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Chairman: Mr. João Carlos MUNIZ (Brazil).

Question of an appeal to the Powers signatories to the Moscow Declaration of 1 November 1943, for an early fulfilment of their pledges toward Austria (A/2160, A/2166 and Add. 1, A/C.1/L.15 and A/C.1/L.16) (*continued*)

[Item 63]*

1. Mr. VON BALLUSECK (Netherlands) recalled that his delegation was one of the authors of the joint draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.16. It was in no way the intention of the authors of that draft resolution to shift the negotiations on the Austrian treaty to New York, or to transfer to the sixty Members of the United Nations a matter which was in fact the exclusive responsibility of the four great Powers. The Netherlands delegation was gravely concerned by the fact that five years of negotiations had ended in deadlock and that seven and a half years after the end of the war Austria was still under an emergency régime of military occupation, with all its consequences. Because of its deep concern his delegation wished the Assembly to address an urgent appeal to the great Powers to strive with goodwill to break the deadlock and bring about an agreement which would restore Austria to real sovereignty.

2. The main facts relevant to the Austrian question had already been set forth in the explanatory memorandum attached to the request for inclusion of the item in the agenda (A/2166/Add.1). It should be recalled, however, that in accordance with the terms of the Moscow Declaration of 1 November 1943 Austria, as one of the first victims of Hitler's aggression, should be re-established as a free and independent State. The fact that Austria had been regarded in the Declaration as one of Hitler's first victims implied that its rehabilitation should be considered one of the first purposes of the common war against aggression.

3. The Netherlands, having suffered as an occupied territory during the war, could sympathize with Austria's plight. While it did not entirely overlook the fact

that Austria, even though occupied in 1938 against its will, had participated in the war against the Allies — a fact mentioned in the preamble of the draft treaty — his Government sincerely hoped that an early agreement between the four Powers would result in Austria's complete liberation.

4. The purpose of the Second World War had been to defeat nazism and free its victims. Consequently, the complete liberation of Austria clearly had priority over the restoration of other States which had joined the enemy of their own accord. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that the liberation of Austria had been accomplished in the spring of 1945. Unfortunately, although the enemy's soldiers had withdrawn and although the ties imposed by the Germans had been broken at that time, Austria was still awaiting complete liberation. It had not been until 1947 that the four great Powers had started negotiations to conclude a treaty that would restore Austria's sovereignty, re-establish its frontiers, remove the occupation forces, settle reparations claims and permit Austria to become a Member of the United Nations. The sad history of those negotiations was common knowledge: they had settled nothing but had led to deterioration of the Austrian situation and increased world tension. It was not the intention of his delegation to apportion blame, but to urge a prompt settlement of the dangerous situation. The Netherlands Government desired an early solution not only because of the reasons he had stated but also because of its feeling of friendship towards Austria, with which it had always maintained cordial relations. As everyone knew, the only obstacle standing in the way of Austria's independence was not the existence of treaties restricting its rights but, on the contrary, the absence of a state treaty restoring those rights.

5. Conflicting interests were involved and, to reach an agreement, both sides would have to make concessions. Austria's right to freedom was established beyond question, and none had contested it. The sole purpose of the joint draft resolution was to appeal to the spirit of understanding of the signatories to the Moscow Declaration and to urge them to come to an early agreement.

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

6. Mr. MENON (India) said that his delegation's participation in the debate was prompted by two considerations: first, it wished to express its sincere sympathy for Austria's aspirations, and, secondly, to state its conviction that the United Nations should not take a stand on the merits of the question. It would therefore confine itself to an appeal to the spirit of goodwill and understanding of the great Powers, since only they were competent to consider the substance of the problem. The joint draft resolution was an eloquent expression of that appeal.

7. It should not be forgotten that Austria, a victim of nazism, was at present occupied by Allied troops. Its annexation by Germany had aroused widespread indignation. In 1943, the Moscow Declaration had promised its liberation; unfortunately, seven years had elapsed since the end of the war and negotiations were still under way.

8. His delegation would in no way attempt to apportion blame, but felt that an appeal should be addressed to the great Powers calling upon them to expedite the settlement of the problem, which could only foster and perhaps aggravate international tension.

