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Chairman: Mr. Víctor A. BELAUNDE (Peru).

AGENDA ITEM 62

**Question of Algeria (A/3197, A/C.1/L.165 to
 A/C.1/L.167) (*continued*)**

1. The CHAIRMAN observed that the Committee at present was engaged in examining the various draft resolutions before it and he hoped that those representatives who had already participated in the general debate would limit themselves to making specific points concerning the texts under discussion.
2. Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador) expressed satisfaction that France had participated in the discussion of the Algerian question and had submitted (830th and 831st meetings) a full report on the situation in Algeria, in relation both to the point of view of the French Government and to its objectives in the matter of reaching a satisfactory solution.
3. His Government considered that in cases such as the Algerian question the General Assembly was competent to study the problem and to make recommendations for a peaceful solution. It must, however, be remembered that the Assembly was a political organ and not an international tribunal. For that reason, his delegation, even if disposed to vote in favour of a draft resolution embodying a legal opinion of the Assembly in the form of a recommendation or an appeal, could not favour concepts or paragraphs defining the rights of one or the other of the interested parties.
4. He thought that none of the three draft resolutions before the Committee was sufficient to bring about a lasting solution of the Algerian question. Recalling that, in similar cases, the General Assembly had proceeded with caution, limiting itself to the kind of action envisaged in the United Nations Charter as appropriate to a political organ, he hoped that the Assembly would not aggravate the situation by adopting a resolution which would not produce the desired result. It would be unwise on the part of the United Nations to raise new hopes which could not be fulfilled and might lead to a loss of faith in its efficiency. For that reason, his delegation could not support the eighteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.165) or the draft resolution submitted by Japan, the Philippines and Thailand (A/C.1/L.166). However, the first paragraph of the preamble of both draft resolutions was a factual statement of the position and might be included in any draft which the Committee might adopt. If that paragraph were put to the vote separately, his delegation would vote for it.
5. His delegation would support the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.167). It was a moderate and

prudent draft, and its adoption would encourage efforts towards ending the present situation in Algeria and towards creating a better atmosphere for the solution of that problem. At the same time, his delegation believed that not to adopt a draft resolution at the end of the present debate would be unfortunate and would not serve the interests either of the parties concerned or of the United Nations.

6. In conclusion, he made an appeal to the sponsors of the six-Power and the three-Power draft resolutions to reach agreement on a joint text which might be adopted by the majority of the Committee. He suggested that that joint text might contain the first paragraph of the preamble of the three-Power resolution and the two paragraphs of the six-Power draft resolution.

7. Mr. JAMALI (Iraq) said that his delegation had co-sponsored the eighteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.165) because it believed that the United Nations must act realistically and in accordance with the principles of the Charter. It would be unbecoming for Members of the United Nations to adopt a draft resolution which made no reference to the Charter.

8. It had been suggested that it would be better to adopt no resolution at all. An acceptance of that suggestion would mean that the United Nations was reluctant to face world issues and to carry out its responsibilities. It should not be forgotten that fighting was still going on and lives were being lost in Algeria. Under those circumstances, the United Nations could not stand aloof and take no action. For three years a fire had been raging throughout Algeria which France had been unable to put out. It was therefore the duty of the United Nations to see that a whole people was not destroyed in that fire and that peace was restored.

9. His delegation had already maintained that Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter did not apply to the Algerian question any more than it applied to the case of Hungary. In cases of genocide, racial discrimination or national movements for independence, the United Nations must render all assistance possible. A genuine national movement was, after all, a spiritual fire in the heart of man that could not be easily extinguished and deserved full support. Those matters were not the concern of any one particular country; they were the concern of the whole world.

10. The eighteen-Power draft resolution must be adopted because it took cognizance of the facts and abided by the principles of the Charter. The draft first took into consideration the fact that Algeria was a national entity and that there was a genuine nationalist movement in Algeria. If the Committee had had the benefit of hearing representatives of the Algerian national movement, it would have realized that it was a real movement struggling for Algeria's national independence.

