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Agenda item 90:

Complaint by the Revolutionary Government of Cuba regarding the various plans of aggression and acts of intervention being executed by the Government of the United States of America against the Republic of Cuba, constituting a manifest violation of its territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, and a clear threat to international peace and security (*continued*)

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Chairman: Mr. Karel KURKA (Czechoslovakia).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Santiso Gálvez (Guatemala), Rapporteur, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 90

Complaint by the Revolutionary Government of Cuba regarding the various plans of aggression and acts of intervention being executed by the Government of the United States of America against the Republic of Cuba, constituting a manifest violation of its territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, and a clear threat to international peace and security (A/4537, A/4543, A/4581, A/4631, A/4701, A/4708, A/4710, A/4716, A/4725, A/C.1/839, A/C.1/840, A/C.1/L.274, A/C.1/L.275, A/C.1/L.276, A/C.1/L.277) (*continued*)

1. Mr. JHA (India) felt that in view of the confused situation resulting from the latest events in Cuba, the first step must be to sort out the facts and then to assess their implications and dangers. The indisputable facts were that armed action was proceeding on the soil of Cuba, that it was aimed at the overthrow of the present Government of Cuba, and that it did not appear to be an internal uprising but rather an attack from outside, including landings, the aerial bombing of cities and military installations, and the strafing of defenceless areas. Every Member State had the right to approach the United Nations in the event of such attack, which, from whatever quarter it might come, constituted unjustifiable armed intervention even if it should be organized and committed by dissident nationals of the country seeking to overthrow an extant régime, and particularly when there was outside assistance. It was then the duty of the United Nations to deal with the situation.

2. Another indisputable fact was that the preparations for an attack of such scope must have been made in the territory of another State not too far from the shores of Cuba, and that Cubans who had fled their country must have received outside assistance. While it was true that peoples in a free society had the inherent right to change the government by means of a revolution, including an armed revolution, any outside assistance for such purposes was inadmissible by virtue, in particular, of the principles of good neighbourliness and non-intervention which were enshrined in the Charter

of the United Nations. The question was not whether the Cuban Government was good or bad; the fact remained that it was the lawful Government of Cuba, whose delegation sat in the United Nations and which was recognized by a large number of Member States.

3. The world of today had truly become indivisible in the sense that the right of the public opinion of any country to approve or disapprove of the actions or the régime of another country, or even the right to extend moral support to any movements relating to the people or territory of other States, could not be denied, but the legitimacy of the right of a State or of its people to interfere in the affairs of another State could not be admitted. That would be contrary to the Purposes and Principles of the Charter as set out in Chapter I.

4. Unless the Cuban situation was controlled, there might be serious repercussions on larger situations of conflict elsewhere. It was therefore to be hoped that the armed conflict which was raging on the shores of Cuba would cease and that nothing would be done which would widen the rift that seemed to have been created by that situation not only between neighbouring countries but also between the big Powers. It was in that spirit that his delegation would examine the various draft resolutions before the Committee.

5. Mr. AGUIRRE (Uruguay) said that he did not understand why the question at issue was being debated in the United Nations General Assembly rather than in the Council of the Organization of American States (OAS). Recourse to the OAS would be fully legitimate within the international legal system represented by the United Nations Charter, which specifically recognized the jurisdiction of regional agencies. In that connexion, he cited Article 52 of the United Nations Charter, article 20 of the charter of the Organization of American States¹ and article 2 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.² The inter-American system had effective means at its disposal. It could apply the Convention concerning the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife.³ It could also call on the Commission of Investigation of the Council of the OAS which had already taken action in April 1959 when Panama had been invaded by armed units originating in Cuba. The United Nations did not possess any equivalent machinery. In addition, the most recent meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States, which had been held in August 1960, had decided to set up an *Ad Hoc* Good Offices Committee composed of Venezuela, Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Chile and Costa Rica for the purpose of settling controversies arising between Governments of American States. The services of that committee had not been called upon because the Cuban Government had pre-

¹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 119 (1952), No. 1609.

² United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 21 (1948), No. 324 (a).

³ League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. CXXXIV (1932-1933), No. 3082.

ferred to apply direct to the United Nations and had then refused to recognize the indisputable jurisdiction of the Good Offices Committee.

