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Chairman: Mr. Frederick H. BOLAND (Ireland).

AGENDA ITEM 13

The future of the Trust Territories of the Cameroons under French administration and the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration: special report of the Trusteeship Council* (A/4092, A/4093/Rev.1, A/4094, A/C.4/395, T/SR.953-963) (*continued*)

REPLIES OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ADMINISTERING AUTHORITIES (*continued*)

1. Mr. ENDELEY (United Kingdom), Leader of the Opposition in the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly, stated, in reply to a question asked at the 847th meeting by the representative of New Zealand, that the right to vote should be granted to Nigerians and to French Cameroonians living in the Southern Cameroons on the same terms as had been recommended in the case of the plebiscite held in the former Togoland under British administration^{1/}. Any person who had been residing in the Southern Cameroons for a least two years should be allowed to vote.

2. As far as men were concerned, the payment of tax would make it possible to ensure that the requirements had been complied with, but that method would be difficult to apply to women. It would also be difficult to ascertain the place of birth, since there was no system for the registration of births. It might be useful for the Administering Authority to conduct an investigation on the spot, in consultation with the political parties, to determine the qualifications required for voters.

3. The plebiscite should be held immediately after the compilation of the electoral register, which should be done under the supervision of the United Nations and during the dry season, since the registration officers could not travel through the Territory during the rainy season.

4. It was also desirable that the results of the plebiscite should be analysed for each division, apart from the total, to ascertain what percentage of voters in each

*In accordance with General Assembly resolution 1281 (XIII).

^{1/} See General Assembly resolution 944 (X), para. 4.

administrative division had voted one way or the other. As the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in West Africa, 1958, had pointed out in its report on the Cameroons under British administration (T/1426 and Add.12^{2/}), the administrative divisions corresponded roughly to ethnic groups.

5. Concerning paragraph 201 of the Visiting Mission's report, to which the representative of Venezuela had referred at the previous meeting, the Cameroonian people held the United Nations in the highest esteem. If the General Assembly decided that a plebiscite should be held, it would presumably be organized under United Nations supervision.

6. In reply to questions asked at the 848th meeting by the representative of Iraq, Mr. Endeley said, first, that in his statement at the 846th meeting he had specifically alluded to the Union des populations du Cameroun (UPC), which had begun its activities in the Cameroons under British administration in 1956. Secondly, in speaking of a "substantial majority", he had meant a two-thirds majority. A smaller majority would not constitute decisive proof that the people wished their existing status to be changed, and a second plebiscite would become necessary. Nor would it be advisable to put three choices to the people. If the majority voted against continued association with Nigeria, it would mean that it wished to secede. If it voted against unification, that would mean that it wished to continue its association with the Federation of Nigeria. A third question would only serve to confuse the voters.

7. Malam ABDULLAHI (United Kingdom), Minister of Northern Cameroons Affairs, stated that the Government of the Northern Region of Nigeria had taken note of the two requests made to the Mission concerning the transfer of certain small areas along the Southern Cameroons boundary, mentioned in paragraph 165 of the Mission's report. Up to the time of the arrival of the Mission, the Regional Government had never received any communication on the matter and no one from its side of the border had expressed such a wish to it. The communications in question had been sent to the Mission when it had been in the Southern Cameroons. The communication concerning the Mambila District had come from three village chiefs who lived very close to the Southern Cameroons boundary. They could not be considered to speak for the people of Mambila as a whole. The claim to Tigon, Ngoro and Kentu Districts had been made verbally to the Mission and related to only a small portion of the Tigon District close to the Southern Cameroons boundary, which was inhabited by Mbembes, and not to the whole of the three districts of Benue Province that lay within the Trust Territory. Moreover, at the meeting of the Consultative Committee for the Northern Cameroons with

^{2/} Transmitted to Members of the General Assembly by a note of the Secretary-General (A/4093/Rev.1).

the Visiting Mission, the representative of the Mambila tribe had told the Mission that the people of the area wished to remain with the Northern Region. That was confirmed in part D, section 3, of annex I of the Visiting Mission's report.

8. Accordingly, the Northern Regional Government had no good reason to believe that those claims reflected the wishes of the majority of the peoples concerned, and there was therefore no *prima facie* case for a change in the existing boundaries. Moreover, it would be wrong to try to ascertain the views of those peoples before the future political status of the Southern Cameroons had been determined, because the inhabitants of the districts concerned should know first how matters stood in the South. The Government of the Northern Region was nevertheless prepared to co-operate at the appropriate time in any investigation into the question that might prove necessary. It should also be borne in mind that the total population of the districts south of the Benue was 162,300 for the Adamawa Province, and 12,800 for the Benue Province. The three Mambila villages in question totalled only 4,500 people and the whole of Tigon District only 5,400. Only a very small area along the Southern Cameroons boundary, therefore, was covered by the claims mentioned by the Mission, and it had no connexion with the large masses of population further to the North.

