

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

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Chairman: Mr. João Carlos MUNIZ (Brazil).

Korea (A/2354) (*continued*): (a) Reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/1881, A/2187, A/2298); (b) Reports of the United Nations Agent General for Korean Reconstruction (A/2222 and Add.1 and 2)

[Item 16]*

1. Mr. DAVID (Czechoslovakia) recalled that, during the first part of the present session of the General Assembly, the Korean war had been considered as the most important item on the agenda. Peace-loving peoples had hoped that an unjust war imposed on the Korean people by the American aggressors would soon cease and that the inhuman bombing which spread misery and death would come to an end. Unfortunately, their hopes had been seriously disappointed. It had perforce been realized that General Assembly resolution 610 (VII) could not lead to a solution of the Korean question. Czechoslovakia had been one of the democratic countries which had drawn the attention of the other Members of the United Nations to the real nature of the resolution on which they were to vote. Such a text had been a flagrant violation of the principles of international law and, furthermore, an encouragement for the barbarous acts already perpetrated by the United States in pursuing the war.

2. In spite of its hypocritical wording, the resolution had been unable to end the conflict. It was sufficient to read the text, which emphasized the question of repatriating prisoners of war while leaving aside the essential aspect of the conflict, namely, the cessation of hostilities, to realize that the whole matter had been hypocritically narrowed down by the United States to one particular item on which it was sure to keep its opponent stalemated.

3. The forced retention of prisoners of war, who were intended for later use against their own country, was contrary to the 1949 Geneva Convention and to the very text of the draft armistice plan. The spokesmen at Panmunjom had already reached a deadlock on

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

that demand. The unfair, arbitrary and illegal nature of such a claim had been amply proved. Knowing that the proposal was unfair and illegal, the United States delegation was aware that it was unacceptable for that very reason.

4. The unambiguous text of the Geneva Convention did not suit the United States. Hence voices of authority were already being raised in that country demanding the unilateral revision of a text recognized by all and signed by the United States itself. The illegal position taken by the United States Government had been condemned in the United States Congress itself, where it had been affirmed that such action was in contradiction with solemnly accepted international commitments. On 25 January 1953, Representative Harold Patten had protested against the illegal attitude of the United States towards the exchange of prisoners of war in Korea, an attitude which violated all humanitarian principles. Everyone knew that, but many tried to distort the truth in order to present their illegal position as ostensibly humanitarian.

5. The Australian, Peruvian, Belgian, Cuban, Ecuadorian and other representatives had regretted that the Governments of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and of the People's Republic of China had firmly rejected the shameful demands in resolution 610 (VII) that the prisoners of war should be forcibly detained. That was another proof of hypocrisy, as the United States representatives had broken off the talks precisely by their unjustifiable demands. Then, in the absence of the lawful representatives of China and North Korea, discussion of the Korean question had been continued, and at the end of the discussion, a completely unjust resolution had been adopted. In such circumstances they could hardly be surprised at having received from the other party a reply similar to the one they had already received during the armistice negotiations.

6. The Australian representative was also hypocritical when he asserted, at the 559th meeting, that the resolution of 3 December 1952 was a compromise which did not affect the basic principle of the detention of prisoners of war. The inadmissible demand that the prisoners should be forcibly detained was thus con-

sidered by the Australian representative as an honest attempt to solve the problem. In the circumstances, it was hardly surprising that such an unfair proposal, which had already been rejected, during the direct negotiations, should be rejected again. Resolution 610 (VII) was completely illegal because it had been adopted in the absence of the representatives of the People's Republic of China and of the Korean people. At the resumed session (557th meeting) the United States, thanks to its mechanical majority, had again been responsible for the rejection of a USSR proposal (A/C.1/L.19) to the effect that those representatives should be invited to attend the meetings of the Committee. It should be noted that among the States which had voted for the proposal to invite those lawful representatives were almost all the countries of Asia, which were well acquainted with the question of Korea and with the Korean and Chinese peoples, with whom they had age-long ties. Those sixteen States, together with the People's Republic of China, constituted the majority of the world's population, which the United States had put in the minority by the vote on the proposal. The United States was afraid of the truth and therefore refused to let the competent delegations participate. It preferred to insult the great Chinese people, which it wished to confuse with the Kuomintang. That mistake had been pointed out by the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Nehru, who had stated on 17 January 1953 in Hyderabad that refusal to recognize the Peking régime amounted to refusal to recognize one of the most important facts of the modern world. The existence of a strong, peaceful and united China was an obstacle to the aggressive plans of American imperialism, and that was the real reason why the United States Government refused to allow the lawful representatives of the Chinese people to be admitted to the United Nations.

