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**FIRST COMMITTEE, 1154th
MEETING**

**Tuesday, 18 April 1961,
at 8.30 p.m.**

New York

C O N T E N T S

Agenda item 90:

Complaint by the Revolutionary Government of Cuba regarding the various plans of aggression and acts of intervention being executed by the Government of the United States of America against the Republic of Cuba, constituting a manifest violation of its territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, and a clear threat to international peace and security
(continued)

Page

73

Chairman: Mr. Karel KURKA (Czechoslovakia).

AGENDA ITEM 90

Complaint by the Revolutionary Government of Cuba regarding the various plans of aggression and acts of intervention being executed by the Government of the United States of America against the Republic of Cuba, constituting a manifest violation of its territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, and a clear threat to international peace and security (A/4537, A/4543, A/4581, A/4631, A/4701, A/4708, A/4710, A/4716, A/4725, A/C.1/839, A/C.1/840, A/C.1/L.274, A/C.1/L.275, A/C.1/L.276, A/C.1/L.277) (continued)

1. Mr. LY (Mali) said that the independence of Cuba was being seriously threatened. His country condemned imperialist wars aimed at the enslavement of peoples, and believed in the principle of peaceful co-existence. The people of Mali knew from experience that the path chosen by the Cuban people was a difficult one, that its efforts to rid itself of the economic and political conditions which had made it dependent on a foreign Power would be resisted and that it would be labelled by the members of one Power bloc as an adherent of the other and outlawed on that account. For its part, the Republic of Mali had adopted a policy of neutralism; it belonged to neither Power bloc, but sought to defend the interests of Africa and the principles of justice and friendly relations between all peoples. Its position in the dispute between the United States and Cuba would be determined by that policy.

2. The charges of aggression made by the Cuban Government had not been refuted by the United States. The existence of the Republic of Cuba was being attacked on the pretext that it constituted a communist beach-head in the Western hemisphere. The people of Mali were familiar with pretexts of that kind, which had been invoked whenever Mali had sought to defend itself against the interests which had jeopardized its independence. If, as everybody agreed, the principle of self-determination was sacrosanct, then the people of Cuba should be left at liberty to choose their own course of development and their own régime, even if it should be communism. In any event, the communist

label was a mere sham: Cuban leaders had repeatedly stated that the course they were following was an independent one, tied to no ideology.

3. His delegation had taken careful note of the United States Government's pledge that it would not intervene directly in Cuba. However, the desired results could be achieved as effectively by the indirect methods which had been described in the Committee. The situation was alarming: on the one hand, the United States had stated that the counter-revolutionaries enjoyed the full sympathy of the United States Government, and on the other hand, the USSR had offered the Revolutionary Government of Cuba unconditional assistance. World peace was clearly in danger, and every effort must be made to find a peaceful solution for the misunderstanding between Cuba and the United States. It would be desirable that the Latin American countries should take the initiative in that respect, but Mali would rule out no initiative based on respect for the principle of the equality of States and for the principle of self-determination. Coming after the events in the Congo, any failure to take effective action in the Cuban question would destroy the confidence of many small countries in the United Nations.

4. Mr. ALEJOS (Guatemala) said that he had just returned from Guatemala and wished to state, on behalf of the President of Guatemala and with particular reference to the charges made by the representative of the *de facto* Government of Cuba, that the forces which had landed in Cuba had not been trained in Guatemala and had not come from Guatemalan territory. Guatemala had never allowed and would never allow its territory to be used for the organization of acts of aggression against its American sister republics.

5. Mr. MALILE (Albania) said that the Cuban delegation had originally asked for the question under discussion to be considered, because of its importance, by the plenary General Assembly.¹ As a result of manoeuvres by the United States delegation, however, the matter had been referred to the First Committee, and the debate on it had not even begun until the apprehensions of the Cuban Government had been proved fully justified.

6. His delegation believed that the question was one of particular importance, not only because it related to a threat to the very existence of a Member State, but also because of the dangers inherent in the established United States policy of aggression against free and sovereign States, a policy which struck at the very roots of the rights of peoples to determine their own destiny, undermined the foundations of international co-operation, embittered relations between States and endangered peace. The United Nations Charter, which the United States Government had signed and under-

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, General Committee, 131st meeting, para. 36.

taken to respect, and all the most elementary principles of international law were being trodden underfoot. The Assembly must therefore adopt the necessary measures to put an end to the United States policy of intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign States.