11. The Algerians were not a minority, and Algeria was not situated within France. Although France had conquered and colonized Algeria, it had never been

able to assimilate it. The Algerians had remained Algerians and had never given up their Algerian nationality. In fact, France had itself recognized the individuality of Algeria when it had negotiated with the Algerian National Liberation Front. The fact that France was ready to negotiate again after elections showed that it did recognize that there was an actual Algerian movement. Under the circumstances, it would be a service to France itself if its friends were to tell the truth about the trend of the times, the trend of history and the principles of the Charter, and if they were to suggest ways in which France could implement those principles. The sponsors of the eighteen-Power draft resolution believed that recognition of Algerian individuality and the right of Algeria to self-determination would best serve the cause of peace and the principles of the Charter.

12. By denying the right of self-determination and by denying the principles of the Charter, the Assembly would not be serving the cause of peace in Algeria. Unless each Member State took a stand for the cause of freedom for all mankind, it should feel morally responsible for the tragedy in Algeria. Freedom was indivisible, whether it concerned Algeria, Eastern Europe, Asia, or any other part of the world.

13. France had declared that it was ready to hold elections in Algeria after a cease-fire. He wondered for what purpose those elections would be held. When there was no freedom and no right of self-determination, to hold elections would amount to painting the walls of a prison. The people of Algeria were, however, not interested in having their prison decorated; they preferred to be free. French plans in respect of social legislation had also been mentioned, but he was sure that the Algerians preferred to have the freedom to adopt their own social legislation.

14. While Iraq had always stood for coexistence, both among peoples and nations, it could not, however, support the coexistence of the ruler and the ruled. It nevertheless believed that once France had recognized Algeria's right to self-determination, then coexistence would be easily possible between those two countries.

15. The arguments now being used to oppose the freeing of Algeria had already been adduced in the past in connexion with Morocco and Tunisia. He appealed to all Member States to recognize the fact that a new nation called Algeria had emerged and to extend to it their support so that it might achieve its freedom in a peaceful manner. He also hoped that France would realize that Algeria was a great potential ally and that it should change its attitude towards Algeria. The cause of freedom must be recognized everywhere, irrespective of questions of race, colour, religion or geographical position. The question of Algeria had not been raised on a religious or racial basis. Iraq would be equally ready to fight for the cause of freedom in any other part of the world.

16. The eighteen-Power draft resolution took into consideration both the realities in Algeria and world public opinion, and was based upon the principles of the Charter. Its chief aim was that France and Algeria should come to a settlement on the basis of France's recognition of Algeria's right to self-determination. In operative paragraph 2, the draft resolution therefore invited France and the people of Algeria to enter into immediate negotiations with a view to obtaining the cessation of hostilities and a peaceful settlement of their differences in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. The draft also requested the Secretary-

General to assist the parties in conducting such negotiations and to report to the General Assembly at its twelfth session. That was, in any case, within the sphere of duties of the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General reported annually on the world situation, which certainly included Algeria. He was, therefore, not being requested to go out of his way. He would be available to the parties concerned in case his services were desired.

17. Mr. ALVAREZ AYBAR (Dominican Republic) said that his delegation considered that the United Nations should not treat the Algerian question as one on which it was competent to suggest a solution, because in the case of Algeria such an action would not be in keeping with the mission of the United Nations in the matter of peaceful solutions. There were two opinions on the question of competence: that of relative competence or the right of limited intervention, and that of complete incompetence. A solution should be sought on the basis of programmes of gradual and progressive action.

18. For that reason, the Dominican delegation would support the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.167) as the only prudent one. It also believed that only a negotiated solution, and not an imposed one, was possible under the present circumstances. That solution must also take into account the interests of all those who resided in Algeria.

19. Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) proposed to consider objectively the three draft resolutions submitted to the Committee in the light of his delegation's extensive knowledge of the realities which existed on his country's borders and in the light of Tunisia's recent settlement with France.

