

Monday, 9 December 1957,  
at 3.45 p. m.



**NEW YORK**

**CONTENTS**

	Page
Agenda item 58:	
The Cyprus question (continued) . . . . .	353

**Chairman: Mr. Djatal ABDUH (Iran).**

**AGENDA ITEM 58**

**The Cyprus question (A/3616 and Add.1, A/C.1/803,  
A/C.1/L.197) (continued)**

1. Mr. SARPEN (Turkey) pointed out that the people and Government of Turkey had a direct interest and concern in any discussion dealing with the status of Cyprus. Since the island lay off the shores of Turkey, part of the population was Turkish, and Turkey had been a signatory of the Treaty of Lausanne,<sup>1/</sup> which laid down the current status of Cyprus. The Turkish Government sincerely regretted the division and bitterness engendered by recent developments, for Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom could have nothing to gain by a deterioration in their mutual relations. Moreover, Turkey and Greece, for reasons of geography, had a common destiny so that anything endangering the real interests of the one would also endanger the real interests of the other.

2. In the atmosphere created by propaganda and agitation, the real issues in Cyprus had often been disregarded, and basic points of agreement and disagreement had been obscured by slogans and mutual recriminations. Those issues had to be discussed calmly in order to prepare the way for a solution satisfactory to all parties concerned. Such a solution should take account of the fact that Cyprus was situated forty miles off the shores of Turkey and nearly 700 miles away from Greece; throughout history, Cyprus had been part of Asia Minor, which was the Turkish mainland; it had never been part of Greece. Turkey had transferred sovereignty over Cyprus to the United Kingdom in the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923; that Treaty concluded between Turkey, Greece, the United Kingdom and other Governments was still valid. There were two distinct communities in Cyprus, with completely different cultural, ethnic, religious, linguistic and national backgrounds and aspirations; although the ratio had varied in the past, the Greek-speaking community was at present larger than the Turkish community. That factor alone could not, in justice and equity, constitute a basis for a satisfactory solution: it would mean that one of the three interested Governments would be imposing its will on the others and that one community would be deciding the fate of the other. Such a unilateral solution, which was also completely lacking in realism, was inconceivable.

<sup>1/</sup> Treaty of Peace signed at Lausanne on 24 July 1923. League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XXVIII, 1924, p. 11.

3. The first constructive step in seeking an appropriate solution should be to eliminate from the debate irrelevant slogans and accusations. In the first place, the question could not merely be classified as one of colonialism versus anti-colonialism, and a discussion based on that premise alone was bound to be sterile. The fact that Cyprus was currently under a colonial status could not justify the demand for its annexation to Greece. Moreover, the insinuation that Turkey was supporting colonialism in opposing that demand was totally unfounded: Turkey had a long record of opposition to all forms of colonialism. On the other hand, it was a known fact that the Cypriot Orthodox Church and the extremist elements in Greece had been frustrating all solutions which they thought stood in the way of the ultimate annexation of Cyprus to Greece.

4. In the second place, it should be borne in mind that although the Greek claim to Cyprus had first officially taken the form of a demand for enosis, or the annexation of the island to Greece, there had been a tactical change and the claim was now being represented as based on the principle of self-determination. At the eleventh session of the General Assembly, his delegation had furnished all the evidence on the circumstances under which that tactical change had been adopted. Therefore, he would not repeat that evidence. For its part, Turkey considered that principle to be one of the main pillars of international relations; what it had opposed and would continue to oppose was the use of the principle to further annexationist ambitions and to bring about the incorporation under Greek rule of over 100,000 Turkish Cypriots against their will. Moreover, he wished to recall the statements of a great Greek statesman, Mr. Venizelos, at the Conference<sup>2/</sup> which had resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, regarding the application of the principle of self-determination. Under that Treaty, not only had Cyprus been transferred to United Kingdom sovereignty, but the Turkish province of Western Thrace, with a Turkish population outnumbering the Greeks in the ratio of four to one, had been annexed to Greece, notwithstanding the request made by Turkey for a plebiscite under international control and the application of the principle of self-determination. Mr. Venizelos, the head of the Greek delegation to the Lausanne Conference, had asserted that the principle could not be applied to territories the status of which had been determined by international treaties. When reminded that his statement did not reflect the case of Western Thrace, he had added that the right of self-determination did not constitute the only relevant factor in the solution of questions relating to the disposal of territories inhabited by mixed populations. The time had come for certain circles in Greece to ponder the relevance of those remarks to the Cyprus question.

