

2. In April 1967, during the fifth special session of the General Assembly, he himself had prepared a draft resolution proposing, *inter alia*, that one or more Member States be asked to act as co-administrators of South West Africa with South Africa during the short period required until the United Nations Council for Namibia took over the responsibility of preparing the Territory for full freedom.¹ The United States delegation had instead supported the creation of the United Nations Council for Namibia, in order to shelve the question of the transfer of power and to preserve the economic and financial interests of the United States and the United Kingdom. The African Members of the United Nations, too, had voted in favour of that proposal and no action had been taken on his own proposal. On 24 October 1974, after waiting in vain for the United Nations Council for Namibia to do something about the situation, he had submitted another draft resolution in the Security Council, urging South Africa to transfer authority over Namibia to the Trusteeship Council without delay, requesting the Secretary-General to appoint two co-administrators from neutral countries to assist South Africa during the period of the transfer of authority, which should be completed within two years, and requesting the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia to assist in co-ordinating the transfer.² The African and Asian States were once again prevailed upon to be patient, since South Africa claimed to be working towards self-determination, by consulting with the tribal chiefs and, once again, no

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Special Session, Annexes, agenda item 7, document A/L.517.*

² *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-ninth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1974, document S/11547.*

action was taken on his draft resolution. On 29 November 1974, at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly, he had once again submitted a draft resolution including similar proposals, but stating that the process of the transfer of authority should be completed within one year and calling for the matter to be referred back to the Security Council.³ Again no action had been taken on his draft resolution, and instead a lengthy resolution submitted by the African States and some Asian States had been adopted (General Assembly resolution 3295 (XXIX)).

3. The time for ineffective resolutions was past. He appealed to all countries to take radical and effective action to ensure that the Namibian people attained their freedom. To that end, he would be willing to intercede personally with South Africa—perhaps together with representatives of such disinterested States as Mauritius, Sweden and Switzerland—to induce South Africa to come to its senses. If South Africa accepted a peaceful settlement, there was no reason why its economic interests should suffer. But if the voice of sanity did not prevail, there would be such an upheaval in Africa that no white man would be safe. He personally decried bloodshed, but if the language of peace and logic yielded nothing, then the possibility of war must be faced.

4. The CHAIRMAN thanked the representative of Saudi Arabia for the offer of his services, which would be used when the need arose.

The meeting rose at 4.25 p.m.

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Annexes, agenda item 65, document A/L.751.*

2148th meeting

Friday, 17 October 1975, at 10.50 a.m.

Chairman: Mrs. Famah JOKA-BANGURA (Sierra Leone).

A/C.4/SR.2148

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Araim (Iraq), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 87

Question of Namibia (*continued*) (A/9998-S/11598, A/10023/Add.3, A/10024 (vols. I and II), A/10050-S/11638, A/10229, A/C.4/784/Add.1)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. TALVITIE (Finland) said that, at the end of the previous year, there had been some ground for optimism with regard to the situation in Namibia, the Security Council having adopted its resolution 366 (1974) in which it again condemned South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia. Unfortunately, the Government of South Africa had shown no genuine will for a dialogue with the United Nations; rather, it had intensified its oppression, which was

connected with the so-called constitutional conference, from which the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and the Namibia National Convention (NNC) had been excluded.

2. Since the General Assembly, by its resolution 2145 (XXI), had terminated South Africa's Mandate to administer the Territory of Namibia, the United Nations had assumed direct responsibility for assisting the people of Namibia to attain self-determination and independence. The United Nations Council for Namibia had been established to administer the Territory and to transfer all the powers to the people upon the declaration of independence. Nevertheless, South Africa had failed to comply with United Nations resolutions and had not permitted the Council to establish itself within the Territory.

3. Despite those setbacks, his delegation recognized that the international community had recently entered a phase

of action against the illegal régime in the Territory. In June 1975, all the members of the Security Council had urged the illegal South African régime to withdraw from Namibia, and that common stand provided a basis for the implementation of Security Council resolution 366 (1974).

