmund Boaten, Ambassador of Ghana to Denmark

James E. Dougherty, Professor of Political Science, St. Joseph's University, Philadelphia

Constantin Ene, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Romania

Alfonso García Robles, Permanent Representative of Mexico to the Committee on Disarmament
John Garnett, Woodrow Wilson Professor of International Politics, University of Wales
Enrique Gaviria-Liévano, Deputy Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations
Office at Geneva

Ignac Golob, Assistant Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia

A. C. S. Hameed, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka

John W. Holmes, Counsellor, Canadian Institute of International Affairs

Hussein Khallaf, Professor at the University of Cairo, former Minister and Ambassador of Egypt

Lai Ya-Li, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China

Carlos Lechuga-Hevia, Director of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Cuba

Akira Matsui, Vice-Chairman, Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.; President, Japan Atomic
Relations Organization

Kasuka S. Mutukwa, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Lusaka, Zambia

Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, Ambassador of Argentina to the Court of St. James

Radha Krishna Ramphul, Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations

Klaus Ritter, Director, Foundation of Science and Politics, Ebenhausen, Federal Republic of
Germany

Alejandro Rovira, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uruguay

Agha Shahi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan

Pierre-Christian Taittinger, Senator and former Minister of France

Oscar Vaerno, Director General for Planning and Research, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Norway

Milous Vejvoda, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia

M. A. Vellodi, Adviser, Department of Atomic Energy, India

Piero Vinci, Ambassador of Italy, Rome

Eugeniusz Wyzner, Permanent Representative of Poland to the United Nations

Alejandro D. Yango, Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the United Nations

Alexander Yankov, Professor of International Law, Sofia State University, Bulgaria

ANNEX II

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research*

Brief history

The proposal for the establishment of an international institute for disarmament research was first presented by the President of France in his address on 25 May 1978 to the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament. Subsequently, the French delegation submitted to the Assembly a memorandum^a concerning the establishment of an international institute for disarmament research, which was later referred to in paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the session as one of the proposals deserving to be further and more thoroughly studied.

At its thirty-third session, the General Assembly considered the proposal and adopted resolution 33/71 K,^b by which the Secretary-General was requested to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session on possible ways of establishing, operating and financing an

* Text contributed by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

^a See A/S-10/AC.1/8, annex.

^b For details, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, chap. III.

international institute for disarmament research, under the auspices of the United Nations and, in that regard, to seek, *inter alia*, the advice of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies in the light of its competence in the area of a programme of studies on disarmament.

Pursuant to that resolution, the Secretary-General submitted a report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session, which included the proposals prepared by the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies.^c The General Assembly, by resolution 34/83 M,^d took note of the report of the Secretary-General, welcomed the recommendations contained in the report of the Advisory Board, and requested the Secretary-General to hold consultations with the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) regarding the establishment of the United Nations institute for disarmament research. The Assembly also expressed the hope that appropriate steps would be taken as soon as possible with a view to implementing the recommendations contained in the report.

The consultations between the Secretary-General and UNITAR referred to in the resolution were initiated promptly and pursued during the course of 1980. The Board of Trustees of UNITAR convened a special meeting for the purpose and decided, on 8 April 1980, to establish the institute. Subsequently, the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies discussed the matter and accorded particular attention to the question of the mandate of the institute and the appropriate composition of its advisory council.^e Accordingly, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) was established at Geneva, Switzerland, with effect from 1 October 1980.

The General Assembly, by resolution 35/152 H of 12 December 1980,^f taking into account the decisions taken by the Board of Trustees of UNITAR and bearing in mind the work of the Advisory Board, welcomed the establishment at Geneva of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research within the framework of UNITAR as an interim arrangement for the period until the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Work of the Institute

The Institute was given a simple, pragmatic mandate to carry out research for the purpose of assisting in ongoing negotiations in the area of disarmament and arms limitation, stimulating initiatives for new negotiations, and providing a general insight into the problems involved. The Institute was called upon to carry out its mandate on the basis of the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and in accordance with resolution 34/83 M.

To determine the general direction of the work of the Institute, an Advisory Council was set up to assist the Institute in planning its programme, determining research priorities and exploring possibilities for fund raising. The composition of the Advisory Council is listed in the appendix to this annex. The tasks of the Advisory Council include the nomination of the Director of the Institute; establishment of the policy to be followed by the Institute on the basis of the provisions of the Final Document of the special session; setting up of the general programme for the Institute's work for a specified time ahead and defining appropriate areas of research; and supervision of the work of the Institute through its Director.^g

The Advisory Council held two sessions in 1981, during which it approved the programme of work of the Institute. The Council decided not to adopt a definitive research programme to extend beyond the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and to review, at a later stage, the draft research programme in the light of the decisions of that session. The programme of work as approved by the Advisory Council consisted of: (a) the compilation of a repertory of disarmament research (completed in 1981); (b) a general conceptual analysis of the field of disarmament; and (c) projects entitled "Security of States and the lowering of the levels of

^c A/34/589.

^d For details, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 4: 1979, chap. XXII.

^e A/35/574.

^f For details, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, chap. XXI.

^g See foot-note c.

armaments"; "Prevention of accidental nuclear war"; "Science and technology for disarmament"; "Disarmament data base"; "Disarmament and development: continued research on various aspects of the problem in the light of the report of the Group of Experts on Disarmament and Development"; and "Negotiating disarmament".^h

For the implementation of its research programme, the Institute, besides its own staff, has utilized the services of, or developed co-operation with, individual experts and research organizations. In the latter case, the Institute has the initiative in approaching those whom it has considered qualified to be engaged in the respective research projects. It has determined the framework of the research and subsequently reviewed it in the light of its finalization by the respective authors.

In the preface of each such research paper, the procedure followed in the elaboration of the paper is stated so as to make it understood that, although conducted within the research programme of UNIDIR and at the initiative of the Institute, the paper is the responsibility of the author. Nevertheless, without taking a position on the views expressed by the authors of the research papers, UNIDIR has assumed the responsibility for determining whether a study merits publication and dissemination.

All research undertaken by UNIDIR is intended for publication and widest dissemination.

From 16 to 18 November 1981, UNIDIR organized, at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, a conference of Directors of Research Institutes on Disarmament, with the objective of strengthening international co-operation in the field of disarmament research, to make better use of the resources available, to avoid unnecessary parallelism and duplication, and to strengthen the impact of research on governmental policies and deliberations and negotiations in that field. Participants included more than 50 representatives of national research institutes working in the field of disarmament from all regions of the world and some 15 international organizations or their respective research institutes which were part of the United Nations system, among which were the Centre for Disarmament and IAEA, ILO, UNEP, UNESCO, the United Nations University, etc. The participants found the global exchange of views and information on disarmament research to be useful, and asked UNIDIR to organize such meetings periodically. Furthermore, the Director of UNIDIR was asked to arrange that the proceedings of the Conference be brought to the attention of the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament.

Conclusion

In a little over a year the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, by the end of 1981, had taken its place within the United Nations Organization and within the academic community. Besides its programme of theoretical and applied research on questions relating to disarmament and international security, the Institute had, in the period of its existence, established a worldwide network of contacts and effective collaboration with international and national research institutes. Close co-operation with the other agencies and organizations within the United Nations system carrying out activities in the field of disarmament had also been established and was in the process of being developed.

APPENDIX

Composition of the Advisory Council of UNIDIR in 1981

Representatives of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies:

Alfonso García Robles, Permanent Representative of Mexico to the Committee on Disarmament
Klaus Ritter, Director, Foundation of Science and Politics, Ebenhausen, Federal Republic of Germany

^h For further details see A/36/654.

M. A. Vellodi, Adviser to the Department of Atomic Energy, India

O. N. Bykov, Deputy Director of the Institute for World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences

Eugeniusz Wyzner, Director, Department of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Poland

Representatives of the UNITAR Board of Trustees:

Shizuo Saito, President, Foreign Press Centre, Japan

Missoum Sbih, Ambassador of Algeria to Canada

Inga Thorsson, Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden

Piero Vinci, former Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations

Members designated by the Executive Director of UNITAR in consultation with the Secretary-General:

Ishaga Audu, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nigeria (Mr. Olu Adeniji as alternate)

Rolf Björnerstedt, Chairman of the Council of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Sweden

James E. Dougherty, Professor of Politics, St. Joseph University, Philadelphia, United States

Ex officio members:

Agha Shahi, Chairman, Advisory Board of the Secretary-General on Disarmament Studies, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Pakistan

Louis de Guiringaud, Chairman of the UNITAR Board of Trustees, Former Minister for Foreign Affairs, France

Jan Martenson, Assistant Secretary-General, United Nations Centre for Disarmament

Peter Michaelsen, Chairman, United Nations Disarmament Commission

Rikhi Jaipal, Secretary and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, Committee on Disarmament

Study on the relationship between disarmament and development

Introduction

ON 28 AUGUST 1981, THE GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, whose 27 members were appointed by the Secretary-General, concluded its work under the Chairmanship of Mrs. Inga Thorsson of Sweden. The experts and countries they represented are listed in annex I to this chapter. The study was completed in three years, between September 1978 and August 1981, and transmitted to the Secretary-General on 3 September 1981.¹ In his foreword to the study,² the Secretary-General referred to the world-wide research commissioned by the Expert Group to investigate the proposition that a balanced and generally acceptable pattern of global economic and social development is inextricably related to disarmament.³ He also expressed the hope that the clear and widely shared understanding of that relationship, as postulated by the study, might provide a basis for the formulation of practical measures by Governments that would both promote disarmament and further the cause of development.

Major features of the study

The comprehensive study, of 426 paragraphs and some 200 pages, examines the relationship between disarmament and development as it is commonly understood, with a view to putting forward both historical and new empirical evidence to establish it as a concept. The study recommends measures to incorporate its perspective into the ongoing activities in the various international forums dealing separately with disarmament and with development. Its major thrust is to demonstrate that the arms race and development pro-

¹ A detailed description of the origins of the study, its mandate and deliberations during the period 1978-80 is provided in *The Yearbook*, vol. 4: 1979, chapter XXIII, and its progress is outlined in *ibid.*, vol. 5: 1980, chapter XXII.

² A/36/356 and Corr.1.

³ A list of the titles of the research projects commissioned by the Group of Governmental Experts is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 4: 1979, chapter XXIII, annex. The commissioned projects received for the study are listed as annex II to the present chapter.

grammes are in a competitive relationship, not only in terms of resources, but also of perceptions and attitudes. The study strongly suggests that the world can either continue to pursue the ongoing arms race with vigour or move deliberately towards more stable and balanced socio-economic development within a more sustainable international political order. It cannot do both.

The study contains six substantive chapters, entitled as follows: "The framework and scope of the relationship between disarmament and development"; "Present-day utilization of resources for military purposes"; "Economic and social effects of a continuing arms race and of the implementation of disarmament measures"; "Conversion and redeployment of resources released from military purposes through disarmament measures to economic and social development purposes"; "Possible institutional measures for international reallocation of resources from armaments to development"; and "Summary, conclusions and recommendations". The last-mentioned sets out concrete measures at national and international levels to implement a positive disarmament-development relationship (see pages 357-358 below).

Following the basic exposition of the subject, the study places the disarmament-development relationship in the context of a triangular interaction between disarmament, development and security. It adopts a twofold approach to the problem of security. On the one hand, the arms race itself, particularly in the nuclear field, is viewed as a major threat to international security. And on the other, a dynamic spectrum of non-military challenges is described as a threat to the national security of individual States, in the form of: (a) a widespread reduction in prospects for economic growth; (b) the impending physical resource constraints — notably in the field of energy and selected non-renewable raw materials but also in respect of stresses in the environment and a growing world population; and (c) the continuing polarization of wealth and poverty and insufficient development in the developing countries.

As with the concept of security, the study examines also development from a broad perspective, one which includes the need for accelerated economic growth for the developing countries and sustained economic growth for the developed countries. In projecting development as a global requirement, the implications of global economic interdependence are analyzed through a contrast between the benefits of co-operative management and the potential threats of mutual denial in the continuation of an attitude which would preserve the status quo. Relying upon recent experiences to demonstrate that the economic fortunes — and thus the security — of all nations is interdependent and destined to become more so, the study argues that a failure to bring the arms race under control is likely to be associated with a vicious circle of confrontation, declining prospects for mutually advantageous economic co-operation, and shrinking developmental options for all nations. Developments in East-West relations and in the North-South dialogue in recent years are cited by the study to illustrate that possibility. The incompatibility between the objectives of a new international economic order and recent trends in the arms race, already recognized by the General

Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament in 1978,⁴ are confirmed by the study's findings on the spill-over effects of the arms race into the area of international economic relations.

The study further provides comprehensive documentation on the prevailing use for military purposes of labour, industrial capacity, raw materials and land. Two other dimensions of global military consumption, namely, military research and development and the international trade in arms, are treated separately. The study recounts some of the more familiar measures of the economic burden of military activities by describing also the purely financial measurements of global military outlays. Calculations and projections about the military end-use of raw materials are made in the light of a situation of serious concern over the availability of adequate supplies of non-renewable raw materials such as oil and minerals. While visualizing no exhaustion of supplies before the end of the century, the study foresees some difficulties in terms of dependable access to sources of certain raw materials. It emphasizes that current projections of demand vis-à-vis known reserves are based largely on the historical pattern of growth of consumption, and it estimates that accelerated growth and industrialization in the developing countries could have a significant impact on the validity of those projections.

Among the study's major findings about the military sector's claim on real resources are the following:

— Some 50 million people are, directly or indirectly, engaged in military activities world-wide. This figure includes: (a) some 25 million persons in regular armed forces; (b) roughly 10 million in paramilitary forces; (c) approximately 4 million civilians currently employed in defence departments; (d) an estimated 500,000 scientists and engineers engaged in research and development for military purposes; and (e) at least 5 million workers directly engaged in the production of weapons and other specialized military equipment.

— Anything between 3 and 11 per cent of a selected group of 14 non-energy-producing minerals are utilized world-wide for military purposes. The use of petroleum for military purposes, including its indirect consumption in military industry, has been estimated at 5 to 6 per cent of total global consumption.

— The absolute magnitude of expenditures for military research and development remains by far the largest single objective of scientific inquiry and technical development. Global expenditure on military research and development in 1980 was probably of the order of \$35 billion, or approximately one quarter of all expenditures on research and development. Approximately 20 per cent of the world's qualified scientists and engineers were engaged in military work during the 1970s. The average military product is some 20 times as research-intensive as the average civilian product.

— Military research and development has some characteristics which cannot be reflected statistically. In the first place, the technological arms race

⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, paras. 2, 16, 35, 89 and 93-95.

has complicated the process of political assessment and of efforts to find means of control through negotiation. Secondly, military research and development expenditure is more highly concentrated than total research and development: while six countries account for about 85 per cent of total research and development, just two account for a similar share of military research and development.

— About \$26 billion are annually traded in the international traffic in arms. Besides, the transfer of military hardware, arms transactions also involve large-scale training programmes and technical personnel. Crudely estimated, such “services” constitute approximately 15 per cent of the current global value of the arms trade.

— In purely financial terms, world military expenditures, by 1980, had reached an astounding \$500 billion dollars or approximately 6 per cent of world output. That amount is roughly equivalent to the value of gross fixed capital formation in all the developing countries combined, and some 19 times as large as all official development assistance provided in 1980 by the States belonging to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

— In the absence of disarmament measures, the introduction of a new generation of more deadly and expensive weapons may well add to military expenditure. A 2 per cent annual rate of increase in real terms, which is modest by historical standards, would mean total expenditures of \$743 billion at today's prices in the year 2000, or in just 20 years; assuming a 3 per cent rate of increase, the corresponding figure would be \$903 billion.

The study, taking the position that military outlays, by definition, fall into the category of consumption and not investment, demonstrates that steadily high or increasing military outlays probably have a depressing effect on economic growth on two counts: directly, through displacement of investment; and indirectly, through constraints on productivity, which is dependent to a considerable degree on research and development, which is currently biased in favour of military technology. The coexistence of high levels of military spending and high rates of economic growth in the past is not seen by the study as providing empirical evidence of a causal relationship between the two.

For the market economies, the study suggests, “stagflation”, that is, the situation of simultaneous unemployment and inflation, may be aggravated by national military expenditures. Similarly, it stresses that, in centrally planned economies, efforts to provide better consumer satisfaction at home and to contribute towards international trade a share commensurate with their share of global industrial output are adversely affected by their military outlays. While recognizing that the availability of unutilized and underutilized resources in less-developed economies may produce results which suggest a direct relationship in the short term between high rates of growth and significant military spending, the study emphasizes that for those economies too, in the long term, the adverse socio-economic consequences of sizeable military outlays would outweigh any immediate positive results.

Special attention is given to burden-measurement and opportunity costs

of the arms race as it affects the developing countries. The study suggests that military outlays put an unequal burden on economies at different national income levels in such a manner that the inequalities operate to the detriment of less-developed economies. Their urgent need for an uninterrupted flow of external inputs like capital, finance, trade and technology make those economies susceptible to the adverse effects of military outlays in the developed world in addition to those caused by their own military spending. The developing countries are thus viewed as the worst-affected victims of an environment dominated by an arms race among the major Powers. For the world as a whole, the arms race is described as complicating the process of stabilizing the international monetary system, aggravating balance of payment problems, and distorting the desired evolution of international exchange, while the world is in a period of growing economic interdependence.

On the basis of estimates concerning the global consequences of gradual reductions of military spending — proportionate to the magnitude of current military outlays of different countries — the study suggests that the diversion of a part of released resources to developing countries would: (a) substantially improve the per capita gross domestic product, industrial employment, and capital stock for the developing countries; and (b) provide significant economic gains for all the regions in the world, including the most developed. Projections based upon the United Nations input-output model of the world economy indicate that by the year 2000 even a modest degree of military restraint — the scenario modelled only assumed a progressive decline from current levels in the share of military expenditure in gross national product (GNP), not a decline in the level of world military expenditure in absolute terms — could result in a 3.7 per cent increase in world GNP, a larger capital stock, and an increase in world agricultural output, to mention only a few of the more obvious economic gains.

The opportunity to apply science and technology more directly and systematically to economic and social problems is viewed by the study as one of the most important dividends that disarmament would bring. As a potential asset for socially productive uses, the research and development component of the military outlays is emphasized as having utmost significance. The previous United Nations report entitled *Disarmament and development*⁵ identified more than 70 possible alternative uses for military research and development capabilities. The current study suggests that production workers in the military sector could quite readily transfer their skills to the development, production and installation of solar energy devices. Environment is another area likely to gain from a possible rechanneling of military research and development. An essential prerequisite to arresting environmental degradation and repairing the damage already done is a more comprehensive understanding of the complex, synergistic effects of certain activities on the air, water and land environments. A wide variety of disciplines from both the natural and social sciences would also be relevant, including all or most of those found in the military research and development

⁵ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.IX.1.

community. Housing and urban renewal constitute another outlet for a range of research and development activities and, subsequently, for massive reconstruction programmes. Finally, new transportation systems, particularly in urban areas, have long been regarded as a major civilian alternative for high technology industries in the military sector.

The study regards a reallocation of converted human and material resources from developed to developing countries as able to provide an important cushioning effect against any major economic disruption in economies with high military spending. In that connection, however, prevailing and prospective economic conditions throughout the industrialized world are clearly not seen as conducive to such a reallocation. The saturation of major consumer markets and the emergence of serious supply-side constraints on economic growth — energy, raw materials, pollution and so on — suggest the need for significant changes in the structure of industry, in the direction of future investment, and in the pattern of consumer demand. There is, however, growing evidence which suggests that the pattern of imports of capital goods by developing countries would coincide significantly with the productive capacities released by the implementation of disarmament measures in the industrialized countries. It is argued, therefore, that the transitional difficulties associated with conversion would be lessened if conducted in a framework of international co-operation.

When increased transfers of resources to developing countries was considered as one of the options for conversion, the study found that the least disruptive transfer policy for the economies undergoing conversion involved goods and services closely matching a new emphasis in developing countries on the provision of basic needs and promotion of self-reliance. Accordingly, resources which could be transferred would include agricultural machinery, fishing technology, machinery for mining, manufacturing and construction, hydropower plants and equipment, and personnel for education and health programmes.

The study examines three basic approaches, which have been found in various past proposals, for promoting the reallocation of financial resources from armaments to development:

(a) The disarmament dividend approach, in which the savings resulting from disarmament measures, or a portion thereof, are allocated to development needs;

(b) The armaments levy approach, in which national assessments for development contributions are based on some agreed measure of States' allocations of resources for military purposes;

(c) Voluntary contributions, on the model of numerous other United Nations funds and specialized agencies, in which each State determines its own individual contribution.

In the context of a disarmament-development relationship, the study considers the disarmament dividend approach as the most attractive. That approach is partially reflected in the proposal made by France at the tenth special session of the General Assembly in 1978 for the establishment of an

international disarmament fund for development⁶ which, pursuant to resolution 33/71 I, was transmitted to the Group of Governmental Experts for its consideration.

By analyzing military spending as an impediment to economic growth, and the arms race as an obstacle to the establishment of a new international economic order, the study, on an economic basis, strengthens the case for a disarmament-development relationship. By projecting the arms race as a threat to international security and outlining the dimensions of non-military threats to national security, the study also realistically points out the strategic considerations pertinent to an assessment of possibilities for reversing the arms race and reducing national military outlays. It suggests that policies aimed at deriving benefit from disarmament-development relationships would be likely to broaden the base of East-West détente and put the North-South dialogue in a mutually advantageous frame of reference, and in so doing it projects direct investments in development as indirect contributions to détente.

