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*President:* Mr. Salim Ahmed SALIM  
(United Republic of Tanzania)

## AGENDA ITEM 55

Development and international economic co-operation  
(continued):\*

- (a) Report of the Committee of the Whole Established under General Assembly Resolution 32/174;
- (b) Report of the Preparatory Committee for the New International Development Strategy;
- (c) Network for the exchange of technological information and the industrial and technological information bank: report of the Secretary-General;
- (d) Multilateral development assistance for the exploration of natural resources: report of the Secretary-General;
- (e) Economic co-operation among developing countries: report of the Secretary-General;
- (f) Preparations for the special session of the General Assembly in 1980: report of the Secretary-General;
- (g) Effective mobilization of women in development: report of the Secretary-General;

\* Resumed from the 61st meeting.

- (h) Restructuring of the economic and social sectors of the United Nations system: report of the Secretary-General

REPORT OF THE SECOND COMMITTEE (PART I)  
(A/34/676)

1. The PRESIDENT: The Assembly will consider first this morning Part I of the report of the Second Committee on agenda item 55, which has been recommended for priority consideration.

2. Miss GARCIA DONOSO (Ecuador) (Rapporteur of the Second Committee) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I have the honour to present to the General Assembly Part I of the report of the Second Committee on agenda item 55 [A/34/676].

3. That report includes a draft resolution entitled "United Nations Cocoa Conference",<sup>1</sup> which was adopted by the Second Committee without a vote and which is recommended to the General Assembly for similar adoption, as a priority item.

*Pursuant to rule 66 of the rules of procedure, it was decided not to discuss the report of the Second Committee.*

4. The PRESIDENT: The positions of delegations regarding the recommendation of the Second Committee on this item were made clear in the Committee and are reflected in the relevant official records.

5. We shall now take a decision on the draft resolution recommended by the Second Committee in paragraph 7 of its report [A/34/676], entitled "United Nations Cocoa Conference". The Committee adopted that draft resolution without a vote. May I take it that the Assembly wishes to do likewise?

*The draft resolution was adopted (resolution 34/23).*

## AGENDA ITEM 3

## Credentials of representatives to the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly (concluded):\*

- (b) Report of the Credentials Committee

SECOND REPORT  
OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE  
(A/34/500/Add.1)

6. The PRESIDENT: If no one wishes to speak on this item, I shall invite representatives to turn their attention

<sup>1</sup> It is stated in the report of the Second Committee (A/34/676, para. 2) that the draft resolution in question was also submitted to the Committee under agenda item 56.

\* Resumed from the 4th meeting.

to the draft resolution recommended by the Credentials Committee in paragraph 10 of its report [A/34/500 Add.1]. The Committee adopted that draft resolution without a vote. May I consider that the General Assembly wishes to do likewise?

*The draft resolution was adopted (resolution 34/2 B).*

## AGENDA ITEM 21

### Question of Cyprus: report of the Secretary-General

7. The PRESIDENT: As representatives will recall, the General Assembly at its fourth plenary meeting, held on 21 September 1979, decided that when considering this item it would invite the Special Political Committee to meet for the purpose of affording representatives of the Cypriot communities an opportunity to speak in the Committee in order to express their views, and that the Assembly would then resume its consideration of the item, taking into account the report of the Special Political Committee.

8. I should like to suggest that the General Assembly invite the Special Political Committee to meet this afternoon in order to hear the views of the representatives of the Cypriot communities. The Assembly will then resume its consideration of this item tomorrow morning. May I take it that the General Assembly agrees to the procedure I have suggested?

*It was so decided.*

9. The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform the Assembly that previously the meetings of the Special Political Committee devoted to the question of Cyprus have been provided with verbatim records. May I take it that the General Assembly wishes the same procedure to be followed for the meeting which the Special Political Committee will hold on the question of Cyprus?

*It was so decided.*

10. The PRESIDENT: I should also like to propose that the list of speakers in the debate on this item be closed tomorrow, Friday, 16 November, at 12 noon. May I take it that the General Assembly agrees to that proposal?

*It was so decided.*

11. Mr. ROLANDIS (Cyprus): For yet another year the orange and lemon trees in north Cyprus blossom and fruit for the benefit of people other than their rightful owners. Extensive investments and installations in industry, tourism and agriculture beyond the line of occupation which scars the placid scenery are in the hands of strangers who never toiled for their creation and expansion. Forty per cent of the land whose "waves will cast up Aphrodite once more"—the description of Cyprus by Seferis, winner of the Nobel prize for literature in 1963—still awaits justice.

