


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COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Forty-first session

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 45th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 7 March 1985, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. CHOWDHURY (Bangladesh)

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GE.85-15504

The meeting was called to order at 10.55 a.m.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

1. After a brief exchange of views, the CHAIRMAN said it had been agreed that night meetings would be held as and when necessary.

QUESTION OF THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO COLONIAL AND OTHER DEPENDENT COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES (agenda item 12) (continued) (E/CN.4/1985/2, 7/Rev.1, 9 and Add.1, E/CN.4/1985/17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 54, 57, 58 and 60; E/CN.4/1985/NGO/4, 8, 13, 14, 15, 20, 21, 25, 28, 29, 34, 36, 38, 44, 50 and 52; E/CN.4/1985/L.12/Rev.1 and L.30; A/39/635 and 636)

2. Mr. HERNDL (Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights), introducing agenda item 12, said that most of the items on the Commission's agenda concerned its endeavours to study and understand issues affecting the realization and promotion of human rights, to draft norms and to promote their implementation through international co-operation. Item 12, however, involved the international community's reaction to non-observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, which had, unfortunately become all too frequent in the modern world. It was imperative that violations should be dealt with in a prompt and adequate manner since the continuation of serious violations of human rights not only entailed much human suffering but also appeared to engage the responsibility of the Commission as the main United Nations body responsible for the promotion and protection of human rights.

3. In his introductory statement at the 1st meeting of the current session, he had asked three questions. One concerned the issue whether there were measures and methods to combat gross violations of human rights, and the answer was that the Commission had pioneered new efforts in that domain. The second question concerned the speed of response to situations of gross violations, and the conclusion was that adequate and effective protection required that the response to emerging or actual problems should be swift. The third question was whether there existed situations of violations of human rights which were not addressed by the United Nations; he had expressed the view that the Commission might need to ask itself how the methods of selection could be improved and made more effective.

4. The General Assembly had repeatedly stressed that the international community should accord or continue to accord priority to the search for solutions to ~~mass~~ and flagrant violations of human rights. In its resolution 34/175, the Assembly had specifically urged the Commission to take timely and effective action in existing and future cases of mass and flagrant violations of human rights. In resolution 37/200, the Assembly had requested the Commission to continue its efforts to improve the capacity of the United Nations system to take urgent action in cases of serious violations of human rights, and at its thirty-ninth session, the Assembly had again referred to the disparity between the established norms and principles and the actual situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms. In its resolution 39/145, the Assembly had expressed concern at that situation and had urged all States to co-operate with the Commission in the promotion and protection of human rights.

5. In considering agenda item 12, the Commission had in practice dealt with country situations as well as thematic issues. All the pertinent documentation was listed in the annotations to the agenda (E/CN.4/1985/1/Add.1, pp.12-16).
6. The CHAIRMAN invited Viscount Colville of Culross, Special Rapporteur, to introduce the report on the situation of human rights in Guatemala (E/CN.4/1985/19).
7. Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSS (Special Rapporteur), introducing the report (E/CN.4/1985/19), said that it brought up to date the interim report (A/39/635), he had submitted at the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly. It contained additional information arising from his second visit to Guatemala in January 1985, which had enabled him to keep abreast of recent developments and to obtain information on a number of previously unanswered questions.
8. As indicated in paragraph 17 of the report, he had discussed methodology with the United Opposition (Representación Unitaria de la Oposición Guatemalteca), whose requests and suggestions would receive careful attention. The Opposition had suggested that he should not request military or governmental assistance, except in the case of official visits; that proposal, although made in the interests of impartiality, did not seem practicable. He could circulate copies of the Opposition's views and would welcome any advice from members of the Commission.
9. He had contacted Guatemalan refugees in Mexico, Honduras and Belize, but since those refugees were now the responsibility of UNHCR, he would in future concentrate on developments within Guatemala if his mandate was renewed.
10. An election time-table had been issued in an official Guatemalan communiqué dated 22 February 1985. The National Constituent Assembly was to complete the Constitution and Electoral Law by the end of May 1985; five days after those laws had come into force, elections were to be announced. Presidential, congressional and municipal elections were to be held on 27 October 1985, with a second round on 24 November 1985 if necessary. Congress and the municipal councils were to take office on 15 December 1985; the assumption of office by the President and the Vice-President, scheduled for 14 January 1986, would complete the return to civilian government. The Social Democratic Party had declared its intention of participating in the elections, which would significantly widen the political spectrum.
11. However, there was no sign of an end to guerrilla attacks and acts of individual violence by such groups as the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG), the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), and the Organización Revolucionaria del Pueblo en Armas (ORPA). Murders and abductions had been reported in the municipality of Patzun, Chimaltenango, only 50 kilometres west of the capital. The Government's detailed explanation had attributed the incident to a guerrilla group, although other organizations had blamed the army. The inefficiency of the criminal court system, described in paragraphs 110-115 of the report, had undoubtedly contributed to the problem of violence, despite some recent successful prosecutions. The number of accused who were not even brought to trial gave cause for serious concern.
12. He expressed his gratitude for the co-operation of the Centre for Human Rights and the Governments of the countries he had visited. His report was a controversial one, and his methods and views were not universally accepted. He was solely responsible for the contents of the interim report A/39/635 and the report currently under consideration, and would welcome the views and guidance of the Commission.