The Expert Group, on the basis of its findings and conclusions, made nine specific recommendations, which may be summarized as follows:

(a) All Governments, but particularly those of the major military Powers, should prepare assessments of the nature and magnitude of the short- and long-term economic and social costs attributable to their military preparations, and their general public should be informed of them;

(b) Governments should undertake studies to identify and to publicize the benefits that would be derived from the reallocation of military resources, in a balanced and verifiable manner, to address economic and social problems at the national level, and to contribute towards reducing the gap in income that divides the industrialized nations from the developing world;

(c) Governments should provide a fuller and more systematic compilation and dissemination of data relating to the military use of human and material resources and military transfers, taking into account the needs of the United Nations in terms of resolution 35/142 B [see chapter XVII above], to avoid the situation wherein excessive secrecy and the arms race reinforce each other;

(d) The disarmament-development perspective elaborated in the study should be incorporated in a concrete and practical way in the ongoing activities of the United Nations system;

(e) Governments should create the necessary prerequisites, including preparations and, where appropriate, planning, to facilitate the conversion of resources freed by disarmament measures to civilian purposes, especially to meet urgent economic and social needs, in particular, in the developing countries;

(f) Governments should consider making the results of experiences and preparations for solving the problems of conversion in their respective countries available by submitting reports from time to time to the General Assembly on possible solutions to conversion problems;

(g) Further consideration should be given to establishing an international disarmament fund for development, and the administrative and technical modalities of such a fund should be further investigated by the United Nations with due regard to the capabilities of the agencies and institutions presently responsible for the international transfer of resources;

(h) There being no special centre of expertise on the international dimensions of the relationship between disarmament and development nor any part of the United Nations system with this particular focus, the Secretary-General should take appropriate action, through the existing inter-agency consultative mechanism of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination,

⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4* (A/S-10/4), sect. III, para. 125.

to foster and co-ordinate the incorporation of the disarmament and development perspective in the programmes and activities of the United Nations system. The two bodies having lead functions in the fields of disarmament and development were stated as being the Centre for Disarmament and the Office of the Director-General for Development and International Economic Co-operation, respectively;

(i) The Department of Public Information and other relevant United Nations organs and agencies, while continuing to emphasize the danger of war — particularly nuclear war, should give increased emphasis in their disarmament-related public information and education activities to the social and economic consequences of the arms race and to the corresponding benefits of disarmament.

Following the body of the study, the Group included three appendices in its report; one listing the commissioned research projects it had received, which is reproduced at the end of this chapter as annex II; the second, a list of possible products which might be produced utilizing converted military industrial capacity; and the third, containing reservations expressed by some experts to certain aspects of the report.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1981

In introducing the study on the relationship between disarmament and development in the First Committee, on 20 October 1981,⁷ Mrs. Thorsson stated that the project had been carried out with a view to making it serve as a basis for decisions leading to concrete actions for the reallocation of real resources, released through disarmament measures, for the purposes of socio-economic development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries. Citing repeatedly from the study, she emphasized that the arms race and underdevelopment were not two problems; they were one. They had to be solved together, or neither would ever be solved.

Many delegations, well over 40, participating in the general debate in the First Committee⁸ — including Poland on behalf of a group of Eastern European countries and the United Kingdom on behalf of the European Community, as well as several countries from those groups separately and some 25 developing countries — referred to the study. In their comments, they discussed the study both in the light of its over-all approach and with regard to its more specific findings. The former references related in general terms to its desirability and to the feasibility of implementation of its recommendations; the latter pertained frequently to the comprehensive enumeration of facts and figures amassed by the Group of Experts. Many delegates, particularly from the developing countries, noted with special satisfaction that the study had been carried out in the context of the current global politico-economic climate and that it had projected the disarmament-development relationship as being of mutual benefit to both the developed and the developing countries.

⁷ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, First Committee, 5th meeting*.

⁸ *Ibid.*, First Committee, 3rd to 42nd meetings, and *ibid.*, First Committee, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.

On 18 November, 23 delegations: Austria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Jamaica, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Sweden, submitted a draft resolution on the study; it was subsequently sponsored by eight additional States: Ecuador, Ivory Coast, Japan, Niger, Panama, Qatar, Rwanda and Zaire. The representative of Sweden, in introducing the draft in the Committee at its 33rd meeting, emphasized the need for follow-up action on the report, which, he stated, should become one of the basic documents for the second special session on disarmament, scheduled to be held in 1982. In that context, he drew attention to the specific provision contained in the draft resolution whereby Governments of States would be invited to inform the Secretary-General of their views regarding the study by 15 April 1982 so that those views might be compiled and circulated well in advance of the special session. The report would also be transmitted to the Committee on Disarmament, to be taken into account in its future disarmament negotiations. The representative went on to stress the wider responsibility of informing the public at large. Accordingly, by the draft resolution, the Assembly, *inter alia*, would request the Secretary-General to arrange for the reproduction of the report as a United Nations publication and recommend to all Governments its widest possible distribution, including, where appropriate, its translation into national languages.

The draft resolution was adopted without a vote by the First Committee at its 42nd meeting, on 24 November 1981, and by the General Assembly on 9 December 1981, again without a vote, as resolution 36/92 G. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling paragraph 94 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it decided to undertake a study on the relationship between disarmament and development and requested the Secretary-General to carry out the study with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts,

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General containing the study,

1. *Welcomes with satisfaction* the report of the Secretary-General and the study contained therein;
2. *Expresses its thanks* to the Secretary-General and to the *Ad Hoc* Group on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, as well as to the Governments, international organizations and non-governmental organizations that have rendered assistance in the preparation of the report;
3. *Commends* the report, its conclusions and recommendations to the attention of all Member States;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements for the reproduction of the report as a United Nations publication and to give it the widest possible distribution;
5. *Invites* all Member States to inform the Secretary-General, no later than 15 April 1982, of their views regarding the report and, in particular, its recommendations;
6. *Decides* to transmit the report to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament for its substantive consideration and appropriate action;
7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit the report to the Committee on Disarmament and recommends that it be taken into account in future disarmament negotiations;
8. *Notes with appreciation* that arrangements have been made for the preparation of a short version of the report aimed at a mass audience;

9. *Recommends* to all Governments the widest possible distribution of the report, including, where appropriate, its translation into their national languages, so as to acquaint public opinion in their countries with its content, and invites specialized agencies and national and non-governmental organizations to use their facilities to make the report widely known.

Conclusion

The study on the relationship between disarmament and development, submitted to the General Assembly at its 1981 regular session, has not at the time of this writing given rise to implementation of tangible follow-up action. Accordingly, in the sense of results deriving from its recommendations, no definite conclusion can yet be drawn.

It can be stated, however, that the study, three years in preparation, is one of the most comprehensive and extensive — if not the most — ever undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and promises to be one of the most widely disseminated and translated. It is also clear, in the light of the resolution adopted, that the General Assembly, at its second special session and beyond, and the Committee on Disarmament, in its future negotiations, will have every opportunity to take the findings and recommendations of the study into account.

ANNEX I

Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development

Ljubivoje Acimović, Yugoslavia	Anthony Hill, Jamaica
Mansur Ahmad, Pakistan	Masayoshi Kakitsubo, Japan
Tamás Bacsikai, Hungary	Sten F. Lundbo, Norway
Horst Becker, Federal Republic of Germany	A. C. H. Mohamed, Sri Lanka
Luis Cabana, Venezuela	Jacques Pradelle de la Tour de Jean, France
Antoni Czarkowski, Poland	Anire Sagay, Nigeria
Hendrik de Haan, the Netherlands	Nodari Simonia, USSR
Sergio de Queiroz Duarte, Brazil	K. Subrahmanyam, India
Omran El Shafei, Egypt	Ibrahima Sy, Senegal
José Antonio Encinas del Pando, Peru	Inga Thorsson, Sweden
Klaus Engelhardt, German Democratic Republic	Leandro I. Verceles, Philippines
Daniel Gallik, United States	Constantin Vlad, Romania
Plácido García Reynoso, Mexico	Barnard Wood, Canada
Robert Haselden, United Kingdom	

ANNEX II

Commissioned research reports received by the Group of Governmental Experts

A. *Projects financed from the United Nations Disarmament Fund*

<i>Author</i>	<i>Title</i>
1. A. Bolaji Akinyemi et al. Nigerian Institute of International Affairs Lagos, Nigeria	Disarmament and Development: Utilization of Resources for Military Purposes in Black Africa
2. Graciela Chichilnisky and Michael de Mello Department of Economics Columbia University New York, United States of America	The Role of Armaments Flows in the International Market and in Development Strategies in a North-South Context
3. Pierre Dabiez Centre for Defence Policy Research (CEPODE) Paris, France	Establishment of an International Disarmament Fund for Development
4. Ali E. Hillal Dessouki Faculty of Economics and Political Science Cairo University Cairo, Egypt	The Effects of Arms Race and Defence Expenditures on Development: A Case Study of Egypt
5. José Antonio Encinas del Pando University of Lima Peru	Declaration of Ayacucho
6. Jacques Fontanel UER, Faculty of Economic Sciences University of Grenoble France	Formalized Studies and Econometric Analyses of the Relationship between Military Expenditure and Economic Development. Examples: France and Morocco
7. David Greenwood Centre for Defence Studies University of Aberdeen Aberdeen, Scotland	West European Defence Efforts in the Later 1970s and Beyond
8. Godfrey Gunatilleke Director Marga Institute Colombo, Sri Lanka	Armament Culture and the Diffusion of the Values of Militarization
9. Helge Hveem and Raino Malnes International Peace Research Institute Oslo, Norway	Military Use of Natural Resources (The Case for Conversion and Control)
10. Mary Kaldor Science Policy Research Unit University of Sussex Brighton, United Kingdom	The Role of Military Technology in Industrial Development
11. Wassily Leontief and Faye Duchin Institute for Economic Analysis New York University New York, United States of America	World-wide Economic Implications of a Limitation on Military Spending
12. Seymour Melman Department of Industrial Engineering Columbia University New York, United States of America	Barriers to Conversion from Military to Civilian Industry — in Market, Planned and Developing Economies

<i>Author</i>	<i>Title</i>
13. Ikenna Nzimiro Department of Sociology and Anthropology University of Nigeria Nsukka, Nigeria	Economics and Social Effects of (Military) Arms Build-Up in Nigeria: Implications for National Development
14. Swadesh Rana, P. K. Namboodiri and R. R. Subramanian The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses New Delhi, India	Reallocation of Military Resources from OECD to Primary Sectors of LDCs: Mutuality of Interests: A Third World Perspective
15. K. Nagaraja Rao and Jack Ruina Centre for Policy Alternatives Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, United States of America	Disarmament and Development: The Case of Relatively Advanced Developing Countries
16. Bruce M. Russett and David J. Sylvan Department of Political Science Yale University New Haven, United States of America	The Effects of Arms Transfers on Developing Countries
17. Ignacy Sachs International Research Center on Environment and Development Paris, France	Reflections on Conversion Strategies for Armament-Related Arms Industries
18. Dan Smith and Ron Smith Department of Economics Birkbeck College London, United Kingdom	Military Expenditure, Resources and Development
19. Ove Narvesen Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Oslo, Norway <i>and</i> Finn Sollie Fridtjof Nansen Foundation at Polhogda Lysaker, Norway	Analysis of a Proposal to Establish an International Disarmament Fund for Development
20. Marek Thee Research Director International Peace Research Institute Oslo, Norway	The Establishment of an International Disarmament Fund for Development — a Feasibility Study
21. Peter Wallensteen Department of Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala University Sweden	New Wine and Old Bottles
B. <i>Nationally financed projects</i>	
1. Jean Thomas Bernard Department of Economics Laval University Quebec, Canada	The Impact of Disarmament on the Canadian Economy
2. Olav Bjerkhold, Aadne Cappelen, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Knut Moum International Peace Research Institute Oslo, Norway	Disarmament and Development: A Study of Conversion in Norway

3. Michael Brzoska, Peter Lock and Herbert Wulf
IFSH Research Unit
Universität Hamburg
Federal Republic of Germany
An Assessment of Sources and Statistics of Military Expenditure and Arms Transfer Data
4. Eckehart Ehrenberg
Universität Bonn
Federal Republic of Germany
Political and Economic Obstacles to Disarmament Efforts in Developing Countries: Egypt, Iran, India
5. Klaus Engelhardt
Institute for International Politics and Economics
Berlin, German Democratic Republic
Effects of the Arms Race and Disarmament on the Labour Situation in Countries of Different Social Systems
6. Institute for African Affairs
USSR Academy of Sciences
Moscow, USSR
Comparative Analysis of the Economic Situation of African Countries, the Resource Requirements for Development, Military Expenditure and Factors Affecting the Arms Race on the Continent
7. Institute of Oriental Studies
USSR Academy of Sciences
Moscow, USSR
The Arms Race and the Economic and Social Problems of the Developing Countries
8. Institute for United States and Canadian Affairs
USSR Academy of Sciences
Moscow, USSR
Urgent Political, Social and Economic Problems of the Present Stage of the Development of Mankind and Practical Ways of Diverting to Development Needs the Resources Now Absorbed by the Arms Race
9. Institute of World Economics and International Relations
USSR Academy of Sciences
Moscow, USSR
Economic and Social Effects of a Continuing Arms Race and of the Implementation of Disarmament Measures
10. John Høsteland
Resource Policy Group
Oslo, Norway
Stabilizing Raw Materials Prices Through Redeployment of Armament Spending
11. Lutz Köllner
Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr
Munich, Federal Republic of Germany
Financial Disarmament, Developing Aid and the Stability of the World Monetary System
12. Rolf Krengel
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung
Berlin, Federal Republic of Germany
Macro-Economic Effects of Disarmament Policies on Sectoral Production and Employment in the Federal Republic of Germany, with Special Emphasis on Development Policy Issues
13. Wassily Leontief and Faye Duchin
Institute for Economic Analysis
New York University
New York, United States of America
World-wide Implications of Hypothetical Changes in Military Spending (An Input-output Approach)
14. Polish Institute of International Affairs
Warsaw, Poland
Arms Race and Global Problems of International Economic Relations
15. Ernie Regehr
Research Director
Project Ploughshares
Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies
University of Waterloo
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
The Utilization of Resources for Military Purposes in Canada and the Impact on Canadian Industrialization and Defence Procurement

<i>Author</i>	<i>Title</i>
16. Lance Taylor International Nutrition Planning Program Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, United States of America	Defense Spending, Economics Structure and Growth: Evidence Among Countries and Over Time
17. Helena Tuomi and Raimo Vayrynen International Relations University of Helsinki Helsinki, Finland	Transnational Corporations, Armaments and Development: a Study of Transnational Military Production, International Transfer of Military Technology and their Impact on Development
18. Constantin Vlad Director Institute of Political Sciences and Study of the National Question Stefan Gheorghiu Academy Bucharest, Romania	Disarmament and the New International Order
19. Herbert Wulf, Michael Brzoska and Peter Lock IFSH Research Unit Universität Hamburg Federal Republic of Germany	Transnational Transfer of Arms Production Technology

Disarmament studies completed in 1981 and studies in progress

Introduction

STUDIES ON VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE ARMS RACE and disarmament have been carried out by the United Nations since the beginning of the 1960s. Most of them have been done with the assistance of consultant or governmental experts appointed by the Secretary-General or, occasionally, experts appointed directly by Governments. The studies serve a twofold purpose: first, they provide general information which facilitates a better understanding of the problems of the arms race and disarmament and, secondly, they support the negotiating process through the analysis of specific matters related to negotiations in progress. In conjunction with these studies, the United Nations Secretariat has also produced, at the request of various bodies, relevant analyses similar in character to studies.

The growing interest in such studies led, in 1976, to a recommendation by the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament that the General Assembly should consider making increased use of in-depth studies on disarmament and related matters carried out by the Secretary-General with the assistance of experts nominated by Governments or selected by him on the basis of their qualifications.¹ By resolution 31/90 of 14 December 1976 the General Assembly endorsed the recommendations of the *Ad Hoc* Committee and, in 1978, at its tenth special session, devoted to disarmament, the General Assembly gave full recognition to the importance of those disarmament studies by including, in the Final Document of that session, a number of general references to disarmament studies as well as several requests to the Secretary-General to carry out specific studies. The Assembly, at that same session, also decided that subsequently it would determine the guidelines for specific studies, and it requested the Secretary-General to make periodic reports on the subject for its consideration.

In 1981, seven studies were completed and six of them were presented to the General Assembly. The other was submitted to the Preparatory Committee

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 36 (A/31/36)*, para. 18, "Agreed proposals", proposal F.6.

for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament and will be considered at the session itself. One of those presented to the Assembly, that concerning the relationship between disarmament and development, is dealt with in chapter XXI above. With that exception, the completed studies are covered in separate sections of the present chapter. One study in progress is described thereafter, and brief reference is made to a new study, concerning conventional weapons, which is dealt with fully in chapter XVII. The composition of the relevant study groups in 1981 is shown in the annex to this chapter, in the order in which the studies are discussed.

Studies concluded in 1981 and action by the General Assembly

Study on the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament

In 1979, following an initiative by Sweden, the General Assembly adopted resolution 34/87 E by which it requested the Secretary-General, *inter alia*, to carry out a comprehensive study assessing current institutional requirements and future estimated needs in the United Nations management of disarmament affairs and outlining possible functions, structure and institutional framework that could meet those requirements and needs, including legal and financial implications, and formulating recommendations for possible later decisions on the matter. The Secretary-General was also requested to submit a final report on the study to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session, in 1981.

In accordance with the resolution, the Secretary-General, in consultation with Member States, appointed a 20-member Group of Governmental Experts to Study the Institutional Arrangements relating to the Process of Disarmament. The Group, which consisted of experts from Argentina, China, Cuba, France, the German Democratic Republic, India, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Poland, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sweden, the USSR, the United Kingdom, the United States and Yugoslavia, held four sessions, two in 1980 and two in 1981, during which time it undertook a comprehensive examination of the subject matter under study.²

At its first session the Group of Experts examined its mandate and considered that its study should be so conceived that its outcome would serve to promote the disarmament process. The Group, furthermore, felt that any evaluation of the present institutional requirements and future estimated needs in the United Nations with regard to disarmament affairs should proceed in a co-ordinated manner, taking account of the work of all bodies and organs

² The sessions were held under the Chairmanship of Mr. Carlos Ortiz de Rozas (Argentina), at United Nations Headquarters in New York, the first from 8 to 11 April 1980, the second from 30 June to 3 July 1980, the third from 19 to 29 January 1981 and the final session from 22 June to 2 July 1981.

dealing with disarmament. In that connection the Group bore in mind that a second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament would be taking place in 1982. At the first special session, held in 1978, the foundation of a comprehensive disarmament strategy had been laid and the Assembly had taken decisions to revitalize the disarmament machinery and strengthen the Secretariat. The Group felt, therefore, that its assessment should focus primarily on the over-all operation of United Nations functions related to disarmament.

By a letter dated 2 July 1981, the Chairman of the Group transmitted the study, which had been endorsed by consensus, to the Secretary-General. It was subsequently submitted to the General Assembly, as the report of the Secretary-General, on 11 September 1981.³

The study consists of an "Introduction"; three main sections: "Present institutional arrangements in the United Nations relating to the process of disarmament", "Views on present institutional arrangements and future estimated needs in the United Nations relating to the process of disarmament", "Conclusion and recommendations"; and two appendices: "Replies received from Member States" and "List of deliberating and negotiating bodies dealing with disarmament matters"

The study states that, whatever the adequacy of the means provided by the United Nations in the service of the task of disarmament, it is ultimately the will of States to make the best use of them and their readiness to negotiate which will determine the level of progress made.

It points out that some of the important measures undertaken following the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, such as the re-establishment of the Disarmament Commission and the enlargement of the Committee on Disarmament into a more representative body, had given Member States wider opportunities for deliberations and negotiations. The study offers, however, no final conclusions in this area, noting that it would be premature to do so.

In reviewing the implementation of some of the other recommendations made by the Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament, the study stresses several developments at the institutional level. It cites, in particular, the increasing tasks of the Centre for Disarmament in the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, on which a greater burden had been placed owing to the increasing length of the sessions of deliberative and negotiating organs in New York and Geneva. In spite of its limited resources, in the view of the Experts, the Centre had coped satisfactorily with its additional responsibilities in that area as well as in the areas of "information" and "studies". A clearer co-ordination of functions between the Centre and the Department of Public Information was, however, desirable.

During the discussion of infrastructural requirements, the report indicates, positions among the experts varied from maintaining present ar-

³ A/36/392.

rangements with the necessary adjustments to enable the Centre to cope with its continuously increasing workload, to proposals for the establishment of a separate department headed by an under-secretary-general and for the creation of a separate international organization.

In examining how the United Nations could make a greater contribution with regard to the implementation of various disarmament agreements, the study points out that the Organization has been already involved in the task of implementation of various disarmament agreements and, through IAEA, in verification proceedings relating to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. If at some future time there were disarmament agreements giving verification functions to the United Nations, that would, in all likelihood, have substantial institutional implications for the United Nations system. At present, however, the study states, it appeared unlikely that the United Nations and/or related bodies can play a more important role in verification.

In conclusion, the experts made several recommendations, stressing the Organization's central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament, which necessitated, in their opinion, a clear reaffirmation of the co-ordinating responsibility resting with the Secretary-General for the activities undertaken by the various bodies in the United Nations system.

The most appropriate person for implementing such a co-ordinating role, the study states, is the Assistant Secretary-General in charge of the Centre for Disarmament, and the Secretary-General should, therefore, continue to consider possibilities of strengthening the Centre for Disarmament to meet anticipated growing needs. It further calls for a development of the role of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies in co-ordinating studies prepared by the United Nations and other bodies (see chapter XX above), and recommends that the future status of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research be discussed and decided upon at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Recalling also the close relationship between disarmament and development, the study suggests that the Secretary-General put forward at the second special session any proposals which may be appropriate regarding possible institutional implications for the United Nations in that area. Finally, it recommends that training programmes and the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament should continue to give preference to candidates from the developing countries.

*

* *

On 12 November, Argentina, the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Cuba, Finland, France, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Romania, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Yugoslavia submitted in the First Committee a draft resolution on the study. The draft was subsequently sponsored also by Belgium, Ecuador, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Panama, the Philippines and Sri Lanka.

In introducing the draft, the representative of Argentina stated that it was

basically procedural, with its main aim being to ensure that the study received the consideration it deserved from the Governments of Member States. Since there would be no time at the thirty-sixth session for delegations to state their views on the matters of substance contained in the study, the sponsors hoped that, at the 1982 special session devoted to disarmament, the Assembly would have ample opportunity fully to consider the report and, if possible, adopt appropriate decisions on the subject.

