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Chairman: Mr. G. J. VAN HEUVEN GOEDHART (Netherlands).

Complaint of failure on the part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to repatriate or otherwise account for prisoners of war detained in Soviet territory (A/1339, A/1339/Add.1 and A/C.3/L.145) (*continued*)

[Item 67]*

1. Lord MACDONALD (United Kingdom) said that the problem of ascertaining the whereabouts and fate of prisoners of war was always a difficult one, and time was certainly needed to deal with it adequately. Five years had, however, elapsed since the end of the Second World War, and it should be possible to find out how many persons still remained prisoners of war and to help bring about their repatriation.

2. The Foreign Ministers of France, the United States of America, the USSR and the United Kingdom had concluded an agreement in Moscow, in the spring of 1947, regarding the repatriation of German prisoners of war (A/1339, annex II). The USSR member of the Allied Control Council had, while reiterating that the time limit for the completion of repatriation would be respected, declined to indicate what monthly repatriation rate his government proposed to follow. All efforts to ascertain that monthly rate had failed.

3. On 3 January 1949, the three other Allied governments had addressed notes to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stating that out of the total of 890,532 German prisoners who, according to Mr. Molotov's statement made at the Moscow conference in the spring of 1947, had still been held by the USSR Government at that time, only 447,367 were officially known to have been repatriated. The three Allied governments had requested information about the USSR Government's intentions regarding the remainder.

4. The Soviet reply, dated 24 January 1949, contained counter-charges but admitted that, in spite of its obligation under the Moscow agreement to return all German war prisoners by 31 December 1948, a number

of such prisoners still remained in Soviet territory. The Soviet note added that the remaining prisoners would all be repatriated during 1949. Thus, while conceding violation of the Moscow agreement, the USSR Government had given a specific undertaking to complete repatriation in 1949.

5. He noted that the USSR had assumed contractual obligations concerning the repatriation of Japanese war prisoners under the agreement into which it had entered with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan on 19 December 1946 (A/1339, annex III).

6. The USSR had not only violated specific agreements, but had also infringed the general principle to which it had subscribed by signing the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, of 12 August 1949. While it was true that the USSR Government had not ratified that convention and was therefore not legally bound by it, its signature of the instrument must be regarded as indicating approval of the principles which it contained.

7. The USSR Government had, in the past, charged the United Kingdom Government with retaining against their will a number of German war prisoners as workers, both in the United Kingdom itself and in the Middle East. The fact was that a number of former German prisoners had chosen to remain in the United Kingdom and in the Middle East as free civilian workers; there were some 14,000 such volunteers in the United Kingdom, 400 in Austria and 300 in the Middle East. Most of them had already availed themselves of the opportunity offered to them to take a holiday in Germany, for which purpose they had been offered free transportation, but nearly all of them had returned.

8. By the end of 1947 the United Kingdom Government had repatriated all the Japanese prisoners under its control.

9. At the Moscow conference in 1947, Mr. Molotov had said that his government had already repatriated 1,003,974 German war prisoners, and that 890,532 were still awaiting repatriation. If to those figures were

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

added the 58,103 German prisoners of war who, according to a TASS announcement of 4 May 1950, had been discovered between 1947 and 1949 among prisoners of war of other nationalities found in the Soviet Union, a grand total of 1,952,609 was reached as the number of German prisoners of war who had fallen into Soviet hands. The TASS announcement had claimed that all but 13,546 had been repatriated, the 13,546 being, with the exception of 14 persons who were ill, convicted or suspected war criminals. In other words, TASS was claiming that every single German prisoner captured by the USSR had either been repatriated or had been, in May 1950, alive in Soviet territory, indicating that not a single German war prisoner had died in the USSR between March 1947 and May 1950.

10. A voluntary registration carried out by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany between 1 and 11 March 1950 of German war prisoners and missing persons who had not yet returned to the Federal territory had led to the listing of the names of 53,820 war prisoners from whom messages had been received from Soviet prison camps and who had not yet been repatriated. In addition, the names of 8,972 German war prisoners from whom messages had been received had been registered by inhabitants of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany, bringing the total number of prisoners actually known to the Federal Government to be still in Soviet custody to 62,792. The total of those unaccounted for was much larger: the Federal Government had the names of 1,154,029 former members of the *Wehrmacht* who, as of March 1950, were reported still missing by their relatives. The last news of some 923,000 of that figure had come from the USSR or from areas occupied by Soviet troops, and careful inquiry among repatriated war prisoners had indicated that a number of them were still alive.