12. A resolution decreeing such justice was adopted by this Assembly last year. A similar one was adopted the year before, and three, four, five years ago; resolutions decreeing justice of which Turkey has made a mockery time and again. Very characteristic is a recent statement by the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktaş, and I

quote the New York *Times* of 2 October 1979: "There is no such a thing as a United Nations resolution on the Cyprus problem". Of course, the man who made the above statement is adequately backed by a fully equipped army of aggression and he can therefore afford to behave with an utter lack of respect for international justice, law and order. But, at the same time, that sacrilegious statement shows the predicament of this institution, which was meant to save the post-war world from moral, and in consequence material, decadence and has ended up being unable to save itself from the jeers and pettiness of those who are strong enough and mean enough to ignore its existence.

13. How does one view a problem such as that of Cyprus five and a half years after the invasion? There is no doubt that, as time passes and the scalding events of Turkey's military intervention fade away and disappear into the depths of time and history, people tend to judge by what they have before their eyes now, forgetting the origins of the problem and its correct dimensions. The Cyprus problem cannot capture the headlines any more, because it is not tinted with what the international press and media consider to be dramatic and newsworthy. It is a chronic problem. It is not newsworthy in exactly the same way as famine, which for years now has been relentlessly killing an average of 100,000 people a day throughout the world; is not newsworthy, as opposed to a hunger strike or even a devastating phenomenon such as that of Kampuchea, which, although much smaller in scale, are newsworthy. Cyprus is not a bleeding wound. It is a mute pain that lies within.

14. Beware of such a mute, silent pain that comes from within, especially when human feelings are involved, especially when the historical pride, the national existence and the future aspirations of a whole country are in the balance. We are content to note that the overwhelming majority of this Assembly have always refused to be carried away by the preaching of Turkish propaganda about the so-called "present-day realities". A post-aggression reality is no doubt a fait accompli, but so is murder. Do we ever treat murder as a reality, and do we base our actions on the validity of such a fait accompli?

15. I have started with this preamble so as to place our problem before you in its correct perspective. True, life goes on in Cyprus. The cities are filled with bustling people looking after their everyday occupational interests. Activity continues from the instinct for survival, from necessity. People do not reveal their feelings and their memories in their everyday dealings, but the feelings and the memories exist. In every house, every church, every factory, every tree that rises up in the free part of Cyprus there is a reminder of what used to be a dynamic presence and is now an image that lies in the haze beyond the lines of occupation. After all, it is a dignified and ennobling trait of human existence, as opposed to that of the lower animals, to view current events in the light of the mandates of the past and the aspirations of the future.

16. The foregoing analysis shows that, although it is true that from the practical point of view negotiation is the current answer to our problem, the problem still presents many other facets. In real terms, the problem is not one of negotiation; it is one of aggression, occupation and international injustice. Negotiations do not constitute absolution for attacks against and murder of

the defenceless. You do not propose negotiations after you have attacked and attempted to liquidate somebody. It must therefore be understood and appreciated that our strong will to negotiate, so often expressed, does not indicate that we endorse the idea that countries must be allowed to attack, destroy and loot, and then negotiate settlements. Negotiations are an act of necessity in the case of Cyprus, not a matter of principle—and I am glad that this has been fully recognized by most representatives in our private conversations.

17. Negotiations have been carried out with zero results so far; they will be tried optimistically in the future as well. Their success or failure will depend mainly on a single factor: the attitude of mind and the ulterior motives and objectives of those who pull the strings in Turkey and of those in the high echelons of the Turkish Cypriot leadership. A *post mortem* of the events of the last five years shows that the constant and consistent dream of Denktas has been and still is the partition of the country, probably to be followed by a unilateral declaration of independence.

18. Actually, Denktas has been working along these lines since 1954. We have harangued you in the past in speeches containing scores of facts and statements giving evidence of the above objectives. We have pointed out Denktas's manoeuvres, his evasiveness, his efforts to undermine every process of talks or rapprochement between the two communities; his devious overtures and offers, which, when examined, prove to be devoid of content; his vanity and his desire to install himself as the ruler of territory occupied by a foreign army and of people forced into a state of partition. Time and again we have referred to his machiavellian machinations in stipulating agreements and then torpedoing them later, as expediency may dictate. Believe me, it is an agonizing experience to follow Denktas's mental processes.