9. With regard to representative institutions in the Northern Cameroons, the Territory was administered as an integral part of the Northern Region of Nigeria under article 5 (a) of the Trusteeship Agreement. That method of administration was the only practicable one since the Trust Territory was divided into two parts which were separated from each other. The Northern Cameroons elected five members to the Northern House of Assembly who represented constituencies wholly within the Trust Territory and one member for a constituency partly within the Trust Territory. It also sent four elected members to the Federal House of Representatives. The Minister for Northern Cameroons Affairs was a member of the Executive Council of the Northern Region. He was assisted by the Consultative Committee for the Northern Cameroons which advised the Executive Council on the particular needs of the Northern Cameroons and kept the Government informed of Northern Cameroons opinion on regional legislation and, through its chairman, informed the Executive Council of its views on proposed legislation. In matters of federal responsibility the Committee could ask the Regional Government to make representations to the Federal Government. Committee members who were also members of the Federal House of Representatives might state the opinion of the population on particular issues. Since 1957, when the Committee had become a formal committee of the Executive Council of the Northern Region, the members of the Council had been kept informed on all affairs relating to the Northern Cameroons.

10. At the local government level, all district councils had elected majorities and were entitled to use part of the local revenue as they chose. Town councils had similar powers. Outer councils also had elected majorities and they themselves elected representatives to the Native Authority Councils of Dikwa and Adamawa. The development of local government during 1958 had been described by the Visiting Mission in paragraphs 122 to 127 of its report.

11. It could therefore be said that the Administering Authority had developed the participation of the inhabitants in the Government of the Territory, both central and local, as was appropriate to the particular circumstances of the Territory, entirely in conformity with article 6 of the Trusteeship Agreement.

12. The people of the Northern Cameroons did not want a union with the South because, for geographical, historical, ethnical and cultural reasons, it felt that its true destiny lay in joining the Northern Region of Nigeria when the Federation of Nigeria became independent. Concerning the expediency of a plebiscite, the Visiting Mission had recorded in paragraph 178 of its report that the members of the Consultative Committee had informed the Mission that they would accept a plebiscite if it were considered necessary—but that they did not so consider it. Subsequently, the Mission had expressed the view that no plebiscite was necessary, for reasons which the Northern Regional Government found entirely convincing.

13. Mr. FIELD (United Kingdom), Commissioner of the Cameroons, replied to questions from the delegation of Venezuela concerning the place in the economy of the Southern Cameroons of the plantations mentioned in part C, section 1, of annex I to the Visiting Mission's report. The total area of the Southern Cameroons was approximately 16,000 square miles. Only 477 square miles had been given out as plantations, of which 377 square miles were controlled by the Cameroons Development Corporation, 9 square miles by the Southern Cameroons Development Agency and 91 square miles by private enterprises, including Elders and Fyffes Ltd. and Pamol Ltd.

14. The Cameroons Development Corporation was a public corporation formed after the Second World War for the purpose of administering the former German estates for the benefit of the people of the Southern Cameroons. It had no private shareholders. The profits were paid to the Southern Cameroons Government and the Corporation also paid an annual rent for its estates to the Government. It also operated port facilities and a railway which served its plantations but was also available for other shippers, such as the co-operative societies.

15. Elders and Fyffes Ltd. operated two plantations, one of which was leased by it from the Cameroons Development Corporation, and the other from the Government. The company exported less than 1 per cent of the entire banana crop. Its principal function was to act as shipping and marketing agents for bananas produced by the Cameroons Development Corporation and the co-operative societies.

16. The only company to own a freehold estate was Pamol Ltd., which had acquired one estate from the Germans before 1914 and two former German estates from the Custodian of Enemy Property after the First World War. The main production of those estates was palm oil, which by law could be sold only to the Southern Cameroons Marketing Board. The Government had granted leases of three other estates, but no freehold had in fact been granted since the end of the German occupation.

17. The Southern Cameroons Development Agency operated an estate leased for the purpose of developing coffee products. The Agency was a quasi-Government

organization established for the purpose of fostering the economic development of the Territory.

18. Thus the Southern Cameroons Government had a direct financial interest in the Cameroons Development Corporation and the Southern Cameroons Development Agency. The taxes on profits and the import and export duties produced additional revenue. Mention might also be made of the wages paid to the many employees on the plantations, and of the educational, medical and other social services provided.