11. Similar inquiries by the Austrian Government had also produced conclusive evidence that at least 1,635 Austrian prisoners of war, including 8 women, still remained in the Soviet Union. In addition, there was evidence to show that a great number of deported civilians of German nationality continued to be held by the Soviet authorities.

12. The TASS announcement of 4 May 1950 had caused consternation in Germany, and the Bundestag of the Federal Republic had adopted a resolution (A/1339, annex VII) asking the Federal Government to take suitable action. On 12 May 1950 the Foreign Ministers of France, the United States of America and the United Kingdom had issued a statement in which they had contested the accuracy of the TASS announcement, adding that the situation revealed gross disregard for human rights and pledging that they would take all possible steps to secure information about, and the repatriation of, the German war prisoners still detained in Soviet territory.

13. On 14 July 1950 the British Ambassador in Moscow had delivered a note (A/1339, annex X) to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, requesting further information. The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not replied until 30 September 1950, when it had stated that the assertion that a large number of German war

prisoners still remained in the USSR was devoid of all foundation.

14. The Soviet note of 30 September 1950 had created a complete impasse, and a mere continuation of an exchange of notes seemed useless. The facts must be ascertained and suitable action must follow.

15. In a note of 15 March 1949, the British Ambassador had suggested the establishment of an agreed international body to carry out investigations, both into the conditions in which German volunteer workers in the United Kingdom and the Middle East were living and working and into the conditions in which German prisoners were held in Soviet territory. The Soviet reply of 4 June 1949 had not even referred to that proposal and had curtly concluded that the Soviet Government saw no necessity to enter into a further examination of the question—a view which, he hoped, was not shared by the Committee.

16. The United Nations could not afford to let matters rest with the simple assertion of the Soviet Government. It must seek to determine whether the Soviet assertions were or were not true and, if the latter, to take what steps it could to ensure the enjoyment of their human rights to those who had been wantonly deprived of them.

17. Should it develop that a wrong existed, that wrong should be redressed. The most appropriate and effective instrument for that purpose would be a small commission, as proposed in paragraph 3 of the operative part of the joint draft resolution (A/C.3/L.145). The establishment of such a commission would demonstrate to the anxious peoples of the world that the United Nations was resolute and meant to act.

18. Mr. McINTYRE (Australia) observed that the special position of war prisoners had long forced itself on the conscience of civilized peoples and had been recognized in a series of international agreements designed to protect the lives and welfare of prisoners of war, and to ensure notification to their relatives of their whereabouts and health, and their prompt repatriation after the war. The general problem of human displacement had assumed a more acute form than ever before as a result of the Second World War, particularly in connexion with prisoners of war, a problem which, given existing agreements and recognized procedures for dealing with it, should have lent itself most easily to quick settlement.

19. Yet it appeared that, five years after the war, large numbers of war prisoners had neither been returned to their homes nor otherwise accounted for by the Soviet Government. While other Allied countries had discharged all their obligations towards prisoners of war under their control, the weight of evidence suggested that the USSR had not.

20. Many efforts had been made to enlist Soviet cooperation in repatriating all prisoners of war and in clearing up uncertainty about those whose fate was still unknown. A stage had been reached where his government felt that there was no alternative but to join the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States in placing the matter before the General Assembly and urging it to exercise its authority in trying to discover the fate of the people involved.

