

GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY

## SEVENTH SESSION

## Official Records



## FIRST COMMITTEE, 561st

## MEETING

Monday, 2 March 1953, at 3 p.m.

Headquarters, New York

## CONTENTS

## Page

Korea (A/2354) ( <i>continued</i> ): (a) Reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/1881, A/2187, A/2298); (b) Reports of the United Nations Agent General for Korean Reconstruction (A/2222 and Add.1 and 2) .....	365
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**Chairman: Mr. João Carlos MUNIZ (Brazil).**

**Korea (A/2354) (*continued*): (a) Reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/1881, A/2187, A/2298); (b) Reports of the United Nations Agent General for Korean Reconstruction (A/2222 and Add.1 and 2)**

[Item 16]\*

1. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) recalled that at the 557th meeting, on 25 February, the representative of the United States had underlined the desire of the American people to establish a lasting peace and their regard for the United Nations as an important instrument for that purpose. Having made that statement, Mr. Lodge, the United States representative, had sought to argue that the ruling circles, the Republican Administration and the Republican Party, wanted peace as much as the American people did. He had also stated that every element of American life desired peace and that for the sake of peace the United States had mustered all its resources and had sent its men. Although Mr. Lodge had not stated where those men were sent, Mr. Vyshinsky observed that it was clear that Mr. Lodge had meant to Korea.

2. According to that logic, Mr. Vyshinsky said, it would appear that the unleashing of war against the Korean people by the United States could be used as evidence of the peace-loving nature of the United States ruling circles. Such logic, he did not believe, would lead far.

3. The representative of the USSR did not think there was any need at that juncture to revert to an analysis of resolution 610 (VII), on the Korean question, adopted at the first part of the seventh session of the General Assembly, or to enlarge on the peace-loving nature of the American people. At issue was not the peace-loving nature of the American people, but the intentions of the American ruling circles, on whose behalf Mr. Lodge had spoken. Although Mr. Lodge had spread considerable nonsense, he had not

said a word about future United States policy on the Korean question. Mr. Vyshinsky asked him if he did not have anything further to say on the question since it had been included on the agenda on the initiative of the United States Government.

4. Although the representative of the United States had uttered hypocritical statements about the peace-loving nature of the ruling circles of the United States, the USSR representative said the whole world was convinced of the true character of its policies, which could be judged by its policies toward the countries of Asia and, in the first instance, the heroic People's Democratic Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China.

5. Mr. Lodge had avoided stating the truth about the present international situation, including the three-year war in Korea. However, Mr. Vyshinsky said it was necessary to discuss that question since there had been more and more indications in the Press in America that the United States intended to aggravate further the international situation. It was no mere accident that the *New York Post* had published, on the same date on which Mr. Lodge had spoken in the Committee, an article entitled "The New Line of the United States: Colder in the United Nations, Hotter in the Far East". Although that article stated that Mr. Lodge had promised that a new tough policy would be carried out by the United States Government at the present session of the Assembly, he had omitted any reference to that topic in his statement.

6. Referring to authoritative sources, Mr. Vyshinsky stated that the Press in the United States had betrayed the State Department's tactics in connexion with the new tough policy. According to the Press, it would consist of the following: the United States Government would not undertake anything further with regard to Korea before the eighth session of the Assembly, using the interval to exert pressure on the Communists with methods not requiring United Nations sanction. Those methods would enable its partners in the North Atlantic bloc to bring their positions into adjustment with the new and more dynamic United States policy. That dynamism of policy

\* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

was expressed in Press reports as increased pressure on the Korean front; greater assistance to France in Indo-China, to the United Kingdom in Malaya, and to Chiang Kai-shek; the rearmament of Japan, and permission "to fight in hot pursuit", which meant permission for United States flyers to cross the Manchurian border. At the same time, Chiang Kai-shek would receive aeroplanes and naval vessels from the United States, and their crews would be instructed by United States personnel. Those flyers would undertake bombing activities against the Chinese mainland; and the naval vessels would seize vessels proceeding to Chinese ports. The latter would be covered up by references to an intensification of China's civil war rather than to an expansion of the Korean war. The State Department assumed that that programme would soften up the Korean-Chinese side prior to the next session of the Assembly. If that did not happen, according to the Press, the United States Government would be prepared to present at that time some really tough proposals.

