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Chairman: Mr. Victor A. BELAUNDE (Peru).

AGENDA ITEM 21

The Korean question (A/3172, A/3203, A/C.1/L.157):

- (a) **Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea;**
- (b) **Problem of ex-prisoners of the Korean war: report of the Government of India**

1. Mr. GREENBAUM (United States of America) recalled that it had been the previous practice of the Committee to invite a representative of the Republic of Korea to participate in deliberations on the Korean question. Accordingly, the United States delegation submitted the following draft resolution (A/C.1/L.157):

"The First Committee

"Decides to invite a representative of the Republic of Korea to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussion of the Korean question."

2. Mr. Krishna MENON (India) moved an amendment to the United States draft resolution to the effect that the words "a representative" should be replaced by the word "representatives" and that the words "the Republic" should be replaced by the words "the Republics of North and South Korea". The Committee should either discuss the question without the assistance of the two parties or, alternatively, it should have representatives of both parties present.

3. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) supported the Indian amendment, pointing out that, without the participation of a representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the question would be dealt with in a one-sided manner which would not permit of a correct solution of the Korean question as a whole.

4. Mr. TSIANG (China) thought it proper and just that the Committee should adopt the United States draft resolution without any amendment whatsoever since that draft corresponded to past practice. Moreover, whereas the Republic of Korea had co-operated with the United Nations and had been recognized as the only legal Government in Korea, the régime in North Korea had the status of an aggressor and should not be treated on the basis of equality with that Republic.

5. Mr. WINKLER (Czechoslovakia) observed that, since the ultimate objective was the unification of Korea, the problem could not be usefully discussed in the absence of a representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. To exclude a representative of that Republic would indicate that there was no real hope of achieving positive results. Pointing out that the cessation of hostilities in Korea had been achieved through agreement between the parties concerned, he declared that unification also required the broad co-operation of both parties in Korea and called for agreement based on mutually acceptable principles.

6. Though it was true that in the past only representatives of South Korea had been invited to participate in the Committee's discussion, he believed that it was because of that unjust practice that no positive results had been achieved in the First Committee.

7. The Czechoslovak delegation supported the Indian amendment and would oppose the United States draft resolution in the event the amendment should be rejected.

8. Mr. KHOMAN (Thailand) cited paragraph 9 of the report of the United Nations Commission for the Reunification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) (A/3172) regarding the negative attitude of the authorities in North Korea toward the United Nations, and declared his delegation's support for the United States draft resolution and its opposition to the Indian amendment.

9. Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom) supported the proposal to invite a representative of the Republic of Korea, but was unable to support the Indian amendment because it would neither be appropriate nor useful to invite the North Korean authorities, whose presence could not contribute to the settlement of the problem.

10. Mr. BELOVSKI (Yugoslavia) expressed the opinion of his delegation that the present situation did not offer much hope of significant progress toward the solution of the Korean problem. Previous debates had proved that progress depended upon agreement among all the parties involved and on an improved atmosphere. Thus, the participation of all the parties was an indispensable pre-condition for finding acceptable solutions. Consequently, the Yugoslav delegation supported the amendment submitted by the delegation of India.

11. Mr. GREENBAUM (United States of America) declared that the United States delegation strongly opposed the amendment submitted by the delegation of India. He urged the Committee not to forget that the North Korean régime had been declared the aggressor in Korea and that it had never accepted the competence of the United Nations in the Korean problem. Since the attitude of the Communists remained unchanged, it would not be useful to hear them now.

12. Mr. GLEBKU (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) stated that the United States draft resolution

would lead to unilateral and biased consideration of the question. Many years of discussion in the United Nations without the participation of the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had shown that such a procedure could not yield positive results. Considering that Republic's contribution to ending the war in Korea and its unflinching efforts to bring about the peaceful unification of Korea, the Byelorussian delegation was convinced that the participation of the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the Committee's discussion might produce constructive and valuable proposals which would assist in settling the Korean question. The policy of discrimination against that Republic must end. Consequently, his delegation wholeheartedly supported the amendment submitted by the Indian delegation.

13. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) shared the pessimism expressed by the representative of Yugoslavia regarding the possibility of reaching a solution of the Korean issue at the present session. Observing that a majority of the members of the First Committee seemed to be unwilling to correct the abnormal situation in which year after year only one party was being heard, he contended that the issue concerning the hearing of both parties was a test of the sincerity of the Committee's desire to find an acceptable solution. No agreement reached in the Committee could be implemented without the support of both parties. Certainly, the absence of the representative of the Democratic People's Republic would not contribute to a solution.

