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Chairman: Mr. João Carlos MUNIZ (Brazil).

Interference of the United States of America in the internal affairs of other States as manifested by the organization on the part of the Government of the United States of America of subversive and espionage activities against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the People's Republic of China, the Czechoslovak Republic and other people's democracies

[Item 71]*

1. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom) proposed to examine why the Czechoslovak delegation had submitted for the General Assembly's consideration a question which the Soviet Union delegation had already put forward at the sixth session (A/1968/Rev.1) and despite the fact that the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/685) had been rejected at the time by a strong majority.

2. The Czechoslovak Government's action could be explained by the fact that that Government lived in a permanent state of apprehension. At a time when working days were very long and wages low, absenteeism in industry had reached the figure of 500,000 shifts a month, according to the Czechoslovak communist newspaper *Rudé Právo*. The situation of the railways was officially regarded as calamitous, while matters were even worse in the rural areas, where hunger was used as a means of forcing farmers to work. An auxiliary guard, consisting of communist storm-troopers, had been organized in the villages and, in co-operation with the secret police, its duty was to arrest persons considered to be suspicious. The middle classes had been almost entirely liquidated by the simple method of depriving them of ration cards. Meanwhile refugees continued to cross the frontier every day to the free world, thus proving that Czechoslovakia was at the moment a vast concentration camp inhabited solely by prisoners and warders.

3. Under such a régime, mistakes, shortages and poverty obviously could not be attributed to a government divinely inspired by Marxism, Leninism and Stalinism; they could only be the work of scapegoats, some types of which had become classic. The Press had recently accused the kulaks of sabotaging food deliveries. Some years before, the Czechoslovak Government had explained that the shortage of potatoes was due to potato bugs dropped from United States aircraft. When the situation became particularly acute, it was even necessary to discover foreign agents among the members of the Government and trials were staged, at which the victims confessed their crimes publicly and received savage sentences.

4. The Czechoslovak memorandum (A/2224/Rev.1) referred to recent acts of espionage which had allegedly been committed with American aid. But the most recent event in the field of espionage had been the trial and execution of some of the prominent Czechoslovak leaders. Fourteen important members of the Communist Party had been summarily liquidated, although they had filled posts of responsibility and had shortly before received awards of honour from their party. The indictment indicated that, prior to the 1948 *coup d'état*, a group of conspirators had collaborated with Mr. Benes to restore capitalism in Czechoslovakia. After 1948 it seemed that their task had been to destroy the people's republic by a counter-revolutionary conspiracy within the Communist Party. The indictment described, *inter alia*, how Slansky had placed in key posts Western refugees, Trotskyists, Zionists and other enemies of the Czechoslovak people, in order to carry on subversive activities from within. It was difficult for those who had not experienced life in modern Eastern European States to conceive of the atmosphere of espionage, conspiracy and executions. It was in the light of those facts that the accusations levelled against the United States should be judged.

5. The third chapter of the indictment of the Prague trial sought to establish that two of the accused, Mr.

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

Bedrich Reicin and Mr. Vavro Hajdu, had participated in a spy network, maintaining contact with Sir Gladwyn Jebb himself as early as 1946. In that connexion he stated that, prior to reading the indictment, he had never heard of Mr. Reicin. It was correct that he had met Mr. Hajdu at the 1946 Conference of Paris, that he had exchanged a few harmless words with him and had spoken to him about some details of the draft treaty with Hungary. But, according to the official record of the Prague trial, Mr. Hajdu had allegedly stated that he had maintained contact with Sir Gladwyn Jebb and that the latter had told him that he knew that Hajdu was a British police agent and had suggested that he should continue his espionage activities through him. Mr. Hajdu was supposed to have added that he had subsequently reported to him the Czechoslovak Government's intentions regarding the peace treaty with Hungary. All that had happened had been the exchange of a few words between the representatives of two allied governments about a matter of mutual interest. Yet that simple fact had served as a pretext for sentencing Mr. Hajdu to twenty years' penal servitude.

6. That personal experience enabled him to declare that the Prague trial had been concocted and was nothing but a pack of lies. It was in the light of those facts that the charges of sabotage levelled by the people's republics against Western governments should be construed. No one could predict when there would be a new purge in Czechoslovakia; probably when the situation became still worse. In the meanwhile, certain events which had recently occurred in the Soviet orbit stirred hopes that a less aggressive policy might ensue.