7. That was the policy of the United States with regard to the Far East, in general, and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China, in particular, as reported in inspired reports in the American Press. Mr. Vyshinsky believed everyone would agree that the most gruesome humorists would hardly call such a programme peace-loving nor the Government intent on carrying out such a programme peace-loving. But in his speech, Mr. Lodge had tried to convince the Committee that every element of American life was intent upon and desirous of peace and that in the United States there was not a single group that did not aspire to peace.

8. To show the lack of seriousness in Mr. Lodge's statement, the USSR representative believed it sufficed to point to such a group as the Republican Party, of which the United States representative was a prominent member. As had been proven again and again, it did not pursue a policy of maintaining and strengthening peace, but rather the reverse. It was not an accident that the United States Government persevered, as regards the Korean question, in carrying out the Truman-Acheson line, since that Administration had prepared and executed the intervention in Korea. Notwithstanding the accommodating attitude displayed by the representative of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and of the Chinese volunteers during the Kaesong and Panmunjom negotiations, which had resulted in the submission of fair, just and reasonable proposals designed to put an end to the hostilities in Korea and to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the United States representatives had thwarted the conclusion of an armistice in Korea although agreement on almost all of the articles of the draft armistice had been reached. At the same time, the United States Government had intensified its barbarous air raids over Korea and China.

9. Not content with continuing the war in Korea, the United States Government had now undertaken a number of measures designed to translate into action its plans for the further expansion of warfare in the Far East. In justification of its aggressive policy and for purposes of deluding world public opinion, the inspirers of that plan did not shrink from spreading absurd tales about an alleged threat to the security of the United States by the Soviet Union. Speaking

over the radio and on television a week after he had assumed office as Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles had made a number of slanderous allegations against the Soviet Union which, according to that speech, was doing everything in its power to assume control of various parts of the globe, including the countries of the Near, Middle and Far East. At that time Mr. Dulles had been unable to conceal his worry over the fruits already harvested by the United States as a result of its aggressive policy.

10. The USSR representative believed that one might find what events had aroused that worry in the stenographic record of Mr. Dulles's statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, a statement which was also full of slanderous attacks against the Soviet Union. Although he had stated that the present United States policy would be replaced by a better one, he had admitted that he had no intention of modifying seriously its main lines. Mr. Dulles had told the Committee that a careful look at the world showed that at that time the European military formations which the United States had hoped to see arise were slipping away, that the tendency was towards disintegration rather than unification. With some regret, Mr. Dulles had noted that France, which was conducting a war against the people's liberation movement in Indo-China, had found itself unable, because of that war, to make the contribution to the creation of a European army which, in his opinion, it could have rendered if that war had not been in progress. He was unhappy about the cool attitude of the United Kingdom and of Western Germany towards participation in the European Defence Community, as a result of which that plan had run into difficulties. Mr. Dulles had conceded that that plan did not enjoy the support of public opinion in France and Western Germany.

11. Those worries were also obvious in statements made by United States representatives, and Mr. Lodge's speech had proven that fact. Mr. Vyshinsky stated that those events had stirred the wrath of the ruling circles of the United States, since they had hampered its plan for the creation of the so-called European army, which was designed to implement the aggressive plans of the United States and which was directed against the Soviet Union and the European countries of the peoples' democracies.

12. As was well known, that situation had been the basis of Mr. Dulles's European trip, which had been designed to elicit the obedience on the part of Western Germany, France and the United Kingdom necessary to ensure the ratification of the Bonn Agreements. It was also well known that prior to his trip to Europe, Mr. Dulles, foreseeing resistance on the part of those countries, had declared that in that case it would be necessary to review United States foreign policy with regard to Western Europe. Mr. Vyshinsky said that that was an overt threat by the United States Government towards its partners.

13. The so-called policy of liberation proclaimed by the State Department, Mr. Lodge's slanderous inventions against the Soviet Union with regard to the alleged persecution of Christians, Moslems and Jews, and the aggressive character of the President's message to Congress on 2 February 1953 each followed that same aggressive policy under the shield of mendacious phrases about co-operation for purposes of defence and the strengthening of security.

