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Chairman: Mr. João Carlos MUNIZ (Brazil).

Methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter: report of the Collective Measures Committee (A/2215, A/C.1/L.27) (*continued*)

[Item 18]*

1. Mr. DAVID (Czechoslovakia) said that the name of the item under discussion did not correspond to the truth, and was designed to deceive public opinion. It was well known that the illegal resolution adopted on 3 November 1950 by the General Assembly (377 A (V)), which formed the basis for the Collective Measures Committee's report (A/2215), had been proposed by the United States as an alleged measure for maintaining and strengthening international peace. The activities of the Committee and the course of international politics during the past years had completely confirmed the fact that the so-called system of collective security was an integral part of the aggressive plans and preparations carried out in the interests of the United States monopolists by the United States Government and its associates in the aggressive Atlantic bloc. Thus, it was not surprising for the United States delegation and its friends in the Committee to express a warm appreciation of that work. It must be remembered, however, that the Collective Measures Committee had been set up on the basis of an illegal resolution, which would in turn invalidate the Committee's activity.

2. Actually, the work of the Committee went counter to the basic provisions of the Charter. The authors of the report hypocritically asserted that the use of the system of collective security might be decided upon by the Security Council or the General Assembly and that collective measures involved actions which could be carried out by both organs, depending upon the decision taken by one or the other organ. Yet, it was perfectly clear that the Security Council was referred to as a mere formality in order to deceive world public

opinion. It was well known that in the Security Council, where the unanimity of the great Powers was required, the authors of the report could not count upon the adoption of any illegal resolution which would undermine the cause of international peace because of the unwavering peace policy of the Soviet Union. It was for the very purpose of circumventing the Security Council and of attempting to avoid the requirement of the unanimity of the great Powers therein, that the United States had imposed upon the United Nations an illegal resolution transferring the powers of the Security Council to the General Assembly. However, the Assembly could not undertake any action in connexion with a threat to the peace, violation of the peace or aggressive acts; such an action could not be undertaken by the Assembly itself nor could the Assembly entrust it to any other body.

3. In its first and second reports (A/1891, A/2215), the so-called Collective Measures Committee had repeatedly stressed the fact that the measures proposed by it had not been directed against any particular State or groups of States. That contention had been reiterated in the First Committee (573rd meeting) by the representatives of Australia, the United Kingdom, Brazil and the United States, who had exerted much effort to convince the members of the First Committee that the work of the Collective Measures Committee was theoretical and general, that it was concerned only with hypothetical cases of aggression and hypothetical threats to peace or violation thereof. But those hypocritical and untrue assertions could deceive no one and could not conceal the reality that collective measures were the tool of American imperialism directed against the Soviet Union, the people's democracies and international peace and security. That fact was borne out by the numerous statements of the leaders of the United States and their henchmen in the aggressive Atlantic bloc, and especially by the whole line of United States policy.

4. The establishment of the Collective Measures Committee with competence in matters which had been entrusted solely to the Security Council was a crude violation of the Charter, according to which the main

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security was entrusted to the Council. Thus, the activity of the Committee complicated and hindered the Security Council in the fulfilment of its duties and in no way helped to strengthen and consolidate peace and security. Accordingly, his delegation could not vote for the joint draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.27.

5. Mr. MUNRO (New Zealand) recalled that during the sixth session of the General Assembly his delegation, after paying a tribute to the comprehensiveness and thoroughness of the report of the Collective Measures Committee, had pointed out that the Committee might be overtaken by the law of diminishing returns; to some extent the present report of the Committee bore evidence that that word of caution had been apposite.

6. The main contribution of the Committee to the task of preparing to meet aggression by collective action had been its first report (A/1891), wherein the principles, techniques, machinery and procedures for the co-ordination of national and international measures to deal with aggression had been outlined. The present report was, to a large extent, an amplification of those topics. The New Zealand delegation realized that planning with a view to meeting hypothetical situations was an arduous task, as the process had to be built on a series of assumptions, which often lead to more doubtful secondary assumptions, and which might not, in many cases, be realized in practice. In completing its impressive analysis and survey of collective security measures, the Committee had shown, in its first report, that that difficulty could be overcome. The Committee's later activities had been less concerned with the sketching of an integral whole than with the amplification of the constituent parts. Nevertheless, the results had been useful both for the Security Council and the General Assembly.

