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Chairman: Mr. K. Krishna RAO (India).

AGENDA ITEM 85

Draft Convention on Special Missions (*continued*)  
(A/6709/Rev.1 and Corr.1, A/7156 and Add.1 and 2;  
A/C.6/L.646, A/C.6/L.683, A/C.6/L.693, A/C.6/  
L.690, A/C.6/L.694, A/C.6/L.721)

Article 24 (*Exemption of the premises of the special mission from taxation (continued)*)

1. Mr. OSTROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation had voted against the French amendment (A/C.6/L.693), and against article 24 as amended, because it foresaw considerable difficulty in the practical application of that article as amended, and indeed it would be impossible in practical terms for States to act correctly on that basis. The ideas underlying the French amendment had some merit, but they had not been expressed in a satisfactory form. It was significant that, while 32 delegations had voted for the French amendment, 25 had voted against it and 25 had abstained. His delegation very much regretted that the Committee had not exhausted all the possibilities of finding a wording which would satisfy as many delegations as possible.

2. It was difficult to deal with the many problems that arose in the consideration of the complex text before the Committee within the confines of the five-minute rule, and his delegation feared that if that procedure continued, there would be increasing dissatisfaction with the results of the work, and the final text might not secure the necessary two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. Thus, if it was too hasty, the Committee might save minutes but waste the years spent in preparing the draft Convention. The Convention would be useful only if, so far as possible, it took account of the position of all States and reflected their interests.

3. The CHAIRMAN said that, while he felt the same concern as the USSR delegation, he was required to put an article to the vote once the discussion had been concluded, unless a proposal was made to postpone the vote.

4. Mr. ALCIVAR (Ecuador) said that his delegation had voted against the French amendment because it would, in effect, delete the whole of article 24. The

fundamental reason for the amendment, namely, the problems arising from the acquisition of premises for special missions of short duration, was entirely sound, but the wording would make the exemption of the premises of special missions from taxation a dead letter. His delegation hoped that the wording of the French amendment would not be approved by the General Assembly, and that it would be possible to agree on a text which provided for exemption of the premises of special missions from taxation as envisaged in the International Law Commission's draft.

5. Mr. TENA (Spain) said that his delegation had voted in favour of the French amendment because it felt that the amendment, far from limiting the scope of the original text, was a realistic recognition of the existence of practical problems arising from circumstances of time and place and the fact that special missions were not the same as ordinary missions. In its view, the French amendment did not deviate from the spirit of the original text, but rather followed the spirit of article 22 which, although it did not refer specifically to privileges and immunities, had guided the Commission in its drafting of article 24.

6. The word "compatible" in Spanish had a certain nuance which the term "compatible" in French did not have. The Drafting Committee might consider using "requerida" or some such word in the Spanish text. With regard to the Belgian amendment (A/C.6/L.683), it should be noted that the phrase "members of the special mission acting on behalf of the sending State" was not defined in article 1, and he suggested that the Drafting Committee might consider replacing that expression by "representative of the sending State in the special mission", which was defined in article 1 (e). Article 23 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, on which article 24 of the Commission's text had been based, referred simply to "the sending State and the head of the mission", and thus the use of a different wording in article 24 implied a wider exemption for special missions than was provided for permanent diplomatic mission.

7. Mr. OGUNDERE (Nigeria) said that his delegation had voted against the French amendment, because it felt that the phrase "the nature and duration of the functions performed by the special mission" related more to political than to fiscal considerations, which in its view were the proper criteria for tax exemption. The fiscal authorities of a State would find it difficult to apply the criteria laid down in the French amendment. He hoped that a happier wording would be proposed to the General Assembly in plenary meeting. Meanwhile, although his delegation was opposed to the French amendment, it had abstained in the vote on article 24 as a whole, as amended.

8. Jonkheer van PANHUYS (Netherlands) said that his delegation had voted against article 24 as amended, because it was not in favour of the principle underlying that article for the reasons stated in his Government's comments submitted in December 1966.<sup>1/</sup> It had, however, voted for the French amendment in order that, if the majority of the Committee approved the International Law Commission's text in principle, its scope would at least be limited.

