

indignation at, and deprecation of, the negative attitude adopted by the Government of the United Kingdom with regard to the relevant United Nations decisions and resolutions.

7. In view of the further deterioration of the situation in the Territory, he expressed the hope, on behalf of the members of the Special Committee, that the Fourth Committee would endorse the recommendations he had just outlined.

Requests for hearings (continued)
(A/C.4/761/Add.2, A/C.4/764)

8. The CHAIRMAN said that, if there were no objections, he would take it that the Committee decided to grant the requests for hearings from Miss Barbara Rogers, of the Friends of Namibia Committee (A/C.4/761/Add.2), and Mr. Romesh Chandra, Secretary-General of the World Peace Council (A/C.4/764), which related, respectively, to Namibia and to the colonial Territories in general.

It was so decided.

Organization of work

9. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the Committee should devote eight meetings to consideration of the question of Southern Rhodesia, thus concluding the general debate on

the item on 22 October. Accordingly, he requested the members of the Committee who wished to speak in the debate to enter their names on the list of speakers as soon as possible.

10. Mr. OUCIF (Algeria) appealed to the United Kingdom delegation to make its statement on the question of Southern Rhodesia at the beginning of the general debate and not to wait, as it usually did, until the end. If the debate which was about to begin was to be truly useful, it was important that the Committee should know in advance the position of the United Kingdom Government on the item.

11. Mr. WORSLEY (United Kingdom) said that his delegation would consider very carefully the representations that the representative of Algeria had made.

12. The CHAIRMAN said that he would like to make some drafting changes in the Spanish text of the note by the Chairman (A/C.4/765): in paragraph 2 the words "*como tema siguiente*" should be replaced by "*a continuación*"; in the same paragraph the phrase "*en la inteligencia*" should be replaced by "*en el entendido*"; finally, in subparagraph 3(d) the word "*propuestos*" should read "*propuestas*".

The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.

2038th meeting

Tuesday, 16 October 1973, at 10.50 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Leonardo DIAZ GONZALEZ (Venezuela).

A/C.4/SR.2038

AGENDA ITEM 72

Question of Southern Rhodesia (continued) (A/9023/Add.1, A/9061)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

In accordance with the decision taken by the General Assembly at its 2139th plenary meeting, on 3 October 1973, Mr. Edward Ndlovu, representative of the Zimbabwe African People's Union, took a place at the Committee table.

1. Mr. NDLOVU (Zimbabwe African People's Union) said that since 1960 the United Kingdom had tried to prevent the United Nations from adopting an effective policy towards Zimbabwe by pretending to solve the problem itself. While the United Kingdom appeared to be prepared to abandon its "responsibility" for Zimbabwe, it was important to prevent it from transferring its own policy to the United Nations in another attempt to delay the national liberation of Zimbabwe.

2. In the past 15 years, the United Kingdom had made no effort to put an end to the tyranny in Zimbabwe; it had

merely engaged in delaying tactics in order to give the racist régime time to consolidate its political, economic and military position and it had used sanctions as a smokescreen to parry attacks from the United Nations. At the same time, it had met the military and economic needs of the racist régime through the intermediary of South Africa.

3. The United Kingdom's current dilemma was how to abdicate its position of "responsibility" for Zimbabwe and at the same time ensure that whatever body assumed the responsibility was unable or unwilling to take any positive or constructive measures to assist the people of Zimbabwe to attain national liberation. If possible, the United Kingdom would like to use the United Nations for that purpose.

4. The United Kingdom's public policy regarding Zimbabwe had always been declared to be in favour of "peaceful progress towards majority rule". But both the British and the inhabitants of Zimbabwe knew that such progress was impossible because the racist minority had sworn to fight against the establishment of majority rule by any means in its power.

5. While the United Kingdom had negotiated political independence with all its other African colonies during the

1960s, it had not been able to do so with Southern Rhodesia. It claimed that the case of Southern Rhodesia was different, since the white settlers there would not agree to the establishment of majority rule. The United Kingdom had preferred to let the United Nations believe that a few impudent settlers were defying its imperial power rather than let it know the truth, which was that it did not wish to establish majority rule. As a result of that attitude, complicated manoeuvres and negotiations had taken place, which had finally been broken off in 1964.

