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Chairman: Mr. Victor A. BELAUNDE (Peru).

AGENDA ITEM 62

**Question of Algeria (A/3197, A/C.1/L.165)
(*continued*)**

1. Mr. SHAHA (Nepal) recalled that his Government had been a party to the declaration, adopted by the Asian-African Conference held at Bandung in 1955, which had supported the right of the people of Algeria to self-determination. His Government had consistently upheld that principle, which was, moreover, recognized by the Charter of the United Nations. The Algerian people's struggle for independence was part of the general movement for national freedom which characterized the awakening of Asia and Africa in the years following the Second World War. Thus, public opinion in the countries of Asia and Africa was extremely sensitive to any question involving the suppression of national independence. Although nationalism might have now lost its importance for the countries of Europe, to the Asian and African nations, which had recently attained their independence, nationalism was still a living force. Those nations realized that their participation in the various forms of international co-operation among nations depended primarily on their independence and the development of their national wealth.

2. The prospect for an association between France and Algeria, as envisaged by France, could only be hindered by France's stubborn attitude in denying the right of self-determination which the Algerian people claimed. But it was undeniable that any proposed form of association should be based on the freely expressed will of the Algerian people.

3. His delegation could not support the French plea of domestic jurisdiction with regard to Algeria (830th meeting). It could not agree with the assertion that Algeria was an integral part of metropolitan France, first, because Algeria, prior to the French conquest and occupation, had been an independent country, as was shown by its treaties and diplomatic relations with other countries. Secondly, the people of Algeria had not been given an opportunity so far to express their will on the question of integration with France, a policy which had been the result of a unilateral decision by France. Thirdly, geographically, ethnically, religiously and culturally, Algeria appeared to be a national and political entity distinct from France. Finally, the United Nations had not in the past recognized the validity of the argument of domestic jurisdiction, particularly in cases involving human rights which had repercussions on international peace and security. In the opinion of his delegation, Algeria's right to self-determination involved

a fundamental human right. Its denial had caused a continuous breach of peace in the area and had disturbed international harmony. Recognizing France's desire to safeguard the rights of the European minority in Algeria, he declared that such concern for a privileged minority should not be allowed to block permanently the progress of the majority towards freedom and national independence.

4. The conflict in Algeria was not only a political problem, but also a great human tragedy in terms of suffering and loss of human life. The only practical solution lay in the initiation of negotiations between France and the leaders of the Algerian National Movement. A prerequisite for such negotiations was France's recognition of the right of the Algerian people to self-determination. On the other hand, if France persisted in its policy of trying to impose a settlement by force, it would not only forfeit the good will of the Algerian people—and thus destroy any prospect for a friendly association with Algeria—but it would also perpetuate a threat to international peace by giving some States the opportunity to interfere in the situation.

5. He hoped that France would reach a political settlement with the leaders and people of Algeria in the same way it had settled the questions of Morocco and Tunisia. It was in that spirit, and in the confidence that France would not allow considerations of prestige to stand in the way of a settlement, that his delegation had co-sponsored the eighteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.165). The purpose of the draft, was to assist in achieving a permanent and peaceful settlement of the question, and it should, therefore, be supported by all those who wished to restore peace in Algeria.

6. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that in his statement (830th and 831st meetings) the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, Mr. Pineau, had attempted to persuade the Committee that the French Government desired to implement a new policy in Algeria. The substance of that policy was an unconditional cease-fire, general elections to be conducted under the supervision of the so-called democratic States, the promise of a new status for Algeria, and other measures. Simultaneously, Mr. Pineau had stated that France would never abandon Algeria.

7. Mr. Pineau's statement had not given any positive answer to some important questions raised by the Algerian people. Mr. Pineau had not recognized the right of the Algerian people to national independence. The intention of the speech had been to mislead public opinion and to blame the political parties in Algeria for the colonial war being waged there. Thus the speech had not contained any constructive proposals for the peaceful settlement of the Algerian question. Instead, there had been threats against the National Liberation Front, the Algerian National Movement and the Algerian Communist Party. It was obvious that France had learned nothing from the failure of its military adventure with the United Kingdom and Israel in

Egypt, which had made the position of the French colonists in Algeria even more uncertain.

