

2064th meeting

Tuesday, 20 November 1973, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Leonardo DIAZ GONZALEZ (Venezuela).

A/C.4/SR.2064 and Corr.1

AGENDA ITEMS 23, 69, 74 AND 12, 75 AND 76*

Agenda item 23 (Territories not covered under other agenda items) (A/9023 (parts II and IV), A/9023/Add.4, A/9023/Add.5, A/9023/Add.6, A/9121 and Corr.1, A/9124, A/9170, A/9176, A/9287)

Agenda item 69 (A/9023/Add.7, A/9239)

Agenda items 74 and 12 (A/9003 (chap. XXVI), A/9023 (part V), A/9051 and Add.1-5, A/9227)

Agenda item 75

Agenda item 76 (A/9241)

GENERAL DEBATE

1. Mr. ARTEAGA (Venezuela), referring to item 23, said that his delegation attached special importance to the question of the small dependent Territories. In the past, those Territories had been considered in a rather routine and hasty fashion, because of the priority attention granted to the delicate situation obtaining in southern Africa; in 1973, however, the small Territories had been considered in greater depth by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which for the first time had held a general debate on them and had established a single body whose exclusive task was to study them.

2. With regard to the Caribbean Territories under United Kingdom administration, he said that the amendments to the Bermuda Constitution of 1968 were a significant step towards government of the island by the indigenous population. Under the new provisions, the title of Government Leader had been changed to that of Premier and the members of the former Executive Council had been designated ministers. A Governor's Council had been established, which would deal with matters such as internal security and external affairs.

3. In the case of the Cayman Islands, he welcomed the increase in the number of elected members of the Legislative Assembly and the Executive Council and the introduction of an embryonic cabinet system. However, it was regrettable that the Governor retained broad executive and legislative powers, that no political parties had emerged in the Territory and that there had been no debate on its future political status.

4. With regard to the British Virgin Islands, the only development worthy of mention had been the establish-

ment of a Constitutional Committee of the Legislative Council, charged with the task of studying constitutional proposals. The political situation was not harmonious, since the majority of the population appeared to be unhappy with the current Governor. The Legislative Council resolution of 4 April 1973 requesting the United Kingdom to remove the Governor should be recalled. In view of that situation, the administering Power should take the necessary steps to foster an atmosphere of understanding between the authorities of the Territory and its population.

5. With regard to the Turks and Caicos Islands, the Administrator of that Territory had been appointed Governor following the attainment of independence by the Bahamas, whose former Governor had up to that time been responsible for the administration of the Turks and Caicos Islands. It was to be hoped that that development would stimulate further constitutional progress.

6. There had been no significant constitutional reforms in Montserrat.

7. From the foregoing facts, it could be seen that constitutional progress in those Territories was proceeding at a slow pace. However, the administering Power's statements to the effect that it would meet the wishes of the various peoples and that it would help them to advance towards self-determination if that was their desire were important. That group of Territories shared many common characteristics, but each of them required a different solution. There was no need to dwell on the usefulness of visiting missions to the Territories and of active participation by the administering Power in the deliberations of the Special Committee.

8. Tourism continued to be the mainstay of those Territories' economies. However, the predominance of the tourist industry should not detract from efforts to promote sectors such as fishing and agricultural production under the control of the indigenous population, paving the way for the indigenous peoples to command their resources and retain control over their future development.

9. His delegation had already had an opportunity to express its views on the United States Virgin Islands during the in-depth discussion on that Territory by Subcommittee II of the Special Committee in August 1973. Emphasis should be placed on the Territory-wide referendum in which the proposals of the Second Constitutional Convention had been approved by a fairly narrow margin, with a substantial proportion of the electorate not participating. Bearing in mind the results of the referendum, the Special Committee had reached the conclusion that the Virgin Islanders had given no decisive support to those proposals. On that point, he referred to recommendation (6) in chapter XXV, paragraph 9, of the Special

* For the title of each item, see "Agenda" on page ix.

Committee's report (see A/9023/Add.6), in which the administering Power was requested to take concrete measures in order to encourage the people to enter into full and free discussion of all alternatives available to them for the realization of their aspirations for the political future of the Territory.

10. Mr. ARAIM (Iraq), referring to item 23, reaffirmed his view that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was the most important achievement of the United Nations in the field of decolonization. The Declaration represented the express will of the majority of States to put an end to colonialism and the invalidity of any argument for the continuation of colonial rule. Special mention should be made of the efforts of Mrs. Joka-Bangura, Vice-Chairman of the Fourth Committee and Chairman of Sub-Committee I of the Special Committee. His delegation supported the recommendations of the Special Committee regarding the dissemination of information (A/9023 (part II), chap. II, paras. 7 and 8) and military activities and arrangements by colonial Powers in Territories under their administration which might be impeding the implementation of the Declaration (A/9023 (part IV), para. 7).