9. Mr. POPOVIC (Yugoslavia) considered that the Austrian question was undoubtedly one of the most important and politically urgent on the agenda of the present session. It was of particular concern to Yugoslavia, Austria's immediate neighbour. Austria's fate was that of a number of countries which had been divided into occupation zones by the great Powers after the war. Having been freed from nazi occupation, Austria had been drawn into the labyrinth of the negotiations of the great Powers, which had made its independence one of their bargaining elements. During that time, it should be recalled, certain Yugoslav claims concerning the rights of the Yugoslav minority in Austria, which had been recognized at the outset, had been wilfully ignored by the four great Powers and subsequently bartered away by the USSR in return for material benefits.

10. The Deputy Foreign Ministers had held 258 meetings in a futile effort to settle the Austrian question. The responsibility for the present deadlock rested in varying degrees on all those who had taken part in the negotiations; it was impossible to escape the impression, however, that the USSR had consistently been opposed to any sort of solution. That desire to frustrate the negotiations was again apparent in the latest stratagem to which the USSR had resorted to prevent a successful conclusion of the negotiations — a last-minute attempt to link the question of Austria with that of Trieste. That example was significant in that it showed the absurd lengths to which the USSR was prepared to go in order to ensure failure of the negotiations. The Trieste question had been expressly dealt with in the Italian Peace Treaty and at present concerned only Italy and Yugoslavia; it had nothing to do with the Austrian question. The USSR stratagem had been revealing, however, since it had shown that the two questions were politically related in the USSR strategy, the primary purpose of which was to maintain the existing tension.

11. At present, since it was obvious that world public opinion was seriously concerned with the problem, the delegations of the Soviet bloc were avoiding a solution by refusing to take part in the debate. They had again

invoked Article 107 of the Charter which, they claimed, precluded consideration of the Austrian question by the United Nations. That was another example of the characteristic manoeuvre of the USSR which, whenever it had to face an unpleasant problem, claimed that all important questions, even if they involved the fate of other States, fell within the exclusive purview of the great Powers.

12. The United Nations was not only competent but morally obliged to take a stand on that grave problem for two reasons. First, the question at issue concerned the independence of a nation which, seven years after the termination of hostilities, was still under a complex régime of occupation, with all the difficulties, both political and economic, that that entailed. The very fact that a State in the centre of Europe with a rich historical tradition was being persistently thwarted in its legitimate aspirations, surely provided the United Nations with sufficient legal and moral grounds for doing everything within its power on that country's behalf. Secondly, it was obvious that the continuation of that state of affairs must inevitably increase the tension among the great Powers. The presence of the armed forces of four different States on the territory of a fifth State, particularly when that fifth State occupied the geographical position of Austria, created a constant danger to peace and security. That danger had particularly serious implications for the Yugoslav Government, since the deadlock served as an excuse for the continued presence of the Soviet forces which, on the pretext that they were establishing supply centres and protecting their lines of communications, had established in other neighbouring countries military bases used by the countries of the Eastern bloc to exercise constant aggressive pressure against Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav delegation had had occasion to cite numerous examples of the aggressive policy of the USSR at the time of the discussion, at the General Assembly's sixth session, of the acts of hostility committed by that group of countries against Yugoslavia. The USSR Government was obviously unwilling to abandon a forward military base, which was an important element in its plans of aggression, or the considerable material benefits that it derived from Austria such as the annual production of the latter's oil fields, worth some \$30 million a year.

13. The Austrian question was in many respects a test-case, particularly for the great Powers, since it revealed their intentions and especially those of the USSR. It was, therefore, important that the United Nations should adopt a resolution concerning the problem.

14. It was doubtful whether the USSR Government could convince anyone of the sincerity of its proclamations in support of the right of peoples to self-determination; its delegation's vociferous support of the rights of certain Asian and African peoples could hardly be taken seriously while the USSR was imposing in its zone of occupation, in the middle of Europe, a régime much more cruel than any colonial occupation. As long as the Soviet policy towards Austria remained unchanged Moscow must bear the responsibility for the suffering of the Austrians and for the world tension that was seriously threatening the peace. It was because it welcomed that state of affairs that the USSR delegation had decided to abstain from participating in both the discussion and the vote on the Austrian question.