8. The colonial war in Algeria had been responsible for a further deterioration in the relations between France and the Arab States. He wondered how the military action in Algeria could be reconciled with Mr. Pineau's statement that the policy of his Government in Algeria was in conformity with the great democratic traditions of France. Under the guise of those democratic traditions, the French Government was protecting the interests of French monopolists who were trying to preserve the *status quo* in Algeria. That colonial policy had been supported by several delegations, among them the United Kingdom, the United States, Spain and Cuba.

9. French circles had succeeded in having forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) sent to Algeria. The North Atlantic Council, at its meeting on 28 March 1956, had officially blessed the French colonial war in Algeria. The activities of the NATO forces in Algeria constituted not only a violation of the Charter of the United Nations, but also a clear act of colonial aggression. He cited several examples of French oppression in Algeria as reported in the French Press.

10. With regard to the claims made by France concerning its achievements in Algeria, careful study of the situation revealed that the benefits of education, medical attention and other social services went to the European population rather than to the Algerian Moslem population. The lack of schools and teachers for the Algerian children, for instance, had resulted in an illiteracy rate of 86 per cent among the local population. About 50 per cent of Algerian children died before the age of five. In general, the standard of living of the indigenous population was indeed very low. The system of land distribution was also evidence of the exploitation to which the Algerian masses had been subjected. The French colonial authorities, he charged, had kept the Algerian people in a state of ignorance and poverty in order to ensure a continued supply of cheap labour—a policy which had tragic effects on the Algerian economy.

11. With reference to Mr. Pineau's statement that the forces of the rebellion in Algeria had been terrorist groups under foreign guidance (830th meeting), he said that the fight for independence in Algeria had been a continuous one for more than one hundred years. Despite the superiority of French troops and equipment, the struggle of the Algerian people to achieve their independence had not weakened. At the last Congress of the French Socialist Party, a delegate from Algeria had stated that 15,000 people were fighting French troops in Algeria and were being supported by all the Algerian people. The colonial policy of France was doomed to failure. The Algerians had demonstrated that they were ready to sacrifice everything in order to achieve independence.

12. In his opinion, the settlement of the Algerian question could be achieved only by adopting new methods and taking into account the historical link between France and Algeria. If the legitimate aspirations of the Algerian people were ignored, there would be no solution to the present situation. His delegation considered that a peaceful settlement would not only be advantageous to the Algerian people, but also to the French. The formula applied in the cases of Morocco and Tunisia could serve as a guide for the solution of the Algerian question. He urged that negotiations between France and representatives of the Algerian

people be started in order to avoid the continuation of the present situation, which was, in his view, a potential threat to peace. The Algerian question had become an important international problem requiring immediate attention. The movement against colonial institutions could not be reversed by military force or by promises of reforms.

13. His delegation fully supported the Algerian people in their demand for national independence: it was imperative that the French Government put an end to the hostilities, recognize the national existence of the Algerian people, and grant them independence. In conclusion, he said that his delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution sponsored by the eighteen African-Asian Powers (A/C.1/L.165).

14. Mr. CHAVEZ ORTIZ (Bolivia) said that his delegation did not wish to add to the passion and controversy which had characterized the Algerian debate, but it intended to examine objectively the reasons advanced by both sides. The task was particularly difficult when the matter affected France, for he was well aware of the decisive influence that France had had on world civilization and stressed the great regard which his country had for France. He felt, however, that it would not be casting shadows on that friendship if his delegation did not agree with the French on every point.

15. Although the Algerian case involved two seemingly contradictory principles of the Charter—that embodied in Article 1, paragraph 2, and that in Article 2, paragraph 7—there were other Articles in the Charter, namely, Articles 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14, under the provisions of which the General Assembly had competence to act on any question, even though that might appear to limit the sovereignty of a nation. Such matters as the reduction and control of armaments, the trusteeship system, and the coercive measures envisaged in Chapter VII of the Charter also represented limitations of sovereignty. Indeed, all law constituted a certain limitation on the individual will in the collective interest.

16. The Bolivian delegation was not endorsing intervention. Bolivia believed, however, that the United Nations must support the principle of self-determination.