<sup>2/</sup> See Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922-1923, Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1923), Cmd. 1814.

5. In order to reduce the discussion to the basic elements, he wished to point out the manner in which the Greek Government had made use of only certain parts of the United Nations Charter. As a matter of fact, in support of its position on the Cyprus question, the Greek Government had made its own interpretation of certain parts of the United Nations Charter and had carefully avoided reference to other passages. It had, for example, cited Article 73 as justifying the General Assembly in dealing with the question, but it had failed to point out the relevance of Article 73 b, which provided that States having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing Territories should take due account, in developing self-government, of "the particular circumstances of each Territory" and "its peoples". The clause was directly applicable to Cyprus, where there were a number of particular circumstances and two distinct peoples with entirely different cultural, linguistic, religious and national aspirations. The text of Article 73 b left no alternative to the Administering Power but to take due account of those facts. Indeed, the statement made by the United Kingdom Government on 19 December 1956, and repeated subsequently in the House of Commons, concerning the conditions in which the principle of self-determination was eventually to be applied in the special circumstances of Cyprus on a basis of equality for the Greek and Turkish communities, was in line with the spirit and letter of that Article. The records of the San Francisco Conference proved irrefutably that the words "each Territory", in the singular, and "peoples", in the plural, had been chosen deliberately, after prolonged discussions, and inserted in both Article 73 and Article 76. The reason for that distinction and the necessity for it in the interest of the principle of self-determination—was of course, that in some Non-Self-Governing Territories which had not assumed the characteristics of a nation or a State, there was not just one but more than one people. The Charter, as well as the accepted practice of international law, had an entirely different set of rules concerning sovereign countries and Non-Self-Governing Territories which constituted a national entity on the one hand, and concerning certain Non-Self-Governing Territories which lacked the characteristics of a nation or of a juridical State organization on the other.

6. In Cyprus, there were two completely different peoples living on parts of the same territory, and that territory lacked the characteristics of a nation or of a juridical State organization. Unfortunately, the relations between the Turkish and Greek communities in Cyprus had been strained to the point of hostility. Since the time when the Turkish Cypriots ceased to be a majority owing to emigration to Turkey and other factors, the Greek-speaking population had brought pressure on the Cypriot Turks in economic matters and municipal affairs and in their professional and private contacts. Since extremists from Greece had begun to practise organized terrorism in Cyprus in order to intimidate the Cypriots into support of *enosis*, coexistence between the two communities had become totally impossible. The terrorist organization EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) had been responsible for the loss of innocent lives among Turkish Cypriots, for threatening Greek Cypriots who persisted in maintaining contacts with the Turkish community, and for deepening the rift between the two communities. Greek and Turkish Cypriots had not only separate schools and religious institutions, but

also separate professional and social organizations, such as trade unions, farmer associations and bar associations. That regrettable situation was not the fault of the Turkish community. But the fact remained that the Turkish Cypriots refused to be placed under the rule of the Greek Government or of the Greek Cypriot community. The question of freedom and political progress for the two communities was not a point of discord, provided it was not interpreted to mean the subjugation of the Turkish population of Cyprus or its arbitrary annexation to Greece. In spite of those facts, all the actions, proposals, statements and policies of the Greek Government, as well as of the Cypriot Orthodox Church, were aimed at bringing about the immediate or eventual retracing of the frontiers between Turkey and Greece through the annexation of the entire territory of Cyprus against the will of the Turkish Cypriots and in contradiction to stipulations of treaties signed by Greece.

7. In providing that due account should be taken of the "particular circumstances of each Territory", the Charter had merely taken cognizance of the fact that internal political settlements and solutions of international disputes could be successful only in so far as they were adapted to the specific situation to which they were applied. Among many, he cited two such situations which did not reflect the cases of distinct national entities but merely concerned the incorporation of some territories into already existing States, namely, the case of the Aaland Islands where, despite the population's overwhelming vote in a plebiscite to join Sweden, the League of Nations had decided that the territory should form part of Finland for historical, geographical and strategic reasons, and that of Trieste, which had eventually been divided into two parts, one under Italian and the other under Yugoslav administration.