15. The Yugoslav delegation would enthusiastically support the joint draft resolution.

16. Mr. COHEN (United States of America) said that the argument advanced by the USSR delegation to justify its refusal to participate in the discussion or the vote on the Austrian question was devoid of foundation. The USSR held that the Assembly was incompetent by virtue of Article 107 of the Charter, whereas Article 107 was not applicable to the case in point. In the first place, Austria was not a former "enemy of any signatory to the present Charter"; Austria had not declared war, and in the Moscow Declaration of the Four Powers had regarded Austria as a victim of nazism that they had pledged themselves to liberate. Secondly, the discussion of the joint draft resolution before the First Committee could in no way be regarded as an attempt to "invalidate or preclude action . . . taken or authorized as a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action". The question under consideration dealt with differences between those Governments; it was clear that Article 107 did not bar consideration of any differences between Members of the United Nations which might threaten the general welfare or impair friendly relations among nations. In addition, as the Yugoslav representative had pointed out, the present situation in Austria seriously affected the peace of that area. Furthermore, there were precedents in which the General Assembly had considered cases when the Allies of the Second World War had been unable to agree on measures to give effect to their war-time declarations and to their post-war agreements. As examples of such precedents, Mr. Cohen mentioned the Korean question, the Berlin blockade, and the question of free elections in Germany.

17. Lastly, those who had requested inclusion of that item in the agenda were not asking the First Committee to deal substantively with the problem. The joint draft resolution concerned solely an appeal to the Powers signatories to the Moscow Declaration for an early solution. It would have been reassuring had the four great Powers supported the inclusion of the item in the agenda, with an earnest intention to seek a solution fulfilling their pledges to restore Austria's freedom and independence.

18. The United States warmly welcomed the proposed draft resolution. As one of the four occupying Powers in Austria it had already tried and would continue to try to find a way to restore Austrian independence in accordance with the Moscow Declaration of 1 November 1943. There could not and should not be any misunderstanding on the Austrian question as a result of that Declaration. The Soviet Union had recognized and proclaimed that the restoration of Austrian independence had been one of the objectives of the war. In March 1945, Marshal Tolbukhin, commanding the Russian forces in Austria, had promised the citizens of Vienna complete independence, stating: "The Red Army has set foot on the soil of Austria not to conquer Austrian territory. Its aim is exclusively the defeat of the enemy German-Fascist troops and the liberation of Austria. The Red Army backs the Moscow Declaration of the Allied Powers on the independence of Austria". The occupation of Austria and the maintenance of foreign troops in its territory could be justified only for the time necessary to effect a transfer of power to

the Austrian people. The four Powers had pledged themselves to remove any interference likely to leave the Austrian people under foreign domination, and the United States intended to stand by that pledge.

19. Early in 1946 the United States had urged the Council of Foreign Ministers to consider the possibility of concluding a treaty with Austria that would restore its independence. The view then expressed by the United States, and supported by France and Great Britain, had been that such a treaty should take the form not of a peace treaty with an enemy State but of a treaty with the liberated Austrian State, recognizing its independence. Not until 1947 had the Soviet Union expressed its willingness to begin discussions on those lines. Since that time 376 quadripartite meetings had been held, but there was still no Austrian treaty because of the unyielding attitude of the Soviet Union which had persisted in making its agreement to the treaty's provisions conditional upon the settlement of specific problems on its own terms. Those terms had been calculated not to safeguard the independence of Austria but to perpetuate its dependence upon the Soviet Union even after the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

20. In the summer of 1949, far-reaching concessions had been made by the Western Powers and it had been thought that a compromise had been effected, but no sooner had tentative agreement been reached on those important points than the Soviet Union had insisted on new conditions, some of which had been entirely extraneous to the conclusion of the treaty. The negative attitude of the Soviet Union towards the draft treaty was most significantly revealed by its attitude on the problem of German assets in Austria. Under the terms of the Potsdam Agreement reparation claims of the Allied Powers against Germany were to be met in part from external German assets. It had been agreed, however, that reparations should not be exacted from Austria itself. Despite the Moscow Declaration of 1943 and the London Declaration of the same year, whereby the Allied Powers were bound to do their utmost to defeat methods of dispossession practised by Axis governments in countries controlled by them, the Soviet Union had seized hundreds of properties in Austria. Those had included properties owned by German nationals and, in addition, many others owned by Austrians who had been dispossessed by the Nazis, and even some owned by United Nations nationals. In 1947, all those assets had been transferred to Soviet corporations which had administered them without regard to Austrian laws. Those corporations had become an *imperium in imperio*, and had claimed extra-territorial rights, exemptions from taxes, and full freedom from the laws of the land. Through those corporations, the Soviet Union was in a position to exercise a stranglehold on the economic life of Austria. That action had cost Austria the use of properties valued conservatively at \$700 million and including, in addition to 300 industrial enterprises, over 200,000 acres of farm lands and forests. The loss to Austria of the production, together with the loss of taxes and customs duties, represented hundreds of millions of dollars. On oil production alone, the loss exceeded the amount which Austria would have been called upon to pay annually to the Soviet Union had a treaty been concluded upon the basis of the compromise proposals made by the Western Powers in the summer of 1949.

