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# SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

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**1957<sup>th</sup>** MEETING: 30 SEPTEMBER 1976

NEW YORK

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#### NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

## 1957th MEETING

Held in New York, on Thursday, 30 September 1976, at 3 p.m.

*President:* Mr. Mansur Rashid KIKHIA  
(Libyan Arab Republic).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: Benin, China, France, Guyana, Italy, Japan, Libyan Arab Republic, Pakistan, Panama, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1957)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Namibia

*The meeting was called to order at 3.50 p.m.*

### Statement by the President

1. The PRESIDENT: I should like on behalf of the Council to welcome the presence at the Security Council table of the Foreign Minister of Romania.

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

### The situation in Namibia

2. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decisions previously taken [1954th and 1956th meetings], I shall now invite the President and the other members of the United Nations Council for Namibia, and the representatives of Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius and Morocco to participate in the Council's discussion without the right to vote.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Kamana (President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took places at the Council table and Mr. Waiyaki (Kenya), Mr. Rabetafika (Madagascar), Mr. Muwamba (Malawi), Mr. Ramphul (Mauritius) and Mr. Bengelloun (Morocco) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.*

3. The PRESIDENT: In addition, I have received letters from the representatives of Algeria, Cuba, Democratic Kampuchea, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Mozambique, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone,

the Yemen Arab Republic and Yugoslavia, in which they ask also to be invited to participate in the debate without the right to vote. I therefore propose, in accordance with the provisions of Article 31 of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

4. I shall invite those representatives to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber, on the understanding that they will be invited to take a place at the Council table when it is their turn to speak.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Rahal (Algeria), Mr. Alarcón (Cuba), Mr. Keat Chhon (Democratic Kampuchea), Mr. Abdel Meguid (Egypt), Mr. Felli (Ghana), Mr. Camara (Guinea), Mr. Chissano (Mozambique), Mr. Garba (Nigeria), Mr. Baroody (Saudi Arabia), Mr. Minah (Sierra Leone), Mr. Sallam (Yemen) and Mr. Petrić, (Yugoslavia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.*

5. The PRESIDENT: I should like to draw attention to document S/12206 which reproduces the text of a letter to the President of the Security Council from the representative of the United States of America.

6. The first speaker is the Commissioner for External Affairs of Nigeria. I welcome him, and I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

7. Mr. GARBA (Nigeria): Mr. President, permit me to join the speakers who have preceded me in congratulating you on your assumption of the important and responsible office of President of the Council for the month of September.

8. This is a momentous period in the history of Africa. All over the continent, and particularly in southern Africa, currents and cross-currents are flowing in several directions. I believe that it would be fundamentally defeatist if we did not accept that these currents could be synthesized into one positive force for the solution of the problem before us.

9. However, these currents are gathering momentum; some aspects are healthy, some rather ominous. Our sincere hope, therefore, is that this series of meetings

of the Council will contribute in no small measure towards consolidating those currents most likely to sweep us away from turbulence and lead us towards the final solution of this problem, which has been rightly called a plague.

10. The continent of Africa has indeed been bedevilled for the past three centuries by one plague after the other: man's inhumanity to man, exploitation of man by man on the basis of colour, power and imposed privilege. Once it was slavery and colonialism; now it is the inhuman and criminal usurpation of power by a privileged few.

11. Suffice it to recall the Council's debate in January of this year and resolution 385 (1976), which called for the application by South Africa of all the legal, human and moral values which the international community holds dear in determining the future of Namibia. Colonialism is anachronistic and unacceptable. The usurpation of the United Nations mandate by the Vorster régime is even more unacceptable. In their performance Vorster and his racist régime in Namibia have been completely oblivious to their responsibilities and obligations and have been unresponsive to the wishes of the international community.

12. It is hardly necessary for me to attempt to evoke here the enormity of the evils of the particular situation we are concerned with today. After all, this body, as well as the General Assembly, has been seized of the problems of Namibia since 1946. Thirty years! We need to celebrate our achievements!

13. The recent scenario, in a nutshell, is as follows. In 1967, almost 10 years ago, the General Assembly in all solemnity—but with innate hypocrisy on the part of many—pronounced itself on and established the Council for Namibia. It appointed the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, charged with administering Namibia following the termination of the Mandate of racist South Africa over that Territory. By some classic exercise in see-saw diplomacy braced with inconsistency, we continue to take decisions and refuse to implement them. This is not out of moral weakness. It is because of the total lack of morals in many of us. We have all contributed to these phantom United Nations institutions in a manner that reflects a unique exercise in hypocrisy—or is it self-deceit? On the other hand, we continue to take no practical steps to pressure South Africa out of business in Namibia.

14. In January of this year, when the Security Council adopted its resolution 385 (1976), my Government thought that we were at last all determined to apply the final pressure to accomplish the objectives of the international community in Namibia. This we thought was the umpteenth but final resolution. We regret to note that today we are back to appeasement and to glorifying and according respectability to the Vorster régime, not for moves towards meeting the wishes of

the international community on Namibia but for dubious involvement in the issues of Zimbabwe. This "good will" and "benevolence" of South Africa should more logically be directed towards compliance with these wishes.

15. In its resolution 385 (1976) the Council took definite decisions on Namibia and called for specific action by South Africa. The South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), the authentic representative of the Namibian people, has called for a number of conditions to be laid down for negotiations for independence, self-determination and sovereignty: first, that SWAPO be a primordial factor in any negotiations regarding the future of Namibia; secondly, that there should be supervision and control by the United Nations; thirdly, that South Africa should release all Namibian political prisoners. In their magnanimity, SWAPO and all African States directly seized of this problem have not insisted on other conditions already determined by the United Nations—namely, the withdrawal of South African troops and the predetermination of a date for independence and so on, before a meeting could be held with South Africa.

16. But what has been South Africa's response to these requests? An independence forecast for December 1978—of course, as Vorster's Government put it, only "with reasonable certainty", whatever that is supposed to mean, and an expression of, and here I quote again, "a firm desire to maintain South West Africa as a unit" [*S/12180, annex*]. This, we all realize, is camouflage for the perpetration of the plan to maintain Namibia as a part of the South African commonwealth.

17. Is this really the kind of response the Council deserves? Even South Africa's more moderate critics have viewed this latest statement of intention as very much less than a modest step forward.