20. The six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.167) reflected a commendable concern not to interfere with the peaceful solution of the question or to take sides. That was a praiseworthy intention, but the draft also involved certain disadvantages. In the first place, it approved the position taken by France without doing so openly. On the basis of the premises contained in the draft, it would have been more logical for it to express the hope that the question might be settled peacefully on the basis of the plan contained in the French statement (830th and 831st meetings). However, that was not the logical conclusion of the debate, which was that all favoured a peaceful and democratic solution based on the principles of the Charter; in that case, another considerandum referring to the debate which had taken place should have been included which would not even have implied any approval of the French position. But that was a minor embarrassment. All delegations were more or less embarrassed in the matter. His delegation refused absolutely to impair the well-founded friendship between Tunisia and France.

21. There were two further serious disadvantages in the six-Power draft resolution. He had already pointed out (836th meeting) that the continued denial of justice by France with respect to the aspirations of the Algerian people had compelled the latter to engage in the unfortunate and deplorable struggle which it had begun in November 1954. He had also shown that, if the Assembly were to avoid the problem and not take a stand, if it did not recommend a cease-fire and the initiation of direct negotiations for a peaceful settlement, the right of the Algerian people to the exercise of its sovereignty and to self-determination having previously been affirmed, there would be a moral denial of justice

which would be most serious for the Organization, which claimed to be universal and to render equal justice to all. Such a denial of justice would do nothing to make peace easier to achieve. Another serious disadvantage of the draft was that it constituted an implicit statement that the General Assembly lacked competence. He did not intend to return to the question of competence, but believed that any decision on the matter must be a formal and explicit one in reply to a direct request. Such a decision had been taken by the General Assembly at its tenth session (530th plenary meeting) at the conclusion of a debate on the question whether the matter was within the competence of the Assembly, and resolution 909 (X) had confirmed that decision. The fact that the General Assembly had included the question in the agenda of its eleventh session without objection (654th plenary meeting) made it clear that the question of competence was *res judicata*. Only another decision no less clear and no less precise could alter the previous decision of the General Assembly. For all those reasons, he opposed adoption of the six-Power draft resolution.

22. The three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.166), which was based on the desire for a compromise, differed from the six-Power draft in that it contributed something concrete and positive, something more in keeping with the principles of the Charter. The lack of clarity of the text, however, might remove all of its effectiveness.

23. His delegation consequently preferred the eighteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.165), of which it was a sponsor. Explaining the reasons for this preference, he noted that all delegations favoured ending the war in Algeria. While that war was not a civil war in the legal sense of the word, it was certainly a fratricidal one between two peoples who had had a common life for over a century. That desire of all delegations must therefore be signified by an appeal for a cease-fire and a cessation of hostilities. By stating as much in a resolution, the other Members of the United Nations would only be supporting France in its appeal to the Algerian people. That appeal had so far not been followed by any concrete results. The fact was regrettable, but it remained a fact. He reiterated his view that the appeal had not been effective because the French proposals continued the legal fiction that Algeria was an integral part of France, which the Algerian people did not believe. The Algerian people did exist. They had not been assimilated by the French nation—assimilation had indeed been rejected by the French Parliament in 1936. Algeria had not been integrated into the French nation, as integration had been thought of only after the Algerians had started to fight in desperation in their search for a dignified and free life. Like every distinctive people in the world, the Algerian people had good qualities and faults. Unfortunately, that people revealed itself by shedding its blood, by its wounds and casualties, and by acts which sometimes were regrettable. France, for domestic reasons with which the Committee was not concerned, still hesitated to change its ideas about its future relations with the Algerians; its appeal for a cease-fire had therefore received no welcome and could receive none. It was therefore incumbent on the General Assembly, by reaffirming the right of the Algerian people to self-determination in accordance with the principles of the Charter, to facilitate the peaceful settlement of the dispute and the achievement of a cease-fire. The Assembly would not in any way prejudice the future relations

between France and the Algerian people by such a proclamation. Reference to the right of self-determination did not mean the immediate exercise of that right. Moreover, once the Algerian people had recovered that right, nothing could prevent it from exercising it in full agreement with France and building a system of real and peaceful co-operation based on respect and equality.