14. As to the negative attitude of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea towards the United Nations, he questioned whether, in the light of continual refusals to allow its representatives to appear before the First Committee, it could be blamed for wishing, as the Commission's report indicated, a conference on the question outside the framework of the United Nations.

15. As a member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, Poland was concerned that a speedy solution to the Korean question should be found. Consequently, the Polish delegation welcomed the Indian amendment and would oppose the exclusive invitation of the representative of South Korea because it doubted whether such action would contribute to a solution of the problem.

16. Mr. JAMALI (Iraq) declared that his delegation supported the draft resolution to invite a representative of the South Korean Government and opposed the Indian amendment on the grounds that the South Korean Government represented all of Korea and that the authorities in North Korea had defied the United Nations. If the Committee could be sure that the North Koreans would abide by the decision of the Assembly and that they were ready to free themselves from external influences, there might be reason for inviting them.

17. Mr. NASE (Albania) believed that an invitation to the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in accordance with rules of equity and proper procedure, would contribute to the possibility of settling the question of the unification of Korea. It was impossible to discuss the question when representatives of only one side were invited. Consequently, the Albanian delegation supported the Indian amendment and would vote against the United States draft resolution in its original form.

18. Mr. KIZYA (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) stated that a favourable solution of the Korean question was impossible without the participation of both North Korea and South Korea. The attempt of the United States delegation and some other delegations to represent Korea by representatives of South Korea only was part of the bankrupt policy of discriminating against the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and an attempt at the outset to bury the possibility of a settlement of the question. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR warmly supported the Indian proposal and rejected that of the United States.

19. Mr. SATO (Japan) thought that the Committee should follow its previous procedure and invite the representative of the Republic of Korea. If necessary, the question of inviting the representative of North Korea could be discussed later, after hearing the explanations and the statements of the representative of the Republic of Korea. For that reason, the Japanese delegation supported the United States draft resolution.

20. Mr. QUIROGA GALDO (Bolivia) recalled that at the ninth and tenth sessions of the General Assembly the Bolivian delegation had felt that the participation of representatives of both parties would not contribute to the discussion in view of their absolute disagreement. Since the intervention of the representative of South Korea had been more discreet at the tenth than at the ninth session, his delegation would not object to the Committee hearing representatives of the Government of South Korea, but would abstain in the vote on both the United States draft resolution and the Indian amendment.

21. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) emphasized that discussion of the Korean question in the absence of the representatives of one of the two parties would be a crude violation of the United Nations Charter. Arguments based upon precedent could be answered by saying that previous discussions without the representative of North Korea had left the Korean question unsettled.

22. Observing that UNCURK had stated in paragraph 7 of its report that South Korea had continued to insist that the armistice should be denounced, and that the South Korean authorities intended to resort to force against North Korea, he questioned a policy which would invite representatives of authorities with such intentions but would exclude representatives of North Korea who wanted a peaceful settlement of the question.

23. If only South Korea were invited, the discussion would be a one-sided one for the purpose of imposing a settlement which was to the liking of one Power or group of Powers, but not to the liking of the Korean people. That, however, was not the task of the United Nations; the Charter required that both parties should be invited. Therefore, his delegation would vote against the United States draft resolution unless the Indian amendment were adopted.

24. Mr. GUNWARDENE (Ceylon) was of the opinion that the United Nations must act not as a party to the Korean dispute, but as an arbiter. Ordinary fairness, law and justice demanded either that both North and South Korean representatives be heard or that both parties be excluded.

25. Since the objective was unification by peaceful methods, he could not understand the attitude assumed by some Members of the United Nations that North

Korea was an aggressor, that it continued to be an aggressor forever, and that there could be no peace between North and South Korea. That attitude meant that there was only one solution possible: the United Nations must engage in a war to liquidate North Korea. He felt that that was not the way to look at questions of world importance. He hoped for some means of negotiation, which would be impossible if the United Nations persistently acted as a party to a dispute. The Committee must enable the authorities of North and South Korea to come together in pursuance of the goal of ultimate unification.

26. Mr. BRUCAN (Romania), supporting the proposal of the representative of India, observed that representatives of nations which had obviously been guilty of aggression had not been prevented from participating in the debates and in the general functions of the United Nations. Yet the fact that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had been guilty of aggression appeared to be the strongest argument against its participation. He felt, therefore that the argument was not at all valid. Noting that both parties had participated in the armistice negotiations, he concluded that, if a lesson was to be drawn from the past, both parties must be invited to participate.