4. He stressed the importance of the consultations which the United Nations Council for Namibia had held with Member States, international organizations and specialized agencies, and particularly of the decision of the Governing Council of UNDP to establish an indicative planning figure for assistance to Namibia, and also recognized the importance of co-operation between the United Nations Council for Namibia and OAU. He recalled that Finland had been one of the sponsors of General Assembly resolution 2679 (XXV) on the establishment of the United Nations Fund for Namibia and noted with satisfaction that both contributions and contributors to the Fund had been steadily increasing. Finland, for its part, had decided to make a further contribution of \$20,000 in 1975, in addition to its earlier contribution of \$28,000.

5. He appealed to all Member States to show their goodwill by giving financial assistance to the Fund as well as to the Institute for Namibia, established by the United Nations Council for Namibia in 1974.¹ He also commended the Government of Zambia for its offer to locate the Institute at Lusaka, and the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, Mr. MacBride, for his efforts in planning the Institute.

6. Finland was alarmed at the plight of the Namibians, whose resources were exploited by foreign companies, with encouragement from South Africa, and recognized the significance of the Decree on the Natural Resources of Namibia adopted by the United Nations Council for Namibia² and endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 3295 (XXIX). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland had transmitted the contents of the Decree to the Finnish authorities and to private bodies dealing with foreign trade. His delegation regarded the dissemination of information on Namibia as one of the main functions of the Council and, in that connexion, wished to stress the importance of the International Conference on Namibia and Human Rights, to be held at Dakar in 1976.

7. He also stressed the growing support enjoyed by SWAPO, despite the activities of the illegal régime, and observed with satisfaction that the differences among the Namibians had been overcome and that the National Convention had regrouped itself as the NNC.

8. His Government had been in close co-operation with SWAPO in extending humanitarian assistance to Namibians. A group of Namibian students was about to start studying in Finnish universities, and Finland had complied with the arms embargo against South Africa recommended by the Security Council. The international community must do its utmost to assist the people of Namibia in their struggle for independence and to enable the United Nations to fulfil the responsibilities which it had assumed.

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 24A*, para. 73.

² *Ibid.*, para. 84.

9. Mr. AL-ZOABI (United Arab Emirates) said that the situation in Namibia called for a speedy solution, since it constituted a challenge to the United Nations and to mankind. The United Arab Emirates had participated in the work of many United Nations bodies dealing with Namibia and had stated in the Security Council that the illegal occupation constituted a threat to international peace and security.

10. General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) had terminated South Africa's Mandate for Namibia, and since then the United Nations, through the United Nations Council for Namibia, had had responsibility for the Territory. In its advisory opinion of 21 June 1971,³ the International Court of Justice had determined that the presence of South Africa in Namibia was illegal.

11. The only solution to the situation in Namibia was the withdrawal of the racist régime; if that could be achieved by peaceful means, so much the better, otherwise the United Arab Emirates would support the struggle of the liberation movements.

12. The United Arab Emirates had provided for an oil embargo against South Africa and urged peace-loving countries to sever all relations with that country and to comply with the relevant United Nations resolutions. Furthermore, his country had co-operated with the United Nations Fund for Namibia, and was continuing to do so, and appealed to friendly countries to assist the people of Namibia in their just struggle for self-determination and independence.

13. In that connexion, he could not forget the repression and oppression to which the Arabs were subjected in the territories occupied by Israel and which constituted a violation of the Charter.

14. Mr. VRAALSEN (Norway) said that the collapse of Portugal's African empire had changed the situation in southern Africa, but in the case of Namibia South Africa did not appear to have retreated in any way from its traditional and unacceptable policy. The problem was that South Africa must withdraw from Namibia to enable the United Nations to conduct the process of decolonization, but there were interlocking issues that had created dangerous uncertainties and tensions in the area.

15. Pretoria had not undertaken to accept majority rule and seemed to be playing for time by holding discussions on the political future of Namibia with what it called the representatives of the various population groups. South Africa was not prepared to give up the Territory except on its own terms, at some unspecified future date. That situation could only result in an increasingly dangerous confrontation.

16. The time had come for the United Nations to help avert racial warfare in the area, and no Member State should retreat into a no-policy position, since that would tend to bolster white minority rule in the Territory. His

³ *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971*, p. 16.

delegation considered that the next steps by the United Nations should be increased assistance to the people of Namibia and their liberation movement, extended information on Namibia and on the relevant decisions and actions of the United Nations, and a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.