17. In the case of Algeria, there was a conflict between French sovereignty and the right of the Algerian people to self-determination. Two distinct nationalities existed in Algeria: one was the French transplanted to Algeria, who were a product of French history and culture and whose destiny was bound up with that of metropolitan France. The other, the Algerians, could be divided into two categories: the native Algerians of Arab origin, conscious of their own culture and ideals; and the Algerians who were born of the mixture of French and native Algerians and who retained the characteristics of both cultures. The mixture of the two cultures had resulted in the creation of a single personality or nationality, as was the case with the Creoles in Latin America.

18. The problem consisted in the conflict between two parties, each of which claimed the right of self-determination: on the one hand, the French State, which had incorporated Algeria into its territory, and on the other, the new personality which was the Algerian nation. In his delegation's view, the Algerian problem fell within the competence of the United Nations, like the case of Hungary, where the people were also fighting for the right to self-determination.

19. The Algerian case had a common denominator with newly independent countries such as Morocco and Tunisia, as all represented the liberation of oppressed nationalities, a process which characterized the world of today. The United Nations could not ignore that fact, for at least one-fourth of its Members were products of the struggle for national liberation.

20. With regard to Communist influence in Algeria, he believed that nationalism itself would prevent communism from taking advantage of the struggle for liberation. In that connexion he noted that nationalist forces in countries behind the "Iron Curtain" were jeopardizing the Communist structure in that area. In discussing the nature and aims of revolutionary nationalism, he stressed that it should not be confused with communism or nazism. The objective of revolutionary nationalism was not to subject people, but to free them and to bring about the conditions for the fulfilment of national aspirations. He did not think that the liberation movement in Algeria was the work of Communists. It was a force that was truly seeking the independence of Algeria.

21. As for the accusations that Egypt, Syria, Tunisia and Morocco had intervened in the Algerian conflict, it was understandable, that those nations which had suffered from colonial rule in the past would be sympathetic to the Algerian cause.

22. The problem in Algeria was that of a nation struggling for its independence. The incorporation of Algeria into France, a unilateral French act, had not destroyed the personality of Algeria as a nation. He cited many examples of unilateral declarations that had no meaning in the context of a struggle for freedom and independence. He realized that it would be painful for France to give up territory which it considered as part of its being. The United Nations could not ask France to withdraw from Algeria, nor could it ask the rebels to surrender unconditionally. On the other hand, the United Nations must recognize the personality of the Algerian nation. The problem could be solved by direct agreement between France and Algeria. The United Nations should assist in efforts and negotiations aimed at a peaceful settlement of the problem. The possibility of a solution envisaging freedom for Algeria must be recognized.

23. Meanwhile his delegation did not consider the eighteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.165) suitable. The Bolivian delegation would favour a draft which would contain in general terms the first paragraph of the preamble of the eighteen-Power draft, but which would recognize the rights of the Algerian people in accordance with the principles of the Charter and would then invite France and Algeria to enter into negotiations with a view to ending hostilities and arriving at a peaceful settlement.

24. In conclusion, he said that his suggestion was not intended to remove the problem from the consideration of the United Nations for the Organization could assist in its solution. His delegation supported Algeria's right to an independent life.

25. Mr. RIFA'I (Jordan) paid tribute on behalf of his delegation to the wisdom and statesmanship shown by the Members of the General Assembly in unanimously including the Algerian question in the agenda (654th plenary meeting). That had encouraged his delegation to hope that positive action might be taken to put an end to a destructive war which was gravely endangering international peace and security.

26. In dealing with the question of Algeria, his delegation was inspired by the desire to promote a peaceful solution. There were fraternal bonds linking Jordan and Algeria. The people of Jordan admired the Algerians not only for their present struggle for independence, but also for their glorious history. The Algerian movement for independence was rooted in its brilliant national history. It was not an artificial movement and could not be crushed by force. The Algerian problem was one growing out of 127 years of history. Each aspect of the problem deserved careful study in order to assess adequately the dramatic events in Algeria.

27. The French delegation had wanted the Committee to brush aside a situation that was so explosive that it required the mobilization of French military forces, a situation so tragic in terms of loss of life and so critical that it had stirred deep emotions in Asia and Africa and was disturbing the peace in the neighbouring States of Africa. His delegation viewed the Algerian question as an international problem and thus rejected the French allegation that Algeria was an integral part of France and therefore a problem within its domestic jurisdiction. The General Assembly, in reaffirming its jurisdiction by including the item in its agenda, had shattered that concept of domestic jurisdiction.

