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Chairman: Mr. Richard M. AKWEI (Ghana).

GENERAL STATEMENTS

and

AGENDA ITEM 37

United Nations Development Decade: report of the Secretary-General (A/7203, chap. III; A/7251, E/4496, E/AC.54/L.25, E/AC.54/L.28, E/AC.54/L.29/Rev.1, E/AC.54/L.30, E/AC.54/L.31, TD/B/186/Rev.1)

1. Mr. De SEYNES (Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs) said that the imminent approach of the second United Nations Development Decade would inevitably dominate the economic discussions of the current session of the Assembly. According to some, the disappointment and concern aroused by the unfavourable international situation should induce one to take in one's sails. The pragmatists suggested that one should keep to the beaten track, strengthen the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the International Development Association (IDA) and leave the idea of a global strategy for another day. The fate of those two institutions remained, of course, the priority aim, because the success of the Decade largely depended on it. Nevertheless, the need for a broader vision was felt. An institutional system which was so complex and so refined as that with which the international community was provided could not go on indefinitely without an indicative framework. One should go beyond a mere act of declaration setting forth a carefully prepared plan of action and develop a continuing "function"; that was what must distinguish the United Nations Development Decade from so many public and private manifestations aimed at the same goal and imbued with the same spirit.

2. The international climate was not such as to enable the institutional system of the United Nations before the beginning of the next Decade, to produce a treaty incorporating specific obligations relating to the various aspects of development. Yet, one could hope to go further than the stage of declarations of

intent. The difficult question of the kind of "social contract" which could unite the Members of the Organization required a practical answer; some light could be thrown on it if one regarded the global strategy of the next Decade not merely as a plan of action but also as machinery for "international surveillance". It would be a major step forward if Governments were formally to accept an adequately articulated plan of action—a reasonable "frame of reference"—with objectives and political stipulations. The fact that the Decade was a topic of discussion in so many meetings, both national and international, suggested that that was possible, and it seemed that agreement could be reached concerning the magnitude and nature of development needs and the guide lines for an international development policy. The United Nations had to translate such agreement into new disciplines and must henceforth adapt itself to that function of surveillance, which had so far been only imperfectly achieved. Machinery for surveillance would bring to light some important problems which United Nations agencies had often ignored. Often, also, the judgements and recommendations emerging from the Organization were based on insufficiently precise criteria or on a somewhat outdated information system which was not designed for the purposes of a global strategy. The organization of information played a leading role in management technology, and the United Nations should not stand aloof from a development designed to introduce a greater element of rationality into economic life.

3. The plan of action for the Decade should be envisaged from the outset in relation to the machinery for international surveillance. That would mean that it was not essential to define precisely in advance every part of a global strategy and that it would be possible to revise certain objectives in the light of experience or new circumstances. Similarly, it became less necessary to express certain phenomena numerically, which was sometimes difficult, if there was machinery for qualitative evaluation. The preparatory phase could be made easier if it was viewed against the background of continuous international surveillance. It would be desirable and natural for Governments to undertake more specific commitments relating to the various aspects of development, as in fact some had already done.

4. A distinction should be made at that point between the concept of machinery for surveillance and the working out of arrangements concerning the ways and means of distributing international aid to recipient countries.

5. A global strategy conceived both as an indicative plan and as a frame of reference derived its strength from the support it mustered at the national and inter-

national levels, and for that reason it should, at the beginning, be the subject of joint study involving various legislative and technocratic bodies and some delicate dovetailing, made all the more difficult by the fact that the preparatory process must be short. Furthermore, while bearing in mind the need for a certain degree of simplicity, the temptation to simplify must be resisted and the Development Decade, which encompassed a complex of multitude phenomena, must not be reduced to the few orders of magnitude that formed the subject of the most impassioned debates and could only be solved through international agreements, which were complex and difficult to achieve. Yielding to that temptation might result in the neglect of certain fields which lent themselves more readily to forms of co-operation that were effective and easier for the United Nations to attain. The range of possibilities open to the United Nations system was very wide indeed. It was important that the over-all view should include all the "determinants" of development, and that was why the preparation of a plan of action called for a vigorous approach. At the executive body level, that involved only technical difficulties which could be overcome. In fact, the Decade project had brought the various bodies closer together than ever before. It should not be much more difficult at the level of governmental bodies. The various efforts must be integrated, not merely juxtaposed, and central machinery was important for that purpose.