14. Mr. Vyshinsky believed that ordering the United States Seventh Fleet to withdraw from the Taiwan Straits was clear proof of the desire of the American ruling circles to expand the war in the Far East. Having issued that order, the United States Government obviously had liberated the hands of the Chiang Kai-shek bandits ensconced on Taiwan Island.

15. Although Mr. Lodge had stated that love of peace applied to all Americans without distinction as to party adherence, the representative of the USSR thought such statements had been repudiated by his colleagues in both the Republican and Democratic Parties. Speaking at a meeting of the Pennsylvania Association of Manufacturers, Senator Styles Bridges had expressed approbation of President Eisenhower's order to the Seventh Fleet; had declared that a full-fledged naval blockade of the coast of the Chinese People's Republic was necessary; had stated that the time had come when the United States must ask its friends to stand up and be counted; and had called for the use of the atomic bomb against the Korean people. On an earlier occasion, Senator Bridges, Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, had declared that the United States had been engaged in a struggle for world domination. He recently had said that once the United States entered the struggle in Korea, there could be no peace for its side on that hapless peninsula barring a final world-wide victory. Mr. Vyshinsky observed that to have a world-wide victory, the United States needed a world-wide war.

16. It should also be noted that Republican members had introduced a resolution in the House of Representatives which, with a view to bringing the Korean war to a rapid conclusion, called for the utilization of the atomic weapon.

17. All those facts fully repudiated the hypocritical and false speeches that were made about the desire of the ruling circles of the United States for peace.

18. The representative of the USSR said it was reported that the President of the United States had had elaborated plans for a Far Eastern war on the basis of a new concept. Those plans called for intensified economic and military pressure on China on the naval front in order to shift the burden of the war against the Chinese People's Republic from land to sea. The objective, as reported in the American Press, was to seize the initiative and to exert aggressive economic, military and psychological pressure on the Korean People's Democratic Republic in order to force it to accept the United States terms. It had been proposed to achieve that end by actually opening up a new front. That had been the appraisal by the New York Press of Mr. Lodge's address in the First Committee. *The New York Times* had declared that Mr. Lodge's statement made it quite clear that the United States counted on the continuation of hostilities in order to exert the necessary pressure to force the Communists to agree to an armistice.

19. Mr. Vyshinsky recalled that the representative of the United States had stated that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Chinese People's Republic had declared that the Korean war had been politically good for communism and had brought political advantages to it; therefore, it had been confirmed that the Chinese People's Republic took a favourable attitude toward the Korean war. Mr. Vyshinsky said Mr. Lodge had

distorted Mr. Chou En-lai's words in order to delude world public opinion and to arouse hatred and hostility against the Chinese and Korean people. The representative of the USSR then quoted from the February political report of Mr. Chou En-lai to prove that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had not made the statements ascribed to him by Mr. Lodge.

20. Mr. Vyshinsky then said that the policies of the American ruling circles, for whom the United States delegation spoke in the United Nations, were not directed toward the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. The trend was toward the further aggravation of the situation, toward an artificial protraction, intensification and expansion of the war.

21. That was the position of the United States delegation and others of the aggressive imperialist camp, which supported the American ruling circles in their accusations against the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the Chinese People's Republic for allegedly having unleashed the Korean war. Despite facts and evidence which repudiated that contention, those delegations were again dragging out the fairy tale about aggression having originated in North Korea, referring to the illegal resolutions of the Security Council (S/1501 and S/1511) which declared the Korean People's Democratic Republic to be the aggressor and to the shameful resolution of the General Assembly (498 (V)) which declared the Chinese People's Republic to be an aggressor as well.

22. It would have been unnecessary to discuss that question if it were not for the repetitious attempts to misrepresent and distort the events that had led to the barbarous war against the Korean people. The USSR delegation, as well as others, had presented numerous facts to prove that the instigators of the war were the puppet Government of South Korea, headed by the American agent, Syngman Rhee, and the United States Government, which had assisted the latter when his adventurous plans to take over North Korea had ended in a fiasco.

