

believe in preventing British citizens from travelling to any country of their choice, including Rhodesia, but the figures he had quoted in his opening statement at the 2092nd meeting, which showed a rapid decline in net European immigration into Rhodesia, spoke for themselves.

61. With regard to the extension of existing sanctions, it was the view of his Government that such a measure should be considered only if the existing sanctions were fully applied and still failed to make an impact. Obviously, if Rhodesia were unable to import spare parts for its industries or to export its commodities, the régime would quickly be brought to its knees. It would be illogical to impose further sanctions while certain members of the international community did not apply those which had already been decreed. What was needed was continuous pressure on those countries, whether Members or non-Members of the Organization, which had not observed the sanctions to do so in the future.

62. Some speakers, including the representative of ZANU, had said that the United Kingdom had no right to organize a constitutional conference. Other speakers had urged the immediate convening of such a conference. As had been pointed out in his delegation's opening statement, his Government believed that a constitutional conference with the widest possible representation should be held as soon as favourable conditions for holding it had been created. The representatives of the existing régime should of necessity participate as should the representatives of all major groupings of Rhodesian African opinion. His Government considered that the conditions laid down for the holding of such a conference should not be so stringent that it would never be held. Otherwise, there would be a further hardening of attitudes and the present stalemate, which benefited no one, particularly the African population, would be prolonged. Moreover, it was contradictory to ask the United Kingdom to find an acceptable solution to the Rhodesian question and at the same time restrict its freedom of action in such a way as to prevent it from effectively exercising its responsibilities.

63. The fact that, nine years after the unilateral declaration of independence, the illegal régime was still in power, contrary to the wishes of his Government, certainly justified criticism and meant that the United Kingdom's policies had not so far been successful.

64. However, his Government utterly rejected certain allegations that had been made in the Committee. The United

Kingdom was not in collusion with the illegal régime and did not regard continuation of that régime as desirable for commercial, political or strategic reasons. It also rejected accusations of indifference to the lot of the African population of Rhodesia. The question of Southern Rhodesia was too serious to be used as a pretext for ideological debate. Indeed, the great variety of often conflicting opinions which had been expressed underlined the difficulties of the problem. Summarizing the positions of delegations, he noted that some had urged the immediate convening of a constitutional conference while others had said that that would be fruitless; some had called upon the administering Power to exercise its responsibilities, while others felt that that would do no good; some had reproached it for not using force and had urged it to do so, while others felt that the administering Power should create the political atmosphere necessary for sound dialogue.

65. In that connexion, he pointed out that the comparisons made between the use of force by Portugal to suppress the recent rising in Lourenço Marques, where it had a large number of troops at its disposal, and the failure of the United Kingdom Government to use force in Salisbury in 1965 were totally unjustified. The fact was that in 1965 his Government had not had a single soldier or policeman in Southern Rhodesia because it had never administered Rhodesia directly, much less maintained an armed force there.

66. Finally, while some had blamed his Government for its contact with the illegal régime, others had urged negotiations with that régime.

67. His Government would continue its efforts to reach a peaceful solution in Rhodesia; it would accept no solution which did not have the support of the African majority. It did not believe that force was the answer either in Rhodesia or in southern Africa in general. The régime was in an increasingly difficult position, and developments in southern Africa would increase the pressure on it.

68. In its efforts to reach a solution, his Government would continue to keep in close touch with those countries most directly affected by the régime's policies. It looked for co-operation and understanding from all members of the Committee in its difficult task and pledged itself to continue to make every effort to restore legality in Rhodesia.

*The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.*

## 2100th meeting

Tuesday, 29 October 1974, at 3.20 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Buyantyn DASHTSEREN (Mongolia).

A/C.4/SR.2100

### AGENDA ITEM 65

Question of Namibia (*continued*)\* (A/9623/Add.3, A/9624 (vol. I), A/9624/Add.1, A/9725 and Corr.1, A/9728, A/9775-S/11519, A/9786-S/11526, A/C.4/771)

### GENERAL DEBATE

1. Mr. JACKSON (Guyana), President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, introducing volume I of the report of the Council (A/9624) and the addendum to that report (A/9624/Add.1), said that the Committee, for the first time in

\* Resumed from the 2092nd meeting.

many years, was considering the question of Namibia against the backdrop of rapid change in the field of decolonization. The declaration of independence by Guinea-Bissau and the developments following the success of the liberation movements in other parts of colonial Africa were new and favourable elements in the struggle of the oppressed peoples of southern Africa for human dignity. Nevertheless, there were still areas in which the racists and colonialists, supported by their friends, continued to subjugate peoples and deny them their freedom.