11. With regard to item 69, he supported the resolution adopted by the Special Committee at its 935th meeting on 10 August 1973 (A/9023/Add.7, para. 9), in which the Government of Portugal was strongly condemned for its refusal to co-operate with the Special Committee and its denial to the African peoples under its domination of their right to self-determination and independence. His delegation was of the view that the administering Powers should continue to present information under Article 73 e of the United Nations Charter as long as the Territories had not yet attained independence. He emphasized the importance of visiting missions in ascertaining the wishes of colonial peoples regarding their political future and deplored the unco-operative attitude of some administering Powers on that matter.

12. The question of the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations (item 74) had been under discussion since 1967 and he noted that valuable reports had been submitted on the subject by the Secretary-General (A/9051 and Add.1-5), the Economic and Social Council (A/9003, chap. XXVI) and the Special Committee (A/9023 (part V)). His delegation had always believed that the national liberation movements, as the true representatives of their peoples, should be consulted in all matters concerning their respective Territories. Their struggle, which had the backing of the majority of States Members of the United Nations, should receive support from the Organization and its organs and the specialized agencies. The negative attitude adopted by some of the specialized agencies and other institutions in the United Nations system regarding the struggle of peoples under colonial domination was a matter for concern. In the view of his delegation, contacts should be maintained with the specialized agencies and, in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2980 (XXVII), visits should be made to the headquarters of the agencies in order to examine with them how the relevant resolutions of

the General Assembly and other United Nations organs could be implemented. To that end, the Special Committee had set up a working group, presided over by a member of the Iraqi delegation, which had held talks with the International Labour Organisation, the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the United Nations Children's Fund. The report of the working group (A/9023 (part V), annex I) gave full details on that question.

13. His delegation had been a sponsor of the resolution adopted by the Special Committee at its 946th meeting, on 28 August 1973, which reaffirmed the need to recognize the legitimacy of the struggle of colonial peoples to achieve freedom and independence (A/9023 (part V), para. 18).

14. His delegation called upon all Governments to instruct their delegations to the specialized agencies and other institutions in the United Nations system to urge those agencies and institutions to implement General Assembly resolution 2980 (XXVII) and other relevant resolutions of the United Nations and its organs.

15. With regard to item 12, he noted that chapter XXVI of the Economic and Social Council's report (A/9003) dealt with the implementation of the Declaration by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations. Iraq supported Council resolution 1804 (LV), which reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggle of peoples to achieve freedom and independence and urged the specialized agencies to grant moral and material assistance to the national liberation movements.

16. With regard to items 75 and 76, his delegation was of the opinion that those educational and training programmes were of tremendous importance for the peoples of southern Africa under colonial régimes and that the national liberation movements should be consulted on the programmes.

17. Mr. LECOMPT (France) said that, during the general debate in the Assembly and, more recently, the consideration of item 23 in plenary meetings, a number of speakers had referred to the situation in the Comoro Archipelago. Some of them had given an inaccurate interpretation of recent developments relating to the political situation in the Archipelago. Accordingly, his delegation believed that the time had come to determine more precisely some aspects of the Territory's future.

18. It would be recalled that, in the referendum of 28 September 1958, the Comoros had decided against independence and had also chosen to retain their status as an overseas Territory. Nevertheless, in accordance with the wishes of the population, that status had evolved and there had been a growing measure of internal autonomy, which had been strengthened by the Acts of 22 December 1961 and 3 January 1968.

19. Since their adoption, which had marked a first decisive turning point in the political life of the Comoros, the Archipelago had had a Chamber of Deputies and a Government Council, responsible to the Chamber of Deputies and with a President elected by that body. Each of the four districts had its own Council for the administration of

local affairs. All elections were held by universal suffrage and direct and secret ballot and were open to all candidates. The diversity of parties, as also the variety of the results, testified to the completely democratic nature of the institutions of the Comoro Archipelago.

20. After the Government of Prince Saïd Ibrahim, the then President of the Government Council, had become a minority Government as a result of the coalition of the parties that favoured independence, elections were held on 3 December 1972 for a completely new Chamber of Deputies of the Comoros. On that occasion four political parties had contested the election: the Socialist Party of the Comoros, which was in favour of immediate independence and the severing of all links with France, had obtained 2.2 per cent of the votes cast; the Mouvement mahorais had obtained 9.1 per cent; the UMMA, Prince Saïd Ibrahim's party, which favoured the maintenance of the *status quo*, had obtained 12.4 per cent; and the Union, which was a coalition of parties standing for accession to independence in friendship and co-operation with France, had obtained 76.3 per cent. Over 80 per cent of the electorate had voted. Those clear results showed a profound change in the political views of the Comoros, since the parties that were against the maintenance of the *status quo* had obtained the great majority of seats. The new Chamber of Deputies had appointed Mr. Ahmed Abdallah President of the Government Council and he had formed the current Government.