13. Mr. PUTZEYS-ALVAREZ (Observer for Guatemala), referring to the report introduced by the Special Rapporteur (E/CN.4/1985/19), said that the fundamental importance of human rights for the individual and society as a whole should not be overshadowed by abstract issues: it was essential to approach human rights problems in a positive way, with the aim of implementing and guaranteeing human rights in every country of the world. The cause of human rights should not be misused in order to serve other interests and promote certain political attitudes. It was criminal to sow dissension among peoples and try to justify policies of violence. The cause of human rights should not be used to justify attempts to overthrow Governments, support fratricidal armed conflicts and bring about the subjugation of a people. All persons, without distinction or preference, were endowed with human dignity: it was inadmissible that the inevitable differences between peoples should lead to conflict or aggression.

14. Activist human rights organizations could achieve positive changes and improvements in human rights situations, but all too often they were used in the struggle for power and influence by violent radical groups. The prestige of such organizations suffered as a result, despite their good intentions. Blind acceptance of the lies fabricated by propaganda campaigns could only contribute to the abuse of human rights. Sadly, instead of lending their support to improvements in human rights, they were helping to maintain human degradation and violence and condoning attacks on life, security, property, employment and peace, rights which all human beings enjoyed. Militant groups were the real enemies of those genuinely fighting for human rights.

15. The Commission should, above all, be impartial, drawing its conclusions from objective and substantiated facts, and maintaining balance in its resolutions. It was distressing that members of the Commission should take up an issue with their minds already made up, before the issue had been thoroughly analysed. In an important matter such as the study of the human rights situation in a country like Guatemala, which was under attack and subjected to an orchestrated barrage of criticism, one could at least hope that those who were empowered to carry out an analysis within the Commission would not confine themselves to parroting their Governments' instructions but would enlighten those Governments through their judgement and promote objectivity, impartiality and commitment to the cause of human rights.

16. The Special Rapporteur's report on Guatemala comprised an analysis of the situation, in accordance with the mandatory procedure, but it also contained some inconsistencies. The Guatemalan delegation had been surprised by the way in which the allegations brought to the attention of the Special Rapporteur had been checked. It was inadmissible that, after establishing personally that the allegations were false, the Special Rapporteur should not have made a detailed and precise statement about the inaccuracies in his so-called conclusions, and that various allegations which he had been unable to check (not through any lack of co-operation by the Guatemalan Government) had been presented as "human rights violations". The allegations should not have been accepted unless they had been checked. Similarly, it was inadmissible that, although the Special Rapporteur had confirmed that there had been substantial improvements in human rights in Guatemala, he had not explicitly recognized those improvements in his conclusions. Did not such an omission prove that the prevailing spirit was one of condemnation and castigation offensive to a country which had opted for democracy and the achievement of an honest improvement in the area of human rights? How could his delegation accept the fact that, although the report had stated that freedom of expression and freedom of the press and religion could not be questioned in Guatemala, that basic reality had not been acknowledged in the Special Rapporteur's conclusions?