17. The issue of territorial integrity was also at stake in Namibia. Through its policy of "bantustanization" South Africa hoped to achieve the fragmentation of Namibia and had created problems of unemployment, overcrowding and poverty. World public opinion should be mobilized against that cruel policy as well as against *apartheid* and enforced migration, all of which were aimed at perpetuating South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia.

18. The so-called multiracial talks on the constitutional future of the Territory were not aimed at achieving a solution compatible with United Nations resolutions. If South Africa genuinely wished the people of Namibia to determine their own future, it should, among other things, accept independence and the principle of territorial integrity, and agree to a national election in the Territory under United Nations supervision.

19. South Africa must demonstrate a change of heart on the question of Namibia, and that had not been the case so far. The documentation before the Committee painted a grim picture of repressive measures and constant violations of human rights. Although Pretoria described such reports as incorrect or exaggerated, all the evidence indicated that the charges had considerable substance. The only satisfactory way of establishing the truth would be for the Commission on Human Rights to dispatch a commission of inquiry to Namibia. Such a commission must of course be allowed complete freedom for the purpose of fulfilling its task.

20. His Government had already appealed directly to the South African Government to release all political prisoners, and he wished to repeat that appeal.

21. Despite all the repressive measures, the Namibians were proceeding with their liberation struggle, and would continue to bear the brunt of the struggle. It was, however, the duty of the world community, and particularly the relevant United Nations agencies, in co-operation with the United Nations Council for Namibia, to render them all possible assistance. Norway had been doing so for many years and stood ready to continue its policy.

22. His delegation attached great importance to the work of the United Nations Council for Namibia, and commended the activities of the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia. An example of his positive work was the establishment of the Institute for Namibia, a project which the Norwegian Government strongly supported and to which it had recently contributed \$54,000. He hoped that the Institute would be supported by other countries, and not only by the "traditional" contributors to United Nations funds and programmes for the victims of racism and colonialism in southern Africa.

23. His delegation also welcomed the steps taken by the Council to disseminate more information on the question

of Namibia, and to ensure that the natural resources of the Territory were not exploited to the detriment of the Namibian people.

24. Mr. AL-BEHI (Democratic Yemen) said that the repression practised by South Africa in Namibia, which was similar to that endured by many countries of the third world, was another phase of nazism. The Committee had been dealing with the question for a long time, but despite all the expressions of condemnation, the Namibians were still under the racist and Fascist rule of South Africa, which was simply intensifying its policy of terrorism and plunder. Its most recent manoeuvre had been to convene a so-called constitutional conference to effect the Balkanization of Namibia.

25. Nevertheless, the Namibian people were carrying on their struggle for liberation, had won numerous victories, had strengthened their unity and increased their fighting strength and had rejected the conference, rightly considering it a deceitful manoeuvre.

26. There was no doubt that the Pretoria régime was doomed to disappear, because it was running counter to history. It was only maintained by the help it received from outside. There was clearly collusion between the Pretoria régime and the régime in Tel Aviv, which was practising repression in the occupied Arab territories. Zionism was only another facet of racism and fascism. Then there were Western Powers, such as the NATO countries, that were continuing to provide military, political and economic support for the Pretoria régime and failing to implement the resolutions of the United Nations.

27. The struggle of the national liberation movement of Namibia must receive increasing support from the United Nations and justice-loving peoples, which meant increasing moral, material and military assistance in order to put an end to colonial and imperialist rule, a goal that had recently been achieved in other parts of the world.

28. Mr. CAMPBELL (Australia) said that in the past year there had been some progress in thinking on South Africa's part, with regard to Namibia, which could be construed as a recognition of South Africa's responsibility to the world community. But the South African response simply did not measure up to what was desired, which was simply South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia. Indeed, South Africa was continuing to apply its policy of suppressing the Namibians and robbing them of their inheritance of natural resources.

29. On 26 August, Namibia Day, the Australian Government had expressed to the South African Government through diplomatic channels its strong concern regarding the situation. It had stressed the need to comply with the resolutions of the United Nations and had said that the Organization must be involved in any process of consulting the people of Namibia. It had restated its position that Namibia should move rapidly towards independence as a united country and that the genuine leaders of the people should be parties in that process.