23. In view of Mr. Lodge's slanderous statement, Mr. Vyshinsky said he was compelled to recall certain facts. First, members of the Syngman Rhee clique had declared they were preparing an attack on North Korea. Mr. Rhee had written Professor Robert T. Oliver that the South Koreans intended to push Kim Il Sung's men into the mountains and there starve them to death. As early as 1949, Mr. Rhee had assured Professor Oliver that the latter and his friends must work in Washington and New York while he worked in Seoul and Tokyo, seeking to "cleanse the country and bring order into our house". At that time, Mr. Chough Pyong Ok, of the South Korean Government Liaison Committee in the United States, had communicated to Professor Oliver the plans for the armed seizure of North Korea. Throughout 1949 and up to the beginning of the Korean war, the South Korean troops had tried to implement those plans. Although he had stated that fact several times, Mr. Vyshinsky said that neither the United States delegation nor those of countries assisting it in the war had taken the trouble to prove that fact false because they could not have done so unless they had resorted to falsifications, which could easily have been exposed.

24. Secondly, assistance had been given to the Syngman Rhee clique by the United States Government

by training the South Koreans to attack North Korea. Although evidence of such assistance had been repeatedly presented, it could be found in the following: the statement made on 19 May 1950 by the head of the Korean Division of the Economic Co-operation Administration; the activities of the then Secretary of Defence, Mr. Johnson; the activities of the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Bradley; the activities of the then adviser to the State Department, Mr. Dulles; the conferences with General MacArthur in Korea; the visit made by Mr. Dulles and General MacArthur to the future front lines in Korea five or six days before military operations were begun. Mr. Vyshinsky asked to what great drama Mr. Dulles had referred on 20 June 1950 when he wrote to Mr. Rhee: "I attach great significance to the decisive role which your country can play in the great drama which is now unfolding". Was it not the drama which had its *dénouement* five days later?

25. Thirdly, General W. L. Roberts, who was the principal instructor of Mr. Rhee's ministers and who had trained the army, had stated that the fact that there would be a campaign against North Korea had been decided. The only thing remaining was an appropriate excuse. That excuse had been found and the South Korean armed forces had made their sudden attack against North Korea.

26. Fourthly, the strategic map found in the secret archives of the Syngman Rhee Government when the North Korean troops captured Seoul exposed the preparations of Syngman Rhee's army for the attack against North Korea. Although the Committee had been shown the map, with symbols indicating the ultimate objectives of the attack against North Korea, no representative had taken the trouble to refute the evidence. Some representatives had said the aggressors were the North Koreans while others had said they were the South Koreans. The USSR delegation had placed its evidence before the Committee, honestly. As an answer, it had been slandered. Although Mr. Acheson had stated that the United States also had a map which it had found in the North Korean Army's Staff Headquarters, the Committee had not been shown it. His delegation was still waiting to see it. He added that any map could have been prepared during the past months.

27. Those facts, he believed, disproved all claims about the aggression having originated from North Korea.

28. Mr. Vyshinsky observed that the representative of the United States and his supporters continued to refer to the resolutions of the Security Council dated 25 and 27 June and 7 July 1950 (S/1501, S/1511 and S/1588), which the USSR delegation had proven represented a farce performed under the baton of the United States, which had unleashed the aggression against North Korea. It had been proven that those resolutions had been adopted on the basis of an unfounded and unproved set of reports received from the South Korean Ministry of Internal Affairs and the United States Ambassador to South Korea, Mr. Muccio, to the effect that the North Koreans had attacked the South Koreans. It was well known, however, that there had been no report of an attack by North Korea from the United Nations observers. There was no report from those observers, Mr. Vyshinsky said, although the records of the Security Council indicated

that the conclusions of the United Nations Commission on Korea were drawn on the basis of information received directly from the military observers in Korea. That was sheer falsification since Security Council documents showed that the observers had returned from the region of the 38th parallel forty-eight hours prior to the commencement of the events of 25 June.

29. Mr. Vyshinsky stated that any speaker who wished to slander the Soviet Union should prove the falsity of those statements on the basis of documents. He could bring the documents to the Committee again and cite chapter and verse to show who had falsified the facts. The falsifiers were those who said that North Korea was the aggressor. In fact, the aggression was perpetrated by South Korea, aided and abetted by Ambassador Muccio and the American ruling circles. For them, that war was merely a phase in the preparation of a world war, which they hoped would expunge the Soviet Union and the countries of the peoples' democracies from the earth.