17. What the Special Rapporteur stated in paragraph 256 (c) of his report concerning "violence and disappearances" was completely at variance with what he personally had found on the spot. Should he not have mentioned all the persons responsible for the violence, rather than use the vague and ambiguous phrase "whoever may be responsible"? Had not the present and previous reports referred to coercion, violence and other illegal acts by the guerrilla forces and terrorism, including murders, kidnappings and intimidation? Why had those violent acts not been mentioned in his conclusions, and why was there no recommendation that those crimes against the person and against human rights should be terminated? Why had the reports stated, in paragraph 256 (e) that "urgent consideration should be given to improving the working of the criminal courts", whereas it had earlier been stated that those who had broken the law, including members of the governmental forces, had been brought to trial? His delegation also took exception to paragraph 256 (f), which stated that "the development programme should receive every encouragement", but then went on ambiguously to suggest that the people might not have freedom to choose whether or not they wanted to live in development centres and that the wishes of the community might not be fully taken into account.

18. His delegation wished to make its position absolutely clear concerning the description of persons who had emigrated from Guatemala as "refugees". It was difficult to understand how that term could be applied to persons who had fled violence perpetrated by factions attacking a people's struggle to return to normality. In any event, it was clear that the United Nations was using a parallel procedure in dealing with those persons, through both the Commission and UNHCR.

19. His delegation also wished to make it clear that its serious reservations concerning the report did not in any way imply a criticism of the Special Rapporteur personally. Its sole concern was to remedy some of the obvious gaps, in order to make a positive contribution to the work of the Commission.

20. The term "concentration camps" had been misused in referring to the development centres, which contained neither physical nor ideological barbed wire to prevent people from entering and leaving as they pleased. If such a term could be used to describe a national effort to create schools, provide drinking water, establish churches, promote production, construct highways and generally improve the economy not only of the residents of those centres but of the nation as a whole, then it might be asked what criterion was being used to judge that effort. Similarly, how could the "civic action patrols" be seen as an instrument of aggression when they were no more than a decision of the people themselves to organize themselves in self-defence and to protect their right to a peaceful life? Guatemalans were tired of being given paternalistic lessons. When would foreign interests leave Guatemala in peace and respect its right to self-determination?

21. Guatemala was making efforts to move towards democracy. An electoral process had been initiated, with the participation of 17 political parties; in particular, the Social Democratic Party was returning to political life. Persons outside the country had been invited to return in order to participate in the elections. The national Constituent Assembly was examining the basic issues which would restore a true democratic order to the country. The Government would come to be exercised by civilians elected by the people. Furthermore, Guatemala had invited international organizations, including Amnesty International, to visit the country in order to observe its democratic efforts at first hand.

22. Unfortunately, in the area of human rights, no country, people or region was completely blameless. However, when proven paths of reaching a democracy existed, there could be no justification for invoking violence as the only possible expedient. There could be even less justification for using a simplistic philosophy to involve a body such as the Commission in matters which were not within its competence.

23. Mr. SUCRE FIGARELLA (Venezuela) said that events in El Salvador during recent years had rightly been of concern to the Commission and to the world. Human rights violations everywhere were a matter for the international community, which had a responsibility to appraise them objectively and dispassionately, eschewing political interests.

24. The various General Assembly and Commission resolutions on El Salvador had reflected the climate of civil conflict in that country. However, the basis of some views expressed had been ideological rather than factual. The Special Rapporteur's latest report (E/CN.4/1985/18) was based on considerations which a number of delegations, including those of Costa Rica and Venezuela, deemed fair. The situation in El Salvador had clearly improved, largely because, as the Special Rapporteur had acknowledged, the Government had followed his recommendations. The "death squads" had been brought under control, the judicial system's functions had been reformed, and there were fewer arbitrary arrests and disappearances. Although the situation was in many respects still serious, it was clearly the Government's policy to create a climate of genuine democracy based on respect for human rights. Moreover, as the Special Rapporteur's report showed, the provisions of international conventions were being increasingly observed in the conflict, thus improving the chances for a peaceful settlement of the socio-economic problems which had divided the country and for the process of political negotiation, as reflected in the continuing dialogue between the Government and minority sectors of the insurgent opposition.

25. The chief concern must be to ensure the progress of human rights by means of constructive policies aimed at ending the conflict and the exercise of democratic procedures based on majority opinion, voiced in free elections acceptable to the Salvadorian people and the world. The international community, as well as being critical of shortcomings, should also acknowledge the progress made in El Salvador, recognizing that events depended to some extent on moves towards peace throughout the region and the success of the Contadora process, which sought the conclusion of a peace treaty.

