

GENERAL
ASSEMBLY

SEVENTH SESSION

Official Records



FIRST COMMITTEE, 576th

MEETING

Monday, 16 March 1953, at 3 p.m.

Headquarters, New York

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Chairman: Mr. João Carlos MUNIZ (Brazil).

Methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter: report of the Collective Measures Committee (A/2215, A/C.1/L.27) (*concluded*)
[Item 18]*

1. Mr. CASSIERS (Belgium), referring to the draft resolution of which his delegation was a co-sponsor (A/C.1/L.27) and which proposed the continuation of the Collective Measures Committee for a limited period of time, said that the sole objective of that Committee was the formulation of preparatory measures designed to facilitate the implementation of any future collective action with which Members of the United Nations would freely consent to associate themselves in the event of a recommendation by the General Assembly or a decision of the Security Council. The Committee had been created in order to study methods which could be used to maintain and strengthen peace and security in conformity with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter. After one year of work, the Committee had been prolonged by resolution 503 A (VI). During its second year, the Committee had studied more thoroughly certain particular problems of a United Nations collective security system, as outlined in its first report (A/1891). The first report had set forth the principles without which such a system could not be set up and the second report (A/2215) dealt with certain problems in greater detail and completed the conclusions of the first. As other delegations had already analysed the second report, Mr. Cassiers would confine himself to certain specific points.

2. In its first report, the Committee had recommended the preparation of check lists of items which might be the subject of partial embargoes. Such lists would help the Security Council or the General Assembly to determine speedily what articles might be embargoed in any given case. They would also serve to diminish the problems of nomenclature and classification and

so reduce the time required for the effective application of an embargo. By setting forth, in its second report, the list of arms, ammunition and implements of war, as well as the list of articles of strategic importance which might be subjected to embargo, the Committee had made a constructive contribution to the preparation of collective action. The lists were the more useful because they indicated the items of strategic importance which were of particular importance in any case of aggression. Thus the Committee's work would facilitate any decisions necessary in the event of aggression.

3. In the opinion of the Belgian delegation, that was an example of the kind of preparatory work for which the Committee had been established. Its real function was to suggest measures and procedures for the better implementation of collective security. Its competence did not include the definition of obligations which would fall upon States.

4. With regard to future studies of the Committee, there were at least two questions upon which further work was necessary. First, there was the question of the recruitment of a United Nations volunteer reserve, in accordance with the proposals of the Secretary-General. The other problem was that of the equitable sharing of the burdens, both military and financial, involved in collective security. In proposing that the Committee should reconsider that difficult matter, the Belgian delegation shared the views expressed at the 573rd and 574th meetings by the representatives of Australia, Brazil, Canada and New Zealand.

5. It was, perhaps, unnecessary to speak of Belgium's devotion to the idea of collective security, but Mr. Cassiers wished nevertheless to reaffirm that devotion. Belgium's fidelity to that principle was witnessed by its contribution in Korea where its forces had recently again been enlarged. Belgium remained convinced that the primary purpose of the United Nations was the maintenance of peace and security, in other words, the prevention and, if necessary, the suppression of aggression.

6. Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador) recalled that the Collective Measures Committee had been established

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

by resolution 377 A (V), entitled "Uniting for peace", and that its first report had been considered at the sixth session of the General Assembly. During the debates at that session, time had been wasted in refuting the arguments of the USSR bloc against the "Uniting for peace" resolution and the Committee's report. It had, however, wisely been decided that the General Assembly was competent to discuss matters relating to peace and security within the provisions of the Charter, except when the Security Council was actually exercising its primary jurisdiction. In the present discussion, it had been possible to pay greater attention to the report of the Committee and to the eleven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.27), without polemics.

7. The report was most important as it marked a further step toward the maintenance of international peace and security. The Charter called for an effective system of collective security to maintain peace by forestalling aggression as well as by taking remedial action. According to the Charter, that system would be completed by the provisions of Article 43. As, however, the agreements mentioned in that Article had not yet been drawn up, it was necessary to consider appropriate measures, so that it would not be necessary to improvise, as had been done in the case of Korea.