7. The resolution imposed on the General Assembly by the United States had been presented to the Chinese and Koreans as an ultimatum and the latter had been unable even to submit their observations. The Americans were thus trying to introduce into international organizations their own methods of discussion based on dictation and violation of the sovereignty of other States and of universally recognized international obligations.

8. It was legitimate to ask what purpose was served by the resolution, which did not even touch on the fundamental question, the cessation of hostilities. The resolution merely reiterated illegal and unjust demands which had been already rejected, and was designed not to put an end to the untold suffering but to extend military operations and to shift the blame for the conflict to the Chinese and Koreans.

9. The resolution was obviously neither reasonable nor fair. It was not reasonable because it was contrary to the conscience of mankind, international usage, the provisions of the Geneva Convention and the draft armistice plan. It was not reasonable for another reason: it insisted on the detention of tens of thousands of Chinese and Korean prisoners as hostages whom the United States intended to use in order to force the Chinese and Koreans to yield. The resolution was unfair because it sought to impose the principle of so-called voluntary repatriation, which was being invoked by the United States in order to reject the Sino-Korean proposals to the effect that prisoners of

war should be repatriated in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention, and the USSR proposals for the immediate and complete cessation of hostilities pending settlement of the prisoners-of-war question.

10. The sensitivity of those representatives who were surprised and shocked by the tone of the replies received could not be taken seriously. There could be no reply to an insolent question other than a flat refusal. There was nothing surprising about the tone of the reply to the unjust resolution of 3 December 1952 since the sole purpose of that resolution was to direct the attention of the peoples from the acts of terrorism committed by the American forces and to encourage the continuation of the barbarous acts of which the Chinese and Korean peoples were the victims. Events since the vote had been taken on the resolution had proved the correctness of that interpretation. Since 14 December, United States forces had been killing prisoners of war on the island of Ponjam. Those atrocities were designed solely to force the prisoners to refuse to be repatriated. A few days previously, the Press had reported similar occurrences on the island of Cheju-do. Those were direct consequences of the General Assembly's resolution. That resolution had been designed to camouflage those atrocities and to justify them, the main purpose being the extension of the Korean war.

11. It was well known that the ruling circles of the United States wished to take over the role of Japanese imperialism in the Far East. Those imperialistic ambitions had been publicly admitted by President Eisenhower who, in his statement of 2 February 1953, had said that the Korean war was only one part of the Far Eastern front. Following that statement, the American Press had stressed that the present situation in Korea could be solved only by extending the field of military operations. That was the aim of the ruling circles of the United States, in opposition to the will of peace-loving peoples. General Chennault and members of the United States Congress, like Mr. Thomas Lane, were calling for the use of atomic and hydrogen bombs and demanding a realistic, aggressive plan.

12. Not content with making statements of that kind, the ruling circles of the United States were turning to aggressive measures such as the deneutralization of Taiwan. That decision could only be a preliminary to raids by Chiang Kai-shek's forces, with the assistance of American air and naval units. According to statements by American military leaders, it was good business strategy, because the cost of maintaining a Chinese soldier was considerably less than that of maintaining an American. As part of that policy, the first jet aircraft were to be sent to Chiang Kai-shek in the summer of 1953 after Kuomintang airmen had finished their training in the United States. The policy was also intended to check the demoralization of American soldiers, who were refusing to fight in Korea. Their reluctance was increasing, and according to the *New York Times* of 7 February 1953, there had been more than 46,000 desertions from the American forces since the outbreak of the war.