The draft was approved by the First Committee on 20 November 1981 without a vote, and adopted by the General Assembly, also without a vote, on 9 December, as resolution 36/97 D. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 34/87 E of 11 December 1979, in which it requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, to carry out a comprehensive study assessing current institutional requirements and future estimated needs in the United Nations management of disarmament affairs and outlining possible functions, structure and institutional framework that could meet those requirements and needs, including legal and financial implications, and formulating recommendations for possible later decisions on the matter,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General to which the study prepared by the Group of Governmental Experts to Study the Institutional Arrangements relating to the Process of Disarmament is annexed,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General and of the study contained therein;
2. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Secretary-General and the experts who assisted him for the efficient manner in which the report was prepared;
3. *Recommends* that all Member States should study the report;
4. *Invites* all Member States to transmit to the Secretary-General by 31 March 1982 their comments on the study and its conclusions and recommendations;
5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit the study to the Committee on Disarmament;
6. *Decides* to transmit the report and the comments of Member States to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament for substantive consideration and the adoption of appropriate decisions;
7. *Further decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session an item entitled "Institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament"

Comprehensive study on confidence-building measures

At its thirty-third session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 33/91 B of 16 December 1978 by which it invited all States to inform the Secretary-General of their views and experiences on confidence-building measures. Pursuant to that resolution, the Secretary-General transmitted to the General Assembly the replies received from 33 States which had provided their views and opinions as to how greater confidence among States might be achieved.⁴

Subsequently, the General Assembly, by resolution 34/87 B of 11 December 1979, requested the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts appointed by him, a comprehensive study on confidence-building measures. The Assembly further

⁴ A/34/416 and Add.1 and 2, and A/35/397.

requested the Secretary-General to submit, at its thirty-fifth session, a progress report on the work of the group and a final report at its thirty-sixth session.

The Group of Governmental Experts on Confidence-building Measures, consisting of 14 experts, from Austria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Finland, Ghana, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Peru, Romania, Thailand, the USSR, the United States and Zaire, held two sessions in 1980, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Gerhard Pfeiffer of the Federal Republic of Germany, and adopted an outline of the study. The outline constituted the main component of the progress report on the work of the Group⁵ submitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session. At that session, the General Assembly, by resolution 35/156 B, took note of the progress report and requested the Secretary-General to continue the work with a view to submitting a final report at the thirty-sixth session.

In 1981, the Group held its two further sessions, from 26 May to 5 June in New York, and from 3 to 14 August at Geneva, which culminated in the unanimous adoption by the experts of the study on confidence-building measures. It was transmitted by the Chairman of the Group to the Secretary-General on 14 August 1981. On 6 October 1981, the study was submitted to the General Assembly as the report of the Secretary-General.⁶

Among the questions considered in the study are the characteristics of and opportunities for confidence-building measures, a historical survey of their evolution, principles in accordance with which such measures should be established and further developed, the various approaches to negotiating and eventually implementing those measures, and the role which the United Nations should play in the process.

In examining the views received from Governments, as well as those expressed by delegations at the thirty-fourth and thirty-fifth sessions of the General Assembly, the study stresses that the main concern expressed by Governments was the need to strengthen international peace and security (see also study on the relationship between disarmament and international security, below) and promote or reinforce confidence among States. The study recognizes also that international confidence cannot be obtained by promoting exclusively military confidence, that is to say, by measures in the military field alone. However, given the importance of confidence-building measures of a military character, especially in those regions where the military factor is pre-eminent, the study gives particular emphasis to such measures.

In view of the recent deterioration in international relations and further escalation of the arms race, the study points out that measures designed to build confidence and facilitate disarmament negotiations have become more urgent than ever. The causes of mistrust, which have their roots in complex historical, geographical, strategic, political, economic, social and other factors, vary from region to region or even within the same regions. All these, when related to perceptions of threat, add a further psychological dimension

⁵ See A/35/422, annex.

⁶ A/36/474 and Corr.1.

to the complexity of the situation. There may also be a lack of confidence among States which are not neighbours.

Citing the lack of reliable information on the military activities of other States and on other matters pertaining to mutual security as one of the principal causes of mistrust among States, the study contends that the destabilization caused by insufficient knowledge about opposing military forces is often aggravated by subjective misconceptions. Consequently, one of the main objectives of confidence-building must be to reduce the elements of fear and speculation in order to achieve a more accurate and more reliable reciprocal assessment of military activities and other matters relating to mutual apprehensions.

The study concludes that confidence-building measures alone cannot replace measures which would directly limit and reduce military potentials. If they were to be used as a substitute for disarmament measures it would not only be an overestimation of their inherent potential, but they might also be used as a pretext for avoiding real progress in arms limitation and disarmament, or even to legitimize a continuing arms buildup. Therefore, in line with the role accorded the United Nations in the field of disarmament, the study recommends, among other things, that all organs of the United Nations be instrumental in maintaining and fostering the will of its Member States to conclude and implement agreements on confidence-building measures. It notes further that the United Nations and its Member States should encourage and assist all efforts to explore further ways in which confidence-building measures can strengthen international peace and security, for example, by actively contributing to and encouraging an increase in public awareness of the potential for the strengthening of peace and security and the promotion of disarmament measures inherent in confidence-building measures.

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On 13 November, a draft resolution sponsored by 26 countries was submitted to the First Committee. Subsequently, it was revised and introduced by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, on 20 November. In introducing the draft on behalf of its 32 final sponsors,⁷ the representative noted that the positive results achieved in the study and the wide consensus reached among the experts had encouraged the sponsors to reflect in their draft some of the results of the experts' work as well as a number of generally accepted principles. Therefore, among other things, the proposal would recommend that, building on the results of the study and on the experiences gained from the application and development of confidence-building measures, further efforts should be made, both within and outside the United Nations, to widen their scope so that account would be taken of non-military

⁷ Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Congo, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Mauritania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay and Zaire.

approaches. All States would also be invited to consider the possible introduction of confidence-building measures in their particular regions. The Secretary-General would be requested to publish the study and it would be submitted to the Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament. The draft resolution was subsequently further revised, in its preamble, in consultation with other delegations.

On 25 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote; and on 9 December 1981 the Assembly, again without a vote, adopted it as resolution 36/97 F. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 33/91 B of 16 December 1978, in which it requested Member States to submit their views and experiences on confidence-building measures,

Noting with satisfaction that numerous Member States responded to that request and provided the Secretary-General with substantive information,

Recalling also its resolution 34/87 B of 11 December 1979, in which the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to carry out a comprehensive study on confidence-building measures with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts appointed by him on an equitable geographical basis,

Expressing its concern about the deterioration of the international situation and the further escalation of the arms race, which both reflects and aggravates the unsatisfactory international political climate, tension and mistrust,

Desirous of strengthening international security and, at the same time, creating and improving conditions conducive to further measures of disarmament,

Mindful of the fact that, while confidence-building measures cannot serve as a substitute for disarmament measures, they play a very significant role in achieving disarmament,

Convinced of the usefulness of confidence-building measures freely arrived at by the States concerned and agreed upon, taking into account the particular conditions and requirements of the regions concerned,

Expressing its conviction of the need for the exchange of pertinent and timely information on military activities and other matters pertaining to mutual security, which would contribute to an improved climate of trust and confidence among States, and the conviction that agreement can be reached on measures to this end,

Noting with satisfaction the encouraging results of some confidence-building measures agreed upon and implemented in some regions,

1. *Takes note* of the comprehensive study on confidence-building measures prepared by the Secretary-General;

2. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Secretary-General and to the Group of Governmental Experts on Confidence-building Measures which assisted in the preparation of the study;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements for the reproduction of the study as a United Nations publication and to give it the widest possible distribution;

4. *Recognizes* that confidence reflects a set of interrelated factors of a military as well as of a non-military character and that a plurality of approaches is needed to overcome fear, apprehension and mistrust between States and to replace them by confidence;

5. *Recommends* that, building on the experience gained from the application and development of confidence-building measures, further efforts should be made, both within and outside the United Nations, to widen their scope, so that account is also taken of non-military approaches;

6. *Regards* the concept of confidence-building measures as a useful approach in reducing and eventually eliminating potential causes for mistrust, misunderstanding, misinterpretation and miscalculation;

7. *Believes* that the promotion of confidence-building measures where appropriate conditions exist will significantly contribute to facilitating the process of disarmament;

8. *Invites* all States to consider the possible introduction of confidence-building measures in their particular regions and, where possible, to negotiate on them in keeping with conditions and requirements prevailing in the respective regions;

9. *Decides* to submit the study to its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982, for further consideration.

Study on the relationship between disarmament and international security

Pursuant to resolution 32/87 C of 12 December 1977, the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly at its 1978 special session devoted to disarmament an interim report on the question of a study on the relationship between disarmament and international security.⁸ In both the Final Document adopted at the session and later that year, in resolution 33/91 I adopted at the thirty-third regular session, the Secretary-General was requested to continue the study in its many aspects, with the assistance of consultant experts appointed by him, and to submit a progress report at the thirty-fourth session and a final report at the thirty-fifth session.

In 1979, the Secretary-General appointed experts from Algeria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, Liberia, Peru, the Philippines, the USSR and the United States to assist him in the preparation of the study. Between June 1979 and November 1981 the Group of Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and International Security held nine sessions under the Chairmanship of Mr. Carlos Romulo, Foreign Minister of the Philippines.⁹ As requested, in 1979 the Group presented a detailed outline of the study¹⁰ to the Assembly, which, by resolution 34/83 A, took note of the progress report. In 1980, during which the Group held one session of the Group as a whole, as well as two sessions of its informal working group, the Chairman, by a letter addressed to the Secretary-General, requested that more time be given to allow the Group to work out a unanimous report. In resolution 35/156 E of 12 December 1980, the Assembly took note of the Secretary-General's report transmitting the Group's request and called for the report to be submitted at its thirty-sixth session.

By a letter dated 6 November 1981, the Chairman of the Group transmitted the study on the relationship between disarmament and international security to the Secretary-General. It was submitted to the General Assembly as the report of the Secretary-General on 19 November.¹¹

⁸ A/S-10/7.

⁹ The sessions of the Group were held at the following places and dates: Geneva, 5 to 8 June 1979; New York, 3 to 14 December 1979; New York, 28 April to 9 May 1980; Vienna, 28 July to 8 August 1980; New York, 8 to 19 December 1980; Geneva, 30 March to 10 April 1981; Geneva, 29 June to 17 July 1981; New York, 17 to 28 August 1981; and New York, 2 to 6 November 1981. At some of these sessions, the experts met as a working group under the chairmanship of Mrs. Betty G. Lall of the United States.

¹⁰ A/34/465 and Corr.1.

¹¹ A/36/597.

In the study, the Group of Experts considered the various aspects of the question under seven separate chapters. Chapter I provides an examination of the detrimental effects of the arms race on international security. Chapter II contains an analysis of the interrelationship between disarmament and international security and chapter III deals with the process of disarmament and international security. In chapter IV, *détente* and international co-operation are examined as means of strengthening international security and promoting disarmament. In chapter V, the relationships between specific disarmament measures, both nuclear and non-nuclear, and international security are explored. Chapter VI focuses attention on the effectiveness of the United Nations system for the maintenance of international peace and security and the interrelationship between disarmament and the implementation of such a system. The final chapter contains the Group's conclusion. Among other things, the conclusion emphasizes that the interrelationship between disarmament and international security lies at the very root of many of the problems concerning progress in disarmament and the maintenance of international peace and security. In the final analysis, the key problem is to find ways by which States can protect their security without engaging in an arms race which merely results in greater insecurity for all.

In the study, two approaches are outlined which, in the view of the experts, would enable States to achieve security without reliance on a continuous buildup of armaments: first, by agreements among States for mutual regulation, limitation and reduction of their armaments and armed forces; and, secondly, through collective arrangements, such as a system based on the organs and bodies of the United Nations, primarily the Security Council with its responsibility for maintaining international peace and security and mandate for taking enforcement action if need be. Those approaches, the study states, are interrelated and should be pursued in parallel since progress in either would greatly facilitate progress in the other.

The study also points out that in order to create an effective system of collective security, the United Nations system must be used more consistently than has been the case in the past. The objective must be to increase the confidence of States that the Security Council would: (a) involve itself effectively and at an early stage in situations in which international peace and security are threatened; (b) see to it that its decisions are implemented; and (c) avail itself of the means required to enforce its decisions.

Noting that there is an urgent need for steps to be taken to halt the arms race, the study recommends that current negotiations should be completed and disarmament measures implemented without waiting for the application of further measures of international security.

Even in a climate of co-operation and *détente*, some basic political and other differences among States will remain, the study states. It is important to contain them by developing and utilizing the procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter, and by the establishment of and respect for principles of international conduct in relations among States. Only consistent adherence by all States to such principles would

provide a solid basis for lasting détente, far-reaching disarmament and sustained international security.

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On 19 November, the Chairman of the Group introduced the report in the First Committee as well as a draft resolution on the subject. He stated that the "parallelism" between disarmament and international security had been stressed throughout the report since most of the experts had endorsed the view that progress in one area could not proceed to any substantial extent without progress in the other. It had been recognized, he added, that as a first step towards the parallel achievement of substantial measures of international security and measures of disarmament, progress would be required in the development of détente and confidence-building measures. The practice of regular, direct, high-level contacts was regarded as an important instrument for effective action. He said that the value of the report was that it had initiated a process which in the future could be vigorously pursued at a more technical and detailed level, now that the general principles had essentially been agreed upon.

The representative of Cyprus, at the same meeting, emphasized the importance of the subject matter of the study, particularly when it was borne in mind that 35 years after the establishment of the United Nations there had been no study on the subject, even though the Charter was based on it, and the words "international security" were repeated over 30 times within the international security system described in the Charter. The purpose of the expert study, he added, was to help promote disarmament through international security, and should be seen from the aspect of compliance with the provisions of the Charter through the relevant system of international security. That system, he said, was not being respected and, as a result, there were decisions of the Security Council with no effect. The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly had indicated the right approach when it had stated that genuine and lasting peace could only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example,¹² thus setting out in appropriate sequence the two essential elements for peace and security and their interrelationship. This, he stated, was not duly reflected in the conclusions of the study.

The draft resolution, sponsored by Cyprus, Ecuador and the Philippines, was approved by the First Committee on 24 November without a vote,¹³ and

¹² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, para. 13.

¹³ The United Kingdom, on behalf of the ten member states of the European Community, as well as the United States, in explaining their positions after the adoption of the resolution, expressed reservations on some of the points contained in the study and reserved the right to submit their respective views at a later date, in accordance with operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution.

by the General Assembly on 9 December, also without a vote, as resolution 36/97 L. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 32/87 C of 12 December 1977, in which it requested the Secretary-General to initiate a study on the relationship between disarmament and international security,

Recalling also paragraph 97 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of consultant experts appointed by him, to continue the study on the relationship between disarmament and international security,

Recalling further its resolutions 34/83 A of 11 December 1979, by which it took note of the progress report of the Secretary-General, and 35/156 E of 12 December 1980, in which it requested the Secretary-General to submit the final report to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session,

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General containing the study,

1. *Notes with satisfaction* the study on the relationship between disarmament and international security prepared by the Secretary-General;

2. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Secretary-General and to the Group of Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and International Security who assisted him in the preparation of the study;

3. *Commends* the study and its conclusions to the attention of all Member States;

4. *Invites* all Members States to inform the Secretary-General, no later than 15 April 1982, of their views regarding the study;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements for the reproduction of the study as a United Nations publication and to give it the widest possible distribution;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit the study, together with the views of Member States, to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982.

World Disarmament Campaign

In the Final Document of its first special session devoted to disarmament, the General Assembly emphasized the importance of mobilizing public opinion on behalf of disarmament.¹⁴ At its thirty-fifth session, in 1980, the Assembly adopted resolution 35/152 I by which it requested the Secretary-General to carry out, with the assistance of a small group of experts, a study on the organization and financing of a world disarmament campaign under the auspices of the United Nations. By the same resolution, the Assembly decided also to include the item in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session, in 1981.

The Group of Experts, appointed by the Secretary-General, which included several members of the Secretariat of the United Nations, one of whom acted as Chairman, held two sessions, from 3 to 6 March and 22 to 26 June 1981, at United Nations Headquarters in New York. On 21 August 1981, the Chairman transmitted the Group's unanimously adopted report to the Secretary-General. It was submitted to the General Assembly as the report

¹⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, para. 99.

of the Secretary-General on 17 September.¹⁵ In the context of the mobilization of public opinion in support of disarmament, this report is also referred to in chapter XXIII below.

The study consists of several sections covering, *inter alia*, such questions as the general purpose that would be served by a world disarmament campaign; its objectives; operational guidelines for the campaign; constituencies of major importance to which the campaign might be addressed; activities that might be undertaken, within the United Nations system, by Member States and by non-governmental constituencies in a world-wide effort to mobilize public opinion for disarmament; and the organizational and financial implications of such a campaign under the auspices of the United Nations. In a final section, the main elements of the report are summarized.

Throughout the study emphasis is placed on the importance of mobilizing public opinion in support of disarmament. The study also stresses the need to involve a large and representative body of people in every part of the world to sustain this effort as well as the catalytic and balanced role that the United Nations could play in it. Ultimately, the aim of the campaign should be to inform, educate and increase the understanding of the growing threat posed by the arms race to international peace and security, and of its economic and social consequences.

Based on those objectives and the consequent guidelines elaborated in the study, the experts note in their conclusions that the campaign activities would be wide-ranging and would include the following:

(a) The United Nations system would be a major source of initiative, materials, co-ordination and guidance, providing information and educational materials, organizing or supporting meetings, seminars and training programmes and using to the fullest the network of field offices and information centres;

(b) Active participation of Member States would be crucial, both in organizing campaign activities and in giving material and moral support to the efforts of non-governmental organizations and other bodies, thereby demonstrating commitment and leadership to the public;

(c) Much would depend on the vitality, imagination and efforts of the many non-governmental organizations, peace research institutes, educational communities and members of the media through meetings, discussions, presentation of information, and other ways of raising public awareness of disarmament issues;

(d) Disarmament Week, in October of each year, could provide an annual focus for the campaign.

The study also suggests that the campaign should be under the over-all guidance and co-ordination of the Secretary-General, who would report annually to the General Assembly.

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On 13 November, Mexico, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Sweden and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution on the subject to the First Committee. The draft was subsequently revised and sponsored also by Cuba, Panama, Romania and

¹⁵ A/36/458.

Sierra Leone. In introducing the draft, the representative of Mexico recalled that the general purpose of the campaign would be that stated in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, namely, to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament. The study, Mexico stated, in taking this into account, had set forth in an articulate and precise fashion various conclusions with regard to the organization and functioning of the campaign. Since the study contained sufficient elements, on the one hand, to stress the clear importance and usefulness of such a campaign and, on the other, to dispel any apprehensions of those delegations which had previously abstained in the vote on resolution 35/152 I, the sponsors hoped that the draft resolution would be adopted by consensus. Mexico further noted that since the Secretary-General would be responsible for the general orientation and co-ordination of the campaign, there should be no doubts that the campaign would be beneficial to all, irrespective of the political, economic and social systems of States.

On 20 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 119 to none, with 3 abstentions. Several countries explained their positions, either before or after the vote. Australia, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom on behalf of the ten member States of the European Community, and the United States found it difficult to support the idea, contained in operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution, for fund-raising (see below), of holding a pledging conference at the initial stage of the second special session on disarmament. Japan felt that adequate consideration of the organization of the campaign should precede such a fund-raising conference. The United Kingdom reserved the right of the Ten to transmit, pursuant to paragraph 3 of the draft resolution, their comments, at a later stage, on all the recommendations contained in the study, including the option of a pledging conference. The United States also expressed the view, generally shared by the Federal Republic of Germany and France, both of which had voted in favour, that a world disarmament campaign could only be of value if it was based on balanced, objective and relevant information, with the free expression of opinion and communications, in free discussions, on the objectives and conditions of disarmament. That, the United States stressed, would not be possible in "closed" societies where public access to information was strictly controlled by the Governments. On the other hand, the flow of public opinion was unimpeded in open society. Thus, the campaign would focus only on public opinion in those societies where numerous bodies with the same aims as those of the draft resolution already existed. Furthermore, the mobilizing of "world public opinion" for disarmament — or for the environment or any other worthwhile cause, in its view, was outside the purview of the United Nations since the United Nations was an organization of Governments which should direct its appeals to Governments, and not to such an amorphous entity as "world public opinion"

In response to that statement, the representative of Mexico recalled that such a concept had been adopted by consensus, since 1978, by the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly. With regard to the dissemination of information, he reiterated his previous point that a world disarmament campaign would be guided and co-ordinated by the

Secretary-General of the United Nations, who would be obliged to report annually to the General Assembly on the matter.

The USSR stated that it attached great importance to world public opinion, supported the proposal, and was gratified to see demonstrations in various parts of the world, including Europe, against the threat of nuclear and other types of weapons; detailed consideration, however, would have to be given to the study and to other proposals regarding the campaign.

The draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December 1981 by a recorded vote of 143 to none, with 2 abstentions (Israel and United States), as resolution 36/92 C. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling that, in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, it stressed the importance of mobilizing world public opinion on behalf of disarmament,

Recalling likewise its resolution 35/152 I of 12 December 1980, in which, for the achievement of that purpose, it requested the Secretary-General to carry out a study on the organization and financing of a World Disarmament Campaign under the auspices of the United Nations,

Having examined the study transmitted by the Secretary-General as an annex to his report of 17 September 1981,

1. *Notes with satisfaction* the contents of the study on the World Disarmament Campaign and commends its conclusions;

2. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Secretary-General and to the experts who assisted him for the prompt and effective manner in which the study was prepared;

3. *Invites* all Member States to transmit to the Secretary-General, not later than 15 April 1982, the suggestions and comments which they deem appropriate to formulate for the implementation of the recommendations contained in the study;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament both the study on the World Disarmament Campaign and the opinions thereon received from Governments, in order that the Assembly may take the decisions it considers advisable for the solemn launching of the Campaign, including a pledging conference to take place at the initial stage of the special session.

Israeli nuclear armament

By resolution 34/89 of 11 December 1979 the General Assembly, convinced that the development of a nuclear capability by Israel would further aggravate the already dangerous situation in the region of the Middle East, requested the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of qualified experts, a study on Israeli nuclear armament. In 1980, the Secretary-General appointed the Group of Experts to Prepare a Study on Israeli Nuclear Armament; it met four times, once in 1980, when it also submitted a progress report on its work to the General Assembly,¹⁶ and three times in 1981.¹⁷

At the 1980 session the Group of Experts discussed the organization, structure and principal elements of the study. By resolution 35/157, the General Assembly took note of the contents of the progress report, requested

¹⁶ A/35/458.

