

2045th meeting

Wednesday, 24 October 1973, at 3.20 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Leonardo DIAZ GONZALEZ (Venezuela).

A/C.4/SR.2045

AGENDA ITEM 72

Question of Southern Rhodesia (*continued*) (A/9023/Add.1, A/9061)

GENERAL DEBATE (*concluded*)

1. Miss KYTÖMAA (Finland) said that since the preceding session the situation in Southern Rhodesia had regrettably remained unchanged. There had been no developments in the relations between the parties concerned, and the position of the illegal régime reflected an attitude of indifference to the cause of the African majority. Moreover, concepts and policies identical with those of *apartheid* had been introduced in Southern Rhodesia. As the representatives of the people of Zimbabwe had pointed out at the 2038th and 2039th meetings, the oppression was daily becoming more severe.

2. The immediate future did not appear to offer any answer to the question. The United Nations had taken action with regard to Southern Rhodesia in 1966, when the Security Council had determined, in its resolution 221 (1966), that the situation in the area constituted a threat to international peace and security. In 1968 the Security Council had adopted resolution 253 (1968), in which it had imposed mandatory sanctions against the régime of Ian Smith. In 1970, under Security Council resolution 277 (1970), the measures already undertaken had been further strengthened. The sanctions, however, were not effective; the economy of Southern Rhodesia had not suffered to the extent expected when sanctions had been introduced. In fact, some Member States were still trading with Southern Rhodesia.

3. In his address to the General Assembly at the current session (2149th plenary meeting), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland had stated that, since the sanctions had not proved effective, Finland supported the efforts of the Committee of the Security Council established pursuant to resolution 253 (1968), otherwise known as the Sanctions Committee, to work out realistic measures through which the sanctions could be made fully effective. The full implementation of the sanctions and the Security Council resolutions was the only means of achieving the goal of the international community, namely, the establishment of a truly representative régime in Southern Rhodesia.

4. The Government of Finland saw no alternative to the policy of sanctions. The Security Council should make every effort to strengthen them. A considerable step in that direction had been taken in the recent adoption of Security Council resolution 333 (1973) and it was to be hoped that all Governments would take urgent action to comply fully with its provisions.

5. The disappointment engendered by the slow pace at which the policy of sanctions was evolving and the obvious deficiencies in that policy should not lead to any underestimation of the historic significance of the unanimous decision by the Security Council. It had shown the white minority that the world community did not intend to give it international recognition. From the economic point of view, the illegal régime continued to survive, but it survived as an outcast, with no hope of ever establishing normal relations with other Governments.

6. The Finnish Government urged all Governments which had not yet done so to adopt more stringent measures to prevent their nationals or companies trading with Southern Rhodesia. Similarly, Member States should continue to refuse to accord any kind of recognition to the illegal régime. There should be no change in that policy until the people of Zimbabwe had achieved independence and majority rule.

7. Mr. FOURATI (Tunisia) pointed out that all those who had spoken in the debate, in particular the representatives of the liberation movements, had emphasized the vital need to find an urgent way out of the tragic situation in which the people of Zimbabwe found themselves.

8. The fact that that problem was still the main preoccupation of all those who loved freedom and justice and that it continued to constitute a permanent threat to international peace and security should make the international community redouble its determination to pursue the anticolonialist struggle. The people of Zimbabwe would finally achieve freedom, no matter what the price. Theirs was a legitimate struggle, which deserved the understanding and support of the international community. Tunisia, faithful to its ideals, would continue to give its firm support to the people of Zimbabwe and to accord them moral and material assistance until the final victory.

9. The special and complex character of the case should be recognized and it should be borne in mind that the problem was mainly the responsibility of a State Member of the United Nations—the United Kingdom—which, as administering Power, had the duty to put an end to Ian Smith's rebellion and to lead the people of Zimbabwe to independence and freedom, in accordance with the United Nations Charter and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Only the administering Power could take all the necessary steps to put an end to the rebel régime and to speed up the process of decolonization in Southern Rhodesia. Unfortunately the policy followed by the United Kingdom had been a failure and 5 million Africans were suffering the most inhuman oppression. The international community had supported the United Kingdom in the adoption of the economic sanctions which that country had proposed in an endeavour to solve the problem. The sanctions, however,

had proved ineffective, since they had not succeeded in bringing down the racist régime in Salisbury, mainly because the products of Southern Rhodesia were still circulating freely throughout the world. In addition to the close collaboration between Salisbury, Pretoria and Lisbon, other countries were still maintaining economic and trade relations with the illegal régime of Ian Smith, despite all the United Nations resolutions. It was clear that urgent measures were imperative.

10. In view of the obvious reluctance of the United Kingdom Government to have recourse to force in order to re-establish its authority, the time had come for London, which had so abruptly rejected the African proposals, to state clearly how it intended to discharge its responsibility. Any settlement regarding the future of the Territory would have to be worked out with the participation of the liberation movements, the true representatives of the people of Zimbabwe. The conclusions reached by the Pearce Commission¹ left no room for doubt about the wishes of the Africans of Southern Rhodesia and their will and determination to intensify the struggle until they achieved final victory.

11. His delegation was convinced that the final solution lay in the hands of the people of Zimbabwe, whose wishes had been communicated by the representatives of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the African National Council in their statements at the 2038th and 2039th meetings. His delegation congratulated them and assured them of his Government's support.

12. The desire of the people of Zimbabwe for freedom was reflected in a struggle which was increasing day by day and which was causing Ian Smith to practise more and more repression and to extend the policy of *apartheid* to the Territory.

13. His delegation firmly maintained that the United Kingdom had the foremost responsibility for that situation and that it should use all means at its disposal to put an end to Ian Smith's rebellion. Furthermore, the Security Council should shoulder its own responsibilities and should have recourse to the ample measures provided in the Charter. In so doing, it would spare mankind the explosion of all the accumulated resentment and would help to bring hope and confidence to the 5 million Africans of Zimbabwe.

14. Mr. SAM (Ghana) said that it was disheartening to reflect that in the space of 11 years neither the Committee nor the international community had been able to do more than impose sanctions against the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia, sanctions that were not even being fully applied. It would seem that Member States lacked sufficient respect for the resolutions they themselves had adopted. However that might be, there was no doubt whatever about where the responsibility for the problem of Southern Rhodesia lay: it lay squarely with the United Kingdom Government. The attitude of that Government was unpardonable; it was deplorable that so many opportunities to restore legality in the Territory had been allowed to pass.

¹ See *Rhodesia: Report of the Commission on Rhodesian Opinion under the Chairmanship of the Right Honourable the Lord Pearce*, Cmd. 4964 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1972).