28. There was no need to review the history of Algeria to show that Algeria was not France. It was evident that there were no cultural, linguistic or ethnic similarities between the French and the Algerians, except that both were creatures of God. But even that law of heaven had been violated by France, which did not treat Algerians as it did the French. Thus there was no similarity or union between the two peoples which might give the French allegation the slightest validity. But the seriousness of the French theory was that it was intended to depersonalize a whole nation through a policy of assimilation backed by arms. It was difficult to believe that such policy represented the true conviction of French statesmen.

29. A number of illustrious Frenchmen denounced the French concept of Algeria and called for a reversal of French policy. Professor Raymond Aron, a professor at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques and a famous commentator, had, for example, stated in an address before the National Council of the Movement for Atlantic Union that sooner or later it would be necessary to recognize the existence of an Algerian State and to fix a time limit within which that State would be independent.

30. Sooner or later Algeria was bound to emerge as an independent and sovereign State. Therefore, he wondered why France persisted in its attempt to crush the national uprising in Algeria, which had never faltered through decades and which now controlled three-quarters of Algeria; why it accepted defeat after defeat in Algeria and failure after failure in its Algerian policy; and why it chose bloodshed, death and destruction, rather than recognition of justice, negotiation, peace and friendship with the Algerians.

31. The whole country of Algeria was aflame with war. In tracing the tragedy it was unnecessary to go back to the year 1871, when mass killings of Algerian civilians by French soldiers had taken place, or to the punitive expedition of 1945 which had resulted in the killing of 40,000 Algerian men, women and children. Those victims had been called "rebels and criminals" by the French authorities and French spokesmen.

32. The representative of France had also a false concept of the *mujâhid* and the *mujâhidin* who were leading and fighting for the national movement in Algeria. The *mujâhid* was not a criminal; nor was he one who fought the "infidels"—according to the terminology of the representative of France (835th meeting). He was a person who dedicated all his personal ability to the cause of righteousness.

33. The French spokesmen always referred to the conflict between France and Algeria as a conflict between the Moslems and the French, or between the Moslems and the Europeans. The terms used by the French seemed to be used intentionally in order to deprive the Algerian people of their Algerian personality and their Arab characteristics. The terms "Moslems and Europeans" or "Moslems and French" were not parallel. Islam was a religion, while the word "French" denoted a nationality. The French concept of a distinction on the basis of religion between an Algerian or an Arab in Algeria on the one hand and a Frenchman or a European on the other was neither adequate nor accurate.

34. The true distinction was between an Algerian Arab nationalist and a French colonialist. There were, certainly, in Algeria, Arabs and Berbers as far as race was concerned; but Arabism was not racialism. The Arab peoples were Arab by nationalism, by culture and aspiration, rather than by blood. Arab nationalism in Algeria, therefore, was a part of the great struggle of the Arab peoples to gain their freedom and independence. Moreover, there was no "Arab imperialism", as the French Minister for Foreign Affairs put it; there was only an Arab unity that embraced the whole Arab world.

35. The charges of so-called external intervention in the Algerian conflict, which were often voiced by France, only served to substantiate the thesis which the sponsors of the Algerian question had never ceased to stress—namely, the impossibility of isolating a struggle of that nature or of keeping it from being an inevitable threat to the peace and security of an entire region.

36. The French military policy against the Algerian people could only be explained in terms of colonialism and exploitation. The French war in Algeria could be explained in economic terms, for it was a conflict between the "haves" and the "have nots", between the master and the slave, between human greed and human self-preservation. That had been formally admitted in a report of a French parliamentary mission that had visited Algeria in 1955. The mission had been headed by none other than Mr. Christian Pineau, now the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France. The report stated:

"Without minimizing ... the achievements of the metropolitan country in North Africa, it must be recognized that they have benefited the European population much more than the Moslem population ... [It seems] as if the Algerians constitute but shadows against a background where the French live and prosper in an artificial security ... No man with a heart can fail to be struck by the destitution which still exists in numerous regions of Algeria and which increases as one travels south."¹

¹ *Rapport d'information... sur la mission effectuée en Algérie du 4 au 9 juin 1955...* Messrs. Pineau, de Chevigné, Jacquet, Jean-Moreau, Lejeune (Paris, Imprimerie de l'Assemblée Nationale, 1955), No. 11100, p. 4.

