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**NEW YORK**

**CONTENTS**

	Page
Agenda item 58: The Cyprus question (continued) . . . . .	387

**Chairman: Mr. Djalal ABDUH (Iran).**

**AGENDA ITEM 58**

**The Cyprus question (A/3616 and Add.1, A/C.1/803,  
A/C.1/L.197, A/C.1/L.199-201) (continued)**

1. Mr. WANG (China) complimented the representatives of the three Powers principally concerned in the Cyprus question on the moderation and the constructive approach they had shown during the debate. Despite the divergent views of the parties, he was convinced that an acceptable solution could be found. After all, the States concerned in the dispute were bound together by ties of friendship and alliance, and there was every reason to hope that the problem would be solved as soon as the psychological and emotional factors had given way to a spirit of compromise and co-operation.

2. The Cypriots' demand had not fallen on deaf ears. The United Kingdom representative had told the Committee that his Government was prepared to enter into negotiations with the Cypriots for the determination of their political future. The United Kingdom Government was not without experience in the application of the principle of self-determination to dependent peoples. Since the end of the Second World War, a number of former colonies had become independent sovereign States and were now Members of the United Nations and partners in the Commonwealth. There was thus no reason to question the sincerity of the United Kingdom Government's pledge that it would satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the Cypriot people. What was needed was the "atmosphere of peace and freedom of expression" mentioned in General Assembly resolution 1013 (XI).

3. No solution of the Cyprus question could however, be real if it did not take into account the interests of the Cypriots of Turkish origin, who had been living on the island for centuries and were justly apprehensive for their future, once the political status of the island had been changed.

4. China had always been a staunch supporter of the principle of self-determination. At the current juncture, however, the important thing was to create the atmosphere needed for a peaceful settlement of the problem. The best the General Assembly could do was to exert moral pressure on the parties for a resumption of negotiations in the search for a peaceful democratic and just solution in accord with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. In any case, the dispute should not be allowed to get out of hand and to undermine the foundation of an alliance on which the

peace of so vital a part of the world depended. Those considerations would determine his delegation's vote.

5. Mr. SARPER (Turkey) said that the information his delegation had received justified the fear he had expressed at the preceding meeting that the Greek draft resolution (A/C.1/L.197), far from promoting a solution might lead to an increase in violence and bloodshed. That extremist draft had, in fact, encouraged the members of the EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), the Greek terrorist organization, to perpetrate acts of violence and to cause unprecedented disorders. Pressures, intimidation, threats and assassination had created an intolerable situation for the Turkish Cypriots. In spite of the Greek representative's affirmations, the murder of three Turkish villagers, to which Mr. Sarper had previously referred, was the work of the EOKA. In view of that situation, the Turkish Government had asked the United Kingdom Government to ensure the protection of Turkish Cypriots, who went in fear of their lives.

6. The riots organized by Greek terrorists were causing unrest and a general feeling of instability throughout the island. Dr. Fazil Kucuk, the leader of the Turkish community in Cyprus, had sent telegrams to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Prime Ministers of Turkey and the United Kingdom informing them of the dangers in which the Turkish community in Cyprus found itself and expressing his fear that the Greek terrorists were preparing a civil war. The telegrams also explained that the Turkish Cypriots, who were unarmed, had to defend themselves against well-armed terrorists, and urgently requested the persons addressed to do all in their power for the protection of the Turkish Cypriots.

7. The adoption of the Greek draft resolution would not only delay a solution of the Cyprus question by encouraging Greek extremists to persist in their activities in the hope of imposing their wishes, but would be interpreted as a justification of their acts by those who were preparing a civil war in Cyprus. For those reasons he earnestly appealed to the members of the Committee not to encourage extremist tendencies and to vote against the draft resolution.

8. Mr. AVEROFF-TOSSIZZA (Greece) said he wished to draw the Committee's attention to the fact that according to the latest Press reports, the property destroyed by fire had belonged to Greek Cypriots not to Turkish Cypriots.

