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**Chairman: Mr. Djatal ABDUH (Iran).**

**AGENDA ITEM 24**

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction (A/3630 and Corr.1, A/3657, A/3674/Rev.1, A/3685, A/C.1/793, A/C.1/797, A/C.1/L.174, A/C.1/L.175/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.176/Rev.4, A/C.1/L.177, A/C.1/L.178/Rev.2, A/C.1/L.179 and Corr.1 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.180, A/C.1/L.181 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.182, A/C.1/L.184, A/C.1/L.185) (continued):

- (a) Report of the Disarmament Commission;
- (b) Expansion of the membership of the Disarmament Commission and of its Sub-Committee;
- (c) Collective action to inform and enlighten the peoples of the world as to the dangers of the armaments race, and particularly as to the destructive effects of modern weapons;
- (d) Discontinuance under international control of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons

1. Mr. WALKER (Australia) said that the Soviet Union's declaration that it would not participate in the work of the Disarmament Commission and of its Sub-Committee if the membership of those organs remained unchanged (890th meeting) was an attempt to intimidate the Committee. The Soviet Union evidently hoped that some members would withdraw their support of the twenty-four Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.179 and Corr.1 and Add.1) and cast their vote for proposals more palatable to the Soviet Union. However, the people of the world would regard the Soviet Union's withdrawal from the Disarmament Commission shortly after the demonstration of Soviet advances in rockets and satellites as a threat to the future peace of the world. By leaving the Commission, the Soviet Union assumed responsibility for the collapse of its endeavours.

2. The Australian delegation did not believe that many members of the Committee would be influenced in their voting by the Soviet threat. Most of the delegations had examined the issues seriously and arrived at their conclusions honestly. Although Australia could not support them, there were a number of proposals before the Committee which represented an honest endeavour to advance the work of the United Nations on the disarmament problem.

3. The Japanese draft resolution (A/C.1/L.174), for example, reflected the understandably strong feelings of the Japanese Government and people on the question of suspending tests of nuclear weapons. However, the fact that the suspension of tests was singled out for separate action, before there was any assurance that agreement could be reached on the inspected prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, made the proposal unacceptable to Australia. A ban on tests would provide a false sense of security if it were not part of a wider agreement and of an inspection system to reduce the risk of the use of nuclear weapons.

4. Similarly, the Indian draft resolution on the suspension of tests (A/C.1/L.176/Rev.4) was unacceptable because it separated the question of nuclear tests from the comprehensive programme of disarmament. Australia could not vote for the more substantive Indian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.178/Rev.2) because it differed too widely from the twenty-four-Power draft, of which Australia was a co-sponsor.

5. On the other hand, the Indian draft resolution which would enlarge the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee (A/C.1/L.177) merited careful consideration. While it would hardly be advisable to give it effect at the present stage when initial agreements could be worked out only by the great military Powers, it might be applicable at a later stage of the negotiations, when other countries would have to be brought into the discussions on particular issues. That would be the case, for instance, in connexion with agreed reduction in the levels of armed forces in various regions of the world.

6. The work of the two disarmament organs of the United Nations was basically different from that of the First Committee. The First Committee discussed the problem from a general, world point of view and made recommendations by majority vote which could be influential. Majority votes in the Sub-Committee would mean little, since agreement among those immediately concerned had to be unanimous. The Disarmament Commission was in an intermediate position between the Assembly and the Sub-Committee: more countries would have to be brought into the Commission at a later stage when the negotiations began to affect their particular security problems. The Soviet draft resolution which proposed an eighty-two-member permanent disarmament commission (A/C.1/797) reflected an altogether different idea of what was involved in negotiating

an international agreement. In view of the Soviet position on the Interim Committee of the General Assembly its proposal for a disarmament commission of the whole could hardly be taken seriously.

7. Moreover, it was not necessary to strive for unanimity in the First Committee, at least not at the price of ignoring real differences of view on the principles and procedures involved in reaching a satisfactory disarmament agreement. The Committee should not hesitate to record a majority view and to make substantive recommendations to the Sub-Committee. The Sub-Committee could also take into account other suggestions made in the Committee. His delegation commended the twenty-four-Power draft resolution for adoption, together with the amendments submitted by Norway and Pakistan (A/C.1/L.184). While there could be no control without disarmament, no measure of disarmament should be delayed by failure to explore in advance the technical problems involved in inspection and control. The Australian delegation would also vote for the Belgian draft resolution (A/3630/Corr.1). It reiterated its appeal to the Soviet Union to reconsider its position with respect to participation in the disarmament organs.