15. The United Kingdom had always insisted that it was the administering Power for Zimbabwe. In that way it had managed to thwart any external pressure that might have been exercised with a view to solving the problem of Southern Rhodesia. As far back as 13 September 1963, the United Kingdom Government had frustrated a move by the Security Council to prevent the arming of the Southern Rhodesian settlers. After the disintegration of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1963, it had become known that the United Kingdom intended to hand over the bulk of the Federation's armed forces to the racist settlers of Southern Rhodesia. Ghana had raised the question in the Security Council and had been supported not only by the African members but also by all the other non-permanent members, representing various regions of the world.² At that time Ian Smith's régime had already been in power and had hinted at its intention of seizing independence from the British Crown by force. The draft resolution³ would have been adopted but for the exercise of the veto by the United Kingdom.

16. It was useful to remember, in that regard, what the late Kwame Nkrumah, former President of Ghana, had stated in an aide-mémoire addressed to the United Kingdom Prime Minister in 1965. He had said at that time that he had been astounded to hear the United Kingdom Government's statement that it would not use armed force in Southern Rhodesia. President Nkrumah had pointed out that it was perhaps the first time in history that a country had declared in advance that those who were prepared to risk their lives to defend the lawful Government would receive no support from the forces of law and order of the country against which the revolt was directed.

17. Most of the measures adopted by successive United Kingdom Governments, both before and after the granting of responsible government to the white settlers in Zimbabwe in 1923, had had the unfortunate tendency of encouraging the denial of the rights of the indigenous majority to justice and equal opportunity. At times those measures had taken the simple form of passivity. The Land Apportionment Act, the Native Registration Act and a host of other obnoxious laws reinforcing the power of the whites in Zimbabwe had been passed long before the unilateral declaration of independence, with little or no opposition in the United Kingdom Parliament.

18. In more recent times, there had been Security Council resolution 314 (1972), which had simply asked Member States to respect and act in accordance with Security Council resolution 253 (1968). On that occasion the United Kingdom had not used its veto but had voted against the resolution, as had the United States of America. All that showed that the United Kingdom was giving tacit assistance to the Ian Smith régime, as was clear from paragraphs 37 to 39 of the annex to chapter VII of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (A/9023/Add.1).

² *Official Records of the Security Council, Eighteenth Year, 1069th meeting.*

³ *Ibid.*, Supplement for July, August and September 1963, document S/5425/Rev.1.

19. With regard to the active assistance given to the illegal régime by the United Kingdom, it should be recalled that in 1972 the United Kingdom Parliament had passed the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965 (Continuation) Order 1972, under which it was possible for the racist settlers to obtain large sums of money from the United Kingdom and elsewhere. Provisions under the titles "non-financial measures" and "recognition of marriages, divorces and adoptions" (*ibid.*, para. 37 (b) and (c)) were also geared to benefit the very people who were supporting Ian Smith's rebellion against the United Kingdom. Apparently the African majority had to manage as best they could.

20. As for the sanctions, all available evidence indicated that they had never been seriously operated. At the 2042nd meeting, the representative of India had provided detailed information on the way in which certain countries were offering active support to the illegal régime in Zimbabwe to help it to withstand the effects of the sanctions.

21. The assistance of the fascist régimes of South Africa and Portugal to their racist colleagues in Zimbabwe had been predictable. So long as those two countries, and some others, continued to aid and abet the illegal régime, there would be little hope of bringing that régime to its knees in the near future. As Frank Clements had stated in his book *Rhodesia: a Study of the Deterioration of a White Society*,⁴ the white Southern Rhodesians would be able to resist long enough to ensure the destruction of the economy and its infrastructure prior to abandoning a devastated country.

22. United Kingdom Governments, both Conservative and Labour, had had talks with the Smith régime on the possibility of reaching a settlement or even reaching a compromise, without the participation of representatives of the Zimbabwe people. None of those talks had come to anything. Despite that and the fact that Ian Smith had sworn that he would never recognize the need to deal justly with the African people, and in the face of the Africans' clear rejection of the 1971 constitutional "proposals for a settlement", the Pearce Commission had been sent to Zimbabwe. That Commission had returned to the United Kingdom with a categorical "No" from the Zimbabwe people.

23. His delegation thanked the representatives of ZAPU, ZANU and the African National Council for their statements to the Fourth Committee (2038th and 2039th meetings). It was encouraging to hear of the progress being made by the Zimbabwe people in their legitimate struggle against the racist minority dominating their country. At the same time, he had been saddened to hear their reports of the cruelties and atrocities committed by the white racists against the indigenous people. As always, Ghana would remain committed to the total emancipation of the African continent and would continue to give the liberation movements every assistance possible until their goal was achieved.

24. On 18 April 1973, the racist Ian Smith had stated in Salisbury that he would make no constitutional concessions to the Africans. The United Kingdom had done nothing

about that; it insisted that it was the administering Power but it regarded the situation with its characteristic cynical inaction. The world press supported and encouraged the illegal régime with calculated silence. In the face of that conspiracy of silence, the only conclusion to be drawn was that it was due to a feeling of sympathy for the rebels because they were white and the kith and kin of the British, and because the victims were black.

25. The Fourth Committee had been told that the Africans should not resort to force, although their oppressors were using force and although their protector, the United Kingdom, claimed to be entirely impotent to intervene on their behalf. In the face of the viciousness of the racist régime, nothing resembling justice and freedom could be achieved without resort to force; Ghana was committed to it in conformity with the resolutions of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

26. The United Kingdom had undoubtedly done something about the Southern Rhodesian question, but it had failed to convince the people of Zimbabwe and the international community that it seriously wished to restore legality in the Territory.

27. The Government of Ghana had taken many steps to ensure compliance with the sanctions imposed by the United Nations, although it entertained serious doubts about their effectiveness. It had had no reason to revise its views, especially since no serious attempts had been made to ensure that countries which violated the sanctions would suffer the consequences of their treachery to United Nations resolutions.

28. The policy of not using force preached by the United Kingdom and its accomplices not only was fraudulent and unrealistic but had failed to prevent violence. Both the white racists and the freedom-loving Africans were using violence as the only means of attaining their diametrically opposed objectives. That indicated that violence would increase and would spread to other areas and to peoples who, in more favourable circumstances, might choose a position of non-involvement. Unless decisive and urgent action was taken, present frustrations would worsen until it would be impossible to prevent another Middle East in southern Africa.

29. It must be recognized that the time had come to act to ensure the speedy and effective implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions. That was the only way to spare the different races of Zimbabwe a senseless holocaust and to save the Organization from the loss of prestige that seemed to be threatening it.

30. Mr. TEYMOUR (Egypt) said that to speak of the problem of Southern Rhodesia was to speak of a new case of *apartheid* in Zimbabwe, where a white minority had taken the law into its own hands against the legitimate rights of an indigenous African majority and against international law, international morality and human rights.

31. After the failure of the efforts of the Pearce Commission, the administering Power's lack of action had encouraged the rebel régime to embark on a policy of *apartheid* similar to that of the racist régimes of South Africa and

⁴ New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1969.