21. On 22 December 1972 the most important stage in the evolution of the Territory had occurred. The Chamber of Deputies had adopted, by 34 votes to 5, the following resolution:

“Considering the will of the Comorian people to effect an evolution of their institutions,

“Considering the need to ensure better Franco-Comorian relations in future,

“The Chamber of Deputies of the Comoro Archipelago instructs the Comorian Government, together with the members of Parliament and a special delegation from the Chamber of Deputies,

“To consider and negotiate with the Government of France the accession of the Comoro Archipelago to independence in co-operation and friendship with France.” (A/9023/Add.4, chap. XI, para. 45.)

The representatives who had been elected by the people in what had undoubtedly been a democratic process had decided upon the framework within which they wanted to open negotiations with France for accession to independence.

22. The French Government, faithful to the principle of self-determination, had respected the wishes thus expressed and had initiated talks in Paris with a Comorian delegation headed by the President of the Government Council. After a month of negotiations, the two parties had signed a joint declaration on 15 June 1973 in which the French Government had affirmed the readiness of the Comoro Archipelago for independence and had stated that the people of the Territory would be consulted on the question at a date

to be jointly agreed upon, within five years at the most (*ibid.*, annex, appendix II). Consequently, the Government of the Comoros could ask for that provision of the declaration to enter into effect at any time from 15 June 1973 onwards.

23. In those circumstances, it might be asked why it had not been decided to proclaim independence immediately and what was the point of the delay, for which the Comorians themselves had asked. In the first place, it was designed to allow for the assembling of all the instruments needed for the exercise of full internal sovereignty, such as had been effectively exercised since 15 June 1973, i.e. all the powers of a State, except for foreign affairs—although the Comorians would participate in matters of concern to them—and external defence and currency—although as from 1974 an issuing institution and a Comorian currency would be established. Secondly, the conditions for an independent national life had to be created.

24. The first point did not require much explanation. It was obvious that a whole series of technical measures would have to be adopted to ensure a harmonious transfer of the powers set forth in the declaration: treasury, foreign trade, currency, education, maintenance of order, judicial system etc.

25. The second point, however, called for some explanation. The organization of the Comorian national life implied the solution of various problems arising from the fact that the Comoros were not one homogenous territory but an archipelago whose peoples were of very diverse origins. It was that situation which had led the French Government to provide that, when the time came, the people would have to decide the question through a consultation, the modalities of which would be determined by legislative means.

26. In order to take those modalities into account, the declaration of 15 June (*ibid.*) had provided, in part 4, that “During the period of transition and in order to promote the unity of the archipelago . . . a regionalization policy shall be put into effect”. That policy was currently under consideration by the Chamber of Deputies of the Comoro Archipelago.

27. The French Government had a long history of decolonization behind it and it felt it had given sufficient proof of its desire to place no obstacles in the way of the wishes of its former possessions for independence. There was therefore no need for it to dwell upon its intention to respond faithfully to the aspirations of the people of the Comoro Archipelago. That policy was in harmony with the views expressed by the Comorian Government which had emerged from the December 1972 elections. At the end of June 1973, Mr. Ahmed Abdallah had declared that, from that moment, all the powers of internal sovereignty had been placed in the hands of the Comorian Government and that it was informed of everything that concerned its external sovereignty. Recently Mr. Mouzaour Abdallah, a Deputy, one of the three high Comorian personalities who had come to the United Nations the previous month to provide information to interested delegations at the General Assembly, had said that, thanks to the Paris talks and the joint declaration of France and the Comoro Archipelago of

15 June 1973, the established objective had been attained. It had been left to the Comorian authorities to take the initiative to acquire full sovereignty for the Archipelago at the moment they considered most appropriate.

28. The French Government, conscious of its responsibilities and desirous of taking the wishes of the Comorian authorities into account to the greatest possible extent, was anxious to establish, in close contact with those authorities, firm foundations for the future State, providing it with the essential means for independence and thus helping it to take its place in the international community in favourable conditions. Once it had completed that process, the French Government would leave the decision in the hands of the Comorians and, if they so wished, they would find in France a friendly Power ready to establish ties of co-operation with it. His delegation was sure that the Committee would recognize that the French Government had followed the right path.

29. Mr. FOURATI (Tunisia) said that he had always welcomed participation by the administering Powers in the discussions and had stressed the importance and urgency of such participation with a view to accelerating the process of decolonization. Consequently, without expressing an opinion on the substance of the question, his delegation proposed that the statement by the representative of France, which contained some essential information on the Comoro Archipelago, should be reproduced *in extenso*.

30. Mr. KOUAMÉ (Ivory Coast) supported that proposal.

31. The CHAIRMAN, after informing the Committee of the financial implications of the proposal, said that if there was no objection, he would take it that the Committee agreed to the proposal.

It was so decided.