9. Mr. HIDALGO VILLALTA (El Salvador) said that his delegation had voted against the French amendment, as being in line with the French amendment to article 21 (A/C.6/L.692), which it had voted against. In particular, it considered that the French amendment to article 24 introduced very subjective criteria, for it would leave the exemption of premises of special missions from taxation to the discretion of the receiving State. In some cases, exemptions might be granted because a special mission would be of very short duration, while in other cases it might be granted because the special mission would continue for a long time. His delegation preferred the text proposed by the International Law Commission.

10. Mr. RATTANSEY (United Republic of Tanzania) said that, while his delegation did not consider it unreasonable to grant fiscal exemption in respect of premises occupied by special missions, it felt that the International Law Commission's text of article 24 was not as specific as it should be. For example, the expression "the premises occupied by the special mission" was not defined; did it include the office or residence of the head of the special mission, or the residences, rented or purchased, of the members of the staff of the special mission? His delegation therefore favoured the French amendment, which gave the sending State and the receiving State an opportunity to discuss the question of exemption. From the viewpoint of legal draftsmanship, however, the French amendment left much to be desired.

11. Mr. MOLINA LANDAETA (Venezuela) said that his delegation would have preferred a wording much like the International Law Commission's text, but, as it had not had sufficient time to consider the French amendment, it had preferred to abstain in the vote. It would defer taking a final stand until the article had been reported back from the Drafting Committee.

#### *Article 25 (Inviolability of the premises)*

12. Mr. DELEAU (France), introducing his delegation's amendment (A/C.6/L.694), said that article 25 should be studied with particular care, because, in providing for the inviolability of the premises of special missions, it imposed on the receiving State not only an important restriction on the exercise of its sovereignty but also an obligation to extend special protection to such premises. His delegation was not opposed to those two principles, but considered it indispensable that the mission should not be able to claim inviolability for premises which it occupied fortuitously and perhaps even without the knowledge of the receiving State. His delegation had accordingly proposed a drafting change to make paragraph 1 more explicit.

13. On the other hand, it had objections of principle to paragraph 3 of the International Law Commission's text. Firstly, it provided immunities not in respect of property found on the premises of the special mission but in respect of property "used in the operation of the special mission", wherever situated. The Commission's commentary gave no explanation of the difference in treatment in that respect between embassies and special missions. In any case, his delegation thought that the paragraph went too far—its scope being wider than that of the corresponding provision of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations—and was not justified in the case of temporary missions, which only in very exceptional cases—such as could be regulated by special agreements—possessed properties situated outside the mission's premises, the property within those premises being covered by the inviolability of the premises themselves, stated in paragraph 1. Moreover, his delegation did not consider it reasonable to provide complete immunity for the special mission's means of transport. The means of transport of permanent diplomatic missions were generally the property of the accrediting State, completely identified and limited in number; furthermore, given the number of special missions using rented vehicles which might be in a receiving State's territory at a given time, the rules laid down in paragraph 3 would be very difficult to apply. Lastly, in view of the distinctive character of the tasks of special missions, paragraph 3 did not reflect a functional need. Inviolability of the premises, combined with the inviolability of archives and documents provided in article 26, would assure the mission sufficient protection.

14. His delegation supported the United Kingdom amendment to article 25 (A/C.6/L.721). It seemed reasonable that if the sending State maintained a permanent diplomatic mission in the locality where the seat of the special mission was situated, the premises of the special mission should not be inviolable unless the receiving State gave its consent; since the special mission should normally establish its seat in the embassy and the inviolability of the embassy would then ensure that the special mission received the necessary protection.

15. On the other hand, his delegation could not support the Ukrainian amendment to article 25 (A/C.6/L.690); it considered that the Commission had been right to retain in paragraph 1 the rule laid down by article 31, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations concerning the presumption of consent. That rule would be particularly useful in the case of special missions, as they would often occupy premises which the sending State could not secure against fire, which were not isolated and which might even be hotel rooms. The authorities of the receiving State must have the necessary freedom of action to prevent the spread of disaster in time.