30. The representative of the USSR observed that the former United States Under-Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Kimball, had stated in October 1950 that the United States had to carry out its military plans at the proper place and had added, "for that purpose we chose Korea". On 13 February 1953 United States Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond had stated that just as during the Second World War American troops had selected their fields of action, so now the United States had similarly selected Korea. Some days ago, General Van Fleet had said in San Francisco: "Should we lose Korea, Japan and the remainder of Asia would also be lost in due course."

31. Those facts refuted Mr. Lodge's allegations about the alleged interest of the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic in carrying on the war.

32. Having pushed through the first part of the seventh session of the Assembly an unsuitable resolution on the Korean question, the ruling circles in the United States now sought to use it as a camouflage for their aggressive purposes and to cover up their refusal to put an end to the war in Korea. The position of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and that of the Chinese People's Republic had shown that all attempts to delude the Korean and Chinese people concerning the true objectives of the American imperialists, who had used the United Nations to their own ends, had had no success. That was why the United States delegation, as well as a number of delegations which supported it, now attacked those Governments which, in their replies to the cablegram of the President of the Assembly (A/2354, annexes I-III), had exposed the false nature of the appeals to adopt the proposals.

33. The representatives of the United States, Brazil, Peru, Australia, Cuba and other countries had made overt attacks against the Governments of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the Chinese People's Republic because of their replies to Mr. Pearson's cablegram. However, an analysis of that cablegram and of Assembly resolution 610 (VII) of 3 December would not fail to show that their answers were well founded. Those replies stated that the resolution was illegal and that it was in violation of the Geneva Convention and of the principles of international law and usage.

34. In his cablegram, Mr. Pearson had sought to impress on the recipients that the resolution of 3 December expressed the profound desire of all Members of the United Nations to put an end to the war in Korea. However, it was well known that the Members who were also members of the North Atlantic bloc had resolutely refused to include in the resolution a demand for immediate cessation of hostilities. By that refusal they had proven they favoured their continuation. Mr. Vyshinsky asked how could the President of the Assembly state that all the Members were desirous of putting an end to the Korean war, while the majority of the Members voting for that resolution had voted against the USSR proposal (A/L.118) for the immediate cessation of hostilities. However, in order to save face, the delegations which had voted for the resolution of 3 December had agreed to include in the preamble a phrase to the effect that the negotiations should have as an objective the conclusion of the Korean war. He did not believe that constituted a demand for the immediate cessation of hostilities. If the Members actually wanted to stop the war, he asked why did they not accept the Soviet Union proposal. The Governments of the Chinese People's Republic and the Korean People's Democratic Republic could not fail to see that the resolution was a mere falsification of the facts. Why say that the United Nations was determined to do everything possible to bring the fighting in Korea to an end, when a simple move such as that proposed by the USSR was sufficient to end that horrible war?

35. The cablegram sent by the President of the General Assembly attempted to shift the responsibility for refusing to end the war from the Anglo-American bloc, where it really belonged, to the Chinese People's Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, by saying that hostilities could be ended by acceptance of the proposals in the 3 December resolution. A letter including such distortions could not but elicit a negative response from the Chinese People's Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea. The Foreign Minister of the Chinese People's Republic had been right in pointing out that the resolution of 3 December had been based entirely on the principle of forcible detention of war prisoners rather than on their repatriation as provided by the Geneva Convention. That resolution had been nothing but a re-tailored version of the twenty-one-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/725) submitted by Mr. Acheson and then withdrawn by him in favour of the resolution of 3 December. The Government of the Chinese People's Republic had rightly pointed out that that resolution had been based on the slanderous contention that, among the Korean and Chinese prisoners of war, there were some who refused to be repatriated, who refused to be reunited with their families and to lead a peaceful life. Mr. Chou En-lai had rightly pointed out that that slanderous contention was contrary to human nature and to the facts, and that the intention was to cover up the forcible retention of prisoners who, being under armed guard, had no freedom to express their real wishes. The Foreign Minister of the People's Republic had made the entirely justified and legitimate demand that the settlement of the question of repatriation of prisoners of war must be made on the basis of the Geneva Convention, according to which the repatriation must be carried out on both sides as soon as the armistice had entered into force,

a demand in full accord with the terms of the Geneva Convention and of international law and practice in general.