21. The United Kingdom representative had dwelt primarily upon the German war prisoners. As a co-sponsor of the joint draft resolution his delegation would deal more particularly with the position of Japanese prisoners of war, especially as his government had been closely associated with the efforts made to ascertain the fate of Japanese prisoners still unaccounted for. In doing so, his delegation was not prompted by any particular fondness for, or sense of obligation towards, the Japanese people, it being well known that Australia did not entertain especially kind feelings towards the Japanese.
22. His delegation believed that the issue was a human problem, a story, judging from the evidence, of mental anguish on a huge scale, which in all conscience could not be ignored. It had been forcibly brought to the attention of his government in thousands of letters from interested families, groups and individuals, constituting an appeal for help the sincerity of which could not be doubted. Such appeals had also come from local associations especially formed throughout Japan for the sole purpose of accelerating the repatriation of Japanese war prisoners; even the Japanese Communist Party had been clamouring for information.
23. The Potsdam declaration of July 1945 had stated that the Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, "shall be permitted to return to their homes . . ." According to the best estimate available, there had been about 6,600,000 Japanese to be repatriated at the time of the armistice, including approximately 2,700,000 in territory under Soviet control. Apart from some hundreds of thousands of persons who had managed to reach Japan immediately after the end of hostilities, repatriation from Soviet-controlled areas had not begun until December 1946, when an agreement had been reached between General MacArthur and a representative of the USSR Government. It provided that all Japanese prisoners of war under the USSR Government's control, together with other Japanese nationals in Soviet territory who wished to return to Japan, would be repatriated at the rate of 50,000 a month.
24. In October 1947, General MacArthur had been able to announce that the repatriation of Japanese war prisoners from all other areas of the Pacific had been virtually completed, but that more than 828,000 Japanese still remained to be repatriated from territory under Soviet control. He had revealed that, in the few months prior to October 1947, the monthly rate of repatriation had fallen disturbingly below the figure of 50,000 stipulated in the agreement of December 1946. He had also stated that the Soviet authorities had declined his offer to supply transportation, which would have permitted repatriation to take place at the rate of 360,000 a month, as they had also rejected his subsequent appeal to increase repatriation to a rate of 160,000 a month, with the aid of shipping which he had offered to supply.
25. Repatriation from Soviet-controlled areas had continued at the rate of less than 50,000 a month, when, on 20 May 1949, TASS had issued a Soviet statement that only 95,000 Japanese nationals remained to be repatriated from Soviet territory. According to careful computations of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Tokyo and of the Japanese Government, the number of Japanese estimated to be in Soviet territory and still unaccounted for had been 471,902 as of 20 May 1949. General MacArthur had once more referred the matter to the Allied Council for Japan in December 1949, by which time a further 94,973 Japanese had been repatriated, at an average monthly rate that had dwindled to 13,500. According to the TASS announcement, all but a handful of Japanese had thus been repatriated, whereas, according to the figures of the Japanese Government and of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, no fewer than 376,939 had remained unaccounted for.
26. The Allied Council had not been able to obtain an explanation of that obvious discrepancy from its Soviet member, who had refused to discuss the matter, on the grounds that its inclusion on the Council's agenda had been unlawful. The Council had then proposed to the Supreme Commander that the Soviet Government should be asked to agree to an impartial investigation by a neutral international organization, with a view to obtaining exact information about Japanese believed to be held in Soviet territory. The Supreme Commander had accepted the proposal, and the United States and Australian Governments had despatched notes in that sense to the USSR Government on 30 December 1949 and 5 January 1950 respectively. Mr. McIntyre proceeded to quote from the Australian note (A/1339, annex VIII).
27. On 10 February 1950, his government had sent a second note to the USSR Government, asking for a reply to the note of 5 January. No reply had ever been received by his government to either note. The United States of America had received, in response to a similar note, a brief communication from the USSR Government on 16 July 1950, to the effect that the matter had been fully dealt with by the TASS statements of 22 April and 9 June 1950 respectively.
28. The gist of the two TASS statements had been that no more than 594,000 Japanese war prisoners had at any time been captured by the Soviet army and that, of those, 510,409 had been repatriated to Japan, 70,880 released immediately in the zone of combat operations, 1,487 detained in the USSR in connexion with war crimes, 9 detained for medical treatment prior to repatriation, and 971 placed at the disposal of the Chinese People's Government of the People's Republic of China in connexion with war crimes. He noted that, notwithstanding all that detailed arithmetic, some 10,000 of the 594,000 stated to have been originally captured by the USSR Government were not accounted for.
29. Every effort to obtain satisfactory answers from the USSR Government by direct representations had thus been exhausted. That was why his delegation had joined the United Kingdom and the United States in bringing the facts before the General Assembly in support of their joint draft resolution (A/C.3/L.145). The draft resolution was being submitted in the interests of respect for human rights and individual justice, its object being above all to dispel the fearful uncertainty and distress of many thousands of unfortunate people.
30. It appeared that 369,382 Japanese nationals were still unaccounted for, and that number included many women and children, as well as others who were not, and never had been, prisoners of war in the strict sense. He had cited that total figure because, under the agreement of December 1946, all Japanese nationals, civilians as well as war prisoners, were to be permitted to return