6. The unilateral declaration of independence had ensured that Southern Rhodesia would remain in the hands of the United Kingdom's kith and kin and had allowed the United Kingdom to pretend that it was safeguarding the interests of the African people. The United Kingdom, however, did not want the United Nations to perceive its delight over that event and it therefore used the smokescreen of economic sanctions.

7. If the United Kingdom had genuinely wanted to establish majority rule in Zimbabwe, it would no doubt have done so by military action in 1965. But what it had actually done was to say that it could not take such action and that economic sanctions would produce the same results. However, it had established those sanctions in such a way that its kith and kin could survive. Certain crucial aspects of the sanctions had never been applied, many British firms continued to trade with Southern Rhodesia and South Africa and Portugal had been allowed to assist the Smith régime to beat the sanctions. A few months earlier, the United Kingdom had celebrated a political alliance with Portugal and it maintained a military alliance with South Africa.

8. All that showed how little concern the United Kingdom had for the success of the policy it adopted publicly with regard to Southern Rhodesia. If it had really wanted economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia to bring about majority rule in Zimbabwe, it would have prevented all communications with and assistance to the racist régime on the part of British businessmen, politicians and sympathizers, it would have protested vigorously against the importation of chrome by the United States and it would have demanded that the latter stop giving material support to the rebels. It would also have adopted legislation establishing that all goods from the "rebel colony" became the property of the Crown the moment they left "Rhodesia". However, British policy was nothing more than a smokescreen, which had never been intended to bring power to the African people of Zimbabwe.

9. At the Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference held at Singapore in January 1971, it had been possible to glimpse the United Kingdom's real policy with regard to Southern Rhodesia from the arrogance which it had shown towards anyone who had dared to question the integrity of its decision to supply arms to South Africa. It was no secret that the weapons on which Smith counted came mainly from South Africa and that military support for South Africa was tantamount to military support for Southern Rhodesia. Recent events had made clear to the United Nations and to the whole world that South African soldiers were carrying out operations with their own

military equipment inside Rhodesian territory to neutralize the efforts of the Zimbabwe people to achieve liberation.

10. At the latest Conference of Heads of Government of the Commonwealth, held at Ottawa in August 1973, the United Kingdom had opposed the proposal that the Commonwealth countries should give humanitarian assistance to all those seeking to achieve self-determination and independence, on the grounds that such assistance could be converted into military support. The British were not prepared to see the crisis in Southern Rhodesia resolved, because that would bring about the establishment of majority rule, a development which the United Kingdom had decided to prevent.

11. The "proposals for a settlement" agreed upon in 1971 between the United Kingdom and the illegal régime, which had been followed by the report of the Pearce Commission,¹ had been a further demonstration of the treacherous behaviour of the British. The people of Zimbabwe had totally rejected those proposals, a fact which had evidently shocked the United Kingdom Government. Either it had been incredibly ill-informed regarding the level of political consciousness of the people of Zimbabwe, or it had believed that its appointees to the Commission would be as hypocritical as it was itself. Since the publication of the Pearce report, the United Kingdom Government had been forced to state that it had noted the rejection and that it did not intend to settle on the terms set out in the proposals. With its policy a failure and its hypocrisy exposed, the United Kingdom had continued to have dealings with the Smith régime.

12. While the Smith régime silenced the genuine representatives of the people of Zimbabwe by a campaign of arrests, detention, intimidation and murder, there were other reports of the indiscriminate shooting of villagers and the burning of their homes by black and white soldiers. According to a report that had appeared in the *Zambia Mail* of 9 August 1973, which he read out, seriously wounded survivors who had escaped from Southern Rhodesia to Zambia had reported attacks on their villages by troops who had fired indiscriminately on men, women and children, burned the huts and seized the livestock. The soldiers had asked who had been feeding the freedom fighters and when the villagers had not replied, they had detained all the men and some old women who, they had said, had been cooking for the freedom fighters. In one village they had also ripped off the roof of a school, saying that they did not want any child over 14 years of age to study, because the boys were joining the freedom fighters.

13. Lastly, he briefly summarized an article published in the *Zambia Mail* of 10 August 1973, describing the tortures to which two chiefs who had escaped from Southern Rhodesia and were now in Zambia had been subjected.