37. Mr. Mendès-France, former Prime Minister of France, wrote in *L'Express* of 22 December 1955 that the Algerian drama resulted from the criminal policy which the Government conducted in the name of France. That policy was one of naked, collective and blind repression which had succeeded in arousing the whole Algerian people against France.

38. No one had been more indignant than the then leader of the French Socialist Party who on 31 August 1955 had led a delegation which had called on Prime Minister Edgar Faure and issued a *communiqué* condemning the repression. He told the Press: "We drew the attention of Mr. Faure to the situation in Algeria; we denounced the repression." The person who had spoken those words was Mr. Guy Mollet, now the Prime Minister of France. There had been other eloquent protests against the repression—its brutality, its futility and its senselessness—from political leaders now in power. Those leaders had risen to power on such criticism, but now that they were in power they had forgotten their words.

39. The continuation of the war was not only costly to the Algerian people, but it was also disastrous to France and to its international reputation, and to the prestige of the United Nations as well. The delegation of Jordan sincerely believed that it was in the interest of France itself to put an end to the bloodshed, to limit the influence of the *colons* of Algeria in French politics, and to seek the esteem and friendship of the Algerians and, to a larger extent, that of many other nations.

40. In his statement of 9 January 1957, Mr. Guy Mollet had said that France would assume the role of arbitrator. Thus the Prime Minister of France had admitted the principle of arbitration. Yet Mr. Rifa'i could not agree with Mr. Mollet that France could assume such a role. France was engaged in a dispute with the Algerians; it was a party to a military conflict. France was denying the Algerians their inherent right of self-determination and independence, and assuming for itself the right of the conqueror and occupier of Algeria. He wondered how France could then assume the role of arbitrator between itself and Algeria. The only body in authority which could conduct such arbitration was the United Nations.

41. The task of the United Nations as far as the Algerian question was concerned had been explained in very simple language in the eighteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.165). Responsible French spokesmen were inviting the Algerian people to agree to an unconditional cease-fire. The Algerians would indeed be naive if they were to put down their arms and terminate a costly but successful resistance merely because they had been invited to do so by the French Government, which had made no commitment regarding their national aspirations. The Algerian people were fighting for self-determination in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

42. It was to be hoped that the combined efforts of the Members of the United Nations would put an end to the fierce armed conflict between France and Algeria. France, a Power with major responsibilities, was in duty bound to co-operate in a flexible manner with all the parties interested in liquidating the peril and in solving the question on the basis of right and equity.

43. Mr. NASE (Albania) stated that the present policy of the French Government in Algeria had not achieved any positive results, despite wide-scale military operations. The situation of the French Government

was becoming more and more embarrassing, both internally and on the international level.

44. The Franco-Algerian conflict was a source of great concern to the peace-loving peoples of the world and was, in fact, threatening the peace of the world. That had been also true of the Franco-British-Israel onslaught on Egypt, which had created the risk of a world war, because there was no doubt that France had joined the United Kingdom against Egypt in the mistaken expectation that the submission of Egypt would mean the end of the difficulties which France was meeting in Algeria. According to the expression used by Mr. Robert Lacoste, Minister residing in Algeria, the fate of Algeria was partly to be decided in Cairo.

45. The situation in Algeria had become an international problem and deserved consideration by the United Nations. The negotiations which had taken place the year before between the representatives of the French Government and the representatives of the National Liberation Front had not resulted in success. Thus the war continued in Algeria, increasing in proportions and causing havoc and destruction.

46. The United Nations, in conformity with the Charter, was quite competent to deal with the Algerian problem and to find a peaceful solution for it. One of the fundamental principles on which the United Nations rested was the right of self-determination of peoples. The policy of integration and assimilation which had been followed by France for more than a century in Algeria had failed to create in the consciousness of the Algerian people durable links with the metropolitan Power. Algerians had resolutely resisted that particular policy. They were distinct from the colonizers because of their traditions, mode of living, religion, culture and language. Today the Algerian people as a whole participated in the struggle for national liberation. It had launched a war without quarter which would continue until the end was achieved. The struggle meant great sacrifices not only to the Algerian people, but to France as well. The war, therefore, was only to the advantage of a mere handful of privileged people in France and of certain French citizens living in Algeria.