21. Those proposals had constituted major concessions on the part of the Western Powers. A written statement of agreed principles had been approved by all four Powers. Incorporating those principles in the body of the treaty had, however, raised some difficulties, but the Soviet Union Government had finally declared that it would raise no further objections on the remainder of the unagreed articles if the Western Powers would accept the Soviet Union position on German assets. On the basis of that statement and with the concurrence of the Austrian Government, further concessions in the matter of German assets had led to an agreement on that subject. Only five relatively minor articles had remained in abeyance. The Soviet Union had then raised a new issue, called by the Austrians the "dried peas debt". The Soviet Union Government had refused to go further with any negotiations until settlement had been made for supplies delivered and services rendered to the Austrian Government by the Soviet Union at the close of the war. The remaining three great Powers had made no such claim on the Austrian Government and hence the matter was not one for quadripartite negotiation. In spite of repeated inquiries, however, the Austrians had been unable to obtain a reply from the Soviet Union Government setting a figure for the alleged debt to the Soviet Union incurred for the supply of large quantities of dried peas turned over by the Soviet Union to Austria. The peas, it was said by the Austrians, had actually come from German army stocks in Austria which had been seized by the Soviet troops. To speed up matters, however, the Western Powers had made an offer to the Soviet Union to include a provision in the draft treaty to cover the claims made. The Soviet Union, however, had refused its agreement even on terms defined by itself.

22. Its insincerity regarding that debt having become too obvious, the Soviet Union Government had dropped the matter but had raised another question even more extraneous to the conclusion of a peace treaty with Austria, namely, the issue of Trieste, and subsequently, questions relating to denazification and demilitarization of Austria. It was abundantly clear that such matters had no relation to the negotiations under way. The problem of Trieste related to the Italian peace treaty. As for demilitarization, the Allied Council in Vienna in 1947, after a four-Power survey, had recognized that Austria possessed no military organizations. The only military forces in Austria today were those of the Allied Powers, and in that connexion it should be noted that the Soviet Union forces far exceeded those of the Western Powers combined, as regards both strength and numbers of military installations and airfields. The one way to demilitarize Austria was, therefore, to conclude a treaty making provision for the withdrawal of the occupation forces.

23. The charge that the Austrian Government had failed to denazify was equally specious, since Austria had complied with the denazification laws approved by the Allied Council. The respect which Austria ensured for human rights proved that it had freed itself from the nazi patterns which were all too evident in the régimes of its Cominform neighbours.

24. In a renewed effort to conclude a treaty, the Western Powers had proposed a meeting of the Austrian Treaty Deputies in London in January 1952. The Soviet Union had refused to attend that meeting. On 13 March

1952, the Western Powers had proposed a treaty containing only eight articles, all but one of which had been agreed. The new article had related to the German assets and had called for their relinquishment to Austria. The Soviet Union had refused, again raising the same extraneous issues, and had failed to appear for a meeting in London on 29 September 1952. The Soviet Union, in fact, continued to use Austria as a pawn for its own imperialistic purposes. The Western Powers were willing to accept any treaty in terms adequate to ensure the restoration of Austria's independence and its freedom from foreign domination.

25. In the absence of a treaty, the Western Powers had made every effort to ameliorate Austria's situation and to grant to the Austrian Government control of its own affairs within the terms of existing occupation agreements. Austria had earned the restoration of its sovereignty: it had re-established its democratic constitution of 1929, it had held free elections, and its political parties were free. The Austrian Government elected in 1945 was recognized by the Governments of the occupying Powers and maintained normal diplomatic relations with many governments. Austria had applied for membership of the United Nations, and the General Assembly had recommended favourable action on its application. Even the Soviet Union had considered Austria as qualified for membership under its "package proposal".