8. The "particular circumstances" of Cyprus must be given due consideration if an appropriate solution was to be reached. The population of the island was not a distinct national entity. There was no Cypriot nationhood. It was not the independence of a nation which was at issue, but rather the transfer of the sovereignty of a territory with a mixed population from one country to another. The slogan "independence" was to serve as a stepping-stone for the annexation of Cyprus by Greece. The direct interest of Turkey in Cyprus was valid because Cyprus was an island off the Turkish mainland commanding the vital routes of communications, defence and trade of Turkey; from that point of view, Cyprus was of no importance to Greece. Finally, the present status of Cyprus had been decided by mutual consent between Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom when they had signed the Treaty of Lausanne. At that time, Turkey had made a conciliatory sacrifice by ceding the overwhelmingly Turkish territory of Western Thrace to Greece, and there had been no question of including Cyprus in the domain of Greece. Thus, an equilibrium had been established in favour of Greece. The Treaty of Lausanne, which had brought about that equilibrium, was still a valid international instrument and it was one of the "particular circumstances" to which due account should be given. He asked whether the General Assembly could ignore all the elements that went together to establish an international agreement and said that one article of such an agreement could not be taken out of context and modified through

a resolution. The extremist Greek solution of the Cyprus question would be to incorporate both the Greek and Turkish communities into Greece on the grounds that the majority of the Greek Cypriots did not wish to remain under United Kingdom rule. However, the Turkish Cypriots did not wish to be placed under Greek rule and, if the supporters of enosis did not consider the British guarantees sufficient, neither did the Turkish Cypriots consider the Greek guarantees sufficient. The particular circumstances referred to in Article 73 b, which he had mentioned, were peculiar to the case of Cyprus, and the provisions of that Article had nothing to do with any situation which might exist in independent countries whose political status had already been formed. It was the inter-connexion between the vast number of problems related to Cyprus that had made the question a particularly delicate issue. Those problems were not similar to any other problems confronting the United Nations; they should be studied by the Assembly on their merits.

9. Before the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1013 (XI), concerning Cyprus, the three countries concerned had stated their respective positions. Immediately before that debate, the Turkish Government had accepted a statement made by the Secretary of State for the Colonies of the United Kingdom Government on the conditions in which it was prepared to consider the exercise of self-determination by the two communities on the island as a reasonable basis for negotiation. The Greek Government had refused to accept it. All through the period in question, violence and terrorism against those opposing the annexation of Cyprus by Greece had spread, encouraged by the official Greek radio and the Greek Press.

10. It was in those circumstances that the Assembly had adopted its resolution. Turkey believed that it included all the elements necessary to co-operation between the three Governments concerned with a view to a peaceful solution. Indeed, despite the obstacles which remained to be overcome, there had been promising developments since the eleventh session. Terrorism in Cyprus had decreased appreciably, although Colonel Grivas of the Greek Army was still heading the terrorist's activity on the island and had intensified it just before the current debate. Moreover, the United Kingdom had relaxed its security measures, first by releasing Archbishop Makarios from the Seychelles Islands even though he had not denounced terrorism, then by agreeing to an offer to mediate with a view to a resumption of negotiations between the three Governments directly concerned, and finally by making further efforts to resume those negotiations. Turkey had accepted all those offers, while Greece had refused them except on condition that its own aspirations for Cyprus should be recognized in advance.