47. When, in February 1956, the French Government had launched its policy of pacification in Algeria, Mr. Robert Lacoste had affirmed that he would conclude the struggle with the Algerian *maquis* in June of that year. A month later, Mr. Guy Mollet had stated that, because of the dispatch of troops to Algeria, the situation would be settled. Mr. Lacoste on 20 June 1956 had stated that pacification would achieve considerable results before the beginning of winter. But the situation today showed that war had spread throughout Algeria; that people were fighting in the Sahara as well as in the coastal regions; and that zones which had been considered pacified were now the arena of bloody struggles. The situation in Algeria was deteriorating daily.

48. The French were using more than half a million men, and the most modern equipment in NATO was available to them. The most cruel methods of reprisal were used to crush the liberation movement. During those cleaning-up operations villages were destroyed wholesale, massacres were to be seen every day, and the entire unarmed population, irrespective of sex or age, were victims of repression. Despite the superiority of the colonialists and despite all the wide-scale military operations, the Algerians fighters did not waver. They were supported by the entire population.

49. The only desirable way out was the peaceful settlement of the conflict. The movement for national liberation had always shown that it was ready to negotiate. It was up to the French to recognize the legitimate rights of the Algerians to independence and full sovereignty.

50. The United Nations could not ignore the real situation prevailing in Algeria. The peaceful settlement of the issue was not only in the interest of the parties concerned, but also in the interest of preserving peace throughout the world. The General Assembly had much to contribute by helping not only the Algerian liberation movement, but also the French Government, to achieve a peaceful settlement of the issue in conformity with the Charter. The Albanian delegation considered that the draft resolution submitted by the eighteen African-Asian States (A/C.1/L.165) met those aims and would therefore fully support it.

51. Mr. PETREN (Sweden) stated that, although it had not objected to the inclusion of the Algerian item in the agenda, France had chosen to invoke Article 2, paragraph 7, of the United Nations Charter in formally opposing the General Assembly's taking decision on the substance of the question. The First Committee, therefore, had to take a stand on the interpretation of Article 2, paragraph 7. That provision of the Charter had already given rise to different interpretations when different matters had come before the Assembly, and it could hardly be denied that, in voting on questions of its competence, the Assembly had sometimes been inconsistent.

52. The Swedish delegation considered that the Algerian question, more than such questions as Tunisia and Morocco was a French domestic matter, since Algeria, from the administrative point of view, formed part of France and its inhabitants elected deputies to the French National Assembly. That did not necessarily mean that no matter concerning the situation in Algeria could be discussed in the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Assembly had often declared itself competent to adopt resolutions concerning matters which had been stated to be domestic affairs, such as the questions of racial discrimination in the Union of South Africa, forced labour in certain countries, and the situation in Hungary.

53. The Swedish delegation believed that there was a very clear reason why the General Assembly had considered itself competent to discuss those questions. Article 62, paragraph 2, of the Charter recognized the right of the Economic and Social Council to "make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all". If the Economic and Social Council was competent to discuss such matters, then it was obvious that the General Assembly must possess the same right.

54. However, if in the course of the debate on racial discrimination in the Union of South Africa, and on the violation of human rights in Hungary, the Government in question had made public its programmes of action designed to effect reforms that would put all the different groups of the population on an equal footing, bring greater public freedom and increase civil rights, then the Swedish delegation would have felt that the General Assembly should be reticent in making recommendations on the issues.

55. The Swedish delegation had been pleased that France did not oppose the inclusion of the Algerian question in the agenda of the present session of the

General Assembly, and that the French delegation, in presenting its case before the First Committee (830th and 831st meetings), had wanted to make known to the Committee the reform programmes that the Government of France was about to implement in Algeria. The Swedish delegation had found it extremely interesting that the French Government had replied to the criticisms that had been raised in the course of the debate against the policy of France in Algeria. For those reasons, his delegation was of the opinion that the General Assembly should not lose sight of the status of Algeria; but before taking any stand on the matter, the Assembly should carefully consider the effects which might be produced by a resolution on the Algerian question.