Israel, and it had resorted to aggression against African countries, with the assistance of the South African armed forces. The Security Council in its resolution 328 (1973) had condemned South Africa for its persistent refusal to withdraw its military forces from Southern Rhodesia. Internally, the illegal régime had continued its repressive policy against the indigenous population and the African nationalists. The sanctions had proved impotent against the illegal régime because of the unholy alliance of that régime with Pretoria and Lisbon.

32. That was the situation in Zimbabwe, where injustice, inhumanity and *apartheid* prevailed and where crimes were committed in the name of civilization and separate development. The system of *apartheid* did not help to raise the level of living of the population and it was totally contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

33. The statements made before the Fourth Committee by the Reverend Canaan Banana and by other representatives of the people of Zimbabwe (2038th and 2039th meetings) had been extremely valuable and revealing. Chapter VII of the report of the Special Committee of 24 showed the effect of the sanctions imposed on Southern Rhodesia, in connexion with which Ian Smith himself had reported that in 1972 exports had increased by 14 per cent, thereby exceeding the 1965 level before the imposition of sanctions. The Special Committee was of the view that unless the sanctions were comprehensive, mandatory and complied with by all States, they would not achieve the objective of putting an end to the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia. Moreover, it was not possible to isolate the Smith régime when Israel allowed teams from the Territory illegally occupied by the Smith clique to participate in the Maccabiah Games in Israel. He wondered whether there was any hope that following those specific examples the United Kingdom would be convinced that, if it did not act to bring down the illegal régime, the Zimbabwe people would be obliged either to suffer under the system of *apartheid* or to resort to force.

34. In his delegation's view the United Kingdom was the administering Power responsible for putting an end to the illegal situation in Southern Rhodesia, and was the sole custodian of the Zimbabwe people. It should therefore submit reports to the Fourth Committee in accordance with the General Assembly resolutions, it should use force to put an end to the illegal rebel régime and it should convene a constitutional conference of all the people of Southern Rhodesia on an equal footing in order to restore order and bring peace to the Territory. His delegation hoped that a speedy settlement would be reached on that basis before it was too late.

35. Mr. WORSLEY (United Kingdom) said that as a member of the House of Commons he had often had to wait tedious hours before being able to address the House. It had therefore been a new experience for him to find that many of his colleagues in the Fourth Committee had been anxious to hear his statement before he had judged it best to speak. It was clear that an important question of principle was involved, namely, the right of a Member to speak when he wished. The subsequent course of the debate had confirmed his opinion that the practice of the United

Kingdom delegation of speaking towards the end of the debate and thus being able to deal with the questions raised by earlier speakers was correct.

36. The representative of Sierra Leone had said (2043rd meeting) that the United Kingdom delegation had not complied with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2945 (XXVII), and had referred in particular to the call to the United Kingdom in paragraph 8 to report to the Special Committee and to the General Assembly. The United Kingdom delegation had voted against that resolution because it regarded it as unacceptable and unrealistic. Accordingly, the obligation of the United Kingdom to report was limited to that which it had accepted under the Charter and, as he had stated at the 2038th meeting, the United Kingdom delegation had reported to the Secretary-General on Southern Rhodesia in 1973 in accordance with the provisions of Article 73 e of the Charter.

37. Replying to the question put by the representative of Algeria (2039th meeting), he said that the United Kingdom was the sole legal administering authority in Southern Rhodesia and that the United Kingdom had accepted the responsibility that that imposed upon it. The actual situation in Southern Rhodesia, however, limited the exercise of that responsibility. The analogies that some delegations had drawn with the policies of the United Kingdom in other territories were not justified, since the essence of the situation was that the United Kingdom had responsibilities in Southern Rhodesia but no effective power. The United Kingdom had never in fact administered Southern Rhodesia by physical presence and, given its rejection of the use of force, it was not in a position to do so at present. Its ability to influence events in Southern Rhodesia directly was limited and it could therefore do nothing to bring about the release of political prisoners, to prevent the execution of Rhodesians or to enforce the withdrawal of South African police. Of course, the United Kingdom objected to the presence of South African police in Southern Rhodesia, as the South African Government was well aware, but it was not in a position to force them to withdraw.

38. A number of representatives had stated openly and unequivocally that the United Kingdom Government should use force. That was a strange doctrine to hear in an Organization whose very purpose was the solution of problems by peaceful means. The United Kingdom Government, as administering Power, emphatically rejected the use of force, which in the case in point would mean a military invasion in the heart of Africa. Apart from the bloodshed and suffering that it would cause, it would damage the interests of all the inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia.

39. If delegations wished to be constructive, they should accept, as successive United Kingdom Governments had had to accept, the reality of the limitations on what the United Kingdom could do.

40. It had also been suggested that the United Kingdom Government, or perhaps the United Nations, should convene a conference inside or outside Southern Rhodesia and do so, if need be, without the agreement of the Smith régime. To convene a conference inside Southern Rhodesia without the agreement of the ruling party or to hold it

outside the country without the participation of the white minority, which, as must be recognized, was in actual control of the country, and perhaps without many of the African leaders, would be both pointless and fruitless. The United Kingdom Government could not assume the responsibility of convening such a conference until it was satisfied that all the parties concerned were ready to participate in it and that it showed some possibility of success. It was obvious that that moment had not yet arrived. With regard to the process of consultation and discussion inside Southern Rhodesia, he thought that it was significant that the contacts between the African National Council and the Southern Rhodesian authorities and between the African National Council and the Rhodesia Party were continuing. The Committee had heard something of those contacts during the debate. His delegation felt that such developments were a step in the right direction. In addition to those contacts, Europeans and Africans were talking to each other on a broad field of topics. One example was the joint publication by the Rhodesia Party and the African National Council of an agreement in principle on the basis of 12 measures for the building of a multiracial society in Southern Rhodesia.

41. His Government had repeatedly expressed its conviction that an interracial settlement would be in the interests of all Rhodesians. At the Conference of Commonwealth Heads of Government, held at Ottawa in August 1973, it had been agreed that the situation in Southern Rhodesia called for a peaceful settlement and note had been taken of the discussions which were taking place within the country towards that end. His Government had welcomed both the fact that other Commonwealth Governments appreciated its efforts and their willingness to contribute towards a solution. In fact, only an interracial solution would survive—a solution based not on violence but on the work of reasonable men, regardless of their colour, who were prepared to abandon confrontation in order to reach a compromise solution of their problem in their country, acceptable to the majority of their people.

42. Some delegations had said that the true intention of his Government was to bolster up the present situation in Southern Rhodesia and to see to it that the majority of the people were deprived for ever of political rights. The facts proved the opposite. His country could have given independence to Southern Rhodesia at any time, and thereby have saved itself a great deal of trouble. It had not done so, for one reason: that it had been its constant aim to discharge its responsibilities towards the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole.