30. The Australian Government had made regular use of the diplomatic link to protest to South Africa against the

arrest of Namibian nationalists and the denial of basic rights, and had indicated that Australia did not recognize the legality of the repressive legislation applied in Namibia. Those diplomatic ties were used in an attempt to reduce the risks to Namibian patriots but there was no question of recognition of any South African standing in Namibia or of any South African claim to act on behalf of Namibia. Consequently Australia recognized the travel and identity documents issued by the United Nations Council for Namibia.

31. More than two years earlier the Australian Government had decided that the official promotion of economic relations with South Africa should cease, and had officially advised Australian companies with subsidiaries in South Africa to refrain from applying any measures of a discriminatory nature. There was, however, a limit to unilateral action in the economic field. The Australian Government would support any decision in the United Nations to impose mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa, provided that such sanctions were also observed by South Africa's major trading partners.

32. The Australian delegation in the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples had just joined again in supporting the imposition of a mandatory embargo against the supply of arms and military equipment to South Africa, called for in the consensus adopted by the Special Committee (see A/10023/Add.3, para. 13), and for more than a decade Australia had not been a supplier of arms to South Africa. That question was close to the issues of the possible resort to force, which Australia could not and did not favour, although it had an understanding of the point of view of those who felt genuinely that the circumstances in southern Africa were such that they were compelled to advocate resort to armed action. The use of force was always a double-edged sword, but especially for all concerned in Namibia, where there were grave implications on both sides. Naturally, in calling for a peaceful settlement, the first requirement was that the South African authorities must desist from the violence which they were inflicting on the African peoples of Namibia. It was not the role of the United Nations to treat talking and fighting as if they were interchangeable options, and the United Nations should continue to pursue the settlement of the Namibian question by peaceful means. But that was impossible if the Namibians continued to be subjected to inhuman practices. In that connexion the Australian delegation had listened with interest to the proposal by the delegation of Norway that the Commission on Human Rights might dispatch a commission of inquiry to Namibia, and it would like to see that proposal set out in greater detail.

33. Unfortunately, South Africa seemed to be more interested in the natural resources of economic value than in the genuine wishes of the people of Namibia concerning their future. For example, South Africa's exploitation of the Namibian uranium deposits should be of immediate concern to the international community, not simply because Namibia was entitled to the protection of its national inheritance but because South Africa was not a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (see General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII)). There was

reason to wonder whether South Africa would continue to be so resistant to self-determination for the Namibian people when all their mines had been dug out. The Australian delegation would continue to give its full support to all responsible and realistic measures intended to preserve the rights of the Namibian people over all the resources of their country, but it had some continuing legal and practical reservations concerning the Decree on the Natural Resources of Namibia, although there were no corresponding reservations on the issues of principle or policy involved.

34. Australia had made a contribution of \$30,000 to the United Nations Fund for Namibia in 1975—a contribution more than double that made the previous year—in the hope that it would assist the successful operation of the Institute for Namibia and hence hasten the formation of a truly Namibian administration in Namibia.

35. Namibia was the immediate and collective responsibility of all States Members of the United Nations, and the question of Namibia should be given first priority. The longer the problem remained unsolved the less chance there was that the final solution would be achieved peacefully.

Mrs. Joka-Bangura (Sierra Leone) took the Chair.

36. Mr. ALI (Bangladesh) said that South Africa was continuing to defy the authority of the United Nations in Namibia, had not taken any steps to withdraw its administration from Namibia and had not allowed the United Nations Council for Namibia to enter the Territory to discharge its functions. In its resolution 366 (1974) the Security Council had condemned the continued illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa, and the Security Council remained seized of the matter.

37. The Special Committee had considered the question of Namibia during its session held at Lisbon in June 1975 and had reached a consensus (*ibid.*), which had been conveyed to all concerned, including the Government of South Africa.

38. His delegation fully and unreservedly supported the views and recommendations of both the Special Committee and the United Nations Council for Namibia. It was evident from the reports of those bodies and from information received from other sources that the South African Government was not only continuing to illegally occupy the Territory and practise the barbaric system of "bantustanization" and *apartheid*, but had further stepped up its reign of terror over the Namibians. Its special target was the leadership material, that is, the members of SWAPO. The inhuman practices of South Africa had recently been described by the Reverend G. Michael Scott in the Committee (2146th meeting). It was inconceivable that a civilized people, which the Pretoria régime claimed to be, could still perpetrate such genocidal crimes with impunity.