19. The four following examples reveal the essence of Denktas's aims and orientations.

20. First, Mr. Denktas made a statement in New York on 28 November 1978 which went as follows: "I personally believe that the time has come for the establishment of a separate State". That statement was followed by another, made in Ankara on 2 December 1978: "I come to Turkey and I make my statement that I believe that the time has come for the establishment of a Turkish Cypriot State in the north".

21. Secondly, there was a news item in the Turkish newspaper *Tercüman* on 14 March 1979 to the effect that Denktas had submitted a secret report to the Turkish Government in which he stated that the only course left was to declare independence.

22. Thirdly, the Turkish Cypriot political leader, Durduran, made a statement on 16 September 1979 that Denktas had undermined completely the agreement of 19 May 1979 and that Denktas's administration would never solve the Cyprus problem.

23. Fourthly, the Turkish Cypriot political leader, Ozgur, made a statement on 9 November 1979 to the Turkish newspaper *Yeni Duzen*, which reads as follows:

"The administration which comes from Denktas's party of national unity by its policies is

trying to facilitate the partition of Cyprus. Denktas does not allow the rapprochement of the two communities. He prevents the meeting of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot organizations; he forbids Turkish Cypriots to apply for Cyprus Republic passports. Denktas's party, with its attitude and the political line it follows, does not contribute to the solution of the Cyprus problem."

24. So our observations, remarks and arguments over the last five years as to Denktas's intentions have now been proved beyond any shadow of doubt, both by Denktas's confessions and by the statements of the Turkish Cypriot political leaders Durduran and Ozgur, who control between them 28 per cent of the so-called Turkish Cypriot Parliament.

25. The language is succinct, unequivocal and clear-cut. Denktas is leading the country to partition; he is sowing the seed of secession; he is trying to break Cyprus up into two parts. He wishes to give birth to a new sovereign régime with the blessing of the Turkish army and its weaponry. This is an ominous development because it constitutes an endorsement of our own findings and fears regarding Denktas's aims and the type of rule he envisages imposing beyond the lines of the Turkish tanks. At the same time, however, there is an auspicious tone in the statements of Durduran and Ozgur that shows that there are voices of sobriety amongst the Turkish Cypriots, and I can tell you that there are many such voices.

26. I wonder how, with Denktas at the helm, negotiations can lead to fruition, given his aforementioned stance.

27. Each year you ask us to negotiate. Each year arduous efforts are made towards this end. But what are these negotiations about? As far as Turkey and Denktas are concerned, they revolve around a single axis: partition. You and we are thinking in terms of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity for Cyprus; Turkey and Denktas are thinking in terms of partition. You and we are thinking in terms of a unified State, based on the principle of federalism; Turkey and Denktas are thinking in terms of partition. You and we are thinking in terms of the withdrawal of Turkish troops of invasion; Turkey and Denktas are thinking in terms of perpetuating the foreign occupation so that partition will never be eradicated. You and we take the view that the United Nations does exist and that it has adopted resolutions; for Mr. Denktas such resolutions do not exist.

28. No wonder that the efforts towards an agreement on Cyprus during the past five years have been a tale of woe.

29. The Assembly may take it for granted that the seat of the Greek Cypriot interlocutor at the negotiating table will always be filled by a person who will be doing his utmost to find a solution to our problem. Some of you have at times indicated that we have to act fast because, with the passage of time, situations become cemented and not easily reversed. That is true, very true. But then we should act fast to move towards what? The "separate State" of Mr. Denktas or "the partition" corroborated by Mr. Ozgur? We want to move fast towards a solution, but not too fast towards partition. If Denktas is aiming at a unilateral declaration of

independence, should we rush to signify our acceptance of something similar?