43. He had said nothing about sanctions because his delegation's views on them were sufficiently well known, but he was grateful to the representative of Sudan for the tribute he had paid to the United Kingdom Government at the preceding meeting, particularly with regard to its co-operation with the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia. A number of delegations, however, had suggested that the United Kingdom, as administering Power, should initiate proceedings in an international court against violations of the sanctions. He felt obliged to point out that the sanctions against the illegal régime were not the responsibility of his Government

alone; they had been imposed by the Security Council and were binding on all States Members of the United Nations. The United Kingdom, for its part, applied the sanctions meticulously, and he wished he could say the same of all other Governments.

44. His delegation was well aware of the depth of feeling among the members of the Committee for the people of Southern Rhodesia. His country shared that feeling and understood the sense of frustration felt by anyone who considered the fate of the efforts which had been made to solve the problem. Obviously there were many features in the situation which gave cause for doubt and increasing concern, but even so he felt there was justification for expressing some cautious optimism for the future.

45. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) said that the question of Southern Rhodesia had been under consideration in the United Nations for almost a decade and that he himself had spoken on the topic on many occasions in the General Assembly and the Security Council. Consequently, he thought himself justified in reviewing the background of the situation.

46. Firstly, he pointed out that the age of empires was over. The Arabs, who had had four empires, had lost them, just as the British Empire had been lost, despite the great efforts of the United Kingdom to preserve it. For example, the conflict between British and German interests had brought about the First World War; it had been said, however, that it was necessary to have recourse to arms to defend democracy. The Second World War, too, had been brought about by a conflict of interests: the United Kingdom had feared that Germany might become a threat to its Empire, and so Sir Winston Churchill had precipitated the war. President Roosevelt, too, had been convinced that the war was necessary, because it would enable the United States to become a Power. Nevertheless, since the Second World War mankind had been living in greater fear than before, just as after the First World War it had lived with less democracy. Hitler, who had said that the Third Reich would last a thousand years, had remarked that if he was defeated he would bring the United Kingdom down with him. Thanks to the great sacrifices of the Soviet people and, to a lesser extent, the military might of the United States, Hitler had lost the war from the military point of view, but the United Kingdom had lost it from the economic point of view. Thus it was clear that wars suited the purposes of the neo-colonialists in their desire to maintain the *status quo*.

47. For all that, he did not blame the United Kingdom for not having recourse to force. The British Empire was bankrupt. The United States, which had also intervened in two world wars, was heading slowly but surely for insolvency. That was the price of war. Consequently, the Africans should be realistic, and not ask the United Kingdom to use force, for it could not afford to do so; moreover, even if it had the necessary resources to overthrow Smith, his white complexion would induce the British people, who were also white, to overthrow their Government.

48. Furthermore, he was well aware that the Soviet Union was just as reluctant to intervene in a confrontation as was the United States, which talked so much about democracy.

49. The question, then, was what should be done to solve the problem of Southern Rhodesia. Clearly the United Kingdom must be asked to do what it could to reach an amicable settlement. He agreed with the United Kingdom that it should not use force and he recalled that the United Nations was predicated on peace. There had also been talk of constitutional processes, but a constitutional process could take years. Another possibility was economic sanctions, which had clearly had no result.

50. The representative of the United Kingdom had just said that his Government had responsibilities in Southern Rhodesia but no effective power. He had also said that the United Kingdom was the only legal administering authority in the Territory. To suppose for one moment that the United Kingdom would renounce that responsibility; would the United Nations be able to deal successfully with the problem? Obviously not. He recalled that he himself had once suggested to Sir Colin Crowe a plan according to which the United Kingdom would contribute \$5 million to establish a fund for the improvement of the living conditions of the Africans who lived under foreign domination. Once the fund, which would provide for the Africans' basic needs, had been established, it would be possible to start a campaign of *satyagraha*, or civil disobedience, such as that waged by Gandhi in India to achieve independence. Perhaps the white man would agree to negotiate when confronted by a wave of strikes and boycotts. The money from the fund would be sent to the churches for them to establish a system of food rationing which would enable the indigenous population to support themselves without going to work until such time as the economy of the illegal régime had been undermined and Ian Smith himself had been overthrown.

51. He would be interested to see whether the United Kingdom Government and other Member States were willing to establish a fund such as he had described in order to bring about the peaceful overthrow of the illegal régime of Ian Smith.

52. When the United Kingdom had raised the question of Israel in the United Nations in 1945, the United States had forgotten about self-determination and had partitioned Palestine. Was that perhaps democracy?

53. If a settlement was not reached in Southern Rhodesia, there would be trouble in the Territory and innocent white people would be killed. The question would go to the Security Council and there would no doubt be problems there too. Attention must be drawn to the Powers which were currently taking an advantage of an easing of tension. The Chinese delegation had already done so in the Security Council. The power-drunk nations that were holding the Africans in subjugation in the name of democracy and self-determination would continue to decline unless they changed their policies.

54. Mr. ALIO (Niger) said that in resolution 1747 (XVI) the General Assembly had affirmed that Southern Rhodesia was a Non-Self-Governing Territory which should attain self-determination and independence under the administration of the United Kingdom, in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV).

55. In 1965, when Ian Smith's rebels had illegally and unilaterally declared the independence of Southern Rhodesia, Portugal and South Africa had given them assistance, thereby interfering in the internal affairs of the United Kingdom and defying all the resolutions of the United Nations. The administering Power, which was responsible for putting down the rebellion and re-establishing legality, abandoning its usual practice, had preferred to take the matter to the Security Council and the General Assembly, whose many resolutions would have been able to bring pressure to bear on the illegal régime if they had not been constantly violated by certain Members of the Organization. At the same time the United Kingdom had devoted itself to the task of establishing direct and secret contacts with the minority régime, disregarding the wishes of the majority of the people of Zimbabwe.

56. In order to cover up its complicity, the administering Power had negotiated with Ian Smith on certain "proposals for a settlement" based on the 1969 "Constitution". The categorical rejection of those proposals by the majority of the population should serve as a lesson and induce the United Kingdom to take urgent action to eliminate the minority Government once and for all and to convene a constitutional conference, in which the liberation movements would participate, with a view to transferring power to the genuine representatives of the people. His delegation profoundly regretted that the United Kingdom could not make up its mind to carry out the resolutions of the United Nations and thus to safeguard the sacred rights of the people of Zimbabwe.

57. The savage repression and the atrocities committed by the illegal régime had been condemned by all countries which espoused the cause of peace and justice. The liberation movements were only defending themselves in answering violence with violence, with the sole aim of gaining greater dignity and freedom for their people and leading them to self-determination and independence. His delegation thanked the representatives of ZAPU, ZANU and the African National Council for their valuable reports and it reaffirmed its support of their legitimate struggle against the oppressor.