14. As he had already indicated, the United Kingdom Government was attempting to create a body of African opinion which would claim to represent the African people and say that they had changed their minds, but that

¹ Rhodesia: Report of the Commission on Rhodesian Opinion under the Chairmanship of the Right Honourable the Lord Pearce, Cmd. 4964 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1972).

attempt had failed by mid 1973. Meanwhile, there were signs that the United Kingdom Government was increasingly feeling the strength of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its power to take economic measures against the United Kingdom if it persisted in its racist policies. It sufficed to say that British trade with free Africa exceeded its trade with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom had therefore begun to feel that it must adopt a more moderate attitude with regard to questions such as those of South Africa and Zimbabwe.

15. For almost a year, there had been signs that the United Kingdom wished to abandon its responsibility for Zimbabwe. The first sign had been the statement by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs on 23 May 1972,² following the publication of the Pearce Commission's report, that the resolution of the problem must now come from the people of Rhodesia themselves. That showed that the United Kingdom was trying to extricate itself from a situation that it had itself created. In other words, there was every indication that the United Kingdom had convinced Smith that the tactic of pretending that it wished to reach a genuine settlement was essential for the survival of the settlers.

16. The first lesson to be drawn from that ambivalent attitude of the United Kingdom was that there could be no peaceful solution. The Africans and the settlers would never reach an agreement because of the arrogance of the latter. The second lesson concerned the question of "parity". Some ingenuous people believed that parity would represent a great step towards majority rule; but the whites who accepted that theory saw it as a way of buying off the Africans, in other words of pretending to give them something without allowing anything to change. Experience had already shown that such a euphemism was commonplace in imperialist circles and led to nothing. The third lesson to be learned was that anyone who was in favour of a peaceful solution and called for negotiations which did not involve the participation of the leaders of the African people either was ignorant of the situation in Zimbabwe or supported the white minority régime.

17. The Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) therefore asked the United Nations to study carefully the real motives of those who proposed a peaceful solution: most of them were only trying to make the public believe that the Africans who resisted violence with violence were morally wrong. Those who denied the necessity of armed struggle were ultimately those who supported the United Kingdom in its intention of maintaining the racist minority régime.

18. The people of Zimbabwe believed that the United Nations could help them in their fight against the United Kingdom by resisting appeals to enter into negotiations aimed at reaching an unacceptable solution. A constitutional conference with the participation of the detained leaders of the African people could result only from the military defeat of the current régime; thus, the fastest way to achieve majority rule was to tip the balance of military power in favour of the African people. That meant that the United Nations should support the armed revolutionary

struggle and that only through military action by the people of Zimbabwe could freedom for all be achieved.

19. With that in view, he expressed the hope that the United Nations would take the following action with immediate effect: first, the United Nations should provide forces to patrol the Mozambique Channel, since it was known that the United Kingdom had abandoned its responsibility with regard to Southern Rhodesia; secondly, the United Nations should demand the removal of South African troops from Zimbabwe; thirdly, it should immediately recognize the Africans from Zimbabwe as refugees, despite the fact that the United Kingdom still pretended that they were British subjects; and, lastly, the United Nations should give bilateral assistance to the liberation movements of Zimbabwe recognized by OAU. Support for the armed struggle of the people of Zimbabwe was the only way in which the United Nations could help them to advance towards freedom.

20. Mr. ZIMBA (Zambia) observed that at the end of the preceding meeting, the representative of Algeria had suggested that the United Kingdom should report on the situation in Southern Rhodesia before the general debate began.

21. Mr. WORSLEY (United Kingdom) said that he had considered the Algerian representative's suggestion carefully and sympathetically. However, as was well known, the question of Southern Rhodesia had been the subject of lengthy debate in the Security Council early in the year and his delegation had stated its position at the 1715th meeting of the Security Council on 18 May 1973. Since no changes had occurred, it had decided to speak at the end of the debate, as usual, in order to answer any questions asked.

22. Mr. REFADI (Libyan Arab Republic), speaking on a point of order, said that, in his view, the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, had a duty to report to the Committee at the beginning of the debate. Needless to say, it should reply if anyone asked a question during the debate.

23. The CHAIRMAN said that he had no power to compel a representative to make statements. He would, however, ask the United Kingdom representative again whether he wished to speak, and if the answer was in the negative, he would take it that the general debate should proceed.

24. Mr. REFADI (Libyan Arab Republic) proposed, in view of the United Kingdom's responsibility as administering Power, that it should make a statement before the general debate began.