18. In the mean time, business goes on as usual in Namibia. South Africa continues to consolidate its military presence, especially along the Caprivi Strip close to the Angolan-Zambian borders. Regular incursions are made into Zambia, as is well known to this Council. In March 1976, the illegal administration condemned two Namibian patriots to death and passed various prison sentences on others. Barely four days ago the United Nations Council for Namibia heard from Mr. Bill Anderson a report on some of the atrocities and inhuman treatment of the defenceless people of Namibia.<sup>1</sup>

19. Another grave concern of the Government of Nigeria bears on South Africa's militarization of Namibia, a fact well documented by Comrade Sam Nujoma in his very noble and restrained statement before the Council two days ago [*1956th meeting*]. More particularly, we deplore the use of Namibia as a front-line position for aggression against neighbouring African countries.

20. Nigeria continues to uphold its policy that the *bona fides* of the South African racist régime in any settlement in southern Africa is suspect. Judging by our own decisions in the Council, the South African régime, which has illegally occupied the Territory, has no right in any way to influence the destiny of Namibia or to interfere with the exercise of the right of self-determination by the people of Namibia. The only matters for discussion with that régime are the modalities for the termination of its illegal occupation and for its total withdrawal from the international Territory of Namibia.

21. We recognize red herrings. We will not accept any dialogue with the racist régime of South Africa without its renouncing the policy of *apartheid* in Namibia. We refuse to yield to any attempt to pull the wool over our eyes. The racist régime of South Africa cannot, on the one hand, pretend to contribute towards a settlement in Zimbabwe while, on the other hand, it ignores the realities of Namibia and continues to consolidate its *apartheid* system in that Territory, which it continues to occupy illegally.

22. While we debate Namibia here, bantustanization, the apogee of the *apartheid* system, continues unabated in South Africa and in Namibia. Six to seven million blacks have already been forcibly moved from their normal abodes into 200 scattered locations in South Africa that will be constituted into about eight Bantustan states. Nineteen million owners of the land will in this process lose their citizenship to about 3.5 million whites and will be settled in 13 per cent of the land. We must not allow our attention to be diverted from these realities of the situation in southern Africa.

23. While we deliberate here, we are certain that many more innocent children are meeting their death at the hands of well-trained but unfortunately bigoted so-called officers of the law in South Africa.

24. I cannot end this statement without recognizing the *démarches* undertaken by certain Western communities, particularly by the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Henry Kissinger. As I stated earlier, and on the basis of experience so far, my Government has no confidence in any dialogue with Vorster. However, it is not my intention to prejudge any diplomatic initiative taken by any Government in the pursuit of its own national policies and interests. We would wish to see these bilateral initiatives falling within the ambit of United Nations resolutions and not leading to the emasculation of United Nations authority and prestige. Put simply, my Government will support such initiatives only as long as they reinforce the resolutions and decisions of this international forum and do not go back on them. We wait to be proved right or wrong.

25. As we see it, the Security Council is faced with an inescapable challenge to its authority, and must act to discharge its solemn obligation to the people of

Namibia. We have called for basic action to pressure South Africa into yielding to universal values of human dignity and human rights. South Africa is the prop of all the evils and problems of southern Africa. We know that what we have called for is a matter of right in Namibia. I do not need to recall this. Yet, we do not demand much. All we wish for is the recognition of SWAPO as a primordial element in any negotiation on Namibia; the release of illegally held national leaders by the usurper régime; the recognition of the supervision and control by the United Nations of the processes of self-determination by all the people of Namibia and the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the State of Namibia.

26. The deadline of 31 August this year given for South Africa to comply with resolution 385 (1976) is past. The response of the Pretoria régime—through the mockery of a constitutional conference in Windhoek—is an insult to the international community. It is not worth commenting on here, as we all know the facts already. We must now move forward in the spirit of resolution 385 (1976), in the absence of any indications of Pretoria's wish to respond to the demands of the Council.

27. In this connexion, we believe it is time to consider introducing mandatory sanctions against South Africa. In addition, in the face of the escalation of the state of war in southern Africa, Nigeria totally endorses the view universally held in the United Nations that the situation in Namibia constitutes a threat to international peace and security and that the Security Council must exercise all its responsibilities in this regard within the framework of Chapter VII of the Charter.

28. We on our part are determined to give every possible support to SWAPO in its heroic struggle to exercise its right to self-determination and to achieve genuine independence. On this, there cannot, and never will, be a compromise.

29. The PRESIDENT: Before calling on the next speaker, I would like, on behalf of the Council, to welcome the presence at the Council table of the Foreign Ministers of Japan and Guyana.

30. The next speaker is the representative of the Yemen Arab Republic, whom I invite to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

31. Mr. SALLAM (Yemen): Mr. President, it gives me great pleasure and it is a great honour to extend to you, on behalf of my delegation and on behalf of the Arab Group, which my country, Yemen, has the great honour of representing as Chairman for the month of September, my warmest congratulations on the assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of September. I should like to tell you how proud the Arab Group feels at seeing you presiding over the Council at this very difficult time.

My delegation is particularly happy to see you, a distinguished son of Africa, presiding over this debate on the question of Namibia. The Arab Group is very confident that these deliberations under your wise guidance and leadership will be crowned with great success.

32. In resolution 385 (1976), the Council voted unanimously to condemn the continued illegal occupation of the Territory of Namibia by South Africa. It condemned the illegal and arbitrary application by South Africa of racially discriminatory and repressive laws and practices in Namibia. It condemned the South African military build-up in Namibia, and the utilization of the Territory as a base for attacks on neighbouring countries. The Council demanded that South Africa withdraw its illegal administration from the Namibian Territory, transfer power to the people of Namibia under the auspices of the United Nations, and put an end to its policy of bantustans and so-called homelands. The Council resolution, likewise, called for free elections in Namibia under the supervision and control of the United Nations, and demanded that South Africa comply fully with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; release all Namibian political prisoners; and accord unconditionally to all Namibians currently in exile for political reasons full facilities for return to their country without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment.

33. None of those demands has been met so far. On the contrary, the racist régime of South Africa has manipulated all its power to remain in Namibia, despite the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, and despite its condemnation by the world community.

34. The military buildup of the South African racist régime in Namibia and the eternal tribal talks in Windhoek, which are intended only to divide Namibia into many tribal States under hand-picked tribal puppets, are new manifestations of the real intention of the Pretoria régime to perpetuate its occupation of Namibia.