58. If the United Kingdom did not provide information on political developments in Southern Rhodesia and its endeavours to overthrow the rebel régime, it might at least tell the Committee what it thought of the presence of South African troops in the Territory. Those troops were supporting the régime of Ian Smith and protecting South African investments and those of the Western Powers in the region. It was urgent that all foreign troops should be immediately withdrawn from Southern Rhodesia and that general and more effective sanctions should be extended to Portugal and South Africa. In that connexion, his delegation called upon the United States to give up once and for all importing chrome and other strategic material from Southern Rhodesia.

59. The closing of the frontier with Zambia and the deployment of troops along it constituted an act of aggression against a peace-loving independent country, which at great sacrifice was fighting to maintain dignity and freedom, in accordance with the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. His delegation paid a

tribute to the courage and spirit of self-sacrifice of the people and Government of Zambia in their fight against the aggression by Southern Rhodesia and reiterated its complete solidarity with them.

60. His delegation strongly supported the different proposals submitted during the discussion with a view to finding a solution to the question of Southern Rhodesia and considered that only through very strict implementation of General Assembly resolutions 2945 (XXVII) and 2946 (XXVII) and of the proposals in regard to Zimbabwe contained in the programme of action of the International Conference of Experts for the Support of Victims of Colonialism and *Apartheid* in Southern Africa, held at Oslo in April 1973 (see A/9061, annex, sect. IV) would a final and satisfactory solution be found.

61. Mr. OUCIF (Algeria) reminded the Committee that at the beginning of the debate on the question of Southern Rhodesia (2037th meeting), his delegation had suggested that it would be helpful if the United Kingdom delegation were to inform the Committee at the outset of its Government's intentions concerning that problem. It was regrettable that that country had not complied with his suggestion.

62. The representative of Saudi Arabia had referred to facts which confirmed that the United Kingdom no longer considered itself the administering Power in the Territory, since it stated that it had no power whatsoever against the illegal régime. Yet that country maintained that it should be informed of the holding of any constitutional conference. As usual, the United Kingdom delegation did not make it clear whether its Government really considered itself the administering Power or had renounced its responsibility to find a solution to a problem which it was its duty to solve.

63. The statements by the representatives of the people of Zimbabwe (2038th and 2039th meetings), which had made an extremely important contribution to the Committee's work, had clearly shown that the administering Power was evading its responsibilities. Consequently, the sole solution to the problem of Southern Rhodesia should be based on the firm determination of the people of Zimbabwe, which was already waging a bitter struggle to put an end to a régime which had been condemned by the whole of world public opinion.

64. In the Security Council debate on the question of Southern Rhodesia on 29 September 1972,⁵ the United Kingdom had used its right of veto against two paragraphs of the draft resolution,⁶ which his delegation considered fundamental because they expressed the principles that there could be no independence before the establishment of majority rule and that any measure to determine the wishes of the people of Zimbabwe concerning their political future should be applied through universal suffrage, on the basis of one man, one vote.

⁵ *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-seventh Year, 1666th meeting.*

⁶ *Ibid., Supplement for July, August and September 1972, documents S/10805 and S/10805/Rev.1.*

65. That clearly proved that the United Kingdom had failed in its duty as administering Power, not only because it took no account of the conclusions of the Pearce Commission, which had explicitly shown that the majority of the inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia rejected the agreement between the United Kingdom and the illegal régime, but also because its negative attitude in the Security Council showed that, far from seeking a solution in accordance with the above-mentioned principles, it tended to consolidate the power of the rebel minority in Salisbury.

66. That consolidation of power was becoming increasingly evident because the Smith régime, with the tacit support of the United Kingdom and the aid of Pretoria and Lisbon, did not hesitate to attack the sovereignty of the independent African States. For instance, in January 1973, that régime had instituted a blockade of Zambia on the pretext that it was helping the freedom fighters. It was true that the intensification of the liberation movements' struggle had disconcerted the illegal régime. However, it was the United Kingdom, which considered itself responsible for Southern Rhodesia, that was mainly responsible for the situation: if that country had used force when Smith had made his unilateral declaration of independence, as it had done on other occasions, it would have avoided the present situation.

67. The economic sanctions imposed by the Security Council, which Algeria had always considered to be the first step towards resolving the conflict, were obviously a complete failure, because some members of the Security Council were systematically violating them and others even did so openly.

68. In the face of such a situation, only the Security Council could solve the problem of Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom Government should bow to the evidence and heed the appeals of the international community to find a solution to that problem in accordance with the aspirations of the majority of the people of Zimbabwe.

69. Whatever happened, however, the people of Zimbabwe were determined to fight till the end and the manoeuvres of the administering Power would be of no avail. In that struggle, the African countries, like all countries that loved peace and justice, were on the side of Zimbabwe.

70. Mr. BUCHANAN (United States of America) reiterated that the United States had always been in favour of self-determination in Southern Rhodesia. It recognized that the present Southern Rhodesian governmental structure discriminated against the African majority in that country and believed that if the Africans were to share in the benefits that country afforded, they must have a decisive voice in their Government. His country identified itself with the forces of freedom and justice elsewhere in the world and with the aspirations of the African people of Southern Rhodesia and it had therefore supported Security Council resolution 253 (1968).

71. However, the United States had to respect the decisions of Congress, which did not mean that many of its members, including himself, were not making strenuous efforts to ensure full United States compliance with the sanctions imposed against Southern Rhodesia. It appeared

comparatively unjust that the United States had been singled out in chapter VII of the report of the Special Committee (A/9023/Add.1). In fact, his country's imports of minerals from Southern Rhodesia had constituted less than 5 per cent of the latter's total exports in 1972.

72. Certain delegations had mentioned alleged violations of sanctions by United States firms, such as the activities of some airlines, which had been documented in several reports by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Those charges had been referred to the Federal Aviation Administration.

73. His delegation did not agree with the views expressed by several representatives that the efforts of the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968), otherwise known as the Sanctions Committee, had been in vain. As far as he knew, all the questions which had been put to him during the debate concerning violations of sanctions had already been answered by the United States representative in that Committee. He agreed with the conclusion reached by the Special Committee that sanctions would not be sufficient to put an end to the minority régime unless they were universally respected.

74. The statements made during the discussion were all characterized by a feeling of frustration. His delegation shared that feeling but hoped that through stricter enforcement of sanctions it would be possible to reach a peaceful settlement, which would ensure self-determination for the Africans of Southern Rhodesia, whose cause the United States was proud to support.

75. Mr. EVUNA OWONO (Equatorial Guinea) welcomed the representatives of the liberation movements of the people of Zimbabwe, whom he assured of his solidarity and moral and material support in their fight against oppression, colonialism and imperialism. He greatly regretted that the United Kingdom delegation had explained its position so late but, since its clarifications did not completely satisfy him, he would make his statement without referring directly to them.

76. It was well known that the people of Zimbabwe were suffering under the most inhuman and cruel form of colonialism; it was also common knowledge that, despite the numerous resolutions of the United Nations, ever since the illegal minority régime of Ian Smith had seized power in opposition to the true aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe, hardly anything had been achieved, because certain States, pursuing their ambitious policy of expansion and domination, were openly defying those resolutions.