2. Namibia was a glaring example of blind obduracy and callous intransigence. The South African régime continued to violate international law in that international Territory by its

illegal occupation. It ignored international public opinion and ruthlessly oppressed the people. There was an open confrontation between the people of Namibia and their racist oppressors, and between the illegal occupying Power and the international community. The brutal acts of the Pretoria régime cried out for universal condemnation. The international community, however, should take careful stock of the situation before preparing a comprehensive programme of action to expel the occupying Power from Namibia. Of cardinal importance was the need to give the Namibian people vigorous support through their authentic representatives, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), and the effort to isolate South Africa completely from the international community should be intensified. The United Nations Council for Namibia had been working on those two tasks during the past year.

3. During the year under review the Namibian people had stepped up their military campaign. Their successes had been so significant as to force the illegal occupying Power to replace its police in the war zones with army units and to strengthen its military infrastructure, thus violating the terms of the Mandate under which it claimed to administer Namibia. The Namibian people were engaging in heightened political activity despite the ruthless operations of the repressive State apparatus. The response of the racist régime had been a wave of terror that had forced hundreds of Namibians to flee their own country. Namibians were encouraged, however, by the fact that South Africa's security wall had been significantly breached by the positive developments in the Portuguese Territories and by improved prospects for the defeat of the white minority régime in Zimbabwe.

4. For reasons that were well known, the United Nations Council for Namibia had not yet been able to enter the Territory, as directed by the General Assembly in resolution 2248 (S-V). However, as its report showed, the Council had sought to maintain the closest possible contact with the Namibian people and to assist them in a variety of ways to prepare for the administration of an independent Namibia by Namibians.

5. For two years SWAPO, as the legitimate representative of the people of Namibia, had been participating fully in the work of the Council as an observer. The arrangement for permanent liaison with SWAPO through its resident representative in New York was essential, and the participation of SWAPO had been extremely beneficial to the Council. In view of Namibia's special position as an international Territory administered directly by the United Nations, SWAPO needed to be enabled to discharge fully the specific and important responsibility of representing the people of Namibia at the United Nations, and to that end it would be appropriate to make a financial grant to SWAPO for the purpose of maintaining its permanent representation in New York at a reasonable level.

6. During the year the Council had approved the establishment of an Institute for Namibia, which would be situated at Lusaka for the time being (see A/9624/Add.1, para. 73). The Council regarded the establishment of the Institute as a most important step in the preparations which the Namibians were making for running their country themselves. If it was to be successful, however, it would need a secure financial base. He appealed to Member States to make generous contributions for that purpose to the United Nations Fund for Namibia. The Council had, indeed, been heartened by the response of Member States to appeals for contributions to that Fund. With more resources the Council could develop existing and new programmes for assistance to Namibians. The Fund would be managed in future by a committee of representatives appointed by the Council under the new guidelines requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 3112 (XXVIII).

7. Missions from the Council had visited several countries in Europe and Latin America in 1974 with a view to strengthening its relations with Governments. Volume II of the Council's report would contain a detailed account of those visits; some of the Council's recommendations took account of its evaluation of the discussions and suggestions made during the visits. The Council was deeply appreciative of the friendly co-operation and ready understanding of the Governments with which it had been in contact.

8. The Council had worked and would continue to work in close co-operation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The identity of aims and unity of purpose of the two bodies had led to an increasing co-ordination of strategies.

9. The Council had been paying increasing attention to the representation of Namibia in the specialized agencies and at international meetings. It had been admitted to associate membership of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and was developing closer relations with other specialized agencies. It had represented Namibia at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, held at Caracas from 20 June to 29 August 1974, and on other occasions, with the aim of disproving South Africa's claim to represent Namibia and of ensuring that the interests of Namibia were properly protected.

