

# GENERAL ASSEMBLY

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**Chairman: Mr. Miguel Rafael URQUIA (El Salvador).**

**Nuclear tests on the high seas: resolution adopted on 23 April 1958 by the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea**

1. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee had been instructed to study a resolution by the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea with regard to nuclear tests on the high seas.<sup>1/</sup>

2. In view of the fact that the Committee and the General Assembly had both completed their consideration of the items on disarmament and the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests, he proposed that the Committee decide to have the above-mentioned resolution distributed as a document of the Disarmament Commission when it met in 1959.

It was so decided.

## AGENDA ITEM 68

**Question of Cyprus (A/3874 and Add.1, A/C.1/811, A/C.1/L.221-223)**

## GENERAL DEBATE

3. Mr. AVEROFF-TOSSIZZA (Greece) said that the situation in Cyprus was such that it was no longer simply a question of the future of the population of the island, but of a direct threat to peace and security in the Eastern Mediterranean area. Indeed, the Government of the United Kingdom was turning the Cyprus question into a power conflict and an object of territorial claims and expansionist ambitions liable to cause the illegal overthrow of the status established by treaty and to compromise stability and peace in an area that was one of the nerve-centres of the world.

4. He recalled the previous debates on the question of Cyprus in the General Assembly and the events which had occurred in the island up to the beginning of 1958. He pointed out that Cypriot resistance had ceased on the day when the General Assembly had adopted resolution 1013 (XI) and had only been resumed because the British authorities had not observed the truce, which had, however, been respected by the patriots of the island, and because the British authorities had once more attempted to impose on the Cypriots a plan which

<sup>1/</sup> Official Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Volume II: Plenary Meetings (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 58.V.4, Vol.II.), p.143.

was against their interests and had been made without their participation. It was for that reason that blood was again flowing in Cyprus, making new victims every day; such was the tragic price of a misguided policy. The tide of history could not be stemmed and any attempt to prolong British domination over Cyprus against the will of the Cypriots was by its very nature condemned to failure from the outset.

5. The territorial claims of the Turkish Government were for their part no more than the manifestation of expansionist ambitions which were as unjustifiable as they were provocative. In fact it was as a means to prolong its domination over the island in flagrant disregard of Article 1, paragraph 2, and Article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations that the United Kingdom had first invented the Turkish factor and then the tripartite formula. The Government in Ankara had then made certain claims and demands, thus using the Turkish minority as an instrument of territorial aggrandizement. The truth was, however, that Turkey had absolutely no right over Cyprus. Not only had it renounced its claim to any right or title over Cyprus under the Treaty of Lausanne<sup>2/</sup> as also to any power or jurisdiction over the nationals of territories situated outside its frontiers, but also—a more grave consideration—its present claim to annex a part of the island constituted a violation of the Charter and of the established rules of international law. The British Government and the Turkish Government were both forgetting that there could no longer be any question of determining the future of a territory without taking account of the wishes of the population.

6. The Turkish Government claimed that the Turkish minority was not a minority, but a community, a people, and therefore by its very nature, a majority. That theory had naturally been invented to fit the case. There remained, however, the question, first, of explaining why the Turkish minority should be an exception to the idea of a minority and, secondly, of determining whether a minority could legitimately claim the right of self-determination, the right to separate itself from the national organism and to invite a neighbouring Power to annex a part of its territory in its name. A further outstanding question was the circumstances in which such an operation was feasible. That was a question of principle of extreme importance, the consequences of which must be carefully weighed.

7. In defence of the thesis of partition, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs had claimed that all Cypriots whether of Greek or Turkish blood were anxious to unite with their respective countries. However, whether their origins were Greek or Turkish, the islanders were in the first place Cypriots and the island was a single territorial unit. The right of self-determination which the Charter granted to the populations

<sup>2/</sup> Treaty of Peace signed at Lausanne on 24 July 1923. League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XXVIII, 1924, No.701.

of Non-Self-Governing Territories had always been exercised by the whole body of a population living in a given territory and could be exercised in no other way. Minorities enjoyed that right as elements in the population and not as minorities *per se*. Furthermore, it might well be asked what the representative of Turkey meant when he stressed that in Cyprus the Greeks were Greek and the Turks were Turkish, since ethnic minorities were by definition ethnically different from the majority of the population. All such reasoning was entirely groundless and was contrary to the established rules of international law, to the Charter, to international practice and to the practice of the United Nations regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories. In Togoland, for example, the United Nations had not given consideration to the wishes of a province which represented a minority in relation to the population as a whole, although it might if necessary have considered it as a unit. In Cyprus, however, the Turkish minority was spread throughout the whole of the population.