8. Mr. SHTYLLA (Albania) said that the debate had shown that partial agreements on certain aspects of disarmament were possible and should be reached by mutual concessions based on the principle of equality between the parties. The Soviet proposals were constructive, conciliatory and acceptable to the Powers concerned, but those Powers, in particular, the United States, had rejected them, thus reaffirming their warmongering policy. The Western Powers could not narrow their differences with the Soviet Union unless they showed the same goodwill and spirit of conciliation as the USSR.

9. Albania supported the Soviet draft resolutions (A/3674/Rev.1, A/C.1/797, A/C.1/L.175/Rev.1) because they were sound, practical and timely. They were supported overwhelmingly by the peoples of the world. They had been put forward in a spirit of compromise and their adoption would facilitate the conclusion of other agreements having a beneficial influence on international relations.

10. The Albanian delegation would vote against the twenty-four-Power draft resolution because that draft would not facilitate agreement. The Western Powers had openly stated their opposition to a ban on nuclear weapons and on the use of those weapons for an experimental five-year period, and had made agreement contingent on a solution of political differences which had no direct bearing on disarmament. They had presented their proposals as an ultimatum, notwithstanding their protests that it merely represented a working basis for the Sub-Committee. The Sub-Committee and its parent Commission, as presently constituted, were not the appropriate organs in which to achieve positive results. The Western Powers had converted the Sub-Committee into an organ of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and were using it to further their political aims. A permanent disarmament commission as suggested by the Soviet Union would be an effective instrument for narrowing differences and bringing about agreement. Many delegations had recognized the need for the participation of the smaller States in the disarmament negotiations in order to reflect the vital importance of the issue to all peoples. Consequently,

Albania approved of the Soviet declaration of its intention to withdraw from the existing organs unless their membership was enlarged. That declaration was neither an ultimatum nor a propaganda gesture; it was an expression of the Soviet Union's ardent desire to break the deadlock and try new ways of reaching an agreement.

11. Albania would also support the Belgian draft resolution (A/3630/Corr.1), provided it incorporated the amendments submitted by Poland (A/C.1/L.185).

12. Mr. MATSUDAIRA (Japan) said that his delegation could not support the motion that priority in the voting be given to the twenty-four-Power draft resolution. It would ask the Committee to take a vote on the Japanese draft resolution (A/C.1/L.174) because the views of the minority as well as of the majority should be recorded in the interests of democratic procedure.

13. While Japan maintained its reservations with regard to the twenty-four-Power draft as a whole, it supported the amendments submitted by Norway and Pakistan (A/C.1/L.184). It would also vote for the amendment of the five Latin-American States (A/C.1/L.181 and Add.1).

14. With regard to the Soviet Union's declared intention to boycott the existing disarmament organs, he drew attention to the fact that those organs had been established by resolutions of the General Assembly and expressed the hope that the Soviet Union would respect the Assembly's decisions and recommendations. Since the views of all States on disarmament could be given adequate expression in the First Committee, it would seem unnecessary to enlarge the Disarmament Commission as proposed by the Soviet Union, although it might usefully be enlarged by a few members in order better to reflect the views of the small Powers.

15. Mr. ENGEN (Norway) again emphasized that the crux of the disarmament problem was the achievement of a controlled cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons use. Norway felt that that measure, together with the question of the suspension of tests, should be considered first of all so that some advance, however modest, might be made towards a solution. The Soviet refusal to consider a cessation of production of fissionable materials unless it was accompanied by a ban on the production and use of nuclear weapons reflected an "all or nothing" position which was not conducive to progress. However, Norway did not wish to complicate matters by pressing for something which the principal Powers concerned were not prepared to accept at the present stage. On the other hand, the Assembly should not adjourn without recommending some initial step towards disarmament on which the parties could agree immediately and unconditionally. Such a step was proposed in the amendments submitted by Norway and Pakistan (A/C.1/L.184) to the twenty-four-Power draft resolution.