26. Although extremists of left and right had no wish to see the violence in El Salvador replaced by democracy, the majority of citizens were anxious for peace and the exercise of the people's sovereignty through a democratic system involving all political groups, with agreement on a programme of social and economic reforms and respect for the law. As the representative of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights had said when addressing the Commission, in Latin America human rights and representative democracy were closely linked. World opinion, including sectors sincerely critical of earlier events in El Salvador, was increasingly sympathetic to the approach adopted by that country's Government as an alternative to extremism. Venezuela, for its part, advocated no particular political doctrine for El Salvador but simply sought the establishment there of democracy and respect for human rights in place of the use of force and the maintenance of privilege for a few. Venezuela's stance was unfluenced solely by the wishes of the Salvadorian people, who were struggling to overcome the injustice and misrule of the past and to establish democracy.

27. It was to be hoped that the Salvadorian Government could complete the judicial reforms already initiated and establish genuine dialogue as a basis for national political life. The Farabundo Marti Front guerrillas should recognize that the way was open to peaceful solution and reform. Although human rights were fully respected in Venezuela, his country too had undergone years of strife similar to that in El Salvador, but it had subsequently established democratic rule on the basis of universal suffrage which had established a Government enjoying popular support.

28. His delegation and that of Costa Rica, following consultations with those of Mexico and Spain, had submitted a draft resolution (E/CN.4/1985/L.12/Rev.1) which recognized the progress of events in El Salvador, the desire to end armed conflict in that country, the establishment of democratic rule and the full exercise of human rights. The sponsors hoped that adoption of that text would further the Contadora process and promote genuine dialogue in place of sterile conflict.

29. Mr. RUPEREZ (Christian Democratic International) reiterated his organization's view that the documents before the Commission on the situation in Poland should include the ILO report dated 25 June 1984 (NGB 227/3/6), which drew attention to breaches of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which Poland had ratified. The report contained in document E/CN.4/1984/26 was very general in character, since the Polish Government had not replied to the questionnaire relating to alleged human rights violations. Moreover, the Under-Secretary-General's visit to Poland had been limited to talks with members of the Government, parliament, the pro-Government alliance, and the new, unrepresentative trade unions, as well as a few Church leaders. In the circumstances, the Special Rapporteur's mandate should be extended, so as to enable him to produce a detailed report on the situation in Poland.

30. Following the murder of Father Popieluszko, which had shocked the world, his organization had written to the Director of the Centre for Human Rights requesting that the Polish Government should be urged to clarify the circumstances surrounding it. Observers at the subsequent trial at Torun had expressed doubts about the court's impartiality; the Polish Government should be cautioned against attempts to influence the courts. The most surprising revelation of the trial, however, had been the evidence it had produced of the scorn for their compatriots emanating from the security services of an avowed people's republic. Their scorn extended to a religion practised by 95 per cent of the population; security officers were taught terrorism and disregard for basic freedoms during their training.

31. In February and March 1984, six persons, whose names he gave, had been abducted in the city of Torun and detained for a number of days in some cases; some had been handcuffed, tied to trees, beaten and threatened with death, probably by police officials. Attempts to institute proceedings had been quashed by the Prosecutor's Office. The Commission was urged to request the Government of the Polish People's Republic to provide information about the incident.

32. The right to popular participation had been dealt a blow in Poland by the dissolution of the independent trade union "Solidarity". That constituted a violation of human rights as well as a disincentive to work, which was particularly serious at a time of economic crisis.

33. For a number of years, Christian Democrats in Western countries had maintained direct relations with the Polish Catholic Social Union, and conferences had been held alternately in Poland and Western Europe at intervals of two or three years, the last one in Poland having taken place in 1981. However, the Polish authorities had refused passports to members of the Polish organization who had wished to attend the conference in Italy in January 1985. Moreover, control of the Polish organization had been usurped by government nominees. Such acts violated the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and of the International Covenants, which Poland had ratified. Although he appreciated Poland's problems, having lived in that country for two years, he felt bound to speak out on behalf of his organization against the human rights violations taking place there - as he would against such violations anywhere.