27. Mr. SERRANO (Philippines) was of the opinion that no change in the situation had taken place since the ninth session which would warrant a change in the policy of the First Committee with respect to the participation of representatives of North Korea. The Korean question was a problem, not a dispute. For the Committee to invite the North Koreans to discuss the question of unification and the establishment of a democratic government in Korea would be to recognize an unlawful act which was responsible for the artificial existence of two Koreas.

28. The Philippine delegation was willing to forgive and forget, provided that conclusive evidence could be adduced indicating that North Korea would be willing to abide by the decisions of the General Assembly. In the absence of such evidence, the Philippine delegation could not see any justification for inviting North Korea to participate in the Committee's deliberations.

29. Sir Percy SPENDER (Australia) disagreed with the view expressed by the representative of Ceylon that the United Nations was an arbiter between North and South Korea. The United Nations was not a party to the dispute. It had acted to meet aggression in Korea and had set out definite objectives when that aggression came to an end. The question at present was solely one of determining what was to be done with regard to the problem of the unification of Korea.

30. While the record of South Korea had been, generally speaking, one of co-operation with the United Nations in carrying out its purposes in Korea, North Korea had, on the contrary, consistently pursued a policy of aggression. He heartily disagreed with the genuinely held view of the representatives of India and Ceylon that the invitation of both parties was the only way to bring about the solution of the Korean problem. In his opinion, the purpose of the Communists was to obtain equal representation both for the part of Korea which had been subject to aggression as well as for that part which had committed aggression. In that connexion, he recalled that during the Korean Political Conference, held at Geneva in 1954, the Communists had advanced the proposition that the

question of Korea could be resolved only by equal representation for North and South Korea. That was the unchanged, classic technique by which the Communists sought to take over a country. The United Nations was involved, not as a party to the dispute, but as an international organization having taken steps to meet aggression and having set out its objectives in relation thereto, of which the cardinal principle was the unification of Korea. If there were any genuine desire on the part of the Communists to seek a solution of the problem of unification, there was ample opportunity for the Communists' views to be made known to the Committee.

31. In the circumstances, the proper course was to adhere steadfastly to the principles, no matter how long it might take. However, there was no reason why a Member State should not advance a proposal aimed at the solution of the question — a proposal other than the Communist proposition of equal representation, but somewhat different from that which had been discussed in the past — as long as such a proposal entailed a decision by the Organization on the attitude to be taken with regard to the problem.

32. Mr. AZKOUL (Lebanon) said that for several reasons, given in the present and in previous debates, his delegation was opposed to the proposal to invite the representative of North Korea to participate in the Committee's debate. First, the Government of Lebanon had not recognized the Government of North Korea; secondly, the United Nations had recognized so far only the Government of the Republic of Korea; thirdly, the United Nations had condemned North Korea as an aggressor; fourthly, the North Korean authorities had never accepted the principles of the United Nations for a peaceful solution of the Korean problem; and, finally, North Korea had refused to accept the authority of the United Nations in dealing with the Korean problem. In view of the unchanged attitude of North Korea, his delegation would continue to vote in favour of inviting only the representative of the Republic of Korea.

33. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) noted that many arguments had been advanced for not inviting a representative of North Korea to participate in the Committee's debate. However, he could not see how the question of the unification of Korea could be discussed in the Committee, and a solution achieved, without the representation of the two parts to be unified. The Government of South Korea, he asserted, was ready to violate the armistice and enforce a solution to the problem by means of war.

34. As for precedent, a failure in the past to achieve a solution to the problem of the unification of Korea pointed to the need for creating new precedents which would lead to the goal stated — a unified Korea. If the intention was to find a true solution to the problem of Korea and thereby alleviate the tension in that part of the world, then both parties should be invited to participate in the Committee's debate. His delegation, therefore, agreed with the Indian amendment to invite a representative of North Korea and would vote against the United States draft resolution should the amendment be rejected.

35. M. Krishna MENON (India) said that, in submitting his amendment to the United States draft resolution, he had purposely refrained from entering into the merits of the question. However, during the discussion, matters of substance had been brought up.

