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ASSEMBLY

## SEVENTH SESSION

## Official Records



## FIRST COMMITTEE, 550th

## MEETING

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Headquarters, New York

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Chairman: Mr. João Carlos MUNIZ (Brazil).

**The question of Morocco (A/2175 and Add.1 and 2, A/C.1/737, A/C.1/738, A/C.1/L.12 and A/C.1/L.13) (continued)**

[Item 65]\*

1. Mr. DE SOUZA GOMES (Brazil) said that the question of Morocco seemed to resemble the Tunisian question previously considered by the First Committee and that his delegation did not, therefore, intend to re-open the question of competence, which it considered settled. He would confine himself to a few comments on a possible course of action for the General Assembly.

2. Any resolution adopted by the United Nations should, above all, reaffirm the fundamental principles of the Charter and, in particular, paragraph 2 of Article 1. It was only in that spirit of compromise, which was the chief characteristic of the Charter, that the question of Morocco could be dealt with. For that reason he regretted France's absence.

3. Owing to the nationalist aspirations of the people of Morocco, a state of tension existed in that country which had prevented the conclusion of an agreement acceptable both to the French and to the Moroccans. The latter had proclaimed, through His Majesty the Sultan, that the best solution, which would guarantee both Moroccan sovereignty and French and foreign interests, would be to re-define French-Moroccan relations. The Sultan had added that he had not requested the immediate withdrawal of French troops and so had displayed a real desire to compromise. On the other hand, there was no reason to doubt France's desire to compromise, a desire which it had expressed repeatedly and which was in conformity with the principles of the Charter.

4. On the basis of those premises the delegation of Brazil, supported by various Member States, had prepared the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/L.13) which it was introducing in the First Committee. It strongly hoped that the Committee would approve the draft, which was based on respect for the legitimate rights and interests of all parties.

\* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

5. Mr. COATON (Union of South Africa) said the question of Morocco was in essence the same as the Tunisian question. Accordingly, his delegation held the same view with respect to the new item, namely, that the General Assembly had absolutely no competence to deal with the matter, and that any resolution, no matter how moderate, and even any discussion, should be considered as a regrettable interference which unlawfully affirmed the United Nations competence. The question, which arose out of the contractual relationship between two countries, had been viewed by some as coming within the purview of the international Organization on the basis of an unduly broad interpretation of the Charter. Moreover, even the discussion of those problems could hardly be favourable to the negotiations themselves and would, on the contrary, be likely to hurt them.

6. The Treaty of Fez still governed relations between France and Morocco. In asserting that such a treaty was invalid because of the circumstances in which it had been concluded the United Nations would be establishing a dangerous precedent which would open the door for States to refuse to carry out any international commitment they had undertaken. The fact was that the Sultan had agreed not to enter into any foreign relations without the agreement of the French Government; consequently, in attempting to discuss an issue involving Morocco, the United Nations was infringing without any legal justification the rights of France which had been established by treaty and which were recognized by international law.

7. Furthermore, the United Nations had no authority to revise international agreements. Some speakers had invoked Article 73 and, as a matter of fact, if the Charter were applicable at all, only Chapter XI would be relevant. Thus the United Nations had already recognized in the Charter the special international status of Morocco, which was that of a Non-Self-Governing Territory.

8. As for the accusations against France which had been refuted earlier by Mr. Schuman at the 392nd plenary meeting, he would not examine them again for the General Assembly had no competence in the

matter and, furthermore, they were familiar charges which had been made all too often.

9. For those reasons, and particularly because the General Assembly had absolutely no competence in the matter, he would vote against any resolution.

10. Mr. PALAMARCHUK (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that his country, which was sympathetic to the liberation movements of the non-self-governing peoples, had expressed its friendly sentiments towards the peoples of North Africa during the debate on the Tunisian question (544th meeting). Their desire for independence, as had been manifested, was patently in keeping with the fundamental provisions of the Charter which, in Article 73 in particular, established the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of the Non-Self-Governing Territories were paramount and that the application of that principle should result in the development of those people towards self-government through the progressive development of their free political institutions. It was apparent from the request for the inclusion of the question of Morocco in the agenda (A/2175) that France was not complying with those obligations and that French policy was a danger both to the integrity of the Moroccan people and to world peace.

11. The year 1952 marked the fortieth anniversary of the French occupation of Morocco and it would be difficult to understand how France could be proud of that fact inasmuch as under its protection Morocco had made no progress and had merely been a theatre for the excessive exploitation of a peace-loving people. That was proved by the systematic export of raw materials which were processed outside Moroccan territory so that the country's industrial development was methodically prevented. Such a scheme was in accordance with the interests of French and American capitalists. Under the Treaty of Meknès and the Act of Algeciras of 1906, which were virtual instruments of capitulation, Americans had obtained considerable privileges in Morocco. They acted as masters there and used the Moroccan economy in the preparation of a new world war. United States companies such as the Newmont Mining Corporation and the St. Joseph Lead Company were known to own lead and zinc deposits at Djébilat and it was also known that they had received \$3,600,000 to promote the exploitation of those deposits which were of considerable importance to United States industries. Having seized all the key posts the American monopolists were shamelessly despoiling Morocco of its resources and transforming them into war *matériel*. Agreements had been concluded between the United States and France to construct huge air and naval bases in the Territory for the exclusive benefit of the United States. Already \$600 million had been spent on the construction of those bases from which, according to United States Press reports, bombers carrying atomic weapons could take off and destroy the Baku oil industries. Such bases were not only a threat to the peace but also a direct threat to the freedom of the peoples of North Africa.