7. That had not yet been the case, however, when the Czechoslovak delegation had requested the inclusion of the item on the agenda. In October 1952 its intention had been to prolong the wave of anti-foreign hysteria provoked by the Slansky trial. The Czechoslovak delegation's memorandum condemned the Mutual Security Act of 1951 and the supplementary Act of 1952 on the pretext that their purpose was to organize a spy network and subversive activities against the "freely elected régimes" of the people's republics with funds appropriated for that purpose.

8. In the first place, the wholesale condemnation of the Act was illogical because the special funds were only a very small part of the credit which the Act intended for a series of purposes such as economic assistance to Western Europe, to Korea and to the Palestinian refugees. As the United States representative had already pointed out (582nd meeting), those funds could be used by the President of the United States to assist political refugees to take part, if they so desired, in the defence of the North Atlantic community, on the understanding that the decision whether those refugees should form part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces depended on the members of that organization.

9. The Czechoslovak Government probably objected to the granting of the right of asylum to political refugees. Nevertheless that right was internationally recognized. In the circumstances, there was no point in preventing those who so desired from serving in the armed forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, after all, was an organization of defence

against aggression. It was true that everything connected closely or remotely with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was anathema to certain delegations. He read out certain provisions from the preamble and articles 2, 3 and 5 of the Treaty, showing that its essential purpose was mutual assistance within the framework of joint defence. He wondered whether the leaders of the USSR really feared that the members of NATO were engaged in a conspiracy against their country. It was possible. It was known to what extent those leaders were capable of reversing facts. But there were limits to their inventiveness and to the credulity of free peoples. If the USSR Government felt anxiety about NATO, it had only itself to blame, because it was its own imperialistic policy which had called that organization into being.

10. The Mutual Security Act was one of the foundations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. For millions of free men, the Act was tangible proof that a powerful nation wished to join with others in building up a system of legitimate collective defence in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Contrary to the allegations of Soviet propaganda, there was in the Act no imperialism nor any threat of aggression, because the governments and parliaments of the various Member States warmly supported that organization.

11. In conclusion it could be said that the Czechoslovak Government had been moved by fear and hate to repeat the slanderous accusation against the United States. A system based on the control of thought could not maintain itself except through fear and hate. In that connexion, mention must be made of the new wave of oppression of the Jews which had been launched in Czechoslovakia, the USSR and in other people's republics. It was the old story again; once freedom was suppressed, the worst excesses could be expected.

12. It was certainly not by following the example of fear and hate that the West would succeed in countering or mitigating the evil. The evil was admittedly infectious, but if the West wished to preserve its political institutions, it must in all circumstances maintain freedom of thought and expression. Again, the West obviously could not remove the fear felt by the Communists by failing to provide for its own security, because, if the NATO States did not organize their defence against aggression, a revolutionary situation might arise which would be immediately exploited by the Communists.

13. The communist governments must nevertheless understand that, provided they were not guilty of aggression, they would be attacked by no one. If that truth finally dawned on them, it was possible that the hate and fear which they felt would diminish. It was not impossible that mankind was approaching a critical point in its history. Coexistence between East and West would finally make it possible to attack the problems of undernourishment and overpopulation. But one could not be very optimistic. If hate and fear continued to dominate the policy of the communist bloc, the future would remain dark, even if mankind should escape a third world war. The free world must remain strong, resolute and calm. It was not for it to say when the cold war would end; it was for the other side to indicate by facts that the climate had

changed. One fact which would be most significant in that connexion would be for the communist world to abandon its attempt to impose complete cultural and spiritual uniformity.

14. Mr. BARANOWSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that, in proposing for consideration by the General Assembly the question of the intervention by the United States in the domestic affairs of other States, the Czechoslovak Government had accused the United States Government of encouraging underground activities against the security of certain States by using funds appropriated under the Mutual Security Act of 10 October 1951 and supplemented by the Act of 20 June 1952.

15. The United States Government, in the course of its history, had on many occasions encouraged diversionist activities in foreign countries, including countries in Latin America, Europe and Asia. Those subversive activities had been directed particularly against the USSR and then against the people's republics. The United States did not differ from other capitalist States in its methods; but it was the only country which had wished to sanction those activities by enacting legislation. Those two Acts constituted flagrant intervention in the domestic affairs of other States and an unprecedented violation of the standards of international law, the principles of the Charter and the obligations entered into on 16 November 1933 by the United States and the USSR not to subsidize military organizations designed to overthrow either of the two Governments by violence.