6. Four draft resolutions had been submitted to the First Committee. The Soviet draft (A/C.1/L.277) was couched in such terms as to forfeit any claim to consideration. The Romanian draft (A/C.1/L.274) was based on an assumption for which there was no valid evidence, since at the present time nothing more was available than the statements and charges of the two parties. Furthermore, in submitting its draft resolution, the Romanian delegation had made systematic charges which could not possibly be supported. The Mexican draft (A/C.1/L.275), also, embodied an unacceptable assumption and had the defect of omitting any reference to the OAS and the ideas it stood for. By contrast, the seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.276), of which Uruguay was a sponsor, not only recommended that the Member States should abstain from any action which might aggravate existing tensions, but also sought to lay the groundwork for a more lasting solution by asking the States members of the OAS to lend their assistance with a view to achieving a settlement by peaceful means. It was therefore to be hoped that once the present crisis had passed, the issues could be settled within an American framework.

7. Uruguay sympathized with the suffering of Cuba and of all the people of Cuba, including the Cuban exiles, to whom it accorded the respect traditionally given to such persons by the peoples of America. Its solidarity with Cuba was not merely of recent date. Not only had Uruguay always been opposed to the Batista régime, even when it had had the support of the Cuban Communists, but the Castro revolution had initially aroused interest, admiration and enthusiasm in Uruguay. Every State, within the limits of international law and the principles of democracy, was entitled to the form of government of its choice, and there could be no intervention against the right of each State freely to develop its cultural, political and economic life. It was untrue, however, that progress and social advancement were possible in the Americas only at the sacrifice of fundamental political liberties and only by resort to threats and force. Uruguay and Mexico offered evidence to the contrary. Nor should the Committee forget how great a contribution the much vilified United States had made to promoting understanding between nations.

8. The OAS was a body much better suited to examine the question at issue, and the adoption of the seven-Power draft resolution would help in achieving the objective of understanding and cordial relations between nations.

Mr. Kurka (Czechoslovakia) took the Chair.

9. Mr. SHAHA (Nepal) said that what had happened in Cuba might happen in any one of the smaller countries unless the United Nations could become an effective instrument for relieving situations of that kind.

10. The present discussion must be based on three vital principles which were contained in the United Nations Charter: non-intervention, self-determination, and respect for treaty obligations. Every State had the right to choose freely, without pressure from external sources, the political and economic system which was best suited to its needs and aspirations. There was no doubt that it was for the Cuban people to accept or reject their present Government. When, however, so-

called volunteers from foreign shores, fully armed and protected, landed on Cuban soil for action against the present Cuban Government, it was hard to believe that the Cuban people were being helped in the free exercise of their right of self-determination. The active participation by any foreign country in a counter-revolution was not permissible in terms either of the Charter or of international law, and was incompatible with the obligations assumed by the States of America by virtue of regional treaties and obligatory instruments such as the Havana Convention concerning the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife.

11. Cuba and the United States belonged to the same region, had common interests and were bound by many ties. It was therefore regrettable that their relations had deteriorated to such an extent as to be a source of anxiety and friction in the Western hemisphere and even a threat to international peace and security. Nepal keenly hoped for a reconciliation between Cuba and the United States. The good offices of other countries of the American continent and the good offices of the OAS itself might be useful for that purpose, but the existence of the OAS could not restrict the jurisdiction of the United Nations in the matter.

12. His delegation would vote in favour of the Mexican draft resolution (A/C.1/L.275), which was conciliatory and constructive and was motivated by the best of intentions. Its adoption would undoubtedly be a step towards the normalization of relations between the United States and Cuba, which had always been good neighbours.

13. Mr. UMAÑA BERNAL (Colombia) said he was disappointed that the Committee did not have before it a draft resolution submitted, if not by all, at least by a majority of the Latin American delegations. However, the seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.276), of which his delegation was a sponsor, would certainly receive the support of a large number of Latin American countries.