7. Since assuming power, the Revolutionary Government of Cuba had followed a policy aimed at peace and international co-operation, and in domestic matters had concentrated on solving the manifold problems inevitably encountered by a country striving to free itself from the stranglehold of United States monopolies and the sad heritage of an evil dictatorship. In its efforts to maintain good relations with all States on a basis of mutual respect, the Cuban Government had shown its willingness to discuss and solve by peaceful negotiation every difficulty arising between the United States and Cuba. The only reply of the United States to its friendly overtures had been renewed attacks against Cuban oil installations, further arms deliveries to counter-revolutionaries and the training of invasion forces. In that connexion, it was worth recalling that the draft resolution submitted by the delegations of Chile and Ecuador in the Security Council on 4 January 1961,² which had urged Cuba and the United States to settle their differences by the peaceful means provided for in the United Nations Charter, had been considered as constructive by the Cuban Government but not by the United States.

8. The United States had always regarded the island of Cuba as a private preserve of North American imperialism, and Batista had been not only a corrupt and cruel dictator but also, and first and foremost, an agent of the monopolies to whom he had sold the wealth and freedom of his country. The Cuban people, by heroic efforts, had put an end to the twin yoke of tyranny and merciless exploitation. That success, however, had displeased the United States policy-makers, who had immediately adopted a policy designed to secure the overthrow of the Revolutionary Government. Their first act, to which attention had been drawn by the Prime Minister of Cuba, Mr. Castro, at the 872nd plenary meeting of the General Assembly, had been to open the doors of the United States to all the criminals who had terrorized Cuba for years. Those who had contended at the time that the asylum thus offered to the enemies of the Cuban people was a prelude to the organization of counter-revolutionary forces and to direct aggression had been proved right by events.

9. Having lost their colonialist privileges, the United States imperialists had made every effort to mislead public opinion into believing that the destruction of the Cuban revolution was an absolute necessity. The sole reason for their slanders, of course, was the fact that, now that it had shed its colonial status, the Cuban people sought to exercise true sovereignty and enjoy the fruits of its labour. Again, the United States monopolists feared that the example of the Cuban revolution might jeopardize their interests in several other countries whose riches and natural resources were still in their possession.

10. One of the principal features of the United States campaign against Cuba had been a series of measures designed to destroy the Cuban economy, culminating in the discontinuance of United States purchases of Cuban sugar. At the same time, the United States Government had intensified other aggressive activities, such

as the dispatch of aircraft over Cuba to drop incendiary bombs on peaceful citizens and sugar cane plantations. Facts showed, therefore, that the United States had long been preparing aggression against Cuba; the change in the United States Administration had had no effect on the designs of United States ruling circles in that respect. And today the aggression against Cuba was no longer imminent but in actual progress. The puppet Government which had been created under Mr. Miró Cardona would doubtless ask the United States for military assistance, and the next step would be direct intervention. The United States Press, particularly in the last few days, had made no secret of the fact that armed units were being organized under the control and with the direct support of the State Department, the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the large monopolies that had dominated the Cuban economy. In addition to those open admissions, there was also the irrefutable evidence furnished by the representative of Cuba and other speakers. The United States representative had gone to great lengths to argue that the United States had neither encouraged nor connived at any attack against Cuba from United States territory; but the armed adventurers who had landed in Cuba could clearly only have come from the United States or Guatemala. Deliberate falsehood seldom served any useful purpose, as had been demonstrated by the U-2 incident.

11. The declaration of the State Department dated 3 April 1961, circulated on 6 April to the Members of the United Nations (A/4725), afforded convincing evidence of the plans against Cuba. Such a gratuitous condemnation of the Cuban Government for maintaining economic, cultural and other relations with the socialist countries constituted an intolerable intrusion into the domestic affairs of a sovereign State. The declaration was thus a typical example of the United States Government's respect for the rules of international conduct, the principles of the Charter and the various United Nations decisions concerning good-neighbourly relations.