12. In exchange for the privileges France had granted to it the United States had agreed to help France to put down national liberation movements in Africa. Those facts had been reported in the United States Press. For example, in an article in the *Saturday Eve-*

*ning Post* of 28 July 1952 it had been said, among other things, that in exchange for the direct military concessions granted by France to the United States the French had asked for support of their political objectives in Morocco. If disturbances were to break out in Morocco, the United States would be bound to support its ally, France, for the sake of the security of those bases. The *New York Herald Tribune* had reported, in December 1951, that the inevitable outcome of United States plans in that area would be the co-ordination of United States and French interests in offering resistance to all moves for granting independence to Morocco.

13. The Moroccan people's standard of living was declining steadily owing to French colonial policy. Prices had risen more than twentyfold between 1938 and 1951. In addition, a whole series of measures of racial discrimination had been applied in economic matters. Whereas European settlers had an average of 300 hectares of land each, the Moroccan peasant had to be content with an altogether inadequate area. Besides, on each hectare the Moroccan farmer had to pay taxes 24 per cent higher than those levied on European settlers.

14. However, the best illustration of the French authorities' neglect of the Moroccan people was to be found in the budget, almost 80 per cent of which was spent on maintaining the administrative departments of the Protectorate. The French Resident-General and his chancellery alone received almost 20 per cent of the total budget, while the Departments of Labour and Social Affairs received only 0.28 per cent.

15. In political affairs the French authorities not only failed to promote the development of free political institutions; quite on the contrary, they hampered such development so as to bar the way towards independence. Just as had been the case forty years earlier, all *de facto* authority was concentrated in the hands of the Resident-General. Moroccan workers were denied their most elementary rights; for example, Arab workers were prohibited from joining general trade-union associations. The relevant draft legislation prepared by the French authorities stipulated that local workers could join trade unions only if agricultural workers were barred from membership and if half the executive posts in those unions were reserved for Frenchmen.

16. It should also be noted that the order of the French Military Command of 14 March 1945, supplemented by a decree of 26 April 1947, prohibited the organization of meetings of the local Arab population unless some very complicated formalities were satisfied, all for the sake of the French.

17. That order still remained in effect. As was known, the French authorities were taking punitive action against demonstrations whereby the Moroccan people asserted their claim to independence. The Press in France and throughout the world was full of reports of bloody reprisals which were a daily occurrence in Morocco.

18. That policy was directly linked to the aggressive policy of the North Atlantic bloc. The obvious war preparation going on under the auspices of that aggressive organization involved intensification of colonial subjugation and the suppression of the national libera-

tion movement in colonial or non-self-governing countries.

19. The Moroccan question was before the General Assembly for the second time. At the preceding session the French Government had claimed that United Nations consideration of the Moroccan question would hamper the negotiations then in progress and interfere with the implementation of reforms contemplated by the French Government. The year that had elapsed since then had witnessed the failure of those negotiations; nor had the alleged reforms materialized. That was further evidence of the fact that the French Government, supported by American imperialists, had no desire to settle the Moroccan question in the interests of the Moroccan people.

20. In the circumstances, it was the duty of the General Assembly to consider the Moroccan question and to adopt a resolution based on the requirements of the Charter and consistent with the interests of the oppressed Moroccan people.

21. Mr. VON BALLUSECK (Netherlands) said that the Moroccan question was similar to the Tunisian question which had been considered earlier. Nevertheless, the Moroccan question was even more complicated because the status of Morocco and the position of the Sultan were influenced not only by the General Act of Algiers but also by the special treaty relations with France and by the relationship to the Spanish zone of Morocco and the international zone of Tangier.

22. The competence of the First Committee in that connexion had again been contested and denied by France without whose co-operation no practical results could be expected from any discussion which, on the contrary, might even increase existing tensions. The competence of the First Committee had also been challenged by other Powers. All of that proved how delicate the problem was. Moreover, as in the case of Tunisia, the French Government had always acted with regard to Morocco in accordance with its obligations under Chapter XI of the Charter, whereby its responsibility was strictly limited to non-political questions. Morocco therefore could not, under the protectorate régime, be regarded at present as a State exercising its full powers of sovereignty, despite the opinion of the International Court of Justice of 27 August 1952 to the effect that Morocco retained its personality as a State in international law.

23. For those reasons, which had been explained in greater detail in its statement on the Tunisian question (545th meeting), the Netherlands delegation was unable to support the draft resolution of the thirteen Arab-Asian countries (A/C.1/L.12). While deploring the difficulties encountered by France and Morocco, for both of which it had the friendliest feelings, the Netherlands took the view that no intervention by the General Assembly in the case could serve a useful and constructive purpose. The fact that the totalitarian communist countries which systematically destroyed the freedom of countless peoples and nations had decided, for reasons of their own, to rally to the so-called defence of Tunisia and Morocco should lead Member States to exercise the most extreme caution.