34. Parliamentary elections were to be held in Poland during July 1985, under a new electoral law which would enable independent candidates to stand for office. Such an event would be at least a first step towards compliance with the Yalta agreements, which inter alia had recognized the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they wished to live and had called for the holding, as soon as possible, of free elections based on universal suffrage and secret ballot. Such action still remained to be taken in Poland after a lapse of 40 years.

35. Mr. KOOLJMANS (Netherlands) said that in 1977, 1978 and 1984, the Commission had attempted to resolve the discrepancy between the public and confidential procedures available for examining allegations of human rights violations. In 1984, a number of delegations had asserted that it should refrain from adopting public resolutions on situations already being dealt with under the confidential procedure, but the majority had seen no impediment to its doing so.

36. A similar question had arisen in respect of Uganda in 1977, but the majority of delegations had then opposed undertaking a public inquiry because the situation was already being considered under the confidential procedure. The complexity of the problem was further illustrated by the fact that one delegation which had vigorously argued against public action had co-operated two years earlier in the establishment of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Situation of Human Rights in Chile even though Chile, like Uganda, was being considered under the confidential procedure. The Commission had been unable to resolve the difference of opinion and had agreed that the Secretary-General should solicit the comments of Member States on the subject, with a view to determining how procedural difficulties could be avoided. Those comments, including those of his Government, had been published in 1978 in document E/CN.4/1273 and the addenda thereto.

37. His Government had not changed its opinion since 1978. The Commission's original terms of reference clearly provided that it could submit reports, recommendations and proposals on any matter relating to human rights. In the mid-1960s, its work had been more specifically focused on human rights violations which, in response to requests from the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly, it had decided to consider annually.

38. When it performed those functions, it could draw upon information from all available sources, including other United Nations bodies and Member States. A special problem arose in respect of information received from private sources: in 1967, the Council had authorized the Commission to examine such information and had reinforced that authorization in resolution 1503 (XLVIII) of 1970. Those directives had been intended to enlarge the Commission's sphere of action, and not

to restrict its competence to deal with human rights violations wherever they occurred. Paragraph 8 of resolution 1503 required that members of the Commission and the Sub-Commission should not refer publicly to communications dealt with, views expressed or decisions taken under the confidential procedure until the Commission had decided to make a recommendation to the Council. That did not, however, preclude members from discussing in public sessions, on the basis of information other than communications received from private sources, particular problems relating to human rights in a specific country. Any other interpretation would unacceptably curtail the Commission's and Sub-Commission's competence. By way of illustration, he recalled that at the Commission's fortieth session, it had had before it a draft resolution on the state of siege in Paraguay. The existence of that state of siege had been common knowledge and the Commission had been entirely justified in adopting a resolution on that aspect of the situation, notwithstanding the confidential consideration of private communications relating to the same country.

39. The confidential procedure enabled the Commission to make use of the information contained in the thousands of communications received from private sources and to discuss certain human rights problems with the Governments concerned in a frank and serious atmosphere in closed session. His delegation could not accept the view that, as soon as problems involving a specific country had been dealt with under the **confidential** procedure, the Commission was no longer competent to deal with problems relating to the same country on the basis of other information; that would mean that, instead of widening the Commission's sphere of action, the confidential procedure served only to shield possible human rights violations from public scrutiny.

40. Mr. SOFINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the Salvadorian authorities and their "death squads" were engaging in acts of terror with increasing frequency. Murderers trained by foreign advisers had unleashed bloody reprisals on peasants in a village only 40 kilometres from the capital; in another village, they had machine-gunned nearly 400 peasants, including women and children; in June 1984, military units had killed nearly 70 residents of a number of small villages; on 30 August, soldiers had shot a large group of unarmed people who, according to eyewitnesses, had clearly been subjected to torture.

41. Over the past few years nearly 45,000 residents of a country with a population of 4.5 million had been killed, many thousands had been forced to leave El Salvador and there were 5,400 political detainees. Over half a million **orphaned children** had been left without shelter; hungry bands of those waifs were a pitiful sight in the streets of San Salvador. A Catholic priest had reported having witnessed the death of a 13-year old girl who, after seeing brutes in military uniform subject her parents to inhuman torture, had suffered a nervous breakdown. Doctors had discovered similar symptoms in the majority of children and adolescents who had been left to roam the streets.