7. His delegation wished to offer two particular comments. The first concerned the question of the volunteer reserve. It appeared from chapter III, section C, of the Committee's report that it did not consider that the Secretary-General's proposal regarding the creation of a United Nations legion could usefully be pursued for the moment, since the Committee was unable to take any decision on the merits of that proposal in terms either of its political possibilities or military feasibility. Although it was appreciated that there were difficulties in such a concept, it had seemed to his delegation to be a most important one, in the development of which more progress might have been hoped for. His delegation noted, however, that the Committee believed the proposal warranted further consideration by any continuing body that might be established by the General Assembly. The second comment concerned the suggestion made by New Zealand to the effect that the Committee might study the equitable sharing of military, financial and other assistance to be accorded to the United Nations in the case of collective action. He was glad that his Government's suggestion had received so much consideration from many representatives in the Committee. Those who had borne the brunt of the fighting in Korea could speak from experience. In the circumstances, it was a pity that a country whose forces had fought against Hitler and Napoleon was not fighting today on the side of liberty.

8. Mr. Munro further explained that in its explanatory memorandum his Government had considered it unsatisfactory and prejudicial to the development of a collective measures system that the burden of the main contribution to collective action should fall on a minority of States, as in Korea. While appreciating difficulties some Members might face in making forces available at short notice in response to the call for assistance from the United Nations, it had expressed the view that States which had made the initial contribution would be entitled to expect that their fellow Members, which had no less an interest in the fulfilment by the United Nations of its central function and which took no less a part in deciding its policy, should make all haste to supply their own quota of forces. His Government had also expressed its serious concern at the development of a situation in which those Members of the United Nations providing military forces for a collective action were also required to bear unaided the whole financial burden of the military effort, including paying in full for services and facilities supplied by States not contributing to the action. In such circumstances, Member States which accepted the risks and casualties of participation were also placed at a grave financial disadvantage as compared with other Members which, while supporting the collective action, did not contribute forces to it. That disadvantage was increased by the loss or damage of valuable equipment, and other incidents inevitable in the conduct of military operations. The New Zealand memorandum, while taking it for granted that the responsibility for maintaining national contingents rested solely upon the States providing them, nevertheless suggested that in a collective action involving the use of armed force, it was entirely inappropriate that all military expenditure should be borne exclusively by those Members providing military elements. In such an action, the memorandum continued, it was incumbent upon all Members to assist the United Nations primarily by the provision of military elements, or if that was impossible, then at least by the provision of financial assistance towards the operations, or by the provision of bases and facilities, where appropriate, or by other alternative forms of contribution.

9. The New Zealand memorandum had been submitted in response to a specific request from the Committee and had been, in fact, the logical extension of a conclusion stated in the first report of the Collective Measures Committee (A/1891, p. 33) to the effect that United Nations collective action, to be most effective, should be as nearly universal as possible. It had, of course, been for the Committee to decide upon the practical measures necessary to implement that principle, although the New Zealand Government had suggested that the Committee should not overlook the possibility of positive measures, such as renewed appeals to all Members to share in the military effort, the recommendation of financial contributions by Member States not participating in collective action, and direct appeals addressed to Member States in a position to provide bases and facilities for the use of the United Nations forces. The Committee's conclusions on that item, contained in paragraphs 78 to 86 of its report, were, first, that it was essential as a matter of principle and of practical necessity that as many States as possible should support United

Nations collective measures by furnishing all possible military, economic and other forms of assistance; and secondly, that whenever the Security Council or the General Assembly was considering measures to resist aggression, the advisability of establishing a negotiating committee to assist in the implementation of that principle should be considered. It was evident, therefore, that the Committee's conclusions were consistent with the views of the New Zealand Government. What he would like to stress, however, was that mere verbal or voting support for collective action was not enough; actions spoke louder than words. The memorandum urged the provision of military elements as the primary duty. Only where that was impossible should financial contributions be regarded as an alternative. It was realized that there were practical difficulties in trying to equate financial contributions with military contributions, but the decision in any given case must depend upon the ability and willingness of States to pay. The ultimate aim should be to secure the greatest possible contribution from each Member so that the total effort could be brought to a maximum and as equitably distributed as possible among all.