16. The two Acts should be considered against the background of United States policy towards the Soviet Union and the people's republics. The diversionist and espionage plan was an integral part of United States preparations for a new world war. In an article in the 19 May 1952 issue of *Life*, Mr. John Foster Dulles had outlined the plan of subversive activities carried on in the people's republics with United States funds and had mentioned the methods used. According to Mr. Dulles, the main purpose was to overthrow the established governments and to encourage the escape of traitors from their homelands in order to use them as counter-revolutionary units. Mr. Dulles had referred to those fugitives as units of the peaceful liberation movement. Dozens of such plans had been published in the United States; but it was the first time that a programme for destroying the people's republics had been prepared by a United States Secretary of State. Nor must it be forgotten that President Eisenhower, in his speech of 25 August 1952 to the American Legion, had stated that the United States would not be satisfied until the wave of aggressive communism had been driven back to the frontiers of the USSR. Lastly, the author James Burnham, an adviser to the State Department, had written that the United States should go over to the offensive by engaging in conspiracies, subversive activities, localized warfare or even by resorting to general war. The current rulers of the United States had therefore freely indicated that United States policy was designed to re-establish capitalism in the people's republics. It was for that purpose that they had passed the Acts of 10 October 1951 and 20 June 1952.

17. Many delegations and the official representatives of the United States had explained the aggressive

nature of those Acts. But Mr. Lodge, repeating the arguments of Senator Mansfield at the sixth session of the General Assembly, had claimed at the 582nd meeting that those Acts had provoked no diversionist activity against the USSR or the people's republics and, to substantiate his assertion, he had pointed out that only \$4,300,000 out of the \$100 million appropriated had been spent exclusively on assistance to political refugees. He had even claimed that that had been a philanthropic gesture by the United States to the unhappy refugees. As early as the sixth session, the USSR delegation had shown that the Mutual Security Act was not a charitable gesture and Senator Mansfield had been compelled to admit that the \$100 million appropriated were intended for recruiting spies in the service of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

18. The authors of the Mutual Security Act left no doubt as to the Act's purpose. Representative Kersten had stated that the purpose of his amendment to the Act was to assist refugees, to use them in national groups attached to NATO, and to help those persons in the USSR and in the people's republics who were struggling to overthrow the established régimes. Hence, contrary to Mr. Lodge's assertion, the Mutual Security Act was not humanitarian but aggressive in its intention.

19. The Act had already been put into execution and trials held in Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia had shown that the United States funds were being used by counter-revolutionary agents. The amounts spent since the Act of 10 October 1951 had been put into effect, were of little importance. The main point was that the Act constituted interference in the domestic affairs of States, since among its objects was the organization of military units against the people's republics.

20. The *U. S. News & World Report* had disclosed that, in 1951, the great United States monopolies had paid \$350 million to organizations whose activities were directed against the USSR. The Ford Foundation had made a large financial contribution towards maintaining the Ukrainian emigrants' movement, which was directed against the USSR and the Ukraine.

21. Mr. Lodge had claimed that the statements of Mr. Dulles and Mr. Dewey had been made by men who at the time were not serving in any official capacity. He had also added that the statements by Senators Wiley and Mundt had not been made by them in their capacity as senators. It was easy to reply that Mr. Dulles had not repudiated his statements and that, on the contrary, he was putting them into effect. Again, what was to be said of a system which allowed influential people, in their speeches, to call for the adoption of aggressive measures against a foreign State without being held responsible for their words?

22. Mr. Lodge had claimed that the Mutual Security Act was based on the defence of freedom. It must therefore be concluded that American imperialism wished to deliver the USSR and the people's republics from communism. It was for the same reason that the nazis had invaded the USSR in 1941 and had wrought havoc and destruction. It would also be recalled that, in 1918, the United States, with the assistance of France and the United Kingdom, had sought to liberate the Ukraine on the Wilsonian principle

of the right of self-determination of peoples. Thirty-five years later new plans were being prepared for the same purpose. Mr. Lodge should remember that in no case had foreign intervention succeeded in preventing the Ukrainian people from living according to the system they had freely chosen.

23. The United States representative also claimed that his country respected freedom and democracy. He had stated, *inter alia*, that no United States nationals wished to leave their country. He was forgetting that Miss Bukar, who had been working in the United States Embassy in Moscow, had sought refuge in the USSR, feeling unable to associate herself with the sabotage activities of the United States against the Soviet Union. Again, it was not true that all United States nationals were free to leave their country. They had first to be investigated. Passports had recently been refused to the United States delegation to the Peace Congress. The ruling circles in the United States had long since crushed democracy at home and had discarded the last remaining civil liberties. The country, in the hands of reactionaries, was welcoming terrorists, war criminals, hired murderers, spies and foreign traitors.