8. It was absolutely clear that the Turkish minority had its own rights, upon which one could encroach and which none could fail to recognize. Any really constructive policy, however, should be aimed at establishing the sincere and trusting participation of the Turkish minority in the government of the island. The Turkish element had always co-operated with the rest of the population in times of servitude and it could well do so in times of freedom if the Government in Ankara ceased to use the Turks of Cyprus as a means for dividing the island. The Turkish Government claimed that its aim was not to leave the Turks of Cyprus under foreign domination. It was, however, Turkey itself—and of its own free will—which had placed the Turks of Cyprus under British colonial domination both in 1878 and in 1923. If, therefore, the Turkish Government maintained that it did not consent to the domination of the Turkish minority by the majority, that was to say the least, a strange theory which would be equivalent to considering life in common as a form of domination and to maintaining that, to prevent the limbs being dominated by the body, the limbs should be amputated. It could easily be imagined what would happen to the world if minorities which were to be found almost everywhere were to adopt such a theory. In reality, what the Turkish Government sought was not the partition of Cyprus between the Greek majority and the Turkish minority—which would also be inconceivable—but indeed the partition of the island between Greece and Turkey, that is to say, the extension of Turkish sovereignty and the occupation of a part of the territory of Cyprus. Greece, on the other hand, requested no territorial expansion over Cyprus.

9. The United Kingdom Government, like the Turkish Government, was endeavouring to bring about partition. That was the reason why it had conceived the Macmillan plan of 19 June 1958<sup>3/</sup> which was based on the assumption that an intermediate period was indispensable. The Greek Government and Archbishop Makarios had no objections to a temporary régime, provided that it did not prejudice the future and guaranteed genuine and democratic self-government.

10. The proposed plan proved that great weakness had been shown in dealing with Turkey. A few weeks before its publication, the Turkish Government had exercised

very strong pressure in London, Athens and Cyprus in order to impose its thesis, namely, partition. First, there had been threats of direct military intervention from various Turkish officials. Next, a campaign of violence had been conducted in Cyprus by the Turkish minority against the Greek population; several Greek buildings had been looted and burned, and many Greek Cypriots had been wounded and even killed. Finally, demonstrations in favour of partition had taken place in several towns in Turkey and that campaign had received the total support of the Turkish Press.

11. The Greek Government, for its part, had forbidden any demonstration, despite popular pressure, but had felt bound to draw the Security Council's attention, in a letter dated 13 June 1958 (S/4025), to the dangers threatening the peace of the world.

12. London, then, had adopted the Turkish thesis, but had camouflaged it under the Macmillan plan. As Professor Bourquin had stated in a legal opinion<sup>4/</sup> the interim régime envisaged in the plan would inevitably direct the political and administrative system of Cyprus towards partition, even before the people had been asked to decide upon their future status. In Great Britain, people had asked themselves what that plan meant. Some had thought that it derived from a secret agreement between Turkey and the United Kingdom concerning the Middle East, and there had been talk of oil. Others had thought that it was an example of the traditional British policy of "divide and rule".

13. What, then, was the Macmillan plan? Cyprus would remain a colony for a period of seven years, after which it was hoped to set up a condominium of three. The members of each community would be able to acquire Greek or Turkish nationality, while preserving their British nationality. Two houses of representatives would be established, one for the Greek community, the other for the Turkish community. The Greek Government and the Turkish Government would each be invited to appoint a representative to assist the Governor. Those representatives would be members of the council responsible for the internal administration of Cyprus. That council would also be composed of four Greek Cypriot representatives and two Turkish Cypriot representatives. It would be presided over by the Governor.