39. Although colonialism was in retreat all over the world, South Africa refused to recognize the facts and rejected the principles of independence, self-determination and territorial integrity of Namibia. The régime was now isolated in the international field and had not been able to take part in the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly nor could

it take part in the current session. The forces of liberation were now achieving sweeping victories in southern Africa and, in spite of murders and other repressive measures resorted to by the illegal régime, the people of Namibia were intensifying their struggle by all means available to them. The obvious duty of the international community was to support that struggle actively and to take all steps necessary to squeeze that atrocious régime out of existence as soon as possible.

40. Bangladesh never had nor would ever have any relations with that régime and would strongly and actively support any action that the United Nations took against it. It fully supported the application of sanctions against the South African régime but noted with regret that the Security Council had not so far been able to act because of negative votes by some Powers. At the same time those very Powers had condemned the illegal régime and urged it to end its unlawful occupation of Namibia. His delegation hoped that, since the régime had not acted upon their exhortation, those Powers would revise their attitude and let the Security Council take positive action.

41. In the face of the pressure exerted by the liberation struggle in Namibia and by the international community, the illegal régime had been resorting to various manoeuvres in an attempt to placate the international community, the latest of which was the sponsoring of a bogus constitutional conference inside Namibia, for which it had collected a few puppets but from which SWAPO had been excluded. Bangladesh condemned and totally rejected such manoeuvres designed to further the régime's policy of divide and rule and reaffirmed its total and continued support of, and solidarity with, the people of Namibia, led by their national liberation movement, SWAPO.

42. His delegation endorsed all the recommendations of the Special Committee and the United Nations Council for

Namibia and urged that the General Assembly should call upon the Security Council to take up again the question of Namibia, which was still on its agenda. The Security Council should consider taking all appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations, including those provided for in Chapter VII, and declare the arms embargo against South Africa as mandatory, unequivocally and without reservations. As the situation in Namibia was a threat to international peace and security, the Security Council must act to implement its resolution 366 (1974). His delegation urged that the General Assembly should again demand a total evacuation of the Territory by South Africa and require all States scrupulously to observe the arms embargo against South Africa, to desist from entering into military arrangements of any kind with the South African régime, and from the sale or supply of military materiel to South Africa, and to co-operate with the United Nations Council for Namibia in order to accelerate the process of emancipation of Namibia.

AGENDA ITEM 89

Question of Southern Rhodesia (*continued*)* (A/9998-S/11598, A/10023/Add.2, A/10050-S/11638, A/C.4/L.1092 and Corr.1, A/C.4/L.1093)

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS

43. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to two draft resolutions on the question of Southern Rhodesia, appearing in documents A/C.4/L.1092 and Corr.1 and A/C.4/L.1093. The following Member States had since become sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/L.1093: Bangladesh, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Mozambique, Romania, Rwanda and Yugoslavia.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.

* Resumed from the 2145th meeting.

2149th meeting

Monday, 20 October 1975, at 10.50 a.m.

Chairman: Mrs. Famah JOKA-BANGURA (Sierra Leone).

A/C.4/SR.2149

AGENDA ITEM 87

Question of Namibia (*continued*) (A/9998-S/11598, A/10023/Add.3, A/10024 (vols. I and II), A/10050-S/11638, A/10229, A/C.4/784/Add.1)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. AL-WALI (Iraq) said that the situation in Namibia showed up the odious exploitation of man by man. The South African Government, acting as if the Mandate given to it by the League of Nations was to last forever, had taken steps to integrate the Territory into South Africa, had plundered the indigenous population and asserted its

authority in the area. Recalling the United Nations resolutions terminating the Mandate of the South African Government for Namibia and placing the Territory under the direct responsibility of the United Nations, and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971,¹ he said that the veto exercised by three permanent members of the Security Council at the 1829th meeting of the Council, on 6 June 1975, had only served to encourage the racist South African Government to pursue its ignoble policy.

¹ *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.*