77. It was high time that the United Nations moved on from mere words to actions, because the question of Southern Rhodesia concerned all Member States and required each of them to adopt practical and positive measures to solve it. His delegation was indignant at the arrogant and unscrupulous attitude of many Member States towards United Nations resolutions which they had themselves adopted. The flagrant violations of the Security Council sanctions committed by the United States, the United Kingdom and their satellites constituted a challenge that States that loved peace and freedom could in no way

permit. Those States might believe that the situation could continue as it was at present but, if they looked back, they would see that less than 10 years earlier the African continent had been totally under the control of the same diabolical power of imperialism that was now desperately trying to hold on to Zimbabwe. The present-day political map of Africa told the whole story. It was therefore inconceivable that that reality should pass unnoticed by Powers such as the United Kingdom, which claimed to observe the principles of dignity and, as administering Power, continued to maintain the people of Zimbabwe under the domination of an unspeakably oppressive régime. Its activities could only be explained by deceitfulness and ambitious interests.

78. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea vigorously condemned the policy of the United Kingdom, the United States, South Africa and other States which traded with Southern Rhodesia; it firmly supported the resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council, which were directed towards restoring to the people of Zimbabwe their inalienable rights; it appealed to the international community to persevere in its efforts to uproot the United Kingdom's policy of oppression in Southern Rhodesia by complying strictly with the economic sanctions against the illegal régime; it rejected any attempt at negotiation with the illegal régime; it requested the United Kingdom Government to release immediately the political prisoners in Zimbabwe and to recognize the freedom fighters as refugees; it also asked the United Kingdom to convene a constitutional conference, in which all the representatives of the people of Zimbabwe would participate in order to work out a constitution that would safeguard the right of the indigenous inhabitants to self-determination; it vigorously condemned the presence of South African military forces in Southern Rhodesia and requested their immediate withdrawal; it expressed its solidarity with the liberation movements of Zimbabwe and recognized their struggle as legitimate; it also expressed its solidarity with the sister nation of Zambia which was struggling against the same imperialist aims; and, finally, it requested the Special Committee to continue to make every possible effort in support of the people of Zimbabwe.

79. Mr. MANGAL (Afghanistan) said that Afghanistan had always supported the legitimate struggle of all peoples under the yoke of colonialism and foreign domination. In his statement on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration (2035th meeting), he had already referred to the other colonial problems in Africa, for example *apartheid*, the repressive measures used by the illegal régime of Ian Smith and Portuguese colonial domination in Angola and Mozambique, which constituted a threat to the territorial integrity and independence of sovereign African States.

80. The existing state of affairs and the ineffectiveness of the measures adopted by the United Kingdom to fulfil its responsibilities as administering Power in Southern Rhodesia were basically due to the fact that that country had chosen inadequate methods, which did not produce any positive results. The United Kingdom Government had the primary responsibility for putting an end to the illegal minority régime by adopting other, more effective, means, which would enable the aspirations of the people of

Zimbabwe to be satisfied. The international community could no longer continue to tolerate the presence of the illegal régime. The sanctions imposed by the Security Council had proved ineffective owing to the lack of co-operation by certain States Members of the Organization, which had not heeded the provisions of the relevant Articles of the Charter. The statements of the representatives of ZAPU, ZANU and the African National Council (2038th and 2039th meetings) left no room for doubt as to the failure of the methods so far employed by the United Kingdom to put an end to the rebellion of the illegal régime.

81. He reaffirmed the support of the Government of Afghanistan for the legitimate struggle of the people of Zimbabwe for self-determination and independence and expressed his complete confidence that, in the long run, the people of Zimbabwe would achieve victory in their struggle against colonialism and foreign domination.

82. The CHAIRMAN announced that, since the general debate on the subject had now been concluded, he would give the floor to those speakers who wished to exercise their right of reply, in conformity with rule 117 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly. He asked them to be brief.

83. Mr. REFADI (Libyan Arab Republic) said that he wished to exercise his right of reply to the statement of the United Kingdom representative, and he expressed his surprise that an attempt had been made to limit speeches by delegations.

84. As had been expected, the United Kingdom delegation had taken a negative attitude. The United Kingdom representative had referred to the earlier decision of the Committee, adopted at the 2038th meeting by an overwhelming majority, requesting the administering Power to make a statement at the beginning of the general debate, which he had construed as an attempt to force a representative to speak in the Committee before he was ready to do so. It sufficed to point out that, as a member of his country's Parliament, the United Kingdom representative could have bowed to the express wish of the majority and have made his statement when he had been requested to do so.

85. With regard to the substance of his statement, the United Kingdom representative had set out the bankrupt policy of his country. He had also insisted that the United Kingdom was the sole legal administering authority and had made a passing reference to the Charter of the United Nations. He wondered whether he believed that it was laid down in the Charter that a racist régime could oppress the indigenous population with impunity and that a delegation could adopt a negative attitude and evade its responsibilities as administering Power.

86. The United Kingdom representative had said nothing new in his statement but he had made it clear that his Government was opposed to the use of force in Southern Rhodesia. He might be reminded that the United Kingdom Government had resorted to force on more than one occasion.

87. He reserved his right to speak again on the subject if necessary. His delegation would endeavour to see that in the draft resolution on the subject to be adopted during the current session there was a paragraph condemning the United Kingdom delegation for its refusal to speak in the Committee at the time it had been requested to do so.

88. The CHAIRMAN explained that he had not limited the right of any delegation to speak, but had simply asked speakers to be as brief as possible. It was evident that, if he had wished to impose a time-limit on statements, he would have submitted a proposal for the approval of the Committee, in conformity with the rules of procedure.

89. Mr. RASOLONDRAIBE (Madagascar) said that it was not clear whether the United Kingdom statement was a report, in which case it was negative, or whether it was a general statement of policy, in which case it was unsatisfactory. It was evident that the United Kingdom Government was doing nothing to extricate itself from the situation in which it found itself regarding Southern Rhodesia. Nevertheless, practical proposals had been put forward, such as the one by the representative of Guyana (2044th meeting), which had been rejected by the United Kingdom delegation. The representative of the African National Council had asked the United Kingdom to withdraw its proposals for a settlement because they blocked any future attempt to resolve the situation (2039th meeting). Moreover, the Swedish representative had said (2044th meeting) that all the possibilities afforded by the Charter of the United Nations had not yet been explored. The United Kingdom delegation had, however, remained silent. The situation in Southern Rhodesia was deteriorating from day to day. The problem of *apartheid* had now been added to that of the rebellion. There were also military complications owing to the presence of foreign forces which were carrying out repressive action. Their presence in itself constituted a *casus belli* but the United Kingdom continued to refuse to use force. Furthermore, the activities of the rebel régime were inciting attacks on neighbouring African States, such as the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia.