6. The effort to achieve integration was particularly important so far as the quantitative elements were concerned. Quantified global targets still aroused some scepticism, and the targets proposed should therefore be made as credible as possible, by concurring the work in the field of development, by including the econometric disciplines and by stressing the implications of certain hypotheses for rates of growth and the requirements of certain major sectors. The targets set for the present Decade, crude as they might have been, had had a beneficial effect on the behaviour of Governments. No doubt the work now being done under the auspices of the Committee for Development Planning with the help of the specialized agencies would result in more reliable formulas.

7. Life must be breathed into those quantified targets, or "performance criteria", on which public opinion focused its attention, by defining general policies and specific measures. That work was difficult, but indispensable, since not to undertake it would lead to the setting of targets by extrapolation, without taking into account the improvements that could be achieved by adopting appropriate policies and measures. Those policies and measures were the mainspring of the next Decade, and should cover the range of factors which contributed to development and be conceived in the light of that interdependence which would make it possible to reach the desired targets.

8. The preparatory period began with a diagnosis, which had been made difficult by the fact that it was not possible to establish a typology based on causal relationships from which certain conclusions applicable to categories of countries could be deduced, owing to the differences in national contexts. Yet, in order to be able to give an over-all picture, use must be made of some classifications.

9. Although the problems of methodology had not been entirely solved, the diagnosis in the World Economic Survey, 1967<sup>L</sup> gave a sufficiently well articulated over-all view to provide a useful point of departure. It showed the background which was characteristic of the whole of the under-developed world and the details of which were now familiar, and particularly the tremendous gap which continued to exist between the poor countries and the industrialized countries, whether in the production of goods and services, in the gross product per capita, in growth rates or in the general level of incomes. That situation called for collective action, in an age when the idea of neighbourliness had spread to encompass the globe.

10. During the period under review, twenty-three countries had achieved growth rates higher than the target of 5 per cent fixed in 1961. Of those countries, nine had already exceeded 6 per cent. The countries in question were generally those whose economies were based on the extractive industry or those with a diversified export sector. The extractive industry had a particularly stimulating effect on the economy of a country, because of the foreign capital which it required in the initial stage and because of the spread of wealth once the deposits were being worked. The countries with extractive resources were obviously in an advantageous position, but the United Nations should continue to help them to benefit from those resources, ensuring that the role of chance in the development of such favourable conditions was reduced to a minimum. The services which the United Nations had already provided in that connexion, with considerable success, should be organized on a much wider and more systematic basis.

11. The fact still remained that two thirds of the countries were in the medium and low growth-rate categories. Those were the countries for which the agricultural sector was the main element in the total product, and also the source of goods for export. Progress there depended essentially on increasing agricultural productivity, adjusting production to the requirements of foreign markets, diversifying the domestic economy through industrialization, and opening up international markets. It was for those countries that collective responsibility must be chiefly mobilized and for them that a global strategy should be essentially conceived. In the high growth-rate group, international action should facilitate harmonious development through technical assistance in the social policy, education and training sectors. But for the others, it was an absolutely decisive factor in the growth process itself.

12. Population statistics now loomed large in any over-all presentation based on a detailed diagnosis. At one time, average growth rates of 3 to 3.5 per cent in the gross national product would have been regarded as major achievements, but in view of the demographic history of recent years such rates could no longer be considered adequate. The key significance of the population factor was only now beginning to be appreciated. The recent progress in health and medicine had brought that about, but, thanks to technological advances, the demographic factor could now be

<sup>L</sup> United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.68.H.C.2.

regarded as a political parameter which could henceforth be influenced. On the threshold of the second Decade, the prospects for food production and the fact that there was a latent productive capacity had dispelled the apocalyptic Malthusian visions.