13. In the plans of the United States Department of War, an important part was assigned to Japan, chiefly because of its manpower reserves, which were estimated at 9 million soldiers. Japan's desire for revenge was being encouraged by the United States Government.

That was clear from the statement of the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr. Yoshida, who, two days after President Eisenhower's declaration that the United States Government would no longer recognize any obligations under secret agreements, had said that Japan would do everything in its power to recover its lost territories.

14. The United States Government was thus repudiating obligations it had assumed. Events in the Far East were the logical consequence of such a policy, which was directed towards the continuation of the Korean war and the preparation of a new war against China, the USSR and the peoples' democracies. The United States was seeking to drag the Asian Powers into propaganda wars undertaken to increase the profits of the American monopolies, which were bent on world domination.

15. In the light of those facts, the real intent of Mr. Lodge's statement at the 557th meeting, which had sought, by means of slander, to divert public attention from the aggressive actions of the United States Government, was obvious. The facts were however there, and the many countries in the world now occupied by the American imperialists were evidence of the latter's aggressive policy.

16. Mr. Lodge had given no answer to the question asked by honest and peace-loving people everywhere: why were American soldiers in Korea, a country thousands of miles from the shores of the United States? Korea was no threat to America, and was interested only in the reconstruction of the country after the devastation of the Japanese occupation. There was no threat to the interests of the American people; the threat was to the interests of the monopolists, who were using their power to continue the war.

17. The United States Government was well aware of the growing opposition of all the peoples of the world to its aggressive policy, which could only lead to a new world war. The United States representative realized that fact, and had accordingly tried to masquerade as an angel of peace; he was seeking to repudiate responsibility for the aggression committed by his country. He was trying to shift to others the responsibility for the actions which were being prepared in the Far East. China and North Korea, the victims of American aggression, were accordingly being branded as aggressors. Despite those slanders the world knew who was rejecting the proposals for the immediate cessation of hostilities in Korea.

18. During the first part of the General Assembly's present session, the USSR delegation had, as at previous sessions, submitted a draft resolution (A/L.118) concerning the question of Korea. That resolution, which called for the immediate cessation of hostilities, had been sincerely supported by the Czechoslovak delegation, which considered that it expressed the wishes of the millions of honest and peace-loving men and women. The peoples of the whole world realized that it was the United States, in its desire for world domination, that was preventing an armistice in Korea in order to extend the conflict and prepare the ground for further aggression. The United States representative's statement, which was filled with hatred for the Chinese and Korean peoples, was only a reflection of his Government's foreign policy. For the time being the United States delegation was not proposing a new solution. As the American Press

had already revealed, it was trying to gain time to carry out its military plans. The United Nations was once more to be faced with a *fait accompli*. The object was to obtain a mechanical majority for a resolution which would brand the victim of aggression as the aggressor and proclaim the aggressor the defender of collective security. In that situation, the peoples must beware, lest they should some day find themselves victims of atrocities similar to those committed by the American forces in Korea. The responsibility of the United Nations was greater than ever, because that body could not turn a deaf ear to the voice of millions of peace-loving men throughout the world. Under the Charter, the United Nations was bound to take every measure to put an immediate end to hostilities in Korea.

19. The Peruvian representative, Mr. Belaúnde, had, at the 562nd meeting, given a curious interpretation of the history of Czechoslovakia. Contrary to his beliefs, Czechoslovakia had never turned towards the Western capitalist countries. The bourgeoisie of Czechoslovakia had indeed turned in that direction, but the people had unmasked those bourgeois representatives as Anglo-American agents and spies, eager to deprive the people of their revolutionary achievements, to enslave the country to Anglo-American imperialism and restore the capitalist system in Czechoslovakia. Mr. Belaúnde should know that the Czechoslovak people had always cherished the most lively sympathy and affection for their heroic brothers of the powerful Soviet Union. Their culture was proof of the fact. That, however, did not prevent Czechoslovakia from respecting the cultural heritage of other countries. In the course of their history, the peoples of Czechoslovakia had undergone great suffering. During the Nazi occupation which was the result of Munich, where the Western Powers had sacrificed the country to Hitler, Czechoslovakia had pinned all its hopes on the Soviet Union and Generalissimo Stalin. It had not been disappointed. Thanks to the friendly assistance of the Soviet people, the Czechoslovak people had developed their economy and their culture and had made progress towards socialism. They had thus contracted a heavy debt of gratitude and affection.