9. With regard to the Greek leaders' attitude, he pointed out that Sir Hugh Foot the Governor, had visited Mr. Gervis, the Mayor of Nicosia, who was, of course, a leader of the Greek community in Cyprus, to thank him for the way in which he had dealt with the situation and for his appeal to maintain calm.

10. Mr. SARPER (Turkey) said that the destruction

of property to which the Greek representative had referred had been a reaction to the assassinations which he (Mr. Sarper) had mentioned. According to the Turkish delegation's information, the Governor had visited the Mayor of Nicosia in order to ask him to use his influence with the Greek population of Cyprus, particularly the EOKA terrorists, and to induce them to show greater moderation.

11. Mr. AVEROFF-TOSSIZZA (Greece) pointed out that the Governor had visited the Mayor of Nicosia after the latter had appealed for calm. With regard to the three murdered Turks, the authorities had arrested two other Turks and were questioning them to ascertain whether or not they were involved in the affair.

12. Mr. NESBITT (Canada) said that in view of the moderation of the debate, his delegation hoped that the parties would be able to reach a satisfactory settlement in the near future. He was glad to note that the Greek representative had expressed his Government's willingness to accept certain parts of the statement made on behalf of the United Kingdom Government. In the circumstances, his delegation felt that the General Assembly should do nothing which might impede direct negotiations between the parties concerned. Whatever views might be held concerning the competence of the General Assembly to discuss the item, any resolution adopted should be one which would promote opportunities for agreement between the parties. His delegation had therefore joined with Chile, Denmark and Norway in submitting a number of amendments (A/C.1/L.199) which were, in its view, necessary to make the Greek draft resolution (A/C.1/L.197) conform to that criterion.

13. The first amendment reaffirmed resolution 1013 (XI), because, as all representatives had recognized, that resolution indicated the proper direction for progress in the dispute.

14. The second amendment expressed the Assembly's concern that more progress had not been made towards the solution of the problem. It was not true to say that there had been no progress. The Greek representative himself had called attention to certain recent developments, including the appointment of a civilian Governor and the relaxation of some of the emergency measures in Cyprus. Those were certainly hopeful developments, although the situation clearly remained disquieting. His delegation accordingly hoped that the Committee would unanimously adopt the second amendment.

15. The third and fourth amendments were intended to express in the operative part itself the Committee's earnest hope for a solution in accordance with the principles of the Charter. That wish had been expressed only in the preamble to the draft resolution; by referring to it rather in the operative part, the sponsors of the amendments wished to ensure that attention should not be directed exclusively to one principle of the Charter, the right of self-determination, as was the case in the Greek draft resolution. The debate had proved that despite general agreement on the value of that principle, there was no agreement on the manner in which it should be interpreted in the problem under consideration. As the representative of the Federation of Malaya had shown, the right of self-determination should in the case in point be related to the position of minorities as well as to that of the majority. In any case, self-determination was only one of the principles raised by the tragic problem. Canada was deeply

aware of the rights of minorities, but considered that the issue might be prejudiced, by over-emphasis on one right only. The right of self-determination was, of course, one of the important principles of the Charter and an important principle in the issue before the Committee. The Committee, however, was confronted with a problem as complex as the Charter itself. Only by viewing all the principles of the Charter in their organic context would it be able to find a truly equitable and democratic solution. His delegation considered that the General Assembly should confine itself to stressing the principles involved, without prejudging the many aspects of the problem. It hoped that the main parties concerned would give those principles a lasting and meaningful application.

16. Mr. AVEROFF-TOSSIZZA (Greece) said his delegation was ready to accept the amendments to the preamble of its draft resolution, but was firmly opposed to the amendment to the operative part, since it completely altered the sense of the original. In order to avoid a lengthy discussion, he would not raise the question whether, under rule 131 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, amendments which completely changed the meaning of a draft resolution were in order.

17. His delegation noted with regret that in the case of Cyprus, as in many others, members resorted to amendments as a devious means of preventing the adoption of draft resolutions by altering their meaning. His delegation was therefore compelled to make a tactical move and to press for a vote on the word "self-determination". To that end it submitted a sub-amendment (A/C.1/L.200) to the joint amendment (A/C.1/L.199) to the operative part. The text was really a sub-amendment, since it maintained the new ideas contained in the amendment, and should therefore be put to the vote first.