13. However, the problem was still distressing, in that it affected most of the developing countries and involved the whole gamut of human needs, including education. In the United Nations, where all activities were motivated by a dynamic concept of human rights, there were still other reasons for drawing attention to the population problem. Statistics showed that populations, of whatever kind, came to adopt methods of birth control when they reached a certain income level with the opportunities that it offered for education and information. It must therefore be recognized that, in the absence of efforts to inform and educate, an unfortunate form of discrimination based on wealth would continue to be practised in relation to the population problem.

14. It was clear that a reduction of 1 per cent in the growth rate of the population level in certain countries could be compared, in terms of well-being, to a 4 point increase in the investment rate, which would be a spectacular increase for some countries. Considerable efforts were already being made, sometimes with signal success, in at least twenty countries, including Pakistan, India, the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong. It was interesting to note that the adoption of birth-control measures did not necessarily depend on explicit government policies, but sometimes developed from private activities with discreet governmental encouragement.

15. It would be wrong to close one's eyes to the difficulties of introducing a factor so closely linked to the personal concept of procreation into a complex network of social and economic phenomena. It was also necessary to bear in mind the particular motivations and cultural patterns of certain groups, but those difficulties should not be used as an excuse for doing nothing. The solemn Declaration on Population, signed by thirty Governments in 1967, which was transmitted to the Secretary-General on the occasion of Human Rights Day, had been evidence of that common concern. The consent of the community in question and a thorough knowledge of the environment were important requirements for success. The United Nations should simply aim at bringing home all the consequences of demographic growth to those who were still unaware of them, within the context of tested machinery and under the guidance of a Committee of acknowledged expertise, taking into account specific data in each nation and particular circumstances.

16. The action foreseen by the United Nations in the population field illustrated the possibilities of the methods of "technical co-operation", which had a prominent place in a global strategy. Technical co-operation made action possible in certain areas, particularly the development of human resources, which over the long term had a profound impact on development capacity. In very many cases, the strengthening of development capacity should serve as the criterion by which to judge performance over part, at least, of the next Decade. Technical co-

operation was particularly important for the United Nations system, since it seemed destined to be the main form of its practical action for some time to come. Technical co-operation had emerged very early in the Organization and had now come to occupy a fundamental position. At the present stage, however, its methods and its very conception perhaps needed to be adjusted; for in some fields the rules governing United Nations activity were not conducive to the desired results. It might be desirable, while adhering generally to the principle of national programming, to entertain the idea of some comprehensive programmes covering large geographical areas.

17. The programmes had not yet assimilated the modern tendency for economic development to be carried out within large organizations which mobilized numerous centres of initiative and combined in one all-embracing plan the application of technology, management techniques, training and education and, of course, capital. Because of that, one was powerless when faced with certain problems, such as malnutrition. The localized consequences of malnutrition were sometimes violently revealed in harrowing pictures, but its irreversible effects were being felt in vast areas of the world. International resources, even in moderate amounts, supporting co-ordinated national programmes, could have a real effect, although most of the expenditure should be borne by the Governments concerned. Bearing in mind the difficulty of achieving international agreements on such complex subjects as tariff preferences and the terms of international aid, a global strategy ought to be capable of devising large-scale actions in more easily accessible fields. Nevertheless, efforts in the more complex fields of the organization of trade and financial aid should not in any way be relaxed. One characteristic which was common to all the developing countries was their dependence on external resources, and the efforts which had been made in that connexion should not be abandoned.