90. Mr. STOBY (Guyana) said that the United Kingdom representative had referred to a number of questions that had been raised by the delegation of Guyana at the 2044th meeting. One of those questions had been about the presence of South African police forces in Southern Rhodesia. In fact, the representative of Guyana had referred to "South African military and paramilitary forces". The United Kingdom maintained that it was unable to compel such forces to withdraw from Southern Rhodesia, but there was no doubt that there were means which it could employ against South Africa.

91. The United Kingdom, which refused to use force in Southern Rhodesia, had not hesitated to do so in Northern Ireland. It was not even threatening to use force, so that Smith was able to continue consolidating his position, confident that the United Kingdom would never use force against him.

92. The United Kingdom had expressed doubts as to the urgency and usefulness of convening a constitutional conference. Such a conference would at least help to

convince a number of Governments that the United Kingdom was really concerned about the interests of the majority in Zimbabwe and not about those of the white minority.

93. Finally, the United Kingdom's reply to the observations of the Guyanese representative that those who violated sanctions should be brought before the International Court of Justice had been that the sanctions had been imposed by the Security Council and that it was for that body to take any decision on the subject.

94. The United Kingdom had insisted that it was still the administering Power of the Territory. If that was really the case, it should take all necessary steps to put an end to the Smith régime.

95. Mr. ISHAN (Nigeria), speaking in exercise of his right of reply, pointed out that, in his statement at the previous meeting, he had referred to his concern at the fact that the United States was continuing to import chrome from Southern Rhodesia, in violation of the sanctions imposed by the Security Council. He was not convinced by what the representative of the United States had just said in that respect and he therefore asked him whether he had been speaking as a representative of the United States or as a member of the Senate.

96. Mr. BUCHANAN (United States of America) said that he was not a member of the Senate but a member of the House of Representatives and a member of the United States delegation to the United Nations.

97. Mr. ISHAN (Nigeria) asked whether the United States maintained that it had to import chrome and nickel from Southern Rhodesia.

98. Mr. BUCHANAN (United States of America) replied that he would be very pleased to send the representative of Nigeria a copy of the statement he had made a short time before in a Congressional committee, in which he had affirmed that he did not believe it necessary for the security of the United States to import minerals from Southern Rhodesia. Furthermore, he pointed out that other persons held the same view.

99. Mr. ISHAN (Nigeria) said that it was precisely in connexion with that question that he wished to know whether the representative of the United States had spoken as a member of the Senate or as a member of his country's delegation to the United Nations.

100. Mr. BUCHANAN (United States of America) replied that he was speaking as a member of the United States delegation and as a member of the House of Representatives.

101. Mr. ISHAN (Nigeria) said he was pleased that the United States representative did not agree with his Government that it was necessary to import chrome from Southern Rhodesia.

102. Mr. RUPIA (United Republic of Tanzania), speaking in exercise of his right of reply, said that the United Kingdom delegation had referred to the proposal that it

should make its statement before the debate commenced, a proposal that had been put to the vote at the 2038th meeting. Although the United Kingdom representative had the right to speak when he wished, he himself considered that, if the administering Power had clarified its position at that time and had informed the Committee of recent developments, the Committee's work would have been greatly facilitated. Nevertheless, the Committee had finally succeeded in eliciting the information, and replies had also been given to various questions. The United Kingdom representative had reaffirmed that his Government continued to consider itself the administering Power, and that Southern Rhodesia therefore continued to be its responsibility, but he had also explained that his Government did not have effective power; as to the use of force, the United Kingdom representative had reiterated that his Government was not going to use force; with regard to South Africa's military forces, the United Kingdom had once again affirmed that it could not compel them to withdraw and, with regard to the proposed constitutional conference, the United Kingdom representative had pointed out that his Government was doing its utmost to convene it.

103. For all those reasons, he found it appropriate to reiterate the position he had stated at the 2042nd meeting. When the Africans, who came from an area very close to Southern Rhodesia, said that force should be used, they said so because Smith was a rebel, and in that respect the United Kingdom agreed with them. What the United Kingdom did not remember was that Smith was oppressing and murdering the people of Zimbabwe. Hence, it was appropriate to ask how a murderer was dealt with. The answer was clear: with force. It was obvious that the United Kingdom was in a better position than the Africans to disarm Smith. However, he accepted the reply of the United Kingdom representative, but he made it clear that the Africans would have recourse to all available means.

104. As to the proposed constitutional conference, he admitted that the United Kingdom had tried to convene it, but it should understand that what was demanded was a conference in which due account would be taken of the wishes of the majority of the people of Zimbabwe. To that end, the people should be consulted and their leaders released, and that was a step which the United Kingdom could indeed ask Smith to take.

105. The murderer was armed and had to be restrained.

106. With regard to the statement by the United States representative, he pointed out that, when the Africans accused that Power of importing chrome and nickel from Southern Rhodesia, they were well aware that it imported less than 5 per cent of the total exports. Nevertheless, in their judgement, even that 5 per cent was very significant.

107. Mrs. JIMENEZ (Cuba), referring to the statement made by the United States representative, said that, in its general tone, it was designed to create the impression that the United States representative was speaking of a "democratic system"; it should be pointed out that the recent events witnessed in the United States did not exactly point to the existence of a democratic system. The United States representative had sought to give the impression that the people of the United States decided whether or not chrome

was purchased from Southern Rhodesia. That was a fallacy equalled only by what he had stated when he had given his assurance that the Government of his country would ensure that it complied with the sanctions. The Government of the United States was largely responsible for the sufferings of the people of Zimbabwe. The fact that its representative had announced to the Committee that he was contemplating distributing to his colleagues copies of a statement that he had delivered earlier in no way altered or improved the situation.

In accordance with the decision taken by the General Assembly at its 2139th meeting, on 3 October 1973, Mr. Edward Ndlovu, representative of the Zimbabwe African People's Union, took a place at the Committee table.

108. Mr. NDLOVU (Zimbabwe African People's Union) said that it had been agreed that he would speak on behalf of both ZAPU and ZANU.

109. The statement made by the United Kingdom delegation was the most naïve he had ever heard. At a time when the people of Zimbabwe were being tortured, hanged, murdered or oppressed by the British, the United Kingdom Government was claiming sole responsibility as the administering Power. It was indeed solely responsible, but only as far as the whites, its own kith and kin were concerned. If it also had responsibility for the African people of Zimbabwe, it would have to release the African political leaders in detention; it would have to stop the hangings, the murders and the oppression. It was intolerable for the United Kingdom delegation to tell such lies before the Committee. He assured the Committee that the decision of the people of Zimbabwe to take up arms was irreversible. They would not stop until they had achieved final victory.

110. The position taken by the United Kingdom regarding sanctions against Southern Rhodesia was well known. Its corporations and its Government were breaking the very sanctions that it had introduced in the United Nations. The British aircraft industry was booming as a result of the chrome and nickel imported from Southern Rhodesia. In order to continue breaking the sanctions, the United Kingdom had withdrawn its naval patrol from the Beira Straits.