AGENDA ITEM 72

Question of Southern Rhodesia (*concluded*) (A/9023/Add.1, A/9061, A/9174, A/C.4/L.1038, A/C.4/L.1039)

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (*concluded*) (A/C.4/L.1038, A/C.4/L.1039)

32. The CHAIRMAN announced that Democratic Yemen, Gabon, Lesotho, Nepal and Rwanda had joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/L.1038 and that the Congo, Democratic Yemen, the Libyan Arab Republic and Nepal had joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/L.1039.

33. Mr. DJIGO (Senegal) said that he was not speaking to explain his vote, since his delegation was a sponsor of both draft resolutions (A/C.4/L.1038 and A/C.4/L.1039), but to appeal to the friends of the sponsors to vote with them. He was not referring to Portugal, which only appeared in the Conference room at the time of the vote, but to the United Kingdom. Senegal hoped that the United Kingdom would at last take into consideration the recommendations in the draft resolutions. The situation in Southern Rhodesia was paradoxical and incomprehensible and his delegation felt that the United Kingdom would be able to collaborate with the United Nations on the current occasion.

34. While it deplored the silence of some members of the Committee on the question of decolonization, his delegation was convinced that they would make a contribution on that occasion and would vote in favour of the draft resolutions, in the knowledge that Africa would appreciate the gesture.

35. The CHAIRMAN said that he had been asked not to put draft resolutions A/C.4/L.1038 and A/C.4/L.1039 to the vote at that meeting but at the next meeting.

36. Mr. TEYMOUR (Egypt) pointed out that the draft resolutions had been submitted and that, moreover, the Committee was behind in its work. He therefore thought that the Committee should vote forthwith.

37. Mr. LUGO (Nicaragua) said that he too saw no reason why the votes should not be taken, the more so since the Committee should try to speed up its work.

38. The CHAIRMAN explained that a number of delegations had asked him not to put draft resolutions A/C.4/L.1038 and A/C.4/L.1039 to the vote at that meeting because they had not yet received instructions from their Governments. In the absence of any objections, however, he would assume that the Committee decided to proceed to the voting.

It was so decided.

39. Mr. HINCHCLIFFE (United Kingdom), speaking in explanation of his vote before the voting, said that draft resolution A/C.4/L.1038 presented great difficulties for his delegation. It was not a practical possibility to take the action requested in operative paragraph 4 (*e*) of that draft resolution. His delegation was willing to take note of the desire for the convening of a constitutional conference, but it did not wish to give the impression that it accepted a commitment that it could not fulfil.

40. The draft resolution did not confine itself to asking for a constitutional conference: for reasons which he had explained on other occasions, his delegation could not accept operative paragraph 4, or operative paragraphs 2, 3 and 5, since they would oblige the United Kingdom Government to follow impractical methods.

41. In its statement on Southern Rhodesia at the 2045th meeting, his delegation had pointed out that, although it had nothing of importance to report, there had been some changes which allowed of a degree of optimism. His delegation was therefore not prepared to agree to anything that might imperil the process of negotiation which was in progress and which might perhaps be the only possible solution to the problem of Southern Rhodesia.

42. Furthermore, there were provisions in draft resolution A/C.4/L.1038 that had already appeared in resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at earlier sessions. His delegation had voted against those resolutions and it would do the same at the current session. It would also vote against draft resolution A/C.4/L.1039.

43. In conclusion, he informed the Committee that on 8 November 1973 both Houses of Parliament had voted in favour of keeping the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965, which

concerned the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, in force for a further year.

44. Mr. MACRIS (Greece) said that his country had always contributed actively to the recognition of the ideals embodied in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), had consistently supported all efforts to promote the principle of self-determination and the right of peoples to independence, and had always fought racial discrimination.

45. He would therefore support both draft resolutions before the Committee (A/C.4/L.1038 and A/C.4/L.1039). It should be noted that Greece had taken steps to ensure the implementation of the sanctions imposed against Southern Rhodesia by the Security Council. Act No. 95, prohibiting trade between Greece and Southern Rhodesia, had been passed in 1967 and Act No. 540, which extended the prohibition on trade relations with Southern Rhodesia to cover all primary commodities without exception, in 1968. As a result of those measures, the Greek authorities investigated all reported violations and took proceedings against those who violated those Acts.

46. Naturally, the breaking off of trade relations with Southern Rhodesia meant a heavy sacrifice for a country which depended on trade to meet its needs. Nevertheless, he believed not only that such a sacrifice was essential, but that it was of slight importance compared with the end it was to achieve. Accordingly, his delegation would vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/L.1038.

47. His delegation did, however, have some reservations with regard to some passages of draft resolution A/C.4/L.1038 and would abstain on the paragraphs which mentioned the Government of the United Kingdom if they were voted on separately. In its view, the Committee should recognize that the Government of the United Kingdom had co-operated with the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) concerning Southern Rhodesia.