18. He was bound to comply faithfully with the instructions he had received to stress the idea of self-determination. He appealed to all members of the Committee not to eliminate that idea from the draft resolution. Unhappily, Greece was not one of a large family of nations banded together to defend their mutual interests. It was fighting alone in defence of the rights of a people subjected to a colonial régime. It had nothing to back it but its principles—and it was a basic principle that the Committee was asked to vote upon. The Committee must not disappoint the hopes placed in it by embarking on a dangerous course, any more than it should, by various stratagems, prevent the adoption of decisions it was its duty to take.

19. Mr. LOUTFI (Egypt) said he was convinced that the delegations of Canada, Chile, Denmark and Norway had submitted their amendments (A/C.1/L.199) in a desire for compromise, but he was unfortunately unable to share their views on the question. In his opinion, their amendments completely altered the Greek draft resolution (A/C.1/L.197) and were therefore contrary to the provisions of rule 131 of the rules of procedure.

20. Comparing the text proposed in the fourth amendment with the operative paragraph of the Greek draft resolution, he remarked that it could hardly be claimed that the new text was a real amendment, since it neither deleted from nor revised any part of the original text. It was a new proposal, entirely different from that submitted by the Greek delegation. On grounds of principle, he requested the sponsors of the amendments

to re-examine their proposals, in particular their fourth amendment, in the light of rule 131 of the rules of procedure.

21. Mr. ZEINEDDINE (Syria) regretted that amendments had been submitted to the Greek draft resolution. They were designed to make the text vague because it was considered that in the circumstances it was better not to be too precise. Moreover, they were no more than a repetition of General Assembly resolution 1013 (XI), which had remained virtually without effect. If the United Nations proceeded along those lines, it would find it increasingly difficult to assist parties in settling their disputes in the spirit of the Charter. The fourth amendment (A/C.1/L.199) mentioned negotiations and discussions, but when all was said and done the General Assembly had, in resolution 1013 (XI), suggested the same thing and the negotiations which had taken place had only complicated the solution of the problem.

22. Two issues were involved in the Cyprus question: the liberation of a people living under colonial domination and the possibility of using the island as a military base. The question of liberation would not be solved unless the people of Cyprus and the United Kingdom Government found, through negotiation, a way of applying the principle of self-determination. To solve the international problem raised by the utilization of the island for military purposes, the island would have to be declared neutral and demilitarized. All the neighbouring countries, including Syria, would have to participate in the necessary negotiations. That second question however, had not yet been brought before the United Nations.

23. The joint amendments applied indiscriminately to both problems and would only delay their solution. His delegation was therefore compelled to vote against them. The Greek sub-amendment (A/C.1/L.200) restored the proper perspective. While efforts to find a compromise solution were laudable, it was none the less true that the time had come to act, in conformity with the United Nations Charter, and not to confuse the issue for reasons of expediency.

24. Mr. ST. LOT (Haiti) noted that the parties principally concerned recognized that the Cypriot people had a right to self-determination. He therefore supported the Greek draft resolution (A/C.1/L.197), the operative part of which affirmed that right. On the other hand he was unable to accept the four-Power amendments (A/C.1/L.199), which, by their failure to mention the right of self-determination, nullified the only positive achievement of the debate.

25. While recognizing that the Cypriots had a right to self-determination, his delegation would not insist on its being exercised since, as in the case of all rights there might be natural or legal obstacles to its exercise. Both the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.197) and the sub-amendment (A/C.1/L.200) submitted by Greece merely recognized the right, without prejudging the manner in which it should be applied, that being a matter for negotiation. The Committee could not refuse to affirm the right itself. If it always evaded the issue by quibbling or procedural manoeuvres, the peoples of the world would lose their confidence in the United Nations.