20. Anyone who thought that the Czechoslovak people, forgetting the past and longing for a return to capitalism and the bartering of their freedom for dollars, would consider renouncing the friendship of the Soviet Union was seriously mistaken. Czechoslovakia was only too familiar with the horrors of war and was therefore sparing no effort in its power to put an end to the bloody war in Korea.

21. The Czechoslovak delegation would accordingly devote all its efforts to obtaining acceptance for the proposal submitted by the USSR representative, which was fully in accordance with the will of all peace-loving peoples.

22. Mr. MARTIN (Canada) said that, as the President of the General Assembly had said, to bring the fighting in Korea to an end and to move forward to the work of reconstruction was still the greatest challenge before the United Nations. To engage in invective or in speculation about United States policy, as the Czechoslovak representative had done, was not a constructive approach. It would never have occurred to any representative of a democratic country to draw a distinction between the "ruling classes" and the people

of the United States. That distinction existed only in countries bordering on the Soviet Union.

23. There was no question as to the course of the United Nations. Its stand was well known and it was now only a matter of waiting for possible reactions. No further resolution was required. A proposal made not by the United States, as the Czechoslovak representative had said, but by India (A/C.1/734/Rev.2) offering a fair solution to remove the sole obstacle to the conclusion of an armistice had been adopted by a very large majority. Furthermore, neither the willingness to compromise of the twenty-one Powers, sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/725, who had supported the Indian text, nor the impartial devotion to the cause of peace of India could be questioned.

24. As the Indian representative, Mr. Menon, had pointed out (525th meeting), the resolution adopted on 3 December acknowledged the principle of the Geneva Convention regarding the right of repatriation of all prisoners and the obligation of the detaining Power to lay no obstacle in the way of their repatriation. Furthermore, Mr. Menon had said that he could see nothing in the Geneva Convention to require the detaining Power to use force to effect the repatriation of prisoners. The essential thing was that no prisoner should be detained as a result of previous screening and that all prisoners should be delivered to a neutral commission.

25. The contention that the resolution amounted to an ultimatum put forward by one great Power was a great distortion of the facts. The list of the fifty-four nations which had voted for the resolution showed that the conscience of mankind had been expressed by the nations of America, Africa, Europe and Asia that had voted for the resolution, which certain representatives had described as an illegal decision taken by a mechanical majority, merely because it had not had the good fortune to satisfy five delegations.

26. Moral force could not be successfully opposed forever by bitter communications and rhetoric. The United Nations had taken its stand, and it was for the other side to show a spirit of co-operation, if not by accepting the United Nations resolution, at least by making helpful suggestions of its own. Mr. Vyshinsky's statement (561st meeting) had perhaps contained a hint that something useful might be heard from him. It was true that he had stated the situation in a deceptive way by claiming that his delegation had put forward a simple straightforward proposal for a cease-fire. In fact, however, that proposal tied the prisoners-of-war issue to political matters such as the unification of Korea. It should be noted that when the armistice discussions were first initiated, the Soviet Union had originally agreed that the negotiations should be confined to military matters. The disposition of prisoners of war had been an item of the armistice agenda. It was only after the communist leaders had seen that they would not be able to gain acceptance of the principle of forcible repatriation that the Soviet Union had sought to mix political and military questions.

27. The question of a cease-fire was too serious a matter for glib tricks of the tongue. If the fighting were stopped and "details", such as the fate of the prisoners of war, were left to a political commission, the latter would be left as hostages in the hands of

the enemy which, once relieved of military pressure, would be able to use them to bargain for concessions.