30. In the process of the intercommunal talks, we believe that each one of the 152 nations represented in this Assembly may play a constructive role. Turkey refuses to listen to your collective voice, but your advice and recommendations offered privately to Turkey may prove more productive. Those in charge in Ankara must hear, either diplomatically or undiplomatically, in each and every one of the 3,000 languages and dialects spoken in the world today that it has to withdraw its army and military equipment from Cyprus and that it should not encourage Denktaş or his like in their wild dreams of partition and consequent devastation. I believe that the shortest path to a correct solution lies not through our "fast action" but through a fast change of mind in Ankara. Your contribution by way of private recommendations may prove enormous. By talking to Ankara, you are not intervening in Turkey's internal affairs, because the invasion of Cyprus is nobody's internal affair. It is an international problem lying geographically in the centre of an area that is beleaguered by the most relentless political and economic upheavals of our times. It is in the interest of each and every one of you to contribute towards a solution or even towards some progress on substance. Any such progress will constitute a step forward in the Middle East, the Mediterranean, Europe and the world.

31. On 19 May 1979, an agreement was reached between President Kyprianou and Mr. Denktaş for the resumption of negotiations [see A/34/610 and Corr.1, annex V]. That agreement was arrived at after strenuous and commendable efforts on the part of the Secretary-General, Mr. Waldheim, whose personal presence, assiduity and determination made such an agreement possible. It has been stated categorically by us on many occasions, and I repeat it now, that we are and have always been prepared to negotiate on the basis of that agreement. Denktaş is not so prepared. He insists that we should accept, in advance and without even discussing them, conditions that are not included in the agreement. This is typical of the man and consonant with his past performance. But, then, where are we heading for?

32. Today the problem is before the General Assembly for the sixth consecutive year since the invasion. The fact that previous resolutions remain unimplemented and ignored constitutes a stigma, but it does not hinder us from invoking your support, which is beneficial in all spheres not affected by Turkey's arrogance. Your espousal of our cause not only bolsters our hopes for a just solution in the future, but in addition affords international recognition of our Government. This recognition forms the infrastructure of our achievements in the fields of finance, trade, culture and politics.

33. The three main issues to which our recourse this year relates, in addition to those of past resolutions, are all well founded and substantiated, and we should like it to be on record that we have raised them before this Assembly and that we have expounded to you the rationale of our position, even though some of our requests may not be granted for reasons of tactics or policy.

34. The first issue is that of sanctions. We are rightfully entitled to ask for them as a result of the flagrant violation by Turkey of her obligations under the Charter. If sanctions are not the appropriate remedy in

cases in which this Organization is defied and humiliated by the supercilious demeanour of a single Member State, when will they ever be imposed? After all, I am not suggesting anything different from what the Permanent Representative of Turkey, Mr. Eralp, proposed on 8 November 1979 when addressing this Assembly on the subject of *apartheid* and South Africa [59th meeting]. Mr. Eralp condemned the occupation of Namibia and the aggression against Angola, Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique by the army of South Africa. He did that, whilst his own army is guilty of exactly the same crimes against Cyprus. Mr. Eralp further stated that because of the defiance by South Africa of the efforts which had been made by the United Nations, concrete and decisive measures must be imposed against South Africa, including an arms embargo under Chapter VII of the Charter and economic sanctions. I do not think that I have to add to that superb statement anything more than the remark: whatever applies to South Africa naturally applies to all other countries including Turkey.

35. The second issue concerns an international conference. We are not pressing for such a conference this year in view of our efforts to reactivate the dialogue and our request for the appointment of a committee on Cyprus. We should like, however, to have our position of principle reflected in the resolution and to reserve our right to request the convening of such a conference whenever appropriate.

36. The third issue concerns the establishment of a committee on Cyprus. The existence of such a committee would afford a new plateau of action in the efforts for the implementation of United Nations resolutions. Moreover, the committee may prove to be of assistance to the Secretary-General. Details about the committee and its terms of reference have been given to all of you during our private meetings.

37. What is the right conclusion for a speech, the focus of which has been an invaded country, the plight of its people and the inability of a willing international community to take remedial action? One might suggest a crescendo composed of references to excruciating suffering and gross injustice. However, that is not what I am going to resort to. I am going to call upon the Assembly to act inexorably and to condemn Turkey for its unduly protracted contemptuous behaviour. But at the same time I shall extend a hand of goodwill and friendship to the Turkish Cypriots, relying heavily on your assistance. The omens are not propitious, but our will to rebuild the country dwarfs the difficulties. I should like to remind the Turkish Cypriots that the power which at this moment props up their political, social and economic structure is artificial, volatile and vulnerable. It may be theoretically vulnerable today; tomorrow it will be practically vulnerable as well.