10. The ruthless exploitation of Namibia's economic resources was continuing at a pace that suggested an intention to exhaust those resources before Namibians took control of their country's destiny. The question of the role of foreign private investment had occupied the attention of the Council for some time. A comprehensive study on the subject commissioned by the Council was expected to be widely distributed. The Council had also used its legislative authority to issue a Decree on the Natural Resources of Namibia (*ibid.*, para. 84) designed to secure the natural resources of Namibia in trust for the people of the Territory. He drew particular attention to the provision in paragraph 6 of the Decree that any person, entity or corporation contravening it might be held liable for damages to the future Government of an independent Namibia.

11. The international community should not be deceived by the minimal changes in the status of Namibian workers as a result of widespread international concern. The so-called improvements were peripheral to the basic structure of exploitation and repression. The position of the Council was unequivocal: the system had to be totally dismantled. Foreign private investment bolstered the illegal régime and would therefore have to be withdrawn.

12. The Council had taken certain steps to ensure that Member States complied with existing United Nations resolutions on Namibia. The steps taken were described in the Council's report (A/9624 (vol. I), paras. 196-198). Much remained to be done, however, and the Council urged Member States to take all appropriate steps.

13. The Council had placed special emphasis on the dissemination of information on Namibia and the work of the Council. Its objective was to mobilize world opinion against the forces of reaction in South Africa. It would pursue and intensify its policies and programmes in that sphere.

14. Of the recommendations and proposals put forward by the Council (*ibid.*, para. 267), the first group dealt with the programme of work proposed for the Council for 1975. They did not require specific approval by the General Assembly, which could, as in previous years, approve the report as a whole. A second group of recommendations dealt with actions which should be taken by the General Assembly. One important recommendation was the proposal to consult more fully with Governments. Another, calling upon all States to

refrain from financing any racially segregated activity in Namibia, was based upon evidence received by the Council that segregated activities were receiving financial and other support from outside Namibia. There was also a recommendation that the Secretary-General should be requested to set up a United Nations radio transmitter in an African State to broadcast programmes about United Nations policies on Namibia, human rights, racism and decolonization to people inside Namibia. A further recommendation related to an invitation to the Security Council, which had taken no action to advance the cause of Namibian freedom since December 1973, to take effective measures to put an end to South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia. Additional recommendations were made in the light of subsequent discussions in the Council (A/9624/Add.1, para. 85), in one of which it was suggested that the General Assembly should draw the attention of all Member States to the Decree on the Natural Resources of Namibia.

15. In 1974, Namibia had had a full-time Commissioner for the first time. The United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, a distinguished freedom fighter in his own right, had indeed been of valuable service to the Council and had discharged his responsibilities with determination and great initiative. The Council supported the extension of his contract for an additional year.

16. The objective of freedom and independence for Namibia would not be easily achieved. The usurpers in Pretoria would continue to use manoeuvres to frustrate the legitimate aspirations of the Namibian people and the will of the United Nations. One such manoeuvre—a proposal to hold discussions on the constitutional development of Namibia—had been categorically rejected by SWAPO and by the Council. If the international community fulfilled its tasks resolutely and full support was given to the Namibian people, victory would not be long in coming.

17. Mr. ARTEAGA (Venezuela), speaking as Rapporteur of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, introduced chapter IX of the report of the Special Committee on the question of Namibia (A/9623/Add.3), which had been prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3163 (XXVIII). In considering the item, the Special Committee had taken into account the provisions of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, in particular resolutions 3111 (XXVIII) and 3112 (XXVIII). The Special Committee had also given due consideration to the Security Council resolutions on Namibia and to the reports and decisions of the United Nations Council for Namibia.

18. The Special Committee had received extensive information from the representative of the liberation movement in Namibia, SWAPO, who had participated as an observer during the consideration of the item.

19. He went on to cite the most important points of the consensus approved by the Special Committee at its 973rd meeting (*ibid.*, para. 11).