11. Archbishop Makarios had given his own interpretation of the terms of the General Assembly resolution in his letter to the United Kingdom Government, in which he had stated his willingness to take part in bilateral talks with that Government, on behalf of the people of Cyprus, on the basis of the application of self-determination in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. There had never been such a misrepresentation of the text of a General Assembly resolution. Contrary to all practice of international law, the Archbishop had added words to the General

Assembly's recommendation. Whereas, before its adoption, the three Governments concerned had officially undertaken negotiations, and consultations between the United Kingdom and representatives of both communities in Cyprus were taking place, the Archbishop was interpreting it as a recommendation to discontinue tripartite talks and to open bilateral talks in which the United Kingdom would have to accept in advance the claim of the Greek Government and from which Turkey would be totally excluded. That misrepresentation had been based on the premise that Turkey and Greece were not interested parties in the question and that the only parties to negotiations should be the population of Cyprus and the United Kingdom, that is, the Greek majority represented by the head of the Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus. The premise was wholly unacceptable because, as had been fully explained, Turkey was directly concerned, and because one ethnic community could not be permitted to decide the future of all the inhabitants of Cyprus or to negotiate on behalf of the other community. Moreover, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece had admitted in 1956 that, in the consultations between Archbishop Makarios and the Governor of Cyprus, the Archbishop had had the "full support and co-operation" of the Greek Government.<sup>3/</sup> Thus, the entire negotiations had actually been carried on by the Greek Government, which had used the Archbishop as a spokesman for reasons of expediency. Such a manoeuvre was designed in effect as a formula by which the Greek Government alone could enter into negotiations while excluding Turkey. It was clearly attempting to reserve for itself the monopoly of negotiation and to represent that as the wish of the General Assembly.

12. No progress towards a solution of the Cyprus question could be made by misrepresenting General Assembly resolutions or carrying on propaganda. All the parties must share an equal desire and will to reach a solution which would safeguard their legitimate rights. The Greek Government had not manifested that desire convincingly; it had requested a reopening of the debate in the General Assembly barely four months after the adoption of resolution 1013 (XI), at a time when some progress had already been made. It had not submitted the explanatory memorandum which should, under the rules of procedure, accompany a request for inclusion of an item in the agenda, until two months after its request had been made. Its actions appeared to mean that it wanted the use of the rostrum of the United Nations for propaganda even before it had established the legal grounds justifying a reopening of the debate. Such tactics could not be in the true interest of the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus or of the Governments concerned. The extremists, by continuing tension and agitation, were defeating the prospects of a reasonable settlement. Endeavours to impose a unilateral solution through such methods could not succeed. The Turkish delegation hoped that the debate would contribute to further progress in regard to the Cyprus question by showing the real issues involved.

13. The Greek representative had at the previous meeting made some amazing charges, repeating the propaganda of extremists. He had thus made himself

<sup>3/</sup> See Official Records of the General Assembly, Eleventh Session, Annexes, agenda item 55, document A/3120 and Add.1, para. 4.

the spokesman of the very organizations responsible for the crimes committed in Cyprus. He regretted that such elements had been introduced into the debate. In his first statement in the debate (692nd plenary meeting), he had made efforts to avoid any detailed reference to certain aspects of the Cyprus question which had been outlined by his delegation to the Members of the United Nations and world opinion during the debates at the eleventh session of the General Assembly. Among those aspects which he did not choose to elaborate against were the instigation, organization and support from Greece of terrorist activities in Cyprus. But when the terrorist organizations which had perpetrated hideous crimes now attempted to launch a campaign against those whose duty it was to maintain order and justice, and when the representative of Greece to the General Assembly introduced that campaign into the debate, his delegation felt compelled to mention briefly a few undeniable facts established by neutral observers. In the first place, it could not be questioned that the field commander of the terrorists in Cyprus, Colonel Grivas, was a regular officer of the Greek Army specially seconded by the previous Greek Government. Secondly, the terrorists in Cyprus had persistently committed the most hideous crimes against the Turkish population of the island. Thirdly, Greek terrorism was also being used as a tool of intimidation against Greek Cypriots opposed to the annexation of the island by Greece; in fact, that group accounted for more than half of all the persons killed by the terrorists. And lastly, the Greek Government's open support for the terrorists was proved by the facts that Greek ships had been intercepted in the act of smuggling arms into Cyprus and that the official Greek radio stations were continuously extolling the acts of terrorism.

14. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece had also said that Greece was not demanding the annexation of Cyprus but only application of the principle of self-determination. That statement, although it did not expressly deny the Greek Government's intention to annex the island, was serious misrepresentation which could be refuted by facts. For many years, although some Greek-speaking Cypriots had doubtless dreamt of the union of Cyprus with Greece just as Turkish Cypriots had always hoped for the return of Cyprus to Turkey, peace and calm had reigned over the island. The turning-point had come between the years 1948 and 1951, concurrently with the defeat of the Communist insurrection in Greece and the country's adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The extreme left, anxious to bring off a counter-manceuvre, had espoused the case of enosis and aligned itself with the agitators of the extreme right. Those two extremist forces had immediately rejected all attempts at constitutional reform. Instead, they had initiated a propaganda campaign, during which they had never concealed the fact that their sole objective was the union of Cyprus with Greece. The word "self-determination" had been introduced into that campaign only quite recently, as an expedient designed to rally support in the United Nations.

15. The same pattern had been followed by the Greek Government. On 15 February 1951, the Prime Minister of Greece had declared in the Chamber of Deputies that his Government intended to make a formal demand for the union of Cyprus with Greece. Between

that date and its request that the question be placed on the agenda of the General Assembly, the Greek Government had always openly advocated annexation. The subsequent introduction of the notion of self-determination had been, in Archbishop Makarios' own words, "a change only in tactics and not in ultimate aims". The final goal therefore remained, as it always had been, the total annexation of the island. The fact that the Greek Government had never changed its original intentions could be proved by its conduct during the past three years. The explanatory memorandum<sup>4/</sup> which it had submitted in support of its first request for United Nations intervention in Cyprus had used the expressions "union with Greece" and "self-determination" quite interchangeably. Subsequently, at the General Assembly's eleventh session, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece had contended that his country's only desire was to see the end of colonial rule in the island, but a few weeks later, in the Greek Chamber of Deputies, he had openly admitted that that statement had only been a manœuvre. He had also been forced to admit to the Greek parliamentary opposition that his offer in the United Nations to sign an agreement with Turkey guaranteeing the independence of Cyprus had merely been a tactical move designed to embarrass the Turkish delegation.

16. The Greek representative had tried to justify his Government's action by stating that in the Second World War the Greek people had fought heroically and seen their country devastated. The Turkish delegation was the first to admit that Greece had defended itself nobly and suffered greatly, but that tragedy seemed wholly irrelevant to the Cyprus question, which should be discussed on its own merits. Furthermore, the Greek representative had revealed his lack of good faith, for in another part of his statement he had made insinuations regarding the demonstrations that had taken place in Istanbul in 1955. If such points were to be raised, the Turkish delegation might justifiably ask whether the Greek incursions into Asia Minor a few decades previously had also been prompted by a zealous respect for the principle of self-determination.

17. Mr. AVEROFF-TOSSIZZA (Greece), replying to statements made by the Turkish representative, said that the distances from Cyprus to the Turkish and Greek coasts were 40 and 135 miles respectively, not 40 and 700 miles; the Aaland Islands were not one island but a group of 300, 80 of which were inhabited by a population of 21,000, a very different matter from one island inhabited by a population of 500,000. The Turkish representative had said that coexistence between the Turkish minority and the Greek majority on Cyprus was impossible, yet for more than five centuries there had been no incidents between the Greeks and Turks on the island, not even during the Greek-Turkish wars; nor was the view that the Greeks and Turks were separated by five centuries of animosity correct, since except for short intervals the record was rather one of fraternal relations. As to the war that had taken Greek armies to Asia Minor, that had been a war carried on by the United Kingdom, France and Italy, which had invited Greece to occupy parts of the coast of Asia Minor; it had not been a Greek war of conquest.

18. Colonel Grivas, to whom the Turkish represen-

<sup>4/</sup> Ibid., Ninth Session, Annexes, agenda item 62, document A/2703.

tative had referred, had been born and educated in Cyprus and had attended military academies in France and Greece; he had resigned from the Greek Army after the Second World War; it was not true to say that he had been released for special duties. The fact that he was a Cypriot serving in the Greek Army was no proof whatsoever that the Greek Government was involved in the activities of the EOKA in Cyprus.

19. The Turkish representative had referred to Archbishop Makarios' statement that he was ready to undertake negotiations on behalf of the Cypriots, but had ignored his further statement that although the minority in Cyprus should not by implication be given a vote equal to that of the majority, the Archbishop did not deny the right of the Turkish Cypriots to a voice, as a minority, proportionate to their ratio of the population. The argument submitted by the Turkish representative that 18 per cent of the people should have the right to veto the will of 80 per cent of the population was obviously specious.

