

# GENERAL ASSEMBLY

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**Chairman:** Mr. Miguel Rafael URQUIA (El Salvador).

## AGENDA ITEM 24

The Korean question: report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/3865, A/C.1/807, A/C.1/809, A/C.1/810 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.214, A/C.1/L.216) (continued)

1. Mr. LALL (India), speaking on a point of order, said he wished to submit an amendment (A/C.1/L.218) to the United States draft resolution (A/C.1/L.216). If the Committee seriously wanted to come to grips with the Korean problem, it would be common sense to invite the representatives of both régimes or Governments in Korea to take part in the debate, instead of merely reaffirming previous positions which had achieved nothing. The issue was not one involving recognition of either régime; the issue was the integrity of Korea and recognition of the fact that the Koreans were one people. If the Committee's approach was to be at the same time practical and moral, it should adopt the Indian amendment.

2. Mr. BUSNIAK (Czechoslovakia) pointed out that a peaceful solution of the Korean question presupposed the unification of the country and that the problem affected the interests of the whole Korean people. It was therefore imperative that representatives of both parts of the country should take part in the debate. Furthermore, their presence was essential in the interest of justice, observance of normal standards of international law and respect for the principles of the United Nations. The repeated denial to the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of access to United Nations deliberations was additional evidence of the United States' intention to frustrate progress towards a positive solution, to perpetuate the division of the country, to sustain tension in the area and to maintain Korea as an aggressive base on the continent of Asia. The presence of representatives of the Democratic People's Republic was all the more desirable as those representatives were in a position to submit details of their Government's most recent proposals for the peaceful unification of Korea. The Czechoslovak delegation would accordingly vote for the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.214) and against that of the United States (A/C.1/L.216).

3. Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom) said that he

would vote for the United States draft resolution. It provided for what had been the Committee's established practice when considering the agenda item on Korea, a practice which had been found helpful. So far as the United Nations was concerned, the Government of the Republic of Korea was the legitimate Government of the country. To invite representatives of North Korea would be tantamount to giving that régime a status which it did not have. The United Kingdom would therefore vote against the USSR draft resolution. It could not support the Indian amendment (A/C.1/L.218) because it would equate the North Korean authorities with the Government of the Republic of Korea.

4. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) noted that if indeed the task of the United Nations was to achieve the unification of Korea by peaceful and democratic means and to restore peace and security in the area, the Organization could not fail to recognize that the two States to be unified were independent States with different political and social systems and that they had not only to be consulted, but to be brought together with a view to facilitating agreement between them. The United States proposal to invite the representatives of one State only cast doubt on United States intentions.

5. The United States representative had, at the 972nd meeting, described the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a puppet régime because the Government concerned had resisted United States invasion and United States pressure. On the other hand, the South Korean régime, which had permitted its territory to be used as a United States military base and had earned an annual subsidy in return, was not considered to be a puppet régime and was being asked to send a representative to take part in the United Nations debate on Korea. No decision on the problem could be valid unless it was taken in the presence and with the consent of both parties. The United States' assertion that the presence of a representative of South Korea would be useful implied that the presence of a representative of the Democratic People's Republic would be embarrassing. Indeed, the evidence that the latter representative could give on United States attempts to convert South Korea into a military base for aggression against Asia would be embarrassing, and the United States was exerting every effort to prevent it from being heard. The United Nations should help to solve the Korean problem, not serve the interests of one State. For those reasons, both sides should be heard, and Bulgaria would support the USSR draft resolution and the Indian amendment to the United States draft resolution.

6. Mr. BUDO (Albania) said that United Nations efforts to achieve a positive solution of the Korean question should be guided by the basic principle that the question of Korea was primarily a matter for the Korean people. Accordingly, no fruitful work could be done

without the participation of representatives of both Korean States. The result of United Nations past practice, namely, an invitation extended exclusively to the representatives of South Korea, had been wholly negative and had perpetuated the existing deadlock. Moreover, the Democratic People's Republic had clearly stated (A/C.1/807) that it would consider invalid any decision taken in the absence of its representatives. Common sense, logic and justice demanded that both sides should be heard. The United States draft resolution was therefore unacceptable and Albania would support the USSR draft resolution.