26. The United States was willing to meet again with the USSR representative in order to conclude the Austrian treaty. But the experience of the past seven years left little hope of arriving shortly at a satisfactory conclusion unless something more were added. Perhaps the joint draft resolution was that something more, and the United States fully supported it.

27. Mr. AMMOUN (Lebanon) said it had been necessary that the voice of Austria, which had been smothered by hitlerite oppression, should be heard on the occasion of the discussion of a problem which concerned above all the Austrian people's rights to independence and freedom.

28. The Lebanese delegation, which had joined with three other delegations in appealing to the States that had signed the Moscow Declaration to fulfil their commitments with regard to Austria, was convinced that that step was calculated to do justice to a nation whose independence had been temporarily suspended.

29. In making that appeal, the four delegations had been careful to put the Austrian case objectively, in the same spirit which had prevailed at the signing of the Moscow Declaration of 1 November 1943. The Declaration had recognized that Austria should be re-established as a free and independent State. Yet Austria, which had been the first nation to pass under the hitlerite yoke, was the last to receive its freedom. The appeal to the four great Powers accordingly expressed the wish that Austria's predicament should be terminated as soon as possible.

30. In 1948, the General Assembly had unanimously adopted resolution 190 (III) whereby an appeal had been made to the great Powers to renew their efforts to compose their differences and establish a lasting peace. The great Powers had thus not objected to being joined by the United Nations in their efforts to establish peace and, in particular, to conclude a peace treaty with

Austria. It was therefore in keeping with its tradition that the United Nations was now addressing the great Powers once more on that matter, asking them to reach an early settlement of the Austrian situation, to do justice to the Austrian people, and thus to contribute towards the consolidation of the peace.

31. Mr. SANDLER (Sweden) felt that it was unnecessary to refer to the substance of the question after the extremely lucid statements made by the Austrian representative and the United Kingdom representative (553rd meeting). He recalled that the late Austrian Chancellor Renner had compared Austria's post-war position to that of a small boat trying to reach the shore with four elephants on board. Three of the elephants, Mr. Sandler added, were willing to leave the boat in order to make it more manageable, but the fourth elephant wished to stay on board. Consequently the three other elephants had to stay where they were, in order to keep the boat trimmed.

32. It was thanks to its high-mindedness, its optimism and its traditional good humour that the Austrian people had been able to persevere in such intolerable circumstances. The Swedish delegation associated itself wholeheartedly with the appeal that was being made to the great Powers in the hope that Austria would regain its full sovereignty as soon as possible.

33. Mr. LEA PLAZA (Chile) said he had listened most carefully to the various statements that had been made on the Austrian question, both on United Nations competence and on the substance of the problem. He wondered how the Austrians would feel if the United Nations, whose purpose was to maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights of peoples and to achieve international co-operation, were to decide for procedural reasons not to concern itself with the question.

34. The independence of Austria was suspended. That dramatic situation transcended the frontiers of Austria and already affected other countries. The Austrian question had become complicated when the great Powers had tried to solve it as if Austria were among the spoils of war. In any case, procedural questions were irrelevant, since the General Assembly had decided to place the question on its agenda. The problem came within the purposes of the Charter, and the First Committee should accordingly take it up.

35. In 1938 Austria, annexed by Germany, had been abandoned by the League of Nations, a failure which had led Chile to withdraw from that organization. The Chilean delegation was taking part in the discussions of the First Committee in order that the Austrian situation might be clarified as far as possible and that the necessary information on the subject brought to the notice of international public opinion.

36. The Moscow Declaration of 1943, signed by the four great Powers, had expressed their wish to liberate Austria, declared that the annexation of Austria by Germany was null and void, rejected the changes made in Austria by the Nazi regime and favoured the restoration of Austrian independence. On 4 July 1945, the Allies had signed an agreement concerning Allied control in Austria, which was to function until the formation of a freely elected Austrian Government recognized by

the Allies. At Potsdam, while taking decisions regarding the peace treaties with the ex-enemy States, the Allies had taken no such decision regarding Austria, since it had been considered that as soon as its own government had been set up Austria would automatically recover its freedom, without the need for a peace treaty.