8. In its first report (A/1891), the Committee had stated that its studies had been concentrated on possible methods and procedures for co-ordinating national and international action in regard to collective measures, and that that involved consideration of steps that could be taken in advance, as well as arrangements which might be made after collective measures had been decided upon. Different types of measures—political, military, economic and financial—had been considered, but they had not been studied exhaustively. For example, the question of equitable sharing of the burdens required further study. The delegation of El Salvador would therefore support the eleven-Power draft resolution. It might, however, have certain drafting changes to suggest to the sponsors in connexion with the Spanish text.

9. Ato ZAUDE (Ethiopia) said that his country had been intimately associated with the principles of collective security and continued to be a supporter of those principles. It was, therefore, appropriate for the Ethiopian delegation to express its views on measures which might be taken to strengthen the system. Other representatives had analysed the matter in detail and Ato Zaude would only touch upon certain of the historical aspects as a background to the present development.

10. Not only was Ethiopia represented in Korea, but it was at its instance that the first study of collective security had been undertaken seventeen years earlier by a committee of the League of Nations. The interdependence of all factors involved had been clearly shown at that early date by the fact that the failure to adopt effective decisions regarding a single commodity such as petroleum had been sufficient to render ineffective all other measures. The failure to obtain integral application of the principle had led to the downfall of the first attempt to apply collective security. Thereafter the League had confined itself to vain exhortations.

11. The language of the preamble of the Charter reflected the bitter experience of war and the United Nations had been founded in order to provide effective machinery for maintaining peace and for removing the economic and social causes of war. Already the experience of the United Nations showed the complexities of the problem. Much progress had, however, been achieved, and over a third of the Member States were actively contributing armed forces and materials to the suppression of aggression in Korea. The Security Council, on the other hand, now found itself powerless to act, although it bore the primary responsibility. The United Nations had therefore sought other means for devising an integrated and realistic programme.

12. The Collective Measures Committee had already accomplished useful work, but there were matters which called for further study. In the "Uniting for peace" resolution, Member States had been called upon to hold national units in readiness for service as United Nations units. The proposals of the Secretary-General with regard to a volunteer reserve might make for duplication and entail additional contributions; they should therefore be examined further. The Ethiopian delegation believed that the Committee should explore all avenues for the preservation of peace through the collaboration of all Members. The creation of machinery alone could not achieve the purposes of the Charter. The Ethiopian delegation would accordingly vote in favour of the eleven-Power draft resolution.

13. Mr. TINE (France) said that he had only certain general remarks to make with regard to the report. The Committee had been modest and patient and had kept within the limits of its instructions; it had laid down no doctrine, but had been guided by the view that it was for the General Assembly or the Security Council to choose the measures appropriate in any particular case. In its conclusions concerning the sharing of the burdens, the Committee had given evidence of its realism by not allowing itself to be tempted to try to formula specific criteria; it had been wise to observe that each case would require its own methods. The French Government agreed that the burdens should be equitably shared in every respect and that economic sanctions should be supplemented by mutual assistance in accordance with Articles 49 and 50 of the Charter.

14. Further evidence of the Committee's realism were the lists of arms and strategic items which it had drawn up and which would be available for consultation by the Council and the Assembly in the event of the application of a partial embargo. Neither of those lists was intended to be absolutely final; they were intended to be used for reference purposes. It should be noted that the list of arms, ammunition and implements of war was normally designed for universal and immediate application, whereas the lists contained in annex I were of a different character. In the event of aggression, the list of materials considered to be of strategic importance would of course usually have to be taken into account as well as the list of arms, but its application, though normally universal, would depend on many factors arising out of the circumstances of each individual case, as would the application of the third list drawn up by the Committee (annex I.2). The various lists would ensure

both the necessary uniformity and the necessary promptness in the implementation of any action taken. Lastly, it would, in the final analysis, be the Security Council and the General Assembly which laid down the precise measures to be taken in any embargo.

15. More work should perhaps be done on the section concerning the activities of the specialized agencies, but, if so, it should always be kept in mind that it was for each agency to decide the nature and extent of its participation in collective measures in accordance with its own constitutional procedures.

16. Further work on the question of a United Nations volunteer reserve might also be of value, but that problem should be approached with the greatest caution. Other unfinished studies noted in the draft resolution should also be continued. The Collective Measures Committee was, however, a temporary and deliberative body and not a permanent executive body. The General Assembly would have to decide at its ninth session whether it would be continued. In the meantime, the Committee would examine information voluntarily transmitted by States, but there should be no investigation or directives to States.