12. The policy of interference which was currently being applied by the United States against Cuba was of course not unprecedented. Albania, for one, had been the victim of similar gross interference in its domestic affairs, immediately after its consolidation as a people's democracy. The United States had on that occasion also employed every possible means to secure the overthrow of a Government created by the people's will. There had been the same campaign of propaganda, slander, military pressure and sabotage. The Albanian delegation was therefore well able to understand the alarm of the Cuban Government in the present circumstances. The policy of the United States represented a most serious threat to world peace. In the interests of peace, therefore, that policy must be exposed and the United Nations must take effective measures to put a stop to the aggression against Cuba before it was too late.

13. Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) said that the dangerous tension existing in relations between the United States and Cuba was a matter of profound concern to the Government and people of Mexico, the more so as Mexico had long enjoyed close and friendly relations with both States, its friendship with the United States being one of the main foundations of Mexican foreign policy, and its traditional ties with Cuba having been further strengthened by the sympathy and admira-

² *Official Records of the Security Council, Sixteenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1961, document S/4612.*

tion with which the Mexican people viewed the struggle of the Cuban people rapidly to improve their standard of living.

14. In explaining Mexico's position with regard to the Cuban complaint, he wished to emphasize that the competence of the United Nations to deal with a situation involving two Member States could not be challenged on the ground that both parties were also members of a regional organization. During the ninth session of the General Assembly in 1954, after the Security Council had rejected a request to place a Guatemalan complaint on its agenda on precisely that ground,³ the delegations of Ecuador, Uruguay and Argentina had severely criticized its decision. The representative of Argentina had quite rightly pointed out that the effect of the Council's decision would be to limit the rights of Member States which, besides being Members of the United Nations, also belonged to regional organizations.⁴ In the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization submitted to the General Assembly at its ninth session, the Secretary-General, commenting on the relationship between the United Nations and regional arrangements, had stated that a policy giving full scope to the proper role of regional agencies could and should at the same time fully preserve the right of a Member nation to a hearing under the Charter.⁵ Once a complaint or situation had been brought before the United Nations, the organ dealing with it had the authority to recommend the means of pacific settlement which it deemed most conducive to a solution in the given circumstances, and was not necessarily compelled to adopt as the only or even as the initial procedure the referral of the question to the regional organization. If the idea of the compulsory, exclusive and preliminary competence of the regional organization were upheld, Members of the United Nations which were also members of such organizations would suffer unjustified discrimination, in that they would be precluded from having recourse to the variety of pacific settlement procedures specified in the Charter while other Members enjoyed that privilege to the full.

15. The Mexican delegation considered that the General Assembly was at liberty to recommend whatever procedure it deemed most effective, taking into account all the circumstances of the case, including the preference of the parties. In the present case it suggested that action by the *Ad Hoc* Good Offices Committee composed of the Heads of State of six Latin American countries, established at the Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States, held at San José, Costa Rica, in August 1960, might constitute an appropriate and impartial method for elucidating the facts and assisting the parties to compose their differences. However, if any of the parties considered that procedure inappropriate, the Assembly should seek a solution by other means.

16. In view of the seriousness of the situation and the danger it posed to world peace, it was imperative that the Assembly should play its peacemaking role quickly and effectively to prevent matters from deteriorating. The principles on which its action should be based were those of non-intervention, self-determination, respect for the territorial integrity and political

independence of States, respect for treaties and the pacific settlement of disputes.

17. The principle of non-intervention as understood in the inter-American system was extremely strict, prohibiting not only armed intervention, direct or indirect, by one or more nations, but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements, whatever the motive might be. Those provisions would be found in article 15 of the charter of the Organization of American States (OAS),⁶ and article 16 of the same instrument prohibited any State from using or encouraging the use of coercive measures of an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind.

18. The right of every people to self-determination, i.e. to build the political, social and economic system of its choice, was a basic right of statehood. It should be respected everywhere, regardless of any political antipathies involved or of any foreign interests affected, and even if the foreign policy of the country concerned was regarded by others as contrary to its best interests. While representative democracy was one of the principles of the inter-American system, it could not be imposed or supported by international action. The protection of the institutions of a State was within the latter's own exclusive jurisdiction, and had not become a matter of an international character subject to collective action. To adopt any other doctrine would mean to invade the reserved domain of States and consequently to violate both the charter of the Organization of American States and the Charter of the United Nations. An international organization must not be converted into a supra-State tribunal competent to judge national institutions or to regulate the democratic fervour of Governments. Mexico's support for the right of self-determination was based on bitter historical experience; and it of course included recognition of the right of a people to revolt against oppression. That was one of the rights held most dear by the Mexican people.