18. It was probable that better arrangements with regard to public aid would evolve during the next Decade, but it was to be hoped that, given the motives underlying international aid, the ways and means would continue to be very diverse. The ground for reciprocal undertakings by donor and recipient countries and for synchronized national and international actions had been broken by the consortia and advisory groups. Those bodies might continue proliferating and refining their methods, but as much thought should be given to regional solutions, turning over to regional bodies the management of a larger proportion of the available bilateral or multilateral aid. The network of such bodies had been strengthened in recent years and, provided that they co-ordinated their efforts, their assistance could prove valuable for both the donor and the recipient countries.

19. Guarantees of continuity, lessening the constraints associated with the voting of budgetary allocations, should be introduced to a greater extent into most financial aid programmes. The question of recourse to the money markets must also be more actively explored, and such problems as the structure of the capital formation of public organizations and co-ordination among the institutions concerned with

multilateral finance in their recourse to the money markets should also be reviewed.

20. Efforts should be made to develop an institutional and a psychological context in which private capital could participate more actively and more fruitfully in development. The dialogue which was necessary in that connexion might take place under the auspices of the United Nations and might enable a basis for reconciliation to be gradually established. "International production" seemed likely to expand considerably; however, it entailed risks as well as promises for newly sovereign States. Thus far, international production in the countries of the Third World had developed principally in the extractive industry. The advantages of decentralization of manufacturing in the developing countries were not as yet always apparent to international firms in making their investment decisions. However, such advantages would soon become clear, opening new prospects for the export of manufactured goods from under-developed countries and enabling them to overcome the handicaps resulting from a belated entry into the community of industrialized countries. That new phenomenon called for an international institutional system adapted to its requirements, and a modicum of control to avoid restrictive practices.

21. One of the major difficulties in the formulation of a strategy covering a ten-year period was the difficulty of visualizing the end of that period and the conditions which would then prevail. There was the danger that proposals would be limited and quickly outmoded. It was inevitable that, because of so much unfinished business, there would be concern to make up for lost time. However, contemporary trends which would assert themselves during the 1970s were fraught with international implications, and the United Nations should develop with regard to them the faculty of foresight over the long term. The nature of the scientific and technological phenomenon with which the civilizations of the world were at present faced, its possible disturbing influence, and the degree of international co-operation which it required, called for the creation of warning devices and machinery for anticipating developments, for the purpose of security as well as economic and social progress and the advancement of science and technology.

22. The world of the next Decade would continue to be characterized to a very large extent by the dependence of the peripheral countries on the centres of economic power. The decisions taken by the industrial countries would continue to affect, more than any other factor, the exports of the under-developed countries and the trend of international aid and trade policies. Changes in the index of industrial production of the developed countries invariably meant changes in the under-developed countries' receipts from exports of raw materials and manufactured goods. The favourable trend of the terms of trade during the first half of the Decade had been due to the sustained demand in the market-economy industrial countries. On the other hand, the recent slow-down in expansion had been reflected immediately in a reversal of the trend in the terms of trade. Furthermore, recent fiscal policies of austerity had already seriously undermined the international assistance programmes.

23. Better co-ordination of demand management policies, and adjustment and consolidation of the international monetary system, would reduce the need for restrictive measures, facilitate an easing of the capital market, encourage the opening up of commercial markets, and suggest procedures for concerted action whereby international development financing might be made freer from undesirable fluctuations and from the constraints of tied aid. The burden of the adjustments made necessary by imbalances in payments between industrial countries were at present unduly transferred in part to the under-developed countries.

24. On all those phenomena, however, the United Nations was usually silent. Because of its fundamental preoccupation with the Third World, it was drifting gradually toward a narrowed and simplified view of the world economy. That had serious disadvantages. It led to a lack of understanding towards the industrialized countries and to misunderstandings which made debate sterile. It was important to analyse and anticipate the behaviour of the industrial nations in relation to the problems of development, taking into account not only cyclical policies but also the structural developments caused by the "civilization of needs", the investment which the most advanced countries still had to make in the social field, and the immense problems which unplanned industrialization and urbanization had gradually built up. That lack of perspective on the part of the United Nations was harmful to the implementation of a strategy which demanded a precise knowledge of the obstacles to be overcome, and it prevented the Organization from making itself heard on fundamental problems.