16. Mr. OSIPENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the reason why his delegation's amendment (A/C.6/L.690) proposed the deletion of the third sentence of paragraph 1 was because it departed from the principle of the inviolability of the premises of the special mission, because it was in direct contradiction to article 22 of the Vienna Con-

<sup>1/</sup> See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 9, annex I, p. 46.

vention on Diplomatic Relations, which had been proved in practice, and because it might give rise to misunderstandings and disputes and even lead to unjustified violations by receiving States of the integrity and inviolability of special missions. As the International Law Commission had noted in paragraph (4) of its commentary on article 25, that provision had been opposed by several members of the Commission who had considered that it might lead to abuses. Serious doubts and differences of opinion might arise in the interpretation of the sentence.

17. Mr. DARWIN (United Kingdom) said that his delegation's amendment (A/C.6/L.721) was designed to take care of the situation where the sending State already had a permanent diplomatic mission in the place where the seat of the special mission was situated. Where there was no permanent diplomatic mission, the original text of paragraph 1 would continue to apply. The amendment brought the International Law Commission's text more into line with the needs of special missions.

18. In accordance with article 11, the site of the premises must be clearly marked and identified for police purposes. The United Kingdom would not consider it appropriate to regard a hotel room as within the scope of article 25.

19. His delegation supported the French amendment (A/C.6/L.694), but could not support the Ukrainian amendment (A/C.6/L.690); it thought that the Commission had been correct in including the third sentence of paragraph 1, having regard to the circumstances of special missions.

20. Mr. ROBERTSON (Canada) said that his delegation was prepared to support the French proposals (A/C.6/L.694) for limiting inviolability to the premises where a special mission was officially established and deleting the third paragraph of the International Law Commission's text which related to immunity from search, requisition, attachment or execution.

21. The United Kingdom amendment (A/C.6/L.721) would make the task of receiving States somewhat easier, because it would restrict the granting of inviolability to cases where a special mission was from a State which did not maintain a permanent diplomatic mission in the locality where the seat of the special mission was situated.

22. His delegation was unable to support the Ukrainian amendment (A/C.6/L.690) or the approach underlying it. A special mission visiting the capital of Canada would most probably have its premises in a hotel and, if a fire were to break out while the special mission's rooms were vacant and no member of the mission could be contacted, it would be intolerable for the authorities to be obliged to stand by and take no action. In such a situation, which constituted a threat not only to the property but also to the physical safety of others, it was essential that the receiving State should be free to take whatever preventive action it deemed necessary, with or without the consent of the special mission involved.

23. Mr. ALVAREZ TABIO (Cuba) said that article 25 dealt with a fundamental principle. His delegation supported the Ukrainian proposal (A/C.6/L.690) that the

last sentence of paragraph 1, which upset the harmony of the text, be deleted. The exception stated in it might give rise to abuse and the term "calamidad" in the Spanish text covered a wide range of contingencies. Moreover, the "prompt protective action" referred to would be carried out on the initiative of an agent of the receiving State with little legal knowledge. The principle of the inviolability of the premises of special missions should not be made subject to the views of such individual agents. The negative duty imposed on the receiving State in paragraph 1 was supplemented by the positive duty, stated in paragraph 2, "to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the special mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity". The legal prerogative of inviolability should not be reduced to the level of a concession on the part of the receiving State which might be revoked in certain cases.

24. Jonkheer van PANHUY (Netherlands) said that his Government maintained the view, stated in its comments submitted in December 1966,<sup>2/</sup> that it would be advisable to insert in the article on the inviolability of the premises of special missions the paragraph proposed in the second report of the Special Rapporteur stating that the article would apply even if a special mission was accommodated in a hotel or other public building, provided that the premises used by the special mission were identifiable.<sup>3/</sup> He asked the Expert Consultant to explain why the International Law Commission had not included that provision. It was important that the case of premises in hotels should be covered; the United Kingdom representative, for example, had stated that he interpreted the article as not applying to premises in hotels.

25. Whereas article 25 referred to the consent of the head of the special mission, it was stated in article 14 that other members of a special mission might be authorized to act on its behalf. The Drafting Committee should be asked to harmonize the two texts.