17. The Committee had performed fruitful work in that it had clarified the possibilities of collective action within the United Nations and had drawn attention to the problems of collective security. It had also encouraged governments to examine their administrations with a view to possible participation in collective measures.

18. Those activities had been carried out within the terms of the Charter and had led to nothing in the way of military alliances. The objections raised by the Polish and Czechoslovak representatives were irrelevant. There was no intention to substitute the General Assembly for the Security Council, which alone could take decisions that would be binding upon Member States. If, however, the Security Council were paralysed, the General Assembly could not shrink from making recommendations, but those recommendations would not be binding on Member States. The Collective Measures Committee had been instructed to study measures to be applied either by the Security Council or the General Assembly so that there would be no need for hasty improvisation. The Committee was quite the opposite of an obstacle to the Security Council.

19. France believed that unanimity was necessary for a decision on collective measures which would make action obligatory. However, if the Security Council could not function and the forces provided for in Article 43 did not exist, there should be means for the Organization to act. It was true that the co-operation of the great Powers offered the best guarantee of peace. However, the provisions for unanimity, if abused, could ensure impunity for an aggressor. There was a need for a collective security system and it was the duty of each State to participate in it and not to rely upon others. While there was a long way still to go, the Collective Measures Committee had taken a step in the right direction. The General Assembly should recognize that fact by giving unanimous support to the draft resolution.

20. Mr. ORTEGA MASSON (Chile) recalled that at the time of adoption of the "Uniting for peace"

resolution, Member States had been urged to take further steps to ensure economic and social progress throughout the world, particularly in the underdeveloped areas. The General Assembly was well aware that a stable peace could not rest on pacts alone. The Secretary-General also, in his seventh annual report (A/2141), had drawn attention to national aspirations in Africa and Asia and had observed that the strength of the free world did not depend on arms alone. On other occasions, too, it had been stressed that peace was not only a question of international security but of the implementation of the other Purposes and Principles of the Charter. Mr. Ortega Masson referred to statements by representatives of the United States concerning the problems arising out of hunger and need. The consensus appeared to be that the economic and social provisions of the Charter were a part of the whole and accordingly that collective measures should be based upon them if they were to be workable.

21. The Collective Measures Committee, however, seemed to believe that political and military measures alone could be applied. No doubt the increase in armaments had improved the outlook of many nations but it had also increased their burdens and was the greatest cause of such economic difficulties as inflation, deficits and high taxes. The Chilean delegation expressed the hope that those matters would be considered by the Committee and that it would make recommendations on those topics in its future report.

22. Mr. ASHA (Syria) stated that any action taken by the General Assembly in connexion with collective measures should be in accordance with its competence and jurisdiction as laid down in the Charter. Articles 10, 11 and 12 gave the General Assembly the power of recommendation only. Mr. Asha recalled the Arab-Asian amendment (A/C.1/690) proposed at the sixth session to the effect that no measure should be given effect on the territory of any State except with the consent of the State concerned. In voting for the eleven-Power draft resolution, the Syrian delegation would understand a similar reservation to be implied. Syria also made a reservation similar to that made by the representative of Egypt at the 575th meeting, to the effect that a vote in favour of the draft resolution would not impair its attitude to the Arab defence treaty. Mr. Asha also wished to recall the statement of the Syrian representative in the First Committee at the sixth session (480th meeting), that no system should be erected for any region without the consent of the nation concerned. With the foregoing reservations, the Syrian delegation would vote for the draft resolution.

23. Mr. SALAZAR (Dominican Republic) said his delegation favoured all measures which would strengthen a system of collective security since it was convinced that aggression could only be discouraged by a system for the application of coercive action. It would therefore vote for the eleven-Power draft resolution, which would constitute another step forward. That draft resolution properly reflected the conclusions of the Collective Measures Committee as set forth in its second report, and that Committee was the appropriate body to continue the study.