14. The strange feature of that system was that it gave to a minority of 17 per cent the right to have a house of representatives. Moreover, the United Kingdom Government was inviting two Governments to share in a function which it exercised but which, both in law and morality, belonged to the people of Cyprus alone. That was not all. The appointment of a representative of the Turkish Government with authority to play a direct or an indirect part in the administration of the island would constitute a flagrant violation of article 27 of the Treaty of Lausanne, the terms of which had been chosen with the greatest care and left no room for doubt. The Greek Government, and Archbishop Makarios on behalf of the Cypriot people, could not but reject that plan.

15. After the Greek Prime Minister had informed him of the points of the plan which prejudged the future of the island, Mr. Macmillan, United Kingdom Prime Minister, had let it be known that a new meeting of the two Prime Ministers would take place after his visit to

<sup>3/</sup> Cyprus: statement of Policy (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, June 1958, Cmnd.455.

<sup>4/</sup> Subsequently distributed as document A/C.1/814.

Ankara. However, he had decided that any new contact with the Greek Government would be superfluous and had declared that the plan would be carried into effect. The plan had admittedly been slightly changed: the provision regarding double nationality had been eliminated, a vague provision had been included for a common house of representatives in the future, the representatives of the two Governments would no longer be members of the Council and the Governor would be authorized to create separate municipalities in places where he might deem it appropriate.

16. On 1 October, the Turkish Government had appointed its representative. The plan had thus been set in motion, against the will of the population. That had led to renewed bloodshed in Cyprus. When the leaders of the Turkish minority had asked the Governor to establish separate municipalities, their request had been received with sympathy. Never had the "divide-and-rule" principle given rise to such an absurdity: two municipal authorities in a single community had been entrusted with the task of providing indivisible services, such as the distribution of water, the lighting of streets and the like.

17. Seeking a solution acceptable to all, Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak, Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), had proposed some modifications to the British plan: the establishment of a single representative body with competence over the internal affairs of Cyprus, the replacement of the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments by the presidents of the two communal houses of representatives and the establishment of an interim régime which would not prejudice the future status of the island.

18. Greece had accepted those proposals, but the United Kingdom Government and the Turkish Government, for their part, had rejected them and had proposed negotiations. Unfortunately, it had soon become clear that those negotiations would not touch the substance of the question. In refusing to defer the application of the Macmillan plan until agreement had been reached on Mr. Spaak's proposals, the United Kingdom Government had made certain that any conference on the future of Cyprus would be faced with a fait accompli.

19. The intransigence of the London and Ankara Governments was apparent from many statements. For example, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies had stated before the Conservative Party that Cyprus was a Turkish "off-shore island" and that Turkish security required that it should be in the hands of the United Kingdom or Turkey. The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, for his part, had declared at Strasbourg and at Ankara that any solution other than partition was out of the question; and that had been confirmed by the President of the Turkish Republic, who had said that the Turkish Government had accepted the Macmillan plan because it could lead to the partition of the island. A conference could thus have served no purpose, as one solution would have been imposed upon the participants.

20. That was the point at which Archbishop Makarios had taken the initiative and proposed a compromise solution: the independence of Cyprus, after a period of genuine and democratic self-government. Greece which, regardless of what might be said, had never cherished expansionist designs—had declared itself in agreement with Archbishop Makarios, as it had no desire to restrict the right of the Cypriot people to

self-determination, a right recognized by the United Nations Charter.

21. The idea of independence had originally been put forward by the representative of India, Mr. Krishna Menon. An independent Cyprus could play a beneficial role in the Eastern Mediterranean. It would naturally wish to maintain friendly relations with Greece, Turkey, the Arab world and the British Commonwealth, of which it could eventually become a member.

22. Those were the considerations which had prompted the draft resolution submitted by the Greek delegation (A/C.1/L.222). The proposals contained therein could be summed up under three essential headings: recognition of the Cypriot people's right to independence at the end of a period of genuine and democratic self-government; recognition of the rights of the Turkish minority and genuine safeguards for their exercise; and the establishment of a good offices committee designed to give practical effect to the interest of the General Assembly in the Cypriot people and to promote the necessary co-operation among all the parties concerned. That committee would submit a report to the General Assembly, which would thus be kept informed of the efforts made to solve the problem.