25. Mr. ZIMBA (Zambia) supported that proposal.

26. The CHAIRMAN said that, to the best of his recollection, the rules of procedure of the General Assembly contained no provision requiring a delegation to speak if it did not wish to do so. He accordingly asked the representatives of the Libyan Arab Republic and Zambia not to press their proposal.

27. Mr. OKOBOI (Uganda) supported the Libyan representative's proposal; he found it ridiculous that an adminis-

² See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-seventh Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1972*, document S/10656.

tering Power should claim that it had nothing to report. In that connexion, he pointed out that a great deal of time had elapsed since the preparation of the most recent report.

28. Mr. REFADI (Libyan Arab Republic) stressed that, under the United Nations Charter, the United Kingdom, as the legally recognized administering Power, was required to report to the Committee on recent developments.

29. Mr. WALTER (New Zealand) asked for clarification as to whether the Libyan representative's proposal invited or asked the United Kingdom to speak.

30. Mr. REFADI (Libyan Arab Republic) stressed that the United Kingdom, as administering Power, had a duty to report to the Committee on recent developments before the general debate began. Moreover, if a question arose during the debate, the United Kingdom had a duty to clarify it.

31. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote on the Libyan proposal.

The proposal was adopted by 78 votes to 14, with 21 abstentions.

32. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to General Assembly resolution 2945 (XXVII), in paragraph 8 of which the Government of the United Kingdom was called upon to comply with the provisions of that resolution and to report thereon to the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and to the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session. That call by the Assembly had not been heeded by the United Kingdom. He was citing that provision only in order that the United Kingdom delegation might take it into account in deciding on the Committee's request that it should speak at the beginning of the general debate.

33. Mr. WORSLEY (United Kingdom) said that he had little to add; it was not within the power of the Committee to insist on a particular delegation speaking at a particular time. His delegation certainly intended to make a statement, but it was obviously entitled to decide when to make it. Despite the arguments adduced at the previous meeting, which his delegation had studied most carefully, there was no reason why his delegation should alter its earlier decision to make its statement at the end of the general debate on the question of Southern Rhodesia.

34. The CHAIRMAN asked whether the Committee wished to begin the general debate or, in view of the situation which had arisen, preferred to suspend the meeting.

35. Mr. REFADI (Libyan Arab Republic) said that the Committee had decided by an overwhelming majority that it wanted to hear the United Kingdom delegation first. To continue the debate before the United Kingdom representative had made his statement would be equivalent to ignoring the decision it had just made.

36. Mr. IBRAHIM (Sudan) deplored the negative attitude of the United Kingdom: the United Kingdom delegation was not in the same position as other delegations, inasmuch

as its Government had a special responsibility with regard to the people of Zimbabwe and, furthermore, it had a hand in what was happening in the Territory. In his statement the representative of ZAPU had made certain accusations with regard to which it was very important to ascertain the position of the United Kingdom: for example, what that Government's attitude was to the presence of South African troops in Zimbabwe. It was difficult to begin the general debate without knowing either the policy or the intentions of the United Kingdom with regard to Southern Rhodesia. The logical course was, therefore, for that delegation to show goodwill and a spirit of co-operation by making the general policy statement that was being requested of it. Otherwise, the inevitable conclusion would be that that delegation was taking a negative attitude, which might give rise to a decision by the Committee concerning that attitude.

37. Mr. MULWA (Kenya) explained that the Committee was not trying to compel a delegation to make a statement, but courteously asking for a policy statement on the item under discussion. He accordingly requested the United Kingdom delegation to change its position about the time at which it wished to make its statement, in view of the decision taken by a majority vote. Otherwise the record would show that the United Kingdom had refused to co-operate with the Committee and had unnecessarily complicated its work.

38. Mr. CAMPBELL (Australia) asked for a clarification, in view of the fact that at the time of voting he had been unable to determine whether the United Kingdom was being asked to submit a report or to make a statement. Uncertainty about what was being sought had forced his delegation to abstain in the vote. He therefore wished to hear the exact wording of the decision the Committee had taken.

39. Mr. FAHNBULLEH (Liberia) endorsed the views expressed by the Sudanese and Kenyan representatives. It was most important that the United Kingdom delegation should make its position on the item under discussion known, particularly in relation to what had been said by the observer for ZAPU. He pointed out that the Committee was dealing with human problems, which had to be solved. For that reason, the United Kingdom delegation should accede to the wish expressed by the Committee.