36. Equally fair and just were the proposals contained in the reply of the Foreign Minister of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea. Those Governments fully and unambiguously supported the USSR proposal calling for an immediate end to all hostilities on land, by sea and in the air and for the establishment of a commission for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question which would include representatives of the parties directly concerned as well as of countries which had not participated in the war. Recalling the provisions of that proposal, Mr. Vyshinsky said that unfortunately the United States and its supporters had rejected the USSR proposal to end the war.

37. It was against that background that the United States and others had the effrontery to say that those who called for the immediate and full cessation of hostilities in Korea favoured the continuation of the war. The extent of that hypocrisy exposed the true culprits of the commencement and of the continuation of the Korean war. Mr. Lodge, who had said that the USSR prevented the termination of hostilities, should remember that a few months previously it had been the United States which had resolutely objected to the Soviet Union proposal to end hostilities in Korea. That eleventh fact overlooked by Mr. Lodge was the one correct one. Although the USSR proposal set no prerequisite conditions for the cessation of hostilities, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and other members of the North Atlantic bloc had voted against it because they did not want to end the war, but wished rather to continue it so as to maintain the profit of the American billionaires who did not care about the bloodshed and destruction. The United States was interested in continuing the current dead lock in Korea in order to enhance its military power and to intensify the military psychosis being cultivated by its ruling circles. The main task being pursued by the Eisenhower Administration was to devise new measures in a plan for extending the Korean war and preparing a new world war. Plans were being made to establish large armed forces in Asian countries such as Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan and Burma, which forces, together with the remnants of the Chiang Kai-shek troops, would be utilized by the United States for the fulfilment of its aggressive plans and at the same time would be used as cannon fodder: in other words, the fulfilment of the benighted principle of setting Asians to fight Asians. It was no accident that the United States Press continually stressed that a main task of the new Administration was to create an army of Asians and to mobilize the military resources of non-communist Asia. The demand was overtly made that Japan should be utilized, since it might offer the manpower for a large and experienced army. Work was feverishly being carried out to create **new military bases in the Pacific** and to forge new military blocs. The ruling circles of the United States planned to use Chiang Kai-shek's troops to carry out raids against the coastline of central China and to carry out diversions inside the Chinese People's Republic. They regarded Korea as a mere phase in the war against the people's emancipation movement in Asia. The United States Press openly approved of those plans to replace American boys by Asians, a procedure regarded as much cheaper in the long run.

38. In view of those circumstances, there could be no question of describing the foreign policy of the United States Administration as peaceful. Peaceful plans were incompatible with the real plans being hatched in certain quarters for the unleashing of a third world war. The industry of the United States was being militarized apace and the programme of military preparation was being intensified. Aggressive blocs were being forged and those already in existence were being strengthened. The more the ruling circles of the United States prepared for war, however, the more they attempted to throw onto the peace-loving countries the responsibility for the growing threat to the peace and security of the peoples, and the more they attempted to disguise their true aggressive purposes. That was the explanation of the ten supposed facts adduced by Mr. Lodge. Those slanderous fabrications had not convinced anyone and were not even original. Indeed, Mr. Lodge had attempted to break through an open door in saying that the USSR was selling armaments to China. The USSR had never concealed the fact that it had sold and continued to sell armaments to its Chinese ally, while China sold to the USSR various types of raw materials, including strategic materials, in line with the treaties of friendship and alliance between the two countries. The USSR had no treaty for mutual assistance with Korea, which had also been mentioned by Mr. Lodge, and consequently did not sell armaments to Korea. However, as had been stated previously, the USSR, when it had withdrawn its troops from Korea in 1948, had sold to that country the surplus of USSR armaments on the spot. A similar slanderous attempt by General MacArthur, and by the United States representative at the 502nd meeting of the Security Council, to ascribe the supply of armaments to North Korea in 1949-50 to the USSR had been fully exposed one week later by a group of important correspondents in *Look* magazine, who had confirmed that North Korea had received from the USSR only weapons left there from the Second World War. Even the *New York Herald Tribune*, he noted, had been constrained to admit that the most noteworthy feature of the Korean campaign had been the strict non-intervention of USSR troops.