23. In adopting the Greek draft resolution, the General Assembly would finally pave the way for the efforts necessary to reach a settlement of the question in that atmosphere of confidence which did not yet exist. The question of Cyprus could only be solved if it were considered by itself, independently of the political conflicts centered upon the island. It was high time to leave Cyprus to the Cypriots.

24. The United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/L.221) could be summarized as follows: the General Assembly blamed the Cypriots for their resistance to the colonialist forces; it congratulated the United Kingdom Government for the excellent manner in which it had dealt with the Cyprus affair; and it requested that Government to continue along the same path.

25. There would doubtless also be talk of a conference and of negotiations. But that was a manoeuvre designed to block General Assembly action, so as to permit the United Kingdom administration to apply its partition plan with the co-operation of the Turkish Government. The United Kingdom Government had itself destroyed the legend of a tripartite agreement: it was carrying into effect its plan for co-operation between three parties despite the vehement protests of one of them. Neither Greece nor the Cypriots would accept the permanent condominium which the United Kingdom Government proposed. They did not believe that the best means of abolishing colonialism was to multiply it by three.

26. Greece had been accused of intransigence. Yet the Greek Government was prepared to discuss the problem with anybody, anywhere, provided it met with good will. In the absence of good will and of confidence, there had to be safeguards; and those had never existed.

27. During the Second World War, Cypriots had fought at the side of the allies. When Europe had been invaded, the United Kingdom had appealed to the people of Cyprus by placing on the island large posters bearing the slogan: "Fight for Greece and Freedom". All the Greeks of Cyprus had enlisted under the British flag and had shed their blood. Having signed that contract with their blood, they refused to forget at least

the clause "Fight for Freedom". The United Nations should not forget that, in the common sacrifice from which the Organization itself had sprung, some Cypriot blood had also been spilled. The United Nations thus had a debt to that people, which was only asking for what was recognized as a right of all the peoples of the globe.

28. Mr. NOBLE (United Kingdom) regretted that the problem of Cyprus should again be before the General Assembly. His delegation had not, however, opposed the inclusion of the question of Cyprus in the General Assembly's agenda because it welcomed the opportunity to explain the policy and present position of the United Kingdom Government.

29. First of all, if the problem were simply a colonial one, the United Kingdom would not have great difficulty in solving it. As its colonial record proved, the United Kingdom's aim had been to advance its dependent territories throughout the world towards self-government and the freedom to decide their own future. As long ago as the nineteenth century, it had transferred the Ionian Islands to Greece.

30. But Cyprus had become an international problem. Besides the two communities in Cyprus, three separate countries were concerned: Greece, because the great majority of the people of the island were Greek in feeling and tradition; Turkey, because of the island's geographical position, its historical connexion with Turkey and the existence of a significant and nationally conscious Turkish minority; and the United Kingdom.

31. The United Kingdom, which was the present sovereign Power, bore the practical and moral responsibility for the welfare of all the island's inhabitants. It was also bound by its international obligations to provide strategic support for two defensive alliances. In the present circumstances, bases in Cyprus were necessary for that purpose, and whatever solution was found to the Cyprus question, the provision of those bases would present no real problem. Greece and Turkey were the friends and allies of the United Kingdom and the strategic needs of the United Kingdom were as much in the interest of the other two countries as in its own.

32. The Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs had just referred to the Treaty of Lausanne, but it was clear from a reading of the Treaty and the minutes of the Lausanne Conference<sup>5/</sup> that articles 16 and 27 were designed only to ensure that Turkey did not claim any residual rights arising from its former sovereignty over the territories it had ceded under the Treaty. Those articles had been designed to terminate past rights and titles and not to preclude the acquisition of new rights and titles in the future.

33. The measures taken by the United Kingdom Government since 26 February 1957 showed that its policy was in conformity with General Assembly resolution 1013 (XI), on which it had been based.