36. His delegation did not share the view expressed by some members of the Committee that it was essential for the Committee to invite anyone outside its own members for the limited purposes of discussing the item before the Committee. However, there was a draft resolution proposed by the United States which his delegation did not oppose, but sought to alter in order to be able to support it.

37. The objective of the United Nations had always been the unification of Korea. Consequently, it was wise and just to take every step necessary to attain that goal. It had been argued that, if the two authorities were invited, there would be equality of representation. India did not recognize either North or South Korea as States or Governments, but as *de facto* authorities which exercised control and administrative functions in different parts of Korea. In his view it was not a question of representation, which was a function of the United Nations, but one of providing an opportunity for both parties to express their views. He recalled that the General Assembly, in admitting new Members, had expressly excluded those States where a problem of unification existed. The unification of a country was an expressed pre-condition for its admission to membership. A unified Korea was necessary to achieve the principle of universality in the United Nations.

38. He believed that unification could be achieved either by persuasion, adjustment, compromise and consent, or by imposition. The Korean war had not been waged for the purpose of unification, but to halt aggression. That meant that there was a territory outside the territory from which that aggression had come, and consequently there were two entities to be brought together. The objective was only one Korea. While historically there was one Korea, factually there were two compartments or functioning units in Korea, the unification of which was the objective of the United Nations. In his opinion, unless the United Nations changed its objective and subscribed to the view of the President of the Republic of South Korea, its task was to find a way of bringing the two parties together, which was not an impossibility. He had hoped discussion on the item by the Committee would be postponed so as not to allow anything said to be an irritant and a step backward.

39. As to precedent, he noted that, whenever the United Nations had taken an effective decision with regard to Korea, it had realistically taken into account the *de facto* existence of the two parts. In that connexion, he recalled that North Korea had been invited to participate in the Korean Political Conference held in the spring of 1954. At that time no one had raised the question of equality of representation. However, the major precedent was the signing of the Armistice Agreement. That armistice and the machinery for implementing it were based on the acceptance of two equal Commands, both responsible for the maintenance of peace.

40. The report of UNCURK, which did not favour either the people of Korea as a whole or of North Korea, stated that the main objective of the United Nations in Korea was to establish a unified, independent and democratic Korea. In his view, that unification could be either imposed by war or brought about by conciliation, which meant not appeasement, but adjustment and compromise between the different points of view.

41. He noted that sub-item (b), dealing with the question of ex-prisoners of war, also concerned the people of Korea as a whole. Thus, he would welcome the decision of the Committee to invite the representative of South Korea provided that the representative of North Korea was also invited.

42. One purpose of the United Nations was the unification of Korea; the other was the maintenance of the armistice pending that unification. The latter purpose required the maintenance of a degree of balance between the two parties. It required ridding oneself of the idea that there was only one Korea. If the position were taken that there was only one authority in Korea, then the committee would be subscribing to those statements contained in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the report of UNCURK which indicated that the policy of South Korea was to have the United Nations denounce the Armistice Agreement and, in the last instance, to establish unification by the use of armed force.

43. It was not correct to say that the two parts of Korea could not be brought together on the basis of United Nations principles. United Nations principles were not identical with any resolutions or procedures adopted by the Committee. The unification of Korea could be brought about only by contacts between the two sides and, still more important, by the expression of the popular will which was not controlled by external pressures, but which was subject to supervision by international authority. He did not agree with the view that international supervision could not be achieved by an organ outside the United Nations. India had not shared that view with regard to Indo-China. There were other cases in which other international authorities had been considered.

44. The task before the Committee was to take the situation as presented and try to move forward towards establishing a degree of stability in the Far East and better relations between the countries immediately proximate to Korea. In the interest of the objectives of the United Nations in Korea he had moved his amendment so that the North Korean people might also be given the opportunity to be heard in the Committee.

45. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the Indian amendment to the United States draft resolution providing for an invitation to representatives of both South and North Korea to participate in the discussion of the Korean question.

The amendment was rejected by 40 votes to 20, with 11 abstentions.

46. The CHAIRMAN then put to the vote the United States draft resolution to invite a representative of the Republic of Korea to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussion of the Korean question (A/C.1/L.157).

The draft resolution was adopted by 51 votes to 10, with 12 abstentions.

At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Limb, representative of the Republic of Korea, took a place at the Committee table.

47. Mr. TARAZI (Syria), in explaining his vote, said that his delegation, in accordance with its policy of allowing a hearing to all parties, had voted in favour of the Indian amendment, and had therefore abstained on the United States draft resolution.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.