24. The Cuban representative had stated at the 584th meeting that the USSR and the people's republics were pursuing an aggressive policy. He had said that the Soviet Press reproduced only the statements made by the representatives of the USSR or the people's democracies in the United Nations. That allegation was completely false, since the proceedings in the General Assembly were summarized in the great Soviet dailies, especially in *Pravda*, and even a summary of the slanderous statements made by the Cuban representative on 14 November, at the 522nd meeting, could be found in them.

25. The USSR, Czechoslovak, Polish and Byelorussian delegations had demonstrated the aggressive nature of the activities of the United States. That evidence had not been refuted. The terrorist and diversionist activities carried on with United States funds against the USSR and the people's republics were doomed to failure. They had already incited the population to greater vigilance in defence of its achievements and liberties.

26. The Ukrainian delegation supported the Czechoslovak draft resolution (A/C.1/L.34) condemning the subversive and espionage activities carried on by the United States against the USSR and the people's republics and recommending the United States to take action to have the Acts in question repealed.

27. Mr. LODGE (United States of America) said that far from being illegal or aggressive the programme of helping escapees from the people's republics and the USSR was fundamentally humane and was inspired by the spirit of the Charter. It was part of a general programme for the defence of the free world. The United States had been compelled to adopt such measures because of the attitude of the Soviet Union. If people were not attempting every day to escape from the USSR and the people's republics, there would be no need to help them. Furthermore, if the USSR were not supporting local wars, as in Korea, there would be no need for a military aid programme or for collective action. It was not the United States

or the United Nations which was forcing people to leave the people's republics, nor was it the United States which was sponsoring wars of aggression. At the end of the Second World War the United States had disarmed. The confidence which the United States leaders had at that time placed in their new ally was currently seen to have been a grave miscalculation, since the Soviet Union had remained armed to the teeth.

28. The United States asked nothing more than to live in peace, and it was the Soviet Union which had compelled the United States to take action to frustrate the establishment of dictatorships throughout the world. If the USSR leaders wished to discover why subversive activities were being carried on within their borders, they had only to look for the cause in their laws, doctrines and their practices of oppression. Those doctrines were the centrifugal force which drove people out through the Iron Curtain in search of freedom and which also sent aggressive armies reaching out beyond the Iron Curtain to Korea and Southeast Asia and threatening Central and Western Europe.

29. The Mutual Security Act had a twofold purpose: to afford asylum to the escapees and to put a halt to Soviet aggression. Of the \$100 million authorized under the Kersten amendment 95 per cent was devoted to the defence of the free world. The remaining 5 per cent went to assist persons fleeing the people's democracies. The USSR leaders regarded the programme as aggressive because their hypersensitiveness led them to imagine all sorts of threats against them. That was why, if they considered it necessary, they shot down unarmed foreign aircraft or signed a pact with Hitler, regardless of the unfavourable repercussions of their acts. Those repercussions must, however, disturb them since they weakened their pretensions to being the champions of peace and humanity. But they were willing to make sacrifices in that regard in order to protect their power interests.

30. The Soviet Union maintained its tyrannical power by preventing its nationals from communicating freely with the outside world. Under the Soviet Penal Code, the family of any person leaving the territory would be punished. It was forbidden to send uncensored communications abroad. Soviet nationals married to aliens could not leave the territory of the Soviet Union and government officials were usually not authorized to speak to strangers. Soviet occupation troops stationed abroad were quarantined and could not fraternize with the local population. Moreover, foreigners were unable to visit the USSR freely. Only diplomats, a few newspapermen, certain businessmen and specially invited delegations were permitted to enter the Soviet Union. The movements of diplomats were severely limited and restrictions of all kinds were imposed on them. Newspapermen had to confine themselves to reporting what appeared in the Soviet Press. Selected foreign delegations were shepherded about on prearranged tours. Moreover, the USSR published only very general information on the various aspects of Soviet domestic life, so as to prevent the world from seeing what Soviet life was really like. On the other hand, it attempted through skilful propaganda to portray the Soviet Union in glowing terms while dwelling on unfavourable conditions in non-communist States. The security and propaganda measures taken by the USSR showed how sensitive its leaders were where

foreign scrutiny was concerned. They betrayed their fear when one of their nationals attempted to flee the country. In such cases they did not hesitate to murder or kidnap the person. It would be recalled, for example, that in 1948 the USSR Consul-General in New York had attempted to kidnap a Soviet school-teacher who was unwilling to return to the USSR. The kidnapping of Dr. Linse in Berlin the previous summer by the East German authorities was merely one instance of a practice common to communist authorities along the frontier dividing the West from the people's republics.