35. The text of the statement issued on 18 August by the so-called Constitutional Committee of the South West African Constitutional Conference in Windhoek [S/12180, annex] reaffirmed the declaration of intent whereby December 1978 could be fixed as the date of independence for Namibia. That statement made no mention of SWAPO as the sole representative of the Namibian people, and did not even approach the requirements for genuine self-determination based on free elections under United Nations supervision and control.

36. It is therefore essential that the Council, with a view to implementing its resolutions, take the necessary measures provided by the United Nations Charter. The delegation of Yemen, on behalf of the

Arab Group, requests that the Council take into consideration the resolution contained in document S/12188, which was adopted by the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries, held in Colombo from 16 to 19 August 1976.

37. We listened very carefully this morning to the statement made in the General Assembly by Mr. Kissinger, the United States Secretary of State.<sup>2</sup> The Arab Group welcomes all sincere and genuine initiatives towards attaining the self-determination and independence of Namibia. The South African régime will never heed the appeal of mankind unless it is denied the collaboration of some States which give it a false sense of security. Being God's most intelligent but not noblest creature, man, throughout his long history, has been mentally occupied with his instinctive behaviour, the domination and subjugation of other species, as well as his own. It is only through an Organization like this, and through the implementation of its aims and principles, that man can establish and enjoy a world order of genuine peace based on equity, justice and human dignity.

38. Mr. WILLS (Guyana): Mr. President, may I say first of all how pleased I am to address the Council at a time when you are President for the month of September. Your guidance of our deliberations based on your vast experience will, I feel sure, be an asset in relation to the present item on the agenda. May I also be permitted to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Abe of Japan, for the able manner in which he presided over the Council's deliberations during the month of August.

39. There is no continent on the globe where there are two internationally condemned illegal régimes, no continent, that is, except Africa. This Council today is faced with one of the most blatant examples of disregard for internationally accepted opinion since the end of the Second World War. Despite our many resolutions and our many exhortations, the illegal occupation of Namibia by the racist minority régime in South Africa continues. African nationalism has won outstanding victories in the last decade, and now has successfully reached the Cunene and the Limpopo. There has been a contraction of the boundaries of the racists. The valiant people of Namibia and Azania have become the front line of resistance to *apartheid*. The catalogue of oppression in Namibia is cruel and long. We have come to the point where the *voertkamp*s in South Africa consider the land to be their Sudetenland and where the grandfather of the late Hermann Goering decimated the Herero tribe and reduced its members from 85,000 to 15,000 in one savage campaign. The victims of the raging on the continent of Africa are not limited to its present-day inhabitants. The assault on freedom on the continent of Africa is the concern of lovers of freedom everywhere.

40. We who sit around this table and have had occasion to discuss this problem *ad infinitum*—and I may say, *ad nauseam*—are all agreed on the objectives. South Africa is trespassing in Namibia and must go. Namibia must achieve independence as a unitary State and must not be fragmented and balkanized into capricious and whimsical geographical divisions based on false interpretations of archaeology and of history. Where we do differ is on the question of what tactics are to be used and what strategies are to be devised to achieve these objectives.

41. In January 1976, the Council adopted resolution 385 (1976), which resolved, *inter alia*, that South Africa should end forthwith its policy of bantustans; release all Namibian political prisoners, including all those imprisoned or detained in connexion with offences under so-called security laws; abolish the application of racially discriminatory and politically repressive laws and practices, and accord unconditionally to all Namibians currently in exile for political reasons full facilities for return to their country without any attendant risk of detention, arrest, intimidation or imprisonment. Above all, we decided to remain seized of the matter and to meet on or before 31 August 1976 in order to review South Africa's compliance with the terms of that resolution and to consider appropriate measures under the Charter, should intransigence and obduracy continue.

42. In the mean time, the racists in Pretoria continued a posture of constitutional advance in a so-called conference at Turnhalle. This slim gesture to international pressure has been rightly condemned not only by SWAPO, the legitimate representative of the people of Namibia, not only by the United Nations Council for Namibia, but also by all those States which hold dear the right of the Namibian people to pursue its destiny as a free people in a unitary State. Thus, this Council's modest and reasonable proposals for action on the part of the illegal occupier and trespasser have been met with non-compliance, non-co-operation and arrogant contempt.

43. The South African intentions in Namibia have the merit of being constant and determined. In 1964, the Odendaal Commission<sup>3</sup> recommended the division of Namibia into bantustans based on the concepts of ethnicity which dictate the perceptions of Pretoria. From this they have never varied, they have never wavered, and their recent activities at Turnhalle are based on this assumption. With deliberate design, they have, however, also held that the Caprivi Strip must not be responsible to the authorities in Windhoek but must be directly responsible to the Government in Pretoria. This, of course, puts a premium on militarism and betrays the intention to remain a permanent threat to peace in the area. My delegation has never been satisfied with the *bona fides* of the South African régime in its alleged attempts at co-operation for a solution in Namibia. At a momentous meeting at Lusaka in 1969, a strategy was outlined for the

realization of freedom in southern Africa. The Lusaka Manifesto<sup>4</sup> posited peaceful negotiations where such negotiations could be meaningful and likely to produce results. In the alternative, armed resistance would be pursued until the achievement of final victory.

44. Speaking before the Council on Tuesday, 28 September [1956th meeting], the President of SWAPO, Comrade Sam Nujoma, reaffirmed the very reasonable conditions under which the liberation movement is prepared to negotiate the future of Namibia. SWAPO is willing to talk with South Africa on the transfer of power in Namibia. SWAPO insists that these talks must be held under the auspices of the United Nations. SWAPO demands that Namibian political prisoners languishing in the fascist torture cells must be released before any discussions can be initiated. And finally, SWAPO demands the commitment that the armed forces of South Africa be withdrawn from the illegally occupied international Territory of Namibia. The Guyana delegation endorses and supports these demands made on behalf of the Namibian people by SWAPO.

45. It is in this context that Guyana sees a potential in the recent efforts of the Secretary of State of the United States to prevent a bloodbath in southern Africa and to enlist in the interests of justice and freedom the possibility of an acceptable negotiated solution. We, however, recognize that when dealing with an intransigent tyrant, the use of the sword has often induced a climate favourable to negotiation. The tragedy in southern Africa is that the racists have never yielded an inch or an ell without a considerable expenditure in blood. We in Guyana have no confidence that any dialogue with Vorster would reach a meaningful result. Past experience has led us to this position of bitterness. My delegation hopes that the alternative option under the Lusaka Manifesto, reaffirmed at Dar-es-Salaam in 1975, might yet not be fully exercised. No right-thinking person wishes to pursue violence for its own sake. However, very little time remains. It may well be that the period for debate is closed and that we have reached the stage where, as Thomas Paine noted in 1776, "arms, as the last resource, decide the contest".