20. Mr. PEIVE (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the history of the discussion of the Cyprus question at the ninth session of the General Assembly, the abortive attempt to place it on the agenda of the tenth session, the fruitless negotiations between the Governor, Sir John Harding, and Archbishop Makarios, and the subsequent deportation of the Archbishop by the United Kingdom authorities all proved the determination of the United Kingdom to maintain a colonial régime in the island at all costs and to use Cyprus as a marshalling base to secure the interests of United Kingdom monopolies in the Near and Middle East. During the Anglo-French-Israel aggression against Egypt in 1956 Cyprus had been a troop concentration centre and an air-base from which Egypt had been attacked.

21. In view of that record it was not surprising that at the eleventh session the General Assembly had again had to take up the Cyprus question. In its resolution 1013 (XI) the General Assembly had stated the belief that the solution of the Cyprus problem required an atmosphere of peace and freedom of expression and had expressed the earnest desire that a peaceful, democratic and just solution could be found and that negotiations would be continued to that end. The resolution had remained a pious hope and its terms had been flouted by the United Kingdom Government. The situation in the island continued to be tense, the people were still deprived of the most elementary political rights, the emergency legislation remained in force and troops carried out repressive measures, including curfews which paralysed the life of the population. Archbishop Makarios and the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs had both claimed to possess accurate evidence of the cruel treatment of Cypriots detained by the Cyprus authorities. The activities of those authorities had roused indignation and demands for investigation even in the United Kingdom itself, yet the United Kingdom authorities in the island had refused any public investigation of police activities on the pretext that such investigation would weaken the campaign against terrorism. The attempt to represent the national liberation movement as the activity of a handful of terrorists in order to justify a policy of repression and violence had been belied by events. Even the Spectator, a conservative English periodical, had

said that the national liberation movement in Cyprus had the universal support of the population.

22. World public opinion demanded that arbitrariness in Cyprus should be brought to a halt, emergency legislation repealed, political prisoners released, and democratic rights restored, so that conditions might be created in which the Cyprus problem could be solved in the interest of the population of the island and of world peace.

23. The United Kingdom Government had failed to take any steps to implement the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its eleventh session. The draft Constitution prepared by Lord Radcliffe<sup>5/</sup> had been unanimously rejected by the population of Cyprus and since then, no constructive proposals had been put forward by the United Kingdom Government, which had refused the proposal of Archbishop Makarios in 1957 that bilateral conversations on Cyprus should take place on the basis of the principle of self-determination, and which continued to evade a solution of the problem on all manner of pretexts. There were suggestions for NATO mediation and reports of the possibility of partitioning Cyprus between the Greeks and Turks while retaining United Kingdom bases in the island, or of granting independence under the protection of NATO. All those reports were linked with plans for the conversion of the island into an atomic base, the existence of which would increase tension in the Mediterranean and seriously prejudice the future of the population of Cyprus. The United Kingdom Government had declared that its forces in the Middle East would in future include bomber squadrons based on Cyprus and capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

24. As a member of NATO the United States was also interested in setting up aircraft and guided missile bases on Cyprus with a view to furthering its aggressive designs in the Near and Middle East, although the peace-loving population of Cyprus was not willing to permit the maintenance of military bases on its territory, as its representatives had stated at the World Peace Council at Colombo in 1957.

25. The suggestions which had been made for the future disposal of the Cyprus question were all designed to divert public opinion from the only method capable of solving the problem in the interests of the population and of world peace, namely, the unconditional recognition of the right of the Cypriots to self-determination. Any solution which ignored the aspirations of the population would only complicate the problem. The question must be solved in the spirit of the United Nations Charter and of the decision taken by the General Assembly at its eleventh session. A genuinely democratic and just solution must provide not only for an atmosphere of peace but also for the restoration of democratic freedoms, the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the island, the liquidation of all foreign military bases in Cyprus and the immediate recognition of the Cypriots' inalienable right to self-determination.

The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.

<sup>5/</sup> Lord Radcliffe, *Constitutional Proposals for Cyprus* (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), Cmd. 42.