14. The overwhelming majority of Colombians had welcomed the victory of the Cuban revolution over the Batista dictatorship. Colombia shared the Cuban people's ideals of liberty, independence, justice and social welfare, and had hoped that Cuba would succeed in achieving reforms in peace, without impairing the democratic system, without departing from the methods and practices of representative government and without abandoning the principles reaffirmed at various Latin American conferences and meetings, in particular, in the Declaration of Santiago de Chile adopted in August 1959 at the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member countries of the OAS. Those principles included the recognition and protection of the fundamental rights of the individual proclaimed in the charter of the Organization of American States and in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, adopted at the Ninth International Conference of American States, held at Bogotá in 1948.

15. One of the principal rights proclaimed was the right of peoples to self-determination. Colombia wholeheartedly upheld that right, but considered that it should be recognized without discrimination and without any distortion of its meaning or arbitrary limitation of its scope. If a people was to enjoy self-determination, it must genuinely be in a position to express its opinion and must not be prevented from doing so by force or by intimidation from totalitarian régimes,

either domestic or foreign. The right of self-determination could be exercised only through elections or plebiscites held subject to reliable safeguards and preceded by a broad campaign of publicity. It was futile to speak of self-determination where there were no public freedoms, no freedom of expression or freedom of vote.

16. Colombia also strongly supported the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of any country, as its record in international affairs amply demonstrated. Unfortunately, that principle was frequently invoked with brazen cynicism when it suited a particular purpose and was skilfully evaded whenever it presented an obstacle to the justification of abuses.

17. Without any prejudice to its loyalty to the United Nations, Colombia staunchly supported the system of the Organization of American States, which was one of the main pillars of its international policy. It was neither the time nor the place to embark on a legal discussion of the relationship between the competence of the United Nations and that of the OAS. The competence of the American States was clearly recognized both in the Charter of the United Nations and in the charter of the Organization of American States (article 20), and in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 (article 2). The Colombian delegation, however, recognized that that competence was not exclusive and that the obligation to refer matters in the first instance to the OAS, which for some was a legal obligation and for others a moral or sentimental obligation, might be disregarded without incurring sanctions. It could not, however, agree to any attempts to force certain views upon it *ex cathedra*, nor could it accept any disparagement of the OAS.

18. The seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.276) represented a further effort to find a peaceful solution of the present crisis, in accordance with the international obligations of the countries concerned. Colombia, which was a member of the *Ad Hoc* Good Offices Committee set up at the Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers of the American States at San José, Costa Rica, in August 1960, was prepared to offer its assistance to that end, if requested to do so. Unlike certain other draft resolutions before the Committee, the seven-Power proposal did not express any opinion on the merits of the charges made in the course of the debate. That should be the attitude not only of the countries which were members of the *Ad Hoc* Good Offices Committee, but of all members of the First Committee.

19. His delegation could, however, say that Colombia had been on the side of the United States in the struggle against nazi-fascist totalitarianism and was firmly resolved to remain in the camp of democracy and of Western Christian civilization. Colombia wished to preserve its representative institutions, under which it was effecting far-reaching social changes with the assistance of the United States and other Western countries. In accordance with the decisions taken at the San José meeting, it condemned all extra-continental interference in the internal or external affairs of the Latin American countries.

20. Mr. SCHWEITZER (Chile) said that the fratricidal strife that was dividing a sister republic was a source of profound concern to the Chilean Government and people, which wished to express their sympathy with the Cuban people. It was particularly regrettable that the differences between Cuba and the United States

should have become more acute at a time when new economic and social prospects were opening up for the Latin American countries. The ideas initially put forward by the previous United States Government and subsequently taken up and developed by the present Government held out great promise for the future. The programme outlined by the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, and the statements he had made pointed to a desire to understand and co-operate with the Latin American countries. The dictatorships which had been impeding the full flowering of democracy on the American continent were progressively disappearing, and there were signs of the emergence of a policy based on the need to lay common foundations for economic and social development. The recurring difficulties confronting Latin America were primarily due to the weakness of its economy and the poverty of its population. If it was to achieve stability, it must strengthen democracy and ensure respect for justice.

21. The Cuban delegation had made an appeal to the Committee and had levelled charges with reference to recent events, charges which had been energetically rejected by the United States representative. The Chilean delegation believed that the United States authorities were sincere in their denial of any participation by their country in the civil war in progress in Cuba and in their statement of their intention not to intervene in that war, in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the principles of the Organization of American States.