56. The Swedish delegation believed that a draft resolution such as the one proposed by the eighteen Powers (A/C.1/L.165) would not contribute to the satisfactory settlement of the question. It would, therefore, vote against the draft, while reserving its position with regard to any other draft resolutions which might be submitted.

57. In conclusion, the Swedish delegation expressed the firm hope that France would follow its reform programme and would apply its democratic tradition and humanitarian wisdom in the solution of the Algerian problem.

58. Mr. ULLRICH (Czechoslovakia) recalled that the Algerian question had not been discussed at the tenth session of the General Assembly. The reason had been that the African-Asian States had decided to accept a proposal (795th meeting) to postpone further discussion of the Algerian issue at the tenth session in the hope that France would seize that opportunity to negotiate with the true representatives of the Algerian people a peaceful settlement securing their legitimate rights to independence. That hope had not been fulfilled. The struggle in Algeria had gained in violence; it required the sacrifice of both material possessions and human life. There was an urgent necessity for proceeding immediately to the solution of the problem, since any delay would render the ultimate solution still more difficult.

59. The interests of both the Algerian and the French people required a peaceful settlement of the Algerian problem. A continuation of the colonial policy of the French Government would be equally harmful to both parties. The French people realized that no nation could be free while it oppressed others. It was also aware that the colonial régime which served the interests of the colonialists was incompatible with the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity solemnly proclaimed by the French people in 1789.

60. After the experiences of the war in Indo-China, it was obvious that the continuation of the war in Algeria would have a most detrimental influence upon the economy of France and would be also harmful to France's international prestige. The armed forces of France in Algeria had been about 150,000 men when the question had been first included in the agenda, at the tenth session, whereas now the total of French armed forces in Algeria, including their armed militia, exceeded 500,000 men and included NATO troops.

61. The Czechoslovak delegation was convinced that the Algerian problem was not of such a nature that its solution by peaceful means was impossible. A solution of the Algerian problem which would respect the right of nations to self-determination, independence and the inviolability of their rights would create the necessary

prerequisites for the establishment of new relationships between France and Algeria which would be in harmony with the interests of both the Algerian and the French peoples and would contribute to the lessening of international tension.

62. In the present situation, the General Assembly should invite France and the people of Algeria to enter into immediate negotiations with a view to the cessation of hostilities and the peaceful settlement of their differences in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. The Czechoslovak delegation believed that the United Nations should play a positive role in the solution of the problem of Algeria, as had been the case with Tunisia and Morocco, and thus contribute valuably not only to bringing peace to North Africa but also to the enhancement of its prestige.

63. Mr. CAÑAS (Costa Rica) said that no event in the world in the past ten years had been more welcome to his country than the progressive movement of Asia and Africa toward independence. Fortunately, negotiated independence had become the rule in present times.

64. The future of the world did not lie in breaking up nations into small States, but rather in the coexistence of different peoples. A world for humanity could not be achieved by means of slogans or exclusivistic doctrines centred around a race, nationality, religion, or philosophy, or by means of movements of retaliation, concentrated against men who believed in such principles. What the peoples of the world had to seek was the coexistence of all, everywhere. The European should be able to live in Africa and the African in Europe. Doors should not be closed; no exclusive clubs should be set up anywhere. Holy wars and racial crusades should disappear. Anyone who tried to throw the Europeans out of Africa would be as mistaken as the man who had sworn to throw the Jews out of Europe.

65. In the case before the Committee, the most important thing was that somehow, in Algeria, a humane coexistence had to be maintained between the European inhabitants and the purely African inhabitants. For that reason the Costa Rican delegation was very much concerned with the bellicose chauvinism which was evidenced by all those who opposed the present régime in Algeria.

66. On the other hand, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France had communicated to the Committee that his Government was ready to negotiate with regard to the future status of Algeria. That was most comforting and it raised many hopes. The Costa Rican delegation did not know whether the proponents of direct action at the head of the rebellion in Algeria were competent to speak on behalf of the people of Algeria, but in its view they should be given the benefit of the doubt.