19. The United Nations Charter did not prohibit internal armed rebellion, and the Organization was not called upon to defend established Governments against insurrection. To the extent that the Cuban question was—as had been asserted—strictly a matter for the Cubans, the United Nations had no ground for intervention. However, that did not detract from the obligations of States to respect the relevant international instruments.

20. The desire of the countries of Latin America to prevent indirect foreign intervention in the internal affairs of States had been reflected in the Convention concerning the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife signed at Havana in 1928⁷ and ratified by Mexico in 1929, by the United States in 1930 and by Cuba in 1934. That Convention had been designed in particular to prevent outside Powers from assisting persons or groups engaged in rebellion against an established Government. He read out articles 1 and 3 of the Convention. In 1957, a supplementary Protocol to the Convention had been opened for signature, with the object of defining more precisely the provisions relating to vessels and to civil or military aircraft.⁸

³ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Ninth Year*, 676th meeting.

⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Ninth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 488th meeting, para. 84.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Ninth Session, Supplement No. 1, p. xi.

⁶ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 119 (1952), No. 1609.

⁷ League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. CXXXIV (1932-1933), No. 3082.

⁸ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 284 (1957-1958), No. 4138.

21. While the statement made by President Kennedy on 12 April 1961 that no United States armed forces would intervene in Cuba and that every effort would be made to make sure that no Americans were involved in any action inside Cuba would be of great help in preserving the internal nature of the Cuban situation, the obligations of States did not end at that point. The obligations of the American Republics had been formulated in the treaties he had cited, and they specifically included the prohibition of every form of indirect assistance. Obviously, that did not mean that political refugees and exiles must be interned and barred from all political activity; but there was a considerable difference between interning and muzzling refugees and allowing them to issue open calls to rebellion and make public preparations for carrying it out. The terms of the Convention on Territorial Asylum signed at Caracas in 1954,⁹ while affirming Latin America's traditional respect for the right of asylum, clearly revealed the desire of the Latin American countries to prevent, so far as possible, the internationalization of revolutions. He read out articles VII and VIII of that Convention, which made it clear that political refugees or asylees were not entitled to engage publicly in systematic propaganda advocating the use of force or violence against the Government of their country. The United Nations itself, in General Assembly resolution 290 (IV), entitled "Essentials of peace", had called upon every nation to refrain from any threats or acts, direct or indirect, aimed at impairing the freedom, independence or integrity of any State, or at fomenting civil strife and subverting the will of the people in any State. Thus, the international obligations of States in such matters were quite clear: they were required to exercise extreme vigilance to prevent persons residing in their territory from engaging in actions directed against the political independence and territorial integrity of other States. In that connexion, he drew attention to the famous *Alabama* case, in which the court, basing itself on the three "Washington rules", which had become customary principles of international law, had given a decision to that effect, even though in that case a state of war had previously been recognized—obviously a less serious situation than that existing where there was only one recognized Government confronting a group of individuals having no international status of any kind.

22. At a time when the Western democracies were engaged in a struggle for the minds of men, its most powerful weapons were moral principles, respect for treaties and adherence to the policy of settling disputes between nations not by force, but by negotiation. On more than one occasion civil wars assisted from abroad had jeopardized world peace, and the West had resisted and was still resisting attempts in other parts of the world to take over countries through the intermediary of dissident groups backed from outside. The democracies must preserve all their moral authority to denounce and combat other cases of internal rebellion fomented and assisted from abroad and should place limitations on collective intervention lest it prove a boomerang.

23. The Cuban question could become a test of the principles which had been invoked with regard to other complaints brought before the General Assembly in the past. The principles of the Charter should be

scrupulously respected, for the United Nations was seeking to create a world order based on the rule of law and compliance with international treaties and to avoid world chaos in which extremist ideas flourished. As President Kennedy had said in his inaugural speech on 20 January 1961, good words must be converted into good deeds, and States should neither negotiate out of fear nor fear to negotiate. In the view of the Mexican delegation, the Committee should seek to end the violence in Cuba and to settle the conflict by negotiation or any other of the means of pacific settlement provided in the Charter.

