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Chairman: Mr. Jiří NOSEK (Czechoslovakia).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Nuñez (Costa Rica), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 27

Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (A/2648 and Add.2, A/2686, chapter IV, section V) (*continued*)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. CHENG (China) observed that the presence of the President of the General Assembly and of the Secretary-General of the United Nations at the Committee's 545th meeting and the commendation of the High Commissioner's work by the chairmen of the Netherlands and Norwegian delegations at plenary meetings of the Assembly showed that more than usual importance was being given to the High Commissioner's report (A/2648 and Add.2).
2. The report showed that some progress had been achieved with regard to the High Commissioner's general activities and that his relationship with other organizations concerned with the refugee problem had improved. It was to be hoped that the improvement would continue, since co-ordination among those organizations and their co-operation with the High Commissioner were the prerequisites for a solution of the refugee problem. The unexplained delay in the preparation of the report on the Chinese refugees in Hong Kong was to be regretted; the statement that the report would be ready by the end of the summer (A/2648, para. 43) appeared to be erroneous.
3. Legal protection of refugees had been greatly strengthened by the entry into force of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (A/Conf.2/108) on 22 April 1954. An important consequence was that under article 35 of the Convention an international organization had been made jointly responsible with ratifying States for applying the Convention. The Convention travel document would probably eventually replace the London travel document.¹ Such progress should be maintained.

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighth Session, Supplement No. 11*, para. 46.

4. The slow reduction in the number of refugees still living in camps—a reduction of only 15,313 in eighteen months—should be a matter of continuing concern and should lead to sympathetic consideration of the High Commissioner's proposal for permanent solutions. The Chinese delegation was still of the opinion, which it had expressed to the Economic and Social Council, that the General Assembly should use the good offices of the Negotiating Committee on Extra-Budgetary Funds for an appeal for further contributions to the United Nations Refugee Emergency Fund. He asked whether the High Commissioner had given further consideration to suggestions made by members of his Advisory Committee about raising funds for the most needy cases by national appeals on Human Rights Day or by the issue of special stamps by the United Nations Postal Administration.

5. Chapter IV of the High Commissioner's report showed that permanent solutions through repatriation, resettlement and integration were being carried forward, that there were difficulties and that he wished to submit to the Assembly for consideration an additional method for permanent solutions. His detailed proposals (A/2648/Add.2) were, in the main, sound. Sample projects B III, IV and V and F XII appeared to be well considered; but D IX, and especially paragraph 2 (a) of D IX, seemed somewhat less urgent, as it was unlikely that a German university would prevent a refugee lacking \$50 in examination fees from taking his final examinations.

6. His delegation still believed that national governments should bear the main responsibility for integration; but, if a stimulus was necessary, the United Nations was the proper organization to provide it. The sum requested for the purpose was modest.

7. To the three forms of revolving fund suggested by the High Commissioner (A/2648/Add.2, para. 8) another might be added: subject to the General Assembly's approval, the High Commissioner might seek from Member and non-member States subscriptions up to the amount of \$12 million to a refugees' permanent solutions financing fund, to revert to subscribing States when the need was over. Subscribing States might not receive back the whole amount, but they certainly would not lose everything they had subscribed; 98 per cent of the money advanced to refugees through the Nansen Office, for example, had been repaid. Such a method might appeal to States which were inclined to assist refugees but could afford no undue sacrifice, and it would also be consistent with the spirit of General Assembly resolution 638 (VII).

8. The refugee problem had been drawn out too long. Accordingly, the Chinese delegation supported the High Commissioner's proposal, differing with him only as to methods of financing the scheme. Should the High Commissioner's proposal be adopted, some new machinery, perhaps a programme committee to review

programmes submitted by him and to allocate funds for them, should replace the existing Advisory Committee on Refugees. Such a committee should be representative of the membership of the United Nations, with the participation of non-member States directly concerned with refugees. The High Commissioner should realize that with such a representative committee he would have supporters of his activities in the United Nations and defenders against the attacks of the un-informed.

9. Mr. HOOD (Australia) commended the High Commissioner on his report (A/2648 and Add.2) and on his cogent statement at the 545th meeting. His delegation had strongly supported the continuation of the High Commissioner's Office. The General Assembly, in deciding to continue the Office, had acknowledged that it had been unduly optimistic in 1950, when it had appeared to feel that a solution of the problem was in sight.