46. The Council must now maximize its use of the little time that, as I said, remains. It must crown its efforts, made over long years on behalf of the people of Namibia, by endorsing the recommendations put forward by SWAPO and applying those provisions of the Charter which would make a reality of those proposals. The disadvantaged people of Namibia can hardly wait any longer. That is our task; those are our obligations.

47. Guyana believes that liberty has no substitute and that freedom has no frontier. We are committed to making our contribution in the Council. It is a commitment that we are taking very seriously, and we are very honoured and pleased to be able to take part in this debate today.

48. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Egypt. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

49. Mr. ABDEL MEGUID (Egypt): Allow me at the outset to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. We are convinced that your personal abilities and talents have been and will be a great asset for the Council in discharging its duties. Allow me also to express our thanks, through you, to all the members of the Council for having made it possible for us to present Egypt's position on the very important question which is now before the Council.

50. The Council is meeting once again to consider the question of Namibia. The purpose of its meeting this time is to review South Africa's compliance with the terms of resolution 385 (1976), which was unanimously adopted at the end of the Council's debate on Namibia in January 1976. The terms of that resolution are well known to all of us; it is equally well known to everyone around this table whether the racist régime of South Africa has in fact complied with any of those terms.

51. But before going into the provisions of that resolution, one may wonder whether it was realistic to cherish any hope and expect from the racist régime of South Africa any degree of compliance with a Council resolution. The first response from the South African régime was quite significant in that respect and was evident from the outset in the debate preceding the adoption of the resolution. It was contained in a letter from the representative of South Africa to the Secretary-General, dated 27 January [S/11948 and Add.1]. With the Council's permission, I should like to quote from that letter.

52. On the issues of law, the letter stated:

"It is conveniently forgotten that there is no legally binding instrument or determination giving the United Nations a right of supervision of the administration over the Territory. Nor is there any legally binding decision giving the General Assembly or the Security Council the right to impose its will on the administration of the Territory or on the peoples of the Territory. Neither the General Assembly nor the Security Council can arrogate to themselves such a power."

53. With regard to United Nations supervision, the South African letter stated:

"The South African Government does not recognize and has never recognized any right on the part of the United Nations to supervise the affairs of the Territory. Moreover, the Government cannot be expected to agree to United Nations supervision of any electoral process as long as the majority of Members of the United Nations continue for their

own interested purposes to conduct a virulent, malicious and completely biased campaign in regard to the Territory."

54. With reference to South Africa's attitude to positions taken by the United Nations, the South African letter stated:

"On the question of South Africa's withdrawal from the Territory according to the wishes of the inhabitants, my Prime Minister stated: 'We do not occupy the Territory. We are there because the peoples of the Territory want us there. We do not force ourselves upon the peoples of the Territory and in this regard we take cognizance only of the wishes of the peoples of South West Africa.'"

55. In other parts of that letter the representative of the *apartheid* régime had the audacity to boast that South Africa had never been a colonial Power.

56. That was the response of the racist régime of South Africa to the Council's debate on Namibia in January 1976. It was crystal clear that South Africa had no intention whatsoever of changing its long-standing policy of challenging the United Nations and flouting its resolutions.

57. What was the response of the racist régime of South Africa to resolution 385 (1976)? It was a statement dated 18 August 1976 [S/12180, annex], published at Windhoek by the so-called Constitutional Conference, calling for the establishment of a puppet régime in Namibia under the guise of a new constitution and for a fake independence by the end of 1978.

58. No one was fooled by that thinly veiled trick aimed at getting around clear and unequivocal United Nations decisions and conditions for the genuine liberation and independence of Namibia. The so-called proposals of the *apartheid* régime were rejected by the African and non-aligned countries, and by the United Nations Council for Namibia. In the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization, the Secretary-General has stated the following in connexion with those so-called proposals:

"I feel obliged to say... that it is a matter of regret that these proposals fall far short of the essential conditions stipulated by the United Nations and do not, therefore, constitute an adequate response to the needs of the situation. At this late hour it is essential that South Africa co-operate fully with the United Nations in resolving this matter to the satisfaction of the people of Namibia and of the international community."<sup>5</sup>

59. If there is still need to review the developments during the last nine months as to the compliance of the racist régime of South Africa with the provisions of resolution 385 (1976), it is no secret to anybody



that not a single provision of that resolution has been implemented by South Africa. It still continues its illegal occupation of Namibia. It continues to militarize the Territory of Namibia and to utilize it as a base for its aggression and military incursions against neighbouring African countries. Zambia's complaint to the Council last July [S/12147] is still fresh in the minds of all of us. The racist régime of South Africa continues to resort to its brutal methods of racial segregation in Namibia, persecution assassination of freedom fighters, and torture of innocent women and children. In the United Nations Council for Namibia we heard, only a few days ago, a most shocking account by Mr. Bill Anderson, a former member of the armed forces of South Africa stationed in Namibia, who was an eyewitness of those brutal practices and who informed the Council for Namibia about the collaboration between the racist régime of South Africa and Israel.

60. South Africa is still going on with its sinister plan aimed at dismantling the unity of the people of Namibia and breaking up the territorial integrity of Namibia through the so-called constitutional talks, where it dreams of using its puppets as a cover to perpetuate its domination over the Territory of Namibia.

61. The Security Council's inability to take effective measures up till now against the racist régime of South Africa has encouraged, and will no doubt encourage, that régime to continue its oppression of the people of Namibia, and therefore will prolong the suffering of the Namibian people in their struggle for freedom. In such circumstances the struggle of the African people in Namibia will continue under the leadership of SWAPO, the authentic liberation movement of the Namibian people. Their struggle will continue until they achieve their freedom and get rid of the illegal occupation of the *apartheid* régime and attain their rightful independence.

62. Egypt, as an African country and as a member of the non-aligned movement, has always wholeheartedly supported, and will continue to support, the heroic struggle of the Namibian people to achieve their inalienable right to self-determination and independence.