16. The major Powers agreed in principle that measures should be taken for a controlled cessation of tests, controlled conventional disarmament and inspection against surprise attack. They did not agree on how those measures should be implemented. The purpose of the amendments submitted by Norway and Pakistan was to initiate the elaboration of possible control and inspection measures on which the Powers would subsequently have to agree. When the parties had a clearer idea of how the necessary control

machinery would operate, they might be more inclined to agree on the disarmament measures which were to be subject to that control. On that point, he endorsed the views of the representative of Sweden (884th meeting). Moreover, by embarking on a study of the technical problems of control and inspection immediately, delay would be avoided on the actual implementation of agreed measures.

17. Mr. PALAMARCHUK (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) thought that the Committee should concentrate primarily on concrete proposals dealing with urgent questions, and not on draft resolutions restating general principles. If the General Assembly were to accept the Soviet proposals for the immediate cessation of tests of nuclear weapons for at least two or three years (A/3674/Rev.1) and for refraining from the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons for five years (A/C.1/L.175/Rev.1), favourable conditions would be created for wider agreement on disarmament, for the improvement of international relations and for averting the threat of an atomic war. It was obvious, however, that the Western Powers had no intention of taking any practical steps to those ends, since they regarded nuclear weapons as a tool of power politics. Their attitude was reflected in the twenty-four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.179 and Corr.1 and Add.1), based on the proposals submitted by the Western Powers to the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission in the working paper of 29 August 1957 (DC/113, annex 5).

18. It was noteworthy that the twenty-four-Power draft resolution made not a single reference to the prohibition of atomic weapons, although the French representative had stated (890th meeting) that such prohibition was one of the aims of the Western Powers. There could be no doubt that the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Canada were still in favour of increasing their military power. Moreover, although the draft resolution contained a provision for the immediate suspension of nuclear tests, that was only a smoke-screen, for it linked the question with a whole series of disarmament problems, which, in turn, were made conditional on the settlement of certain political problems.

19. The twenty-four-Power draft resolution replaced all measures regarding nuclear weapons by a proposal for the cessation of production of fissionable materials for military purposes. Such a proposal, however, had no practical meaning without the prohibition of nuclear weapons, their elimination from the armaments of States, the destruction of existing stockpiles of such weapons and the cessation of production of weapons from existing fissionable materials. It also ran counter to the General Assembly's resolutions calling for the absolute prohibition of nuclear weapons.

20. The same general trend was reflected in the proposals concerning conventional armaments. Contrary to General Assembly resolution 808 A (IX), which called for a major reduction of all armed forces and conventional armaments, the twenty-four-Power draft contained a vague formula, which would enable any State to evade appreciable reductions and which was based on the proposals of 29 August 1957.

21. It could only be inferred that the Western Powers were seeking to avoid agreement and to raise obstacles to disarmament. As soon as the Committee had begun to consider the draft resolutions submitted, a violent attack had been launched against all other proposals,

especially against that of the Soviet Union. The motion to give priority to the twenty-four-Power draft was not merely a procedural move, but a deliberate stratagem against the adoption of measures which did not suit the opponents of disarmament.

22. Although the Yugoslav draft resolution (A/C.1/L.180) was obviously prompted by good intentions, the Ukrainian delegation could not support it, because it considered that the cessation of production of fissionable materials for military purposes, without the prohibition of nuclear weapons and their elimination from the armaments of States, would not serve to avert the threat of atomic war.

23. Progress in the field of disarmament would be furthered by a change in the procedure of discussing disarmament problems in the United Nations, and particularly by broadening the basis of such discussion to include all States. The Soviet proposal to set up a permanent disarmament commission composed of all States Members of the United Nations (A/C.1/797) was therefore opportune and was particularly urgent in view of the failure of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee to carry out the tasks assigned to them by the General Assembly. One of the reasons for that failure was the limited membership of the Commission and Sub-Committee and the fact that seventy Member States were excluded from disarmament debates. Moreover, the secrecy of proceedings in the Sub-Committee had led to ignorance of the subject in many States and had even misled world public opinion. Consideration of disarmament problems should not be confined to a narrow group of States. Although the great Powers bore the primary responsibility for solving those problems, small and medium-sized States should be given an opportunity to make practical contributions to the cause of peace. The Ukrainian delegation would therefore vote in favour of the Soviet proposal for the establishment of a permanent disarmament commission and would vote against the twenty-four-Power draft resolution.