24. Dealing with paragraph 3 of the eighteen-Power draft resolution, which requested the Secretary-General to assist the parties, he noted that some delegations regarded that paragraph as representing an even greater degree of intervention in affairs essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of France. Pointing out that he had already dealt with that aspect of the matter, he said that the problem was to facilitate negotiations with a view to ending hostilities and to finding a peaceful solution of the dispute in accordance with the Charter. To request the Secretary-General to offer his help was one means of assisting the negotiations. The sponsors would have liked to ask a committee of good offices to do that, but it appeared that such a method might raise difficulties about its composition and terms of reference. The Secretary-General, by the nature of his office, and indeed his personality, might avoid touching on certain sensitive spots. It was difficult, as his delegation knew from experience, to begin negotiations for a cease-fire. Officers who had viewed the *fellagha* as bandits—which they were not—would not find it easy suddenly to meet them in order to discuss ways and means of ending hostilities. The sponsors had wanted to avoid any painful situation that might develop at the outset by bringing in a third party who enjoyed a certain prestige and who would not be an arbitrator, but would lend his assistance.

25. A serious complaint against the eighteen-Power draft resolution was that it did not mention the democratic character of the peaceful settlement which all desired. In that connexion, he pointed out that his country, which had applied democratic principles since recovering its independence, was above any suspicion of being anti-democratic. The point had been omitted from the draft because it would have implied agreement with the system proposed by France. Since 1948, there had been legitimate suspicion concerning Algerian elections. France was opposed to dispelling such misgivings by admitting a United Nations election commission to participate in the organization and conduct of the elections. The French declaration that neutral observers would be invited to witness the elections was simply a declaration of intentions which, however praiseworthy, appeared to many not to offer safeguards which would dispel legitimate suspicion. Moreover, the French delegation had not indicated in what proportion Frenchmen and Algerians were to be elected. It was conceivable that a single electoral college of French and Algerians might elect fifteen Frenchmen and fifteen Algerians—the question had been raised by eminent members of the French Parliament—but that would not be very democratic. It could lead to a situation in which discussion of the future status of Algeria would be conducted by Algerians, the French Government and Frenchmen from Algeria, with the interests of the latter thus being doubly represented. Furthermore, the elections would designate thirty members of the French National Assembly, which had 627 seats. There was a considerable disproportion between electing thirty representatives to represent 8 million to 10 million people and 627 to represent another 40 million. The greatest

difficulty was involved in the fact that the representatives to the French National Assembly would also be empowered to discuss—not to negotiate—with the French Government concerning the future status of Algeria. The fiction of Algeria as an integral part of France thus continued, and it was in order to dispel it that the Algerian people had embarked on the current deplorable and unfortunate struggle. That was why the sponsors of the eighteen-Power draft resolution had thought it best not to use the word “democratic”.

26. His delegation was firmly convinced that the adoption of that draft would contribute to the solution desired by all. As the representative of India had pointed out (844th meeting), the draft was in accordance with the general principles of the Constitution of France and with its tradition of the freedom of peoples and of their right of self-determination. By asserting that right, the Organization would not commit a denial of justice, but would contribute to making it easier for France, one of its most eminent Members, to get out of the impasse in which it unfortunately found itself.

27. Mr. PEREZ PEREZ (Venezuela) said that the United Nations constituted an association with certain political aims. It was important, however, to bear in mind all the legal implications and aspects of the problem under discussion, in order to avoid a solution going beyond the limits of the Charter. The Committee had to consider which of two fundamental principles of the Charter had priority and should be applied. Those principles were those of respect for the domestic jurisdiction of States embodied in Article 2, paragraph 7, and the principle of self-determination of peoples in Article 1, paragraph 2. In the opinion of his delegation, no resolution should be adopted which went beyond the limits of the Charter. To adopt such a resolution could provoke the continuation and increase of bloodshed and the aggravation of the problem. Moreover, it was questionable whether a solution for such a serious problem could be reached as the result of such a short debate. The first thing to do was to bring about an immediate cease-fire and thereby establish favourable conditions for a future solution.