to Japan if they so desired. It would in any event be impossible to supply accurate statistics on the number of war prisoners among the 370,000 or so Japanese involved; for one thing, because distinctions between civilian and military personnel had tended to become blurred in the years since the end of the war. The dominant fact was that some 370,000 Japanese had virtually gone into oblivion, so far as their families and friends were concerned. In the circumstances, his delegation would expect the proposed United Nations commission on prisoners of war not to attempt to make an artificial distinction between prisoners of war and civilians, but to find out what it could about all those who had never been accounted for.

31. His purpose was not to censure the USSR Government for its conduct in the matter. His immediate concern was to resolve the conflicting assertions of the USSR Government that no German or Japanese war prisoners remained to be repatriated and that all had been accounted for, and of the other Allied governments that very considerable numbers of such persons must still remain on Soviet territory. He urgently appealed to the General Assembly to act resolutely, and to the Soviet Government to afford the United Nations that co-operation which it had withheld from the sponsors of the draft resolution individually and which could confidently be expected from other governments affected by the draft resolution. If the Assembly had a collective conscience and a true respect for human rights, it would do everything in its power to establish the facts of the unhappy situation.

32. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the question of prisoners of war was, by virtue of Article 107 of the Charter of the United Nations, excluded from the competence of the United Nations. No organ of the United Nations was empowered to deal with action "in relation to any State which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the governments having responsibility for such action". The question had been placed on the agenda of the General Assembly in violation of that Article, for purposes of political propaganda.

33. As the Governments of Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States knew full well, the Soviet Union had long since completed the repatriation of Japanese and German prisoners of war from its territory. Unlike those governments, the USSR had systematically published official data concerning such action: the complete repatriation of Japanese prisoners of war had been announced by TASS on 22 April 1950 and of German prisoners of war on 5 May 1950.

34. The information given by the USSR on repatriation had been entirely factual and accurate, and the allegations that it still retained Japanese and German prisoners of war on its territory were made in order to divert the attention of the Japanese and German peoples, as well as of the rest of the world, from the steady policy of the United States and its followers, which was that of political and economic subjugation of Germany and Japan and of their militarization in anticipation of a new war.

35. Efforts were being made to disguise that policy by casting slanderous accusations against the USSR on

the basis of fabricated statistics. It was noteworthy that the figures cited by the Australian representative were based on those released by General MacArthur, that evil genius who had prepared his statistics with an eye to provoking war in the Far East. The Australian representative himself had admitted that those figures were no more than estimates; although General MacArthur's staff had at one time alleged that it had obtained those figures from the Japanese Government, the Japanese Government had on various occasions made it entirely clear that the reverse was the case, and that the statistics on prisoners of war in its possession had originated with General MacArthur.

36. Those figures were not merely tentative; they were deliberately falsified. Thus, the total number of Japanese prisoners who were to be repatriated had, according to General MacArthur's official reports in 1946, inexplicably grown by some 700,000 from one month to the next. One year later, he had officially recognized that it was impossible to estimate with any accuracy the number of Japanese troops caught in Manchuria at the moment of surrender. The reason for that could be found both in the Japanese Press and in a number of official documents; whereas in the United States and United Kingdom zones of operations Japanese armies had surrendered *en masse*, in the USSR theatre of war they had scattered and attempted individually or in small groups to make their way south. Consequently, no one knew exactly how many Japanese soldiers had been in that region when war had ended, and the figures advanced were necessarily inaccurate. The only reliable figures were those issued by the USSR in 1945, shortly after the end of the war: 594,000 Japanese prisoners of war had been taken by the USSR armies in the entire USSR zone of operations in the Far East, and 70,880 of them had been freed almost immediately.

37. General MacArthur had been unable to contest those figures, but he had deliberately misconstrued them, holding that they applied to Manchuria alone and failing to make an adjustment for the 70,880 prisoners released at once. He had thus arrived at a much higher total of prisoners of war than the USSR had ever captured. In an effort to substantiate his statistics, he had induced the Japanese Government to ask the population to submit names of all those relatives—no matter how distant—who had been taken prisoner and had not been repatriated. Since several families might submit the name of the same person, it was inevitable that many persons should be counted twice over.