26. As his Government had stated in the comments referred to, it supported the inclusion of the last sentence of paragraph 1 of article 25. He agreed with the representative of Canada that such a provision was particularly essential in the case of special missions. A similar provision was contained in article 31, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Its deletion might be taken as implying that the receiving State had no competence to act in the case of force majeure, which would be contrary to existing law and practice in the matter. The good faith of States should be an acceptable guarantee against possible abuses.

27. His delegation would support the retention of article 25, paragraph 1, as it stood. The Drafting Committee could perhaps reword the sentence so as to dispel the misgivings of the Cuban representative concerning the use of the term "calamidad".

28. Mr. BARTOS (Expert Consultant) said that the question raised by the Netherlands representative

<sup>2/</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3/</sup> See Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1965, vol. II (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 66.V.2), document A/CN.4/179, p. 127.

was of great importance, because special missions were very often obliged to use hotel rooms as their premises. There were two schools of thought on the question of inviolability. The so-called "police theory" held that hotel rooms could not be regarded as entirely inviolable and that hotel owners and service staff should be allowed to enter the premises at specific times. According to another theory, however, premises made available to a sovereign State for its special mission could properly be regarded as having the same inviolability as the premises of other official missions.

29. As Special Rapporteur, he had suggested that the International Law Commission should insert a short clause stating that the provisions relating to inviolability applied to hotel rooms when used as the premises of a special mission. That suggestion had not received wide support, and the Commission had not discussed the question in detail. Nevertheless, it had not expressly ruled out the extension of inviolability to hotel rooms. Theoretically, there were certain valid criticisms which could be raised against it. The question arose, for example, whether international law should take precedence over the hotel owner's private property rights. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that, even if hotel rooms used as the premises of a special mission were theoretically regarded as inviolable, the maintenance of such inviolability in practice would be very difficult, as most diplomats would know from their own experience.

30. Mr. SECARIN (Romania) said that the inviolability of the premises of a special mission was an integral part of its diplomatic immunity. It was a privilege closely linked to personal inviolability and the inviolability of archives and documents, official correspondence and the diplomatic bag, and derived from the representative character of any diplomatic mission, whether permanent or temporary. The purpose of inviolability was to give the mission the protection it needed for the proper exercise of its functions. His delegation did not believe, therefore, that the rules governing the inviolability of the premises of a special mission—which was a diplomatic mission—could be modelled on the rules governing the inviolability of consular premises. The temporary nature of a special mission did not justify the application of a different set of rules concerning the protection it needed in order to perform its task. In view of their exceptional importance, special missions should enjoy in the territory of the receiving State the same inviolability as permanent diplomatic missions.

31. Since the restriction on the inviolability of the premises of special missions contained in the last sentence of paragraph 1 of article 25 had not been imposed in the case of permanent missions, it should not be imposed in the case of special missions. The special mission itself would surely be able to judge whether or not prompt protective action was necessary in the case of fire or disaster.

32. His delegation would therefore support the Ukrainian amendment (A/C.6/L.690).

33. It could not support the French amendment (A/C.6/L.694). It was obvious that "the premises of

the special mission" referred to in paragraph 1 of article 25 were the same premises as those referred to in article 11, paragraph 1 (f), so that no further qualification was required in the present context. Paragraph 3 of article 25 was an integral part of the text and the French proposal for its deletion was unjustified. As in the case of permanent missions, the inviolability of the premises of a special mission meant, first, that agents of the receiving State were not permitted to enter except with the consent of the head of the special mission or, if appropriate, the head of the permanent diplomatic mission of the sending State accredited to the receiving State, and, secondly, that it was the duty of the receiving State to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the special mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity. It followed logically that the premises of the special mission, their furnishings and other property used in the operation of the special mission should enjoy the immunity provided in paragraph 3 of article 25.

34. The United Kingdom amendment (A/C.6/L.721) would make a special mission subordinate to the permanent diplomatic mission. A special mission should enjoy inviolability of its premises in its own right, and not as a right deriving from the privileges of a permanent mission. If that amendment was adopted, the question would arise whether, if the premises of the permanent mission were not large enough to accommodate the special mission, the premises found elsewhere for the special mission would be regarded as inviolable. Such cases often occurred in practice, and there was no reason why a special mission having its seat in a locality where the sending State maintained a permanent diplomatic mission should have its privileges restricted. His delegation would therefore not support the United Kingdom amendment.