38. A foreign army of occupation will prove to be a tool of destruction, not of construction. Long-term prosperity cannot be built on the roofs of tanks. Let us build it in the fields and on the mountains of peace, in a free and unified Cyprus.

39. Mr. KRESSE (German Democratic Republic): More than five years have passed since the tragic events of July 1974 with their grave consequences for the Republic of Cyprus.

40. Despite the fact that relevant documents of our

Organization have long indicated how to arrive at a lasting, just and peaceful solution of the problem of Cyprus, we find ourselves again this year confronted with a situation in which substantial progress has not yet been achieved in resolving the issue of Cyprus and in which the people of that tortured country are still facing an uncertain future.

41. The wish of the Cypriot people remains unfulfilled—the wish to live and to work in a united and non-aligned country, free from external interference and without military bases of alien Powers or foreign troops stationed in their island. Although the Government of Cyprus has succeeded in providing decent housing to 200,000 refugees in their own country, those refugees still wish to return to their homes. The fate of many a missing person has still to be elucidated.

42. In the face of these facts my delegation feels compelled to state that the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-aligned status of Cyprus continue to be seriously endangered, the more so since foreign military bases continue to exist in Cyprus and no decisive measures have been initiated for the withdrawal of the foreign troops stationed in the island.

43. What really underlies the difficulties involved in resolving the problem of Cyprus is the adherence in certain quarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] to the military concept of making the island a republic an unsinkable aircraft carrier of NATO—a scheme which, in the light of the recent political changes in the region of the Middle East, has assumed new and dangerous dimensions. It is therefore with attention and concern that my delegation views the attempts in those quarters to interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign State Member of the United Nations and to exert pressure on the Government of the Republic of Cyprus on behalf of a solution to the problem which would meet the interests of NATO. That approach and any concept that tends to sanction the disunity of Cyprus aggravate the situation in the eastern Mediterranean, which has been subjected to additional tensions as a result of activities in the region by circles opposed to détente.

44. In the summer of this year the General Secretary of the Progressive Party of the Working People of Cyprus declared that the most intransigent enemies of Cyprus did not wish and continued not to wish for the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to live together in a common and truly free homeland. They wished to see them live in disunity and hostility. They wished to see Cyprus a divided and occupied country serving as NATO's military base and spearhead.

45. Basing itself on the provisions of the Final Act of Helsinki,<sup>2</sup> and unrestrictedly subscribing to the Moscow Declaration of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty<sup>3</sup> as well as to the communiqué of the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty held at Budapest on 14 and 15 May 1979 [see A/34/275-S/13344, annex], the German Democratic Republic advocates a political solution by means of negotiations.

<sup>2</sup> Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, signed at Helsinki on 1 August 1975.

<sup>3</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-third Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1978*, document S/12939.

46. A sound compromise formula could emerge from the 10-point agreement which was achieved with the support of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Waldheim, as a result of the meeting earlier this year between the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Spyros Kyprianou, and Mr. Rauf Denktaş. My delegation regards talks between the communities in Cyprus as an important step towards enhancing a peaceful solution of the internal political aspects involved in the Cyprus issue.

47. The good will, patience and readiness to compromise of the parties concerned are required to meet the high expectations associated with a resumption of the intercommunal talks to solve the primarily humanitarian problems afflicting the people of Cyprus. The activities of certain circles in Cyprus which, in disregard of existing arrangements between the two communities and of United Nations resolutions, endanger the Republic's unity as a State are not suited to bringing relief to either Greek Cypriots or Turkish Cypriots.

48. For some time, the way towards a just and lasting solution to the problem of Cyprus has existed in the form of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), as well as in follow-up resolutions and in Security Council resolution 365 (1974). Now as before, the situation in Cyprus is a threat to international peace and security. The implementation of these resolutions in all their aspects by concrete and practical measures, if necessary by the Security Council itself, should be regarded as a priority task. Progress in the solution of the refugee problem would be proof of the serious intention of the two sides to achieve progress in the intercommunal talks. It would facilitate such talks, would give them fresh impetus and would improve the general climate.