48. He had reservations about paragraphs 7 and 10, particularly in so far as they referred to the function of the specialized agencies and other organizations, a subject on which his delegation's views continued to be those it had repeatedly expressed.

49. His delegation would abstain on draft resolution A/C.4/L.1039 because it doubted whether its provisions could, in fact be applied. Sanctions were not an end in themselves, but a means, and all States should apply them strictly, but any problem that might arise from the violation of sanctions should be brought before the Security Council and no other body.

50. Mr. HEIDWEILLER (Netherlands) said that it was regrettable that the negotiations between the United Kingdom Government and the Smith régime had not produced a settlement acceptable to the African majority in Southern Rhodesia. Ever since the rejection by the African population of the proposals transmitted by the Pearce Commission,¹ the situation had been growing worse and an intolerable deadlock had been reached. In his view, the six

principles proposed by the United Kingdom Government as a basis for the independence of Southern Rhodesia² were still valid and he believed that those principles offered the best prospects for agreement between the parties. He wished to reaffirm his conviction that the international community, in its search for a solution, should abide by the principle of the settlement of disputes by peaceful means.

51. His Government was fully aware of the explosive situation prevailing in the Territory as a result of the brutal measures—described by the representatives of the liberation movements—by which the Smith régime was trying to crush its African opponents. In such a situation, it was difficult to be optimistic about the possibility of settling the differences by peaceful means. Nevertheless, contacts had been arranged with the régime, which might lead to the convening of a constitutional conference. In the meantime, the United Nations should continue to use its influence to strengthen the sanctions programme. In that connexion, his Government had informed the Secretary-General that it had recently set up a committee of representatives of the ministries concerned with the implementation of sanctions for the purpose of considering ways of ensuring compliance with the sanctions and the possibility of amending existing laws to ensure that they were strictly applied.

52. Draft resolutions A/C.4/L.1038 and A/C.4/L.1039 contained a number of recommendations that he supported, and he endorsed the underlying purpose of both proposals, namely, the ending of the illegal situation in the Territory. However, the draft resolutions also contained proposals which raised certain difficulties for him. His delegation had explained those difficulties at the twenty-seventh session (2009th meeting) prior to the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 2945 (XXVII), the content of which was essentially the same as that of draft resolution A/C.4/L.1038. He was referring, in particular, to the proposals that the United Kingdom should take certain measures which were not within its power.

53. Draft resolution A/C.4/L.1039 bore a striking resemblance to General Assembly resolution 2946 (XXVII). He had strong reservations about operative paragraph 1, in which the United Kingdom was condemned for failing to take effective measures to put an end to the illegal Smith régime. He hoped that the Government of the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, would continue its effort to find a solution which would take into account the wishes of the majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia.

54. Mr. THUNE ANDERSEN (Denmark), speaking on behalf of his own delegation and of those of Finland, Norway and Sweden, said that it was common knowledge that the Nordic countries were strongly opposed to the policy of the Smith régime and that they had given proof of their support of the efforts of the people of Southern Rhodesia to attain their independence. The Nordic Governments endorsed the purpose of draft resolutions A/C.4/L.1038 and A/C.4/L.1039, but they would regretfully have to abstain in the vote on them, because operative paragraphs 3 of the former and 1 of the latter advocated the use of force, which they opposed as being, in their view, a violation of the Charter of the United Nations.

¹ Rhodesia: Report of the Commission on Rhodesian Opinion under the Chairmanship of the Right Honourable the Lord Pearce, Cmnd. 4964 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1972).

² Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth session, Supplement No. 23 (A/7623/Rev.1), chap. VI, annex I, page. 71.

55. The Nordic delegations were somewhat disappointed at not having been allowed to express their views in the consultations which had taken place prior to the submission of the two draft resolutions. They hoped to be consulted at the following session, so that the draft resolutions submitted to the Committee would receive greater support.

56. Mr. NAILATIKAU (Fiji) said that his Government maintained no relations of any kind with Southern Rhodesia and scrupulously respected the Security Council sanctions against that régime.

57. In his opinion, some features of draft resolutions A/C.4/L.1038 and A/C.4/L.1039, including the language, were neither practical nor suitable, but he understood the idea behind them, which coincided with his own opinion, and he would therefore vote in favour of both of them.

58. Mr. ZADOTTI (Italy) said that he had carefully studied draft resolutions A/C.4/L.1038 and A/C.4/L.1039 in conjunction with the report of the Special Committee, the statements made during the discussion and the statement by the administering Power (2045th meeting). He recognized the importance of the problem of Southern Rhodesia and how difficult it was to solve it. He accordingly commended the sponsors on their labours on behalf of the people of Southern Rhodesia; he would have liked to support the draft resolutions, but because of certain features they contained, could not do so.