37. The Austrian representative had recalled that the conditions for the withdrawal of the occupying forces, namely the holding of free elections and the establishment of a constitutional government, had been fulfilled soon after the conclusion of the 1945 Allied control agreement. The great Powers had divided the country into four zones. In the control agreement of 28 June 1946 they had promised to remove all restrictions on the movement of persons and goods from one zone to another. They had also authorized the Austrian Government to maintain law and order. In actual fact, however, the Austrian Government was not able to dispatch police reinforcements from one district of the capital to another without the consent of the local occupying Power.

38. The situation of Austria would be abundantly clear to anyone reading the 45 articles of the proposed treaty with Austria. Those provisions, which had remained secret for over seven years, would certainly astonish the Austrian people. For example, under article 35, an occupying Power could be maintained in Austria, and could control the greater part of the national resources, and national legislation would be powerless to intervene in case of conflict. That explained the origin of the abbreviated treaty with Austria and the insistence of one of the four great Powers that the Austrian question should not be brought before the General Assembly.

39. As Mr. Grüber had pointed out, it was obvious that Austria should have something to say about a problem of intimate concern to itself. The Moscow Declaration of 1943 had not in itself re-created Austria, and no treaty would do so if the Austrian people refused to recognize it. In that connexion, it was difficult not to recall that, shortly before his death, Chancellor Renner had said of the treaty then being drawn up by the four Powers that it was an agreement among four Powers which would be imposed on Austria and which would be called "the treaty with Austria".

40. The Austrian people wanted to be free and to regain its sovereignty. The United Nations must support and promote those aspirations. If the General Assembly resolutely faced the problem and confirmed, by means of a resolution, the fact that international public opinion repudiated the negotiations of the four great Powers which had resulted in converting Austria into a vassal State, it would have strengthened the principles laid down in the Charter and earned the confidence of the peoples.

41. Mr. DEVINAT (France) affirmed the sympathy of his Government for the Austrian people, which had so much affinity with the French people. France had known the misery of an occupation and was ready to manifest its solidarity with Austria and help that country regain its liberty.

42. On 13 November 1943, France had associated itself with the Moscow Declaration recognizing Austria's right to independence. At the end of the war, his country had rejoiced over Austria's liberation, and he now

congratulated the Austrian people on its rapid economic recovery and the re-establishment of its democratic institutions. His country welcomed the four-Power proposal, which was based on humanitarian considerations and animated by the spirit of the United Nations Charter.

43. France was well aware of the disappointments suffered by Austria as a consequence of the maintenance of a provisional occupation régime for eight years. As the Austrian representative had pointed out, his country's independence could not be achieved without the withdrawal of the occupation troops. France had done its utmost to lighten the burden of the occupation, and it was ready to do everything in its power to develop Austria's resources.

44. The Austrian people, whose culture was one of the most refined in the world, suffered profoundly from the injustice perpetrated against it. Its good faith could not be doubted, nor could any aggressive intentions be attributed to it; it had reacted to trying experiences with magnificent dignity.

45. Mr. Grüber had drawn attention to the dangers of a possible weakening of national sentiment in Austria. The French representative did not think there was anything of that nature to be feared, for Austrian patriotism was beyond question. Nevertheless, the prolongation of a provisional régime and the maintenance of occupation troops in the country might well cause bitterness and lead the people to take desperate measures. It was because such fears were well founded that the United Nations had invited an Austrian representative to be present.

46. The United Kingdom representative had drawn a clear picture of the negotiations among the great Powers and had called attention to the responsibilities incurred by them. He had described the unremitting efforts of the United States, the United Kingdom and France to arrive at a solution. The French delegation had nothing to add to that statement, which it heartily endorsed.

47. The Soviet Union was not being asked the reasons for its refusals. Because of the sacrifices it had made, the heroism it had shown and the horrors it had experienced during the nazi invasion, the Soviet Union could scarcely remain indifferent to the fate of the Austrian people, which had known the same horrors. The decision depended upon the Soviet Union; it alone bore the responsibility today. It was not being asked to give up its rights, but only to honour its promises. The French delegation could not believe that the Soviet Union would fail to respond to the appeal unanimously addressed to it.