28. The Communists themselves had in fact rejected the offer of a cease-fire on a previous occasion. In a telegram dated 17 January 1951 (A/C.1/653), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of communist China had laid down two political conditions for a possible cease-fire: the withdrawal of United States forces from Formosa and the admission of communist China to membership of the United Nations. At that time the Soviet Union had not supported the proposals (A/C.1/643) for an immediate cease-fire which had been put forward by the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea set up by the First Committee at the fifth session.

29. It should be recognized that a cease-fire offer which was not accompanied by concrete suggestions for the solution of the prisoners-of-war issue was merely an attempt to exploit the desire for peace. The General Assembly resolution not only provided a practical basis for the solution of the prisoners-of-war problem but, despite Mr. Vyshinsky's remarks, would bring about a cease-fire within twelve hours, in accordance with article 12 of the draft armistice agreement. It would not be a mere declaration of intention, but a firm and secure cease-fire.

30. It might be asked why, if the intentions of North Korea and communist China were so good, they refused to exchange the sick and wounded in accordance with the Geneva Convention, to which they had also refused to adhere in the matter of the disposition of camps, correspondence and the receipt of parcels. On 13 December 1952, the League of Red Cross Societies had issued an appeal in which it had offered its services in the implementation of the Geneva Convention, in particular in regard to the repatriation of the sick and the wounded, which the United Nations Command had tried to facilitate on a number of occasions by making specific proposals to the enemy. It was difficult to see how anyone truly concerned with the welfare of the prisoners of war could fail to accept such offers.

31. In view of the statements made regarding the outbreak of the Korean war, it was unfortunately necessary to restate the fundamental fact that the attack of the North Korean régime upon the Republic of Korea was established both by the patent facts and by the reports of the United Nations Commission on Korea. It was not true that the Commission had given no judgment on the aggression. In its telegram of 26 June 1950 (S/1505/Rev.1) it had reported that for two years North Korea had engaged in propaganda and subversive activities against a government established under the auspices of the United Nations. Moreover, in a telegram of 25 June 1950 the Commission had stated that the attack had been completely unexpected to both the Korean army and the United States Korean Military Advisory Group. Not only did the representatives of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia choose to flout the unequivocal opinion of an international body; the facts showed that South Korea had been invaded and that with its pitifully inadequate equipment and training, it had been utterly incapable of launching an attack against the North Korean forces which, as Mr. Vyshinsky had admitted, had received equipment of Soviet origin.

32. Although Mr. Vyshinsky's statement did not completely close the door to negotiation, statements such as those of the representatives of Poland and Czecho-

slovakia gave little opportunity to reach a common ground. It was to be hoped that Mr. Vyshinsky had it in his mind to make constructive proposals.

33. If North Korea and communist China and the countries supporting them had accepted the compromise offer, there would be a cease-fire and the way would have been paved for the easing of tension through a political conference. In any case, it was incumbent upon those who did not accept those proposals to put forward without delay suggestions in the spirit of resolution 610 (VII). It might perhaps be a favourable sign that Mr. Vyshinsky had avoided reference to the problem of the repatriation of prisoners and had confined his remarks to his own draft resolution. In any case, in view of the necessity for putting an end to the bloodshed, the Committee should be patient, while adhering to the principles of the General Assembly resolution. There was no point in the opposing side's putting forward old proposals in new clothes; what was needed was a new proposal which was not contrary to the United Nations position.

34. If no such proposal was forthcoming, it seemed that the situation would grow worse. For its part, the Canadian delegation was strongly determined that the war should not spread; it was, moreover, convinced that the war could be stopped on the basis of the draft armistice agreement and General Assembly resolution 610 (VII). In conclusion, he again expressed the hope that the other side would accept the United Nations position or submit to the Committee proposals consistent with those principles, and marked by a genuine desire for peace.

35. Mr. JOOSTE (Union of South Africa) stated that he was participating in the debate with some hesitation since he shared the Belgian representative's view that there was little purpose in discussion while the opposing party maintained a purely negative attitude. On resuming the debate, the Committee had had before it the replies of communist China and North Korea (A/2354, annexes II and III), which had echoed, both in language and substance, the USSR's flat rejection of the General Assembly resolution. Since then, Mr. Vyshinsky's most recent statement (561st meeting) would appear to have removed any doubts the Committee might have had as to whether the Soviet Union persisted in its negative attitude.