24. Every people had the right to resort to arms to repel armed foreign intervention, to depose a tyrant or to carry out a social revolution. But no foreign Power had the right to instigate or bring about the fall of a Government which was not to its liking. It would be impossible to prevent any country or geographical area from becoming the battleground of third Powers unless the principles of non-intervention and self-determination were respected. Mexico did not want Cuba to become the catalyst which might touch off a chain reaction ending in world war. For like Laos, the Congo, Korea and Germany, Cuba was a political nerve-centre of the world today.

25. He read out a statement by the Ministry of External Relations of Mexico setting forth the broad lines of Mexico's foreign policy. The Cuban people should be allowed, in exercise of its right of self-determination, to translate its aspirations for economic and social betterment into reality without outside interference. No State or group of States was entitled to intervene directly or indirectly, for whatever reason, in the internal affairs of any other State; the principle of non-intervention was the corner-stone of peaceful coexistence. There were no conflicts or disputes which could not be settled by peaceful means, and Mexico had publicly offered its good offices in the settlement of any disputes affecting the Western hemisphere. The Mexican authorities would exercise the strictest vigilance to prevent any assistance from its territory to groups opposing the Government of Cuba.

26. He presented a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.275) which set forth the action which his Government felt the Assembly could appropriately take on the Cuban question. The draft resolution might not be regarded as satisfactory by some Latin American States; he respected their opinions, but wished to emphasize that the Mexican proposal should not be interpreted as hostile to the views of any other delegation. In reasserting the basic principles of Mexico's foreign policy, which were identical with those of many other Latin American States, the Mexican delegation was confident that it was carrying out the responsibility of its Government towards the people of Mexico, the American continent and the United Nations.

27. Mr. STEVENSON (United States of America) read out to the Committee the reply sent by Mr. J. F. Kennedy, President of the United States, to the message from Mr. N. S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which the Soviet representative had read out at the previous meeting.

28. He wished to reiterate his previous statement that no invasion of Cuba had taken place from any part of the United States and that his Government was opposed to the use of United States territory for launching a military attack against any foreign country. The Cuban

⁹ Convention on Territorial Asylum, signed at the Tenth Inter-American Conference, Caracas, March 1-23, 1954 (Pan American Union, *Law and Treaty Series*, Washington, D.C., 1954).

representative had failed to produce any evidence to support his charges of United States intervention in Cuba.

29. The various types of United States armaments to which the Cuban representative had referred had been sold by the United States Government to many foreign nations, including Cuba, and most of them were freely available on private arms markets. With regard to the alleged flights of United States aircraft over Cuba, the Cuban Government must be aware that the United States had established an elaborate system of controls to prevent unauthorized flights; details on that point were available in the United States reply (A/4537) to the allegations made by Prime Minister Castro in his statement at the 872nd plenary meeting. He recalled that in one case a pilot who had made such a flight had later acknowledged having done so as a Cuban agent for the purpose of discrediting the United States. The flight of 24 March referred to by the Cuban representative had originally received clearance from the Cuban authorities, even though the clearance had been revoked after the plane had taken off.

30. The vessel *Western Union* had not been engaged in any kind of United States Government operation but in cable repair work. It could scarcely have been carrying 180,000 gallons of high octane gasoline since the weight of that quantity of gasoline was 540 tons and the *Western Union* was a 90-ton schooner. The vessel had been six miles off shore, and hence outside Cuban territorial waters, when it had been intercepted. Finally, the United States aircraft dispatched in response to the *Western Union's* distress signals had not employed tear gas.

31. The Cuban representative had cited the former Cuban sugar quota in the United States market as evidence that before the advent of the Castro régime Cuba had been in a position of colonial dependence upon the United States. In fact, however, the quota arrangement had enabled Cuba to supply about 71 per cent of United States sugar imports at prices which had generally been higher than the world market price, and Cuba had earned \$350 million from sugar exports to the United States during the first year of the Castro régime. It was curious that the Castro régime, which had denounced the quota system as "economic bondage", had subsequently described the termination of the quota as economic aggression.