10. The Australian Government had participated actively in the work of the International Refugee Organization; it had contributed large sums of money and had admitted 182,000 refugees. Since the discontinuance of IRO, it had admitted 5,500 more refugees and persons of similar status. By its accession to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees in March 1954, that instrument had been brought into force. It had made two contributions of £A25,000 each to the United Nations Refugee Emergency Fund, and its delegation had announced at the 479th plenary meeting of the General Assembly that it would contribute a further £A25,000 to the Fund during the current year.

11. Contributions to the Refugee Emergency Fund had been disappointing. The United States representative's suggestion that it should be merged with the new fund proposed by the High Commissioner would require thorough discussion.

12. The High Commissioner had rightly stressed assistance to the governments concerned in integrating groups of refugees in the economic and social life of their country of residence. Repatriation was no longer a feasible solution, nor was the alternative, resettlement; the countries of entry could not admit more than a small minority of the refugees. The High Commissioner's stress on integration was therefore commendable, and the Australian delegation had supported it in principle at the eighteenth session of the Economic and Social Council. Some delegations had argued that, in view of the disappointing response to appeals for contributions to the Refugee Emergency Fund, the Council would be unwise to give approval to a programme which called for the expenditure of \$12 million. The Assembly, however, would be well advised to approve the High Commissioner's proposals in principle; to request the Council to study the question of either reconstituting the existing Advisory Committee or setting up a new body to consult with the High Commissioner and direct and supervise the application of the proposals for permanent solutions; and to request the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds to approach governments for contributions to the new fund. The High Commissioner's proposals could be put progressively into practice as and when the necessary funds came in. The Australian delegation, however, could not at that time promise any contribution to the new fund.

13. Mr. SAKSIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) reminded the Committee that at all sessions since

1946 his delegation had explained its position on a matter which had remained all too long on the Assembly's agenda. The basic reason why so many hundreds of thousands had not returned home had been the incorrect policy adopted by the United Nations in failing to comply with resolution 8 (I) unanimously adopted by the General Assembly on 12 February 1946, in particular operative paragraph (c) (iii) of the resolution. Had the United Nations in fact regarded as its main task the encouragement and assistance in every way possible of an early return to the countries of origin, the refugee problem would have disappeared long since. But first IRO and later the High Commissioner for Refugees, had not merely ignored the Assembly's plain instructions, but had done everything in their power to prevent repatriation. It was clear from the report that the alternative, resettlement, had simply been a cover for the recruitment of cheap manpower in such countries as the United States, Canada, Australia and Brazil. Hundreds of thousands of persons forcibly displaced during the war by the Fascist invaders had been compelled to agree to do any kind of work at any wage simply in order to subsist, as was clear from the High Commissioner's report. In the entire report there was only one paragraph, paragraph 165, dealing with compliance with the basic Assembly resolution—which it did not mention specifically—and in that the High Commissioner admitted that he had done nothing to encourage repatriation. Nor was there anything about repatriation in his proposals for future action. Thus, in the future as in the past, all his activities were intended to perpetuate the problem in order to maintain a large reserve of cheap manpower. The remainder of the report was devoted to resettlement, but the figures given merely showed that that could not solve the problem. The High Commissioner himself described the inhuman conditions in the refugee camps and the tragic plight of the aged and sick who had been rejected by the recruiters of cheap labour.

14. Not only had the High Commissioner's Office failed to comply with the basic United Nations resolution; it was also being used to foster enmity and hatred among the peoples. It was promoting the recruitment of spies and diversionists to work against the Soviet Union and the peoples' democracies instead of repatriating the refugees so that they might be able to work at home in peace. Statements by displaced persons who, despite all obstacles and at the risk of their lives, had managed to return to their own countries had disclosed that propaganda against repatriation, intimidation, deceit and slander of the Soviet Union and the peoples' democracies were rampant in the camps. The inmates were subjected to direct pressure to act as spies, saboteurs and diversionists against their native countries.

15. Clearly, such activities would never solve the vital refugee problem. The Soviet Union delegation, therefore, faithful as it was to the purposes and principles of the United Nations and to the promotion of the peaceful settlement of disputes, could not regard them as satisfactory. In the past three years the United Nations budget had allocated some \$2 million for refugees; it was absurd that United Nations funds should be used to subsidize activities flagrantly inconsistent with the United Nations Charter.

16. He would therefore vote against any proposal to approve the High Commissioner's report and any proposals for the continuation of the High Commissioner's activities in their current form.