36. The very future of the United Nations as an instrument of collective security depended upon the termination of a conflict which continued to involve the expenditure of human life and resources. Unfortunately the Soviet Union persisted in exploiting the Korean question for ideological ends. Various delegations had already appropriately refuted some of the charges made, but it was essential to deal with some allegations made by Mr. Vyshinsky.

37. The latter had alleged that the nations which had troops in Korea were serving the interests of certain groups in the United States. The Soviet bloc should not forget the fact that relations between the United States and its allies were such that it was possible for them to disagree openly among themselves, as the Cuban representative had pointed out (560th meeting). The governments which had sent troops and materials to Korea in accordance with the Security Council's resolution (S/1511) had done so in a firm conviction as to the validity of the facts which governed

their decisions. They were participating in Korea in order to apply the system of collective security laid down in the Charter, and not for any selfish ends.

38. Mr. Vyshinsky had also alleged that the intention was to force the communist forces to accept United States conditions. At Panmunjom, the United Nations and its enemies had reached agreement on all but one of the clauses of the armistice proposals. The Assembly resolution of December 1952 had been introduced by India (A/C.1/734/Rev.2). Some delegations, including the United States, had had some hesitation in accepting that draft resolution which, as had been said, pushed conciliation to its extreme limits. Nevertheless they had voted for the resolution. How then could it be alleged that the United Nations wished to force the communist forces to accept American conditions?

39. The fifty-four delegations which had voted in favour of the resolution were justified in expecting that the other party would accept the formula offered. The reverse had been the case, and the USSR delegation had reopened a number of issues and stated that its own draft resolution (A/L.118) was the only acceptable one. Promptly, the Peking Government and North Korea had followed suit. It seemed therefore a fair inference that not the United States but the USSR was attempting to dictate conditions for an armistice.

40. The replies from Peking and North Korea had caused real disappointment. The representative of Peru, Mr. Belaúnde, had pointed out at the 562nd meeting that they must be regarded not merely as replies to the proposals put forward, but also as a reflection of a general policy. That was a warning which should be carefully studied.

41. In conclusion, he stressed two essential facts. In the first place, the United Nations was not a neutral in the present conflict although some Members had not yet been able to participate actively in it, and the fact that a small minority of delegations regarded the decisions taken as unconstitutional did not change the situation. The forces in Korea under the United Nations flag were fighting as the consequence of a legal decision of the Security Council and were resisting aggression on behalf of the United Nations as a whole, which was therefore not in the position of a tribunal called upon to adjudicate a dispute between two parties, but was itself one of the parties. Mr. Vyshinsky had criticized the communication (A/2354, annex I) addressed by the President of the General Assembly to Peking and North Korea. While the wording of that communication could hardly have been improved, Mr. Pearson, as President of the General Assembly, was acting on behalf of the Organization, and there could therefore be no question of impartiality, in Mr. Vyshinsky's understanding of the term. Forces in Korea were risking and often sacrificing their lives and it was understandable that preposterous accusations such as those of the representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia had aroused some indignation.

42. In the second place, as had been well stated by the representatives of New Zealand and Canada, the United Nations forces, by expelling the communist aggressor from South Korea, had achieved their military objective, as distinct from the political aims, which the United Nations would continue to pursue. From a military point of view nothing remained to be done

but to conclude an honourable and realistic armistice. Thanks to the patience of the United Nations negotiators at Panmunjom, there was only one point which remained to be settled.

43. Mr. Jooste expressed the hope that the USSR Government would enable Mr. Vyshinsky to accept the terms of the United Nations resolution, which continued to stand and the formula offered therein as a basis for further negotiations at Panmunjom. As

for the aggressors, it was to be hoped that they would reflect upon the manifestation of solidarity among fifty-four Member States, which did not desire to exploit the peoples of China or Korea, but sought only to repel aggression, in the firm belief that their own survival itself depended upon the system of collective security which was fundamental in the Charter.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.