28. The history of his country made it feel great sympathy for the cause of all peoples fighting for realization of their desire for self-determination. His delegation viewed the problem of the people of Algeria with great concern and sincerely hoped that it would be carefully considered by France, a great nation with great historical traditions. At the same time, in accordance with its loyalty to universally recognized legal principles, it considered that a precipitate decision by the United Nations would only worsen the situation in Algeria. It trusted that France would open the door to the creation of favourable conditions for a solution.

29. His delegation consequently could not support either the eighteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.165) or the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.166), but would vote in favour of the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.167).

30. Mr. DE LA COLINA (Mexico) stressed his delegation's interest in the Algerian question. It was fully conscious of the gravity of the problem and of the circumstances that had brought it about, as well as of the effects it could have in the international field. The Algerian conflict had brought bloodshed to Algeria and could also endanger the tranquillity and good relations of friendly neighbouring States. It might thus become a threat to the peace of a great part of the world.

All were fully aware that the situation in the Middle East was precarious and delicate.

31. The competence of the General Assembly to consider such problems was undoubted. That view entailed the obligation, without going beyond the Charter, to proceed moderately and to examine sincerely all the aspects of the problem. A decision by the Assembly which dealt with the matter in terms of ideal justice and absolute principles would be condemned to impotence in advance. On the other hand, to satisfy the transitory political passions or necessities of one State or group of States would only aggravate the problem. A recommendation must be equitable and just, viable and capable of effective application. It must appear acceptable to the interested parties. The Assembly should try to establish conditions which might facilitate the negotiations between the parties and open the door to a political formula which could be accepted by both. Any solution should take into account the interests of both parties and should certainly be based on justice.

32. It would be vain to oppose the great movement transforming humanity. That movement sometimes assumed destructive aspects, but in order to avoid them it must be recognized that the movement was, in its origin and in its fundamental aspects, a legitimate one representing the very essence of the historical development of the present world.

33. His delegation sympathized with the spirit of the eighteen-Power draft resolution, particularly the second paragraph of the preamble, which recognized the right of the people of Algeria to self-determination. Mexico had always supported that principle. However, the adoption of that draft might aggravate the situation and prolong the conflict. The three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.166) contained some useful provisions which might be included in the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.167), which his delegation supported with certain reservations. For reasons of equity and courtesy, the preamble to the six-Power draft should refer to all the delegations which had participated in the debate. It would be useful to add to the operative part the words “in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations”, which were to be found in the three-Power draft. In that connexion, he suggested that the authors of the various proposals should make a final effort to arrive at a common text before the vote.

34. His delegation interpreted the operative paragraph of the six-Power draft resolution in the following manner: a peaceful solution of the question implied the opening of negotiations with a view to achieving a cease-fire and the establishment of political conditions which would prevent the renewal of hostilities. By their very nature, the negotiations for a cease-fire implied a particular political aspect of the problem transcending a mere cease-fire. A democratic solution meant, above all, consultation of the Algerian people without internal or external pressure, so that that people might decide its own fate. That amounted to saying that account must be taken of the right of peoples to self-determination. Any solution not founded on that principle would leave the door open to new and even more violent conflict and could not give any guarantee of a final settlement of the dispute. A solution would not be democratic if it did not take into account the freely expressed wishes of the majority, while safeguarding the future political status of Algeria and the legitimate interests of the minority.

35. In conclusion, he repeated the words of Benito Juárez, one of the founders of modern Mexico, quoted

by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France: Among individuals as among nations, respect for the rights of others was respect for peace.