22. The Ecuadorian representative had explained, at the 1153rd meeting, the reasons why his delegation and that of Chile had submitted to the Security Council, on 4 January 1961, a draft resolution providing for the settlement of the Cuban problem by peaceful means.⁴ That proposal had not been adopted, but at no time had the Chilean delegation felt it was entitled to sit in judgement. When certain Latin American countries had accused Cuba of interference in their domestic affairs, Chile had felt concern and had considered that the Republic of Cuba should respect the principles of the OAS. It had welcomed the Cuban Government's statement in which it had ruled out the use of force and had given an assurance that the revolution would not be "exported". It was now for the United Nations, and more particularly for the members of OAS, to ensure respect for the principles governing international relations. In stressing the importance of those principles, Chile certainly had no intention of passing judgement on the political régime of any country; it could not, however, subscribe to the Cuban Government's statements concerning certain countries nor to the lack of confidence it had expressed with regard to the efficacy of the inter-American system.

23. Seven Latin American countries had submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.276) in which, in the absence of detailed information on events, they abstained from expressing any conclusion on the situation. Chile, which was among the sponsors of that proposal, desired that tranquillity should prevail in Cuba and that the courageous Cuban people, who had expelled Batista, should succeed in overcoming their difficulties. In the meantime, it proclaimed its respect for Cuba's independence and sovereignty and its opposition to any interference in that country's internal affairs. It also hoped that the

⁴ Official Records of the Security Council, Sixteenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1961, document S/4612.

present hostility between Cuba and the United States would be eliminated and that some means would be found of bringing about a peaceful settlement of the dispute. Both the United Nations and the OAS offered legal machinery for the settlement of disputes between States; the *Ad Hoc* Good Offices Committee set up in August 1960, of which Chile was a member, was a case in point. All possibilities of reaching an understanding must be explored and the present crisis, which might well poison the international atmosphere, must be speedily brought to an end. Chile hoped that the present events would not foster the growth of ideologies alien to the democratic convictions of the American countries, since that would undermine the legal system uniting those countries. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the Latin American delegations to do everything in their power to restore confidence and tranquillity to the continent.

24. Mr. PALAMARCHUK (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) stated that after the victory of the people's revolution, Cuba had become an object of hatred for the United States and certain Governments of Latin America. The undeclared war that the United States had been waging against Cuba for two years had finally resulted in an invasion by counter-revolutionary bands, i.e. an act of direct aggression against the Cuban people. The consequent situation represented a grave threat to peace. As the Soviet Government had stated (A/C.1/839), the attack against Cuba constituted open defiance of all peace-loving nations and an act of provocation for which there could be no justification, since it was a blow against the inalienable right of the Cuban people to live in freedom and independence and was contrary to the elementary principles governing international relations and peaceful coexistence of States.

25. The events which had preceded the landing warranted scrutiny by the Committee, since they showed to what extent propaganda and military operations had been co-ordinated. First, a provisional Government had been formed in Florida, following which the State Department had published a booklet entitled "Cuba" (see A/4725) in which the counter-revolutionaries were presented as liberators who shared the aspirations of the population for political freedom and economic and social progress. Next, the President of the United States had stated at a press conference on 12 April that the dispute was not between Cuba and the United States but between the Cubans themselves. But the people had already settled their differences with Batista and, in so doing, had freed themselves from United States trusteeship. The United States was now trying, on the pretext of a dispute between Cubans, to arrest the course of the revolution and to deprive the Cuban people of the fruits of its historic victory.

26. Soon after that press conference, bombs had been dropped on Cuba by American aircraft and, on 17 April, the landings of counter-revolutionary bands had started. The majority of the representatives on the First Committee had defended the cause of Cuban freedom and independence and it was certain that the Cuban people needed moral support in its struggle against the invader. But the United Nations should not confine itself to expressing its support and sympathy: it should condemn the acts of aggression by the United States and take steps to prevent a dangerous aggravation of the situation. The representative of the United States was claiming that his country had nothing to do with

the invasion. The Guatemalan delegation no doubt possessed fuller information on the situation than it had given the Committee. And the *New York Herald Tribune* of that morning, 19 April, reproducing an article from the *Miami Herald*, had stated that there were good reasons to believe that Puerto Cabezas, a place in Nicaragua where a United States air base was situated, was the main point of departure for the invasion of Cuban territory.