63. The area has become an acute hot-bed of tension and a real threat to peace in the African continent and it is the duty of the Security Council, as the organ entrusted with the responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security, to act accordingly. The Council should go beyond the simple condemnation of the racist régime of South Africa, which has accumulated a shameful record of condemnations reminiscent only of Israel the racist régime's ally and supporter. The Council should act in a responsible manner by imposing effective sanctions on that international recidivist. I should like to refer here to the resolution adopted by the Summit Conference of the

Non-Aligned Countries in Colombo<sup>6</sup> which, called upon the Council to live up to its resolution 385 (1976) and, in the event of the non-compliance of South Africa with the provisions of that resolution, to consider appropriate measures, including recourse to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

64. I should like to conclude my statement by quoting from the speech delivered by President Sadat at the Conference I have just mentioned:

"The second case is that of the struggle of the African people against the racist minority régimes in Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia. Certainly the escalating struggle of the brotherly African people which are carrying the burden of direct confrontation with these terrorist-racist régimes should be met with a definite commitment on our side to support the right of our brothers in those territories to a decent free life. Unless the aggressors feel that the non-aligned countries' denunciation of their attitude will be translated into action and political and military measures, they will think that they can continue with their aggression without having to pay the price for it."

65. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Algeria. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

66. Mr. RAHAL (Algeria) (*interpretation from French*): I should like first of all to express my pleasure and that of my delegation at seeing you, Mr. President, presiding over the meetings of the Council at a time when, once again, it is dealing with the question of Namibia. It was particularly fitting that this debate, which is of such importance to the African countries, should be opened under the guidance of one of the representatives of Africa in the Council. But in our view it is more significant that it is precisely a representative of northern Africa who is presiding over a debate on a problem of southern Africa. Of course, this is simply a reflection of a reality which can no longer be disregarded, namely, the mobilization of all African countries in a struggle which is of paramount concern to the future and the destiny of their peoples. In that struggle, we are familiar with the role played by the Libyan Arab Republic and the active support which it unswervingly gives to all liberation movements on our continent. You yourself, Mr. President, have participated in that support, and the honour conferred on you of guiding this debate is a just tribute to the militant of the past as well as to the politician and diplomat of the present.

67. The problem of Namibia is one of the problems which have for so long recurred on the agenda of the General Assembly and of the Security Council, that we are justified in feeling that its elements are no longer a mystery to anyone. In fact, the evolution of this question is so well known and there is such

general agreement among the members of the Council on the key to its solution that we might well wonder why it has been so difficult until now to arrive at a solution, concerning which there is no lack of Council resolutions. These decisions have always declared the presence of South Africa in Namibia illegal. They have thus requested the Pretoria régime to withdraw its administration and its army from the Territory and to transfer the power which it illegally exercises there to the people of Namibia, with the assistance of the United Nations. The future of Namibia was then to be determined by free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations.

68. The Council, through its decisions and within the framework of its responsibilities towards the people of Namibia, has not failed on many occasions to explain its threefold concern: to safeguard the territorial integrity of Namibia, which must be restered to its people in its totality; to protect the political unity of Namibia by refusing any measure aimed at leading to a parcelling out of Namibia, especially through the creation of bantustans; and, finally, to oppose any extension in Namibia of the *apartheid* régime which the long-standing administration of South Africa might be tempted to establish there.

69. South Africa's resistance to complying with decisions as universally approved as these does not suffice to explain the persistence of this problem and the difficulties which have for many years been preventing the implementation of a solution.

70. It must be acknowledged that, for better or for worse, the problem of Namibia is part and parcel of the situation throughout southern Africa and, in particular, of the situation in Rhodesia and also of the persistence in South Africa of a system based on *apartheid* and determined to ensure its survival if need be against all the rest of Africa. The maintenance of Namibia under the control of South Africa is part of the defence strategy of the Pretoria régime, just as is the consolidation of a white racist minority régime in Rhodesia. Any solution of the question of Namibia necessarily has implications with regard both to the situation in Rhodesia and to the capacity for resistance of the *apartheid* system. Inversely, it is impossible seriously to consider a solution of the Namibian problem while ignoring this context, in which all these questions are placed and so closely related. This has become particularly obvious lately, but I am taking great pains to stress it precisely in order to refute the reasoning that might be put forward by some according to which, going from the simple to the more complex, it would be useful to consider the different questions separately and temporarily to set some of them aside in order to achieve success in others. This would no doubt be recognizing the components of a situation which is certainly extremely complex, but it would also be disregarding their effects on each other, which condition their combined development.

71. We feel that this is one of the difficulties which have complicated the search for a solution to the Namibian problem up to now. We also feel that, by using the close relation I have pointed out between the problems of Namibia, Rhodesia and South Africa, we could accelerate the process of a comprehensive solution, since any progress achieved in one problem must necessarily have repercussions on the others. It seems that we have now embarked on this course and, while we are certainly gratified at this, we feel that all the efforts made should be geared towards keeping to this course and perhaps even clarifying it further, because we cannot over-emphasize that, in our opinion, it would be illusory to try to resolve the problem of Namibia, or that of Rhodesia, without tackling most energetically and resolutely the problem of the system of *apartheid* on which the South African régime is based.

72. This analysis would be very naive if it did not also make mention, among the elements which add to the complexity of the question of Namibia, those which are based on considerations or interests of a strategic, political, economic or commercial nature and which introduce extra-African factors in to any future development of the situation. We do not want to recall once again the links which exist between South Africa and the great Western Powers and which have undeniably contributed to maintaining the *apartheid* régime. We have learned to our cost that international relations are determined by a balance of interests perhaps even more than by a balance of forces. Therefore, it should no longer be necessary for us to wonder about the intentions underlying political attitudes, but we can no longer be fooled by them.

73. The international situation has never been so favourable to a solution—so long awaited—to the question of Namibia. That is no doubt a result of the struggle of the people of Namibia themselves, who, under the leadership of SWAPO, have shown their determination to regain their freedom and take their fate into their own hands. It is clear also that the problem of Namibia is now in an entirely new context because of the liberation of the former Portuguese colonies, because of the progress in the struggle of the Africans in Zimbabwe and, finally, because of the revolutionary movement against *apartheid* now developing in South Africa. The situation in southern Africa as a whole obviously poses genuine threats to peace in that region and in the world, because it has developed to a point where it could bring into play factors that are much more important to the international balance. The very interests that have been linked to the survival of *apartheid* and the strengthening of the Pretoria régime are now being shaken by the deep changes that are on the horizon, changes which are gaining more and more momentum.