35. Mr. REIS (United States of America) could not support the Ukrainian amendment (A/C.6/L.690). The question under discussion could be regarded both theoretically and practically. Theoretically, his delegation agreed that the premises occupied by a special mission should be inviolable; it did not agree with any police theory that if the premises happened to be a hotel room they should not be inviolable. His delegation's concern arose strictly with the case of fire. The risk of fire, particularly in densely populated cities, necessitated comprehensive precautionary measures, and outbreaks could entail very serious consequences. Obviously, the fire authorities of the host country must do everything humanly possible to seek and obtain the consent of the special mission before entering rooms in which the special mission was housed. But if, because at the time a fire broke out the members of the special mission were not on the premises, it was impossible to obtain such consent, the authorities could not be expected to stand by and watch the building burn down. They would enter the rooms and extinguish the fire and, in the case of a hotel, it was extremely important that they should do so. Equally, his delegation wished to protect the fire authorities of the host country, whose sole motive in entering the rooms would be to save innocent lives, from being accused of treaty violation. With regard

to the suggestion that the host country might purposely set fire to the premises of the special mission in a hotel suite, or that a false claim of fire might be used to gain entry, it must be remembered that the existence of special missions and the usefulness of the Convention must in the last resort depend on good faith. It was unbelievable that countries would engage in such subterfuge. The United States delegation therefore supported the International Law Commission's action in including in article 25 a provision to deal with fire and hoped that the provision should be retained.

36. It had been argued that there was a law of necessity which must apply in the case of fire, so that, whatever the provisions of the Convention, the host country, acting under the law of necessity, could enter the premises to extinguish the fire. The United States delegation did not believe in the law of necessity. As the late Adlai Stevenson had once said, nameless and numberless acts had been perpetrated in justification of a law of necessity. The Commission had acted wisely by including in the text a provision to deal with fire.

37. Mr. OGUNDERE (Nigeria) said that the question of the inviolability of the premises of special missions was one to which the developing nations attached great importance. The provisions of article 25 were the barest minimum necessary for the protection of the lives, property and documents of a special mission.

38. Presumably, the equivalent in the common law system of the first proposal in the French amendment (A/C.6/L.694) was that the premises of which the special mission was the occupier were to be inviolable. If that was so, the proposal was acceptable to his delegation. The second French proposal was, however, unacceptable. All delegations had stressed the importance of special missions being able to perform their functions efficiently. The purpose of paragraph 3 was to enable a special mission to function efficiently; the paragraph should therefore be retained.

39. It was to be hoped that a receiving State would do all in its power to safeguard the security of a special mission occupying premises in a hotel or in the embassy of the sending State. In the case of fire or any other natural disaster, however, the inviolability of the special mission's premises could not be absolute. The Nigerian delegation hoped, therefore, that the Ukrainian delegation would not insist that its amendment (A/C.6/L.690) be put to the vote.

40. The motives of the United Kingdom delegation in submitting its amendment (A/C.6/L.721) were comprehensible. The question of facilities should not, however, be confused with that of security. Account should be taken of the realities of the situation and the special nature of the security measures required for special missions. He hoped that the United Kingdom delegation would not insist that its amendment be put to the vote.

41. Provision had been made in the International Law Commission's text for occasions when the inviolability of special missions' premises could not be absolute. The text also sought to maintain an equitable balance between the rights and interests of both sending and

receiving States. It was therefore acceptable to his delegation.

42. Mr. QUERALTO (Uruguay) agreed that the word "*calamidad*" in the Spanish text was too general. He requested, therefore, that the text be submitted to the Drafting Committee in order that the other disasters alluded to in paragraph 1 be clearly specified. The examples given by the Expert Consultant proved the necessity of safeguarding the inviolability of premises occupied by special missions. It did not seem necessary to delete the last sentence of paragraph 1, but its wording should definitely be improved.