34. Shortly after February 1957, Archbishop Makarios had been released from the detention to which he had condemned himself by activities dangerous to the peace and welfare of the people of Cyprus. All members of

the terrorist organization EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) had been offered safe-conduct out of the island. The emergency regulations had been relaxed and the death sentences of many terrorists commuted. Everything had been done to encourage the return of tranquillity to the island.

35. Unfortunately, as the months had passed, it had become clear that the terrorists were not prepared to moderate their extreme demands. In December 1957, with the approach of the United Nations debate on the Cyprus question, strikes and demonstrations had taken place, followed by a precarious peace and then a renewal of EOKA terrorism. Serious violence had broken out between the Turkish and Greek communities in June 1958 and had reached a peak in July.

36. At the beginning of August, in response to appeals from the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, that violence had ceased. But the terrorist activities of EOKA had been resumed and were continuing. They were directed not only against members of the Greek community and the security forces but against unarmed British civilians.

37. The United Kingdom had always sought a solution which would enable the inhabitants of Cyprus to live once again in peace and freedom from intimidation. In March 1957, it had accepted without qualification the offer of good offices made by the Secretary-General of NATO, but that initiative had foundered on the opposition of the Greek Government.

38. The United Kingdom Government had then begun a series of informal exchanges with the Greek and Turkish Governments with a view to holding a conference. That initiative had also come to nothing, through no fault of the United Kingdom.

39. At the Twelfth session, the Cyprus question had once again been debated at the United Nations. During that discussion, he had assured the Assembly that confidential exchanges between the three Governments directly concerned were still continuing and had urged it to take no decision which might frustrate those exchanges or make a compromise more difficult.

40. At the beginning of 1958, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom had himself visited Ankara in January and Athens in February to discuss in detail with the Turkish and Greek Governments every aspect of the problem. Following those talks and after a careful study of the problem, the United Kingdom Government had formulated a completely new policy for Cyprus, which the Prime Minister had announced to Parliament on 19 June.

41. Noting that prolonged discussion and negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Governments and the two Cypriot communities had failed to provide a basis for an immediate and permanent settlement of the situation, the United Kingdom Government had considered it necessary to think in terms of an interim solution by which peace could be restored and political progress made without requiring any of the parties to abandon their long-term aspirations.

42. The dominant principle of the United Kingdom's policy was that of partnership between the two Cypriot communities and the Governments of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey. That idea of partnership had proved its worth in the development of the British Commonwealth. The United Kingdom's new policy,

<sup>5/</sup> Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, held at Lausanne from 21 November 1922 to 4 February 1923. See Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922-1923, Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1923), Cmnd. 1814.

based on that idea of partnership, invited the co-operation of the Greek and Turkish Governments in a joint effort to ensure the peace, progress and prosperity of the island. A representative of each of the two Governments would co-operate with the Governor. The Cypriots would have a liberal constitution giving them self-government, with a separate house of representatives for each of the two communities. Each house would have final legislative authority in its own communal affairs. Internal administration other than communal affairs and internal security would be managed by a single council presided over by the Governor. That council would include six elected ministers, four of whom would be Greek Cypriots and two, Turkish Cypriots. The representatives of the Greek Government and the Turkish Government would have the right to require that any legislation they considered discriminatory should be submitted for consideration to an impartial tribunal.

43. In order to allow time for the new principle of partnership to be worked out and brought into operation in the necessary atmosphere of peace and stability, the international status of the island was to remain unchanged for seven years. Its external affairs, defence and internal security would during that time be reserved to the Governor, acting after consultation with the representatives of the Greek Government and the Turkish Government.

44. The essence of the policy was to leave the future of the island, after the expiration of the seven-year period, completely open and unprejudiced. At that time, it would be open to any of the parties to put forward any proposals they wished for the island's ultimate status. Those proposals would be freely discussed in what it was hoped would be a new atmosphere of calm and confidence. At that time, sacrifices of principle on all sides would no doubt be necessary. The United Kingdom for its part would be ready to share the sovereignty of the island with its Greek and Turkish allies. That was only one suggestion, but it should indicate that the United Kingdom would not make the retention of its sovereignty in Cyprus an obstacle to an eventual settlement. In the meantime—that is, during the seven-year period—the United Kingdom's policy would consist of a series of steps to be put into effect progressively with provision for discussion and consultation at each stage.