38. General MacArthur had resorted to even more unscrupulous methods: under his influence, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had actually set quotas of unrepatriated prisoners for various districts of Japan; the local authorities had been told to prepare lists of certain numbers of prisoners who had not returned to their homes, adding up to a total previously decided upon. Naturally, in those circumstances, persons who had been killed in action, who were missing, or who had even been repatriated to some other district, had been reported as prisoners in the Soviet Union. Mr. McIntyre cited specific instances of soldiers who had been drowned at sea or had deserted in Malaya and who by some sleight of hand had turned up on General MacArthur's list. In one case, all those soldiers who had not returned after the war had been considered prisoners of war not repatriated by the USSR, no allowance being made

either for war casualties or for the possibility that some of the men had fought and been taken prisoner in other zones of operations.

39. General MacArthur's purpose was plain: it was to discredit the USSR in the eyes of the Japanese people and to cause anxiety and unrest among them. That fact had been recognized in an article which had appeared in an Australian magazine, the *Australian Democrat*, of February 1950. The article mentioned, among other facts of like nature, that 8,000 Japanese soldiers lost when a transport ship had been torpedoed near Korea were listed as prisoners of war held in the Soviet Union, and came to the polite conclusion that the data published by General MacArthur's Staff were of doubtful value. It was clear, however, that their value was in fact nil.

40. The deliberate falsification of statistics served another purpose as well: to conceal the fact that the United States Government itself had failed to fulfil its obligation to repatriate Japanese prisoners of war from territories under its control, and was violating their basic human rights. The juggling with figures was intended to lead the Japanese people to believe that unreleased prisoners were in USSR territory, whereas in fact they were being detained by the United States military authorities. Although General MacArthur had announced on 31 August 1947 that repatriation had been completed, a Japanese newspaper had on 24 October 1947 drawn attention to the fact that approximately half a million Japanese, of whom some 336,000 were prisoners of war and the rest civilians, had vanished without a trace in the United States and the United Kingdom zones of operation, in Okinawa, the Philippines, etc. General MacArthur had studiously refrained from giving any information on those people's fate. To assume that they had all died would surely imply an unusually high rate of mortality; perhaps historians might some day unearth the truth.

41. The United States authorities, moreover, had a peculiar interpretation of the meaning of repatriation. Nearly half of some 5,000 Japanese prisoners of war had been "repatriated" to Hawaii and Okinawa where they had been put to work building military installations; only those unfit for hard labour had been actually returned to Japan.

42. The junior partner of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, had equally curious ideas about what constituted repatriation. The Chinese Press had reported in 1946 that Japanese prisoners of war had been "repatriated" from India to Singapore for compulsory work. More than 20,000 Japanese had been taken prisoner in Malaya; the Tokyo radio station had stated in 1947 that they were being used to combat the Malayan independence movement. It was well known that Japanese prisoners of war had been used by Chiang Kai-shek in China and by the Netherlands Government in Indonesia against such national independence movements. Eight special service regiments had been formed from Japanese prisoners of war in China.

43. Both the United States and the United Kingdom had failed to fulfil their obligations with regard to Japanese prisoners of war, and in order to conceal it, they were levelling false accusations against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which had fulfilled its obligations.

44. A similar policy could be observed with regard to the German prisoners of war. Whereas the TASS agency had announced that the USSR had completed the repatriation of those prisoners on 5 May 1950, the United States, United Kingdom and French Governments still retained very large numbers of former German prisoners of war in the territories under their control, while falsely alleging that the USSR Government alone was violating its obligations. The irresponsibility of such accusations had been shown by an incident at a Press conference held at the United Kingdom Foreign Office on 12 May 1950, at which a spokesman had alleged that the TASS agency had stated in 1945 that there were no less than 3,500,000 German prisoners of war in the USSR, but had been completely unable to give the date of that alleged statement; it had in fact never been made and there had never been so large a number of German prisoners of war in territory under USSR control.