24. Mr. KOMZALA (Czechoslovakia) condemned the colonial system by which, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, economically advanced Powers had enslaved autonomous and independent countries. The populations of those countries, deprived of their freedom by violent methods which had received formal recognition in treaties imposed under duress, had never accepted the colonial régime of poverty and oppression inflicted on them. Because history had shown that no form of violence could provide the basis for peaceful coexistence among peoples, the Member States of the United Nations had taken pains to include among the purposes and principles of the Charter the goal set forth in paragraph 2 of Article 1. Thus, in fighting valiantly against colonial régimes, subjugated peoples were fighting for the recognition of a principle, the right to self-determination, frequently ignored by many Powers that were prone to boast about their traditional democracy. Imperialist Powers which had abused their economic and military supremacy in order to reduce the peoples of those countries to slavery and to deprive them of their most elementary rights, were guilty of a serious crime. Accordingly, it was now the duty of the United Nations to lend its support to the national liberation movements of those people which were reduced to slavery. Indeed, the maintenance of peace required such action.

25. After the case of Tunisia, the First Committee had a second opportunity to deal with a specific and typical case of the enslavement of a people by a foreign Power.

26. Towards the end of the nineteenth century France had subjugated Tunisia. Early in the twentieth century, it had concentrated its selfish designs upon another rich and independent State, Morocco. France, not alone in its ambitions in that area, had succeeded in eliminating in turn the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain and Italy, which had competing interests. After the Algiers Conference of 16 January-7 April 1906, France and Spain had obtained virtual control of the Moroccan police and army. In 1907 a French expeditionary force had landed at Casablanca, allegedly because of the massacre of French workers. Moulai-Hafid had proclaimed himself Sultan while the sovereign, Abd-el-Aziz, had requested French protection and promised reforms. In 1908, France had given its support to Moulai Hafid who had been surrounded at Fez. Before the end of 1911, the French Army had occupied in turn Fez, Meknès and Rabat. Rid of the rivalry of England, to which it had given a free hand in Egypt, of Germany, to which it had ceded another part of Africa, and of Spain, whose interests were restricted to one zone of Morocco, France, supported by a Sultan who owed his power to France, had imposed the so-called treaty of protection of 1912 on Morocco. In fact the purpose of that treaty had been to establish the French *diktat*.

27. A system of representative government and the separation of powers were still unknown in Morocco because the regular powers of the Sultan, for all practical purposes, had been vested in the Resident-General of the Protectorate who, as the principal French administrative authority, could enact decrees having the force of law. Both the legislative and the executive power were vested in the Resident-General. The population participated in the conduct of public affairs only

through consultative organs of which the French members were elected by French citizens while the Moroccan members were appointed by the Government. Those were purely advisory bodies. The Sherifian administration, though in law distinct from the French administration, was in fact subject to its absolute control and management.

28. The Moroccan people, which had formerly lived in its own State and under its own administration, had never recognized the Protectorate. The history of Morocco since 1912 was one of continuous struggle by the Moroccan people against French occupation. The state of emergency, proclaimed by France on 2 August 1914, was still in force. Under French rule the Moroccan people had been deprived of all rights and freedoms. The French colonizers had called that system "restoration of peace and order in Morocco". It was characteristic of all aggressors and invaders that they used such words to describe recourse to brutal violence against persons whom they called terrorists and bandits yet who were in fact patriots and fighters for freedom. Those were the same hackneyed slogans of the Goebels propaganda.

29. Recent events were the best possible illustration of the policy of aggression, oppression, exploitation and terror which the French colonizers had followed ever since they had first occupied Morocco. Strikes and demonstrations were the only means left to the Moroccan people to express its desire for freedom from colonial oppression. The strikes were brutally broken up by the French occupation authorities which, according to *The New York Times*, had arrested 1,235 persons during the past few days. A comparison of that situation with the situation in Tunisia showed that Mr. Schuman had been right when he had said that though the evolution in Morocco had begun thirty years later than in Tunisia, and had been of a different nature, its final purpose was the same. Indeed the French administration had succeeded in destroying fundamental human rights in Morocco in an even shorter period of time than it had in Tunisia. In spite of empty phrases concerning Morocco's development on a democratic basis, the fact remained that the Moroccan people had no political rights. It was subject to economic discrimination. Living conditions were wretched because industrial development was directed exclusively towards war production.

30. For food, the Moroccan people depended primarily on agriculture. The land system was such, however, that 5,500 settlers owned one million hectares of extremely fertile land while the remaining seven million hectares of arable land was divided among 1,300,000 fellahs. The average size of a settler's property was 180 hectares, as against the seven hectares of a fellah's property. There were now 700,000 peasants who had been driven from their land with the approval of the protecting Power and reduced to a wretched existence. Those so-called farmers, who owned little more than tiny patches of land, were forced to hire themselves out to the settlers as tenant farmers for which, in principle, they were to be paid one-fifth of the harvest. Lastly, there were 500,000 agricultural labourers working for starvation wages of from 60 to 100 francs a day, which were further reduced by heavy fines and the extortionate prices charged by their employers for agricultural produce. Unable to subsist on that income,

the agricultural labourers were forced to ask their employers for advances which they could never repay, and thus became virtual bondsmen of their masters.