10. Mr. Munro wished to make a brief reference to annex E on page 19 of the report, containing the text of the communication to Member States requesting information as to the steps taken in implementation of the recommendations made by General Assembly resolution 503 A (VI). Those recommendations included references to the maintenance of elements within national armed forces for service as United Nations units, assistance and facilities for United Nations armed forces, and appropriate steps for carrying out United Nations collective measures promptly and effectively. In its reply, the New Zealand Government had stated, first, that it was unable for the present, owing to commitment of naval and ground forces in Korea and the requirements of regional defence, to provide for the formation within its armed forces of an element for service as a United Nations unit; secondly, that whenever the exigencies of a collective action so demanded, an endeavour would be made to extend to United Nations armed forces such assistance and facilities as might be appropriate in the circumstances; and, thirdly, that existing New Zealand legislation provided authority for the prompt implementation of the most important economic and financial measures proposed by the Committee in its report.

11. Though his delegation believed that there was still a residuum of work which could be usefully completed by the Committee, it doubted that the amount of work to be done justified the continuance of the Committee in its present form. The desirability of continuing the Committee should be reviewed soon in order to determine whether its continued existence in the present form was justified. The existence of some continuing machinery might be necessary for the maintenance of the impetus which the collective measures system had gathered and the implementation of the General Assembly's resolutions on the subject, but the United Nations should be on its guard to avoid undue complications in international organization and the continuance of bodies which had completed their work or which were too elaborate for the purpose in hand. His delegation would nevertheless support the joint draft resolution in the hope that such further studies as the Committee might undertake

would be helpful in rounding out the work already achieved.

12. In conclusion, he wished to reiterate his delegation's support of the principle of collective action against acts of aggression and threats to the peace. It also believed that the machinery established in pursuance of the "Uniting for peace" resolution (377 (V)) had marked a significant advance in the development of an effective system of collective security. That resolution, in spite of what had just been said by the representative of Czechoslovakia, was legal and necessary for the preservation of peace.

13. Mr. ABDELRAZEK (Egypt) said that the principal purpose of the Charter was to maintain international peace and security. The United Nations therefore had the duty to take effective collective measures to prevent and eliminate threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression. To that end, the Charter had expressly provided for the establishment of an effective security system, as could be seen from the commitments of Member States under Article 43 of the Charter. But in view of the fact that the special agreements referred to in that Article had not been concluded, the Security Council did not possess the means necessary for the discharge of its responsibilities in the field of collective security. In order to fill that gap, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 377 A (V) reaffirming its desire that, pending agreement under Article 43, the United Nations should have at its disposal the means necessary for maintaining international peace and security. Moreover, section C of that resolution invited Member States to survey their resources in order to determine the nature and scope of the assistance they might be in a position to render in support of any recommendations of the Security Council or the General Assembly for the restoration of international peace and security; and recommended that Member States should maintain within their national armed forces elements that could be made available for service as United Nations units. Section D called for the establishment of the Collective Measures Committee with the task of studying methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter. Moreover, in its two reports, the Committee had noted that its work would not be inconsistent with the responsibilities of the Security Council but would, in fact, assist the Council in exercising those responsibilities, as well as facilitate the contribution of Member States to the measures which the Council might take in the future.

14. In studying both reports, it could be seen that the Committee had concentrated its efforts not on special measures which the Council or the Assembly might adopt or recommend to meet a specific case, but on criteria in connexion with measures which governments might take to ensure the most rapid implementation of any collective action. Moreover, the Committee had also examined measures which would have to be taken at the time of collective action in order to co-ordinate the activities of participating States.

15. The collective measures envisaged by the Committee in its two reports were of three types, namely, political, economic and military. Those three types could be applied separately or as a whole. Indeed, the measures it might be deemed advisable to apply in

a specific case would vary depending upon the circumstances and on such factors as the geographical situation of the State concerned, its economic independence and its sensitivity to moral pressure.

16. The political measures considered by the Committee included appeals to the parties to the conflict, the determination and denunciation of the responsible State, the severance of diplomatic relations with that State, the expulsion of the State from the United Nations and the specialized agencies and the non-recognition of changes brought about by the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State. It was to be noted that, in its second report, the Committee had admitted that it did not find it necessary to elaborate upon the political measures considered in its first report and that the types of measures to be applied and the arrangements to be made for their effective application would depend on the circumstances of each case.