¹⁷ The sessions were held from 21 July to 1 August 1980, 19 to 30 January and 20 April to 4 May 1981 in New York, and 15 to 19 June 1981 in Geneva.

the Secretary-General to submit a final report at its thirty-sixth session and decided also to include an item entitled "Israeli nuclear armament" in the provisional agenda of that session.

By a letter dated 19 June 1981, the Group transmitted the final text of the study to the Secretary-General. It was submitted to the General Assembly as the report of the Secretary-General on 18 September 1981.¹⁸

The study consists of an introduction, four main chapters (on Israel's nuclear development, nuclear-weapon potential, nuclear policy, and international reports concerning Israeli nuclear armament) and conclusions.

The study states that, while many of the other countries in the region which have nuclear activities are parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, Israel is not a party to that Treaty and therefore is under no statutory obligation to supply IAEA with an inventory of all its nuclear facilities and materials. According to the experts, that has resulted in ambiguity about the nature and scope of Israel's nuclear programme. Nevertheless, on the basis of what is known and has been reported over the years, there is widespread agreement among technical experts that, given Israel's nuclear activities and level of expertise, it is capable of manufacturing nuclear explosive devices and possesses the means of delivery of such weapons to targeted areas. In particular, the study states that, since 1964, when Israel's Dimona nuclear centre began operations, Israel has been capable of producing sufficient weapons-grade plutonium for a significant number of explosive devices.

The study further notes that Israel's official statements on its plans and intentions with regard to the possession of nuclear weapons have often been equivocal and have provided little definitive information. Although it has repeatedly stated that "Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East", its refusal to sign and ratify the non-proliferation Treaty or to place all of its nuclear facilities under international safeguards might well, in the view of the experts, be one of the factors contributing to instability in the region.

On the basis of the available authoritative information, the Group was unable to conclude definitively whether or not Israel at the current time possessed nuclear weapons. However, the study emphasizes that if Israel has not already crossed the nuclear threshold, it has the capability to do so within a very short time.

The study concludes that the possession of nuclear weapons by Israel would be a seriously destabilizing factor in the already tense situation prevailing in the Middle East, in addition to being harmful to the cause of non-proliferation in general. Only by renouncing, without delay, the possession of or any intention to possess nuclear weapons, and submitting all its nuclear activities to international safeguards, could Israel play its part in avoiding an arms race in the region of the Middle East.

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¹⁸ A/36/431.

On 20 November Iraq, on behalf of 14 sponsors,¹⁹ introduced in the First Committee a draft resolution entitled "Israeli Nuclear Armament" In doing so, Iraq recalled that a number of resolutions on similar subjects had already been adopted by the General Assembly and noted that the one under consideration was in effect a culmination of earlier ones and was largely based on the report which had been submitted to the General Assembly. Iraq called particular attention to the fourth preambular paragraph and operative paragraphs 3, 4 and 8 of the draft resolution.

On 25 November, the First Committee, responding to a request, took a separate recorded vote on operative paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the draft resolution and adopted those paragraphs by a vote of 82 to 17, with 25 abstentions. Several delegations which had voted in favour (Mexico, Panama, Peru and Venezuela) stated, after the vote, that if there had been a separate vote on each paragraph they would have abstained on paragraph 7 (see below). At that same meeting, the First Committee approved the draft resolution as a whole by a recorded vote of 93 to 2 (Israel and United States), with 32 abstentions.

Most delegations which spoke in explanation of vote expressed dissatisfaction with certain paragraphs contained in the draft, especially operative paragraphs 5, 6 and 7. Some of those which had abstained in the vote, among them, Ireland, the Ivory Coast, New Zealand, Portugal and Sweden, while condemning the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear facilities,²⁰ regretted the formulations of those paragraphs. Others which had voted in favour (Argentina, Bahamas and Spain) also expressed reservations regarding some of the language used in the draft resolution. The United States, the only country besides Israel to vote against the draft, expressed the view that targeting one country for comprehensive sanctions was not an appropriate approach to the goal of non-proliferation.

On 9 December 1981 the Assembly adopted the draft as resolution 36/98 by a recorded vote of 101 to 2, with 39 abstentions. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its relevant resolutions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Recalling also its resolutions 33/71 A of 14 December 1978 on military and nuclear collaboration with Israel and 34/89 of 11 December 1979 and 35/157 of 12 December 1980 on Israeli nuclear armament,

Alarmed by the increasing evidence regarding Israel's attempts to acquire nuclear weapons,

Noting with concern that Israel has persistently refused to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons despite repeated calls by the General Assembly and the Security Council to place its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards,

Recalling Security Council resolution 487 (1981) of 19 June 1981,

Recalling the resolution adopted on 12 June 1981 by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency and resolution GC(XXV)/RES/381, adopted on 26 September 1981 by the General Conference of the Agency, in which the Conference, *inter alia*,

¹⁹ Bahrain, Chad, Democratic Yemen, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Sudan, United Arab Emirates and Yemen Arab Republic.

²⁰ See chapter IX above.

considered the Israeli act of aggression as an attack against the Agency and its safeguards régime, and decided to suspend the provision of any assistance to Israel,

Recalling its repeated condemnation of the nuclear collaboration between Israel and South Africa,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on Israeli nuclear armament,

1. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Secretary-General for his report on Israeli nuclear armament;

2. *Expresses its deep alarm* at the fact that the report has established that Israel has the technical capability to manufacture nuclear weapons and possesses the means of delivery of such weapons;

3. *Also expresses its deep concern* that Israel has undermined the credibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, in particular by the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear facilities which were under Agency safeguards;

4. *Reaffirms* that Israel's attack on the Iraqi nuclear facilities and Israel's capability constitute a serious destabilizing factor in an already tense situation in the Middle East, and a grave danger to international peace and security;

5. *Requests* the Security Council to prohibit all forms of co-operation with Israel in the nuclear field;

6. *Calls upon* all States and other parties and institutions to terminate forthwith all nuclear collaboration with Israel;

7. *Requests* the Security Council to institute effective enforcement action against Israel so as to prevent it from endangering international peace and security by its nuclear-weapon capability;

8. *Demands* that Israel should renounce, without delay, any possession of nuclear weapons and place all its nuclear activities under international safeguards;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to give maximum publicity to the report on Israeli nuclear armament and to distribute it to Member States, the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency and non-governmental organizations, so that the international community and public opinion may be fully aware of the danger inherent in Israel's nuclear capability;

10. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to follow closely Israeli military nuclear activity and to report thereon as appropriate;

11. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to transmit the report on Israeli nuclear armament to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament;

12. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Israeli nuclear armament"

Study on the implications of establishing an international satellite monitoring agency

In compliance with resolution 33/71 J, the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session a report²¹ on the technical, legal and financial implications of establishing an international satellite monitoring agency, prepared with the assistance of the Group of Governmental Experts appointed to study that question. Taking note of the preliminary conclusions contained in the report, the General Assembly adopted resolution 34/83 E on 11 December 1979, by which it requested the Secretary-General to carry out an in-depth study, again with the assistance of governmental experts, and to

²¹ A/34/540, annex.

submit a comprehensive report on the subject, by June 1981, to the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament.

The Group of Governmental Experts on the Question of the Establishment of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency met at Geneva three times in 1980 and once in 1981 to prepare the study.²² By a letter dated 10 June 1981, the Chairman of the Group transmitted the unanimously adopted study to the Secretary-General. It was submitted to the Preparatory Committee as the report of the Secretary-General on 6 August 1981 and subsequently circulated as a document of the Preparatory Committee.²³ The report contains, in addition to a preface and an introduction, three main chapters and conclusions.

In chapter I, the experts consider the background against which the technical aspects of the question must be seen, in particular, the present state of both civilian and military space technology, weather satellites relevant to an international satellite monitoring agency (ISMA),²⁴ facilities for receiving and processing remote sensing satellite data, launchers, and future trends in remote sensing. Proceeding to estimate the mission and data requirements of such an agency as well as the technical facilities it would need, the chapter deals with those requirements in relation to the monitoring of compliance with both existing and future international arms regulations and disarmament agreements. In conclusion, the chapter addresses questions of the evolution of an ISMA in the light of three proposed phases of its implementation as well as other outstanding technical considerations. The phases envisaged are: the setting up, in phase I, of an image-processing and interpretation center (IPIC); establishing ground stations and data transmission facilities to IPIC (phase II); and determining the technical feasibility and facilities needed for launching satellites (phase III).

Chapter II deals with the legal implications of the question, relating to all kinds of monitoring by satellites, including the financial implications of the functions of an ISMA with regard to monitoring to ensure compliance with existing and future international arms and regulation and disarmament agreements as well as bilateral, regional and other accords. The legal aspects of an ISMA are further examined in the light of specific legal issues relating to its establishment and functioning, and the legal implications of its activities, membership and organs, financing, and the settlement of internal disputes.

Chapter III examines the financial implications of establishing an ISMA in the proposed three-phased approach. The study notes that, because of the uncommon features of technical options, precise estimates of costs are difficult to make. Therefore, figures are offered therein as only an approximation of what the financial implications in the implementation of the three

²² In 1980, the Group met from 4 to 8 February, 10 to 30 May and 8 to 9 September, and in 1981 from 16 to 20 February, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Hubert G. Bortzmeyer of France.

²³ A/AC.206/14.

²⁴ The term "international satellite monitoring agency" (ISMA) was used in the report without prejudging the nature of a future organizational structure.

phases could entail. In the light of that consideration, the Group recommends that the international community, if it should decide to establish an ISMA, should commission a detailed engineering and related cost study to be prepared by a specialized professional organization or establishment.

The report also contains six annexes consisting of a list of the Experts, a glossary, a list of abbreviations, maps and charts related to chapter I, the texts of verification clauses in existing arms limitation and disarmament agreements, and a list of reference materials used.

The study on the implications of establishing an international satellite monitoring agency, along with the other documents of the Preparatory Committee, will be submitted to the General Assembly at its second special session on disarmament, to be held in 1982.

Studies in progress

Economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures

On 12 December 1980 the General Assembly adopted resolution 35/141 by which it requested the Secretary-General to bring up to date, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts appointed by him, the report entitled *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures*,²⁵ and to transmit it to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session. Pursuant to the resolution, the Secretary-General appointed experts from Austria, Bangladesh, Czechoslovakia, France, Japan, Romania, Mexico, the Netherlands, the USSR, Venezuela and Yugoslavia to assist him in the updating of the study.

The Group of Experts on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures held an organizational session from 20 to 30 July 1981, at which it unanimously appointed Ambassador Constantin Ene of Romania as its Chairman. At that session, the Group also considered and adopted a draft outline of the Secretary-General's report on the basis of which the Secretariat of the United Nations will prepare the first draft of the report for consideration by the experts during the 1982 sessions of the Group.

Studies initiated by the General Assembly in 1981

Conventional disarmament

In 1980, Denmark put forward a proposal, first in the Disarmament Commission and later at the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, for a

²⁵ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.1.

comprehensive United Nations study on conventional disarmament. This led to the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 35/156 A by which the Assembly approved, in principle, the carrying out of a study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces, to be undertaken by the Secretary-General. The Assembly agreed that the Disarmament Commission should work out the structure and scope of the study and convey the conclusions of its deliberations to the Secretary-General.

As requested, the Disarmament Commission dealt with the question of such a study at its 1981 substantive session. However, it was unable to complete guidelines for the study and the question was returned to the General Assembly for further consideration. A full description of the Disarmament Commission's deliberations and General Assembly debate on the question is contained in chapter XVII above.

Conclusion

The interest in United Nations disarmament studies as a means of promoting a better understanding of concepts and issues relating to the arms race and disarmament efforts and as an aid in the negotiating process is clearly illustrated by the number and variety of subjects embraced by the studies completed in 1981. Seven studies were completed in 1981, that is, those covered in this chapter and, in addition, the study on the relationship between disarmament and development to which chapter XXI is devoted.

In the course of the year, an updating of the study on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and military expenditure was started and will be completed in 1982. Finally, the General Assembly, by resolution 36/97 A, requested the Secretary-General to establish a group of qualified experts to assist him in the preparation of the study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces, and called on the Disarmament Commission to complete, in 1982, its elaboration of a general approach to the study, its structure and scope for consideration by the group of experts. By the same resolution, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit its final report on the subject to the thirty-eighth session, in 1983.

[Annex overleaf]

ANNEX

Composition of study groups in 1981*

Completed studies

STUDY OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS RELATING TO THE PROCESS OF DISARMAMENT

B. A. Adeyemi, Nigeria	Carlos Lechuga-Hevia, Cuba
Rolf Björnerstedt, Sweden	A. C. H. Mohamed, Sri Lanka
Alicia Cabrera-Silva, Mexico	Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, Argentina
Benoît d'Aboville, France	Henryk Pac, Poland
Roy Dean, United Kingdom	Sidi Mohamed Rahhali, Morocco
Sushil Dubey, India	Robert B. Rosenstock, United States
Charles Gatere Maina, Kenya	Vladimir Shustov, USSR
Yang Hushan, China	Darko Silović, Yugoslavia
Tsutomu Ishiguri, Japan	Ibrahim Sy, Senegal
P. H. Kooijmans, the Netherlands	Ferdinand Thun, German Democratic Republic

STUDY ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

Leopoldo Benites, Ecuador	Ion Nicolae, Romania
Frank Boaten, Ghana	Nobumasa Ohta, Japan
Busba Bunnag, Thailand	Hugo Palma, Peru
O. N. Bykov, USSR	Gerhard Pfeiffer, Federal Republic of Germany
Franz Ceska, Austria	Esko Rajakoski, Finland
Charles C. Flowerree, United States	P. M. Roberts, Canada
Pracha Gunakasem, Thailand	Hans-Georg Rudofsky, Austria
Kamanda Wa Kamanda, Zaire	Milan Stembera, Czechoslovakia

STUDY ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

M'Hamed Achache, Algeria	Jorge Morelli, Peru
Evgheny Alexandrov, Bulgaria	Janus A. W. Paludan, Denmark
Leopoldo Benites, Ecuador	Carlos P. Romulo, Philippines
Evgheny Bougrov, USSR	Zenon Rossides, Cyprus
Betty G. Lall, United States	

STUDY ON A WORLD DISARMAMENT CAMPAIGN

Francisco Correa-Villalobos, Mexico	John Rwambuya, Secretariat of the United Nations
Francis Obai Kabia, Sierra Leone	Nobuaki Tanaka, Secretariat of the United Nations
Ingrid Lehmann, Secretariat of the United Nations	
Mihail Rosianu, Romania	

* Inclusion of a name does not necessarily indicate that the individual served with the study group for the entire year or duration of the group's mandate.

STUDY ON ISRAELI NUCLEAR ARMAMENT

Ashok Kapur, Canada

Mark A. Khroustalev, USSR

Ali A. Mazrui, Kenya

George H. Quester, United States

Assad Saab, Lebanon

STUDY ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE MONITORING AGENCY

Mohamed Abdel-Hady, Egypt

Cesare Albanesi, Italy

Hubert G. Bortzmeyer, France

Sune Danielsson, Sweden

Enrique Gaviria Liévano, Colombia

Mekki Louiz, Tunisia

Eugeniu Mandescu, Romania

Jean-Pierre Ouedraogo, Upper Volta

Carlos Passalacqua, Argentina

Krishnamurthy Santhanam, India

Mohamed Sidik, Indonesia

Obrad Vucurović, Yugoslavia

Hans Winkler, Austria

Ongoing Studies

Group of Experts on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures

Simón Alberto Consalvi, Venezuela

Dragomir Djokić, Yugoslavia

Constantin Ene, Romania

Hendrick de Haan, the Netherlands

Yasunori Kikuchi, Japan

Ifigenia Martínez, Mexico

Ladislav Matejka, Czechoslovakia

S. N. Nadel, USSR

Waliur Rahman, Bangladesh

Kurt Rothschild, Austria

Christian Schmidt, France

Mobilization of public opinion and the observance of Disarmament Week

Introduction

AN IMPORTANT FUNCTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS is to increase public awareness of the dangers of the arms race, mobilize public opinion in support of disarmament, and create an atmosphere conducive to progress in disarmament negotiations. To those ends, the United Nations, in recent years, has increased the flow of information on the arms race and disarmament to Governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the media and, through them as well as directly, to the general public. The objectives are to facilitate a better understanding of the problems involved, to stimulate the interest of organizations and individuals, and to generate public support for disarmament efforts. Of major significance in this connection are the guidelines laid down in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament of 1978 which, *inter alia*, states:¹

15. It is essential that not only Governments but also the peoples of the world recognize and understand the dangers in the present situation. In order that an international conscience may develop and that world public opinion may exercise a positive influence, the United Nations should increase the dissemination of information on the armaments race and disarmament with the full co-operation of Member States.

It is clear that the General Assembly saw a particular need for increased participation in disarmament activities by the non-governmental organizations concerned and for closer liaison between them and the United Nations.

The effort of the United Nations to mobilize public opinion in support of disarmament was given fresh impetus in 1980 as a result of the consideration of the matter by the Disarmament Commission and by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session. The latter, in adopting its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980, which embodied, as an annex, the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, stated, in the context of "public awareness", that the United Nations, in particular its Centre for Disarmament, should intensify and co-ordinate its programme of publications, audio-visual materials, co-operation with non-governmental organizations, and relations

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4* (A/S-10/4); see also paras. 99-106 and 123.

with the media.² Further impetus was given in 1981 by resolution 35/152 I, of 12 December 1980, by which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to carry out a study on the organization and financing of a world disarmament campaign under the auspices of the United Nations (see also chapter XXII above). Additionally, the extensive work of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization related to disarmament is described in appendix III below.

General activities

In the course of 1981, the United Nations substantially expanded its cooperation with non-governmental organizations, research institutes and the media in all regions of the world. The Centre for Disarmament, which maintains a roster of several hundred non-governmental organizations, has continuously updated that listing. In 1981, all non-governmental organizations on the Centre's mailing list received current United Nations publications in the field of disarmament. Within the constraints of financial and human resources, the Centre also responded to further requests for United Nations studies, fact sheets, brochures, films and posters, as well as to requests for panelists and speakers at non-governmental conferences and meetings.

The Centre for Disarmament, in accordance with a request of the General Assembly, conducted, in the context of the Second Disarmament Decade, two regional seminars for non-governmental organizations, the beginning of a series of United Nations seminars which is envisaged to continue throughout the Decade. The first of the two was held in April 1981 in Mexico City for the Latin American and Caribbean region. The United Nations was able to invite 46 participants from 14 countries of the region. The second was held in September 1981, in Nairobi, Kenya, for the African region, and was attended by 54 participants from 16 countries. The participants at both seminars were drawn from professional associations, educational institutions and research institutes, and journalists', religious, women's and youth organizations. The seminars lasted four days each and received significant publicity in the countries in which they were held, as well as in the respective regions, where they were covered by the media. By December 1981, plans were under way for two seminars in 1982, one for the Asia-Pacific region and the other for Europe.

Consideration in the Disarmament Commission and the Committee on Disarmament, 1981

At the substantive session of the Disarmament Commission in May and June 1981,³ the Chairman referred to the modalities of the participation of non-governmental organizations in the work of the Commission. It was decided, as it had been the previous year, to extend to non-governmental organizations the

² See resolution 35/46, annex, sect. III F.

³ See A/CN.10/PV.44 and 49 and A/CN.10/32.

following arrangements: attendance at plenary meetings of the Commission; access to official documents; the submission of material related to the agenda items of the Commission; the publication by the Commission of an information document listing the contributions of NGOs; and ensuring the availability of their contributions to members of the Commission. Similarly, in accordance with its rules of procedure, the Committee on Disarmament arranged for lists of communications received from non-governmental organizations and persons to be circulated to the Committee.⁴

In the general exchange of views in the Disarmament Commission, Costa Rica emphasized the need for governmental and non-governmental information organs to undertake further programmes of information relating to the changes in the armaments race as well as to disarmament efforts. The promotion of public awareness, in Costa Rica's view, was an important element in generating the necessary political will to facilitate disarmament. China and Pakistan both emphasized the importance of mobilizing world public opinion against the threat to international peace posed by the arms race.

Although not on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament, a number of delegations, among them those of the German Democratic Republic, Mexico and Norway, referred in plenary meetings to the importance of an informed public opinion in support of disarmament.⁵ Sweden commented on the need to make the vocabulary of the armament-disarmament debate more understandable and to communicate with people in human terms in order to gain their support. Romania referred to the desirability of a closer link between the Committee and the public, and Italy emphasized that the Committee's work should be a source of hope for world public opinion.

Observance of Disarmament Week, 1981

At its first special session devoted to disarmament, in 1978, the General Assembly proclaimed the week starting 24 October, the day of the founding of the United Nations, as a week devoted to fostering the objectives of disarmament. In 1981, in accordance with Assembly resolution 33/71 D, the Secretary-General received replies from 11 Governments and specialized agencies concerning their activities in connection with Disarmament Week in 1980.⁶

As part of its regular information activities in 1981, the Centre for Disarmament prepared a fact sheet describing the goals of Disarmament Week and possible activities by the United Nations, Governments and non-governmental organizations, which was mailed to all NGOs on record with the Centre, and to United Nations Information Centres for distribution in all regions of the world.

⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 27* (A/36/27), para. 22.

⁵ *Ibid.*, appendix III (CD/228).

⁶ A/36/568 and Add.1.

An international poster competition was organized by the United Nations in 1981, in which artists from 67 countries participated. An international selection panel chose the entry submitted by Mr. Gerhard Voigt of the German Democratic Republic as the winning poster. It was subsequently printed and used in connection with the preparations for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. All entries were exhibited in the public lobby of the United Nations for the duration of Disarmament Week 1981 and were on display at the Centre for Disarmament for the remainder of the year.