36. Mr. BIOY (Argentina) said that no one could suspect the representative of an American nation—and particularly Argentina—of colonialism. His country had freed itself and had assisted its neighbours in their struggle for liberation. Now it could say with pride that Spain was among its fastest friends in the world today.

37. His delegation would vote for the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.167) of which it was a sponsor. The Algerian question fell within the domestic jurisdiction of France. The United Nations could not deal with such domestic matters without prejudicing the specific provisions of the Charter and establishing a precedent dangerous to the peace of the independent Member States of the United Nations. The French Government had declared its intention to seek, without delay, a peaceful and democratic solution by means of free and supervised elections. All knew that there had never been any reason to doubt France's word. His delegation believed that the aspirations of the Algerian population, for whom it had every sympathy, would be taken into account and that its wishes would be met.

38. Mr. TSIANG (China) observed that the principle of self-determination had figured very largely in the debate and was prominent in the eighteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.165). That principle was a very good one. From the time it had been proclaimed by the President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, at the end of the First World War, it had gathered momentum and had indeed become part of the spirit of the times. It had been made part of the Charter. It was, therefore, an obligation of all Member States, and it was applicable to all parts of the world, under proper circumstances. His delegation regarded the principle of self-determination as in fact a principle of political procedure. As such, it included many possibilities, of which independence was one, but not the only one. It was thus a mistake for the United Nations to take for granted that the principle of self-determination was equivalent to independence. Nationalism had grown; yet while he did not know of any force that could deny the national aspirations of peoples, economic life in the world made it desirable for all peoples to try to achieve higher degrees of integration. It would be good both in law and in policy for the United Nations to encourage integration, but only under conditions of freedom and equality. By the same token, it would be a wrong policy for the United Nations to encourage separatism for its own sake. The eighteen-Power draft, it was true, did not use the word "independence", but many of its sponsors had equated self-determination with independence. Of course, the explanations of the sponsors carried great weight in interpreting a resolution of the United Nations.

39. By self-determination, the United Nations must mean self-determination on an orderly, democratic basis. While the eighteen-Power draft naturally did not call for anything not orderly or democratic, a number of its sponsors had declared that they believed that the present leaders of the resistance movement, or National Liberation Front, in Algeria had the right to represent Algeria, that negotiations should be opened between France and those leaders, and that, therefore, those leaders had the right, in fact, to determine the future of Algeria. That did not seem to him to be quite an orderly or a democratic process. Whether or not the leaders of the National Liberation Front in Algeria in

fact represented the people of Algeria could be determined only after elections had been held. To advocate that they should be considered representatives or leaders of the Algerian people would not promote the orderly and democratic process of self-determination. Consequently, he could not support the eighteen-Power draft resolution.

40. The real choice before the Committee was between that draft resolution and the programme of action put before it by France (831st meeting). As he understood it, French policy called for a cease-fire, free elections, and then negotiations. Negotiations could not mean the imposition of a solution by one party and must therefore be held with duly elected representatives of the Algerian people. Since it was impossible for any Government to negotiate with 9 million or 10 million people, he found the French programme of free elections, observed by international representatives, to be an eminently democratic procedure and one consistent with the principles of the Charter. That enlightened, progressive programme was still in the blueprint stage, but should be given the right of way by the United Nations. His delegation felt that the purposes of peace and democracy would be better promoted by not adopting the eighteen-Power draft resolution.

41. Mr. MENDEZ GUARDIA (Panama) agreed with the view that the question of Algeria was one of the most delicate ever to come before the United Nations. Although the debate had been somewhat acrimonious, it represented a step towards finding a constructive and permanent solution of the question. He welcomed the fact that France, in an admirable gesture of conciliation, had accepted the fact of discussion in the First Committee and had participated in the debate.