24. To be effective, a system required support from the maximum number of Member States so that their military and economic strength might be organized

for mutual assistance. That was the only way to resist aggression. It was to be hoped that the United Nations would arrive at a system of collective security in accordance with the Charter which would enable the United Nations to fulfil its main purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

25. Mr. ALIREZA (Saudi Arabia) said his delegation recognized the competence of the General Assembly in matters relating to international peace and security but had the impression that the eleven-Power draft resolution implicitly empowered the General Assembly to go beyond Articles 10, 11 and 12, which defined its powers. Mr. Alireza shared the Indian view that the primary aim of the United Nations was to settle situations by peaceful means and not to add elements to international tension. He desired, however, to co-operate in constructive methods which might lead to an effective system of collective security. The Arab States had established a regional arrangement in that spirit and Mr. Alireza interpreted the draft resolution as another effort to strengthen the collective security system. However, no recognition could be given to any provision allowing the General Assembly to take measures beyond the powers granted by the Charter or to initiate measures in any State without its consent. Moreover, neither the economy nor the armed forces of Saudi Arabia would be affected by the draft resolution and its efforts would be limited by its potentialities. Saudi Arabia would not be committed to any of the measures recommended in the draft resolution, nor could that draft resolution be construed as calling upon Saudi Arabia to take any action contrary to the Arab defence pact.

26. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru), referring to the argument that the "Uniting for peace" resolution was illegal, recalled that from the outset many delegations had not thought that complete unanimity was possible. From the time of San Francisco, Peru had taken the position that the General Assembly could not be made impotent by the paralysis of the Security Council, for the Assembly had definite responsibilities under the Charter. The collective measures proposed were not offered as a substitute for the Security Council but in order to co-operate with it. The Security Council might act through the Military Staff Committee or through consultation with States, but the Military Staff Committee was not functioning and no agreements had come into being. That system, however, was not replaced by the present proposals.

27. There was a general recognition of the obligation of States to assist with their economic and military resources in the interests of collective security. That obligation varied, however, according to the geographical location and power of each State. Only a nation itself could judge the scope of the political, military or economic aid it would give. At the time of the "Uniting for peace" resolution, the Peruvian delegation had observed that each nation should act in accordance with its constitutional processes when disposing of its national resources.

28. One of the problems of collective measures was the organizing of a co-ordinating body. Mr. Belaúnde was pleased to observe that, in its second report, the Committee had referred to the need for such a body. There was a further matter which the Committee ought to study, namely, the problems of peaceful set-

tlement with a view to preventing conflicts. If the Security Council were paralysed, the General Assembly ought to take such action. There was, moreover, the question of raising living standards in order to eliminate the causes of war. Mr. Belaúnde agreed that the Committee should study preventive as well as punitive measures.

29. The Collective Measures Committee could not act to limit the jurisdiction or the tasks of any regional arrangements. Nor was there any incompatibility between regional and general obligations. The problem was how to co-ordinate the two. It was the duty of the General Assembly to promote and encourage regional arrangements and provide for their co-ordination.

30. Mr. KHALIDY (Iraq) said that his country was involved in a situation in the Middle East created by the existence of a State with aggressive and expansionist aims and could therefore not accept any provisions that would work in favour of that State at the expense of others in the area. Moreover, nothing might be done under the terms of the draft resolution except with the consent of the States concerned. Finally, nothing in the draft resolution should be construed as limiting the Arab defence pact. With those reservations, the Iraqi delegation would vote for the eleven-Power draft resolution.

31. Mr. AZKOUL (Lebanon) said that his delegation, in voting for the eleven-Power draft resolution, wished to be on record as making the same reservation as the other Arab States.

32. The CHAIRMAN put the eleven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.27) to the vote.

The draft resolution was adopted by 52 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions.

33. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), in explaining the negative vote cast by his delegation, recalled that, in the course of the sixth session, the USSR representative had pointed out that the Collective Measures Committee had been meant to replace the Security Council, to which the Charter had entrusted the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. As was evident from the second report of the Committee, such questions as the consideration of a list of armaments and of so-called strategic materials, including equipment necessary for normal economic development, were to be subjected to embargo for the obvious purpose of organizing an economic blockade of the USSR, the People's Republic of China and the peoples' democracies. Moreover, the study of questions such as the equitable sharing of expenditures connected with the application of collective measures, the question of mobilizing the specialized agencies for participation in political, military and economic sanctions, the question of the volunteer reserve, and the question of the establishment of a group of military experts to counter-balance the Military Staff Committee demonstrated the fact that the Committee had openly violated the basic provisions of the Charter in dealing with questions which normally fell within the jurisdiction of the Security Council and its Military Staff Committee.