59. Draft resolution A/C.4/L.1038, as it stood, seemed to have ignored the views expressed by the administering Power. He would have preferred more practical proposals, conducive to the continuation of negotiations, since he considered that that course would have to be followed if there was to be any progress. Moreover, although he endorsed the legitimacy of the Rhodesian people's struggle, he could not agree to the inclusion of the phrase "by all the means at their disposal", for the reasons he had explained (2058th meeting) when the same words were included in another draft resolution (A/C.4/L.1034/Rev.2), dealing with Territories under Portuguese administration. In his view, the purpose of the United Nations was to maintain peace and not to suggest resort to force.

60. With regard to draft resolution A/C.4/L.1039, he believed that operative paragraphs 1 and 4 took no account of the situation prevailing in the Territory or of the statement by the United Kingdom delegation (2045th meeting).

61. Although Italy supported the programme of sanctions imposed by the Security Council, his delegation could not understand recommendations such as those in operative paragraphs 5 and 7, which were scarcely consistent with the Charter. In its opinion, the subject of both those paragraphs was a matter for the Security Council. For all those reasons, his delegation would abstain in the voting.

62. Mr. PLEUGER (Federal Republic of Germany) said that, in his delegation's view, the Territory of Southern Rhodesia should be subject to the British Crown and its population should have the opportunity to exercise self-determination. His Government supported the measures

taken by the Security Council with regard to Southern Rhodesia and scrupulously implemented the programme of sanctions.

63. His delegation could not agree to the use of force to settle political problems and it believed that some of the proposals in draft resolutions A/C.4/L.1038 and A/C.4/L.1039, and their language, rather than facilitating a rapid and peaceful solution to the problem, would create further difficulties for the administering Power. Furthermore, he held that the General Assembly should not adopt procedures which were within the sole competence of the Security Council. His delegation would therefore be compelled to abstain in the vote on the two draft resolutions.

64. Mr. BLÖNDAL (Iceland) said that he would vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/L.1038, thus continuing its traditional support for peoples fighting for their freedom and independence.

65. Mr. CAMPBELL (Australia) said his delegation would vote in favour of the two draft resolutions to register Australia's support for all practical measures to bring about effective progress on the Rhodesian question. His delegation underlined its strong support for a peaceful settlement. With regard to operative paragraph 7 (a) of draft resolution A/C.4/L.1039 he had to make the observation that there was Australian legislative authority for the confiscation of Australian shipments to and from Southern Rhodesia but no authority for the confiscation of shipments by other countries.

66. His delegation's affirmative vote was not directed against the approach of the United Kingdom but against the Salisbury régime.

67. Mr. TEYMOUR (Egypt) said that he had a few remarks to make regarding the concept of the use of force given by some of the speakers who had preceded him. Ian Smith's illegal régime had instituted a system of *apartheid* in Southern Rhodesia similar to that practised in South Africa. That rebel and illegal régime had unilaterally declared its independence of the United Kingdom and had defied the legitimate authority of the British Crown over the Territory. It was a most serious situation. In view of the inaction of the international community, he wondered who would take responsibility for the atrocities that were being committed in Southern Rhodesia. Perhaps the United Kingdom would make itself responsible for the massacres that were bound to occur as a result of the explosive situation. Traditionally, when countries of Africa had found themselves subjugated, they had had to use force to overthrow their oppressors. It could be stated quite plainly that the use of force was legitimate when it was resorted to in order to put an end to a régime of oppression which itself used force. If the subject peoples of southern Africa had not the right to resort to force, he wondered how they were to attain freedom. His delegation was convinced that the heroic people of Zimbabwe had the right to make use of any violent means—as Kenya and Algeria, for example, had done earlier—to throw off the tyranny of the oppressors and to be able at last to hoist the flag of independence.

68. The CHAIRMAN put draft resolution A/C.4/L.1038 to the vote.

At the request of the representative of Egypt, the vote was taken by roll-call.

Niger, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua.

Against: Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining: Norway, Sweden, Uruguay, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (Federal Republic of), Italy, Japan, Netherlands.

Draft resolution A/C.4/L.1038 was adopted by 100 votes to 3, with 13 abstentions.

69. The CHAIRMAN put draft resolution A/C.4/L.1039 to the vote.

At the request of the representative of Egypt, the vote was taken by roll-call.

Yugoslavia, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bhutan, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone,

Singapore, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Venezuela.

Against: France, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining: Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany (Federal Republic of), Greece, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Uruguay.

Draft resolution A/C.4/L.1039 was adopted by 93 votes to 4, with 20 abstentions.

70. Mr. ORANTES LUNA (Guatemala) said that his delegation had voted in favour of both the draft resolutions in the hope that it would be possible to achieve the objective of independence for the people of Zimbabwe, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). It had reservations, however, with regard to operative paragraphs 4 and 7 of draft resolution A/C.4/L.1039, because it felt that those paragraphs encroached upon the powers of the Security Council. If a separate vote had been taken, his delegation would have voted against those two paragraphs.