25. Yet the very circumstances should impel it at the present time to discharge its mandate to the full. The requirements of functional organization in the economic field no longer coincided as closely as in the past with the diplomatic options. That might give rise to complications, but it was within the universal framework of the United Nations itself that such contradictions could be resolved. The efforts required of countries which bore the main responsibility for the world economic order could be given the additional stimulus and encouragement at the United Nations which would prompt them to adopt the necessary reforms and measures and to act collectively in pursuit of common goals. The vision of one interdependent world, in which, more than in the past, the affairs of each would be the concern of all, must replace the idea of a universe in which groups and blocs sometimes opposed each other and sometimes co-operated, but remained fundamentally alien to each other and that was the vision presented by the second Development Decade.

26. The CHAIRMAN, supported by Mr. DANIELI (United Republic of Tanzania), thanked the Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs for his excellent statement, which gave a complete picture of the problems of development and would undoubtedly be a valuable document for the Committee throughout its work.

27. Mr. KHANACHET (Kuwait), supported by Mr. SAM (Ghana), also expressed his appreciation of the Under-Secretary-General's authoritative statement,

and proposed that it should be issued in full in all the working languages.

28. Mr. KASSUM (Secretary of the Committee) pointed out that the financial implications of the proposal would amount to \$1,200, and drew the Committee's attention to the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2292 (XXII).

29. Mr. POSNETT (United Kingdom) noted that the statement had already been issued in full by the Office of Public Information.

30. Mr. VIAUD (France) said that he appreciated the desire for economy which underlay the concern for the financial implications of issuing the statement as a document. However, in view of its interest and importance, it was essential that it should be issued in full in all languages. He wondered whether the same concern for economy would be expressed when it came to issuing the draft resolutions submitted by delegations, which were sometimes lengthy.

31. After a discussion in which Mr. CHTOUROU (Tunisia) and Mr. PIÑERA (Chile) took part, the CHAIRMAN suggested that the statement made by the Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs should be issued in full as a Committee document in all the working languages, as proposed by the representative of Kuwait.

*It was so decided.*<sup>2/</sup>

32. Mr. VARELA (Panama) congratulated the officers of the Committee on their election. Under the guidance of such a capable team, the work of the Committee was bound to prove beneficial to the developing countries.

33. Economic development was not a spontaneous phenomenon; that was why the gap between the rich and poor countries could not be bridged unless external resources were mobilized in sufficient volume, unless the terms on which they were provided were eased and unless there was a comprehensive, coherent and sustained policy of world co-operation. If the present situation continued, the social tensions and instability which racked the poor countries would be exacerbated. It could not be denied that in recent years the developing countries had made a more substantial contribution to their own development, but that effort, and the sacrifices it entailed, had not been matched by a corresponding increase in external aid. That shortage of financial resources helped to aggravate the many problems which beset the deprived nations. Leaving aside the cost of servicing the external debt, payments of dividends and private investments, it would be seen that in 1966 total development aid had amounted to \$3.2 thousand million, while the combined gross national product of the principal donors of financial assistance had totalled \$1,500 thousand million and their military expenditure had come to \$150 thousand million.

34. While it was true that the United Nations and the developed countries were making efforts to promote development, those efforts were not sufficient to fulfil the expectations of mankind: they were still not receiving support. For example, not one of the

measures provided for in resolution 1183 (XLI) of the Economic and Social Council concerning the flow of external resources to developing countries had been implemented. It was to be hoped that in future the Committee would approach the question of the external financing of economic development in developing countries realistically and that instead of adopting new resolutions on the subject, it would confine itself to expressing its disappointment that Council resolution 1183 (XLI) had been treated so lightly by the countries which could and should encourage the peoples of developing countries to recognize their stake in a more human world order and take part in shaping it.