On 26 October, the First Committee⁷ of the General Assembly observed Disarmament Week at United Nations Headquarters. The Chairman of the First Committee, Mr. Ignac Golob of Yugoslavia, read a message from the President of the General Assembly in which he stated that, while all wars must be of concern, in the atomic era the greatest threat emanated from nuclear weapons. The President stressed that disarmament could be accomplished only if the nation States which were devoting so much effort and so many resources to the arms race decided to stop and move towards true disarmament and emphasized that, while the United Nations remained the most valuable international mechanism to aid that process, the necessary political will must also be shown in the capitals of Member States. The Assistant Secretary-General, Centre for Disarmament, Mr. Jan Martenson, conveyed the message of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the same occasion. In his message, the Secretary-General stated that Disarmament Week 1981 was darkened by the shadow of deteriorating international relations, which had aroused the deep concern of the world community. The deadly momentum of the arms race must be halted. The Secretary-General stated that measures to build confidence among States were an essential condition for progress towards peace. He appealed to Governments to help make the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament the start of a new and productive phase in disarmament negotiations. He added that non-governmental organizations, which reached wide segments of society, could render significant assistance in advancing that goal.

Speaking on behalf of the Eastern European States, the representative of Hungary stated that the current international situation and the senseless arms race gave special importance to Disarmament Week. Highest priority should be given to the preservation of mankind from a nuclear catastrophe. In that connection he stressed the importance of public opinion and the contribution which NGOs could make.

The representative of Spain, speaking on behalf of the Western European and Other States, stated that the international situation was not such as to suggest that in the near future positive steps would be taken towards the final objective of disarmament, but that should give the international community an incentive to persevere in that important task. He referred to the series of events in the Western European States during Disarmament Week aimed at

⁷ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, First Committee*, 11th meeting, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

mobilizing public opinion with regard to the need to make progress in the cause of disarmament.

On behalf of the African States, the representative of Angola stressed in particular the connection between disarmament, development and the survival of mankind. He called for the denuclearization of Africa and appealed to the nuclear Powers to hold negotiations to avert catastrophe. Speaking on behalf of the Latin American States, the representative of Jamaica pointed to the peril faced by mankind arising from a nuclear confrontation. During Disarmament Week, public discussion could focus on the dangerous level of the arms race and the drift towards cold war. He stated that it was important for the ordinary citizen to become aware of the dangers and the urgent need for corrective action by Governments. People were demanding of Governments that global survival be put before considerations of power. On behalf of the Asian States, the representative of Nepal stated that Disarmament Week reminded the international community of the destructiveness of war and the need to secure a climate of confidence among States. To that end, the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament could make an important contribution.

In his statement, the Chairman of the First Committee said that Disarmament Week had a great deal to do with the rights of peoples of all countries to know and to be informed in order that they might influence their destinies. He stressed the right of peoples to know that spending enormous amounts of money on the armaments race was a veritable plague; that so many countries were hostages to the armaments race as a way of thinking; and how much better off nations would be in a world of security, independence and peace.

Also in connection with Disarmament Week, the Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Mr. Edouard Saouma, issued a statement in Rome in which he referred to the unprecedented social and economic turbulence and expressed his organization's appreciation for the efforts of the United Nations to maintain peace and security. He hoped that Disarmament Week would provide an opportunity for new and imaginative ideas to come to the fore which could bear fruit at the Assembly's second special session on disarmament. The statement is reproduced in appendix IV below.

On 27 October, Mr. Olof Palme, Chairman of the group of eminent persons called the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues and former Prime Minister of Sweden, addressed a special meeting of non-governmental organizations and delegations at United Nations Headquarters in New York. In his address, he stated that, despite warnings by scientists, the nuclear arms race had passed the limit of mutual deterrence and that technological developments might one day give one of the super-Powers hope that it would be able to wipe out the other's counterforce ability by striking first itself. He regarded as particularly disturbing the gradual acceptance of the possibility of a limited nuclear war. He stated that there was a great fear among large segments of the European population and a sudden beginning of the realization of what a war in Europe would mean. Mr. Palme

also stressed the importance of disarmament for development as possibly being the only course for survival. Referring to the work of the Independent Commission, he said "National security cannot be achieved by policies that lead to international insecurity", and stressed that security was a common responsibility which must also be based on common prosperity. Following Mr. Palme's presentation, participants at the meeting were invited to a preview screening of the United Nations film *The Big If*.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1981

At the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, while reference was made in the general debate in plenary meetings to the importance of public opinion to disarmament efforts, more substantive discussion on the subject took place in the First Committee.⁸

In the course of the debate in the First Committee, some 60 delegations, representing all regions and groupings, stressed the importance of mobilizing public opinion and of disseminating information on the arms race and disarmament by the United Nations.

The General Assembly had before it a report of the Secretary-General, under the agenda item "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session", entitled "World Disarmament Campaign".⁹ The origins of the concept, the work of the Group of Experts which prepared the report, a discussion of its contents, and the Assembly's action and views expressed in that connection are contained in preceding chapter XXII in the context of studies concluded in 1981.

Briefly stated, the general purpose of the world disarmament campaign would be to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament through information, education, and the generation of public understanding and support. Although the campaign envisaged would be directed to all segments of the world's population, certain constituencies — because of their influence and consequent multiplier effects — should receive particular attention, and Disarmament Week could provide an annual focus for the campaign. The campaign would be under the over-all guidance and co-ordination of the Secretary-General of the United Nations who would report annually to the General Assembly.

Regarding views of Member States, in their statements on the subject, Austria, Bulgaria, Chile, Lebanon, Mexico, Mongolia, Peru, Romania, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, the Soviet Union, Venezuela and Yugoslavia specifically supported the findings of the Group of Experts. The representative of Mexico particularly commended the study, which, he believed, could become an instrument of incalculable value for the promotion of disarmament at the

⁸ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 33rd and 91st meetings; *ibid.*, *First Committee*, 3rd to 41st meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

⁹ A/36/458.

global level. He felt that the campaign might have the effect of making United Nations resolutions more effective, and also observed that the report contained constructive practical suggestions; for instance, the suggestion of a pledging conference of Member States which might be held in connection with the Assembly's second special session on disarmament and from time to time thereafter. Mexico, which also introduced the draft resolution on the report, expressed the hope that it would be adopted by consensus. As chapter XXII explains, however, votes were requested on the draft and on the corresponding resolution, 36/92 C.

On 20 November, also under the agenda item on the implementation of the resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly at its tenth special session, Bulgaria introduced in the First Committee a draft resolution, which was sponsored also by Mongolia, entitled "World-wide action for collecting signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and for disarmament" Referring to the Assembly's 1978 special session on disarmament and its recognition at that time of the potential influence of world public opinion as well as the importance of Disarmament Week as a focal point for activities promoting public awareness of arms and disarmament issues, Bulgaria welcomed the initiative for the launching of a world disarmament campaign. It felt that there was, however, another important aspect of the question of mobilizing public opinion to which the United Nations had not yet given sufficient attention, namely, the question of identifying the wishes of world public opinion with regard to the course of action to be followed in the field of disarmament. It felt that in the current circumstances it was more than ever important that the peoples of the world express, clearly and unambiguously, their will to foster implementation of practical measures aimed at checking the arms race and proceeding with disarmament. Bulgaria stated that the recent intensification of activities of governmental and non-governmental organizations had been demonstrated as an effective tool for involving masses of the population in the decision-making process on vital issues. Therefore, the draft resolution being proposed recommended world-wide action for collecting signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and for disarmament. The sponsors hoped that the draft resolution would be adopted by consensus.

On 24 November, before the vote in the First Committee, Mexico stated that it would vote on the understanding that the General Assembly would adopt a decision to prevent a duplication of activities undertaken in the context of the world disarmament campaign. Czechoslovakia voiced its full support of the idea of world-wide action for collecting signatures as envisaged by the proposal. It felt that the adoption of the draft would play an important role in preparation for and implementation of the results of the second special session on disarmament by mobilizing world opinion. Guinea, too, shared the view that the draft would promote, in a dynamic way, the task of informing world public opinion.

China pointed out that it had not participated in the voting since, in its view, world-wide action for collecting signatures in support of disarmament measures would be more appropriately implemented by non-governmental

and other private organizations. Japan, too, adopted that position, stressing that at the first special session on disarmament, representatives of Japanese non-governmental organizations had journeyed to the United Nations carrying some 20 million signatures in support of nuclear disarmament; that had been entirely a voluntary effort in which the Government had not been involved.

In the Byelorussian SSR's view, efforts to avert nuclear catastrophe should be applied at all possible levels, starting from the highest political level, and ranging through those of the inter-governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations, and reaching the level of all aware and sensible persons. Therefore, the idea of a world-wide campaign for the collection of signatures was a very timely idea. The Byelorussian SSR further pointed out that mass demonstrations in many countries of the world had indicated the rising concern of society about mankind's future, and the United Nations could not stand aside from the voice of world public opinion; that was especially so in view of the fact that in the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament the Assembly had called for the mobilization of that opinion in support of disarmament. The German Democratic Republic fully supported the draft resolution, stressing that it would establish a suitable means of eliciting the suggestions of Member States concerning such world-wide action, and that the report to be prepared by the Secretary-General would enable the General Assembly at its second special session on disarmament to take an appropriate decision (see resolution below). Hungary considered that the proposal would also contribute in a valuable way to the Second Disarmament Decade and the world disarmament campaign in mobilizing world public opinion on behalf of disarmament.

For its part, the Netherlands expressed the view that the draft resolution was redundant and propagandistic since there was a difference between an open and a closed society. Mass demonstrations in Western Europe provided evidence that public opinion there was not in need of Government guidance to be mobilized for disarmament. Austria similarly regarded as highly problematical the involvement of Governments in a practice designed to facilitate input into the political processes from the population at grass-roots level. It also expressed doubts whether the measures proposed in the draft resolution could usefully contribute to the disarmament process. Brazil stated that it could not support the proposals since it did not believe that it was incumbent upon the United Nations to engage in such activities. Finland and Pakistan expressed the view that the action proposed could have been a part of the proposal for the world disarmament campaign. Finland also believed that the kind of activity envisaged should fall within the activities of non-governmental organizations.

On 24 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 68 to 3, with 46 abstentions, and on 9 December, the General Assembly adopted it, as resolution 36/92 J, by a recorded vote of 78 to 3 (Brazil, Canada, United States), with 56 abstentions. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned over the growing threat of a nuclear war and the continuation and escalation of the arms race,

Conscious of the need to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament, as called for in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Considering that world-wide action for collecting signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and for disarmament would be an important manifestation of the will of the world public and would contribute to the creation of a favourable climate for achieving progress in the field of disarmament,

Considering also that it is desirable to carry out such world-wide action under the auspices of the United Nations and with the active participation of non-governmental organizations and other public institutions,

1. *Invites* Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General their views and suggestions concerning world-wide action for collecting signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and for disarmament;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to prepare a report on the most appropriate format and methods of carrying out such world-wide action under the auspices of the United Nations, taking into account the views and suggestions of Member States, and to submit it for consideration to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

Conclusion

The continuing effort of the United Nations to mobilize public opinion on behalf of disarmament was given fresh impetus in 1981. The information activities of the United Nations in the field of disarmament continued to be strengthened through contacts with non-governmental organizations in all regions of the world and the wider dissemination of United Nations publications and films. There were also increased activities world-wide during Disarmament Week. On 26 October, the First Committee held a special meeting and, on 27 October, non-governmental organizations heard a special presentation at United Nations Headquarters to mark the occasion. These general trends are expected to continue in coming years.

As a result of a 1980 decision of the General Assembly, the expert study on the organization and financing of a world disarmament campaign was concluded in the first part of the year and its results were considered by the General Assembly. As a result, pursuant to resolution 36/92 C, the study will be transmitted, together with views received from Governments on the subject, to the Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

A second action by the General Assembly, the adoption of a resolution concerning the collection of signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and for disarmament, although not extensively opposed, failed to gain the support of a number of States. Those not supporting the initiative, among others, China, the United States and the members of the European Community, generally explained their positions on the grounds that it would in many cases involve Governments in an activity which they felt should properly be initiated on a strictly voluntary basis by non-governmental and other private organizations and peoples themselves.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

Status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements

Actions taken in the period 1 January to 31 December 1981

The following list provides the basic information concerning the agreements contained in the special supplement to *The Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977,^a updated in appendices of *The Yearbook* in subsequent years,^b and shows action taken, if any, with regard to those agreements during the period 1 January to 31 December 1981.^c It also includes a new Convention, which was opened for signature on 10 April 1981, entitled "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects"

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare

SIGNED AT GENEVA: 17 June 1925

ENTERED INTO FORCE: for each signatory as from the date of deposit of its ratification; accessions take effect on the date of the notification of the depositary Government

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: France

NEW PARTIES: Solomon Islands — 1 June 1981 (s)^d

The Antarctic Treaty

SIGNED AT WASHINGTON: 1 December 1959

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 23 June 1961

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: United States of America

NEW PARTIES: Papua New Guinea — 16 March 1981 (s)^e
Italy — 18 March 1981 (a)
Peru — 10 April 1981 (a)

^a *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.2).

^b See Editorial note, p. xiv above.

^c Accession is indicated by (a) and succession by (s). Instruments of ratification, accession or succession may be deposited with the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L) and/or the United States of America (W) or other depositaries, as applicable.

^d Succeeded to the instrument in question by virtue of the ratification of the United Kingdom.

^e Succeeded to the Treaty by virtue of the ratification of Australia.

**Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere,
In Outer Space and Under Water**

SIGNED BY THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN MOSCOW: 5 August 1963

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 8 August 1963

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 10 October 1963

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: Papua New Guinea — 16 March 1981 (W) (s)^e

**Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 27 January 1967

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 10 October 1967

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: Papua New Guinea — 16 March 1981 (W) (s)^e
Chile — 8 October 1981 (W)

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT MEXICO CITY: 14 February 1967

ENTERED INTO FORCE: for each Government individually

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: Mexico

TREATY — NEW PARTIES: none

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I — NEW PARTIES: United States of America — 23 November 1981^f

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II — NEW PARTIES: none

^f With the following understanding:

“I

“That the United States Government understands the reference in Article 3 of the treaty to ‘its own legislation’ to relate only to such legislation as is compatible with the rules of international law and as involves an exercise of sovereignty consistent with those rules, and accordingly that ratification of Additional Protocol II by the United States Government could not be regarded as implying recognition, for the purpose of this treaty and its protocols, or for any other purpose, of any legislation which did not, in the view of the United States, comply with the relevant rules of international law.

“That the United States Government takes note of the Preparatory Commission’s interpretation of the treaty, as set forth in the Final Act, that, governed by the principles and rules of international law, each of the contracting parties retains exclusive power and legal competence, unaffected by the terms of the treaty, to grant or deny non-contracting parties transit and transport privileges.

“That as regards the undertaking in Article 3 of Protocol II not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties, the United States Government would have to consider that an armed attack by a Contracting Party, in which it was assisted by a nuclear-weapon state, would be incompatible with the Contracting Party’s corresponding obligations under Article 1 of the treaty.

“II

“That the United States Government considers that the technology of making nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes is indistinguishable from the technology of making nuclear weapons, and that nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices for peaceful

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 1 July 1968

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 5 March 1970

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: Egypt — 26 February 1981 (L)
Solomon Islands — 17 June 1981 (L) (s)^d

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 11 February 1971

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 18 May 1972

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: Solomon Islands — 17 June 1981 (L) (s)^d
Central African Republic — 9 July 1981 (W)

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 10 April 1972

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 26 March 1975

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: Papua New Guinea — 16 March 1981 (W) (a)
Uruguay — 6 April 1981 (W) (a)
Solomon Islands — 17 June 1981 (L) (s)^d
Netherlands — 22 June 1981 (L) (M) (W)^g

purposes are both capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and have the common group of characteristics of large amounts of energy generated instantaneously from a compact source. Therefore the United States Government understands the definition contained in Article 5 of the treaty as necessarily encompassing all nuclear explosive devices. It also understands that Articles 1 and 5 restrict accordingly the activities of the contracting parties under paragraph 1 of Article 18.

“That the United States Government understands that paragraph 4 of Article 18 of the treaty permits, and that United States adherence to Protocol II will not prevent, collaboration by the United States with contracting parties for the purpose of carrying out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes in a manner consistent with a policy of not contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. In this connection, the United States Government notes Article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, under which it joined in an undertaking to take appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear explosions would be made available to non-nuclear-weapons states party to that treaty, and reaffirms its willingness to extend such undertaking, on the same basis, to states precluded by the present treaty from manufacturing or acquiring any nuclear explosive device,

“III

“That the United States Government also declares that, although not required by Protocol II, it will act with respect to such territories of Protocol I adherents as are within the geographical area defined in paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the treaty in the same manner as Protocol II requires it to act with respect to the territories of contracting parties.”

^g With the statement that ratification was also on behalf of the Netherlands Antilles.

**Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT GENEVA: 18 May 1977

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 5 October 1978

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES: Canada — 11 June 1981

Solomon Islands — 19 June 1981

Italy — 27 November 1981

**Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT NEW YORK: 10 April 1981

NOT YET IN FORCE

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW SIGNATORIES: Afghanistan — 10 April 1981

Austria — 10 April 1981

Belgium — 10 April 1981

Bulgaria — 10 April 1981

Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic — 10 April 1981

Canada — 10 April 1981

Cuba — 10 April 1981

Czechoslovakia — 10 April 1981

Denmark — 10 April 1981

Egypt — 10 April 1981

Finland — 10 April 1981

France — 10 April 1981^h

^h With the following declaration:

"After signing the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, the French Government, as it has already had occasion to state

"— through its representative to the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons in Geneva, during the discussion of the proposal concerning verification arrangements submitted by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany and of which the French Government became a sponsor, and at the final meeting on 10 October 1980;

"— on 20 November 1980 through the representative of the Netherlands, speaking on behalf of the nine States members of the European Community in the First Committee at the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly;

"Regrets that thus far it has not been possible for the States which participated in the negotiation of the Convention to reach agreement on the provisions concerning the verification of facts which might be alleged and which might constitute violations of the undertakings subscribed to.

"It therefore reserves the right to submit, possibly in association with other States, proposals aimed at filling that gap at the first conference to be held pursuant to article 8 of the Convention and to utilize, as appropriate, procedures that would make it possible to bring before the international community facts and information which, if verified, could constitute violations of the provisions of the Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto."

With the following interpretative statement:

"The application of this Convention will have no effect on the legal status of the parties to a conflict."

German Democratic Republic — 10 April 1981
Germany, Federal Republic of — 10 April 1981
Greece — 10 April 1981
Hungary — 10 April 1981
Iceland — 10 April 1981
Ireland — 10 April 1981
Italy — 10 April 1981¹
Luxembourg — 10 April 1981
Mexico — 10 April 1981

With the following reservation:

"France, which is not bound by Additional Protocol I of 10 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949:

"Considers that the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, which reproduces the provisions of article 35, paragraph 3, of Additional Protocol I, applies only to States parties to that Protocol;

"States, with reference to the scope of application defined in article 1 of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, that it will apply the provisions of that Convention and its three Protocols to all the armed conflicts referred to in articles 2 and 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949;

"States that as regards the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, the declaration of acceptance and application provided for in article 7, paragraph 4 (b), of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons will have no effects other than those provided for in article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, in so far as that article is applicable."

¹ With the following declaration:

"On 10 October 1980 in Geneva, the representative of Italy at the United Nations Conference which adopted the texts of the Convention and Protocols on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, speaking at the closing meeting of the Conference, emphasized that the latter, in an effort to reach a compromise between what was desirable and what was possible, had probably achieved the maximum results feasible in the circumstances prevailing at that time.

"However, he observed in his statement that one of the objectives which had not been achieved at the Conference, to his Government's great regret, was the inclusion in the text of the Convention, in accordance with a proposal originated by the Federal Republic of Germany, of an article on the establishment of a consultative committee of experts competent to verify facts which might be alleged and which might constitute violations of the undertakings subscribed to.

"On the same occasion, the representative of Italy expressed the wish that that proposal, which was aimed at strengthening the credibility and effectiveness of the Convention, should be reconsidered at the earliest opportunity within the framework of the mechanisms for the amendment of the Convention expressly provided for in that instrument.

"Subsequently, through the representative of the Netherlands, speaking on behalf of nine States members of the European Community in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on 20 November 1980, when it adopted draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.15 (subsequently adopted as General Assembly resolution 35/153), Italy once again expressed regret that the States which had participated in the preparation of the texts of the Convention and its Protocols had been unable to reach agreement on provisions that would ensure respect for the obligations deriving from those texts.

"In the same spirit, Italy — which has just signed the Convention in accordance with the wishes expressed by the General Assembly in its resolution 35/153 — wishes to confirm solemnly that it intends to undertake active efforts to ensure that the problem of the establishment of a mechanism that would make it possible to fill a gap in the Convention and thus ensure that it achieves maximum effectiveness and maximum credibility vis-à-vis the international community is taken up again at the earliest opportunity in every competent forum."

Mongolia — 10 April 1981
 Morocco — 10 April 1981
 Netherlands — 10 April 1981
 New Zealand — 10 April 1981
 Norway — 10 April 1981
 Poland — 10 April 1981
 Portugal — 10 April 1981
 Spain — 10 April 1981
 Sudan — 10 April 1981
 Sweden — 10 April 1981
 Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic — 10 April 1981
 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics — 10 April 1981
 United Kingdom — 10 April 1981^j
 Viet Nam — 10 April 1981
 Sierra Leone — 1 May 1981
 Yugoslavia — 5 May 1981
 India — 15 May 1981
 Philippines — 15 May 1981
 Nicaragua — 20 May 1981
 Switzerland — 18 June 1981
 Ecuador — 9 September 1981
 China — 14 September 1981^k
 Togo — 15 September 1981
 Japan — 22 September 1981
 Argentina — 2 December 1981

^j With the following statement:

“The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland will give further consideration to certain provisions of the Convention, particularly in relation to the provisions of Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and may wish to make formal declarations in relation to these provisions at the time of ratification.”

^k With the following statement:

“1. The Government of the People's Republic of China has decided to sign the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects adopted at the United Nations Conference held in Geneva on 10 October 1980.

“2. The Government of the People's Republic of China deems that the basic spirit of the Convention reflects the reasonable demand and good intention of numerous countries and peoples of the world regarding prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which are excessively injurious or have indiscriminate effects. This basic spirit conforms to China's consistent position and serves the interest of opposing aggression and maintaining peace.