74. So it is not just by chance that the problems of southern Africa are now at the forefront of international concerns. We are following with attention and

a great deal of interest the initiatives of the United States Secretary of State. Of course, they can be judged only by their results. Nevertheless, we feel that they have the merit of taking into account the close link between the various problems which exist in the region and which, as I have already said, are actually due to the persistence of the system of *apartheid* in South Africa. The success of these initiatives thus depends on their final effect on the situation in South Africa itself. This means that, in our opinion, these efforts would be completely undermined if they were designed only to obtain an additional respite for the *apartheid* régime or to delay the time-limit which Pretoria must necessarily accept. In the last analysis it is for the Africans themselves, and above all those who are directly concerned in these questions, to see to it that their true objectives are not sacrificed to immediate but illusory advantages.

75. As to Rhodesia, it appears that we are moving towards the convening of a constitutional conference that would make it possible for the African representatives and the representatives of the white minority to work out the arrangements for establishing a system of government by the majority. It may perhaps be as well to recall that this is a long-standing demand of the African countries, who made a suggestion to that effect in the Security Council itself. As the African countries requested, this conference will be placed under the responsibility of the United Kingdom, which will thus again assume its prerogatives as administering Power. If my information is correct, our colleague Ambassador Richard—who, fortunately, has just returned to the Council chamber—will preside at the conference. The responsibility just entrusted to him is no doubt a very heavy one, but it is an expression of the high esteem in which Ambassador Richard is held. This appointment is a tribute to him for the qualities that we here have had the opportunity of appreciating, and it is an honour to the United Nations diplomatic corps. I should like to digress a bit from the subject of this statement and extend to him my personal congratulations and tell him how much hope we place in the success of his task.

76. That success, we are sure, will have immediate effects in Namibia, where everything still remains to be done. There the United Nations still has full responsibility, and whatever initiatives may be taken to define possible solutions should not in any way release the Organization from its obligations. We therefore think that the time has come for the United Nations Council for Namibia and the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia to play a more active role in the events now taking place, and that it is up to them to reaffirm their powers and their duties as representatives watching over the interests of the people of Namibia.

77. The purpose of this series of Security Council meetings is clear and precise. It was defined in the

resolution 385 (1976). Thus, what the Council has to do today is to consider how far South Africa has implemented the decisions of the Council and, in the event of non-compliance to envisage the appropriate measures to take under the Charter.

78. The situation developing in southern Africa and the various diplomatic activities undertaken there cannot, in our opinion, change the significance of this debate. On the contrary, it is through the Council's decisions, through the measures it will take, that it will be possible to ensure the success of these initiatives, to keep them directed towards the genuine purposes they should pursue and to see to it that they take into consideration all the elements of a complex situation, a situation that it would be dangerous to approach only through some of its parts.

79. It is, in fact, up to the Council to provide the central impetus towards the harmonious development of the solution of all the questions of southern Africa, and, since in the last analysis it is on the Pretoria régime that the decisions of the Council must be imposed, this debate is more necessary than ever, since it will enable the Council to decide upon the measures it must take in exercising the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Charter. We therefore we urge the Council fully to assume its responsibilities. At a time when it should be more active and vigilant than ever, we expect it to use its authority and all the possibilities which Chapter VII of the Charter places at its disposal to force the Pretoria régime finally to implement the resolutions on the solution to the Namibian problem which have been so often reaffirmed.

80. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kenya. I welcome him, and I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

81. Mr. WAIYAKI (Kenya): Mr. President, first I wish to thank you and the members of this Council for inviting Kenya to participate in this important debate. May I also express to you my delegation's pleasure and satisfaction at seeing you, a son of Africa, presiding over the Security Council when this body is once again taking up the question of Namibia, a country of our great continent. Libya, a country with which we have cordial relations, has been in the forefront in the liberation of Africa. Your personal experience and skill in international matters will no doubt be invaluable in the current debate.

82. Although not now a member of the Council, Kenya wishes to co-operate in this debate to help the Council come up with a concrete and, we hope, immediate solution to the vexing problem of Namibia.

83. When the Council last met to discuss the situation in Namibia it unanimously adopted resolution 385 (1976), in paragraph 12 of which it decided "to

remain seized of the matter and to meet on or before 31 August 1976 for the purpose of reviewing South Africa's compliance with the terms of this resolution". The Council therefore has a duty to consider the matter impartially and to decide whether South Africa has complied with the various demands that were made in that very important resolution.

84. In the view of my delegation, the Council made five demands on South Africa relating to the Territory of Namibia.

85. The first of these, and probably the most important, was that South Africa take steps to effect withdrawal from the Territory it has been occupying illegally since its Mandate was terminated in 1966. As the members of the Council and all of us know, South Africa has persistently refused to comply with this demand. Indeed, the recalcitrant behaviour of South Africa did not begin in 1966. As the Council will remember, South Africa refused to comply with the request of the Organization to place the Territory of Namibia under the Trusteeship System that came into effect when the United Nations was established. This refusal and the administering Power's persistent denial of human rights to the indigenous people of Namibia led the Organization to seek the legal opinion of the International Court of Justice. The Opinion of the Court is well known. South Africa alone disputes it. We must therefore ask ourselves whether in the interim period since the adoption of resolution 385 (1976) South Africa has taken steps that in any manner show the members of the Council that it is prepared to withdraw from the Territory of Namibia. In the view of my delegation it has done nothing.

86. The Council was quite clear in its demands to South Africa on how it was to prepare its withdrawal from Namibia. It demanded that South Africa urgently make a solemn declaration accepting the provisions for the holding of free elections in Namibia under the supervision and control of the United Nations. That was the second demand made upon South Africa. Kenya has followed the activities of South Africa relating to its responsibilities for the Territory of Namibia in the time that has elapsed since the adoption of the resolution in January, and again it is a matter of great concern and regret that we have not seen any evidence to convince us that South Africa has made such a solemn declaration. In an attempt to confuse the international community and to continue manoeuvring with a view to entrenching the supremacy of the white person in Namibia, South Africa conducted the now very much publicized so-called constitutional talks in Windhoek. But that was not what the Council demanded of South Africa. The talks, which were attended by delegates hand picked by South Africa, were, in the view of my delegation, illegal, as they were organized by South Africa, which was itself illegally occupying the Territory of Namibia. Moreover, the instructions of the Council were that there should be elections freely

conducted and supervised by the United Nations. There is no mention by the South African authorities, so far as we are aware, that the so-called constitutional talks were to lead to free elections, let alone of their being supervised by the United Nations. This we consider to be another violation and a rejection of the demands made on South Africa by the Council.