17. Rev. BEAUFORT (Netherlands) pointed out that it was the responsibility of the United Nations to find a solution to the refugee problem, as the High Commissioner had emphasized. Furthermore, the United Nations had indirectly recognized that responsibility by setting up the International Refugee Organization. Early in 1951, the United Nations had assumed direct responsibility for refugees by winding up IRO and establishing the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The High Commissioner's functions differed from those of IRO in that he was not provided with operational funds and that his task was a limited one.

18. A number of United Nations Members had assisted the High Commissioner to fulfil his functions by admitting refugees into their countries and contributing to the Refugee Emergency Fund, but it was perfectly understandable that the High Commissioner could state, in paragraph 267 of his report, that the decision which the United Nations had to take on the refugee problem could not be avoided because it was inherent in the principles accepted in the Charter.

19. Generous contributions had been made by many governments in answer to the High Commissioner's appeal, but the need for emergency aid in many areas had increased. That was understandable, as opportunities for resettling or integrating the older and less healthy refugees diminished with time, and the number of difficult cases increased. The High Commissioner's Advisory Committee had suggested that the good offices of the Negotiating Committee on Extra-Budgetary Funds might be sought in obtaining funds for the United Nations Refugee Emergency Fund. The Netherlands delegation warmly supported that suggestion.

20. Two questions arose in connexion with the new programme the High Commissioner had outlined: first, whether the programme was technically feasible, and secondly, how it was to be financed.

21. With regard to the first point, it should be remembered that the High Commissioner and his staff were not dreamers, and that they had acquired valuable experience with the Ford Foundation grant. Furthermore, there were a number of specific sample projects (A/2648/Add.2) which had been worked out in co-operation with local authorities and private organizations in the refugees' countries of residence. He was convinced that the High Commissioner had not exaggerated in stating that his programme would, if implemented, make a very considerable contribution to the solution of the refugee problem over the coming five years.

22. With regard to the financial implications of the programme, the sum of \$12 million requested by the High Commissioner was extremely low, but some delegations might be expected to hesitate about contributing in view of the limited response to appeals for the Refugee Emergency Fund. His own country had done work for refugees which might stimulate others. Through "liberation markets", organized by the Netherlands Youth Community in connexion with the Netherlands Liberation Memorial Day on 5 May, 58,000 guilders had been collected and had been transmitted to the High Commissioner, the larger part being earmarked for the refugee children's home near Paris. The Protestant Radio Organization had launched a campaign to collect 100,000 guilders for Trieste: over 200,000 had been collected and a hundred tuberculous

patients had been transferred from Trieste to the Netherlands. The trade unions had recommended to their members that they should work one hour for the benefit of the United Nations refugee programme, and employers had pledged a matching contribution.

23. In addition, the Netherlands Government had announced its intention of making a special contribution of \$200,000 to the Refugee Emergency Fund, before the end of 1954, over and above its normal contribution of \$50,000. Provision had been made in the 1955 budget for a further contribution in case the contributions of other countries did not reach the expected level. Subject to the approval of Parliament, the Netherlands Government was also willing to make a corresponding contribution of \$480,000 to the fund for the new programme.

24. Mrs. ELLIOT (United Kingdom) thought it a measure of the success of the International Refugee Organization and of the High Commissioner that the number of refugees had been substantially reduced. She hoped that there would be increased support for the High Commissioner's camp-adoption scheme. The excellent work done in co-operation with the specialized agencies and private agencies was worthy of the highest praise.

25. The United Kingdom Government realized that the work could not be undertaken without financial support and had contributed \$280,000 to the Refugee Emergency Fund. The representative of Norway had announced in the General Assembly that his Government was hoping to make an increased contribution to refugee funds, and in the Committee the representatives of Australia and the Netherlands had also made announcements of further contributions. She hoped that other governments would follow that lead.

26. The United Kingdom was in full agreement with the High Commissioner as to the importance of economic integration for those refugees for whom emigration had not proved a possible solution, and it had noted the emphasis placed on economic integration in the High Commissioner's proposals. One of the reasons why the United Kingdom delegation had been unable to support Economic and Social Council resolution 549 (XVIII) was that its sponsors had had particularly in mind a solution by emigration, which was, as the High Commissioner had indicated, no longer practicable.

27. The United Kingdom felt some doubt about some of the proposals in the report (A/2648 and Add.2), such as the settlement of non-agricultural refugees on agricultural holdings. Much money might be wasted in attempting to settle refugees with no agricultural experience on holdings where skill and experience were required. The proposal to train refugees for jobs in countries already over-populated was also fraught with difficulties. If the solution of the refugee problem lay in integration, it was important not to incur the ill will of the local population by putting the refugees in a more favoured position. In the long run it would be essential for the integration to be brought about by the country of residence rather than as a result of international pressure.