7. Mr. BRATUS (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that consideration of the Korean question without the presence of representatives of both parts of Korea would violate the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations, deliberately jeopardize the national rights of the Korean people, and render impossible an objective decision. Moreover, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had stated that it would consider invalid any decision taken in the absence of its representatives. The United Nations should recognize the existence of two States with different political and economic systems in Korea, and it should attempt to ensure that representatives of the two States could freely exchange views. It was for the Korean people to decide which system it preferred. Only by a fair and dispassionate hearing of both sides could the United Nations obtain a clear idea of the wishes of the Korean people. In the circumstances, the Ukrainian SSR would vote for the USSR draft resolution and for the Indian amendment to the United States draft resolution.

8. Mr. BARUSHKO (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that his delegation continued to believe that an invitation to representatives of both sides was most likely to lead to a positive solution of the Korean question. To bar the Democratic People's Republic from attending the United Nations debate was to play into the hands of those who wanted to perpetuate the military occupation of South Korea. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was not merely an interested party; it had consistently taken the initiative in attempts to establish a united, democratic Korea. Its most recent proposals, made on 5 February 1958 (A/3865, para. 9), constituted a genuine basis for early unification. In view of the fact that past efforts to settle the Korean question without consulting the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic had failed, and that the absence of those representatives would render any United Nations decision invalid in the eyes of that Government, it was logical to support the USSR proposal and to vote against the United States proposal. The Byelorussian SSR would follow that course.

9. Mr. LEWANDOWSKI (Poland) said that the solution of the Korean question was primarily of concern to the two existing Governments in Korea. To hear only one side would be to prejudice the issue before the substantive debate began. The Committee would be deprived of an opportunity of gaining a fuller understanding of the respective policies of the two Governments, and it would make no progress towards a solution of the problem. A refusal to hear the representatives of a Government because that Government was not acceptable to certain States was tantamount to an admission that the United Nations lacked the political wisdom to deal with so complex a problem and was prepared to

let political passions prevail. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which had made great strides in reconstructing the country, needed a peaceful solution of the Korean problem in order to continue its efforts. Poland therefore urged adoption of the USSR draft resolution or of the Indian amendment.

10. Mr. PAZHAWAK (Afghanistan), observing that the Indian representative, in introducing his amendment, had given reasons why the United Nations should not follow past practice in the matter of inviting representatives of Korea to take part in the debate, asked the United Kingdom representative to explain how "the Committee's established practice" had proved helpful in the past and why it could be expected to be helpful in future.

11. Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom) replied that an explanation of his earlier remarks would lead him too far into the substance of the question at the procedural stage of the debate. He proposed to deal at greater length with the point raised by Afghanistan when the Committee came to discuss substance. For the time being, he preferred to rest on his balanced statement, which should be read as a whole.

12. Mr. SUBASINGHE (Ceylon) pointed out that the idea of unification of Korea presupposed the existence of two parts of Korea and two Governments. The United Nations could not impose unification; it could only help to bring it about. In the circumstances, it should hear representatives of both sides. Consequently, for those reasons, Ceylon would support the USSR draft resolution. If it was not voted on, Ceylon would vote in favour of the Indian amendment to the United States draft.

13. Mr. FORSYTH (Australia) said that his delegation was opposed to the proposal to invite representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to participate in the discussion of the Korean question because the North Korean régime had been established by external force and did not represent the Korean people, because it had rejected the principles laid down by the General Assembly with regard to the unification of Korea, because the Assembly had recognized the Government of the Republic of Korea as the legitimate Government of Korea, and because the Assembly could not simultaneously recognize two Korean States while it was working for the unification of Korea.

14. The Australian delegation would vote for the United States draft resolution (A/C.1/L.216) and would oppose the amendment to that draft proposed by India (A/C.1/L.218) and the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.214).

15. Mr. PETER (Hungary) said that, whatever the opinions of the Committee's members concerning the two Korean Governments might be, representatives of both Governments should be heard. Otherwise, the debate would be unbalanced and a one-sided resolution would result. The Hungarian delegation was prepared to vote for the Soviet draft resolution and the Indian amendment to the United States draft resolution.

16. Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania) said that, if the Committee once again followed the suggestion of the United States that representatives of only one of the two Korean Governments should be heard, the ensuing debate would be as sterile as it had been in past years. Since the twelfth session of the General Assembly, the

Democratic People's Republic of Korea had presented constructive new proposals which attested to its desire to bring about the unification of Korea by peaceful, democratic means. Furthermore, the People's Republic of China had withdrawn the last Chinese volunteers from the territory of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 28 October 1958, whereas United States troops remained on the territory of the Republic of Korea, which was continuing to pursue an aggressive policy towards the Democratic People's Republic.

17. If the Committee was seeking to promote the unification of Korea by peaceful, democratic means, it must listen to representatives of both sides, regardless of the members' views as to the character of those Governments. If the United Nations excluded representatives of the Democratic People's Republic from the debate and admitted those of the Republic of Korea, it would be sanctioning the aggressive schemes of the Republic of Korea and the colonialist policy of the United States. Such action would be contrary to the United Nations Charter and would perpetuate a threat to international peace and security. Adoption of the United States draft resolution would show that those States which supported that country's policy wanted to bring about the unification of Korea by force rather than by peaceful, democratic means. The assertion that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had aggressive intentions and was dominated by foreign Powers was wholly unfounded.

18. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) rejected the Australian representative's contention that the General Assembly could not recognize two Korean régimes while working for the unification of Korea; on the contrary, if the two parts of Korea were to be unified, it was necessary to listen to representatives of both. The past practice of admitting only the representatives of South Korea—a practice which the United States and the United Kingdom representatives sought to justify—had merely served to perpetuate the partition of Korea and could not provide a basis for the peaceful unification of that country.

19. The Soviet Union took an objective position in the matter. It supported participation in the debate by representatives of both Korean régimes, even though it did not regard the South Korean régimes as representative of the people. The United States and its supporters, on the other hand, showed that they were committed to an aggressive policy designed to extend the sway of the South Korean régime to all of Korea and were seeking to impose that policy on the Committee and the General Assembly.

20. The United Kingdom representative's refusal to reply to the Afghan representative's question as to precisely how the past practice with regard to debate on the Korean question had justified itself was most significant.

21. In addition to its own draft resolution, the Soviet delegation intended to support the Indian amendment to the United States draft resolution if it was put to the vote.

22. Mr. SON SANN (Cambodia) said that, if it hoped to set up an independent, unified, democratic Korean Government, the United Nations must consider all aspects of the question. The Cambodian delegation would therefore vote in favour of the Indian amendment

to the United States draft resolution and would abstain in the vote on the Soviet draft resolution.

23. Mr. JORDAAN (Union of South Africa) associated himself with the remarks of the Australian representative and said that he would cast his vote accordingly.

24. Mr. ORTIZ MARTIN (Costa Rica) said that his delegation would vote for the United States draft resolution, but was opposed to the Indian amendment to that draft because to permit participation in the debate by the representative of a country which the United Nations had condemned as an aggressor would mean encouraging defiance of the United Nations.

25. U THANT (Burma) said that it was the United Nations' duty to hear the views of both parties to the dispute, since the past policy of excluding representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had led to the adoption of mere paper decisions which remained without effect. The Burmese delegation would therefore support the Soviet draft resolution and the Indian amendment to the United States draft resolution.

26. The CHAIRMAN called for a vote on the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union (A/C.1/L.214).

A vote was taken by roll-call.

The Philippines, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, Ghana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq.

Against: Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru.

Abstaining: Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Austria, Cambodia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Norway.

The draft resolution was rejected by 42 votes to 17, with 18 abstentions.

27. The CHAIRMAN called for a vote on the Indian amendment (A/C.1/L.218) to the United States draft resolution.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

The Federation of Malaya, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Ghana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Morocco, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Ceylon, Czechoslovakia.

Against: Federation of Malaya, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia.

Abstaining: Finland, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, Norway, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, Venezuela, Afghanistan, Austria, Canada, Denmark.

The amendment was rejected by 42 votes to 21, with 14 abstentions.

28. The CHAIRMAN called for a vote on the United States draft resolution (A/C.1/L.216).

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Thailand, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sweden.

Against: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania.

Abstaining: United Arab Republic, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan.

The draft resolution was adopted by 51 votes to 10, with 16 abstentions.

At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Yang, representative of the Republic of Korea, took a place at the Committee table.