87. The third demand made on South Africa by the Council was that it immediately cease applying its racist policies of creating bantustans or the so-called homelands in Namibia. The evidence available to us and, I am sure, to members of the Council is that the so-called talks had been aimed at preserving the present structure of government—namely, at keeping the indigenous people in their tribal home areas and the white population in the so-called military zone. As is well known by the Council, the legislative organ that was to emerge from those talks and, after that, from elections based on those talks, was to be based on representatives who were to come from the homelands of the various tribes in the region. It is therefore clear that South Africa has also failed to comply with this third demand.

88. The fourth demand made in this resolution was that, pending the transfer of powers to the indigenous people, South Africa must in spirit and in practice comply fully with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, release all Namibian political prisoners, abolish the application in Namibia of all racially discriminatory and politically repressive laws and practices, and unconditionally accord to all Namibians currently in exile for political reasons full facilities for return to their country without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment. As is well known, not only did South Africa bar the return of the exiles—in this case, the true representative of the Namibian people, namely, SWAPO—but it continued to harass and arrest those people who in any manner disagreed with the South African authorities in the conduct of the so-called constitutional talks or opposed the continuing occupation of their land.

89. The last demand that was made on South Africa was that it cease to make Namibia a military base. We had occasion to condemn South Africa for using Namibia as a military base to attack the independent Republic of Angola. South Africa came to the Council and tried to defend its position, which was, of course, rejected. It is a matter of great concern to us that even after the Council condemned the behaviour of South Africa in relation to its use of Namibia to attack Angola, South Africa has seen fit to use that same Territory as a military base to attack another independent African State, namely, Zambia. And Council debated, not too long ago—in July—the Zambian complaint against South Africa.

90. So to sum it up, in the view of my delegation, there is no doubt that South Africa completely defied the supreme organ of the United Nations—namely,

Security Council. Some may try to convince the Council that South Africa made a positive gesture by announcing, through a tiny communiqué after the so-called constitutional talks, that independence would be granted to Namibia by the end of 1978. My delegation refuses to accept this as compliance in any manner with the demands of the United Nations that Namibia be accorded its inalienable right to move towards full independence. Moreover, as I stated earlier, the independence envisaged by this communiqué clearly violated the concept of free elections and the preservation of the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia, as it proposes to establish bantustans, contrary to the United Nations demands.

91. As I hope I have clearly shown, South Africa has not complied with the letter of the spirit of the demands made by the Council in January of this year. My delegation would therefore like to make the following proposals for the consideration of the Council on the next steps that should be taken:

92. First, South Africa should, without delay, recognize the authentic representatives of the Namibian people—namely, SWAPO—and enter into negotiations with that organization, with a view to convening a proper constitutional conference under the auspices of the United Nations. SWAPO, being the authentic representative of the Namibian people, should not just be invited to that conference, it should be involved in its preparation. Indeed, SWAPO would act as the chief political party to call on all the other small parties to close ranks so as to present a united platform during the conference.

93. Secondly, the United Nations should, we feel, consider sending a buffer force to Namibia to protect the interests of the Africans, as well as to establish its presence in the Territory. We feel that this force could be used to help supervise the organization and conduct of the elections.

94. Thirdly, if South Africa refuses to comply with the first proposal—which, in the view of my delegation, would lead to a peaceful transfer of power—then it is incumbent on the Council to recommend economic and other measures of compulsion that will oblige South Africa to comply with its decisions. Such measures should include a complete embargo on the sale, gift or transfer of arms and other forms of military equipment to South Africa. It should also include the cutting off of all economic ties with South Africa. This perhaps would be difficult, but it is a matter that the Council should consider.

95. And, finally, we would call on all States to give material and moral support to SWAPO in order for it to wage an intensive armed struggle to evict South Africa from Namibia.

96. Before concluding my statement, I should like to take this opportunity, on behalf of my Government, to

thank Mr. Sean MacBride. It is our view that he has been a dedicated servant of the Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia and that he has carried out the mandate entrusted to him by the General assembly—namely, preparing Namibia for independence.

97. We have stated on many occasions that the defiance by South Africa of the opinion of the international community is eroding the authority of the United Nations and, if allowed to continue, will constitute a dangerous precedent. Article 25 of the Charter obliges all Member States to comply with the decisions of the Council. We would therefore urge that all countries should refrain from placing short-term economic interests above human dignity and the ideals of the Organization. I am confident that the Council will discharge its obligations and demand that South Africa fully comply with its demands. And I want to observe in conclusion that any intransigent Members like South Africa ought to be expelled from the United Nations.

98. The PRESIDENT: The last speaker is the representative of Mauritius, whom I invite to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

99. Mr. RAMPHUL (Mauritius): I am happy to report that I have received from Mr. Scranton, the representative of the United States, a letter in which, after consultations with Mr. Kissinger, he has replied to the questions I raised here on Tuesday [1956th meeting]. The letter has been distributed as an official document of the Council [S/12206].

100. I wish publicly to thank Mr. Scranton and the delegation of the United States for having provided me with civil answers to my civil questions. I consider that the exercise of raising those preliminary questions at an earlier stage of the debate has been constructive and useful. I shall be commenting on those replies at a later stage, and I am sure that all members who will be participating in the Council debate on the question of Namibia will bear in mind and take into consideration the replies that have been provided to us by Mr. Scranton.

101. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Saudi Arabia has requested to be allowed to speak. Accordingly, I shall ask him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

102. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): Mr. President, it is superfluous for me to congratulate you on assuming the responsibility of the presidency, because I have known you for many years, and, as they say in Arabic, my testimony about you will not hold up in court because of my affection for your person, aside from your position as the representative of Libya.

103. I have personally been seized of mandates since 1922, 54 years ago, and I shall not go into the

historical background of mandates. They were nothing but colonialism in disguise.

104. I had the privilege of being contacted by none other than the Foreign Minister of South Africa, Mr. Muller, in 1966; he wished to ascertain my views on the question of what was then known as South West Africa, and I was very candid with him. I told him that more than 45 years had passed without South West Africa being liberated, and at that time I mentioned that it would be wise for his Government to agree to the appointment by the United Nations of two administrators to accelerate the liberation of the mandated Territory. He was a reasonable man. He toyed with the idea, but he was not the policy formulator of his country and this encouraged me to submit in 1967, during the special session on Namibia, a draft resolution calling for the appointment of co-administrators, along with South Africa, to accelerate the liberation of the Territory.