28. The United Kingdom delegation agreed with much that had been said by the United States representative at the 546th meeting. It had understood that the basis for the General Assembly decision to wind up IRO and establish the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees had been the conviction

that the primary responsibility for the integration of refugees whose emigration was impracticable should rest with the countries of residence. The United Kingdom delegation had clearly stated that view at the time, as had the Director-General of IRO at the thirteenth session of the Economic and Social Council.

29. The United Kingdom Government had followed a similar policy in dealing with the refugee problem on its own territory. Many thousands of victims of Nazi persecution had found refuge in the United Kingdom and had received aid from charitable organizations. After the Second World War, more than 250,000 Polish and other refugees had been granted asylum, in spite of the fact that the country was facing a housing shortage and food rationing. Many of the refugees had since become part of the community. Others had been assisted to find a livelihood overseas.

30. However, there were other problems to be faced. There were the claims of reconstruction and of the under-developed countries, as well as the burden of defence. The United Kingdom had already contributed £100,000 to the United Nations Refugee Emergency Fund, but it could not see its way to support a new fund when only \$1 million had been subscribed towards the target of \$3 million for the Refugee Emergency Fund. Before a new fund was opened, Member States and private agencies should be urged to support the existing fund.

31. The United States representative, at the 546th meeting, had outlined the terms under which the High Commissioner might operate a single fund. That would mean merely the continuation of the Refugee Emergency Fund, with a wider interpretation of the ways in which the fund could be used. If other Member States agreed to it, the United Kingdom would also agree, as it had already given its support to the fund. But, if a \$12 million fund were created, as the High Commissioner proposed, the United Kingdom would not be able to contribute to it. It would therefore not vote for its establishment.

32. The United Kingdom delegation was impressed with some of the schemes the High Commissioner proposed for a permanent solution and would support him if he, in special circumstances and subject to prior agreement with interested governments, used some of the Refugee Emergency Fund for such schemes.

33. The question of establishing an executive committee to supervise the expenditure of the funds at the disposal of the High Commissioner was raised in Economic and Social Council resolution 549 (XVIII). The United Kingdom Government wished to postpone a discussion on the terms of reference of that committee until the Council or the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions had given an opinion.

34. The United Kingdom Government did not wish to limit the funds that the High Commissioner could raise from various sources. It had helped the refugees and would continue to do so. Its difference with the High Commissioner was one of method rather than of kind.

35. Mr. ALTMAN (Poland) regretted that, ten years after the end of the Second World War, the refugee problem was still not solved nor, according to the High Commissioner's report (A/2648 and Add. 2), likely to be solved in the near future. That was due to neglect of the principle laid down in General Assembly resolution 8 (I) of 12 February 1946 that

the main task concerning displaced persons was to encourage and assist in every way possible their early return to their countries of origin.

36. The High Commissioner's report recognized the failure of the attempt to find a solution for the refugee problem by other means than those laid down in the General Assembly resolution. There were thousands of displaced persons and the possibilities of settlement, which was the ideal solution according to the High Commissioner, were limited. Nearly 88,000 refugees were living in official camps and thousands more in unofficial ones. The conditions in which the refugees in official camps lived were described in paragraphs 88 to 90 of the report. As conditions were so bad in the official camps, those in unofficial camps could be expected to be worse. An article in the *Manchester Guardian* of 28 June 1954 gave details of the appalling living conditions of the refugees in three unofficial camps in and near Munich. The case of the Munich camps was not an isolated one; conditions in most of the camps of West Germany were similar and were clear evidence of discrimination against displaced persons.

37. In other countries refugees were shamefully exploited. They were paid low salaries and given the more arduous tasks, and their trade-union and social security rights were restricted. The situation of members of the liberal professions was particularly bad: they were not allowed to practise and were forced to take manual jobs. In all those cases, the refugees were victims of political, economic and social discrimination. The remarks of the Saudi Arabian representative on that subject at the 546th meeting had been particularly cogent.

38. The countries of residence were recruiting refugees for military and para-military organizations and using them to combat the democratic movements in Asia and Africa. Many thousands of refugees had been recruited by United States agents for espionage against the peoples' democracies and the Soviet Union. Paragraph 33 of the report mentioned the close liaison that was maintained with the United States Escapee Programme, and the exchange of information. Such activities were contrary to the principle of peaceful coexistence.