31. The living conditions of industrial workers were equally wretched. Wages ranged from 35 to 42 francs per hour. Yet one kilogramme of bread cost 54 francs, and one kilogramme of low-grade meat 300 francs. Moreover, those wages existed on paper only; they were considerably reduced by the system of paysheets and under all other kinds of pretexts. The workers had to pay the foremen who supervised them. Further, the protection of workers was so inadequate, and industrial accidents so frequent, that factories were sometimes called "factories of amputated hands". The workers lived in wooden and tin shacks without drainage or electricity, and frequently without water.

32. Those were the living conditions in a country which had immense resources and which was the second phosphate exporter in the world, while French capitalist companies accumulated gigantic profits.

33. The Moroccan trade unions, which fought for better living conditions, were mercilessly persecuted. The assassination of Farhat Hached and many others showed the French settlers' hostility to the trade-union movement which stood in the way of their imperialist aspirations.

34. The French Government, not content with depriving the Moroccan people of all its political and most fundamental human rights, sold the Moroccan people and the wealth of Morocco to its partners in the North Atlantic Treaty of aggression, even as it had sold its own people to them. Without consulting the people of Morocco, the French Government had ceded Moroccan territory to its American masters so that they could build enormous air bases on it.

35. Though deprived of all rights, subjected to police terror, and suffering from hunger, poverty and sickness, the Moroccan people continued its heroic struggle against the oppressors. The Czechoslovak delegation, together with a number of other delegations, had received a telegram the previous day from the Comité de liberation de l'Afrique du Nord stating that General Guillaume intended to depose the Sultan unless he disavowed the action taken by the United Nations on the Moroccan question. The telegram contained information showing that France's punitive action had resulted in hundreds of deaths and over 2,000 arrests.

36. It was the supreme duty of the United Nations to take effective measures to assist the Moroccan people to attain independence.

37. Mr. MENON (India) said that despite the urgency of the problems arising in Morocco, the matter had to be considered in the proper historical perspective. In ancient times, when India had come into association with North Africa through the Phœnician traders, the Moroccan people had already been distinguished for its spirit of independence and its resistance to Roman domination.

38. Prior to the Act of Algeciras and the Treaty of Fez, the Moroccan State had been independent and its sovereignty had remained inviolate in law and in fact. Accordingly, it was not surprising that the Moroccan people should now be struggling to regain its freedom and independence.

39. It could not be argued that the relationship between France and the North African States was that between a protecting Power and protected States. Although the North African States had benefited from the French conquest, it should not be forgotten that Europe since the eleventh century had owed much to Arab civilization and to the peoples of Africa. The period of Moroccan history under discussion went back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, starting with the Convention of Madrid and the Act of Algeciras, which were a manifestation of the interest of all the colonial Powers in Africa.

40. The United Kingdom representative had contended (548th meeting) that the General Assembly was not competent to deal with the Moroccan question on the ground that it was not a dispute between two sovereign States. That was an inadmissible argument, particularly in view of the United Kingdom's own experience with protectorates; the British protectorate in Egypt had come to an end in conditions very similar to those prevailing in Morocco, and besides, through transactions with France, the United Kingdom had been a party to the protectorate régime in Morocco.

41. Even if it were true, as the United Kingdom representative alleged, that Morocco was a non-self-governing entity, the situation in that country would justify the intervention of the United Nations. Morocco, however, was neither a colony nor a dependency. It was a sovereign State, some of whose sovereign functions remained in abeyance. As a matter of fact, not a single government in the world enjoyed absolute sovereignty, for national sovereignty was invariably limited by treaties, obligations and interests of all kinds. The truth was that Morocco was a sovereign State, some of whose functions France exercised not in its own name but in the name of Morocco.

42. The International Court of Justice, in its judgment dated 27 August 1952, had stated, *inter alia*, that France had recognized that the characteristic of the status of Morocco as it emerged from the Act of Algeciras was respect for the sovereignty and independence of the Sultan, the integrity of his domains, and Moroccan economic liberty without any inequality. That being so, it was hardly arguable that the situation in Morocco was a domestic problem of France. At most France could be regarded as a guardian exercising limited functions.

43. The Act of Algeciras had been a multilateral instrument. For that reason the International Court of Justice had pointed out in the judgment referred to, that the Treaty of Fez of 1912 had not in any way affected the principles laid down in the Act of Algeciras or modified the obligations assumed by the signatories of that Act, other than France and Morocco. Those obligations, even in so far as France was concerned, had remained the same, since the Act of Algeciras had not been denounced by the Treaty of Fez. The countries which had signed the Act of Algeciras were consequently in the same position as France *vis à vis* Morocco.