26. Mr. SARPEN (Turkey) felt that the amendment (A/C.1/L.199) to the operative part of the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.197) went further than resolution

1013 (XI). However, even if it did not, that was no reason for rejecting the amendments, since resolution 1013 (XI) contained all the elements necessary for a solution of the problem, including even those to be found in the Greek text. The limited success of that resolution was due solely to the intransigence of one of the parties.

27. The General Assembly should leave sufficient latitude for all concerned to achieve a solution on which they agreed. His delegation could not vote for a proposal the implementation of which would be impossible because it was unrealistic and not in conformity with the situation.

28. As the Greek representative had said, his amendment (A/C.1/L.200) to the joint amendments (A/C.1/L.199) was a tactical move. That was not true of the amendments themselves, as they would enable all the parties concerned to make contact with one another in order to achieve a settlement. The Greek representative had appealed to the emotions rather than to reason. It should not be forgotten that the First Committee was the political committee of the General Assembly and that to be politically-minded meant to be practical and realistic. The General Assembly could not afford to ignore the international implications of the Cyprus question.

29. Mr. ENGEN (Norway) said he had been surprised at the Greek representative's contention that the four-Power amendments (A/C.1/L.199) were a manoeuvre. His delegation could not accept that statement. The main function of the United Nations was to harmonize the views held by various delegations on the questions before it. He could not agree that the Committee must regard a text submitted by a party to a dispute as being the last word in the discussion and vote yes or no on the solution which that party felt the United Nations should adopt. While the Greek draft resolution (A/C.1/L.197) was quite suitable from the point of view of the Greek Government, he did not think it was necessarily the best possible solution. The Norwegian delegation had co-sponsored the amendments because in its view they expressed more adequately the opinions of the members. If that was not the case the Committee would vote against the amendments.

30. The fourth amendment—the only one to which the Greek delegation objected—did not deny to anyone the right of self-determination, which was one of the basic points in the Charter. But in a matter of such complexity as the Cyprus question, other factors had also to be taken into account. All the rights set forth in the Charter should be applicable to the whole population of Cyprus—both the majority and the minority. That idea was very clearly expressed in the amendment.

31. The Greek amendment (A/C.1/L.200) placed the Committee in a rather strange procedural situation. If it was admitted as a sub-amendment the four Powers would be free to reintroduce their amendment as a new sub-amendment, and the Committee might find itself faced with an endless series of amendments and sub-amendments.

32. Mr. VELA (Guatemala) said that his delegation, like all those in the First Committee, recognized that the prestige and strength of the United Nations were founded on principles.

33. Although the first three of the amendments proposed by Canada, Chile, Denmark and Norway (A/C.1/

L.199) might be considered as amendments, the fourth could not. He read out rule 131 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, which defined amendments, and pointed out that the text proposed by the four Powers as a substitute for the operative paragraph of the draft resolution completely changed the Greek proposal. Moreover, it simply repeated the terms of General Assembly resolution 1013 (XI). The United Nations could not be expected to be satisfied with the modest results achieved by means of that resolution.

34. The Guatemalan delegation was convinced that the principle of self-determination should be applied in the case of the people of Cyprus, particularly since the parties concerned had either directly or indirectly recognized that Cyprus had the right to determine its own future. As the representative of Haiti had said, the negotiations might be directed towards determining the manner in which the principle would be applied. The principle itself, which had never been tested by a vote in the General Assembly, ought to be the subject of a formal decision.

35. The problem was a complex one, it was true, but where the fundamental issue was that of a people's fate, neither the First Committee nor the General Assembly could disregard the human values of justice and freedom, even though perfectly understandable interests and responsibilities were also involved. Those interests and responsibilities could be reconciled through negotiation once the people of Cyprus had expressed its wishes in regard to its political and social future.

36. The General Assembly must therefore take a clear-cut decision on the basic issue and not be content to adopt a proposal which would not lead to any progress.

37. From both the procedural and the substantive points of view—the adoption of amendments which were not in fact amendments would establish a precedent contrary to the rules of procedure—the Guatemalan delegation considered the four-Power amendments (A/C.1/L.199) unacceptable and requested all the delegations to vote, as it would itself, for the draft resolution of Greece (A/C.1/L.197).

38. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) wished first of all to assure the Greek representative that his country was not alone and without support in the United Nations; on the contrary, Greece was a member of a very large family, the Greco-Latin family; in other words, it was among those countries which prided themselves on having received the immortal message of ancient Greece. Referring particularly to the Latin American countries, he recalled that they had upheld the cause of Greece during its difficulties with Yugoslavia and had supported its efforts to secure the return of Greek prisoners and children.

39. The Cyprus question could not be oversimplified by singling out certain factors. The principal factors were: the interest of the inhabitants of Cyprus, whether of Greek or Turkish origin; the interest of the country exercising sovereignty over Cyprus, which had responsibilities towards that territory and also towards the rest of the world; the hope on the part of Greece that it would see Cyprus reunited to itself; the interest of Turkey; and the interest of world peace. There were also intangible factors, for example, the ambitions

which certain great Powers perhaps cherished in the Mediterranean.

40. Consequently, there could be no hope of solving the problem by isolating one principle of the Charter and applying it to Greece. It was first necessary to consider how that principle was to be applied. That was why the main defect in the original draft resolution (A/C.1/L.197) was the absence of any mention of negotiations.

41. His delegation had welcomed the four-Power amendments (A/C.1/L.199). They were drafted in conciliatory terms, that is, in the language the United Nations should use in exercising its harmonizing functions. If resolutions were to be effective and exert a moral influence, they should always be drafted with a view to adoption by the greatest possible majority, if not unanimously.

42. It was true that the text of the amendments did not contain the phrase "self-determination", but all the speakers taking part in the debate, including the representative of the United Kingdom, had used it in their speeches. It was not included in the text of the amendments because, as the representative of Norway had explained, that principle was not the only one in the Charter and where a mixed population was involved, it might give rise to different interpretations. It was, nevertheless, the principle implied by the expression "in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations" with which the text proposed in the fourth amendment concluded.

43. His delegation was in favour of the sub-amendment submitted by Spain (A/C.1/L.201), because the United Nations should not confine itself to expressing a hope.

44. The Peruvian delegation would accordingly vote for the amendments, which, in its view, reflected a serious attempt to find a compromise.

45. Mr. NOBLE (United Kingdom), explaining how his delegation would vote on the four-Power amendments (A/C.1/L.199) and the Greek sub-amendment (A/C.1/L.200), reminded the Committee of his statement that the Cyprus question was not a straightforward colonial problem; because of the campaign for enosis (union with Greece), it had become an international problem. The responsibility for that lay, not with the United Kingdom, but with those who had promoted the campaign; nevertheless, the United Kingdom had certain responsibilities because of the international problem thus created. The problem involved was complex, but not insoluble, given the will on all sides to work for a solution. The United Kingdom believed that there was a ground for compromise, but if the problem were wrongly handled, grievous consequences could follow both in Cyprus and elsewhere.

46. It was not for the Committee to endorse or even to point out the way to any particular solution. That must be worked out between the three Governments concerned and the two communities in Cyprus. What the Committee should do, since the problem had become so acute, was to point to the procedures that should be followed in the search for a solution. In doing that, the United Nations should bear in mind the full complexity of the problem. It should not single out one aspect of it. Least of all should it endorse the campaign for enosis, which, as everyone knew by then, was being waged there under the banner of self-determination to the detriment of that principle itself.

47. He reiterated that his delegation did not reject the principle of self-determination but believed, as did many other delegations, that the application of that principle, always difficult, was particularly so in the case of Cyprus.

48. The United Kingdom delegation would therefore vote against the Greek sub-amendment (A/C.1/L.200). If it were rejected, it would support the four-Power amendments (A/C.1/L.199). If they were adopted, it would support the draft resolution thus amended, as a whole.

49. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to the fact that the Committee should expedite its discussions in order to complete its work within the time limit. As there was still another item on the agenda that the Committee should study fully, the debate on the draft resolution and the amendments relating to the Cyprus question would be closed as soon as the nine speakers on his list had spoken. The Committee would proceed to the vote and then pass on to the next item on the agenda.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.