31. Such incidents threw light on communist unwillingness to allow prisoners of war to decide whether or not they wished to be repatriated. From the USSR leader's viewpoint, Soviet troops taken prisoner had without question to be repatriated to the Soviet Union, yet no foreign soldiers or civilians held captive in the USSR could be sent home. For example, 3,000 Greek soldiers and several thousand Greek children, thousands of Austrians, 63,000 Italians, more than 300,000 Japanese and in all likelihood upwards of 98,000 German soldiers were being held captive in the USSR, while a number of German civilians were still being detained in Czechoslovakia and Poland. The USSR leaders could not admit that an individual could prefer freedom to Soviet tyranny. They therefore pretended when assistance was given to political refugees from the people's republics that it was an act of aggression and staged show-trials of so-called traitors in order to counteract the effect produced by those who had chosen freedom, or merely to liquidate a number of persons who had fallen into disfavour.

32. While he did not propose to dwell on Soviet persecution of Christians, Moslems and Jews, or to examine the persecution of non-Russian ethnic groups, he felt bound to mention the massacre of 4,000 Polish officers in the Katyn forest early in the Second World War. Those officers had committed two crimes, that of having defended their country against the Soviet invader and that of having been taken prisoner. It was only in 1943 that Nazi Germany had announced the discovery of the mass graves at Katyn. At that time it was thought that the crime might well have been committed by the Nazis themselves. Doubts had remained, however, and many Poles residing in the United States had demanded an inquiry. In 1951, the United States House of Representatives had established a Select Committee to study the facts and circumstances of the Katyn massacre. That Committee had established that responsibility for the massacre lay with the USSR, and the NKVD in particular. Its findings were of particular importance as they drew attention to a policy contradictory to the principle of the dignity of the human person expressed in the preamble to the United Nations Charter.

33. Another aspect of Soviet Union tyranny over non-Russian ethnic groups was illustrated by Soviet colonial policy in Central Asia. The USSR leaders had sent so many thousands of Slav colonists to those regions that in some cases they outnumbered the local population. The local leaders were usually Slavs. For example, in 1948, the proportion of local inhabitants employed in eight local enterprises in Kazakhstan had varied from 2 to 14 per cent. Doctor Riaz Ali Shah, a Pakistani tuberculosis specialist, who had visited Central Asia in 1952 at the invitation of the Soviet Government, had reported that in Tashkent, Russians

occupied many more government posts than the local inhabitants. One might wonder how long it would take before all the best jobs in China were also taken by Russians, leaving the Chinese in a position similar to that obtaining in the earliest days of colonialism.

34. He had sketched that picture of Soviet tyranny in order better to explain the reasons which impelled thousands of persons to leave their homes in an effort to regain their freedom. The world might well ask how long that oppression would continue to endure. There was no need for a hasty answer to that question in view of its importance, but the world was entitled to expect a reply. Perhaps Mr. Vyshinsky would bring that reply with him.

35. In the interim, he would like to know what plans the Czechoslovak Government had for William Oatis, the courageous United States newspaperman who was still imprisoned in Czechoslovakia. He wondered whether the USSR delegation was informed of the fate the Chinese authorities had in store for the hundred-odd Americans detained in China. The United States Government had been informed that five of its nationals had already died as a result of ill-treatment, that at least twenty-eight had been imprisoned, and that four others had been arrested. On 21 March 1953, three more Americans had been abducted by the Chinese from a yacht off Hong Kong. The United States would like to have answers to those questions.

36. The matter before the Committee was to ascertain whether the United States, by assisting escapees from the people's republics, was engaged in acts of aggression and interfering in the internal affairs of other States. Plainly the only aspect of the escapee question which merited condemnation was that the world should be so organized that there were any escapees at all. On the other hand, the free peoples of the world could not abandon the victims of Soviet tyranny. Assistance to those escapees could only cease when the escapees stopped coming, in other words, when the USSR leaders permitted their peoples to live their own lives in their own way.