43. Mr. MOSER (Observer for Switzerland) said that inviolability of premises was a very important aspect of privileges and immunities; it was, in principle, necessary to the proper functioning of special missions. The concern of those who considered that, in certain cases, the privileges and immunities provided for in the draft were excessive, was understandable. He wished to make it quite clear, therefore, that in his Government's opinion the special missions entitled to receive the privileges and immunities provided for in the draft were important special missions or special missions of a representative character. Such missions could be as important as permanent diplomatic missions. As the Czechoslovak representative had pointed out at an earlier meeting, a special mission on water supplies would not normally be of a representative character. If, however, such a mission were fully empowered to negotiate or initial an international treaty on water supplies it would be representative in character and a real special mission.

44. His delegation shared the French view (1061st meeting) that provision should be made in the proposed Convention for a minimum of privileges and immunities, which the parties concerned could increase if they so wished. In the case of inviolability, however, and particularly inviolability of premises, the minimum was also the maximum. In order to function properly, special missions had to enjoy inviolability and as soon as exceptions were made inviolability would become meaningless. His Government understood the difficulties to which article 25 might give rise. As the Expert Consultant had pointed out, special missions were frequently housed and had their offices in a hotel in which other persons also lived. Attention should be paid, in that connexion, to the expression "premises", which was not defined in the draft Convention, although a definition of it was contained in article 1 (i) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. A definition was perhaps unnecessary in the proposed Convention on Special Missions, given the provisions in article 11, paragraph 1 (f), of the draft. In view of their possible variety, however, it was important that the premises of special missions should be clearly identified. In that sense, he could support the first proposal in the French amendment (A/C.6/L.694).

45. The provisions of paragraph 3 of article 25 could give rise to many practical problems. It would be difficult, for instance, for a receiving State to requisition a hotel in which a special mission had its premises. Normally, however, such difficulties could be settled amicably. It should be noted that the provisions of paragraph 3 were more extensive than those

in article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. It was reasonable to consider, however, that special missions were entitled to even more protection than permanent diplomatic missions. After all, the latter's property was always protected in its own building. It was quite possible, on the other hand, that a special mission would take its property from the premises it occupied in a hotel to a conference room and it was essential that property be protected even when outside the mission's premises. He regretted that he was unable to approve the amendment of the Ukrainian SSR (A/C.6/L.690).

46. Normally, a special mission would have its premises in the building occupied by its Government's permanent diplomatic mission. There were cases, however, where special mission had to occupy premises separate from the permanent diplomatic mission. If the United Kingdom amendment (A/C.6/L.721) were approved, the special missions would, in such cases, be deprived of the protection to which they were entitled. He could therefore not support the United Kingdom amendment.

47. Mr. ALCIVAR (Ecuador) said that the Expert Consultant had pointed out that in practice the principle of inviolability was often not respected, particularly when missions had their premises in hotels. It would be dangerous, however, to provide in a legal instrument for the surreptitious violation of a country's security. His delegation therefore seriously doubted the advisability of maintaining the last sentence of paragraph 1 of article 25. Provision was made in law for cases of force majeure and it should be remembered that, as the United States representative had said,

the law of necessity led to many abuses. No provision for force majeure had been made in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, presumably because those who had drafted that Convention had not wanted to provide in a legal instrument for a practice which could unquestionably lead to abuse.

48. Reference had frequently been made to the fact that the International Law Commission had attempted to balance the rights and obligations of sending and receiving States. There seemed to be a marked tendency, however, to transfer the rights of the sending State to the receiving State. Article 25 provided for the minimum inviolability which should be granted to special missions, which, it should be remembered, were as representative as permanent diplomatic missions. Ecuador could therefore not support the French proposal in amendment A/C.6/L.694 for the deletion of paragraph 3.

49. Small countries would be faced with great difficulties if the United Kingdom amendment (A/C.6/L.721) were adopted. The permanent diplomatic missions of big countries were usually housed in large buildings with plenty of space. That was not the case with small countries, whose permanent diplomatic missions would be unable in most cases to provide space for a special mission. It seemed unfair that, because it could not be housed with its Government's permanent diplomatic mission, a special mission should be deprived of the inviolability to which it was entitled. Hence, his delegation could not accept the United Kingdom amendment.

*The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.*