24. Mr. BOLAND (Ireland) said that, although the potential danger inherent in any plan for public propaganda in favour of disarmament was that it might encourage people in countries where public opinion was free to demand reduction in armaments irrespective of world conditions necessitating the maintenance of national defence at a safe level, Ireland would support the Belgian draft resolution (A/3630/Corr.1). Its position was based on a recognition of the idealism and sincere devotion to the cause of peace which had led Belgium to submit it.

25. With regard to the various substantive draft resolutions, Ireland would be guided by the following considerations. An essential precondition for progress in the disarmament negotiations was a relaxation of tension between the main Powers concerned, particularly in certain vital areas. In the absence of confidence, no resolutions adopted by the Assembly could be very helpful. However, any disarmament agreement which might eventually be negotiated would have to deal with the six points enumerated in paragraph 1 of the twenty-four-Power draft resolution not only severally, but in their relationship with one another. No resolution of the Assembly could take the place of agreement among the major Powers on those points; it could be no more than a suggestion of the broad lines along which negotiations should be pursued.

Although many of the proposals before the Committee could usefully be incorporated in a final disarmament convention, the twenty-four-Power draft resolution was the only one which afforded a fair, reasonable and realistic basis for at least a partial disarmament agreement. His delegation would support it, as amended by Norway and Pakistan.

26. Ireland could not support the proposals for enlarging the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee or for replacing them by a committee of the whole Assembly. Whatever other methods might be temporarily applied, effective agreement must ultimately depend on the method of negotiations between the Powers principally concerned. Moreover, the General Assembly and the First Committee provided ample opportunity for public debate and no further provision was required. It was in any case unwise to abolish the Sub-Committee, which constituted the only body in the structure of the United Nations for the type of detailed, technical discussions on which agreement depended. Ireland therefore regretted the Soviet Union's declared intention of withdrawing from the Sub-Committee. Surely, if a majority decision of the Assembly on disarmament was, in the Soviet view, an ultimatum, the same could be said of a majority decision of the proposed permanent disarmament commission. Ireland hoped that the Soviet Union would reconsider its decision.

27. Mr. PELAEZ (Philippines) said that the Soviet Union's statement that it would not participate in the work of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee in their present composition was a regrettable attempt to exert pressure upon the members of the First Committee to change the composition of those bodies in conformity with the wishes of the Soviet Union. In a sense the Soviet Union was itself guilty of delivering an ultimatum to the United Nations. Threats of boycott could not be regarded as legitimate persuasion and could not be allowed to sway the Committee in its decision. It was to be hoped that the Soviet Union would not persist in its attitude.

28. The Soviet Union proposal to replace the present Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee by a permanent disarmament commission consisting of all the States Members of the United Nations (A/C.1/797) would be ineffective because, regardless of the composition of the body in question, the principal parties concerned had a de facto veto power in the negotiations. A change in the Commission or its Sub-Committee would not alter that salient fact. Moreover a workman-like approach to the disarmament problem would certainly be impossible in a body of eighty-two members. The Philippine delegation was therefore unable to support the Soviet Union proposal for the creation of an eighty-two-member permanent disarmament commission.

29. His delegation also regretted its inability to support the Indian draft resolution which called for an increase in the membership of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee (A/C.1/L.177) but failed to indicate the number of States to be added and gave no indication of the basis on which additional Member States were to be chosen. Moreover, the arguments which he had adduced against the Soviet proposal applied with equal weight to the Indian draft resolution.

30. Referring to the suggestion of the Mexican dele-

gation (699th plenary meeting) for the designation of a United Nations commissioner for disarmament, he agreed that the designation of such an official should depend entirely on the principal parties concerned.

31. The Philippine delegation would vote in favour of the Belgian draft resolution (A/3630/Corr.1). It associated itself with the view that, as presently worded, that draft resolution was in no way concerned with political issues and should be left unchanged. It believed, however, that the second Polish amendment (A/C.1/L.185) was an improvement in style which strengthened the draft resolution and was, therefore, acceptable. Although it concurred in the fear that the campaign provided for in the Belgian draft resolution might be misused, the Philippine delegation would vote in favour of that draft in the hope that no Member State would use that campaign to serve its own ends.