37. So long as escapees continued to come, it was a humanitarian duty to assist them. It was also a duty imposed by the United Nations Charter, which was fundamentally an undertaking to safeguard freedom. The Mutual Security programme would come to an end with the disappearance of the threat of aggression against the United States and the free world as a whole. The United States preferred peaceful negotiations to an armaments race. It longed for the day when honest negotiations could be undertaken and it was prepared at any time to meet the Soviet Union halfway.

38. Mr. THORS (Iceland) pointed out that the United States representative had stated that over 95 per cent of the \$100 million appropriated under the Mutual Security Act had been apportioned for a military and economic fund to help free nations stay free, and that the balance, about 5 per cent, was to be used to help escapees from the Iron Curtain countries. The escapees were stateless persons who had fled to seek liberty in the democratic world. They were helpless and penniless. The means provided under the Mutual Security Act had made it possible to reintegrate many of them into a new life. More than 2,500 had already been settled in thirty-one countries outside Europe. Why should such humanitarian activities be

halted? On the contrary, gratitude should be felt towards the United States Government for its endeavours in that and so many other spheres, and it was to be hoped that those activities could be continued in the years to come.

39. It was strange that those who accused the United States of spying, subversive activities and interference in the internal affairs of other States were the leaders of the communist world, which sponsored a fifth column in all the democratic countries. The communist parties in those countries were encouraged, and even paid, to create trouble, hamper economic life and overthrow the governments. In the autumn of 1952, the Kremlin had given orders to Communists to endeavour to infiltrate into the governments of the democratic countries. Yet, in the First Committee, the representatives of the Kremlin spoke in moving terms of their desire to maintain international peace and develop friendly relations among nations. Their campaign of hatred against the United States seemed little suited to promote such relations. In the circumstances it was difficult to take their professions of faith seriously. A report on the number of communist spies arrested to date would make a very lengthy document.

40. The Mutual Security Act of 1951 had replaced the Economic Co-operation Act of 1948. In 1948, Czechoslovakia had decided to participate in the Marshall Plan, but its representatives had been called to Moscow and requested not to do so. Phrases such as "flagrant interference" were surprising when they came from representatives of the communist leaders who had engineered the 1948 *coup d'état*.

41. Iceland had felt the benefit of the assistance granted by the United States under the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, known as the Marshall Plan. In the course of the negotiations on the subject between the Governments of Iceland and the United States, the latter had taken into account all the requests for the amendment of the agreement which the Icelandic Government had felt it necessary to submit. Speaking of the Plan on 5 June 1947, General Marshall had said that it was directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Hands were stretched out to all former allies and also to the conquered. The USSR had refused the offer and prevented its satellites from accepting it. Between 1948 and February 1953, the United States had spent \$14,400,000 on European recovery. As far as Iceland was concerned, the benefits of the Marshall Plan had enabled it to face the future with confidence. No angry words, abuse or propaganda could eradicate the glowing tale of Marshall Plan aid from the pages of European history. The Icelandic delegation considered that humanitarian aid should be encouraged, regardless of its origin. It would therefore vote against the Czechoslovak draft resolution, the effect of which was to condemn United States aid in a field where it was much needed.

42. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) believed that the debate had taken a turn which the United States representative had not expected. The New York Press had forecast that the United States representative would make a revealing statement which would demolish all the Soviet accusations. However, when Mr. Lodge had made his statement, which was to have been sensational, it had in fact fallen flat. All the

members of the Committee recognized that Czechoslovakia's accusation was based on undeniable facts. So the representatives of countries friendly to the United States had been asked to drown the facts in a flood of speeches on extraneous subjects. Consequently, no one had been surprised at hearing a number of representatives describe in detail how United States aid had helped in improving economic conditions in their countries. In addition, the Committee had heard the usual charges concerning the relations between the people's democracies and in particular between those countries and the USSR. The only surprise had been provided by the United Kingdom representative, who had been assigned a lamentable part in the debate. His speech had been full of fairy-tales and one wondered whether there was some connexion between it and the recent visit to London of Marshal Tito, the "specialist" on Soviet problems.