44. The principle of economic liberty without inequality was mentioned in the Act of Algeciras and implied that there should be no economic discrimination between the European Powers. Accordingly, France did not enjoy a privileged position in Morocco and could

not be said to be sovereign in that country; if that had been the case, its position would be different from that of the co-signatories to the Act of Algeciras. The judgment of the International Court of Justice had recognized that the United States had the right to establish consular courts in Moroccan territory. Accordingly, a third Power, other than France, exercised that right in Morocco, and exercised it by virtue of a Treaty concluded with the sovereign State of Morocco.

45. Moreover, the Act of Algeciras provided that France would use its good offices with the Moroccan Government on behalf of the co-signatories in order to prevent any economic inequality operating to their detriment. One could not at one and the same time use one's good offices with a country and claim sovereignty over it. It was not disputed by France itself that Morocco had retained its personality as a State in international law after the Treaty of Fez. It was thus evident that Morocco had continued to exist as a sovereign State despite the Treaty of Fez of 1912 and that France had made contractual arrangement to exercise certain powers of Moroccan sovereignty on behalf of Morocco. Besides, had Morocco not been a sovereign State, it could hardly have entered into a valid contract.

46. There had been advance criticism of any action that the Assembly would take, and reference had been made to so-called intervention. The Arab and Asian States' draft resolution (A/C.1/L.12) did not condemn France. It did not ask for sanctions against France and made no provision for arraignment before a court. It merely noted that Moroccan sovereignty had been violated and therefore asked the parties concerned to enter into negotiations to reach a peaceful settlement of the situation in accord with the sovereignty of Morocco, the aspirations of the Moroccan people, and the principles of the United Nations. The draft resolution was based on two premises: first, that France as a rule respected the covenants it had signed, the law of nations and the rights and desires of peoples to liberty and equality; secondly, that the Sultan and the people of Morocco had proclaimed their desire for the early attainment of their national aspirations by peaceful methods of negotiation. Accordingly, it could not be claimed that the United Nations was not competent to invite the parties concerned to undertake negotiations to reach a settlement consistent with the principles of the Charter.

47. The United Kingdom representative had asserted that the Trusteeship Council should deal with the matter. That was an inadmissible argument, first and foremost because Morocco had at no time been classed as a Trust Territory but had remained a sovereign State. Consequently, it was unfortunate that the draft resolution submitted by the eleven Latin-American States (A/C.1/L.13) referred to Morocco as though it were a non-self-governing State. Although in practice Morocco might be weak, it was strong in its legal and moral rights. It was not in the position of a Non-Self-Governing Territory demanding reforms and the right to self-determination; it was a sovereign State demanding that its guardian should not act in a manner harmful to its interests and contrary to its status.

48. The Treaty of Fez of 1912 specified that France could intervene in the conduct of the international

relations of Morocco, though subject to the latter's consent, which meant that France had to consult the Moroccan Assembly. Consequently, France could take decisions only in the name of the Sherifian Empire. In addition, the London Agreement of 1904 provided that the United Kingdom would not obstruct any action taken by France in Morocco, provided that such action did not prejudice British interests in Morocco. That meant that the United Kingdom then still recognized Morocco as a sovereign State.

49. Accordingly, Morocco was not in a state of absolute dependence. It was true that France exercised a protectorate in Morocco, but it was not a protectorate of the colonial type. Moreover, the situation had changed greatly during the past forty years. Early in the twentieth century annexations by States exercising protectorates had still been recognized as legitimate under international law, but the Charter and modern international law forbade such annexations. France had acted in that way in the past when it had converted its protectorate over Madagascar into outright annexation. There was therefore reason to fear that Morocco might one day be integrated by France into the French Union. Since Morocco was a sovereign State which respected its obligations, it was the duty of the United Nations to use its good offices in inviting both parties to negotiate. Some claimed that that would constitute intervention in the domestic affairs of a State. But the people concerned had a separate existence of their own; the Moroccans were not French citizens. As for the French residents in Morocco, they were in a privileged position. Hence it could surely not be said that the Moroccans had no international status or that their affairs were inseparably bound up with those of the French.

50. If the United Nations were to be indifferent to the Moroccan question, the people of Morocco, who had never accepted the domination imposed on them in 1912, would have no recourse other than to rebel.

51. France was using its troops against the Moroccan people. That constituted a threat to peace and security, and the United Nations was entitled to intervene.

52. It had been said that the Sultan of Morocco was in charge of the country's internal affairs. However, ever since the establishment of the Protectorate, the Sultan had been kept in such a state of subjugation that the Moroccan people had in fact had no say in their own affairs. The first Resident-General himself had written in 1920 that the Sultan had no real powers and that his rights were a mere formality. In the circumstances, it was quite understandable that the Moroccans were struggling for their emancipation.

53. He appealed to the representatives of the Latin-American countries to reconsider their attitude and to accept the joint draft resolution submitted by the thirteen States, which did not condemn France but simply called for observance of international law and of the Charter. The Latin-American joint draft resolution mentioned the right to self-determination, which implied that Morocco was a colony when in fact it was a sovereign State, as had been recognized by the International Court of Justice. If that joint draft resolution were adopted, the Moroccans would quite justifiably be disappointed. The responsibility of the United Nations was all the greater since there was no representa-

tive of Morocco present. Even in the interests of French civilization itself, which had made such a contribution to the world, it was important that the two parties should desist from violence and should try to reach a peaceful settlement. It might be recalled that some of the sponsors of the Latin-American draft resolution had themselves at one time been protectorates. It was useless to weep crocodile tears over oppression. It must be recognized that oppression and exploitation were results of imperialism. The Moroccans did not object to the legitimate material benefits derived by the French; they simply asked that fraternity should take the place of domination. He urged the Committee to give the most careful consideration to the joint draft resolution submitted by the Arab and Asian States. Members would see that it contained nothing contrary to law or to the Assembly's practice, and they would then be unable to withhold their support.

54. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) associated himself with the delegations which had expressed their regret at the absence of France from the Committee's discussions on the Moroccan question.

55. Iraq was related to Morocco by a long tradition of civilization, language and religion, and could not remain indifferent to the fate of the Moroccan people. The peoples of North Africa were fighting for their freedom. It was not through armed force that France would be able to deny or wipe out that movement. France claimed that its difficulties in Morocco were due to the encouragement given to the Sultan and his people by the United Nations. It was obvious, however, that the Moroccans had no need of encouragement, for when people fought for their freedom they were inspired by an unshakable faith. It should be added that, apart from the moral support of millions of freedom-loving men, the Moroccans had received no material aid whatever.

56. The recurrent uprising, the arrests, the imprisonments and the suspension of fundamental freedoms in Morocco were the result of France's refusal to recognize the Moroccan people's desire for independence. Those who were rebelling against fascism and dictatorship should take a look at what was happening in Morocco.

57. The Moroccan people's struggle for independence was not a new movement; it had started with the domination in 1912. The Riff uprising in 1925 led by Abd-el-Krim apparently had not taught the French that the Moroccans would not submit to slavery. Censorship of the Press and of correspondence had been established over North Africa in order to prevent the world from knowing what was going on. The fact that the French administration had built roads and schools was no justification for its tyrannical domination.

58. Morocco had enjoyed complete freedom from the time of the Arab conquest in the seventh century until the establishment of the Protectorate in 1912. Traditions of freedom, sovereignty and independence were a deeply-rooted part of its culture. During that period of more than a thousand years Morocco had established remarkable institutions, had had a stable government, and had helped towards the progress of human civilization through its scientific contributions to the Arab civilization in Spain and through its contact with the whole Arab civilization of the Middle Ages.



59. Considering that Morocco had enjoyed independence for more than a thousand years and had been eminent during that period of brilliant civilization, it was inadmissible to claim, as did the French representative, that France had gone into Morocco to fill a political vacuum and to bestow upon the country the benefits of civilization. The Moroccans were not a primitive people. As had been said by Marshal Lyautey, the first French Resident-General in Morocco, France had found upon its entry into Morocco an independent empire eager to resist any form of bondage and having all the appearances of a constituted State, with an organized body of officials, diplomatic representation abroad and social-welfare bodies. Besides its leaders, who had been accustomed to negotiating on an equal footing with European statesmen, there had been an important religious hierarchy, distinguished economists, experienced businessmen, and an industrious people open to progress.

60. The tragedy of Morocco had begun in 1830, when France had annexed Algeria, and had resulted from the industrial revolution in Europe and the quest for markets and raw materials. Algeria had been an obvious prey for the interests of the French industrialists, for it was near to France geographically, economically prosperous, and politically weak and divided. The conquest of Algeria had been completed in 1848, after continuous warfare. From that moment the French had incessantly intrigued against the Sultan of Morocco, and had encouraged with arms and money the dissident elements which were undermining the authority of his Government. During the nineteenth century the French, abusing the right of protection enjoyed by foreign missions in Morocco, had bestowed that protection not only upon their own nationals but also upon a large number of Moroccans, who had thus ceased to be subject to the authority and jurisdiction of the Sultan. In addition to that internal crisis stirred up by France, Morocco had had to fight against France in 1845 and against Spain in 1865. With the object of creating economic chaos in the country, France had forced Morocco to pay huge indemnities. The fact that Morocco had been able for a time to escape the fate of Algeria had been due to the commercial rivalry between the great European Powers. That situation had led to the Convention of Madrid in 1880, which had put an end to the practice of granting foreign protection to Moroccan citizens and had guaranteed equal trading rights to all countries. France had, of course, raised strong objections to the conclusion of the Convention. In 1881 it had occupied Tunisia and had then concentrated its efforts on Morocco.

61. From then onwards France had continued its endeavours to foment internal disturbances against the Sultan. It had forced the Sultan to accept loans at exorbitant rates of interest, so that he needed French financial assistance. Side by side with that policy, termed financial diplomacy, France had acted mainly at the international level. It had managed to gain the acquiescence in its domination of Morocco, of Italy, the United Kingdom, Spain and Germany, one by one. That success of French diplomacy was a flagrant example of the cynical power politics that had then prevailed. In 1901 France had signed a secret treaty with Italy, by virtue of which Italy had renounced all claims on Morocco in exchange for a free hand in Libya. In

1904 a secret treaty concluded between France and Great Britain, immediately after the ratification of their *Entente cordiale*, had recognized British supremacy in Egypt and had given France a free hand in Morocco. That same year Spain had adhered to the Franco-British agreement and had been promised a free hand on the African side of the Straits of Gibraltar. In 1905, the Kaiser had sent warships to Tangier and had declared himself prepared to defend Moroccan independence. The diplomatic crisis that had followed that declaration had resulted in the Conference and the Act of Algeciras in 1906. The Conference had recognized the independence of the Sultan and the integrity of his domain, and had established the principle of the open door in the economic relations of the various Powers with Morocco.