27. The position of the United States with regard to Cuba, as revealed in official documents and the statements of Mr. Stevenson, provided food for thought. In the past, the members of the present American Government had often condemned the policy of provocation pursued by the preceding Government and had stressed the need to re-establish United States relations with the rest of the world on new foundations. It might therefore have been expected that the policy of the new Government would reflect more accurately the realities of the situation. The United States delegation to the United Nations had made efforts to justify that hope: in the Security Council, it had voted in favour of an inquiry in Angola,⁵ despite the position taken up by certain of its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; it had also given an assurance that the United States was carefully preparing for negotiations on disarmament. Unfortunately, however, the United States policy towards Cuba had remained aggressive. The invasion apparatus built up during the term of office of President Eisenhower had been set in motion and, if it were not halted in time, risked provoking first a localized and then a general war.

28. Shortly before the landings the United States Government had declared that its armed forces would not participate directly in an invasion. But an aggression could also be committed indirectly; and it was a fact that the United States continued to support the counter-revolutionaries. It should not be forgotten that Cuba had always occupied a very special place in the foreign policy of the United States and that exploitation seemed to be the destiny of the island. After the Second World War, however, United States investments in Cuba had increased rather slowly. The Department of Commerce of the United States had given the following reasons for that: first of all, there was no oil in Cuba; secondly, United States monopolies were reluctant to place capital in metallurgy, metal construction, mines etc. The situation of the monopolies in Cuba determined the policy of the United States Government. At the beginning of the century, it used to send marines to the island whenever the need arose. In those conditions, the Cuban Government had inevitably viewed the interests of the United States capitalists with concern. Today the United States sought to show its hostility to Batista. But the Cuban people pursued a policy in accordance with its own interests, and as soon as the Revolutionary Government had put its ideas into effect the United States had started to speak of a "threat" to the Western hemisphere. In that connexion, one might well wonder how the Cuban Government, which had undertaken a vast programme of economic and social reform, could present a danger for the United States. The victory of the people's revolution had put an end to exploitation of the country and had aroused the stubborn hatred of the United States monopolies. According to them, there was no freedom in Cuba because they were no longer free to derive immense profits from the country.

⁵ *Ibid.*, *Sixteenth Year*, 946th meeting.

29. At the preceding meeting, the representative of Argentina had endeavoured to convince the Committee that it was the task of the OAS to settle the dispute resulting from the complaint by the Cuban Government. That organization certainly could contribute to halting the aggression against Cuba. But it had so far done nothing to defend the territorial integrity of the island or to prevent the economic blockade of which Cuba was a victim. Perhaps the representative of Argentina wanted the OAS, as a United States Senator had suggested recently, to require Castro to account for his actions, and if he refused, to take sanctions against him which might go from breaking off economic relations to the use of armed force. In those circumstances, the United Nations now found its role and its responsibilities increased, since the attack against Cuba fell under the provisions of Article 1 of the Charter.

30. For those reasons, the Ukrainian delegation supported the draft resolutions submitted by Romania (A/C.1/L.274) and the Soviet Union (A/C.1/L.277).

31. Mr. LIU (China) pointed out that the question under discussion had been on the agenda of the General Assembly for several months and had been given a sense of urgency only by the recent developments. Any accusation of aggression was extremely serious, and the United Nations should retain a clear perspective of the issues involved. The Security Council had received a similar complaint from the Cuban Government against the United States on 3 January 1961.⁶ However, no evidence had been presented in support of that complaint. In the present case, the accusations brought against the United States would sound just as hollow, except that the discussion of the item coincided with new events. The facts indicated a state of civil strife: Cuban exiles had carried out landings on the territory of the island in order to join their compatriots in a revolt against tyranny. In the eyes of the Government they were seeking to overthrow, they were naturally mercenaries and traitors. But in the opinion of many people, they were, on the contrary, patriots who wanted to liberate Cuba. The representative of the United States had not concealed the feelings of the American people, but he had given a formal assurance that his country was not participating in the action which was the subject of the complaint by the Cuban Government. There was no reason to dispute the validity of that statement. An impartial survey of United States foreign policy could not fail to reveal that the good-neighbour doctrine, as applied in particular to Latin America, was founded not only on understandable self-interest but also on the idea of international co-operation. The United States had always endeavoured to encourage economic development and democracy in the whole world, and it was hard to see how, when opposing the forces of aggression in the Far East, it could deliberately launch an attack against a neighbouring State.