39. Mr. Lodge's statement that the Korean war would have been ended long before but for the USSR, which could end the war when it wished to, was nonsense. The USSR had taken the initiative for the armistice negotiations in Korea, negotiations frustrated by the United States in flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention of 1949. The USSR proposal (S/1668) for the cessation of hostilities in Korea and the simultaneous withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea, submitted in the Security Council as early as August 1950, had been rejected by the United States and its allies, who had likewise rejected a proposal (A/1426) submitted by the USSR and four other States to the fifth session of the General Assembly, in October 1950. That proposal had called on the General Assembly to recommend to the belligerents in Korea immediately to put an end to hostilities. The United States and its allies had also voted against the fourth USSR proposal (A/C.1/698), submitted at the sixth session of the General Assembly in 1951, which had called on the countries participating in the hostilities immediately to put an end to such hostilities, conclude an armistice and withdraw their troops from the 38th parallel within ten days. It had also provided that all foreign troops

and foreign volunteer detachments should, within a three-month interval, be withdrawn from Korea. The United States had similarly voted against the USSR proposal at the first part of the seventh session. In the light of all those facts, Mr. Lodge's statement at the 557th meeting was a failure, as were the unfounded, reckless and slanderous fabrications against the Soviet Union. All of those were mere attempts to cover up the refusal of the United States to accept the Soviet Union proposal for the immediate and complete cessation of hostilities in Korea.

40. However, that would not stop the USSR in its struggle for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. With undaunted resolution, the USSR would continue to champion its proposal of 2 December 1952 (A/L.118) recommending that the belligerents in Korea immediately cease fire and end all hostilities on land, at sea and in the air and that that should be carried out on the basis of the armistice agreement already agreed upon between the belligerents. That proposal also provided for the establishment of a commission for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, which would be instructed to take, without delay, measures for the settlement of the Korean question on the basis of the unification of Korea, which should be carried out by the Koreans themselves under the supervision of the commission. The commission should also take measures to extend all possible assistance in the repatriation of all prisoners of war by both sides. That programme for the settlement of the Korean question was the only method capable of ending the barbarous war against the Korean people and was in accordance with the sincere and deep-rooted aspirations of all peace-loving peoples.

41. Mr. LODGE (United States of America) noted that Mr. Vyshinsky had admitted that the USSR had been assisting the Chinese communist forces, whom the United Nations had branded as aggressors. The Committee would recall the Security Council resolution (S/1511) of 27 June 1950, and the General Assembly resolution of 1 February 1951 as regards the Chinese Communists.

42. In all Mr. Vyshinsky's talk about aggression, there had been no reference to the heart of the matter, which was the early report of the United Nations Commission on Korea (A/1350), comprising representatives of India, Australia, China, El Salvador, France, the Philippines and Turkey, which had clearly and unqualifiedly found that North Korea had launched the attack. Mr. Lodge quoted from that report to the effect that the invasion launched by the North Korean forces on 25 June could not have been the result of a decision taken suddenly in order to repel a mere border attack or in retaliation for such an attack. The nature and scope of the invasion, and the subsequent steady advance of the North Korean forces, the report had stated, presupposed a long-premeditated, well-prepared and well-timed plan of aggression. The considered opinion of the Commission had been that the planning and preparation had been deliberate, and an essential part of the policy of the North Korean authorities, designed to secure by force what could not be gained by any other means. The Commission had concluded that, in furtherance of that policy, the North Korean authorities had initiated a war of aggression without provocation and without warning. Mr. Lodge considered that that report cleared up the question of



who had been the aggressor, a question decided by the United Nations on several occasions.

43. Mr. Vyshinsky had accused the United States of wanting to continue the Korean action and of rejecting his so-called peace proposals. Mr. Vyshinsky had referred to Mr. Lodge's quotation from Chou En-lai's statement of 4 February and, in so doing, had probably unwittingly read exactly the same statement which Mr. Lodge had quoted. Mr. Lodge thought his statement could therefore stand as quite accurate. The proposal submitted by the USSR at the first part of the session, Mr. Lodge noted, had called for a commission of eleven States to consider the prisoner-of-war question and other political questions. Mr. Vyshinsky had insisted that there should be a two-thirds vote in that commission to reach a decision. Since four of the proposed eleven members would be communist, it was not necessary to be a clever mathematician to work out that the Soviet Union camp would in effect have a veto.