62. The Moroccans had felt reassured. Not one of the governments that had signed the Act, however, had had the slightest intention of respecting it. They had been bound by secret treaties which violated both the letter and the spirit of the Act of Algeciras. France had been the first to violate its provisions, and the assassination of four French citizens in Morocco had provided it with the long-awaited opportunity to occupy part of the country. From 1907 to 1911 all the coastal towns had been occupied by French troops. Finally, in 1911, the Agadir incident had eliminated all remaining obstacles to French domination of Morocco. By a treaty signed in the same year Germany had finally given France a free hand in Morocco, receiving in return part of the French Congo. From then onwards the European Powers, having satisfied their ambitions in other parts of the world, had lost interest in Morocco. Such had been the power politics, imperialist deals and secret diplomacy that had enabled France finally to dominate Morocco and to force the Treaty of Fez upon the Sultan in 1912.

63. The actions of France before establishment of the Protectorate had been the prelude to the policy it had followed once it had assumed full control of Morocco. The aim of that policy had been to perpetuate the influence of France, subordinating the Moroccans to the interests of the French colonists. Under the terms of the Treaty, France had been given the right to maintain armed forces in Morocco and to exercise police functions. The Sultan had been unable to grant concessions without French authorization. In foreign affairs he had been unable to conclude treaties without the approval of France, or to receive foreign representatives. In a report submitted to his Government in 1920 Marshal Lyautey, who had been Resident-General for eight years, had stated that Morocco was an autonomous State to which France had guaranteed protection, but that it was under the authority of the Sultan. He had noted that one of his duties was to ensure the integrity of that form of government and the observance of the Moroccan statute. That interpretation of the Moroccan Protectorate, as given by Marshal Lyautey, had unfortunately not lasted long.

64. Contrary to what had been said, the French record in Morocco during the forty years of the Protectorate had been one of repression, exploitation, despotism and bloody unrest. One of the first aims of the Protectorate had supposedly been to reorganize the administration of the country, adapting it to the requirements of modern times. It had been agreed that the

French would propose reforms, which would be carried out by the Sultan under French supervision. There had thus been no question of replacing the Sultan's Government by a direct French administration. The French, however, had behaved as though it had been understood that Morocco was a French colony. As early as 1914 Marshal Lyautey had stated that the idea of a protectorate was more often than not regarded as a convenient formula, a label designed to hide the succession of modifications of the original statute, and had added that it was difficult, in Morocco or anywhere else, to resist the drive towards direct government, towards *de facto* annexation as a prelude to *de jure* annexation. Marshal Lyautey had tried in vain to combat those tendencies, for he had thought that the true interests of France would be better served by a policy of co-operation with the Moroccans. He had been anxious to improve their governmental institutions, and had declared in 1920 that French political institutions had no place in Morocco. He had considered that the French could set up in Morocco organizations in which they could enjoy professional representation, but that they should not set up organizations which would give them political representation. Lyautey had, however, fought a losing battle. In the end the theory of direct administration had triumphed. The French had kept some of the outward forms of the existing administrative machinery but had taken away from it all actual power. The Sultan and his Government had become powerless to do anything except to affix their signatures to laws dictated by the French administration. The affairs of the country were managed by the Resident-General assisted by French officials. In practice the Resident-General had become the direct and almost dictatorial administrator of the country, notwithstanding the provisions to the contrary contained in article 5 of the Treaty of Fez. He had been empowered to issue "orders" which did not even require the Sultan's approval. Such orders had even been used in the appointment of minor Moroccan officials.

65. The result of that concentration of power in French hands was that Morocco, after forty years of foreign rule, had not yet developed an indigenous administration on modern lines. Democratic institutions had been suppressed. There was no real legislative body, and Moroccans were denied the right of election and self-expression.

66. In 1951 the French authorities had proposed the establishment of municipal bodies in which the French colonists, who composed 5 per cent of the population, were to have equal representation with the Moroccans. The only representative body was the Government Council, which met twice a year and consisted of a Moroccan section and a French section which met separately. The Moroccan section was composed of businessmen and was headed by the Resident-General. It could give advisory opinions only.

67. Having examined the record of France in Morocco with regard to the preparation of the people for self-government, Mr. Al-Jamali turned to its record with regard to human rights. The French enjoyed many privileges while the Moroccans suffered in the shackles of foreign rule, with its attendant manifestations of oppression and exploitation. No association could be formed without the sanction of the French authorities.

So-called technical advisers were always present in the few associations which existed, to make sure that political questions were left alone. An "old-school-tie" association had been dissolved in 1934 and a sporting club had met the same fate. Even the Boy Scout movement was thought too dangerous, and had been banned in 1942. Such parties as the Istiklal operated underground while the traditional French political parties enjoyed full freedom in Morocco. Under the law of March 1945 no public meeting could be held without special authorization, which had to be obtained in accordance with complicated regulations. The French language alone was permitted at meetings, and entrance to the meeting hall might be refused to Moroccan citizens.