17. The economic measures included the complete severance of economic and financial relations with the responsible State, a selective embargo such as an embargo on exports of arms and other strategic materials, the refusal to grant credit or loans, etc. It had been the Committee's opinion, however, that in the case of flagrant aggression a total embargo on all exports to the aggressor was the most effective weapon to use. However, the Committee had pointed out that the imposition of a selective embargo, such as upon arms and ammunition, would weaken the aggressor to the same extent as a total embargo, without undue damage to the participating States. Accordingly, in its second report, the Committee had drawn up two check lists, of armaments and of strategic materials, to serve as examples. The Committee had also stated that the importance of an embargo on strategic items would vary according to the geographic and other circumstances of each particular case.

18. In addition, the Committee had considered the problem of economic and financial assistance to be extended to States victims of aggression. It had devoted particular attention to the problem of an equitable sharing of the burdens involved in collective measures. There was no doubt that the application of economic sanctions would entail unequal economic sacrifices for participating States. In the circumstances, if States were to be encouraged to participate without reservation in the application of economic sanctions, then measures should be taken to ensure a fair distribution of the burdens resulting from those sanctions. For example, measures should be envisaged to find new customers for goods subjected to an embargo, new sources for goods formerly imported from the offending State and sources of financial assistance. In that connexion, the Committee had stated in its second report that the method and procedure which would be most appropriate to ensure an equitable sharing of the burdens could be determined only at the time of applying collective measures.

19. Mr. Abdelrazek wished to associate himself with the views expressed at the 573rd meeting by the representatives of Brazil and Venezuela, who had drawn the Committee's attention to the particular situation of the under-developed countries, which would be the most likely to suffer from participation in economic and financial measures taken collectively. Indeed, those under-developed countries had long suffered from a

chronic disequilibrium in their balance of payments and of trade, owing to disparity between import and export prices. Moreover, the economy of those countries was usually based on the export of a single raw material or food and on the import of equipment and capital goods for the implementation of their programmes for economic and social development.

20. The Government of Yugoslavia had suggested that the Committee should study the problem of States victims of hostile economic pressures. The Committee had studied that problem and noted that it would be for the Security Council or the General Assembly to determine whether or not hostile economic pressures constituted a threat to the peace and to decide whether or not assistance should be rendered to the victim State.

21. The Committee had studied in its second report the role to be played by the specialized agencies and had concluded that the duties and powers of those agencies varied and that none of them had been organized in such a way as to undertake collective measures or to render assistance in that respect. His delegation believed, however, that the specialized agencies could, each in its own field, play a useful and important role in the application of collective measures.

22. With regard to the question of military collective measures, the representative of Egypt recalled that the "Uniting for peace" resolution had recommended to Member States to determine the nature and the scope of the assistance they might be in a position to render as well as to maintain within their national armed forces special elements for service as United Nations units. Those recommendations had been reinforced by General Assembly resolution 503 (VI) wherein it was also recommended that further steps should be taken with a view to increasing the ability of Member States to furnish armed forces and other types of assistance and to lend support to United Nations action. That resolution not only stressed the need for having trained and well-equipped units, but it specially stressed the need for each Member to take the necessary measures to furnish assistance to the United Nations forces participating in the implementation of collective military measures decided upon by the General Assembly or the Security Council. But the resolution expected each State to count upon its own resources to train, equip and organize the national units designed to join the United Nations forces. It did not provide for a State or a region which lacked the military and economic resources necessary to discharge such a task, nor did it provide for assistance of a preparatory nature to such a State for the proper discharge of its obligations. Such type of assistance was essentially important as a preventive measure against aggression or against a threat or a breach of the peace, since the military and economic weakness of a State or a region might incite an aggressor to commit or attempt aggression with a view to obtaining by force what he could not obtain by law. Moreover, the auxiliary assistance to be granted to United Nations forces should not give any State the right to occupy, permanently or temporarily, the territory of another participating State, specially when the government of that State opposed such occupation, since it would be absurd to repress aggression by another disguised aggression under the ægis of the United Nations.

23. In its second report the Committee had dealt with the New Zealand proposal to consider the question of the equitable sharing of economic, financial or military assistance to be rendered to the United Nations. The Committee believed that a special negotiating committee should negotiate directly with the Member States on the question of their contribution. Thus, in order to have the support of as many States as possible, it would be necessary to study the resources of Member States and to decide whether or not they were in a position to discharge the collective task without impairing their territorial integrity or their political independence.