35. With regard to the agenda items on the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (item 34) and the United Nations Development Decade (item 37), there was no point in recalling past events which could only depress and embitter the developing countries as long as there was no departure from the rigid economic practices that currently governed trade and financial relations between the rich and the poor countries. The problems of external financing and world trade should be studied and resolved with due regard to their interdependence and on the basis of an over-all concept of world development strategy during the next decade. His delegation was not opposed to the idea that the Committee, UNCTAD and the Economic and Social Council should turn their attention to the preparations for that Decade. However, only the Council, through its Economic Committee and in consultation with Member States, the Committee for Development Planning, UNCTAD and the Committee for Programme and Co-ordination, could formulate a comprehensive and coherent plan of development for the next Decade to be submitted to the General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session.

36. He had high hopes for the next Decade and believed that the lessons learned during the present Decade should foster the development of human society and make it possible to find common denominators among the Member States of the United Nations. They could then strive together to accelerate economic growth in the developing countries by increasing agricultural and industrial productivity and improving the terms of trade so that the political will of man might bring about social tranquillity and universal peace.

37. Mr. PIÑERA (Chile) said that the statement of the Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs had placed the development programme in its proper context. It was an economic and social problem, but it was also a human problem which demanded political solutions. In the United Nations reference was very often made to a *détente* which apparently was to be based upon agreement between East and West, or more specifically, between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries and those of the Warsaw Pact. His country, for its part, would do nothing to jeopardize the rapprochement that was needed for that *détente*. But if the *détente* was to benefit all mankind, it should also be achieved from the North to the South.

38. In his statement, the Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs had referred to a "social contract". That was an expression which was very difficult to define, and there was some doubt

<sup>2/</sup> See document A/C.2/L.1002.

as to what it meant. One thing, however, was certain, namely that poverty could no longer be condoned in today's world. In fact, man had the means to solve the problem. It would therefore be possible to conclude that social contract during the second Development Decade, in so far as the necessary political will to do so existed.

39. The Under-Secretary-General had also spoken of the need to set up international machinery which would not destroy the sovereignty of nations. It was not that machinery that infringed national sovereignty, but rather the failure of certain countries to abide by certain great principles. In any case, the United Nations did not lack the necessary machinery, but to make it genuinely effective, it had to be more closely co-ordinated.

40. With regard to global strategy for the second Decade, it was interesting to note that the Under-Secretary-General thought it would have to include all aspects of development. Indeed, that was the crux of the problem, but the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) had taken twenty years to discover that education, for example, was a fundamental element of development. Would it be necessary to wait another twenty years for the international organizations to reach the conclusion that justice, health, rural development, community development and so forth constituted social investments which were just as important as economic investments?

41. The Under-Secretary-General had spoken at some length of the problem of family planning and birth control. His delegation could not endorse those comments, for it respected individual liberty and the integrity of the family. What was more, it could not accept that the growth of investment should be measured in relation to the decline of the birth-rate. The population problem should be solved by each country in the light of its particular circumstances, and similarly by each man and woman. That was what was happening in Chile, where the public authorities had made available to the population the means of practising family planning on a purely voluntary basis. Finally, the task of the financing agencies was to find resources for development and not to export contraceptives.

42. He expressed satisfaction at the establishment of the Pearson Commission by IBRD. He personally had no doubt that that Commission would do interesting and useful work. He wished to emphasize, however, that its role was not to concern itself with family planning. Furthermore, with regard to IBRD, it was becoming evident that while it had provided assistance for industrial development in the developing countries, it had contributed nothing, or very little, to the exploitation of mineral resources, which were vital in some of those countries. It was to be hoped that the Pearson Commission would give its attention to that problem as well as to the problem of the social investments which must be made in the course of the next decade.