39. It was worthy of note that the High Commissioner devoted only one paragraph out of two hundred and seventy to the question of repatriation, although he had been invited in General Assembly resolution 728 (VIII) to consider repatriation, as well as resettlement and integration, as solutions of the refugee problem.

40. The Polish delegation was convinced that repatriation was the only solution to the problem. The High Commissioner held different views, but his so-called constructive programme contained nothing really constructive. It merely emphasized resettlement and integration and, on the financial plane, was based on an appeal to philanthropy. It was nothing more than a continuation of the policy followed up to then, which had been to encourage emigration and the dispersal of the unfortunate refugees throughout the world.

41. Mr. DE BARROS (Brazil) pointed out that, ten years after the end of the war, the refugee problem was still unsolved. Brazil had welcomed thousands of refugees, in a spirit of human solidarity and in the knowledge that the work of the refugees could be of use to the country. The Brazilian representative to the International Labour Organisation had visited the

refugee camps and had drawn up a detailed report, as a result of which 45,000 refugees had entered Brazil in nine years, without discrimination on racial, political or religious grounds.

42. The High Commissioner had done very valuable humanitarian work, which was also important from the economic and social point of view. Nevertheless, approximately 350,000 refugees were still not completely assimilated and 88,000 of them were still in camps. Brazil remained faithful to its "open-door policy" and was prepared to help to remedy that situation.

43. In chapter I, section 5, of this report, the High Commissioner stated that he had consulted the Brazilian Government about the establishment of a branch office at Rio de Janeiro. In principle, the Brazilian delegation did not approve of the establishment of new branch offices, but, as it was sure that the High Commissioner had good reasons for making such a proposal, it was prepared to accept the establishment of an office provided that it was completely independent of the Bogotá branch office. In view of the fact that Brazil had received more refugees than any other Latin American country, the Brazilian office had to be answerable directly to the High Commissioner, who should remain in direct contact with the Brazilian authorities.

44. The Brazilian Government had recently taken action to unify and centralize activities relating to colonization and immigration and had set up an institute to deal with those matters on a federal basis. The institute had drawn up an extensive immigration programme, taking into account not only the number of immigrants, but also their quality, technical capacity and degree of adaptation. It was well known that, in order that immigrants might be completely assimilated into the life of the receiving countries, they should have qualifications compatible with labour and production requirements. The great need of Brazil was for skilled workers and experienced farmers. A plan had been prepared for the distribution of immigrants in Brazil; that plan had involved a careful study of the potentialities of each region and was intended to prevent the continued flow of European immigrants to the southern states.

45. The wide difference between the immigration problem and the refugee problem had to be borne in mind. Admission of refugees necessitated strict selection; for political and humanitarian reasons, the Brazilian Government could not run the risk of receiving refugees who would not be adaptable to the way of life of the country. Moreover, refugees who had suffered persecution and hardships were often predisposed towards indiscipline and found it very difficult to adapt themselves to conditions which differed greatly from those of their own countries; many of them were imbued with the spirit of adventure and found routine work incompatible. It was obvious that such refugees could not fulfil the minimum conditions required of immigrants.

46. Many refugees had settled in countries where it had proved necessary to provide assistance for their integration. The Ford Foundation grant had been used to provide vocational and agricultural training, but the results achieved were as yet inconsiderable. The High Commissioner was asking for a sum of \$12 million to complete the work. If the necessary funds could be found, the problem might be finally solved,

since not only would the refugees' training be greatly advanced, but the task of the countries prepared to receive them would be facilitated. In that connexion, it should be pointed out that, if the United Nations could not find the funds to develop and direct the immigration of refugees, the Latin-American countries, which were the receiving countries mainly concerned, could not undertake to pay the cost of such immigration. He was sure, however, that a reasonable solution would in fact be found.

47. The High Commissioner had stressed the need to provide refugees with travel documents to enable them not only to travel abroad, but also to return to their countries of residence. Brazil had long since adopted a system of special passports for aliens, under which refugees admitted on a permanent basis might obtain a passport for a one-way journey and an identity book entitling them to obtain a return visa from any Brazilian consulate. Brazil had signed the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (A/Conf.2/108) and, although ratification had been delayed, refugees already enjoyed the same guarantees as other aliens. His country had also signed the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (E/Conf.17/5).

48. In spite of its wish to facilitate the solution of the refugee problem, Brazil could not support the High Commissioner's proposals concerning the executive functions he would assume in connexion with certain aspects of the problem relating to immigration. His Government had no intention of binding itself in any way to admitting a given number of refugees, unless it could be certain that their selection would be compatible with Brazilian interests. The problem of refugees should not be confused with that of normal European immigration to Latin America.