43. The United States representative, for his part, had not even attempted to deny a single one of the concrete facts produced. He had launched into digressions, acting on directives from President Eisenhower's present adviser on psychological warfare, Mr. Charles D. Jackson, who, in a speech at Princeton, had said that the United States, after having laughed at Goebbels, Hitler and Mussolini, had now found itself obliged to set up a propaganda service, for the truth was not enough unless supported by hard-cash arguments and propaganda. Following those principles, the United States representative had endeavoured to bring out from his arsenal of lies and slander anything which seemed likely to serve his purpose. He had spoken of the composition of Central Asian governments, and of students in Central Asian medical academies, thus confirming the fact that Central Asia had a medical academy. He had spoken of freedom, terror and the difficulty of obtaining information on what went on in the USSR. It would be easy to refute all those arguments: something could be said about what was happening in the United States in the matter of freedom, about the situation in which any peace-loving person found himself there, about the activities of the McCarran Committee and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and everything that showed what the famous American democracy really was. Mention could be made of the difficulties experienced by certain Polish journalists wishing to enter the United States, especially the Polish journalist accredited to the United Nations, who was still waiting for a visa although the General Assembly was approaching its end.

44. He felt bound, however, to emphasize that one particular passage in the United States representative's statement, the passage relating to the Katyn massacre, was a despicable piece of slander. The massacre had been perpetrated by Hitlerite Germany in order to create dissension among the Allies during the war. It had later been proved by impartial witnesses at the Nürnberg trials to have been committed by Hitler's armies. Nevertheless, a committee of the United States Congress had been appointed and, with the help of a few gangsters as anonymous witnesses, it had produced fantastic statements, on the basis of which the verdict had been pronounced. However, a lie would always remain a lie even when wrapped in the American flag. Nevertheless, it was regrettable that the Committee should have been brought so low that lies fabricated by Hitler could be repeated in that forum.

The wives and children of the Katyn victims had been revolted to hear that their sufferings were being used as propaganda against their own country.

45. The United States representative had resorted to arguments of that kind because he did not know how to refute the charges of interference in the affairs of other States brought against his Government. The text of the Mutual Security Act left no doubt in the matter. The Act referred to the grant of assistance to persons who were residing in, or were escapees from, the USSR or Poland. What kind of assistance was meant? Mr. Lodge had not explained that. Was it a question of sending them Christmas gifts? Various speakers had talked of assistance to refugees and had tried to cloak the undertaking in humanitarian garb. Since when had the formation of national military units been considered as assistance to refugees? Its true purpose was preparation for the crime of aggression.

46. An exchange of views which had taken place between Representatives Kersten and Vorys during the discussion in the House of Representatives on the Mutual Security Programme made it clear that the intention was to establish a Polish legion which would be integrated into the European army. That arrangement, it had been said, would prove to be profitable or would at least represent a saving, as the members of that legion would be paid less and would wear cheaper uniforms than American soldiers. Mr. Vorys's explanation clearly showed that it was not a question of assisting refugees but of enabling Polish citizens to fight for the United States cause.

47. Mr. Lodge had not denied the existence of an American plan of operations in Poland known as the Vulcan Plan. Nor had he denied that an aircraft had left Wiesbaden on 24 November 1952 and had dropped two parachutists in Polish territory. He had not denied that training centres, the location of which had been given by the Polish representative, had been set up in Germany. His silence could only be interpreted as an attempt to conceal the truth.

48. The truth was that since the advent of the people's democratic systems of government in Eastern Europe, the United States had tried to undermine them by every possible means. Instead of pursuing such activities, those who sincerely desired peace should study that new form of government. They would then understand that the governments of the people's democracies enjoyed the support of the masses and that it was because of that support that they were able to carry out their great plan for economic development. That support also gave them the necessary strength to combat all political and economic pressure and enabled them to discover immediately any attempt at infiltration.

49. In the period between the two wars, stories had been told about the alleged weakness of the USSR. Some, like Hitler, had fallen victims to their own propaganda. They had hoped to find allies within the USSR. The same disappointment awaited all those who still believed that they would find, in the countries which had freed themselves from foreign oppression, people ready to welcome an army of occupation. They saw Poland and other countries of the people's democracies as they were painted by a few emigrants in the pay of the State Department. Several of the persons mentioned by Mr. Lodge had been convicted by

the courts of their own countries; others feared the punishment which awaited them for crimes which they had committed either recently or during the last war, or between the two wars; still others were former exploiters who, rather than earn their daily bread by working, preferred to live off the State Department. A criminal needed only to say that he disagreed with the system of government in force in his country to become a political refugee, a hero of the new world mentioned by Mr. Lodge. Those persons represented nothing but their own pockets, their nostalgic dreams of returning to power. Their only hope was a third world war. In those circumstances it might be asked whether it was possible that there were still some who wished to support the warlike programme of the United States in order to assist a few worthless emigrants to regain power. It was deplorable and surprising to see such a great country sink to such base methods of propaganda.