67. The French Government had made known its plan that the elections should be internationally supervised and that it was ready to invite representatives of a group of countries to be present at the elections. Without in any way prejudicing its thesis that the General Assembly was not competent to deal with the matter, the French could also invite the United Nations to participate with that group of observers by inviting either the Secretary-General or the President of the General Assembly. The Costa Rican delegation could not accept the contention that the rebels in Algeria were necessarily the true representatives of the people merely because they were rebels. The fact that there was a

rebellion in Algeria was not absolute proof that the Algerian people wished to be completely free of France. 68. For many years in all the countries of Latin America there had been a great deal of concern about the position of Puerto Rico, which had become a United States possession at the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898. When the plebiscite had been held in 1952, the Puerto Ricans had preferred a status that was *sui generis*, giving the island a special kind of autonomy within the framework of an economic and political union with the United States. The people of Algeria might adopt a similar course. Perhaps the Algerian people would decide that they wished absolute independence; perhaps they would not. What should be done was to give all opinions an opportunity to be heard. That could only be done by free elections. Therefore, it should first be seen what support the Algerians gave to the men who were fighting to achieve the independence of their country.

69. To a large extent, the eighteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.165) met the point of view that the Costa Rican delegation had expressed with regard to negotiations. The adoption of the draft would, however, be premature at the present stage. His delegation was very pleased with the plan that France had outlined for determining the will of the Algerian people. The best course that the Committee could take was to give France the time to carry out its plan and to stop the struggle in Algeria so that the correct atmosphere for the elections might be created.

70. Mr. BELOVSKI (Yugoslavia) stated that the situation prevailing today in Algeria was not only disturbing, but was also assuming graver and more tragic forms every day. For years the situation had shown no signs of improvement. Armed clashes and repressive measures continued without interruption. The number of casualties was growing constantly. Economic loss and damage were increasing while, on the international plane, the adverse effects of that state of affairs were making themselves felt increasingly from year to year.

71. The Yugoslav delegation viewed the gravity of the situation in Algeria primarily in terms of the hardship and suffering that it was causing to the inhabitants of Algeria. But it wished to point out that, even from the point of view of France's interests, the problem of Algeria was an extremely difficult one. It was impossible to overlook the burdens and limitations which the approach which had so far been made to the problem of Algeria had imposed on French economy and French policy.

72. Certain aspects of the problem had to be kept in mind. First, it was not possible to isolate the problem of Algeria from other problems of the North African region. Secondly, the question of Algeria could not be

viewed apart from the general trend of world developments towards the emergence of new nations on the stage of history and their efforts to organize their national lives with as little conflict and upheaval as possible. Finally, the presence of a numerous French community and its special interests in Algeria, as well as the existence of important and varied interests resulting from the long association of Algeria with France, constituted one of the chief specific features of the Algerian problem.

73. The basic problem, however, was not the existence of a serious, tragic and extremely complex situation, but how to find a way out. It would not be justifiable to disregard the efforts that France was making in that respect. However, it was a fact that the efforts exerted by France had not proved adequate to the situation or even capable of achieving a final solution of the problem of Algeria. The present French policy in Algeria amounted essentially to the opposing of a national liberation movement which enjoyed the broadest support of the masses of the Algerian people. On the other hand, the use of force and repressive measures could not prevent the strengthening and the spreading of such a movement.

74. The Yugoslav delegation was firmly convinced that a cease-fire, which was undoubtedly a necessary and essential development for easing the situation, could be negotiated only through talks with the representatives of those forces, without whose co-operation it was not possible to attain a lasting solution.

75. With those thoughts in mind, the Yugoslav delegation concluded that the method of negotiation between France and the representatives of the uprising in Algeria should be advocated as a first step towards the solution of the question of Algeria. In recommending such a course of action to the General Assembly, his delegation was guided in equal measure by the interests of the people of Algeria, the interests of France, and the interests of world peace and co-operation.

76. Mr. HANIFAH (Indonesia), exercising the right of reply, took exception to the reference to Indonesia made by the representative of Chile in his statement (841st meeting). His delegation considered irrelevant and unfortunate the comparison that had been drawn between the Algerian case and some events in Sumatra. The former was a struggle for freedom against a foreign and colonial rule, while the latter was in the nature of a family quarrel.

77. Mr. ALDUNATE (Chile) in reply, pointed out that, since in his statement he had stressed the fact that he was by no means comparing one situation with the other, the explanation of the representative of Indonesia appeared to be unnecessary.

The meeting rose at 6.5 p.m.