43. The Second Committee was about to come to grips with various problems, one of which was the financing of development. Certain questions arose in that connexion. The resumed forty-fifth session of the

Economic and Social Council was to meet at regular intervals throughout the General Assembly. It would hear, for example, Mr. McNamara, President of the World Bank, and Mr. Schweitzer, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), introducing, respectively, the report of IBRD and IDA,<sup>3/</sup> and the report of IMF.<sup>4/</sup> By then, however, the Committee would have more or less finished its work; it would, therefore, have no opportunity to study the Council's report on those matters. In his opinion, the obvious solution would be to invite Mr. McNamara and Mr. Schweitzer, as well as the Presidents of the Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the African Development Bank, to come and participate in the work of the Committee.

Organization of the Committee's work (continued)  
(A/C.2/242, A/C.2/L.1000/Rev.1)

44. The CHAIRMAN drew the Committee's attention to his note containing the plan of work, as revised in the light of comments made at the previous meeting (A/C.2/L.1000/Rev.1), the note by the Secretary-General dealing with the organization of work for the resumed forty-fifth session of the Economic and Social Council.<sup>5/</sup>

45. It would appear that the date of the Pledging Conference on the United Nations Capital Development Fund could be changed only a formal decision of the General Assembly.

46. Mr. DIALLO (Upper Volta) proposed that the Committee should recommend to the General Assembly that the Pledging Conference on the United Nations Capital Development Fund should be held on 18 November, the date of the Pledging Conference on the United Nations Industrial Development Organization.

47. Mr. BADAWI (United Arab Republic) wished to know why the General Assembly had to approve the date.

48. Mr. KASSUM (Secretary of the Committee) explained that the General Assembly had to do so in accordance with operative paragraph 1 (c) of General Assembly resolution 2321 (XXII).

49. Mr. CHTOUROU (Tunisia) noted that the provisions of the above-mentioned resolution had not been taken into account when the original plan of work had been established.

50. Mr. LOBANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the Committee should not encroach upon the General Assembly's prerogatives. The Committee was not competent to set the dates for pledging conferences. It would be tactless to try to settle the matter immediately, since informal consultations were far from completed.

<sup>3/</sup> International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Development Association, Annual Report, 1968 (Washington, D.C.), transmitted to members of the Economic and Social Council by a note of the Secretary-General (E/4593).

<sup>4/</sup> International Monetary Fund, Annual Report of the Executive Directors for the Fiscal Year ended April 30, 1968 (Washington, D.C.), transmitted to the Economic and Social Council by a note of the Secretary-General (E/4596).

<sup>5/</sup> Document E/L.1236.

51. His delegation supported the revised plan of work, with some reservations, particularly regarding item 39 (Permanent sovereignty over natural resources), on which no report had been circulated. He was alarmed at the increase in the number of meetings of the Economic and Social Council, and wished to know why so many were scheduled, merely complicating the Council's work and creating problems for small delegations.

52. Mr. BLAU (United States of America) considered that the Second Committee should not interfere with the work of the Economic and Social Council. The last part of the Council's resumed forty-fifth session would occur after the Second Committee had finished its work and the Council had considered its programme of work for the coming year, in the light of the decisions of the General Assembly. Since some reports, including those of the Trade and Development Board, IBRD and IMF, were not available before the end of its forty-fifth session, the Council was obliged to schedule a resumed session. Moreover, the General Assembly, in its resolution 2311 (XXII), had requested the Council to consider the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations, and, after some discussion, the Council had agreed, following further consultations with the specialized agencies, to consider that matter again at its resumed session.<sup>b/</sup>

53. Mr. PIÑERA (Chile) agreed with the representative of the Soviet Union: it was for the General Assembly to decide whether to change the date of the Pledging Conference on the United Nations Capital Development Fund. A large group of delegations might request that the date set by the General Assembly should be changed, and his delegation would support that view. In the meantime, the Chairman of the Second Committee might hold informal consultations. If the Committee found that there was substantial agreement in favour of changing the date, the General Assembly, whose membership was basically the same as the Committee's, could endorse that consensus.