34. In their statements to the Committee, the representatives of countries like Australia, the United

Kingdom, Brazil, the United States, Canada, France and others, had attempted to justify the illegal activity of the Committee by alleging that the Security Council did not possess the necessary means of discharging its responsibility for collective action provided for in Article 43 of the Charter. Moreover, they had contended that the rule of unanimity had been an obstacle to the normal functioning of the Security Council. His delegation believed that all those arguments were groundless. It was not the rule of unanimity which had prevented the Security Council from functioning normally, but the constant attempts of the United States and its supporters to circumvent the Council and to carry out their military plans under the flag of the United Nations. It had been in San Francisco that the final settlement had been reached concerning the need for unanimity of action on the part of permanent members of the Security Council as the primary condition for the normal functioning of the United Nations. In the circumstances, it was important to recall that as early as 1944, Generalissimo Stalin had said that United Nations actions would be ineffective unless the great Powers acted in a unanimous spirit. It followed, therefore, that to strengthen the principle of collective security meant the strengthening of unanimity of action within the framework of the Security Council and the United Nations, but not in violation of the Charter. The joint draft resolution ran counter to that principle. Accordingly, the USSR delegation had voted against it.

35. Mr. TJONDRONEGORO (Indonesia) recalled that although his delegation had been in agreement with the idea that the United Nations should institute studies of measures to be taken collectively in the event of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or acts of aggression, it had abstained in the vote on resolution 503 A (VI) concerning the first report of the Collective Measures Committee. It had done so because it had felt that the purpose of the studies envisaged by that resolution had been such as to make them unlikely to contribute to the bringing about of conditions conducive to the alleviation of the prevailing tension. Those reasons were still valid, and the events which had developed since had fully justified the position taken by his delegation. His delegation had therefore abstained from voting.

36. Mr. DE LA COLINA (Mexico) explained that the Collective Measures Committee, in a communication to non-member States (A/2215, annex F), had invited those States to contribute to the collective measures taken by the United Nations. That communication had been addressed, *inter alia*, to the Spanish Government of Generalissimo Franco.

37. In view of the fact that paragraph 3 of the draft resolution just adopted referred to Member and non-member States, his delegation wished to emphasize that the invitation to non-member States mentioned in that paragraph must not be interpreted to mean an invitation to all non-member States without exception; States not able to participate in United

Nations activities by virtue of General Assembly resolutions should be excluded as those resolutions were still valid and could not be abrogated except by the General Assembly itself. His delegation believed the Collective Measures Committee would agree with that view, and had therefore supported the joint draft resolution.

38. Mr. CASTILLO ARRIOLA (Guatemala) recalled that paragraph 15 of the "Uniting for peace" resolution urged Member States to respect fully, and to intensify, joint action in co-operation with the United Nations to develop and stimulate universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms and to intensify individual and collective efforts to achieve conditions of economic stability and social progress, particularly through the development of under-developed countries. His delegation had given preference to that paragraph of the resolution because Guatemala was, as yet, economically and militarily unable to co-operate fully in collective action; it was still endeavouring to develop its economy and social system so as to be able to co-operate fully in future collective action. It was in that spirit that his delegation had, during the sixth session of the General Assembly, proposed an amendment (A/C.1/695) to paragraph 2 of the draft resolution which had become General Assembly resolution 503 A (VI), by virtue of which States had been asked to take action to the extent to which, in their judgment, their capacities permitted them to do so. In the circumstances, he wished also to recall that his delegation had supported, in the First Committee, during the sixth session, an amendment (A/C.1/689) to paragraph 3 of resolution 503 A (VI), under which Member States would be allowed to decide how much aid they could give the United Nations forces. For those reasons, his delegation had supported the draft resolution just adopted.

39. In conclusion, he wished to associate himself with the views expressed by the representative of Mexico to the effect that the Government of General Franco should not be requested to make any contribution to the proposed collective effort in view of the General Assembly resolutions prohibiting certain States from participating in the Organization's activities.

40. Mr. TARCICI (Yemen) wished to associate himself with the reservations and explanations made by the representatives of the Arab countries in the Committee.

41. Mr. JORDAAN (Union of South Africa) said that at the time of the adoption of the "Uniting for peace" resolution and of resolution 503 (VI) his delegation had stated its understanding as to what the provisions of those resolutions imposed on Member States. The eleven-Power draft resolution, especially paragraph 3, was, in his delegation's view, subject to the same understanding and interpretation as given at that time.

42. The CHAIRMAN announced the conclusion of the discussion of the item.

The meeting rose at 4.55 p.m.