44. The USSR representative's call for a cease-fire now, leaving the question of the prisoners of war to be decided later, reminded Mr. Lodge of the communist willingness to have a cease-fire after their forces had overrun most of the territory of the Republic of Korea during the early days of their aggression, in the knowledge that there could be no cease-fire which left the fruits of aggression in their hands or which was otherwise inconsistent with the principles for which the United Nations was fighting. But even taking the Communists at their word, it would mean, as the Australian representative had pointed out (559th meeting), a cease-fire on condition that thousands of United Nations and Republic of Korea soldiers be left in communist hands as hostages, to be held indefinitely and to be used to blackmail the United Nations to agree to return to the Communists by force tens of thousands of prisoners who would violently resist efforts to return them to the fate that awaited them at communist hands. While they held those hostages and bargained over their fate, the Communists would be building up their airfields and maintaining the constant threat that if the prisoner-of-war question was not settled to their satisfaction, they might start their aggression over again. No country participating in the fighting in Korea wanted to leave its prisoners as hostages. If Russian soldiers were involved, he did not believe that the USSR representative would want to abandon them. But it was the USSR, not the United Nations, who had Asian soldiers as cannon fodder, and the USSR was indifferent as to what happened to those soldiers.

45. The CHAIRMAN suggested that, in view of the heavy agenda before the Committee, the list of speakers should be closed on the following day, Tuesday 3 March, at 6 p.m. He pointed out that there were no speakers on the list at that point. Once the list had been closed, he intended to follow it in the exact order of inscription of the different speakers.

46. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) considered the Chairman's suggestion inappropriate since the Committee was just approaching the possibility of elaborating proposals on the Korean question in the spirit of peace and justice. Moreover, it might very well be that other delegations would find it necessary to speak after the list had been closed.

Pointing out that the Committee was just beginning its work on an item upon which, during earlier part of the session, it had spent one and a half months, he urged that it should be given a chance to debate the question comprehensively, so that the various political views and tendencies might reach a common ground. To wind up the debate that early would be contrary to the interests that should guide the Committee, namely those of putting an end to the war and restoring peace in the Far East. He therefore requested the Chairman not to resort to so drastic a measure as the closure of the list of speakers on the following day. Such a measure would be an unwarranted limitation of debate on an important question and would show a lack of respect for the rights of the minority. The question of closing the list, he suggested, could at least be postponed until the following day.

47. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) proposed that the list of speakers should be closed at 6 p.m. on Wednesday, 4 March.

48. Mr. SKRZESZEWSKI (Poland) considered that the raising of the question of the closure of the list of speakers at that point, when the discussion was just beginning, was incorrect and unjust. He appealed to the Chairman to withdraw his suggestion.

49. Mr. MARTIN (Canada) feared that the General Assembly would soon be faced with a demand, for one reason or another, for a more orderly arrangement of its debates, particularly in committee. He noted that some countries, such as his own, endeavoured to be represented by members of their governments, along with permanent delegations. That practice, of course, could not go on indefinitely if there was not to be a more orderly and continuous way of proceeding with the General Assembly's work.

50. He suggested that, if it was not possible to proceed with the item under discussion on the following morning, the Chairman should ask the person who had proposed the inclusion of the next item in the agenda whether he would not be ready to proceed with that item. If the representative concerned could not do so, was the Committee convinced that it could not continue its discussion of the current item the following morning? In any event, he supported the Chairman's original proposal to close the list of speakers on the next day, pointing out that that procedure had not in the past precluded anyone from taking part in the debate.

51. In reply to a question put by the CHAIRMAN, Mr. MARTIN (Canada) formally moved that the list of speakers should be closed on Tuesday, 3 March, at 6 p.m., as originally suggested by the Chair.

52. After further discussion, the CHAIRMAN stated that the USSR proposal would be voted on first, since it had been submitted first.

*The USSR proposal that the Committee should decide the question of closing the list of speakers on the following day was rejected by 29 votes to 10, with 16 abstentions.*

*The proposal submitted by the representative of Peru providing that the list of speakers should be closed at 6 p.m. on Wednesday, 4 March, was adopted by 40 votes to 4, with 9 abstentions.*

The meeting rose at 5.20 p.m.