32. The Chinese people had always valued the friendship of the Cuban people and was following with sympathy its struggle for freedom. But, whatever might have been the deeper reasons for the movement which had brought Castro to power, the Republic of Cuba had become in a brief period the pawn of international communism. It was known that Castro enjoyed the support of the communist bloc, which supplied him with means of propaganda and weapons. If there were any plan of aggression against the Cuban people, it lay in

the communist conspiracy which sought to transform the civil strife into a world crisis.

33. The important point, above all, was to keep those who had the habit of fishing in troubled waters away from the area of conflict. Furthermore, the opinions of the Latin American countries, which had primary interest in the peace and stability of the region, deserved the utmost consideration. The draft resolution submitted by seven of those countries (A/C.1/L.276) was consistent with an earlier decision of the Security Council on a similar complaint and the Chinese delegation supported it.

34. U THANT (Burma) said that certain essential facts had emerged from the statements that had been made in the Committee: an armed conflict was taking place on Cuban soil; that conflict, whether or not foreigners were taking part in it, certainly constituted a threat to international peace and security; and there was ample evidence that some foreign Powers were involved in accelerating the conflict. General Assembly resolution 290 (IV), which had been mentioned by the Mexican representative (1154th meeting), today deserved more attention than ever: that resolution called upon every nation to refrain from any threats or acts, direct or indirect, aimed at impairing the freedom, independence or integrity of any State, or at fomenting civil strife and subverting the will of the people in any State.

35. States Members of the United Nations must not be blinded by their belief in their own ideological and social systems to the fact that other nations believed otherwise. That was the meaning of the principle of peaceful coexistence enunciated at the historic Asian-African Conference held at Bandung in April 1955. That principle was especially significant when countries that maintained different political and social systems were in close geographical proximity to each other. Any attempt of a large and powerful country to effect any sort of change in the political system of a powerless neighbour was fraught with the most dangerous consequences. In 1961, those attitudes, which recalled the policies of Hitler's Germany, should have been completely discarded by the great Powers. It was the fear of such actions that led the small countries to put their faith in the United Nations.

36. Accordingly, the United Nations must make an urgent appeal to all States to ensure that their territories and resources were not used to promote any armed action in Cuba, and must urge all the States concerned to put an immediate end to any activity that might prolong bloodshed in that country. His delegation would like to associate itself with other delegations in requesting all States to seek a peaceful solution of the present situation, in accordance with the spirit of the Charter.

37. Mr. NESBITT (Canada) thought that the most striking feature of the present debate was that certain essential information relating to the situation was, unfortunately, not available. The force and conviction with which the case had been argued in the Committee made it even more difficult to see the situation in perspective. In those circumstances, the Committee should refrain from adopting a partisan resolution by which it would take a position on the substance of the dispute. It was still too early to make a judgement but it was not too early to determine the steps to be taken. The immediate task of the United Nations was to try to contain the situation. There was great danger that Cuba, unhappily racked by internal conflicts, might be

⁶ *Ibid.*, Sixteenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1961, document S/4611.

drawn into a wider conflagration through the direct clash of great-Power interests. The United Nations had been able to provide assistance in similar circumstances in the past, and it should be able to do so in the present case. Action must immediately be taken to prevent the situation from endangering international peace and security. In that connexion, there was cause for satisfaction in the availability, not only of the resources of the United Nations, but also of those of the OAS. The statements made by the delegations of States members of that organization had stressed the mediatory role which the Governments of the American peoples had played in situations not dissimilar to the present case. One unique aspect, however, greatly aggravated the present situation: the intrusion of the influence and power of countries outside the Americas. The effects of that factor had been all too evident throughout the debate.