45. His Government hoped that the General Assembly would recognize the sincerity of its efforts and that all concerned would co-operate in establishing and preserving a peaceful atmosphere in the island.

46. In June 1958, shortly before the official announcement of the new policy, his Government had made its details known to the members of the North Atlantic Council. The twelve countries not directly concerned in the problem, and the Secretary-General of NATO himself, had welcomed it as a constructive move to break the present deadlock.

47. In August, after violence had ceased on Cyprus, the United Kingdom Prime Minister had proposed an immediate meeting with the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey to discuss and exchange views on the new policy. Upon their acceptance of his proposal, Mr. Macmillan had at once gone to Athens and then to Ankara. Following his return to London on 15 August, he had made a statement on the manner in which the new policy was to be gradually applied; first, however,

he had made certain modifications in the manner of its application in an effort to meet the wishes of the Greek Government and the Turkish Government.

48. One such modification had concerned the status of the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments, who, under the original plan, would have sat as members of the Governor's council. In order to meet certain objections regarding the desirability of their participation in the day-to-day administration of the island, it had been decided that they would not in practice be members of the council; that would not, however, impair the closeness of their contact with the Governor. Another modification had been intended to make clear the hope and expectation of the United Kingdom Government that a unified assembly, representing the island as a whole, would in due course be established.

49. In spite of those modifications, which had been designed to meet the wishes of the Greek Government, the Turkish Government had announced its acceptance of the new United Kingdom policy and had promised to co-operate in its application. Unfortunately, the Greek Government had felt unable to do the same. The United Kingdom Government deeply regretted that fact. It continued to believe that its policy provided the best hope for a solution and did not despair that the Greek Government would come to believe that also.

50. On 1 October, the Turkish Government had appointed as its representative on Cyprus the Turkish Consul-General at Nicosia, who, since his appointment, had co-operated with the Governor and discussed with him the preparations for the projected elections. The Greek Government was free to appoint its representative whenever it wished.

51. He emphasized that the interim seven-year régime envisaged in the new United Kingdom policy was not designed to go into effect all at once, but by stages. The date of 1 October 1958, which had received great publicity, marked only the beginning of one stage. There was no one vital date after which it would be too late to co-operate with the policy.

52. The Governor's council was of particular importance, for it was to be a body responsible for matters relating to the island as a whole. It would be a unitary body, with a Greek Cypriot majority. It would help to preserve the united personality of Cyprus. It was the hope of the United Kingdom Government that its plan would, with general good will, facilitate the development of some form of representative assembly for the whole island. The two communal assemblies had not been designed to lead to separatism on the island, but in the present state of intercommunal tension and distrust, they represented the one chance of making a start with the establishment of democratic machinery.

53. In theory, it might have been preferable to establish a unitary system. Unfortunately, however, Lord Radcliffe's draft constitution,<sup>6/</sup> which had been the last of the United Kingdom Government's repeated efforts in that direction, had been rejected by the Greek Government. That approach was now no longer feasible, particularly in view of the recent outbreaks of open fighting which had occurred between the two communities.

<sup>6/</sup> Lord Radcliffe, *Constitutional Proposals for Cyprus* (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, December 1956), Cmnd.42.

54. He emphasized that the United Kingdom Government's action in granting a measure of communal autonomy was in no sense intended to bring about partition of the island, which would bring misery to a large part of the population. The United Kingdom Government had never favoured partition as a solution of the Cyprus problem. It did not favour it now.

55. Turning to the NATO Council's recent discussion of the Cyprus question, he paid a tribute to the efforts which Mr. Spaak, the Secretary-General of NATO, had made to further the talks; it was to be hoped that they would yet bear fruit. During the NATO discussion, the United Kingdom Government had made clear its willingness to attend an international conference on the Cyprus question. The Turkish Government had taken a similar stand. At the last moment, however, the Greek Government had declared its inability to continue the negotiations.