32. The Cuban representative had also charged that the United States was trying to force Cuba to return to the Constitution of 1940, which he had described as a political expression of Cuba's colonial economic structure at that time. In 1953, however, Mr. Castro himself had promised to restore the Constitution of 1940 when he took power. It might also be noted, in connexion with the events now occurring, that Mr. Castro had on the same occasion cited article 40 of the Constitution in support of the principle that resistance to tyranny was legitimate.

33. The Cuban representative had denied that Mr. Castro had betrayed the Cuban revolution and had handed it over to extra-continental Powers. In that connexion, it was instructive to compare the pledges made by Mr. Castro in the "Declaration of the Sierra Maestra" of 12 July 1957 with the actual performance of the Castro régime. Mr. Castro had promised immediate freedom for all political prisoners; but there were at present some 15,000 political prisoners in Cuba. He had promised absolute freedom of information; but

today not a single independent newspaper or independent radio or television station remained in Cuba. He had promised in his declaration to uphold individual and political rights. After his accession to power, however, so-called "counter-revolutionary crimes"—a term never defined—had been made punishable by death, and military instead of civilian courts had been given jurisdiction in all such cases. The Castro régime's interference with the independence of the judiciary, culminating in the assumption by the Government of full power to dismiss or transfer judicial personnel, had resulted in the resignation and flight from Cuba of the President of the Cuban Supreme Court. The declaration of 1957 had promised the democratization of labour union politics. However, more than 200 leading union officials elected in 1959 from among candidates proposed by Mr. Castro's own 26th of July Movement, including the Secretary-General of the Cuban Confederation of Labour, had been dismissed as counter-revolutionaries by December 1960, and the Cuban Confederation of Labour had been transformed into a disciplinary and propaganda organization. In August 1960, the Minister of Labour had been empowered to fix wage-rates and compulsory production norms for workers in State-owned and mixed enterprises. Mr. Castro had promised to combat illiteracy and promote civic education. In fact, however, he had abolished university autonomy, had established strict control over teachers and educational subject-matter at the primary and secondary levels, and had turned the Cuban educational system into an instrument for political indoctrination. Finally, Mr. Castro had promised to break up large land holdings and distribute the land to individual farmers; but instead most Cuban land had been converted into co-operatives and State farms. He had also failed to honour his pledge to indemnify the former owners.

34. The present events in Cuba were the outgrowth of popular opposition to the régime, which had been reflected during the past year in increasingly numerous acts of open resistance inside and outside of Cuba. Many Americans had originally sympathized with the cause espoused by Mr. Castro and were now sympathetic to those who were seeking to bring freedom and justice to Cuba. However, it was the hostility of Cubans, not of Americans, that Mr. Castro had to fear, and the United States had no obligation to protect him from the consequences of his treason to the Cuban revolution.

35. His Government hoped that such difficulties as had arisen between Cuba and other countries of the Western hemisphere would be settled peacefully and that the Cuban people would solve their own problems in a way that would guarantee them social justice, genuine independence and political freedom.

36. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that although he was not in entire agreement with the representatives of Mexico and Ecuador, he appreciated their sympathy and concern for Cuba in its present troubles. The United States representative, on the other hand, had ignored the fundamental points they had made, and particularly the argument that the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of another State, which was laid down by the Charter of the United Nations and the charter of the Organization of American States, must be observed. Instead, he had spoken in considerable detail of the past and present affairs of Cuba, a subject outside the province of the United Nations, which was not entitled to pass judgement on the internal régime of any country.