111. The people of Zimbabwe would fight until victory was achieved. Who could talk of violence? Who could judge whom? Were both policies not violent? The British were sated with the blood of the African people of Zimbabwe. While the British spoke of peace, people were being sacrificed under the pretext of a peaceful solution. There would never be any peaceful solution with the British. The fight of the people of Zimbabwe with the British was hereditary; it had continued ever since the arrival of the British in Zimbabwe. With whom had the British ever talked of peace? They did not understand the meaning of the word. The photographs displayed recently in the Committee had shown what atrocities the British were perpetrating at the present time in Zimbabwe. They were killing, maiming and raping.

112. The British should release Mr. Joshua Nkomo and the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and let them speak. The

British talked of constitutional negotiations between Africans and whites, but while they talked with guns, the Africans had their hands and feet tied. He challenged the United Kingdom Government to confirm that it was the sole legal administering authority over the African people. If that was the case, the United Kingdom Government should release all political prisoners and put an end to the murders that were being committed in Zimbabwe. It had the power to do so: quite recently, it had ordered the release of Peter Niesewand, the white Southern Rhodesian news correspondent imprisoned by the Smith régime. The United Kingdom Government had ordered Smith to release him, and the man had been released and sent to England. Yet several thousands of people whose homes had been burned and livestock taken away had taken refuge in Zambia. If those people had been white, they would have been issued with British passports, flown to Britain and given accommodation.

113. The British could not deceive the people of Zimbabwe. He assured the Committee of his people's determination to liberate their country by force of arms. They knew full well that the power of the British lay in the trigger of the gun. The peoples of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and of the Scandinavian and Socialist countries were helping the people of Zimbabwe in their liberation struggle, and victory was drawing near.

114. The United Kingdom delegation admitted that it could not have the South African troops withdrawn from Southern Rhodesia. That was not surprising: in 1965, following the unilateral declaration of independence by the Smith régime, a secret agreement had been signed between the Governments of the United Kingdom and South Africa to the effect that, in the event of a unilateral declaration of independence by the Smith régime, South Africa would send troops to defend that régime on behalf of the British; and South African troops had in fact been sent.

115. That was why, despite the offer made by the President of Zambia, the United Kingdom Government had refused to use Zambia as a base to eradicate the scourge of rebellion in Southern Rhodesia. That was the truth of the matter, but the British did not want to tell the truth in the Committee. In fact, the British were very professional at telling lies. Yet the people of Zimbabwe would expose those lies at all times and wherever they were uttered. British action had never been dictated by morality; all the British understood was their economic interests in southern Africa. Unfortunately, the United States behaved like a vulture hovering over a carcass in order to obtain its supplies of chrome and nickel.

116. Irrespective of what the United Kingdom Government might decide, the people of Zimbabwe had taken a new road, that of armed revolutionary struggle. They refused to be dictated to by the British. They would continue their struggle until they achieved complete freedom and independence, and could participate in the General Assembly like any other independent country. The United Kingdom Government was acting in Southern Rhodesia as it had done in Palestine. However, unlike the people of Palestine, who were speaking from outside their country, his people were speaking from inside Zimbabwe

and could not be expelled, since Zimbabwe was their country.

117. Neither ZAPU nor ZANU had ever stated that the whites must leave Zimbabwe. The people of Zimbabwe believed in the universal principles of majority rule and adult suffrage. They would achieve those principles the hard way, because all peaceful means had failed. The statement made by the Reverend Canaan Banana at the 2039th meeting was irrelevant to the issue. So too was the question of talks with the African National Council, a body that had been formed by ZAPU merely to act as the publicity organ inside the country. The African National Council was not in touch with the people who mattered for the purposes of revolution. In contrast, his organization had the full support of the people. The United Kingdom Government was trying to use the leadership of the African National Council for its own selfish ends. The Council had been warned to beware of such manoeuvres, the whole purpose of which was to consolidate the economic and military position of Ian Smith. If Smith had been present at the meeting, he would have been delighted with the support given him by the representative of the Council, support which he had received ever since the unilateral declaration of independence.

118. In conclusion, because of British intrigue in Southern Rhodesia, he warned the United Nations to be very careful in dealing with the matter.

119. Mr. FAHNBULLEH (Liberia) said that his intention was not to reply to the United Kingdom but rather to appeal to the United States as a result of the statement made by the representative of ZAPU. The relations between Liberia and the United States had always been friendly and cordial, and he appealed to the representative of the United States, as a member of the House of Representatives, to present the case of Zimbabwe to the people of his country. If he did so, he could rely upon the gratitude of the African people.

Organization of work

120. The CHAIRMAN said that, in accordance with the decision taken at the 2037th meeting, the Committee would begin the general debate on the question of Namibia (item 70) at its next meeting and he suggested that on 5 November the Committee should begin its general consideration of the activities of foreign economic and other interests impeding implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (item 73).

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 7 p.m.

2046th meeting

Friday, 26 October 1973, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Leonardo DIAZ GONZALEZ (Venezuela).

A/C.4/SR.2046

AGENDA ITEM 70

Question of Namibia

(A/9023/Add.2, A/9024, A/9061, A/9065, A/9066, A/9225)

GENERAL DEBATE

In the absence of the Chairman, Mrs. Joka-Bangura (Sierra Leone), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

In accordance with the decision taken by the General Assembly at its 2139th meeting on 3 October 1973, Mr. Mishake Muyongo, representative of the South West Africa People's Organization, took a place at the Committee table.

1. Mr. LUSAKA (Zambia), speaking as the representative of Zambia and as President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, said that the conduct of the Vorster régime during the year made it imperative for the United Nations to take decisive action which would compel South Africa to withdraw immediately from Namibia. The authority and prestige of the Organization were at stake and it could no longer afford to tolerate the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa.

2. By its resolution 309 (1972), adopted at Addis Ababa at its 1638th meeting, the Security Council had offered South Africa a chance to terminate its illegal occupation of Namibia. The Government of Zambia, which knew only too well the fanatical resolve of the racists in Pretoria to perpetuate their stranglehold on the Territory, had not concealed its apprehension. As all members of the Committee were aware, the contacts that the Secretary-General had undertaken with the South African régime in pursuance of the Security Council resolution had produced negative results. That had not been unexpected. Nor had it been surprising that the South African régime had sought to exploit the contacts as a forum for justifying its aggressive policies against the Namibian people.

3. The South African régime continued to impose its will on the Namibian people, as evidenced by its so-called "homelands" policy and the establishment of the so-called "Advisory Council for South West Africa", the sole purpose of which was to deceive and confuse the international community. Nevertheless, the Namibian people were determined to resist the balkanization of their country and were not prepared to accept the traitors in the "Advisory Council" as their representatives.