54. The forty-fifth session of the Economic and Social Council had left at least twelve items in abeyance, including multilateral food aid, the report of the Trade and Development Board, UNCTAD, the reports of the World Bank Group and IMF and the Council's programme of work for 1969. In these circumstances, it was natural for the Council to hold a resumed session. While the Committee should not interfere in the affairs of the Council, it could ask it to consider the essential reports as early as possible, so that the Committee could carry out its task within the prescribed time. The Committee could also invite the Managing Director of IMF and the Presidents of the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, as well as the Advisory Committee on the Application of Science

and Technology to Development, to address it during the session.

55. Mr. CHTOUROU (Tunisia) proposed that it should be left to the Chairman to satisfy those countries which had requested that the dates of the pledging conferences should be changed.

56. Mr. VIAUD (France) thought that the difficulties which the Economic and Social Council had experienced should not affect the General Assembly. In recent years, the Council had been in the habit of hearing representatives of the Trade and Development Board, IBRD and IMF shortly after the end of the financial year covered by their reports. All the other items on the agenda for the Council's resumed session were there for a special reason. It was unwise to discuss questions without sufficient documentation or preparation. The Committee could, with due regard for the Council's autonomy, urge it to defer some of the remaining items on its agenda, such as multilateral food aid and the protein question, until 1969. Such a step would make it possible to gain several working days.

57. Mr. VARELA (Panama) suggested that the Chairman of the Committee should convey its concern to the President of the General Assembly and should confer with the President of the Economic and Social Council with a view to reducing the number of the Council's meetings. It would not be advisable to invite the President of the World Bank and the Managing Director of IMF to address the General Assembly; moreover, it was doubtful that they could change the scheduled dates of their appearance in the Council.

58. Mr. LUBBERS (Netherlands), supported by Mr. CHTOUROU (Tunisia), felt that the Secretary-General, rather than the General Assembly, was empowered to determine the date of a pledging conference. It did not matter whether the dates of the different conferences coincided or not.

59. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the Secretary-General had to take into account decisions already adopted by the General Assembly.

60. Mr. LUBBERS (Netherlands) noted that his delegation had co-sponsored a draft resolution fixing the dates of the Pledging Conferences on UNDP and the United Nations Capital Development Fund. Convening the two Conferences "simultaneously" did not necessarily mean that they would be held on the same day. They could be scheduled fairly close together.

61. Mr. KASSUM (Secretary of the Committee) noted that the original proposal, which the Netherlands delegation has supported, had been to hold the Pledging Conferences on the United Nations Capital Development Fund and UNDP one month apart. The Committee could make the following recommendation to the General Assembly: "In order to convene a separate Pledging Conference for the year 1968 on the United Nations Capital Development Fund, the Second Committee recommends to the General Assembly that paragraph 1 (c) of its resolution 2321 (XXII) of 15 December 1967 on the United Nations Capital Development Fund shall not apply". If the General Assembly adopted that recommendation, the Secretary-General would be free to suggest any date.

<sup>b/</sup> See Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Forty-Fifth Session, 1559th meeting.

62. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the Committee should authorize the Rapporteur to report on the matter directly to the General Assembly in plenary meeting.

*It was so decided.*

63. The CHAIRMAN said that, following consultations, the President of the Economic and Social Council had obligingly requested that the meetings at which the President of the World Bank and the Managing Director of the Fund would speak should be held in a large room so that the representatives of the Second Committee could attend as observers.

64. Mr. PIÑERA (Chile) again expressed the hope that the various persons mentioned would address the Economic and Social Council at an earlier date. The Chairman might use his influence to that end.

65. Mr. VIAUD (France) protested that the General Assembly was not empowered to express its wishes to those persons; they were coming to report to the Economic and Social Council, not the General Assembly.

*The meeting rose at 7.20 p.m.*