49. Mr. TUNCEL (Turkey) said that he would limit his statement to the enumeration of some generally accepted principles relating to the Emergency Fund and to permanent solutions.

50. The first principle was that of the categories of refugees with which the United Nations was concerned. It had rightly been pointed out that the clear definition of those categories in the High Commissioner's Statute (General Assembly resolution 428 (V), annex) was limited in time, since the last category was that of persons who had become refugees as the result of events which had taken place before 1 January 1951. It might therefore be assumed that the number of refugees would not increase appreciably, but, on the contrary, would be reduced by measures taken jointly by governments and by the United Nations.

51. Secondly, the United Nations had set a target date for the completion of its task. By 31 December 1958, the General Assembly would have to take a decision on whether or not the High Commissioner's Office should be continued for another term. It would therefore be advisable to draw up new plans to ensure that the High Commissioner's work would no longer be necessary by that date.

52. Thirdly, most representatives would agree on the need for emergency aid to certain groups of refugees. Nevertheless, the methods used to finance that aid had not proved entirely satisfactory. The form of appeals to governments had been chosen, but appeals no longer gave the desired results, and the High Commissioner's Advisory Committee on Refugees had decided to ask the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds

to inquire into the possibility of contributions from governments.

53. A fourth point on which there seemed to be agreement was the need to take specific and effective measures to solve the problem. One solution might be the ratification of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (A/Conf.2/108) by as many States as possible, as the Convention contained provisions which should constitute the basis of all permanent solutions of the problem. The Assembly might well recommend that all governments which had not yet done so should sign the Convention. Voluntary repatriation, free from any pressure whatsoever, might provide another solution. Another solution was that of resettlement, or emigration. Opinions differed on that score; some held that resettlement possibilities had become so limited that that solution no longer played an important part in refugee programmes, while others believed that the really permanent solution lay in resettlement, since refugees were given equal treatment with the nationals of the receiving country. In the case of integration in the country of residence, refugees were not likely to receive such equal treatment. It therefore seemed that the resettlement solution should not be underestimated, although the High Commissioner should, of course, be given the choice between integration and resettlement, according to cases. The High Commissioner's programme provided for a preponderance of 80 per cent to 20 per cent in favour of integration as against resettlement. It might be wise to stress the importance of resettlement as a permanent solution, as the Economic and Social Council had done at its eighteenth session. In practice, it would be the attitude of the countries of residence that would prevail. The case of each country should be considered separately, since some of them might favour integration and others resettlement. Turkey, for example, would prefer that the unassimilable refugees in its territory should be resettled elsewhere.

54. The fifth principle on which wide agreement might be reached was that the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds should inquire into the possibility of governmental contributions. That form of financing would not, of course, preclude appeals to governments by the High Commissioner.

55. Sixthly, many representatives might agree on the advisability of combining the Refugee Emergency Fund and contributions for permanent solutions in a fund for emergency aid and permanent solutions.

56. Finally, it might be agreed that the High Commissioner's Advisory Committee on Refugees would be more effective if it were given executive functions.

57. A number of delegations already agreed with those principles and would submit a draft resolution on those lines.

58. Mr. CARBONELL (Colombia) said that his delegation had paid special attention to the High Commissioner's future programme for the promotion of permanent solutions. With regard to the appeal for the Refugee Emergency Fund, his delegation considered that the General Assembly should authorize the High Commissioner to secure the necessary amounts and would vote to that effect. In doing so, it would be casting a vote of confidence in the High Commissioner and his work.

59. The Colombian Institute of Land Settlement and Immigration, with the co-operation of the Inter-Governmental Committee for European Migration and the International Catholic Migration Committee, was studying plans for the settlement of refugee families on agricultural plots. A refugees centre had also been established. The Institute, which had been established in 1953, had been provided with a rotating capital of \$40 million and was empowered to open colonization centres, grant loans to settlers, engage technical personnel, create selection missions and dispose of State lands. It had already elaborated a number of projects, such as the settlement of 200 Hungarian refugee families from Germany and Austria. In addition, 300 visas had recently been granted for refugees from Trieste. Special travel documents had been issued for refugees and stateless persons.

60. Colombia, like other Latin American countries, wanted to secure strong, healthy and assimilable immigrants. Its attitude could not be regarded as egotistical, since it was essential for it to convert the heterogeneous elements of its population into a homogeneous national entity.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.