38. For those reasons, his delegation considered that the draft resolution submitted by seven Latin American countries (A/C.1/L.276) offered the best approach. It would, therefore, support that draft resolution, and would not be able to vote for any of the other draft resolutions that had been presented.

39. Sir Patrick DEAN (United Kingdom) said that his delegation deplored the present conflict in Cuba and was conscious of the gravity of the debate. It was somewhat bewildered, however, by the contradictions between the various accounts of the situation. On the one hand, the Cuban representative presented detailed accounts of events, but said that he was relying largely on the United States Press, which he asserted was biased against his Government. According to the Cuban representative, those reports showed that the Governments of the Western hemisphere, and particularly the United States, had organized aggression against his Government.

40. The United States representative had answered in convincing terms the charges preferred by the Cuban Minister for Foreign Affairs, and had refuted in detail some of the allegations laid against his country. Also, the President of the United States had made a forthright declaration that the United States intended no military intervention in Cuba. It had been the experience of the United Kingdom Government that it could rely upon the word of the United States. Under the circumstances, rather more weight must be given to the official assurances offered by the representative of the United States than to certain extreme allegations advanced in the Committee.

41. Unfortunately, some members of the Committee seemed to accept unquestioningly the statements made on one side and to reject unquestioningly the statements put forward on the other. However, he had been impressed by the extremely thoughtful speeches of the representatives of Venezuela, Argentina and Uruguay. Surely the representatives of Latin American countries had a better title to speak on the question than those whose countries were further removed from Cuba. The representative of Ecuador had made a moving appeal for a cessation of the slander which had characterized the debate, and had added that there was not sufficient evidence to judge the accuracy of the allegations that had been made.

42. His delegation was not prepared to vote for a draft resolution which was based on the proposition that those allegations had been proved. The record to

the contrary was too strong. It would support any resolution that would leave the way open for a solution of the question by way of negotiation or other peaceful means.

43. It seemed appropriate and useful that such negotiations should be undertaken by the States of the American continent. The bond of sympathy between the various Republics of the Western hemisphere had always been especially strong. Consequently, it was particularly sad to see so tragic a deterioration, during recent months, in the relations of Cuba with so many of its neighbours, despite the efforts made by the Governments of neighbouring States to restore friendly co-operation with the Cuban Government and to solve differences of opinion. One might ask whether an effort by Cuba to engage in direct talks with the United States and other Governments, particularly after the Security Council had recommended that course of action in July 1960, might not have prevented their relations from deteriorating.

44. Whether or not the OAS offered the only means for settling present difficulties between Cuba and its neighbours, the Governments of the Latin American countries were in the best position to contribute to a settlement. Therefore, it might be better for the representatives of other countries not to offer their opinions too insistently. For instance, the language used by the representative of the Soviet Union suggested no respect for the traditional feelings in the Western hemisphere. Such information as was available led his delegation to agree with most of the representatives of Latin America that the hostilities in Cuba were rather in the nature of a struggle between Cubans than of intervention by one Government in the affairs of another. Whatever the cause, his delegation hoped for the early restoration of peace and tranquillity to Cuba.

45. As to the four draft resolutions before the Committee, the United Kingdom could not accept the condemnation of the United States contained in the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/C.1/L.277). The Romanian draft (A/C.1/L.274) seemed to make a judgement which, on the present evidence available to the Committee, was certainly unjustified. The Mexican draft resolution (A/C.1/L.275) apparently failed to recognize that the struggle now engaged principally concerned the Cuban people itself. Nor did it mention the OAS, although the members of that body were deeply interested in the problem. On the other hand, the seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.276) represented a wide consensus of opinion in the Latin American countries and held out the best possibility of dealing with that difficult problem satisfactorily. For those reasons his delegation would vote in favour of that draft resolution.

46. Mr. ROA (Cuba) read an official *communiqué* from his Government, which stated that United States participation in the aggression committed against Cuba had been proved that morning. The Cuban Government's anti-aircraft batteries had brought down a United States military aircraft, piloted by a United States flyer named Leo Francis Berliss. Among the papers found on him were his pilot's licence, social security card and driver's licence, and documents relating to his aggressive mission. Since the beginning of the attack against the Zapata Peninsula, Cuban Government forces had brought down nine aircraft.

The meeting rose at 6.5 p.m.