24. In conclusion, the representative of Egypt stated that, as the joint draft resolution recommended that the Committee should continue its work for the maintenance and the strengthening of the collective security system and that it should suggest specific ways and means to encourage States to take further preparatory action; and as that draft reaffirmed the preceding resolution adopted by the General Assembly on the role to be played by Member States; and finally, as the Collective Measures Committee would take into account all the comments made either in the First Committee or in the replies transmitted to it by the Member States, his delegation was prepared to support the draft resolution, subject to the reservation that Egypt would respect all its obligations and commitments arising from pacts, collective security and other arrangements signed by the Arab States.

25. Mr. HAMMARSKJOLD (Sweden) recalled that in the course of the sixth session, his delegation had submitted to the First Committee (476th meeting) certain general comments on the problem of collective security. It had remarked at that time that the Committee's report had not brought out clearly enough the distinction between the legal obligations of Member States in the case of a Security Council decision and those deriving from a General Assembly decision. If the Security Council took a decision in pursuance of Articles 41 or 42 of the Charter, which presupposed unanimity among the permanent members, such a decision would constitute an obligation, and Member States should comply with it. However, if the General Assembly approved a recommendation, even by a two-thirds majority, each Member State had the right to decide for itself whether or not it should take part in compulsory measures. Apart from the legal difference, there was also a considerable difference in the political and defence aspects.

26. The representative of Sweden wished to express appreciation for the technical work done by the Committee; the study made would undoubtedly prove to be of great value. However, as regards the measures which Member States were requested to undertake, his Government wished to reserve the right to decide its attitude after close consideration.

27. His delegation was in favour of the joint draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.27.

28. Mr. JOHNSON (Canada) stated that there was nothing in the second report of the Collective Measures Committee nor in the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/L.27) of which his delegation was a co-sponsor which exceeded the framework of the principles enunciated in the "Uniting for peace" resolution adopted by the

General Assembly in 1950. Under the joint draft resolution, the General Assembly would take note of the second report of the Committee, and request the Collective Measures Committee to continue its work for a limited time. That Committee would be directed to pursue such studies as it might deem desirable to strengthen the capability of the United Nations to maintain peace, and, in the light of its studies, to suggest to the Security Council and the General Assembly such specific ways and means as it might deem appropriate to encourage further preparatory action by Member States.

29. There was nothing in either the joint draft resolution or the report of the Collective Measures Committee which could be interpreted as committing any government beyond its pledges under the Charter itself, or under the "Uniting for peace" resolution. The studies of the Committee were directed towards facilitating rapid action by governments in the political, military and economic fields in case of aggression.

30. In June 1950 the United Nations had not been organized to act quickly against the aggressor in Korea. The Collective Measures Committee had been working to improve the general readiness of those Member States wishing to co-operate so that the United Nations might be able to act more quickly and more effectively another time. However, the decision as to what any particular government might decide to do about any particular case of aggression would remain, in the final analysis, entirely up to that government. Should it decide to respond to a recommendation of the General Assembly, its ability to co-operate quickly with other Members of the United Nations in collective action would be greatly increased by the studies of the Collective Measures Committee over the past two years. For that reason his delegation considered that those studies must be continued.

31. Mr. Johnson emphasized that the establishment of a collective security system was the responsibility of all Members of the United Nations and that a few countries alone should not be left indefinitely to bear nearly all the burden of maintaining collective security for all. In a great-Power world, collective security was the only security for the smaller countries. He recalled that Canadian forces had been fighting for one-third of the past thirty-nine years. All that suffering might have been avoided had there been an effective and universal system of collective security. In that connexion he quoted a statement made recently by the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs in support of the principles of general collective security.

32. For the past two years the USSR delegation had tried to maintain that the General Assembly was not competent to deal with a question which, in its opinion, fell within the sole competence of the Security Council, which it could control by the veto. That was not a correct position. Although the Security Council, under Article 24 of the Charter, had primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, it did not have sole or exclusive responsibility. Under Articles 10 and 12 of the Charter, the General Assembly must assume the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security if the Security Council was unable to act in the event of aggression because of the negative vote of a permanent member. Mr. Johnson added that that was the whole purpose of the "Uniting for peace" resolution and the

work of the Collective Measures Committee was directed to that end.