40. Mr. RUPIA (United Republic of Tanzania) suggested that the Chairman could help the Committee to decide how to interpret the decision it had just taken. He himself held that the purpose of the Libyan proposal had been to have the United Kingdom delegation make its statement before the general debate began. The intention had been excellent, and it would have been useful to know the position of the United Kingdom Government on the problem of Southern Rhodesia. However, he did not believe that the Libyan Arab Republic, Zambia and the other delegations that had voted for the proposal had meant to prevent the Committee from holding a debate on the question of Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom delegation had replied to the Committee's request by saying that it had no statement to make. When note had been taken of that situation, the debate should proceed.

41. Mr. DJIGO (Senegal) said that he was surprised that the delegation of the United Kingdom, a country which presented itself to the world as a champion of democracy, should refuse to accept a majority decision. That delegation clearly owed the Committee an explanation of its attitude and of its position on the problem of Southern Rhodesia. It was hard to justify the lack of co-operation shown by the United Kingdom delegation.

42. The CHAIRMAN observed that unless a conciliatory spirit was shown the debate could continue indefinitely. The Libyan proposal was clear. It called upon the delegation of the United Kingdom to make its statement on the progress and new developments recorded during the current year in Southern Rhodesia before the general debate began. He urged the United Kingdom delegation, in view of the Committee's decision and of paragraph 8 of resolution 2945 (XXVII), to decide to make a statement to the Committee; the current meeting could be suspended until that delegation was in a position to speak.

43. He added that, if that satisfied the sponsors of the proposal that the Committee had endorsed, the general membership of the Committee and the United Kingdom delegation in particular, the discussion could be brought to an end.

44. Mr. WORSLEY (United Kingdom) pointed out that his delegation's position had been announced quite clearly at the very beginning of the discussion. The United Kingdom had already reported on the question of Southern Rhodesia during the current year. The decision not to make

a statement at the beginning of the debate had been taken with great care and because there had been nothing new to add, since no new policy had been adopted with respect to the Territory. For that reason, his delegation had decided to speak only in response to observations and questions asked during the general debate. The proposal made at the preceding meeting by the representative of Algeria had been most carefully considered, and his delegation regretted that it was unable to change its position. Moreover, it did not wish to give the impression that it might alter its decision and speak at the opening of the general debate.

45. Mr. REFADI (Libyan Arab Republic) said that the Committee was witnessing an attempt to ignore a previous decision. The Committee's will had been quite clear: 78 delegations had asked the United Kingdom delegation to make a statement on the question of Southern Rhodesia. He was surprised at the statement of the Tanzanian representative, who seemed to accept the possibility that the United Kingdom would make its statement when the debate on the item ended. His delegation's proposal, adopted by an overwhelming majority of the Committee, had been quite clear and did not need to be reconsidered. He consequently proposed that the meeting should be adjourned until the United Kingdom delegation consented to speak in the Committee.

46. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that, under the rules of procedure, a proposal to adjourn the meeting had precedence over any other question.

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.

2039th meeting

Wednesday, 17 October 1973, at 10.50 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Leonardo DIAZ GONZALEZ (Venezuela).

A/C.4/SR.2039

AGENDA ITEM 72

Question of Southern Rhodesia (*continued*) (A/9023/Add.1, A/9061)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

In accordance with the decision taken by the General Assembly at its 2139th meeting, on 3 October 1973, Mr. Mukudzei Mudzi, representative of the Zimbabwe African National Union, took a place at the Committee table.

1. Mr. MUDZI (Zimbabwe African National Union) said that the United Nations had considered the question of the oppressed people of Zimbabwe on many occasions. In April 1973, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) had made a statement at the 907th meeting of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, in which it had

pointed out that Western imperialist forces were conniving with the racist, imperialist and fascist Smith régime in exploiting the people of Zimbabwe.

2. Zimbabwe had taken an unshakable stand against colonialism and imperialism: because peaceful and non-violent methods had failed, the people had resorted to armed struggle as the only way to achieve total liberation and it should be pointed out that, since the representative of ZANU had addressed the Special Committee, his organization's military wing, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), had achieved many victories.

3. He would merely mention that, during the period from 24 April to 29 July 1973, ZANLA forces had killed 163 enemy troops. In May and June they had destroyed many trucks and launched a big attack on the operations base which the enemy maintained at Uchachacha.