20. Mr. GURIRAB (South West Africa People's Organization) said that he wished to speak as the legitimate representative of the people of Namibia at what was a historic moment in view of the new situation in southern Africa stemming from the changes in the Portuguese colonies. The forces of the liberation movements in Zimbabwe and Namibia were reorganizing their strategy in the armed struggle for national liberation. The Security Council was currently studying the status of South Africa in the United Nations. The South African régime constantly violated the principles of international law, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the United Nations Charter and the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. The prevailing trend in the Security

Council was to condemn South Africa and to expel it from the United Nations. His delegation was unique in that it included freedom fighters, three of them women, who had all participated in the liberation struggle, suffered imprisonment and had been subjected to torture by the South African régime and its police.

21. His delegation wished to associate itself with the report of the Council introduced by the representative of Guyana, which reflected the participation SWAPO, its desires and aspirations.

22. The CHAIRMAN said that if the Committee wished to conclude its work on the date set in the time-table, it would have to conclude the debate on agenda item 65 by Wednesday 6 November, at the latest. He therefore suggested that the list of speakers should be closed on Thursday, 31 October, at 1 p.m. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee agreed to his suggestion.

*It was so decided.*

#### AGENDA ITEM 67

##### Question of Southern Rhodesia (*continued*) (A/9623/Add.2, A/9809, A/C.4/777)

##### GENERAL DEBATE (*concluded*)

23. Mr. SILUNDIKA (Zimbabwe African People's Union) said that he wished to comment on the statements made by the representative of the United Kingdom at the 2092nd and 2099th meetings. First of all, he referred to the latter's statement on the measures taken by the United Kingdom in the case of the kidnapping of Mr. Ethan Dubé, Public Relations Officer of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) at Francistown, Botswana. He was disturbed by the assertion that the United Kingdom Government had been in contact with the Government of Botswana and with the ruling régime in Southern Rhodesia in order to clarify the circumstances surrounding that occurrence. He was at a loss to understand the statement that the United Kingdom Government had protested to the Ian Smith régime, since the master could not protest to his servant, in other words to the white régime in Southern Rhodesia. It was, in fact, an indirect method of conceding some legitimacy to the régime in Southern Rhodesia. ZAPU continued to note the unchanging attitude of the United Kingdom, which, consistently although indirectly, suggested recognition of the Smith régime.

24. In that connexion, he urged the Committee to adopt a draft resolution condemning the Rhodesian régime, as an agent of the United Kingdom, for that and all the other acts committed in violation of the principles of the United Nations, such as its attack on the sovereignty of a neighbouring State—Botswana—and the persecution of members of the liberation movement; the draft resolution should also call on the Ian Smith régime to refrain from such activities and should urge the United Kingdom to take all necessary steps to enable the freedom fighters imprisoned in Southern Rhodesia to obtain their release and rejoin their comrades.

25. The representative of the United Kingdom had declared in his first statement that his Government acknowledged its responsibility for the problem of Southern Rhodesia. In his opinion, that acknowledgement was of little importance. What concerned his movement was that the United Kingdom was in Southern Rhodesia, was the guilty party and was there in the form of the white minority régime. The Rhodesian régime was an internal matter, and the real problem was that there was a colonial situation in that Territory for which the responsible party was not the Smith régime but the United Kingdom Government.

26. At the previous meeting the representative of the United Kingdom had stated that States members of the Committee had submitted contradictory suggestions. Of course, those States could make their own replies to that remark, but he believed that members of the Committee could not be criticized for attempting to find a solution to a problem created by the United Kingdom. The real problem was the colonial situation in Southern Rhodesia for which the United Kingdom Government was responsible and for which it had no excuse. If that Government wished to co-operate in solving the problem, it must withdraw from Zimbabwe, thus complying with the resolutions of the United Nations which called upon it to leave the Territory. In that way, there could be no contradiction, since the attitude which the United Kingdom must adopt in order to face up to its responsibilities was clearly set forth.

27. It had been suggested that various solutions to the problem could be found; however, there was only one solution for Zimbabwe: majority Government, without discrimination, and independence for the Territory.

28. There would be no point in convening a constitutional conference in order to negotiate a solution favourable to the settlers and to the United Kingdom Government. If it desired a peaceful solution, the United Kingdom Government had only one way out: to leave Zimbabwe in the hands of the majority. That could be achieved only by recognizing the authenticity of the national liberation movements.

29. However, in view of the fact that there did not seem to be a peaceful way out, the liberation movements had taken the path of armed struggle. In that endeavour, they needed all the help that could be given in order to arrive at the logical outcome: the complete defeat of the enemy.