49. The proposals submitted by President Kyprianou of the Republic of Cyprus in the spring of 1978 to achieve immediate and complete disarmament and the demilitarization of the island,<sup>4</sup> including the withdrawal of all foreign troops and the elimination of existing military bases on Cyprus, remain valid and the German Democratic Republic continues to support them. The implementation of these proposals would be a genuine step towards détente in the eastern Mediterranean.

50. At the same time, the German Democratic Republic advocates the convening of an international conference, as proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.<sup>5</sup> The idea also enjoys the support of Cyprus. Such a conference would be likely to advance the solution of the problem of Cyprus and to counteract unilateral attempts to resolve the problem.

51. The German Democratic Republic and the Republic of Cyprus are linked by friendly relations. These close bilateral relations are being further developed and intensified in the interests of the two States.

52. In accordance with its policy characterized by solidarity and support for the just and anti-imperialist struggle the Cypriot people are waging for a democratic and peaceful solution to the problem of Cyprus, the

<sup>4</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 2nd meeting, para. 145.

<sup>5</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-ninth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1974*, document S/11465.

German Democratic Republic will, in the future, remain faithful to its established position. The idea of solidarity with Cyprus has met with a warm response from the people of the German Democratic Republic, as was manifested by the celebration in the German Democratic Republic of the week of international solidarity with Cyprus in July of this year.

53. In conclusion, permit me to express the German Democratic Republic's firm conviction that the resolution of this problem, which has been a source of crisis for many years, would constitute an important contribution towards strengthening peace and security in that part of the world and would be in the interest of an expansion of the process of détente pursuant to the provisions of the Final Act of Helsinki.

54. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Turkey, who wishes to speak in exercise of his right of reply.

55. Mr. ERALP (Turkey): I do not propose to go into a refutation of the false allegations made by Mr. Rolandis, the representative of the Greek Cypriot régime, as he will receive a full reply in the statement which I shall make on Monday morning.

56. Nevertheless, I feel that a few brief remarks are called for.

57. To begin with, let us bring clarity to one important point. There is no army of occupation in Cyprus. There is a Turkish peace-keeping force which has brought peace and security to the Turkish community of Cyprus for the first time since the Greek massacres and persecutions began in 1963, perpetrated by the Greek Cypriot usurpers of power in Cyprus. This is a peace-keeping force which is ready to withdraw as soon as real peace is established in Cyprus through intercommunal talks.

58. False allegations have just been made as to the intention of the Turkish community to declare unilateral independence. I should like to read a statement that appeared as recent as 12 August 1979 in the Greek Cypriot daily *Simerini*. It is made by the Greek Cypriot negotiator, Mr. Papadopoulos, who says:

"I have no information or evidence to show any activity by the Turkish Cypriots to proclaim independence. I am merely reading exaggerated Greek

Cypriot press reports and overstatements by the Greek Cypriot spokesmen. Most of these are distorted and exaggerated reports attributed to Turkish Cypriots. For example, I studied the report headlined 'Cagatay Also Threatening to Proclaim Independence'. When I read Mr. Cagatay's statement, I saw that he made no such threat. Simultaneously, I noticed reports that the Greek Cypriot side had embarked on an enlightenment campaign in a well-organized, orchestrated fashion, and was taking successful initiatives. All these indicate that the rumours of tension that have been created are artificial and that this is the creation of the Greek Cypriot Government and press. This attitude is wrong and is serious criminal behaviour. Unfortunately, this attitude is aimed at the glorification of some people; it is a very dangerous trick, because by calling upon others to save us in the face of a non-existent danger, we lose our credibility and give them the opportunity not to come to our help in case of real danger."

That is a statement by no less a person than the Greek Cypriot negotiator, Mr. Papadopoulos.

59. As you can see, an attempt is made at every level of the international community to give the impression that the Turks of Cyprus are aiming at partition or a separate State. This is a very transparent manoeuvre designed to perpetuate the present situation, which is the aim of the Greek Cypriot Administration. They see lasting benefit to themselves in the divided State of Cyprus as it is today because they are prosperous, they enjoy sole sovereignty and power, and they do not wish to share that power with anyone, even in a federated State.

60. Finally, Mr. Rolandis began by referring to the predicament of this institution, the United Nations. In fact, the predicament of this institution lies in its inability to prevent the perpetration of false accusations and misrepresentations such as those to which we have been subjected this morning.

*The meeting rose at 12 noon.*