“3. However, it should be pointed out that the Convention fails to provide for supervision or verification of any violation of its clauses, thus weakening its binding force. The Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices fails to lay down strict restrictions on the use of such weapons by the aggressor on the territory of his victim and to provide adequately for the right of a state victim of an aggression to defend itself by all necessary means. The Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons does not stipulate restrictions on the use of such weapons against combat personnel. Furthermore, the Chinese texts of the Convention and Protocol are not accurate or satisfactory enough. It is the hope of the Chinese Government that these inadequacies can be remedied in due course.”

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1981
(s) signed; (r) ratified (including accessions and successions)

State	Geneva Protocol		Antarctic Treaty		Partial Test Ban		Outer space		Treaty of Tlatelolco		Non-proliferation		Sea-bed		BW Convention		ENMOD		Conventional weapons	
	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)
AFGHANISTAN.....					X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X				X
ALBANIA.....																				
ALGERIA.....					X															
ANGOLA.....																				
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA.....																				
ARGENTINA.....			X	X	X		X	X	X	X			X		X	X				X
AUSTRALIA.....			X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X		X	X	X			
AUSTRIA.....		X	X		X	X	X	X			X	X	X		X	X				X
BAHAMAS.....					X		X	X	X	X		X								
BAHRAIN.....																				
BANGLADESH.....									X	X		X						X		
BARBADOS.....		X					X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X				X
BELGIUM.....	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
BELIZE.....																				
BENIN.....					X	X					X	X	X		X	X	X			
BHUTAN.....					X										X					
BOLIVIA.....		X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
BOTSWANA.....					X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X				
BRAZIL.....	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X		X	X	X			
BULGARIA.....	X	X			X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
BURMA.....					X	X	X	X					X		X	X				
BURUNDI.....					X	X	X	X				X	X		X	X				
BYELORUSSIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC.....					X	X	X	X					X	X	X	X	X	X		X

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1981 (continued)

State	Geneva Protocol		Antarctic Treaty		Partial Test Ban		Outer space		Treaty of Tlatelolco		Non-proliferation		Sea-bed		Convention		ENMOD		Conventional weapons	
	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)
CAMEROON, UNITED REPUBLIC OF					X		X				X	X	X							
CANADA	X	X			X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CAPE VERDE																				
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	X				X	X	X				X	X	X	X	X		X			
CHAD					X	X					X	X								
CHILE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X					X	X				
CHINA	X							X	X	X										X
(A.P.II)***																				
COLOMBIA					X		X		X	X	X		X							
COMOROS																				
CONGO											X	X	X							
COSTA RICA					X	X			X	X			X		X	X				
CUBA	X						X						X		X	X	X	X	X	X
CYPRUS	X				X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CZECHOSLOVAKIA					X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA	X	X		X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
DEMOCRATIC YEMEN					X		X				X		X							
DENMARK	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
DJIBOUTI																				
DOMINICA																				
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	X				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
ECUADOR	X				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X			X	X
EGYPT	X	X			X	X	X	X			X	X			X	X			X	X

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1981 (continued)

State	Geneva Protocol		Antarctic Treaty		Partial Test Ban		Outer space		Treaty of Tlatelolco		Non-proliferation		Sea-bed		BW Convention		ENMOD		Conventional weapons	
	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)
EL SALVADOR.....	X				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X								
EQUATORIAL GUINEA.....											X									
ETHIOPIA.....	X	X			X		X				X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
FUJI.....	X				X			X			X									
FINLAND.....	X	X			X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
FRANCE.....	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X										X
(A.P.II)																				
GABON.....					X	X					X				X					
GAMBIA.....		X			X	X	X				X	X	X		X					
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC.....	X	X		X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF.....	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
GHANA.....		X			X	X	X				X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
GREECE.....	X	X			X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X				X
GRENADA.....									X	X										
GUATEMALA.....					X	X			X	X			X	X	X	X				
GUINEA.....													X							
GUINEA-BISSAU.....					X		X				X		X		X					
GUYANA.....																				
HAITI.....					X		X		X	X	X	X			X					
HOLY SEE*.....	X						X		X	X							X			
HONDURAS.....					X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X					
HUNGARY.....	X				X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
ICELAND.....	X				X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
INDIA.....	X	X			X	X	X	X					X		X	X	X		X	X

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1981 (continued)

State	Geneva Protocol		Antarctic Treaty		Partial Test Ban		Outer space		Treaty of Tlatelolco		Non-proliferation		Sea-bed		BW Convention		ENMOD		Conventional weapons	
	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)
INDONESIA		X			X	X	X	X			X	X			X					
IRAN		X			X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
IRAQ		X			X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
IRELAND	X				X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X
ISRAEL	X				X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
ITALY	X	X		X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
IVORY COAST	X				X	X					X	X	X	X	X					
JAMAICA	X				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
JAPAN	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X			X	
JORDAN	X				X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X				
KENYA	X					X					X	X				X				
KOREA,* DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF																				
KOREA,* REPUBLIC OF					X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
KUWAIT	X				X	X	X	X			X	X			X	X	X	X		
LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC					X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
LEBANON	X				X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
LESOTHO	X					X	X				X	X	X	X	X	X				
LIBERIA	X				X	X					X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA	X				X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X					
LIECHTENSTEIN											X	X								
LUXEMBOURG	X	X			X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
MADAGASCAR	X				X	X		X			X	X	X	X	X	X				
MALAWI	X					X													X	

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1981 (continued)

State	Geneva Protocol		Antarctic Treaty		Partial Test Ban		Outer space		Treaty of Tlatelolco		Non-proliferation		Sea-bed		BW Convention		ENMOD		Conventional weapons	
	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)
MALAYSIA		X		X	X	X	X				X	X	X	X		X				
MALDIVES		X									X									
MALI		X		X			X				X	X	X		X					
MALTA		X			X						X	X	X	X	X					
MAURITANIA				X	X															
MAURITIUS		X		X	X		X				X	X	X	X	X					
MEXICO		X		X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X					X
MONACO*		X									X	X			X					
MONGOLIA		X		X	X		X	X			X	X	X	X	X		X	X		X
MOROCCO		X		X	X		X	X			X	X	X	X	X		X	X		X
MOZAMBIQUE																				
NEPAL		X			X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X					
NETHERLANDS	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X			X
(A.P.I.)																				
NEW ZEALAND		X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X
NICARAGUA	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X		X
NIGER		X		X	X	X	X						X	X	X					
NIGERIA		X		X	X	X	X				X	X	X	X	X					
NORWAY		X		X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X		X	X		X
OMAN																				
PAKISTAN		X		X	X	X	X								X					X
PANAMA		X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X					X
PAPUA NEW GUINEA		X		X	X		X													
PARAGUAY	X			X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X						X

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1981 (continued)

State	Geneva Protocol		Antarctic Treaty		Partial Test Ban		Outer space		Treaty of Tlatelolco		Non-proliferation		Sea-bed		BiW Convention		ENMOD		Conventional weapons	
	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)
PERU.....			X		X		X		X		X				X					
PHILIPPINES.....					X		X				X				X				X	
POLAND.....	X		X		X		X				X		X		X		X		X	
PORTUGAL.....	X				X						X		X		X		X		X	
QATAR.....	X												X		X					
ROMANIA.....	X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X			
RWANDA.....	X				X		X		X		X		X		X					
SAINT LUCIA.....											X				X					
SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES.....																				
SAMOA.....					X						X									
SAN MARINO**.....					X		X				X				X					
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE.....					X								X				X			
SAUDI ARABIA.....	X						X						X		X					
SENEGAL.....					X						X		X		X					
SEYCHELLES.....							X						X		X					
SIERRA LEONE.....	X				X		X				X		X		X		X		X	
SINGAPORE.....					X		X				X		X		X					
SOLOMON ISLANDS.....	X										X		X		X		X			
SOMALIA.....					X		X				X				X					
SOUTH AFRICA.....	X		X				X						X		X					
SPAIN.....	X				X		X								X		X		X	
SRI LANKA.....	X				X		X				X				X		X		X	
SUDAN.....	X				X						X		X							
SURINAME.....	X								X		X									

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1981 (continued)

State	Geneva Protocol (s) (r)	Antarctic Treaty (s) (r)	Partial Test Ban (s) (r)	Outer space (s) (r)	Treaty of Tlatelolco (s) (r)	Non- proliferation (s) (r)	Sea-bed (s) (r)	BW Convention (s) (r)	ENMOD (s) (r)	Conventional weapons (s) (r)
SWAZILAND			X			X	X			
SWEDEN	X		X	X		X	X	X		X
SWITZERLAND*	X		X	X		X	X	X		X
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	X		X			X			X	
TANZANIA, UNITED REPUBLIC OF	X		X			X	X	X		
THAILAND	X		X	X		X		X		
TOGO	X		X	X		X	X	X		X
TONGA**	X		X			X				
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	X		X	X	X	X				
TUNISIA	X		X	X		X	X	X	X	
TURKEY	X		X	X		X	X	X	X	
TUVALU**						X				
UGANDA	X		X	X					X	
UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC			X	X			X	X	X	X
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES								X		
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
UPPER VOLTA	X		X	X		X				

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1981 (continued)

State	Geneva Protocol		Antarctic Treaty		Partial Test Ban		Outer space		Treaty of Tlatelolco		Non-proliferation		Sea-bed		BW Convention		ENMOD		Conventional weapons	
	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)
URUGUAY	X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X					
VANUATU																				
VENEZUELA	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X			X	X
VIET NAM	X				X		X						X	X	X	X				
YEMEN, ARAB REPUBLIC OF	X				X						X		X	X	X	X	X			
YEMEN, PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF					X		X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X				
YUGOSLAVIA	X	X			X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X
ZAIRE					X	X	X				X				X	X				
ZAMBIA							X							X						
ZIMBABWE																				

* = Non-Member States maintaining Permanent Observer Missions to the United Nations.

** = Non-Member and Non-Observer States belonging to Specialized Agencies.

*** A.P. means Additional Protocol.

APPENDIX II

Activities of the United Nations Environment Programme related to disarmament*

Introduction

The Declaration on the Human Environment adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held at Stockholm in June 1972 and endorsed by the General Assembly, clearly states in principle 26 that

“Man and his environment must be spared the effects of nuclear weapons and all other means of mass destruction. States must strive to reach prompt agreement, in the relevant international organs, on the elimination and complete destruction of such weapons.”

Since the creation of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), its Governing Council has adopted a number of resolutions, and also some of the activities of UNEP are related to that principle for the enhancement of the environment. A brief review of such resolutions and activities is given in this appendix.

Resolutions and reports

1. The Governing Council of UNEP, at its sixth session in May 1978, requested the Executive Director of UNEP to continue to gather, through the International Referral System, sources of information on methods of dealing with environmental problems caused by the material remnants of wars, to render assistance to Governments in preparing their programmes for the elimination of mines in their territories and to carry out and promote studies on the environmental effects of the material remnants of wars, particularly mines. The Governing Council of UNEP, at its fourth session in April 1976 and at its fifth session in May 1977, had requested the Executive Director of UNEP to render assistance in the field of environmental protection to States in preparing their own programmes for the elimination of mines in their territories.

2. The Executive Director of UNEP submitted a report (A/32/137) entitled “Material remnants of wars and their effect on the environment” to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session, highlighting the adverse effect of remnants of wars on the environment. The General Assembly, at its thirty-fifth session in December 1980, adopted a resolution (35/71) in which it took note of the interim report of UNEP on the study of the problems of the material remnants of war, particularly mines, and their effect on the environment and requested the Governing Council of UNEP to ensure its completion. At its thirty-sixth session, the General Assembly had before it a report of the Secretary-General (A/36/531) entitled “Problems of remnants of war”. At that session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 36/188 by which it requested the Secretary-General, *inter alia*, to continue his contacts and to collate all relevant

* Text contributed by the United Nations Environment Programme.

information, in order to find ways and means, including the possibility of convening a United Nations conference, for solving the problem of remnants of war, and to report to the Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

3. The United Nations Conference on Desertification, held in 1977, adopted a resolution concerning the effect of weapons of mass destruction on ecosystems. It noted that the use of chemical and biological weapons during wars was one of the factors contributing to desertification in certain parts of the world and that those factors were most seriously felt in developing countries, including those which were currently engaged in armed struggle for independence and those which had recently achieved independence through armed struggle. It condemned the use of any techniques that cause the desertification of the environment and denounced the effects of destructive weapons and practices on the ecosystems of all countries. The use of chemical and biological weapons which destroy or diminish the potential of ecosystems and are conducive to desertification was also condemned and the prohibition of the use of poisons in water as a weapon of war was demanded. In implementation of the resolution, the Secretary-General presented a report to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session.^a

4. *The State of the World Environment Report*, 1980, published by UNEP, included the topic "Environmental effects of military activity"

5. The General Assembly, at its thirty-fifth session in November 1980, adopted, by a recorded vote of 68 to none, with 47 abstentions, resolution 35/8 on the historical responsibility of States for the preservation of nature for present and future generations and asked UNEP to prepare a report on the pernicious effects of the arms race on nature and to seek the views of States on possible measures to be taken at the international level for the preservation of nature. At its thirty-sixth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 36/7 by which it requested the Secretary-General, *inter alia*, to complete the preparation of a report containing recommendations for the adoption by States of specific obligations and measures relating to the protection of nature from the pernicious effects of the arms race, and to the limitation and prohibition of the types of military activity which present the greatest danger for nature. It also requested the Secretary-General to submit that report to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.^b

6. The Governing Council of UNEP, at its ninth session, in May 1981, called upon Governments to stop the arms race and, until disarmament was achieved, to allocate at least 0.001 per cent of armaments spending for development projects and the protection of the environment.

Ozone research and monitoring

UNEP organized a meeting of experts designated by Governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations at Washington, D.C., in March 1977. The outcome of the meeting was an agreed World Plan of Action on the Ozone Layer. Following the recommendations contained in the Plan of Action, the Co-ordinating Committee on the Ozone Layer was set up. It was composed of representatives of the international agencies and non-governmental organizations participating in implementing the Plan of Action as well as representatives of countries with major scientific programmes contributing to it. The Committee met in November 1977 and November 1978 to review the progress made in implementing the Plan of Action, identified deficiencies and made recommendations for future work. At its first meeting, held at Geneva in November 1977, it was agreed that UNEP should issue a half-yearly bulletin (January and July) giving information on ongoing and planned research activities on the ozone layer relevant to the Plan of Action. The publication of the bulletin was begun in January 1978. At the

^a A fuller version of that report is available in *UNEP Studies*, vol. 1, "The effects of weapons on ecosystems", by J. P. Robinson of the Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, Brighton, England. (Published for the United Nations Environment Programme by Pergamon Press.)

^b Resolution 36/7 is reproduced in full in chapter I (see p. 25 above). The voting record on the resolution is shown in appendix VIII below.

second meeting, held at Bonn in November 1978, the Committee issued a document entitled "An assessment of ozone depletion and its impacts — December 1978"

UNEP is supporting a Global Ozone Research and Monitoring Project meant to provide advice to Member States, to the United Nations and other appropriate international organizations concerning various aspects of atmospheric ozone.

The Governing Council of UNEP, at its ninth session, in May 1981, adopted decision 9/13, section B of which is entitled "Protection of the ozone layer". In paragraphs 1 and 2 of that decision, the Governing Council decided, *inter alia*, to initiate work on the elaboration of a global framework of a convention for the protection of the ozone layer. It further decided to establish an *ad hoc* working group of legal and technical experts which should report, through the Executive Director of UNEP, to the Governing Council on the progress of its work.

Weather modification

The Governing Council of UNEP, at its fifth session, in May 1977, took note of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques annexed to General Assembly resolution 31/72 of 10 December 1976 and requested Member States to facilitate exchanges of information on the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes.

The Governing Council of UNEP, at its eighth session, adopted decision 8/7, section (a) of which is entitled "Provision for co-operation between States in weather modification". In paragraph 1 of that decision, the Governing Council decided, *inter alia*, that weather modification should be dedicated to the benefit of mankind and the environment.

Activities of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization related to disarmament*

Introduction

1. Pursuant to the mandate given to it by the General Assembly of the United Nations in the Final Document of the 1978 special session devoted to disarmament and by the 1980 General Conference of UNESCO in its resolution 21 C/11.1,^a UNESCO has continued its programme of activities relating to social science research, disarmament education and disarmament information.^b

2. One of its activities during the period under review stands out as particularly important as it covers all areas in which UNESCO contributes to the cause of disarmament. Pursuant to one of the recommendations of the World Congress on Disarmament Education, the Director-General organized a consultation to work out a phased action plan relating to the future activities of UNESCO in that area. This consultation will therefore be the first subject covered below.

3. The other disarmament-related activities carried out by the Organization in 1981 relate to:

- (a) Research and publications;
- (b) Training;
- (c) Co-operation with the United Nations.

A. Consultation on the preparation of a phased action plan

4. As a follow-up to the World Congress on Disarmament Education and in accordance with resolution 21 C/11.1, adopted by the General Conference at its twenty-first session, the Director-General decided to convene an informal consultation of experts and representatives of the United Nations, with a limited number of international and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) represented by observers in order to assist the secretariat in drawing up that action plan and to advise the Director-General in related matters. The aims of the consultation and the substantive agenda items were:

- (a) To study the modalities of the implementation of the recommendations of the Congress;
- (b) To advise the Director-General on the reinforcement of social science research in the field of disarmament;
- (c) To advise the Director-General on the preparation of the Second Medium-Term Plan as regards disarmament education;

* Text contributed by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

^a See *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, appendix III, annex IV.

^b *Ibid.*, vol. 1: 1976, appendix I; vol. 2: 1977, appendix III; vol. 3: 1978, appendix IV; vol. 4: 1979, appendix V; and vol. 5: 1980, appendix III.

(d) To advise the Director-General in the drawing up of a phased action plan for the development of disarmament education for the decade of the 1980s.

5. Nine experts from different regions participated in the consultation. Three representatives from the United Nations attended, as well as five representatives from non-governmental organizations. The list of participants appears at the end of this section.

6. The consultation proceeded to examine the six proposals made by the World Congress to the Director-General^c and the action taken since the Congress, and to formulate suggestions for further action.

7. As regards the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, the secretariat explained the efforts made by UNESCO to contribute to the preparation by the Disarmament Commission of the draft Declaration, drawing attention to document A/CN.10/11/Add.4 which was before the Commission at its May 1980 session, and the proposals communicated after the World Congress by the Director-General of UNESCO to the Secretary-General of the United Nations with his letter of 13 October 1980 for consideration by the First Committee during the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly. The consultation was informed by Ambassador Adeniji of the conditions and technical problems which had made it impossible for the First Committee to modify the draft Declaration; the experts expressed the view, however, that the appropriate occasion for reconsideration of the appropriate language proposed by UNESCO would be the second special session, in preparation for which the Committee on Disarmament was doing work on the comprehensive programme of disarmament. The consultation regretted that it had not been possible to include references to the World Congress and to disarmament education in the Declaration but encouraged the Director-General to pursue efforts to contribute elements to the comprehensive programme and in general to have an input in the final document of the second special session.

8. As regards encouraging initiatives designed to make adequate funds available for disarmament education, it was pointed out that the proposed World Disarmament Campaign, which was being studied in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 35/152 I, was a new element which may generate pledges but would not be likely to approach the figure of \$500 million which would be generated if the Secretary-General's proposal concerning 0.1 per cent of military budgets were implemented.

9. The Director-General was invited to use whatever means he deemed appropriate to encourage contributions from Member States to such efforts, and to seek financing from appropriate private sources for such activities. It was pointed out that the National Commissions could be involved in these efforts.

10. After discussing the drafting of standard clauses aimed at the dissemination of instruments related to disarmament, in view of the forthcoming second special session of the United Nations General Assembly, the consultation recommended that a study on the possibility of drafting such a clause be undertaken as rapidly as possible and that its results should, if appropriate, be included among the contributions of UNESCO to the special session.

11. Concerning the proposal that the Director-General examine, in collaboration with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the possibility of setting up a United Nations-UNESCO radio station, the Director of the United Nations Information Centre in Paris informed the consultation of the experience of the United Nations in that area. It was generally felt that while the idea of such a radio station was desirable for substantive reasons, the financial requirements would constitute an insurmountable obstacle. In conclusion, the consultation proposed that the UNESCO secretariat request officially from the United Nations detailed information on the status of the matter within the United Nations, particularly the Joint United Nations Information Committee (JUNIC) and the Department of Public Information. With this information in hand, the Director-General could decide whether any further action should be envisaged in collaboration with the United Nations.

12. The discussion on strengthening disarmament research was based on information supplied by UNESCO, by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and by the United Nations Centre for Disarmament. In the discussion it was pointed out that the research activities at UNESCO were directed more to the needs of the scholarly community than

^c *Ibid.*, vol. 5: 1980, appendix III, pp. 450-451.

to those of the negotiators and that it constituted an ideal structure to assure interdisciplinary and internationalization of research. It was also stressed that the disarmament research activities of the various units in the United Nations system appeared in no way to involve duplication or competition but were complementary. The special concerns of the third world countries and the special responsibility of UNESCO in that regard were emphasized.

13. A distinction was made between the role of UNESCO in carrying out or sponsoring research, on the one hand, and its role in creating conditions conducive to research in Member States, on the other. On the latter subject, it was suggested that UNESCO convene a meeting of researchers and teachers from third world countries to discuss their specific needs, continue to provide technical co-operation for the creation and development of research centres in those countries, grant fellowships, publish translations for the use of researchers and organize a meeting of women on the subject of disarmament research.

14. As regards specific research themes, numerous proposals were made and discussed at length. A tentative list was agreed upon and appears in the phased action plan reproduced below. The themes are ranked according to the priority given them by the participants but are to be considered as suggestions for a possible phasing of the projects rather than as a rigid scheduling of activities.

15. Numerous suggestions were made concerning the development of co-operation between UNESCO and other international organizations, both intergovernmental and non-governmental.

16. The representative of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament stressed the need for continuing close co-operation with UNESCO and mentioned some specific activities for which such co-operation was particularly desirable to assure the accuracy in publications of official positions of Member States concerning disarmament negotiations and deliberations. Close co-ordination was also considered important in view of the preparation of the World Disarmament Campaign, about which the General Assembly would take a decision at its thirty-sixth session. Such a campaign, to be effective internationally, would require not only close co-ordination between members of the United Nations family but possibly also joint execution of certain projects which, the consultation suggested, might constitute useful contributions to that campaign.