42. The draft resolution most likely to result in achieving a satisfactory solution which might bring peace to Algeria and contribute to the lessening of tension was the one submitted by the six Powers (A/C.1/L.167). His delegation would vote in favour of it, believing that it expressed the confidence of the General Assembly that a peaceful and democratic solution of the Algerian question would be reached. By that he understood an immediate cease-fire, without reprisal on either side and without force, pressure or violence. A democratic solution must take account of the feelings of the people of Algeria as expressed through free elections held without distinction as to race, origin, religion or political ideas and designed to result in just and equitable representation as far as the people of Algeria were concerned. In the light of those views and of the observations made by the representative of Mexico, his delegation would not insist on any particular changes in the six-Power draft resolution at the present advanced stage of the debate.

43. A nation with the traditions of France, which had recently proved its loyalty to the basic principles of the United Nations by agreeing to the withdrawal of its forces from the Suez Canal region, must be believed when its Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that colonialism was a thing of the past (831st meeting). Mr. Pineau had also said that the most important thing was a suitable standard of living, together with freedom for all the peoples of the world (831st meeting).

44. In conclusion, he recalled the observation of the representative of Japan at the 840th meeting to the effect that both sides must make concessions and that, in such a moral issue, the party upholding morality was bound ultimately to triumph. He concurred in the

Japanese representative's expression of belief that the result would be a triumph for both France and Algeria.

45. Mr. PANYA (Laos) noted the observation of some of the sponsors of the eighteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.165) that it contained not a single word not already found in the French Constitution. He felt, however, that the draft resolution contained all the controversial elements on which no agreement had been achieved in several days of discussion. The adoption of such a draft, far from settling the Algerian crisis, might well lead to the opposite result. The three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.166) represented undeniable progress towards a compromise, but was not entirely free from the defects of the eighteen-Power draft. It could not achieve the goal envisaged, for it was easy to imagine the effect of a resolution which one party declared inapplicable: it would not be applied.

46. The six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.167) represented the best solution for the time being, because it alone would permit attainment of the first objective, namely to stop the bloody fighting, the attacks and the bombings and to prepare an orderly and calm atmosphere appropriate for negotiations to be held in peace and friendship. He pointed out that a similar problem arising between France and his country twelve years before had been settled, not in violence and passion, but in friendship, patience and mutual understanding. All hope of reaching a fair solution satisfactory to all concerned was not lost. In order to achieve it, the French Government would have to implement the programmes announced by it without any reservations and the Algerian people, while maintaining its aspirations for independence, would have to refrain from any reprehensible acts likely to maintain or increase tension instead of facilitating a return to order and stability.

47. Mr. QUIROGA GALDO (Bolivia) said that the problem of Algeria was one of capital importance for the preservation of peace in the world. The United Nations must make every effort to resolve it as soon as possible in order to avoid new violations of the human

rights which it was the obligation of the Organization to defend. It was for the United Nations to guide the parties in the dispute, to try to point out to them the best way to follow in order to reach a solution, in order that justice and freedom might be respected in that region of Africa, the economic and strategic importance of which had repeatedly been emphasized.

48. The three draft resolutions before the Committee emphasized the universal desire to meet the problem in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, although each indicated a different path to be followed. His delegation agreed with the first paragraph of the preamble of the eighteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.165), which stated a simple fact, namely that a situation of strife existed in Algeria. The draft also referred to the principle of the self-determination of the Algerian people. Of the three operative paragraphs, the delegation of Bolivia could only support the second. Operative paragraphs 1 and 3 would serve only to postpone peaceful negotiations and to interfere with the possibility of their being carried out.

49. His delegation would vote in favour of the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.166), which accorded with the sincere desire to resolve the problem of Algeria by means of negotiations, which could constitute the basis of a better understanding, satisfying the legitimate aspirations, of the Algerian nation and also guaranteeing the interests of the European community. It would also ensure in Algeria the permanence of the good economic influence of France.

50. His delegation would be happy to support the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.167) as a second choice, since it represented a good statement of the concepts expressed in the operative paragraph of the three-Power draft, which referred to the urgent necessity of finding a peaceful solution of the dramatic problem of Algeria.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.