50. The United Kingdom and United States representatives, as well as others, had tried to give the impression that refugees were going only from East to West. It would be well to recall, in that connexion, the case of the two agents who, on learning what the United States wanted of them, gave themselves up to the Polish authorities along with the sum of \$1,160,200 which they had been paid to act against their own country. Hundreds of men and women resident abroad had also given themselves up to the authorities shortly after the United States propaganda had begun to reveal American intentions towards Poland. Polish refugees had also been prevented from re-entering their country, hundreds of others had been forcibly deported to various countries, thousands had been forced to exchange their Polish passports for passports issued by the International Refugee Organization. Further, Polish repatriation missions had been refused access to refugee camps. There was even a provision whereby United States courts had the right to decide whether Polish children should be returned to their parents in Poland or whether it was better to send them elsewhere. He mentioned three cases in which the United States courts had decided against returning a child to its parents in Poland.

51. Whenever a statement by a highly-placed American citizen was mentioned, the United States representative replied that it was the expression of a private, not an official, opinion. Similar tactics would doubtless be used as regards the composition of an organization whose purpose was espionage and sabotage in Poland—the National Committee for a Free Europe, which included Mr. Joseph Grew, former Ambassador to Tokyo, former Under-Secretary of State, former member of the Atomic Energy Commission; General Eisenhower, then commanding the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Mr. Arthur Bliss Lane, former United States Ambassador to Poland; Mr. William Donovan, known for his espionage work all over Europe; Mr. Allen Dulles, head of the Central Information Agency; and Mr. James Farley of the Coca-Cola Company. That Committee was supposed to keep in touch with a political council which was acting clandestinely in Poland. It had been proved that the National Committee for a Free Europe was to receive all data obtained in Poland by the political council in question. Could it be seriously contended that that Committee was composed of private individuals? Was

it necessary also to recall that the Secretary of State himself had sent that Committee a letter assuring it of his support? Had the Secretary of State written that letter in his private capacity? At that rate, one might begin to wonder whether anyone at all in the United States could be considered as an official person. Recalling what he had said at the 585th meeting about the book written by Mr. Stanton Griffis, former United States Ambassador to Warsaw, he quoted extracts from the diary of General Grow, former United States military attaché at Moscow, showing that he had then been of the opinion that the United States should strike at the USSR as soon as possible. The authenticity of General Grow's diary had never been denied by the United States Government. The General had in fact been court-martialled and found guilty and later United States military attachés had been ordered not to keep diaries.

52. The United Kingdom representative had asked what the West could do. The problem was a much greater one: it was to know what all the members of the First Committee could do. The problem had been placed before the Committee in the hope that the United States would revoke the Mutual Security Act and thus prove that it was ready to co-operate in the work of peace. By adopting the Czechoslovak draft resolution the Committee would show that the United Nations was opposed to any interference in the domestic affairs of States and was ready to defend the principles of the Charter.

53. Mr. DE SOUZA GOMES (Brazil) said that not one new fact or argument had been adduced in support of the Czechoslovak draft resolution. That draft had been submitted for propaganda reasons and its aim was to provide communist parties in the various

countries with new pretexts and catchwords in their activities.

54. The aggressive attitude of the USSR and Polish representatives was all the more shocking at a time when some were trying to find a constructive meaning in the speeches made by the new persons in power in Moscow. Such recent manifestations of hatred and violent attacks would only worsen the present tension. They were certainly not measures to ward off the threat of a new war and to consolidate peace and friendship between peoples, and they contradicted the text of another item added to the agenda of the present session by one of the members of the Soviet bloc. The solution of all pending problems would be greatly facilitated if a new attitude was adopted by the USSR and the States under its political influence.

55. Without wishing to enter into any discussion of the substance of those problems, he desired to draw attention to the refusal of the USSR to co-operate in solving the problem of the prisoners of the last war. The General Assembly, at its 415th plenary meeting, had dealt with the question of the fate of members of the Greek armed forces held in certain countries to the north of Greece. Another problem was that of the Italian prisoners numbering approximately 63,000 who were detained in the USSR. The Soviet Union Government had turned a deaf ear to all appeals that such prisoners should be returned to their families or to their country. Such problems were not insoluble, but their solution depended on a minimum of goodwill and a sincere wish to co-operate. The word "peace" should not be used as a *leit-motiv* in revolutionary propaganda aims. It should not be used to hide the intention to prevent peaceful co-operation between peoples.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.