37. The United States representative had gone on to deny that the invasion of Cuba had taken place from United States territory, and the Guatemalan representative had said the same of Guatemala. Where, then, had the invasion come from? The answer to that question could be deduced from the statements made at a press conference on 17 April by the United States Secretary of State. He had been asked why the Press had not been allowed to see the pilot who had landed in Miami after allegedly defecting from the Cuban Air Force; whether the United States had had any advance knowledge of the invasion; whether the Government had any policy regarding the use of United States territory for the training, equipment or organization of anti-Castro forces; whether there was any contact between the United States Government and the so-called Revolutionary Council in New York; and whether the United States was giving material assistance to the counter-revolutionaries. In each case he had refused to reply, and his refusals could be interpreted only to mean that the answer to those questions was in the affirmative. The United States representative's statement to the Committee had been no more enlightening or candid. He had said that the possession of United States weapons by the counter-revolutionaries was no evidence of United States involvement, since most Latin American countries, including Cuba, had such weapons. But that did not relieve the United States of responsibility, for the Cuban Government would scarcely have given the weapons to its enemies. The United States should admit its responsibility, since everyone knew that the counter-revolutionaries had been trained and equipped by the United States and that the invasion had been launched with the full assent of the United States Government. The sequence of events had been exactly the same as when the United States had organized an invasion of Guatemala by bands of mercenaries in 1954. On that occasion it had denied its responsibility in exactly the same way.

38. The invasion was not part of a civil war among Cubans, but was an act of aggression by the United States, the reasons for which were clear. The Cuban people had revolted against the dictatorship of Batista in order to bring freedom to their country. The Revolutionary Government, acting with full popular support, had carried out agrarian reforms and laid the foundations for the development of the national economy. It had given the people what they had wanted for centuries—freedom, land, bread and work. In doing so, it had put an end to the merciless exploitation of Cuba by foreign, and especially United States, monopolies. Certain circles in the United States had long regarded Latin America as a fit object of exploitation. About 80 per cent of all foreign capital investment in Latin American countries belonged to the United States, and brought profits amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars a year to United States monopolies. In addition, the Latin American countries were considered to come within the United States sphere of influences in military matters and were used as strategic bases. The motive behind the invasion of Cuba was thus obvious: it was to re-establish the economic domination of the United States in Cuba and to secure its military bases there. That was the answer to the United States representative's claim that his country had no direct economic interest in Cuba.

39. The United Nations could not ignore such flagrant violations of its Charter, and must take immediate measures to put an end to aggression. His delegation was therefore submitting a draft resolution to that effect (A/C.1/L.277). As a first step, to prevent any further deterioration of the situation, it urged the Committee to adopt immediately the draft resolution submitted by Romania (A/C.1/L.274).

40. Mr. STEVENSON (United States of America) said that, contrary to what the USSR representative had said, he was entitled to speak of the internal affairs of Cuba because they determined its relations with other countries.

41. Mr. ALEJOS (Guatemala) said that the "bands of mercenaries" to which the Soviet representative had referred in connexion with the Guatemalan crisis of 1954 had in fact been Guatemalans who had wanted freedom and democracy to be re-established in their country. The people of Guatemala had had experience of communism and democracy, and they preferred the latter.

42. Mr. ROA (Cuba) said that the United States representative had made his Government's attitude to the Cuban revolution and to all movements of national liberation quite clear. He had not uttered one single word in condemnation of the Batista régime or of any Latin American dictatorship, nor had he answered any of the specific charges made by the Cuban delegation. That was not surprising; the history of the United States was one of economic, political and military expansion. It had eaten up half of Mexico and the Spanish and French provinces of Florida and Louisiana. It had taken over Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Hawaii and Guam. It had divided Panama in two and still held on to the Panama Canal. It had intervened in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua. It had isolated Mexico diplomatically when that country had carried out an agrarian revolution and adopted a policy of nationalization which affected United States interests. It had intervened in Cuba four times since the foundation of the Republic. There was thus nothing new in its present policy.

43. A revolution had taken place in Cuba, and like the French and United States revolutions, it had gone through various phases. That did not mean that its leaders had betrayed their original principles. They had given land to the peasants and factories to the workers and they had the complete support of the people. There was no need to hold elections to show that the Cuban Government was democratic; that had been proved by spontaneous mass demonstrations in its support. Contrary to what the United States representative had said, not a single person in Cuba had joined the invaders: the whole population was preparing to repulse them.

44. The United States had given the Cuban people no help in their revolution, but had persecuted those who had tried to promote it. Now it was trying to recapture resources and property which belonged to the Cuban people through an invasion carried out by mercenaries in the service of the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the United States monopolies. But the Cuban people believed in their destiny and they were determined to conquer.

The meeting rose on Wednesday, 19 April, at 12.25 a.m.