32. The Philippine delegation considered that the General Assembly should unanimously recommend the resumption of negotiations on disarmament. There were divergent opinions on the specific points that the Assembly should offer as a guide for future disarmament negotiations. Some countries, such as Japan, India and the Soviet Union, singled out the question of nuclear tests and proposed their suspension as an independent, isolated step. Another proposal, put forward by the Soviet Union, was that States possessing nuclear weapons should assume a temporary obligation not to use them for five years (A/C.1/L.175/Rev.1). A third proposal, advanced in the twenty-four-Power draft resolution, called for the immediate suspension of nuclear tests upon the emergence of agreement in principle on a number of initial steps vital to disarmament.

33. Finally the Yugoslav draft resolution (A/C.1/L.180), comprised most of the points contained in the foregoing proposals but separated them, thus rejecting a unified approach.

34. Despite the universal desire that nuclear tests should be suspended at the earliest possible date, the Philippine delegation felt that the General Assembly would be remiss in its duty if it adopted a resolution recommending only a suspension of nuclear tests without reference to the really vital aspects of disarmament. Such a recommendation standing by itself would be grossly inadequate and could lull the world into a false sense of security. Accordingly, the Philippine delegation could not lend its support to such proposals. The USSR draft resolution calling for a mere declaration by States possessing nuclear weapons not to use them (A/C.1/L.175/Rev.1) was unacceptable because such a declaration would constitute only a gentleman's agreement and unfortunately the parties on either side did not trust one another. With mutual confidence such a declaration would be unnecessary; without mutual confidence, it would be worthless.

35. The Philippine delegation appreciated the efforts exerted by Yugoslavia to offer a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.180) seeking to encompass the different views. That draft resolution, however, failed to give any definite orientation for future negotiations. Moreover, the very number and in some cases the contradictory nature of the details included would merely provide fertile ground for disagreement. The Yugoslav draft resolution failed to establish a definite line of action of the kind which the General Assembly should recommend to the negotiating parties.

36. The Philippine delegation was of the opinion that the twenty-four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.179 and Corr.1 and Add.1) provided a definite, simple and consistent line of action. In reply to the Soviet protest that that draft resolution was tied to political conditions, he stated that no such conditions were to be found in the text itself. Moreover, the United States representative had categorically stated (866th meeting) that his Government and the Western Powers were prepared to enter into an agreement without any political conditions.

37. In view of repeated assurances by various delegations, it would be wrong to think that the twenty-four-Power draft resolution was a rigid ultimatum. That draft was, rather, a starting point for resuming negotiations which in no way curtailed the freedom of the negotiating parties to explore various approaches to the problem.

38. Two documents had been offered to amend the twenty-four-Power draft resolution which the Philippine delegation regarded as improvements. The first consisted of the amendments of Norway and Pakistan (A/C.1/L.184) which would provide machinery to work out the technical problems of disarmament and give impetus to the speedy implementation of agreements which might be reached in principle. With regard to the second, the Philippine delegation was pleased to associate itself with the amendment of Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico and Uruguay (A/C.1/L.181 and Add.1) recommending that the States concerned should consider the possibility of devoting the funds made available as a result of disarmament to the improvement of living conditions throughout the world, particularly in the less-developed countries. It favoured that amendment, either as presently worded or as amended to take into account the views of some members.

39. Prince WAN WAITHAYAKON (Thailand) said that the problem of disarmament was most complex because its object was not the mere reduction of armaments, but the attainment of security and the prevention of war. The various component parts, even in the initial stage, must be dealt with as a whole before they were considered separately in detail. Therefore, the delegation of Thailand was in agreement with the twenty-four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.179 and Corr.1 and Add.1) both as regards the contents of a priority disarmament agreement and the procedure to be adopted.

40. Analysing the contents of the joint draft resolution, he questioned whether any of the sub-paragraphs of paragraph 1 would be deleted and, if so, whether the peoples of the world would then feel that there was sufficient security to allay the fear of war. Sub-paragraph (a), concerning the suspension of testing of nuclear weapons, obviously could not be deleted because an agreement on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests was certainly desired by people all over the world. Nor could sub-paragraphs (b) or (c) be deleted because they were the corollaries of sub-paragraph (a). Sub-paragraph (d), concerning the reduction of armed forces and armaments, could likewise not be deleted, for without such reduction there would still be fear of war in the popular mind. Similarly, sub-paragraph (e), concerning the progressive establishment of open inspection with ground and aerial components, should be retained because an agreement on that point would reassure world public opinion. The necessity of including sub-paragraph (f), concerning joint study of an in-

spection system designed to ensure that the sending of objects to outer space would be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes, was not so clear but since only a joint study was to be made, the delegation of Thailand did not object to the inclusion of that sub-paragraph.