71. Mr. CHANG Yen (China) said that his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolutions, although it had reservations about the wording of operative paragraph 4 of draft resolution A/C.4/L.1038. China had always maintained that, in accordance with the United Nations Charter and with the aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe, those people should be given assistance so that they might put an end to the Smith régime and achieve independence.

72. Mr. SETSHWAELO (Botswana) pointed out that his delegation had voted in favour of both the draft resolutions in order to show its support of self-determination, the United Nations Charter and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). In view of the situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia, sanctions were the only course and his country had accordingly applied them, although at the cost of great sacrifices to its people and its economy. Nevertheless, his delegation had reservations with regard to operative paragraph 8 of draft resolution A/C.4/L.1039, because there were limits to its contribution to the sanctions, as the members of the Committee would no doubt understand. Apart from that reservation, his delegation fully supported draft resolutions A/C.4/L.1038 and A/C.4/L.1039.

73. Mr. DE ROSENZWEIG DIAZ (Mexico) said that his delegation had voted in favour of both the draft resolutions, but if a separate vote had been taken on operative paragraph 7 (c) of draft resolution A/C.4/L.1039 it would have abstained, since freedom of movement was enshrined in the Mexican Constitution. His country could not prohibit travel but only discourage it. It would also have abstained on operative paragraph 8 of the same draft resolution.

74. Mr. BELEN (Turkey) said that his delegation had voted in favour of both the draft resolutions, as a natural result of its general policy with regard to the problem of decolonization. Any settlement with Southern Rhodesia should be worked out with the effective participation of the true leaders of the people of Zimbabwe and with their support. For that reason, his delegation endorsed draft resolution A/C.4/L.1038, which proposed steps to enable the people to become self-governing.

75. It was undoubtedly the responsibility of the administering Power to put an end to the situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia, although it should be recognized that in exercising its responsibility the United Kingdom had to deal with a régime which, although illegal, was firmly in power.

76. With regard to the sanctions, he pointed out that Turkey had no relations whatever with the Salisbury régime. Any decision to extend the sanctions must be taken by the Security Council alone; his delegation therefore had reservations with regard to operative paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/C.4/L.1038 and operative paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8 of draft resolution A/C.4/L.1039.

77. Mr. MacKERNAN (Ireland) said that, in accordance with his Government's policy of support for the right of self-determination and for the application of the sanctions, his delegation had voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/L.1038, although it had reservations about the language of the draft resolution and some of its provisions. In principle, violence should have no place in United Nations resolutions, and for that reason his delegation had reservations with regard to operative paragraphs 1, 3 and 7 of that draft resolution, in particular the words "by all the means at their disposal" in operative paragraph 1. Similarly, it deplored the categorical statement in operative paragraph 2 that the representatives of the national liberation movements were "the sole and authentic representatives of the true aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe"; that paragraph was in any case in contradiction with operative paragraph 5, which his delegation supported. It also had reservations about operative paragraph 8, which it considered ambiguous.

78. His delegation had abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/C.4/L.1039 because it had reservations about operative paragraph 1, which it found unduly hostile, and about operative paragraphs 6, 7 and 9, which encroached upon the competence of the Security Council.

79. Mr. SHUKE (Albania) said that, in line with its anti-colonialist policy, his delegation had voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/L.1038, but that vote should not be interpreted as agreement with the provisions of operative paragraph 3 and of operative paragraph 4 (*e*). His delegation did not believe that the United Kingdom would take any measures or that the proposed constitutional conference would produce the results hoped for. In any case, the people of Zimbabwe would attain independence through armed struggle, for experience showed that that was the only effective way.

80. Mr. PETRELLA (Argentina) said that his delegation had voted in favour of both the draft resolutions, but that did not mean that it considered that there were provisions in them whereby the problem of Southern Rhodesia could be solved in a peaceful and orderly way. It therefore declared that it had certain objections but that, generally speaking, it was in favour of the contents of draft resolutions A/C.4/L.1038 and A/C.4/L.1039.

81. Miss BEGIN (Canada) said that her delegation had abstained in the votes because it thought that the draft resolutions were unrealistic. In particular, it did not think that the United Kingdom could fulfil the requirements of operative paragraph 4 of draft resolution A/C.4/L.1038. It hoped, however, that the United Kingdom would take note of the suggestions made during the debate.

82. Mr. WALTER (New Zealand) said that his delegation had voted in favour of draft resolutions A/C.4/L.1038 and A/C.4/L.1039, but it would have preferred a less rigid text and it agreed with many of the previous speakers that the two draft resolutions were excessively critical of the United Kingdom. His delegation considered that it was the Smith régime that was responsible for the situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia and that consequently it was that régime that should be condemned. It therefore thought that the difficulties with which the administering Power had to contend should have been mentioned in the draft resolutions.