48. Mr. EL-PHARAONY (Egypt) expressed his delegation's appreciation of the initiative taken by four States as a result of their concern regarding the deadlock reached in the negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty with Austria. In the Moscow Declaration the great Powers had recognized that Austria should be re-established as a free and independent State. Negotiations had been under way for more than seven years, yet the pledges had not been fulfilled. His delegation expressed its sympathy to the Austrian people, which had shown great patience and dignity throughout those seven years of occupation. There was no

justification for prolonging the situation, because Austria, which had been the first victim of nazi aggression, had made successful efforts since the end of the war to re-establish its democratic institutions.

49. The four-Power proposal did not touch upon the substance of the question, nor did it establish responsibility or propose any concrete solution. In that respect it was commendable, for the solution of the problem was the responsibility of the great Powers. The proposal expressed the concern of world public opinion as regards Austria, and appealed to the four great Powers to renew their efforts to terminate the occupation and re-establish Austria's sovereign powers. The proposal was in line with the spirit of resolution 190 (III), adopted unanimously in 1948.

50. The Egyptian delegation would vote in favour of the four-Power draft resolution, in the hope that it would help to alleviate the existing international tension and establish conditions favourable to a lasting peace.

51. Mr. ENTEZAM (Iran) whole-heartedly endorsed the statement of the Indian representative. He would have had some doubts concerning the General Assembly's competence if he had been asked to take a stand in favour of certain Powers and against others. It was clear, however, that the joint draft resolution made no attempt to establish responsibility and was based wholly on humanitarian considerations. The Assembly could not, therefore, remain aloof from it.

52. Iran supported all peoples, whoever they might be, who fought to attain freedom and independence. Iran was not indifferent to the plight of the Austrian people, which had lost its independence and was still encountering difficulties in freeing its country from an occupation régime. Iran, too, had suffered from the presence of foreign troops within its borders, even though they had been Allied troops. Now, six years after the end of that occupation, Iran still felt its consequences. Austria, which even in peace time had known economic difficulties, was now forced to bear the heavy costs of occupation. Worse still, that occupation laid upon its people the intolerable burden of humiliation. The delegation of Iran would therefore support the joint draft resolution in the hope that it would help Austria to free itself of foreign occupation.

53. Mr. GOROSTIZA (Mexico) said that the letter addressed by his Government to the Secretary-General on 19 August 1952 (A/2160) had indicated Mexico's desire to have the Austrian question included in the agenda of the General Assembly. The four-Power draft resolution expressed the concern of all the medium-size and small countries of the world regarding the fate of Austria.

54. When Austria had been annexed to Germany in 1938, Mexico had been the only State to protest formally against that act in the League of Nations, characterizing it as a serious attack upon the Covenant of the League and demanding that sanctions should be applied. Mexico had rejoiced when, during the war, the Moscow Declaration had declared the annexation null and void. In 1948, the Mexican representative to the General Assembly had linked the conclusion of a peace treaty with Austria to the cause of international peace. In 1949, the Mexican delegation had

expressed satisfaction at the resumption of negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty with Austria. Consequently, Mexico certainly had moral authority to demand an early solution of the Austrian question. Its action in the matter, however, was based primarily on the declaration of the great Powers and on the resolutions of the General Assembly.

55. In 1948, the General Assembly had unanimously adopted resolution 190 (III), submitted by the Mexican delegation, recommending that the great Powers should redouble their efforts to reach agreement and establish a lasting peace. The present joint draft resolution was conceived in the same spirit; it was an application to the specific case of Austria of general principles already adopted by the United Nations. Resolution 190 (III) did not impinge upon the competence of the four great Powers; and the joint draft resolution merely appealed to them to give effect to their declared intentions and to strive together to achieve the independence of Austria. The joint draft

resolution made no effort to apportion blame or to establish individual responsibility. It looked to the future and expressed a hope that the Allied Powers would reach agreement. It ought to be possible to make of it a starting point for a new review of the Austrian problem.

56. The great Powers had not regarded Austria as a former enemy, and they had committed themselves to re-establish its independence. Yet, for eight years Austria had suffered military occupation. Clearly, such an abnormal situation must come to an end. Its injustice was even more patent since in 1938 the Austrian Government had asked the League of Nations for help in repelling the nazi aggression, and that help had been refused. In the circumstances the four-Power draft resolution could be regarded as an appeal on behalf of Austria, in the name of all the peoples of the world.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.