33. Unlike the USSR delegation, the representative of Canada did not see anything sinister, illegal or aggressive in the steps being taken towards the eventual building of a universal collective security system. Nor did he think that it was incompatible with membership in the United Nations for any group of States, including the Soviet bloc, to organize supplementary regional defence pacts under the collective self-defence provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. His delegation would certainly have preferred to see the United Nations collective security system function as it had been intended at San Francisco that it should function, in other words, on the basis of the full co-operation of the five great Powers. But when that became patently impossible, his country preferred to have some collective security to none at all, and for that reason it was a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It had taken measures to strengthen that organization in order to support very materially the cause of world peace by deterring aggression everywhere in the world. It still hoped for a genuine universal system of collective security.

34. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, instead of co-operating with other Member States to make collective security practicable, had offered the United Nations a definition of aggression. His delegation believed that it was inconceivable that a majority of the Members of the United Nations, either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly, would fail to recognize aggression if it should occur, regardless of whether there had been an agreement beforehand on a formal definition of aggression. Moreover, his observation of the results of previous attempts to define aggression had taught him to be sceptical about a mere definition. It would be more realistic to work for a real, universal and impartial system of collective security than to be content with some formal definition of aggression, no matter how complete or correct. It appeared that the Soviet Union wished the United Nations to be ready with a definition of aggression but with nothing else. It was not concerned about the mechanics of how Member States might co-operate to stop aggression. For that reason, the USSR delegation refused to take any part in the work of the Collective Measures Committee. It would therefore appear that the Soviet Union was opposed to any measures being taken inside or outside the United Nations for collective security except in connexion with the closely-knit system of military alliances of its own.

35. Mr. Johnson observed that it was encouraging that, when presented with a concrete emergency like Korea, more than two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations were prepared to provide the Korean people and the Unified Command with concrete offers of combat forces and medical or other assistance. A universal system of collective security was, therefore, more of a reality than the reports of the Collective Measures Committee might indicate. Nevertheless, the Committee had some accomplishments to report: (a) it

had prepared detailed lists of strategic articles which would be of great assistance to the Security Council or the General Assembly in applying either a selective or a general embargo; (b) it had studied the roles which the specialized agencies might play in contributing their valuable knowledge and skills, should occasion arise, in the application of collective measures; (c) it had given further attention to the problems of the equitable sharing of both economic and military burdens in the event of collective action being undertaken; (d) it had considered the advisability of establishing, in such an eventuality, a negotiating committee as a means of encouraging as many States as possible to support United Nations collective measures by furnishing military, economic and other forms of assistance; (e) it had given some preliminary consideration to the Secretary-General's proposals for a United Nations volunteer reserve; (f) it had followed up, where possible, the recommendations made by the Assembly in resolution 503 (VI) that Member States should take further steps to increase their general readiness to take part in collective measures.

36. Dealing further with the problem of the equitable sharing of the burdens involved in collective action, Mr. Johnson stated that that problem arose out of the existing situation in which those Members of the United Nations who provided military forces were also required to bear unaided the whole financial burden of the military effort. It was fair that those Member States who were unable to provide military forces should consider alternative forms in which a contribution could be made. In that connexion, the Canadian representative on the Collective Measures Committee had informally suggested that a possible means for implementing that principle would be to adapt for the purpose the experience of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East in obtaining from Member States contributions to extra-budgetary funds through the assistance of a negotiating committee. The Collective Measures Committee had decided to recommend that whenever the Security Council or General Assembly was contemplating measures to resist aggression, consideration should be given to establishing a negotiating committee. The Canadian delegation favoured study of the question of a negotiating committee to deal with the whole problem of equitable sharing and not only with military contributions.

37. Mr. Johnson pointed out that the joint draft resolution before the Committee recommended that the Collective Measures Committee should be continued in its present form for a limited time only, and there was therefore no need to change its composition.

38. In conclusion, Mr. Johnson stated that, in voting for the joint draft resolution, the Assembly would be keeping alive not just a committee, but the kernel of a great idea which must not be allowed to fade because of the disappointments in the past years—the revolutionary idea of collective security in world terms.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.