30. He thanked the Committee and Member States for the resolute support given to the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe.

31. Mr. MUKONO (Zimbabwe African National Union) said that the United Kingdom representative, in his second statement, made at the preceding meeting, had again stressed that his Government was not in a position to exercise its authority over the illegal régime in Rhodesia. That statement reinforced the position held by the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), namely that the United Kingdom had abdicated its authority over Rhodesia and should refrain from confusing world public opinion by saying one thing and doing another. In the nine years since the rebellion by the Smith régime, the United Kingdom had simply watched with pleasure the intervention of South African troops in Rhodesia and the murders of Africans in Zimbabwe. That clearly showed that the United Kingdom had neither the will nor the power to organize a constitutional conference in Rhodesia.

32. Moreover, a struggle was being waged in Zimbabwe which was already almost a conventional war. Even the racist South Africans had admitted that fact, as was clearly shown in a press release issued on 29 October by the Permanent Mission of South Africa to the United Nations, which stated that South Africa intended to establish a voluntary corps to take over from the frontier police because of the fact that what they described as the "struggle against terrorism in Rhodesia" was becoming increasingly difficult and necessitated the use of conventional weapons.

33. A war could be brought to an end only through talks between the adversaries. It was inconceivable, in a war situation like that obtaining in Zimbabwe, to expect one of the parties to lay down its arms in order to take part in a constitutional conference.

34. ZANU was at war with the illegal Fascist régime and was determined to struggle for national liberation until victory was achieved. It was tired of the hypocrisy of the United

Kingdom and wished to reiterate that that country should cease meddling in the affairs of Zimbabwe, since its tactics served only to support the white racist settlers.

35. In his statement on the question at the 2098th meeting, the representative of the United States had quoted the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Henry Kissinger, as stating in the General Assembly that the United States would support the aspirations of all Africans to enjoy the fruits of freedom and human dignity. However, in his secret memorandum of 1970, endorsed by Mr. Richard Nixon, the then President of the United States, Mr. Kissinger had said that, in his opinion, the whites in southern Africa would not be quickly dislodged. He had declared that the blacks had no hope of gaining their political rights through violence, which would only lead to chaos and an increase in communist influence. He had felt that the United States could use its influence over the whites to induce them to take a more flexible position and, at the same time, could use diplomatic channels and financial assistance to convince the African States that the liberation movements could not win through violence and that the only hope of those States for a prosperous future was to improve their relations with the white dominated States. Mr. Kissinger had indicated that United States interests in the area must be protected at an acceptable political cost. With regard to Rhodesia, he had pointed out that the United States must maintain consular relations with that Territory, must gradually weaken sanctions and must consider the possibility of eventually recognizing the régime. It was clear, therefore, that the United States was determined to perpetuate white supremacy in Southern Rhodesia. It was concerned with promoting its own economic and financial interests in the Territory, for which purpose it supported the oppressive racist régime. ZANU believed, however, that the power of the dollar would never succeed in corrupting the African States which genuinely supported its armed struggle.

36. It was well known that the United States was trading with the illegal Smith régime. A Rhodesian information office, which for all practical purposes literally performed the functions of an embassy, was operating in Washington. In addition, plans were currently being made to carry out a gigantic iron and steel project in Rhodesia, to be financed with capital, emanating from the United Kingdom, the United States, Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany Switzerland. That entire venture constituted a flagrant violation of United Nations sanctions, and ZANU would make all the relevant information available to the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968)—the Committee on Sanctions. It also hoped that those facts would be brought to the attention of the Security Council.

37. Mr. SIMITXHIU (Albania), replying to the statement made by the United Kingdom representative at the 2099th meeting, said that that country's relations with the Smith régime were known to all and that it was no secret to anyone that, without the support of the United Kingdom, the régime in Southern Rhodesia could not survive.

#### *Requests for hearings*

38. The CHAIRMAN informed the Committee that two communications had been received concerning the question of Namibia. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee wished the communications to be circulated as official documents of the Committee.

*It was so decided.*<sup>1</sup>

*The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.*

<sup>1</sup> The communications were subsequently circulated as documents A/C.4/771/Add.1 and 2.