17. Note was taken with satisfaction that JUNC had taken up the matter of disarmament information. The view was generally shared that JUNC should propose appropriate measures to see that the United Nations and its specialized agencies give effect to paragraph 100 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament according to which they "should give priority to the preparation and distribution of printed and audio-visual material relating to the danger represented by the armaments race as well as to the disarmament efforts and negotiations on specific disarmament measures"

18. The view was also expressed that the *ad hoc* inter-agency meetings on co-ordination of disarmament-related activities within the United Nations system should not only be the occasion for sharing information on existing activities and plans but should also identify gaps and assign responsibility for filling them.

19. As regards inter-agency co-operation in the preparation of reference material, a distinction was made between compilation of texts of official United Nations documents, including treaties concluded under United Nations auspices, which is clearly the responsibility of the United Nations, and the preparation of collections of documents for the use of teachers and researchers. In this latter area, there is a need for reference materials prepared by UNESCO which would not be limited to United Nations documents. It was suggested that the publication entitled the *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, special supplement to the 1977 *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, be brought up to date in preparation for the second special session.

20. The consultation recommended that UNESCO, in carrying out its action plan for disarmament education, establish contacts and co-operate with regional organizations and regional economic commissions of the United Nations. Special attention should also be given to institutions like the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations University, the University for Peace in Costa Rica and the Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (ALECSO). The success of certain

disarmament-related activities of UNESCO could also be enhanced by using the network of national commissions and of associated schools. Co-operation with non-governmental organizations, particularly those concerned with peace research, has been a constant feature of UNESCO's work in the field and should be continued.

21. In the light of the explanations provided concerning the preparation of UNESCO's second Medium-Term Plan and drawing from the experience of the plan for the development of human rights teaching, the consultation grouped proposed activities for a phased action plan under various headings. The proposals examined came either from annex I to the report of the World Congress on Disarmament Education containing the suggestions made by the two Commissions established by the Congress,^d from background papers distributed at the Congress, from written proposals received by the Secretariat or from experts at the consultation.

22. The following Phased Action Plan for Disarmament Education was drawn up by the consultation on the basis of these suggestions. While its main purpose is to serve as suggestions for the consideration of the Director-General, the consultation felt it could stimulate others to contribute to the long-term aims of the World Congress and suggested that it be distributed to the participants in the Congress, perhaps as the first newsletter on disarmament education.

Phased Action Plan for Disarmament Education

[The activities included in this plan are to be carried out, sponsored or encouraged by UNESCO. The phasing of the projects by budgetary periods is merely indicative as adjustments are to be expected in the order of execution.]

I. Research projects [ranked by priority, within each budgetary period]

A. 21 C/5 (1981-1983)

1. On-going

- Military research and development
- Strategic doctrines
- Role of scientists
- Militarization
- Images of war and peace
- Perception of security

2. Proposed continuation of existing projects or new projects for execution within 21 C/5

- Militarization in the third world and its effects on disarmament prospects
- Pedagogical and psychological aspects of disarmament education

B. 22 C/5 (1984-1985)

1. Overview of economic, political, social and cultural aspects of militarization
2. Stereotypes which lead to international tensions
3. Images of a disarmed world
4. Role of nationalism and ideology in creating attitudes which encourage the arms race
5. Legal, social, technological and political obstacles to verification

C. 23 C/5 (1986-1987)

1. Obstacles to disarmament involving elimination of colonialism, racism or gross violations of human rights
2. Nuclear proliferation in the third world
3. Systematic overview of previous comparative studies of perceptions of peace, war and international conflicts
4. Aims and effects of military service on the educational development of youth

^d *Ibid.*, vol. 5: 1980, appendix III, pp. 451-456.

5. The formation of attitudes on security and disarmament questions to determine what factors make public opinion favour or reject disarmament
- D. 24 C/5 (1988-1989)
1. Women, militarization and disarmament
 2. Disarmament aspects of the struggle against *apartheid*
 3. Theories of armaments dynamics: overview and critical examination
 4. Perception of threat and the role of mistrust in determining security policy
 5. Teacher training in disarmament, theoretical problems
- E. *Other themes which could be dealt with whenever possible during the Second Medium-Term Plan*
1. Systematic evaluation of data sources on military expenditure and forces
 2. Functions and functional alternatives to armaments
 3. In-depth studies on the nature and function of military research and development
 4. Non-military forms of defence
 5. Psychological, cultural, legal and military aspects of confidence-building measures
 6. Analysis of the role of international agreements in conflict resolution
- II. *Publications*
- A. 21 C/5 (1981-1983)
1. *Armaments, Arms Control and Disarmament: A Reader for University Level Disarmament Education* (ed. by M. Thee)
 2. *Military R & D* (ed. by R. Vayrynen)
 3. *Strategic Doctrines and their Alternatives* (ed. by Y. Sakamoto)
 4. *Scientists, the Arms Race and Disarmament* (ed. by J. Rotblat)
 5. *UNESCO Yearbook on Peace and Conflict Studies* (3 issues)
- B. 22 C/5 (1984-1985)
1. A selection of a limited number of the best manuscripts from the research programme
 2. A volume on disarmament in the collection "*New Challenges to International Law*"
 3. List(s) of unclassified research projects completed by various Member States
- C. 23 C/5 (1986-1987)
1. A selection of a limited number of the best manuscripts from the research programme
 2. Compilation of instruments from the United Nations and other sources intended for university teachers and researchers
 3. Yearbook
- D. 24 C/5 (1988-1989)
1. A selection of a limited number of the best manuscripts from the research programme
 2. Translations of basic documents and major scholarly writings into major languages used by researchers
 3. Glossary and/or encyclopaedia of disarmament and armament terms
 4. Yearbook
- III. *Teaching materials and curriculum development*
- A. 22 C/5 (1984-1985)
1. Primary level
Preparation of a handbook on activities, including socio-affective approaches, simulation exercises, peace games, etc.

2. Secondary level
Regional meeting of educators, including from Associated Schools
 3. University level
Translation of textbook and reader into two languages widely used for teaching
Publication of special materials
— on alternative security
— for Latin America
 4. Informal
Preparation of special materials for scientific groups
 5. Non-formal
Publication of one popular, illustrated brochure
- B. 23 *C/5 (1986-1987)*
1. Primary level
Inventory of teaching aids and textbooks useful for disarmament education
 2. Secondary level
Teachers' guidebook
Encouragement to the creation of new bilateral commissions for textbook revision
Second regional meeting
 3. University level
Translation of textbook and reader into two other languages
Special materials for Asia
 4. Informal
Special materials for trade unions
Survey of existing adult education materials on disarmament and peace
 5. Non-formal
Cartoon strip on disarmament for popular education
- C. 24 *C/5 (1988-1989)*
1. Primary level
Experimental work
 2. Secondary level
Third regional meeting
Teachers' guidebook on disarmament aspects of subjects taught in regular curricula
 3. University
Revision and translation of textbook and reader into two more languages
Special materials for Africa
 4. Informal
Special materials for medical groups

IV. *Training*

- A. 22 *C/5 (1984-1985)*
1. Regional training seminar for education at primary level on curriculum, methods and materials of disarmament education
 2. Meeting of experts in charge of teacher training
 3. Ten fellowships for university teachers and researchers from third world countries
- B. 23 *C/5 (1986-1987)*
1. Second regional training seminar for educators at primary level
 2. Regional training seminar for university teachers in Latin America and the Caribbean

3. Ten fellowships for university teachers and researchers from third world countries
 4. Training seminar for animators of adult education
 5. International meeting of youth leaders on including disarmament education in youth programmes
- C. 24 *C/5 (1988-1989)*
1. Third regional seminar for educators at primary level
 2. Regional seminar for university teachers in Africa
 3. Ten fellowships
 4. International meeting of trade unionists to determine how to include disarmament education in trade union education
 5. Training seminar for teachers at military academies
- V. *Information/Mass media*
- A. 22 *C/5 (1984-1985)*
1. Encourage vigorous measures through JUNC to implement paragraph 100 of the Final Document of the special session on disarmament
 2. Annotated survey of audio-visual materials
 3. Reinforce efforts to disseminate written and audio-visual documentation of use to educators in co-operation with United Nations Information Centres, United Nations Offices of Public Information and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
 4. Encourage Member States to hold seminars in schools of journalism on reporting armaments issues
 5. Issue of UNESCO *Courier* devoted to the United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and development
- B. 23 *C/5 (1986-1987)*
1. Production (preferably co-production) of one film
 2. Organize debates among journalists and seminars for media executives (through JUNC)
 3. Issue of *Courier* on another disarmament theme
- C. 24 *C/5 (1988-1989)*
1. Dissemination of film
 2. Production of radio programme
 3. Production of a TV programme
 4. Issue of *Courier*
- VI. *Co-ordination/Structures*
- A. *In general, throughout the Medium-Term Plan*
1. Among educators and educational planners
 - (a) Encourage bilateral and multilateral agreements on curricula
 - (b) Encourage initiatives like the one that took place at the World Congress between educators from East and West
 - (c) Disseminate a newsletter on disarmament education
 2. Among researchers
 - (a) Encourage regional centres to exchange and, if necessary, translate research results
 - (b) Provide technical co-operation for the creation and development of national and regional disarmament research and teaching centres and programmes
 - (c) Co-operate in efforts through UNIDIR to establish a data bank on disarmament

3. Among NGOs
 - (a) Disseminate a newsletter on disarmament education
 - (b) Associate Paris-, Geneva- and New York-based NGOs in efforts for disarmament education
 - (c) Provide financial support for NGO efforts
- B. *Specifically*
 1. 22 C/5 (1984-1985)
 - Prepare first newsletter
 - Prepare special set of materials for Associated Schools
 2. 23 C/5 (1986-1987)
 - Establish liaison body of teachers of disarmament-related questions at university level
 - Hold international meeting of representatives from research institutes and university teachers from third world countries to discuss specific problems of research on disarmament in their region and make proposals
 3. 24 C/5 (1988-1989)
 - Collective consultation of NGO Standing Committee
 - Second World Congress Disarmament Education

B. Research and publications

23. Two publications dealing with disarmament were issued by UNESCO in 1981. The first was the *Unesco Yearbook on Peace and Conflict Studies 1980*, containing a 48-page annotated bibliography on the relationship between disarmament and development, in addition to articles on approaches to teaching and research and information concerning development of peace research institutes which appeared in 1981. Furthermore, a publication based on the work of an expert committee meeting before the 1978 special session and on subsequent UNESCO activities, entitled *Obstacles to Disarmament and Ways of Overcoming Them*, appeared in English, French and Spanish. The table of contents of this book is as follows:

<i>Swadesh Rana</i>	Introduction
	<i>Obstacles to disarmament</i>
<i>Joseph Owana</i>	International political structures as obstacles to disarmament
<i>Sergiu Verona</i>	International, legal and diplomatic aspects
<i>Swadesh Rana</i>	Determination of strategic interests
<i>Marek Thee</i>	Armament dynamics and disarmament
<i>Michael Randle</i>	Militarism in developed and developing countries
	<i>Ways of overcoming obstacles to disarmament</i>
<i>Jaime Diaz</i>	The arms race and the role of education
<i>Betty Reardon</i>	Obstacles to disarmament education
<i>Serge Wourgaft</i>	The role of public opinion in overcoming psychological obstacles
<i>O. V. Bogdanov</i>	The role of the United Nations
<i>Uma Chopra</i>	Bibliography
	<i>Appendices</i>
	1. Report of the expert meeting on the obstacles to disarmament and the ways of overcoming them, Paris, 3-7 April 1978
	2. Final Report and Document of the World Congress on Disarmament Education, Paris, 9-13 June 1980

3. Resolution 21 C/11.1 adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO at its twenty-first session on 24 October 1980

24. Research projects were completed on military research and development, strategic doctrines and their alternatives, and scientists, the arms race and disarmament; new research projects were launched on militarization and society and on perceptions of threat and security.

C. Training

25. The major disarmament education activity of UNESCO in 1981 was the organization of the first regional training seminar for university teachers in the field of disarmament in Caracas, Venezuela, from 13 to 17 October 1981.

26. The seminar was organized by the Division of Human Rights and Peace in co-operation with the Regional Centre for Higher Education in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Venezuelan National Commission for UNESCO. It took place at the Central University of Venezuela with the co-operation and participation of that institution.

27. Twenty-five university instructors and researchers participated, from Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, France, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela.

28. The seven themes listed were the subject of in-depth discussions following brief introductions to the subject, in most cases by two different persons. A rapporteur was designated for each theme and a summary was presented by each rapporteur.

29. Concerning more specifically the "content" of disarmament teaching in Latin America, the discussion brought out that it should (a) provide knowledge about the arms race in Latin America, (b) describe the history of (unsuccessful) negotiations aimed at arms reduction and disarmament, (c) establish links between the problem of disarmament and the State system, the problem of social justice, human rights and violence, including structural violence. As regards the "usefulness" of disarmament teaching in Latin America, it should (a) bring the approaches of numerous social sciences to a better understanding of the problem, (b) contribute to the mobilization of public opinion and community action, and (c) place the issue of disarmament under public scrutiny.

30. In addition to the suggestions regarding the contributions various disciplines could make, the nature of the relation between teacher and student, which should be one of participatory learning, was mentioned, as was the general problem of identifying the real possibility of introducing disarmament-related matters into existing university systems. State control, inflexible curricula and students' motivations regarding professional opportunities were factors to be considered as a necessity for Latin America and an interdisciplinary approach using teams of scholars was cited as the most valid way of dealing with disarmament studies.

31. Concerning the theme of bibliographic sources for disarmament research and education, a distinction was made between the sources required for research, which are often in English only, and those required for teaching, which should be in Spanish if used in Latin America. Concerning the latter, UNESCO was strongly urged to bring out appropriate materials in Spanish, in particular the reader *Armaments, Arms Control and Disarmament*. The importance of using existing data banks was also stressed and certain references to national armed forces and defense publications were added to those provided in the bibliography distributed.

32. With respect to teaching strategic doctrines, arms control and disarmament, the link between teaching and research and the process of change in Latin America was stressed as an alternative to the choice between so-called "neutral" teaching (which inevitably supports the national and international *status quo*) and "militant" teaching (which runs the risk of becoming dogmatic).

33. Referring to the pedagogical means most appropriate to convey to students an understanding of strategic doctrines, it was proposed to distinguish between the concept of "operation" (which is necessarily offensive) and "deterrence" (which claims to avoid operations). It was also suggested that particular care be taken to avoid being one-sided in characterizing the role of the super-Powers in the region.

34. Among the subjects discussed under the theme of the dynamics of the arms race and its relation to development in the third world were the increasing sophistication of weapons produced and transferred and the appearance of high-cost technology, which leads to the transfer to the third world of material that has become obsolescent or worn out for the supplier, the present trends of even greater sophistication of weapons, their increased cost, higher military investment and new forms of transfer of weapons technology through patents, co-productions and joint ventures and the integration of third-world countries into the world arms trade, as well as the underlying causes of the dynamics of the arms race.

35. A link was made between the evolution of strategic doctrines and the appearance of new weapons systems. This relation should be kept in mind in teaching about the dynamics of the arms race. It was pointed out that the acquisition of weapons by the armed forces in certain countries of the region is less for defensive purposes against an external enemy than for repressive purposes against the population of the country. Numerous disciplines were mentioned as having specific contributions to make to the understanding of the dynamics of the arms race, which is a multi-causal phenomenon. The relation between armaments and strategic doctrines, and phases in the arms trade may be best dealt with in international relations and history, while the use of models such as action-reaction-overreaction requires the perspective of political science or political sociology. In economics, proper treatment could be given to the interbranch approach or to understanding the effects of arms production and acquisition on prices and employment. Similarly, in international law the relationship between the arms race and agreements concerning its limitation or even trade in this area could be studied, as well as legal means of facilitating verification, etc. Other examples were given for policy sciences, architecture, city planning, anthropology, natural sciences, health sciences, agriculture and psychology.

36. Concerning model syllabi for university courses on disarmament, a flexible model was proposed with a regional orientation, based on a multidisciplinary approach, involving community participation and a participatory learning process. The first part of the model was historical and philosophical, covering general questions and strategic doctrines; the second part was devoted to the political economy of disarmament, covering such issues as militarization of the economy, weapons systems, the military sector and its relations with the civilian sector, social expenditures, trade unions, etc.; the third part dealt with the pedagogical dimensions of the problem, including its relations with cultures and social values, the integration of the community in action-oriented projects, etc. The interdisciplinary syllabus prepared for the University for Peace of Costa Rica was also presented.

37. In order to overcome the pessimism and negative attitudes students have to the subject, evidence should be brought to bear to show that disarmament is possible, in spite of the seemingly insurmountable obstacles. At the same time it was considered essential to keep in mind the present situation of university programmes in Latin America which offer virtually no possibility today to teach disarmament as a distinct subject of one discipline, let alone in an interdisciplinary way. It might be more realistic, it was suggested, to seek to include at least one chapter in courses on international relations and international law. Particular attention should be given, in this regard, to the prohibition of the use of force in international law, to the absence of a nuclear arms race in Latin America due to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, with, however, an extremely dangerous conventional arms race. Attention was also drawn to other international agreements concerning outer space, the sea-bed and the environment, for example, and to the matter of peaceful settlement of disputes and denuclearized zones in general which should be part of this teaching. It was also proposed that justice was a basic concept to any teaching of this subject in Latin America. Finally, it was suggested that the reader prepared by UNESCO, consisting of eight parts, could also serve as a model syllabus and that separate chapters of it could be used for units within traditional courses in various disciplines devoted to disarmament, which, in most cases, was the most realistic objective to be sought.

38. On the subject of regional and interregional co-operation for research and study on disarmament, background information on the peace research movement internationally and in Latin America was presented with particular reference to the International Peace Research Association (IPRA) and the Latin American Peace Research Council (CLAIP). Concerning the latter, a critical evaluation of its first years of activity was made and new orientations were suggested, according to which CLAIP would stimulate the establishment of national peace research bodies, like ACHIP in Chile and ABIPP in Brazil, without becoming institutionalized itself. The following recommendations were addressed to UNESCO: (a) rapid circulation of the

proceedings of the seminar; (b) holding other training seminars with a larger number of participants; (c) preparing a publication on the state of the art in Latin America in 1983; (d) providing a constant flow of significant publications to peace researchers in Latin America; (e) establishing links among the participants at the Caracas and similar meetings, and (f) holding a meeting of university authorities to explore how they could implement disarmament education.

39. It was also suggested that the military be associated with programmes such as the seminar and that the Peace Education Commission of IPRA, the National Commissions of UNESCO, the Associated Schools and existing networks of educational innovation, such as those in Central America and the Caribbean, be associated actively with further activities in this area.

40. In addition, throughout the seminar and particularly at the closing meeting, proposals were made concerning specific activities which could be undertaken in order for this seminar to attain its ultimate objective: the incorporation of disarmament-related issues in the teaching and research programmes of the countries of the region.

D. Co-operation with the United Nations

41. The General Conference of UNESCO at its twenty-first session (Belgrade, 1980) invited the Director-General "to maintain co-operation with the institutions of the United Nations system, and in particular with the United Nations Centre for Disarmament and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research..." (resolution 21 C/11.1, para. (h)). This co-operation was pursued and reinforced in 1981 by UNESCO's participation in four United Nations activities.

42. First, UNESCO participated in the work of the group convened by the Secretary-General in June 1981 pursuant to resolution 35/152 I to prepare the report on the organizational and financial aspects of a World Disarmament Campaign which was submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session (A/36/458). In the light of the special responsibilities given to UNESCO in the Final Document of the 1978 special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament as regards education, information and research, UNESCO attaches considerable importance to the reference to document A/36/458 in resolution 36/92 C and is prepared to carry out fully the tasks implicitly assigned to it by the General Assembly in that resolution.

43. Secondly, the representative of UNESCO made a statement to the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session Devoted to Disarmament. In that statement, the representative of UNESCO stressed that its disarmament-related activities, rather than developing independently of United Nations efforts, have been strictly limited to UNESCO fields of competence and have been harmoniously co-ordinated through the competent United Nations bodies in order to be complementary to United Nations action. He also expressed the view that the United Nations programme to attain general and complete disarmament under effective international control, to be comprehensive, would seem to require an educational component. Recalling that at the first special session the General Assembly had given special responsibilities to UNESCO in that area and that numerous disarmament education activities had been organized, including the World Congress on Disarmament Education, seminars and training programmes, he mentioned that a renewed mandate from the Assembly at its second special session in the fields of disarmament education could be considered almost immediately by the States members of UNESCO which would be meeting in October 1982 in extraordinary session to adopt the Second Medium-Term Plan. He concluded by quoting the address at the first special session by the Director-General of UNESCO who had declared that "The reduction of armaments and their progressive elimination would be the most striking proof that mankind has at last become reconciled with itself and can one day look forward to experiencing that peace in justice and fraternity which has been its aspiration from time immemorial." The challenge has only become greater since 1978 and so has the commitment of UNESCO to meeting this challenge. UNESCO has therefore taken careful note of resolution 36/81 and is prepared to make, as it did in 1978, a substantial contribution to the second special session.

44. Thirdly, as in the past, UNESCO participated in Disarmament Week in 1981 by organizing a display of United Nations and UNESCO publications and posters at the entrance hall of the main building of its headquarters in Paris. Furthermore, the representative of the Director-General helped animate a "pedagogical day" on 28 October 1981 dealing with disarmament education and organized in Namur, Belgium, by the United Nations Information Centre for Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.

45. Fourthly, UNESCO took an active part in the Conference of Directors of Disarmament Research Institutes organized by UNIDIR in Geneva from 16 to 18 November 1981. On that occasion the representative of the Director-General recalled, in particular, that the mandate of UNESCO in disarmament research was inextricably linked with its mission in disarmament education in general. That link explained why there had not been nor could there be a problem of overlapping or duplication with the United Nations Centre for Disarmament or UNIDIR. The former carried out studies specifically related to the needs of the legislative bodies entrusted with inter-governmental negotiations while the latter sought to democratize research, with a view to contributing to giving negotiations a solid foundation on objective and in-depth technical studies. UNESCO, on the other hand, promoted disarmament research as part of its efforts to meet the needs of the academic community and to develop knowledge and understanding in those areas which students and scholars find to be of priority interest in accordance with their particular perspectives. He concluded by expressing the hope that the United Nations University, the University for Peace, UNITAR, the Centre for Disarmament, UNIDIR and UNESCO, all of which are involved in planning or carrying out disarmament research, could be mutually reinforcing.