41. His delegation was of the opinion that the present procedural arrangement was well calculated to meet the requirements of the case. At each session of the General Assembly there was a full discussion of the disarmament problem in all its aspects and every delegation was at liberty to present its ideas and proposals. Then the matter was entrusted to the Disarmament Commission, and, for purposes of negotiation, to its Sub-Committee. Nothing, however, prevented the Disarmament Commission from playing a more active role and he hoped that it would do so.

42. The Yugoslav draft resolution (A/C.1/L.180) seemed to assume that the cessation of nuclear weapons tests could be the subject of a separate agreement. The delegation of Thailand did not share that view and agreed with the twenty-four-Power draft resolution that a disarmament agreement should combine provisions for the immediate suspension of testing of nuclear weapons with provisions for the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, the restriction of future production to non-weapons purposes only, and the reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons. He explained, however, that he interpreted the word "suspension" in the joint draft resolution as referring to a long-term suspension or what the Yugoslav delegation referred to as "cessation". He could well conceive of a temporary suspension or moratorium.

43. It was in that light that he had examined the Japanese draft resolution (A/C.1/L.174) calling upon Member States to suspend all nuclear test explosions from the time an agreement was reached in principle on a supervision and inspection system necessary to verify the suspension of tests until the discussions on the report of the Disarmament Commission at the next regular session of the General Assembly had been concluded. His objection to that draft resolution was that it did not leave the Member States concerned sufficient liberty of action in determining the conditions on which an agreement for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests might be concluded. In fact, it was an appeal to suspend the tests and not an appeal to the Member States concerned to come to an agreement for the suspension of the tests.

44. He found a similar difficulty with the Indian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.176/Rev.4) because in his delegation's opinion the United Nations must appeal to the Member States concerned to come to an agreement for an immediate temporary suspension of nuclear tests. He believed that a temporary suspension was sincerely desired by the peoples of the world and that it was possible. The Member States concerned must, however, agree upon the conditions for such suspension. Representatives of small countries, in particular, should express the peoples' desire for a temporary suspension of such tests so that the great Powers concerned might feel their responsibilities in the matter even more keenly.

45. The delegation of Thailand supported the Belgian draft resolution (A/3630/Corr.1) and the five-Power

amendment (A/C.1/L.181 and Add.1) to the twenty-four-Power draft resolution.

46. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) drew attention to the Soviet Union draft resolution proposing the abolition of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee and the establishment of a permanent disarmament commission consisting of all the States Members of the United Nations (A/C.1/797). The proposal, which had been carefully considered, was prompted by the failure of the existing United Nations disarmament bodies to achieve any results and by the longing of the common people of the world for peace.

47. The narrow composition of the Sub-Committee, consisting as it did of four NATO countries and the Soviet Union, had given many countries no opportunity to take part in the discussion of disarmament problems. The Sub-Committee's work, moreover, had been absolutely fruitless and the Disarmament Commission itself had been reduced to playing the part of a post office for the Sub-Committee's reports.

48. The ruling circles of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Canada, which did not wish their countries to disarm, had been using the Sub-Committee as camouflage for the armaments race, prolonging the negotiations in order to represent themselves as champions of disarmament and to delude world public opinion. It was obvious that the secret proceedings of the Sub-Committee could not contribute to a successful solution of disarmament problems.

49. The United States representative had alleged in his statement (866th meeting) that the Sub-Committee had achieved favourable results; unfortunately, that did not correspond to the facts, for no agreement had been reached, despite the Sub-Committee's seventy-one closed meetings. The United States and French representatives had also tried to distort the Soviet representative's statement by alleging that the Soviet Union was no longer willing to consider the problem of disarmament. In actual fact, however, the Soviet Union's new proposal was motivated by its desire to emerge from the deadlock that had been reached.

50. The Committee's debates had shown that the majority of Member States were genuinely alarmed by the lack of progress and by the necessity to solve the disarmament problem in order to avert the threat of a destructive atomic war. Many proposals had been made on ways and means of expediting and facilitating such a solution, and it had been correctly pointed out that the best method would be to expand the number of States participating in disarmament negotiations. The Governments of the seventy countries which had no chance of taking part in those negotiations had shown great interest in the problem, but their constructive proposals to bring the positions of the countries concerned closer together had not been studied seriously in the Sub-Committee.