83. His delegation's affirmative vote should not be interpreted as a criticism of the United Kingdom or as a defence of the use of force, since it was convinced that the problem in question could not be solved by force. Furthermore, he pointed out, in reference to operative paragraph 5 (*b*) of draft resolution A/C.4/L.1039, that his Government would not encourage emigration to Southern Rhodesia but that it would remain faithful to the principle of freedom of movement. It also had reservations with regard to the expediency of extending the sanctions, although it applied them scrupulously.

84. Mr. DLAMINI (Swaziland) said that, in line with its anti-colonialist policy, his delegation had voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/L.1039 but that, for reasons of geography, it had serious reservations concerning operative paragraph 8.

85. Mr. MOKHESI (Lesotho) said that his delegation had voted in favour of both the draft resolutions but that, owing to his country's geographical situation, it had some reservations with regard to the extension of the sanctions to South Africa, as suggested in operative paragraph 8 of draft resolution A/C.4/L.1039.

86. Mrs. JOKA-BANGURA (Sierra Leone), speaking on behalf of all the sponsors, explained that the words "to take effective steps" in operative paragraph 5 (*b*) of draft resolution A/C.4/L.1039 did not mean that the use of force was being encouraged. The delegations which had voted against the draft resolution or had abstained because they thought that that was the meaning of those words must be

very convinced that the use of force was the only way of settling the situation in Southern Rhodesia.

87. She also explained that in operative paragraph 7 of the same draft resolution the Security Council was merely invited, and not instructed, to take the necessary measures.

REPORT OF THE FOURTH COMMITTEE

88. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the Rapporteur should be authorized to submit the report on item 72 direct

to the General Assembly. In the absence of any objections, he would take it that the Committee agreed to that suggestion.

*It was so decided.*³

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.

³ The report was submitted to the General Assembly as document A/9339.

2065th meeting

Friday, 23 November 1973, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Leonardo DIAZ GONZALEZ (Venezuela).

A/C.4/SR.2065

AGENDA ITEMS 23, 69, 74 AND 12, 75 AND 76*

Agenda item 23 (Territories not covered under other agenda items) (*continued*) (A/9023 (parts II and IV), A/9023/Add.4, A/9023/Add.5, A/9023/Add.6, A/9121 and Corr.I, A/9124, A/9170, A/9176, A/9287, A/9330)

Agenda item 69 (*continued*) (A/9023/Add.7, A/9239, A/9330)

Agenda items 74 and 12 (*continued*) (A/9003 (chap. XXVI), A/9023 (part V), A/9051 and Add.1-5, A/9227, A/9330)

Agenda item 75 (*continued*) (A/9240)

Agenda item 76 (*continued*) (A/9241)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. The CHAIRMAN informed the Committee that Mr. Abdou Bakari Boina, the Secretary-General of the Mouvement de libération nationale des Comores (MOLINACO), wished to address the Committee under item 23, in connexion with chapter XI of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, dealing with the Comoro Archipelago (see A/9023/Add.4). If he heard no objection, he would assume that the Committee wished Mr. Boina to be invited to speak.

It was so decided.

At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Abdou Bakari Boina, representative of the Mouvement de libération nationale des Comores, took a place at the Committee table.

2. Mr. BOINA (Mouvement de libération nationale des Comores) said that, in August, representatives of MOLINACO had participated as observers in the discussions held by the Special Committee on the question of the Comoro Archipelago and had at the 934th meeting of the Special Committee given a detailed account of the political, economic and social situation in the Comoros and informed the Committee of the Movement's views on the subject.

3. The Comoro Archipelago had been a French colony for 150 years and although there had been some developments described as positive, the basic situation had not really changed since the Second World War. The statement on the Comoros made by the French delegation to the Fourth Committee at the preceding meeting had been disappointing, although it was a first step towards co-operation between France and the United Nations with respect to the granting of independence to the Comorian people.

4. Following the general election held on 3 December 1972 a pro-independence coalition had been formed, comprising the three main political groups. The chief organ of that coalition was a co-ordinating committee. The new Chamber had decided to initiate negotiations with France immediately. In May 1973, a delegation from the Comoros had left for Paris with a mandate to obtain independence from France in 1974, or in 1975 at the latest, without a referendum. In the interim, the Chamber of Deputies was to serve as a constituent assembly and draft the constitution of the new State of the Comoro Archipelago. The transfer of services from the French State to the Comorian authorities would also take place during that period. However, if France were to insist on a referendum, it should be held in 1973 and on a territory-wide, rather than an island-by-island, basis.

5. In June 1973 a joint declaration on the accession to independence of the Comoro Archipelago (A/9023/Add.4, chap. XI, annex, appendix II) had been issued in Paris. MOLINACO rejected that agreement, which was a trick and an attempt to undermine the integrity and security of the

* For the title of each item, see "Agenda" on page ix.