46. Several possible joint UNESCO/UNIDIR projects were discussed and plans were made for future collaboration between the two organizations.

Conclusion

47. Thanks in large part to the impetus of the 1978 special session of the General Assembly, the disarmament-related activities of UNESCO have expanded in an effort to meet the expectations of the international community. The Organization looks forward to the second special session to stimulate disarmament research, education and information even more.

Activities of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations related to disarmament*

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), though not directly engaged in disarmament activities, continued on a number of occasions in 1981 to contribute to the dissemination of information on the alarming consequences for mankind of the acceleration of the armaments race.

1. Thus, in his opening address to the twenty-first session of the FAO Conference on 9 November 1981, the Director-General, in referring to world-wide risks of conflict and the dangers created by food insecurity, said that no global society could ever be built until a solution had been found to man's ancient problem of hunger and nutrition. Only a genuine reordering of priorities could achieve this. He went on to say that the arms race should be transformed into a collective search for security. The existence of a nuclear arsenal that could destroy every city in the world several times over and indeed the capacity to overkill the underfed were surely the foremost evidence of irrationality in human affairs, and the Director-General observed that the frenzied search for military security brought little but an intensification of rivalries. Each tip in the balance of power provoking a counteraction, there remains, he said, the barely thinkable prospect that all these weapons, made not to be used, may one day start firing.

He went on to say that while food security might seem remote from military affairs, the tensions that stemmed from food shortages had proved to be one of the most powerful factors of destabilization. He added that even for some countries in Europe, the era of national food crises was not yet over. He considered that a government that fears for its security could do well to equip itself with an arsenal of grain, not bombs, and that the training of farmers might do more for peace-keeping than the drilling of soldiers.

2. At its twenty-first session the FAO Conference also had before it a paper on recent developments in the United Nations which included a section on the preparations underway for the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The paper stated that the FAO secretariat would make every effort to contribute within its means to these preparations (C 81/19-Sup.1).

3. Disarmament Week, beginning on 24 October 1981, was yet another opportunity for the Director-General to mark the importance attached by FAO to the celebration of this event. The statement he issued on that occasion is reproduced below:

"In a year marked by unprecedented social and economic turbulence and rising world tension the observance of Disarmament Week 1981 assumes an even greater importance.

"FAO welcomes the opportunity given to the Organization on this occasion to express once again its particular appreciation for the persevering and unstinted efforts of the United Nations to promote measures aiming at the maintenance of peace and security.

* Text contributed by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

"FAO is deeply concerned that as the extension of military power dominates world priorities and the ability to destroy civilization grows at an accelerated pace more people are condemned to live out their lives in fear and want and ultimately to die of hunger.

"In conveying FAO's wishes for the success of Disarmament Week the Organization expresses the earnest hope that it will provide an opportunity for new and imaginative ideas to come to the fore which will bear fruit at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982."

4. FAO wishes to report in addition that it participated in the Second *Ad Hoc* Interagency Meeting on Co-ordination of Disarmament-related Activities Within the United Nations System, held in Geneva on 11 and 12 June 1981, and was represented at the two sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament that took place in New York during 1981.

Activities of the World Health Organization related to disarmament*

In relation to the follow-up to resolution WHA32.24 adopted by the World Health Assembly on 24 May 1979 and to resolution WHA33.24 dated 23 May 1980 which, *inter alia*, recalled the role of health in relation to the strengthening of peace, détente and disarmament, WHO member States at the thirty-fourth World Health Assembly, held in Geneva in May 1981, adopted a resolution entitled "The role of physicians and other health workers in the preservation and promotion of peace as the most significant factor for the attainment of health for all" (resolution WHA34.38).

In that resolution, it was noted that there was a growing concern amongst physicians and other health workers in many countries at the mounting danger of thermonuclear war as the most serious threat to the life and health of all peoples. Member States were called upon to multiply their efforts to consolidate peace in the world, reinforce détente and achieve disarmament so as to create conditions for the release of resources for the development of public health in the world. In the light of this, the Director-General of WHO was requested to create an International Committee of eminent experts in medical science and public health to study ways by which WHO could facilitate the implementation of United Nations resolutions on strengthening peace, détente and disarmament and preventing thermonuclear conflict. The Director-General was also requested to continue collaboration with the United Nations Secretary-General and with other governmental and nongovernmental organizations regarding a comprehensive study and elucidation of the threat of thermonuclear war and its potentially baneful consequences for the life and health of peoples of the world.

In response to the last mentioned resolution, the Director-General of WHO sought expert advice at an informal consultation held at WHO Headquarters in December 1981. Terms of reference plus suggestions for eminent experts who could comprise the International Committee were made and have been put before the Director-General in preparation for the establishment of the Committee in question. It is foreseen that the International Committee will hold its first meeting in mid-1982 and that a report will be prepared and submitted to the thirty-sixth World Health Assembly in May 1983.

At the request of the Chairman of the United Nations Committee on Disarmament, the Director-General of WHO has nominated two representatives of the Organization to provide expert advice to the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons, on the toxicity of chemicals and the international register of potentially harmful chemicals. During the year, the WHO experts attended two meetings of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

In co-operation with the Geneva International Peace Research Institute, WHO has collaborated in the preparation of a book on the effects of war on child health. A bibliography of available materials is being prepared and joint action is under consideration with the Geneva International Peace Research Institute, the United Nations Children's Fund, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross.

* Text contributed by the World Health Organization.

Activities of the World Meteorological Organization related to disarmament*

Introduction

The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) is not directly involved in questions of disarmament. Some of the activities of the Organization, however, have some relevance to article III of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (General Assembly resolution 31/72, annex) and the understandings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament relating thereto.^a A brief review of such activities in 1981 is given in the present note. Before describing those activities, it should be noted that the World Weather Watch, which is the basic programme of WMO, contains the following provision:

"The World Weather Watch shall be used only for peaceful purposes, due account being taken of the national sovereignty and security of States, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the spirit and traditions of the World Meteorological Organization."

Weather modification

The Eighth Congress (1979) of WMO reaffirmed the commitment of the organization to continue studies in weather modification, the main component of which is the Precipitation Enhancement Project. The Project is designed as an internationally planned, executed and evaluated field experiment to obtain scientifically accepted information on the feasibility of precipitation enhancement under given conditions. It has progressed to the final stage of the site selection phase where the data obtained during three seasons (1979, 1980, 1981) of investigations of the characteristics of precipitation systems over the Duero River Basin in Spain is being assessed to determine the suitability of the site for a precipitation enhancement experiment.

The Eighth Congress of WMO also approved a project on hail-suppression research aimed at reducing the enormous losses caused by hail in numerous countries around the world. In its initial stages the project is concentrating on solving a number of scientific questions concerning the poorly understood physical hail formation processes through the convening of expert meetings.

In connection with WMO activities or the weather modification programme, discussions have been held with appropriate bodies such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) on studies of the environmental consequences of weather modification experiments. This has led to agreement on a draft document concerning co-operation between States in weather modification pertaining to legal aspects (WMO/UNEP Meeting of Experts on Legal Aspects of Weather Modification, Geneva, September 1979).

* Text contributed by the World Meteorological Organization.

^a See *The Yearbook*, vol. 1: 1976, appendix IX.

The Sixth Register of National Weather Modification Projects, relating to activities in 1980, was prepared and widely distributed.

Ozone research and monitoring

Action was continued in implementing the WMO Global Ozone Research and Monitoring Project, the objective of which is to enable WMO to provide advice to member countries and to the United Nations and other appropriate international organizations concerning various aspects of atmospheric ozone. The project is being carried out with support from the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).

The main activities are related to the improvement of the global network of ground-based total-ozone measuring stations and the organization of meetings of experts for discussion and preparation of reviews of specific problems relating to the project in accordance with the UNEP World Plan of Action on the Ozone Layer. The third WMO Statement "Modification of the ozone layer due to human activities and some possible geophysical consequences" was adopted and distributed at the end of December 1981.

World Climate Programme

Following approval of a draft plan for implementation of the World Climate Programme (WCP) by the Eighth World Meteorological Congress (1979), action is now under way for its implementation. WCP comprises four component parts: the World Climate Data Programme (WCDP) and the World Climate Applications Programme (WCAP), for which WMO has assumed responsibility in co-operation with concerned United Nations organizations and other international organizations, the World Climate Impact Studies Programme (WCIP) for which UNEP, in co-operation with WMO, has assumed responsibility, and the World Climate Research Programme (WCRP), which will be carried out jointly by WMO and the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU). The WMO Executive Committee is responsible for over-all co-ordination of the Programme.

Draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space*

The States Parties to this treaty,

Guided by the goals of strengthening peace and international security,

Proceeding on the basis of their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations to refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations,

Desiring not to allow outer space to become an arena for the arms race and a source of aggravating relations between States,

Have agreed on the following:

Article I

1. States Parties undertake not to place in orbit around the earth objects carrying weapons of any kind, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner, including on reusable manned space vehicles of an existing type or of other types which States Parties may develop in the future.

2. Each State Party to this treaty undertakes not to assist, encourage or induce any State, group of States or international organization to engage in activities contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article.

Article II

States Parties shall use space objects in strict accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and mutual understanding.

Article III

Each State Party undertakes not to destroy, damage, disturb the normal functioning or change the flight trajectory of space objects of other States Parties, if such objects were placed in orbit in strict accordance with article 1, paragraph 1, of this treaty.

Article IV

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this treaty, each State Party shall use the national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

* Annexed to the letter dated 10 August 1981 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the Secretary-General and circulated to the General Assembly as document A/36/192.

2. Each State Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of other States Parties operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article.

3. In order to promote the objectives and provisions of this treaty, the States Parties shall, when necessary, consult each other, make inquiries and provide information in connexion with such inquiries.

Article V

1. Any State Party to this treaty may propose amendments to this treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the depositary, who shall promptly circulate it to all States Parties.

2. The amendment shall enter into force for each State Party to this Treaty which has accepted it, upon the deposit with the depositary of instruments of acceptance by the majority of States Parties. Thereafter, the amendment shall enter into force for each remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

Article VI

This treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Article VII

Each State Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from this treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject-matter of this treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice to the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the decision adopted six months before withdrawing from the treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events which the notifying State Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article VIII

1. This treaty shall be open to all States for signature at United Nations Headquarters in New York. Any State which does not sign this treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification/ accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

3. This treaty shall enter into force between the States which have deposited instruments of ratification upon the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the fifth instrument of ratification.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification and accession, the date of entry into force of this treaty as well as other notices.

Article IX

This treaty, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send duly certified copies thereof to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

APPENDIX VIII

List of resolutions and decisions on disarmament and related questions adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session, held from 15 September to 18 December 1981 (including voting)

		<i>Reference in text</i>
Resolutions on disarmament questions		
36/81	Second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament	
	Resolution A — Preparations for the second special session	59
	<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
	Resolution B — Prevention of nuclear war	118
	<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
36/82	Reduction of military budgets	
	Resolution A	333
	<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
	Resolution B	334
	<i>Adopted by a non-recorded vote of 120 votes to none, with 19 abstentions</i>	
36/83	Implementation of General Assembly resolution 35/143 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	164
	<i>Adopted by a non-recorded vote of 138 to none, with 5 abstentions</i>	
36/84	Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons	133
	<i>Adopted by a recorded vote of 118 to 2, with 23 abstentions,^a as follows:</i>	
	<i>In favour:</i> Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon,	

^a The delegations of Angola, Malawi and the United Republic of Cameroon subsequently advised the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour.

Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire

Against: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, Belize, Canada, China, Denmark, Fiji, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, Samoa, Spain, Turkey, Zambia

36/85 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 35/145 B 134
Adopted by a non-recorded vote of 140 to none, with 5 abstentions

36/86 Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa 166
Resolution A — Nuclear capability of South Africa
Adopted by a recorded vote of 129 to 4, with 10 abstentions,^b as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

^b The delegations of Angola, Malawi, Mauritius, the United Republic of Cameroon and Vanuatu subsequently advised the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour.

Against: France, Israel, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Federal Republic of Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal

Resolution B — Implementation of the Declaration

167

Adopted by a recorded vote of 132 to none, with 12 abstentions,^c as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: None

Abstaining: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of Guatemala, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

36/87 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East

Resolution A

171

Adopted without a vote

Resolution B

173

Adopted by a recorded vote of 107 to 2, with 31 abstentions,^d as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea,

^c The delegations of Angola, Malawi, Mauritius and the United Republic of Cameroon subsequently advised the Secretariat that they intended to vote in favour.

^d The delegations of Angola, Malawi, Peru and the United Republic of Cameroon subsequently advised the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour.

Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: Israel, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, Belize, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

36/88 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

177

Adopted by a recorded vote of 93 to 3, with 44 abstentions, as follows:*

In favour: Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Burundi, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zaire, Zambia

Against: Bhutan, India, Mauritius

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Fiji, France, German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Mongolia, Mozambique, Norway, Poland, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia

36/89 Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons

244

* The delegations of Angola, Samoa, the United Republic of Cameroon and Vanuatu subsequently advised the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour.

Adopted by a recorded vote of 116 to none, with 27 abstentions,^f as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: None

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

36/90 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace 316
Adopted without a vote

36/91 World Disarmament Conference 78
Adopted without a vote

36/92 Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session
Resolution A — United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament 40
Adopted without a vote

Resolution B — Report of the Disarmament Commission 41
Adopted without a vote

Resolution C — World Disarmament Campaign 379
Adopted by a recorded vote of 143 to none, with 2 abstentions,^g as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil,

^f The delegations of Angola, the United Republic of Cameroon and Vanuatu subsequently advised the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour.

^g The delegation of Angola subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao P  ple's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: None

Abstaining: Israel, United States of America

Resolution D — International co-operation for disarmament

42

Adopted by a recorded vote of 116 to none, with 26 abstentions,^h as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia

Against: None

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy,

^h The delegations of Angola and Vanuatu subsequently advised the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour.

Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire

Resolution E — Nuclear weapons in all aspects

103

Adopted by a recorded vote of 118 to 18, with 5 abstentions,¹ as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Greece, Israel, Mali, Morocco, Zaire

Resolution F — Report of the Committee on Disarmament

44

Adopted by a recorded vote of 136 to none, with 9 abstentions,¹ as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,

¹ The delegations of Angola and Vanuatu subsequently advised the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour.

² The delegations of Angola and Vanuatu subsequently advised the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour.

Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: None

Abstaining: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Resolution G — Study on the relationship between disarmament and development

359

Adopted without a vote

Resolution H — Status of multilateral disarmament agreements

46

Adopted by a recorded vote of 115 to none, with 23 abstentions,^k as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: None

Abstaining: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, India, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay

Resolution I — Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war

117

Adopted by a recorded vote of 121 to 19, with 6 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma,

^k The delegation of Angola subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Austria, Comoros, Finland, Greece, Israel, Sweden

Resolution J — World-wide action for collecting signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and for disarmament 395

Adopted by a recorded vote of 78 to 3, with 56 abstentions,¹ as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Angola, Bahrain, Barbados, Benin, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against: Brazil, Canada, United States of America

Abstaining: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Bhutan, Central African Republic, Colombia, Comoros, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Portugal, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan,

¹ The delegation of Vanuatu subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour; the delegation of Bangladesh had intended to abstain.

Sweden, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Yugoslavia, Zaire

Resolution K — Prohibition of the neutron nuclear weapon

111

Adopted by a recorded vote of 68 to 14, with 57 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Benin, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Brazil, Burma, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Jamaica, Lebanon, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, United Republic of Cameroon, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire

Resolution L — Programme of research and studies on disarmament

345

Adopted without a vote

Resolution M — Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session

48

Adopted without a vote

- 36/93 United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

263

Adopted without a vote

- 36/94 Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

149

Adopted by a recorded vote of 115 to 17, with 12 abstentions,^m as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi,

^m The delegation to Malawi subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Austria, Burma, Greece, Guatemala, India, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Morocco, Sweden, Tunisia, Zaire

36/95 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 152

Adopted by a recorded vote of 145 to none, with 3 abstentions,ⁿ as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon,

ⁿ The delegation of Malawi subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: None

Abstaining: India, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

36/96 Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons

Resolution A

227

Adopted by a recorded vote of 147 to none, with 1 abstention,^o as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: None

Abstaining: United States of America

Resolution B

228

Adopted by a recorded vote of 109 to 1, with 33 abstentions,^p as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic

^o The delegation of Malawi subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

^p The delegations of Malawi and Peru subsequently advised the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour.

Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Canada, Central African Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Paraguay, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Upper Volta, Zaire

Resolution C

223

Adopted by a recorded vote of 86 to 20, with 34 abstentions,⁹ as follows:

In favour: Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Zaire, Zambia

Against: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Romania, Seychelles, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Viet Nam

Abstaining: Argentina, Bahrain, Bhutan, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cape Verde, Finland, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Nepal, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Qatar, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia

36/97 General and complete disarmament

Resolution A — Study on conventional disarmament

302

⁹ The delegation of Malawi subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour; the delegation of Vanuatu had intended to abstain.

Adopted by a recorded vote of 114 to none, with 26 abstentions,[†] as follows:

In favour: Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: None

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Benin, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Hungary, India, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Qatar, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, Viet Nam

Resolution B — Conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons 257

Adopted without a vote[§]

Resolution C — Prevention of an arms race in outer space 273

Adopted by a recorded vote of 129 to none, with 13 abstentions,[†] as follows:

In favour: Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman,

[†] The delegation of Malawi subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

[§] The delegation of Malawi subsequently informed the Secretariat that it would have supported the consensus.

[†] The delegation of Malawi subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: None

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Viet Nam

Resolution D — Institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament

369

Adopted without a vote

Resolution E — Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present

109

Adopted by a recorded vote of 84 to 18, with 42 abstentions,⁴ as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina, Bahrain, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Sudan, Swaziland, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Algeria, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belize, Brazil, Burma, Central African Republic, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Djibouti, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Ireland, Israel, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Samoa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Yugoslavia, Zaire

Resolution F — Confidence-building measures

372

Adopted without a vote

⁴ The delegation of Malawi subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

Resolution G — Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes

113

Adopted by a recorded vote of 125 to 14, with 6 abstentions,^v as follows:

In favour: Algeria, Angola, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, Seychelles, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Viet Nam

Abstentions: Argentina, Brazil, France, India, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Resolution H — Study on all the aspects of regional disarmament 304

Adopted without a vote

Resolution I — Strategic arms limitation talks 105

Adopted without a vote

Resolution J — Report of the Committee on Disarmament 23

Adopted by a recorded vote of 134 to none, with 12 abstentions,^w as follows:

In favour: Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg,

^v The delegation of Malawi subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour; the delegation of the Seychelles had intended to abstain.

^w The delegation of Malawi subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: None

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Viet Nam

Resolution K — Disarmament and international security

24

Adopted by a recorded vote of 132 to none, with 11 abstentions, as follows:*

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: None

Abstaining: Belgium, China, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Resolution L — Study on the relationship between disarmament and international security

376

Adopted without a vote

* The delegation of Malawi subsequently informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

36/98 Israeli nuclear armament

381

Adopted by a recorded vote of 101 to 2, with 39 abstentions,^y as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: Israel, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Burma, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Luxembourg, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Portugal, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay

36/99 Conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space

274.
433

Adopted by a recorded vote of 123 to none, with 21 abstentions,^z as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden,

^y The delegation of Liberia subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour; Malawi intended to abstain.

^z The delegation of Malawi subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: None

Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

36/100 Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe

115

Adopted by a recorded vote of 82 votes to 19, with 41 abstentions,^{aa} as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Chad, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Fiji, German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Central African Republic, Chile, Comoros, Costa Rica, Democratic Kampuchea, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Malaysia, Morocco, Niger, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Rwanda, Samoa, Senegal, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Zaire

Resolutions on related questions

36/7 Historical responsibility of States for the preservation of nature for present and future generations

25

Adopted by a recorded vote of 80 to none, with 55 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Algeria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Demo-

^{aa} The delegations of Malawi and Swaziland subsequently informed the Secretariat that they had intended to abstain.

cratic Yemen, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Finland, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jamaica, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: None

Abstaining: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Luxembourg, Malawi, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Samoa, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Togo, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United States of America, Upper Volta, Venezuela

36/25 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency

193

Adopted by a recorded vote of 128 to 1, with 4 abstentions,^{bb} as follows:

In favour: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Israel

Abstaining: Guatemala, Jamaica, Malawi, United States of America

^{bb} The delegation of the Dominican Republic subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain.

- 36/27 Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations and its grave consequences for the established international system concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and international peace and security

174

Adopted by a roll-call vote of 109 to 2, with 34 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Israel, United States of America

Abstaining: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malawi, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Zaire

- 36/78 United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

195

Adopted without a vote

- 36/172 Resolution E — Military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa

169

Adopted by a recorded vote of 119 to 19, with 4 abstentions,^{cc} as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia,

^{cc} The delegations of Qatar and Vanuatu subsequently advised the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour.

Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Austria, Finland, Guatemala, Sweden

Resolution F — Arms embargo against South Africa

169

Adopted by a recorded vote of 138 to none, with 7 abstentions,^{dd} as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Guatemala, Italy, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

36/101 Development and strengthening of good-neighbourliness between States

Adopted without a vote

^{dd} The delegations of Qatar and Vanuatu subsequently advised the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour.

36/102 Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security

26

Adopted by a recorded vote of 127 to none, with 20 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: None

Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, Guatemala, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

36/103 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States

26

Adopted by a recorded vote of 120 to 22, with 6 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela

Abstaining: El Salvador, Finland, Greece, Guatemala, Swaziland, Turkey

36/104 Implementation of the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace

26

Adopted by a recorded vote of 143 to none, with 2 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: None

Abstaining: Israel, United States of America

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