56. The United Kingdom Government had published a White Paper (A/C.1/811) outlining the course which the NATO negotiations had taken. That document showed that the United Kingdom had been most anxious to arrive at an agreement which would enable a conference to be held and had made a number of concessions to that end. His Government was ready to discuss not only its policy, but also possible changes to it. Discussion of a long-term solution was also to have been on the agenda of the proposed conference. No possibilities for a final solution would have been excluded. The United Kingdom had agreed that the conference should be held at Paris under the chairmanship of Mr. Spaak and that it should be attended by representatives of two other Governments which were not directly concerned in the matter and by representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, including Archbishop Makarios, if his attendance was desired.

57. The United Kingdom Government had been most disappointed at the Greek Government's sudden decision to break off negotiations, and hoped it was not final. The United Kingdom Government was always ready to negotiate, but it wished to make it clear that it would not give way to violence or terrorism.

58. Archbishop Makarios had recently stated in New York that the terrorism in Cyprus was the heroic work of patriots. That contention was as shocking to the conscience of the world community as it was cruel to the unfortunate inhabitants of Cyprus. The cowardly murderers in Cyprus were not heroes; they were at best misguided, at worst despicable.

59. Nevertheless, some progress had been made on Cyprus. Inter-communal fighting had ceased, and the drift towards civil war had been halted. Greece and Turkey were no longer pressing quite so urgently the extreme demands which they had made at the twelfth session of the General Assembly. It would be tragic if that progress should be jeopardized by any action of the Assembly.

60. It was in the light of the ground gained that the United Kingdom delegation had submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.221), under which the General Assembly would invite the United Kingdom to continue its efforts to arrive at a solution acceptable to all the parties concerned and in accord with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; invite the other parties to co-operate to that end; and call

upon all concerned to use their best endeavours to put an end to terrorism and violence on Cyprus.

61. As for the question of independence for Cyprus, which was advocated by the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, the United Kingdom had no objection to the consideration at a conference of all possible long-term solutions, of which independence was naturally one. It would be dangerous, however, for the General Assembly specifically to endorse independence for Cyprus now, even as a long-term solution. Nor would it help, in the present circumstances, to establish a United Nations good offices committee, as suggested in the Greek draft resolution (A/C.1/L.222). Such a committee could only duplicate the work already done by the NATO Council.

62. Independence was a noble principle which had been supported by British policy throughout the world. The complexity of the Cyprus problem was such, however, that no one final solution could command general agreement until a climate of confidence existed between the two Cypriot communities and among the three countries concerned; that confidence did not yet exist and must be gradually built up. Any attempt to endorse a long-term solution in the absence of general agreement could only lead to civil war, or worse. Civil war in turn would point the way to partition in Cyprus and perhaps to international conflict in the Mediterranean. The General Assembly would bear a heavy responsibility if a decision taken by it were to lead to conflict and conflagration.

63. Moreover, the exact nature of the proposal for independence was far from clear. One could well ask how long such independence would last. Cyprus by itself would be terribly exposed to threats of subversion and even to aggression. Furthermore, it was difficult to escape the suspicion that independence might in practice prove to be not a concession involving the abandonment of enosis (union with Greece), but rather a covert means of approach to it. Archbishop Makarios' statement in an interview published in The New York Times was significant in that connexion.

64. Anticipating the suggestion that the permanence of an independent régime could be guaranteed by an international body such as the United Nations, he warned of the difficulties which such an undertaking would involve and wondered whether the United Nations would be willing to provide a police force to maintain peace on Cyprus—particularly since such a force would have to be kept on the island for a considerable period of time. Would the United Nations be willing to take over the burden of subsidy at present borne by the British taxpayer?

65. It was a mark of wisdom and statesmanship to recognize that there were times when one's dearest ideals and principles could not be applied without causing vast suffering. The Government of the United Kingdom was confident that such wisdom and statesmanship would not be found lacking in the General Assembly.

66. The United Kingdom Government would go ahead with the gradual implementation of its plan; it would remain ready to negotiate in whatever way might seem most useful, and it would hope that in time all concerned would not fail to see and grasp the opportunity which that policy offered.

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.