51. Accordingly, the new Soviet proposal was timely and expedient. Its adoption would serve to eliminate the serious drawbacks of the present United Nations procedures with regard to disarmament and would promote a solution of the whole problem. The Byelorussian delegation would support that proposal and also the Soviet proposals for the assumption of the obligation not to use atomic and hydrogen weapons for five years (A/C.1/L.175/Rev.1) and for the cessation of nuclear weapons tests for two or three years (A/3674/Rev.1).

52. The Byelorussian delegation did not consider that the Belgian draft resolution (A/3630/Corr.1) served any useful purpose in its present form. The dissemination of information on the armaments race would not remove the danger of war; the urgent need was to concentrate all efforts on the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. The Byelorussian delegation would therefore be able to support the Belgian draft only if it were modified, in accordance with the Polish amendments (A/C.1/L.185), which substantially improved it.

53. The shortcomings of the Japanese draft resolution (A/C.1/L.174) remained unaltered. Although the draft appealed for the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, it linked that question with agreement on other disarmament problems; experience had shown that such an approach, which was similar to that of the twenty-four-Power draft resolution, would actually lead to the prevention of agreement on the cessation of tests. The Japanese draft was therefore one facet of the attempt to impose on the Committee the views of the opponents of a disarmament agreement.

54. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) said that the discussion in the Committee, and particularly the explanations of the various draft resolutions furnished by their sponsors, made it possible to draw some general conclusions and to foresee the consequences which the adoption of those drafts would have.

55. Six general conclusions emerged from the debate: first, that the existence of nuclear weapons was in itself a threat to the very existence of whole peoples in certain areas of the world, who were doomed to almost complete destruction in case of a general war; secondly, that the peoples of the whole world were united in the conviction that the disarmament question was the most important and most urgent international problem of modern times; thirdly, that the effects of the radiation emitted during test explosions were a growing danger to all mankind and that steps should be taken to stop the tests; fourthly, that, although a final decision on a disarmament agreement and especially on the elimination of nuclear weapons from the armaments of States was the responsibility of the great Powers, the small countries and all the peoples of the world nevertheless had a great interest in the conclusion of an agreement on the problem, particularly in view of the fact that they ran the risk of becoming the innocent victims of a general nuclear war; fifthly, that world public opinion was very far ahead of the opinions expressed by some representatives on the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the suspension of test explosions; and sixthly, that it was unanimously recognized that, in view of the difficulties which stood in the way of general disarmament, it would be more reasonable to begin by concluding partial agreements on questions on which agreement in principle existed between the parties. The draft resolutions before the Committee should be examined in the light of those conclusions.

56. The twenty-four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.179 and Corr.1 and Add.1) expressed the point of view of the four NATO countries which were members of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission; in fact, the very wording of the draft was an exact restatement of the last proposals submitted by those Powers (DC/113, annex 5).

57. The policy of the United States and its allies was

to assure themselves of military supremacy and to rely on armed strength and the power of the "nuclear deterrent" to guarantee world security. It was not surprising, therefore, that the United Kingdom representative had presented arguments against the suspension of nuclear tests and had attempted to minimize the danger they represented.

58. The twenty-four-Power draft resolution not only linked the question of suspension with other problems which the Western Powers themselves had made insoluble but, in contradiction to all the resolutions already adopted on the subject, failed to mention the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the solemn undertaking not to employ them. Such a prohibition would certainly influence world public opinion against the manufacture of those weapons, and that was why it was feared by the circles interested in the production of nuclear weapons.

59. For the first time since the creation of the United Nations an attempt was being made to impose on one side the opinion of the other regarding disarmament. However, a solution to the problem of disarmament could not be found by delivering ultimatums. Moreover, the twenty-four-Power draft resolution would block all negotiation and any possibility of disarmament, and was an expression of the policy of nuclear supremacy and "positions of strength", pursued by the Western Powers, as recent decisions of the United States and United Kingdom Governments had confirmed.

60. The CHAIRMAN reminded the Bulgarian representative that the Committee was discussing only the draft resolutions and amendments now before it, and asked him to confine his remarks to them.

61. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) said that he was explaining the position on which some of the draft resolutions before the Committee were based.

62. The explanations made to the Committee by the representative of the Western Powers regarding the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes were additional proof of their lack of sincerity regarding the prohibition and cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The cessation of future production was proposed without being accompanied by an agreement or even an undertaking regarding the categorical prohibition of nuclear weapons and their elimination from the armaments of States. Moreover, the Western Powers refused to halt nuclear test explosions, and that attitude could only result in a further extension of nuclear weapons production and the continuation of the armaments race.

63. His delegation could not support a draft resolution which sought to divide the General Assembly and to guarantee military supremacy to certain imperialist and militarist circles in the Western countries.

64. His delegation would support the Soviet draft resolution proposing the establishment of a permanent disarmament commission (A/C.1/797) because all the peoples of the world were vitally interested in the problem of disarmament and should participate in discussion of the problem. The fear that publicity would harm the work of such a commission was unjustified; on the contrary, it might have a salutary effect on the progress of negotiations. Moreover, more than ten years of private negotiation had led only to a dangerous increase in military budgets and nuclear armaments.

Some representatives had said that a permanent disarmament commission would be used for propaganda purposes, but why should propaganda against war and in favour of disarmament be feared? Furthermore, the Soviet proposal, far from excluding direct contact between the representatives of the great Powers, made special provision for it in the very structure of the commission.

65. His delegation would also vote for the Soviet draft resolution in documents A/C.1/L.175/Rev.1 and A/3674/Rev.1, which were in conformity with the desire of the peoples of the world to see a beginning of disarmament, the elimination of nuclear weapons and the cessation of nuclear tests. It could not support the Japanese draft resolution (A/C.1/L.174) which artificially linked the question of the suspension of test explosions with all the difficult questions which the Western Powers had raised as obstacles to disarmament.

66. His delegation had some fear that the Belgian draft resolution (A/3630/Corr.1), as it now stood, might lend itself to propaganda regarding the lack of danger to humanity in the continuation of test explosions. If the draft resolution were amended so as to make its purposes clear, as the Polish delegation had proposed (A/C.1/L.185), his delegation would be able to vote for it. As it stood, it might serve to drown the chief questions of disarmament under a flood of propaganda for the continuation of nuclear test explosions and the establishment of unnecessary controls.

67. Mr. DE LA COLINA (Mexico) recalled the suggestion made by his delegation (699th plenary meeting) that a United Nations commissioner for disarmament should be appointed by the General Assembly on the unanimous recommendation of the members of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission. The basic function of the commissioner would be to assist those members in their negotiations and, to that end, to consult with them, to submit in private for their consideration such proposals as he thought might help to reconcile the differences between them and in general to promote agreement between them. Such a commissioner would not only represent the General Assembly, but could transmit to the great Powers opinions, suggestions and studies which might be of great assistance in the gradual solution of the problems of disarmament.

68. The events of the past few days had reinforced his delegation's conviction that the appointment of a disarmament commissioner or mediator by the General Assembly would not only be useful, but was urgently necessary. However, it was obvious that if the idea was to be successful the statesman to be appointed would have to be recommended unanimously by the great Powers. If those conditions were fulfilled, his delegation would submit a draft resolution to the following effect:

"The General Assembly,

"Convinced that an agreement on disarmament is both necessary and possible,

"Considering that it is urgent to intensify the efforts and to seek additional procedures in order to reconcile diverging points of view,

"1. Requests the Governments of Canada, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and

the United States of America to consider, when they deem it appropriate, the desirability and possibility of unanimously recommending a statesman of high international prestige, to be appointed by the General Assembly, to assist them in their negotiations, and, to this end, to consult with them, to submit in private for their consideration the proposals he may see fit and, in general, to promote agreement among them;

"2. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary facilities to implement the present resolution."

69. If the great Powers did not agree on that proposal,

the idea of the Chairman of the Mexican delegation would be only a suggestion.

70. Mr. MOCH (France) pointed out that, although the representatives of Albania, the Ukrainian SSR and Bulgaria had spoken of an ultimatum, he had stated clearly in his first speech to the Committee (877th meeting) that France would continue to seek, in future negotiations, conciliation and the harmonization of the different points of view. There was no intransigence in France's attitude, only a very great desire for clarity. France desired negotiation and would do everything in its power to achieve it.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.