105. Then a representative, whose nationality I do not want to mention, came up with the idea of the United Nations Council for Namibia. He played on the sentiments of our African brothers and they turned their backs on me and settled for the Council for Namibia. Then I warned South Africa, here and in the Assembly, that it would be just a question of several years before the struggle would begin and then South Africa would have to accede to the demands of the people of South West Africa, otherwise known as Namibia.

106. Now, if we are going to air our views without getting a practicable solution, then I believe that things may take a turn for the worse. May I humbly give you an idea, now that I have spoken with several persons and with my good friend the United Nations High Commissioner for Namibia, an illustrious gentleman. I am convinced that there is a way to accelerate the liberation of South West Africa, otherwise known as Namibia, without further conflict, provided that both parties are willing to collaborate, and when I say both parties I mean the Government of South Africa and SWAPO, the representative of Namibia.

107. Succinctly, I would suggest that the Secretary-General preside over an initial meeting between Mr. Vorster, if he wishes, and whomever he wants to accompany him from among the African friends of South Africa. They would form one party. SWAPO would form the other party. That would be an initial, practical and practicable step; otherwise, negotiations will be protracted and the whole affair will get out of the hands of the Security Council and of the General Assembly if we meet again on this question. There should be a meeting between Mr. Vorster, or his representative, and SWAPO representatives, under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General, with our friend Mr. MacBride assisting and serving as catalyst.

108. If, on the other hand, Mr. Vorster or his Government should opt for the holding of a plebiscite to ascertain who represents Namibia, I can assure the Council that the trouble would begin again and that there might be a continuation of the conflict. How do I know? Because I have lived under mandates and know how high commissioners and their agents act when they are in a territory which does not belong to them. Of course they want to bring in their stooges, who conduct plebiscites the way they choose, and then trouble starts.

109. I do not say that those Africans who may accompany Mr. Vorster should not have a voice; they should have a full voice. But, really, had there been no SWAPO, the Mandate would have continued for another 50 years. Therefore, there are two parties. Mr. Vorster, if we may say so, and SWAPO—and Mr. Vorster is free to bring with him any Africans who would like to co-operate with him and with SWAPO. The alternative will be protracted Council meetings, leading to nothing, and then innocent people will lose their lives. That is one thing we do not want to see.

110. I am also in favour of two interested parties who are not in the area lending their good offices though not as Governments. They should choose from among their nationals representatives who are known for their integrity to work out a constitution. Somebody suggested that gentleman who is a tower of strength, Mr. Ivor Richard. I think he would contribute greatly because of his integrity. I would not know who the Americans have of equal status with Ambassador Richard. I mean that; I am talking seriously. We have known Ambassador Richard for only a short time but he has gained our confidence. I do not say our American friends have not gained our confidence, but this is an election year and I do not know who might be appointed. That is a practicable solution; otherwise, again, again and again we shall be bogged down in interminable bitter debates which may finally end in a protracted struggle.

111. To sum up, therefore, may I, as an old-timer—I am not a member of the inner circle, I am on the edge of the circle—, ask you to consider seriously what I have told you from my humble experience with mandates and those who operate them, and to follow a line that, I hope, may lead to a practical and practicable solution.

112. I thank you, Mr. President, and the other members of the Council for having afforded me the opportunity to speak again on this subject, in the hope that a draft resolution incorporating some of those ideas will emerge.

113. The PRESIDENT: The list of speakers has now been exhausted, but, before I adjourn the meeting, I should like, in my capacity as representative of the LIBYAN ARAB REPUBLIC, to take this opportunity

to thank all members of the Council for the excellent co-operation they have given me in the course of the month of September and also for the courtesy they have shown me, not only in the public meetings but also during our numerous contacts, consultations and informal meetings.

114. When I spoke for the first time in the Council, in January of this year, I said:

“We come to the Security Council without any pretensions. We know that the Libyan Arab Republic is a small, developing country. History teaches us, however, that small nations can and must play a very important role in international politics and within the Organization. Especially now, in the so-called era of détente, they can play their role and influence events individually or collectively, in spite of the fact that they are threatened, pressed and blackmailed by some big Powers.” [1870th meeting, para. 131.]

115. We know that not everyone welcomed our election to the Council or our assumption of the presidency for this month. The biased mass media, the evil forces of zionism and of imperialism attacked Libya on the occasion of our assumption of the presidency of the Council. But we are sure that the support that we enjoyed from members of the Council and from the membership of the United Nations on our election is proof that the pretensions and accusations of these forces of evil were not true.

116. Also, when I spoke about the role of small nations in history and in our Organization, I said that because we Libyans have learned from our own experience. In 1949, our cause was brought before the United Nations. There was an agreement between some European Powers to delay the independence and unity of Libya. The decision passed through the First Committee. When it arrived before the General

Assembly it could not pass because it lacked one vote—one vote only. At that time the pressure of the big Powers, of the Big Brother—and at that time there were many Big Brothers—on the small nations was tremendous and the vote was very tight, and just one small country changed its vote in favour of the draft resolution and voted against it in the General Assembly. It was Haiti, a small country linked to Africa and Haiti's vote, cast by Ambassador Saint-Lot in the General Assembly, which changed the history of Libya at that time. It was just not the history of Libya but the whole struggle in Africa. At that time Libya was the least developed country in northern Africa. That decision was a very important one in provoking and accelerating the fight for liberation in North Africa and throughout the whole continent of Africa. So one vote cast by a representative of a small country changed history at that time. For that reason we said that we small countries can play a role in the international Organization because we have the proof. We have learned it from our own history.

117. I have just mentioned Ambassador Saint-Lot, a great man from Haiti, who passed away some days ago. On this occasion I offer my condolences to his nation and his family on behalf of the grateful people of Libya.

*The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.*

*Notes*

<sup>1</sup> See A/AC.131, SR.237.

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Plenary Meetings*, 11th meeting.

<sup>3</sup> Commission of Enquiry into South West Africa Affairs, established in 1962 by the Republic of South Africa under the chairmanship of Mr. F. H. Odendaal.

<sup>4</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 106, document A/7754.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, *Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 1A*, p. 3.

<sup>6</sup> A/31/197, annex IV, resolution NAC/CONF.5/S/RES.3.

<sup>7</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Special Session, Annexes*, agenda item 7, document A/L.517.