68. Inside their country Moroccans were denied freedom of movement from one arbitrary zone into another; so far as travel outside Morocco was concerned, the French had erected a barrier round Morocco which completely shut it off from the outside world.

69. The right to own property was in great jeopardy as a result of a law of 1927 which allowed expropriation, ostensibly for reasons of public utility but in fact for the creation of areas of colonization. Such confiscations were compensated, but only nominally.

70. There were only scattered incoherent laws administered by persons possessing few if any qualifications. Natives could be imprisoned without any of the usual safeguards.

71. Forced labour was widely practised in Morocco. The victims were the Moroccan workers, who were denied the benefits of French legislation. Trade-union rights were denied by the law of 1946. Any person recruiting Moroccans for trade unions was liable to penalty. There were no municipal elections, and not even the nucleus of a legislative assembly which might attempt to protect the native labourer and his family.

72. Freedom of speech was rigorously curtailed for Moroccans, and freedom of the Press was denied them unless they obtained the consent of the French authorities, who constantly resorted to suppression and censorship. At the present time all nationalist newspapers were suppressed.

73. Such was the French record in Morocco in regard to human rights.

74. The French claimed that their greatest success had been in the economic field. In point of fact France had demanded a privileged position to which it was not entitled under the Act of Algieras of 1906, which laid down the principle of the "open door". The United States Government had protested against that situation, and France had been forced to bring the matter before the International Court of Justice at The Hague. The Court had ruled that the Act of Algieras was still binding on France and the other signatories. Nevertheless, the markets of the world were shut to Moroccan goods until all French requirements were satisfied. Moroccan products were taken to France to be re-exported, with the result that the foreign currency obtained accrued to France alone.

75. To the tourist Morocco, with its graceful white-washed buildings and broad avenues, might present a truly striking picture. Unfortunately the Moroccans themselves were little better off than in 1912. All major



enterprises and most of the choice property was owned by the French. The French had set up an enormous administration which served a triple purpose. First, it helped to perpetuate French domination; secondly, it provided a great number of French citizens with remunerative posts; and lastly, it helped to ensure that French residents enjoyed increasing advantages.

76. There were recurring famines which the French, who had monopolized all natural resources, did nothing to prevent. South of Marrakesh, for example, an American combine had proposed to carry out irrigation works which would open up 360,000 hectares of new land. The French had pretended to be in favour of the scheme but had done nothing.

77. The condition of education had certainly been better in 1912 than it was today. Not Arabic but French was replacing Berber as the language of instruction.

78. The facts regarding wages, currency, finance, industry, irrigation, education, health and other matters showed that 8 million Moroccans were being subjected to economic exploitation on the pretext that they were being advised in their development towards self-government.

79. Moroccans had served France and the democratic world in two world wars. In France a memorial had been erected at Château-Thierry, on the Marne, to the memory of the Moroccans who had fallen in defence of the democratic world. It might well be asked what had become of the promises made by President Roosevelt in 1943 when he had assured the Sultan that the political aspirations of Morocco would be satisfied after the war. In his speech from the Throne (A/C.1/738) the Sultan himself had described the frustration of his Government's attempts to obtain by peaceful negotiation the satisfaction of the political aspirations of his people. France had not listened to that advice and had continued its policy of repressing the nationalists, who had asked the Arab League to intervene on their behalf. Friendly Powers had intervened, but to no avail. The matter had been brought before the United Nations by the Arab League at the last session of the General As-

sembly, which had, however, decided to defer debate on it. At the present session the States members of the Arab League had been joined by other Asian and African States in bringing the matter before the Assembly. The fact was that in the modern world, nations no more developed than Morocco had achieved their independence, and there was no justification for withholding Moroccan independence.

80. It was argued that the people of Morocco were not united, but it was France which had encouraged dissension between the Arabs and the Berbers. The religious tolerance of the Moslems in Morocco had been shown when the Sultan had refused to enforce against his Jewish subjects the discriminatory laws promulgated by Vichy. For that action he had been personally thanked in a letter from the head of the French *Alliance Israélite*.

81. The people of Morocco were united in fighting for their independence. They did not wish to replace one foreign Power in Morocco by another; and strategic interests which could be preserved by mutual agreements should never be used as an excuse for dominating any people.

82. Progressive opinion in France certainly wished to see an independent Morocco friendly to France. A small minority of industrialists, financiers and politicians representing the colonists was standing in the way of Moroccan independence. The delegation of Iraq appealed to all members of the First Committee, and especially to the representatives of the Latin-American countries, who were related to the Moroccans by ties of blood, history and culture, to bring pressure to bear upon France to yield to the legitimate aspirations and demands of Morocco.

83. The Iraqi delegation also appealed to France to grant Morocco its independence, not for the sake of Morocco alone but also for the sake of France itself, for the sake of the East-West relationship, and for the sake of world peace.

The meeting rose at 1.55 p.m.