45. The history of the repatriation of German prisoners of war had been marked by double dealing. It had been the USSR Government—not the United States or the United Kingdom Government—which had initiated the consideration of the repatriation of prisoners of war at the Moscow conference in April 1947, and the United States and the United Kingdom had concurred in a USSR proposal to the effect that the repatriation of the German prisoners of war should be carried out in accordance with a plan which would be worked out by the Control Council. That plan was never worked out by the Control Council because the French, United Kingdom and United States Governments had decided behind the backs of the other Allied Powers to retain large categories of prisoners of war on the grounds that they were gainfully employed persons. Those governments had never revealed the substance of those agreements, and yet they accused the USSR Government of failing to provide necessary information. On 20 January 1948, the United States representative on the Control Council had proposed that the plan for the repatriation of German prisoners of war should be removed from the agenda. He had obviously had nothing more to say as the whole matter had been decided behind the Council's back.

46. Thus, the French, United Kingdom and United States Governments had wrecked the entire plan, because, if it had been worked out, it would have covered hundreds of thousands who had been drafted into the Foreign Legion or sent to work in the mines under the pretext that they were gainfully employed.

47. In France, the prisoners of war in the camps had been placed in a dilemma: they had either to face the prospect of indefinite detention or to sign contracts for employment and thus lose their right to repatriation. That they were unwilling to remain in France was shown by many protests from them; an example was a collective letter from the prisoners in the Cherbourg camp stating that they wished to return to Germany. At a meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee of the Control Council on 8 September 1947 the French representative had officially stated that those former prisoners of war who wished to work in France had refused to be considered as prisoners of war, thus creating a completely new category of prisoners which did not come within the scope of the repatriation plan. The French representative at the Conference of Foreign Ministers

in London in November 1947 had confirmed the fact that 130,000 German prisoners of war were still working in the mines in France.

48. There was documentary evidence that the policy of the United Kingdom and the United States Governments with regard to the repatriation of prisoners of war was similar to that of the French Government. In agreement with the United States authorities, arrangements had been made to transfer German prisoners of war to France and Belgium for work in the mines. An official United States document on the repatriation of prisoners of war stated that 742,000 prisoners had been thus sent to France, 30,825 to Belgium and 5,518 to Luxembourg. The governments concerned had asserted that they had concluded their arrangements for repatriation; actually they had concluded agreements for a new form of slavery.

49. Under the pretext that the prisoners were gainfully employed, thousands had been retained in Belgium and Luxembourg; it had been stated that the United Kingdom Government had transferred prisoners in Libya to work as volunteers on military installations. Reference had frequently been made in the United Kingdom Parliament to the number of former German prisoners of war engaged in heavy work as agricultural labourers in that country. The *New York Herald Tribune* had recently stated that former German prisoners of war who had worked in the United States of America were still awaiting the payment of \$US 330 million due to them for that work and were protesting because no legal redress was open to them.

50. There had been an unfortunate discrepancy between a statement from the French Embassy at Moscow on 3 November 1949 that there were no more prisoners of war in territories under French control and a statement from the French Ministry of National Defence quoted only three days later by a leading Paris news-

paper to the effect that 137,000 prisoners of war still remained in French territory. Furthermore, tens of thousands of former German prisoners of war were being used by the French Government as cannon-fodder in its efforts to suppress national independence movements in Indo-China and Madagascar; approximately 80 per cent of the French Foreign Legion were German prisoners of war. Thus, hundreds of thousands of Japanese and German prisoners of war were being used by the French and United Kingdom Governments, under pressure from the United States Government, to suppress the independence movements of the peoples of Asia.

51. The facts were clear enough and could not be refuted. The USSR Government had fulfilled its obligation with regard to the repatriation of both Japanese and German prisoners of war; the Governments of Australia, France, the United Kingdom and the United States had not. No amount of propaganda directed against the USSR could hide that fact.

52. The CHAIRMAN proposed that the time limit for the submission of proposals relating to the item under discussion should be 11 a.m. on 8 December 1950.

It was so agreed.

53. Mr. PAZHAWAK (Afghanistan) proposed that the speeches both of the sponsors of the resolution and of other speakers should be subject to a time-limit.

The proposal was rejected by 15 votes to one, with 16 abstentions.

54. The CHAIRMAN said that item 32, concerning refugees and stateless persons, should be dealt with at the Committee's 341st meeting, as the Fifth Committee had to deal with the financial implications of the decision on that item.

The meeting rose at 2.30 p.m.