42. The Salvadorian authorities were apparently preparing to implement "Project 1000" which, according to a correspondent of the Los Angeles Times, was a plan to resettle the residents of rural areas in reservations in order to isolate insurgents and facilitate the repression of partisans by murderers in the service of the **Government**. Under the project "strategic villages" similar to those once used in Viet Nam would be established.

43. Some representatives were making every effort to represent the Duarte régime as "democratic", but the facts argued otherwise. Recent information attested to the broad range of vigilante operations directed by the Duarte régime against patriots and innocent civilians under the pretext of combating the partisans. A number of battalions and brigades well-known for their cruelty, which had been trained by foreign advisers, took part in those operations, terrorizing citizens and attacking villages and transport networks. The activities of the "death squads" had simultaneously been stepped up.

44. Those actions revealed that the Duarte régime favoured a military solution to the Salvadorian problem and contradicted its assurances that it sought a political settlement through dialogue. Its guilt for the crimes which were being committed against the Salvadorian people was great, but those who sought by all means to retain that and other Central American countries as their political vassals and sources of raw materials also bore a heavy responsibility.

45. The people of Guatemala had likewise seen no change for the better in 1984. According to the Christian Science Monitor, from January to September 713 extrajudicial executions had taken place and 506 citizens had "disappeared". In other words, the repression of earlier years had not abated and the Government was deeply implicated. In November and December 1984, over 1,500 citizens had died or disappeared or had been thrown into prison. About 1 million citizens had fled to the mountains, the forests or Mexico, whose Government had established a special committee to provide assistance for the refugees. It deserved praise for those efforts, but the ratio of refugees to available camps was extraordinarily high and their living conditions were deplorable.

46. Residents of the eastern and northern departments of Guatemala suffered even more: a representative of the armed forces had declared that hundreds of rebels had been captured in military operations there. As it had turned out, the rebels had been 10 women, 6 elderly persons and 32 children who had been imprisoned and would soon be sent to a "model village". Those villages, which were in fact concentration camps, currently housed over 500,000 Guatemalans who had been taken there against their will on the pretext of having connections with the partisans. The villages had been established for the sole purpose of demoralizing the population and depriving the insurgents of support.

47. The successive military dictatorships in Guatemala, the inflated expenditures on vigilante forces and the constant inhuman acts in which they engaged seriously damaged the economy and jeopardized the fundamental rights of the citizens. Fifty per cent of the country's productive forces were paralysed; unemployment and underemployment currently affected nearly 50 per cent of the able-bodied population; taxes were constantly rising, as were the prices of food-stuffs, in some cases by a factor of four. Expenditure on the army had risen by over 50 per cent since 1972. The number of poor families had increased from 63.4 per cent in 1981 to 80 per cent in 1985. Fifty-two per cent of the urban and 80 per cent of the rural population were starving. Guatemala had the highest **infant** mortality and illiteracy rates in Latin America. A representative of the country's Indian population had recently declared that the bloody dictatorship was destroying his people simply because it was **struggling** for social justice. What was happening was nothing less than genocide and the parties responsible were not confined to the forces of reaction and militarism in Guatemala itself.

48. One could not help but notice that the trademarks of vigilantes in both El Salvador and Guatemala were very much alike: extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, torture, political detention, and the creation of "model" or "strategic" villages, which were in fact concentration camps. Such methods of repression all came from one source, which provided the régimes with advisers, weapons and funds. The régimes could not remain in power and pursue their repression of basic rights and fundamental freedoms without the military, political and financial support generously provided from abroad. The Western press had reported that overt military aid to the Salvadorian régime already totalled nearly \$2 billion. The vigilante forces were being trained by over 300 foreign advisers and were receiving both light and heavy weaponry, including tanks, armoured cars, helicopters and planes. Aid also flowed freely to the suppressors of freedom through loans and trade operations by private firms and totalled millions of dollars.

49. On the basis of General Assembly resolutions 39/119 and 120, the Commission should condemn the gross and massive violations of human rights and the terror, repression, torture and murder carried out by the dictatorial régimes in El Salvador and Guatemala. It extends the mandates of the Special Rapporteurs, and develop effective means of curtailing the inhuman policies and practices being applied in those long-suffering countries.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.