#### GENERAL DEBATE

29. Mr. HICKENLOOPER (United States of America), reviewing the history of the Korean question, said that after the Second World War, the United States, as the occupying Power in the southern zone of Korea, had made every effort to bring about the establishment of an independent and united Korea. Unfortunately, however, the Soviet Union had obstructed all efforts to reach agreement on the necessary arrangements. In bringing the problem before the United Nations in 1947, the United States representative had said that any settlement of the problem must in no way infringe the fundamental democratic right of freedom of opinion (82nd plenary meeting), and the right of the Korean people to express their will through genuinely free elections still remained the basic issue in the dispute. The free elections under United Nations observation called for by the General Assembly in resolution 112

(II), had been held in South Korea in 1948 and the General Assembly had, by resolution 195 (III), recognized the resulting Government as the only lawful Government in Korea. Only the refusal of the Soviet Union to permit the same procedure in North Korea and its decision to establish the North Korean puppet régime instead had prevented the achievement of Korean unification at that time. The Armistice Agreement (S/3079, appendix A) which had followed the North Korean attack on the Republic of Korea, to which the United Nations had responded with the first successful collective defence effort in history, had included a recommendation for a political conference to achieve unification. At the Korean Political Conference, held at Geneva in 1954, the United Nations side had maintained that genuinely free elections were an essential first step towards the unification of Korea and that those elections must be conducted under impartial and effective United Nations supervision. The communist participants, however, had refused to provide any guarantee that elections would be carried out in genuine freedom, proposing a supervisory body where equal representation of communist and non-communist nations and a provision requiring unanimity for all decisions would have enabled them to prevent any effective observation of the elections. The Geneva Conference had thus failed to achieve the unification of Korea. Nevertheless, the Armistice Agreement had continued as a basis for maintenance of the truce. The violations of that Agreement by the communists and the remedial action the United Nations Command had been compelled to take as a result, including the purely defensive measures announced in its statement of 21 June 1957 (A/3631), had been fully reported to the General Assembly.

30. Now the Chinese Communists had announced the withdrawal of their forces from North Korea and demanded the withdrawal of United Nations Command forces from the Republic of Korea. However, they continued to defy the purposes of the United Nations, to ridicule its resolutions and actions and to reject every constructive proposal designed to bring about Korean unification. The deplorable record of their past actions could not now be forgotten; nor should it be forgotten that the last withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea had been followed by ruthless communist aggression against the Republic of Korea. The forces of the Chinese aggressors in Korea could not be equated with the United Nations forces which had been sent there, in accordance with United Nations resolutions, to repel aggression, and the minimal size of the United Nations forces remaining in Korea showed how ridiculous the communist claims were that those forces were "occupying" South Korea. Those forces remained in Korea for one purpose only, namely the achievement of United Nations objectives, and the Governments participating in the United Nations Command had repeatedly stated that their forces would be withdrawn from Korea when the conditions for a lasting settlement laid down by the United Nations had been fulfilled. The Chinese Communists has recently made it abundantly clear that their position had not changed since the Geneva Conference; they refused to clarify their position on the question of free elections, as requested by the Governments participating in the United Nations Command, and brushed aside the question of the principles on which elections should be held. That refusal to accept conditions which would guarantee the free

expression of the will of the Korean people remained the only real obstacle to a permanent settlement in Korea.

31. If the communist authorities really desired a settlement, they need only give evidence of their sincerity on the question of free elections. So far they had failed to do so, undoubtedly because they feared the results of the free expression of opinion by the Korean people, just as they feared freedom of opinion anywhere in the world, and because they knew that, in the Republic of Korea, the Korean people had learned to exercise their fundamental democratic rights. The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea had repeatedly testified to the continuing growth and development of democratic institutions in the Republic of Korea. The Republic of Korea had also proved its right to full and equal status as a sovereign nation in many other important respects. It had repeatedly been found qualified for membership

in the United Nations, its admission being blocked only by the Soviet Union. The United States hoped that the Republic of Korea could soon assume its rightful place in the United Nations, and it would continue to work for its admission.

32. The General Assembly could now contribute to the peaceful unification of Korea by reaffirming the just principles it had advanced in the past as a basis for a settlement. That was the purpose of the draft resolution co-sponsored by the United States (A/C.1/L.217). The will of the overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations must once again be exerted upon those who had so far prevented a settlement through a free expression of opinion by the people of Korea. The communist forces could not forever reject the demands of the Korean people and of world opinion for a just settlement.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.