19. The plantations in the Southern Cameroons played a very important part in the economy of the Territory, but they had in no sense a monopoly. Of the 4 million stems of bananas exported per year, only 100,000 came from private estates. The peasant producers exported over 1 million stems through their co-operative societies and the rest was exported by the Cameroons Development Corporation. The situation with regard to cocoa, of which only some 200 tons of the 6,000 tons exported annually came from plantations, was similar. All the coffee exported was produced by small Cameroonian growers.

20. Both the main parties in the Southern Cameroons were anxious to encourage overseas investment of the kind that would strengthen the economy of the Cameroons in such a way as to benefit the inhabitants.

21. The recurrent revenue for the financial year 1958-1959 was £1,380,000. If the Southern Cameroons were to become a separate entity, it would require approximately a further £500,000 a year to maintain the existing services, taking into account the fact that the Southern Cameroonian Government would have to provide those services now paid for by the Federal Government and assuming that all revenue now accruing to the Federal Government from the Southern Cameroons would be available. The Government of the Southern Cameroons might be able to secure additional sources of revenue, but no estimate could be given of what they might amount to. The development of existing services would also involve further costs.

22. Sir Andrew COHEN (United Kingdom) stated the views of the United Kingdom on a possible period of continuation of trusteeship in the Southern Cameroons under British administration. In the first place it should be pointed out that the aim of Mr. Foncha, the Premier of the Southern Cameroons, and his party was not an indefinite extension of trusteeship. The intention was simply that the Southern Cameroons should be constituted as a separate unit from Nigeria and that it should remain for a short time under United Kingdom trusteeship. That purely interim arrangement would make it possible for the Cameroons to work out a permanent solution.

23. His delegation did not intend in any way to prejudge what decision would be taken about the choices to be put to the people of the Southern Cameroons in the plebiscite, still less to prejudge what the result of the plebiscite would be. But if one of the questions provided for a continuation of the trusteeship as conceived by Mr. Foncha, and should that be the decision taken as a result of the plebiscite, the United Kingdom Government would be prepared to continue as the Administering Authority.

24. The representative of Iraq had referred to previous statements by the United Kingdom about the difficulty of administering the Southern Cameroons

separately from Nigeria, and had also referred to the work of the Trusteeship Council's Committee on Administrative Unions. Sir Andrew wanted to make it quite clear, however, that the Southern Cameroons was not in an "administrative union" with Nigeria. The Southern Cameroons was administered as an integral part of Nigeria, in accordance with the Trusteeship Agreement, and the United Kingdom delegation continued to believe that it would otherwise have been difficult to promote the development of the Cameroons, both the North and the South, and that if the Territory had been administered separately from Nigeria, its development would have been slower. The solution adopted had been the best way of bringing the two parts of the Trust Territory to the stage of pre-independence which they had now reached. But the view taken hitherto by the United Kingdom would be in no way inconsistent with the interim arrangement proposed by Mr. Foncha, if the people should come out in favour of such a solution. It would not be appropriate for him to express a view on the possibility of an indefinite continuation of the trusteeship, as no one had suggested that that should be a choice to put before the people.

25. With regard to the viability of a possible independent Southern Cameroons linked neither with the Cameroons under French administration nor Nigeria, it was evident from the figures given by Mr. Field that such a state would have serious financial and economic problems. That would be one of the very important factors which the Cameroonian leaders and people—and the Administering Authority so long as it retained responsibility—would have to take into account in considering a permanent solution.

26. With regard to the postponement of registration for the federal elections in the Southern Cameroons, the Governor-General would discuss with the leaders of the Southern Cameroons what action should be taken on the request by the Southern Cameroons House when they returned to the Cameroons at the end of the current session. It would thus be possible to take into account the result of the debates in progress in the Committee. Meanwhile, registration in the Southern Cameroons was not proceeding.

27. The representative of the Philippines had wondered whether the Administering Authority could not have foreseen events in the Trust Territory at an earlier stage and set a target date corresponding to what had since happened. It was not always wise to attempt to foresee the future too precisely. If the Administering Authority had tried some years previously to set a target date for the independence of the Territory, it might well have been too cautious in its estimate, and that might have led to unnecessary differences of opinion. Events had proved that the best course was to proceed step by step in the closest possible consultation with the people and their representatives.

28. With reference to the question raised by the Philippine representative whether the objectives of the Trusteeship System would be attained if the Cameroons under British administration joined Nigeria, since such a union was not expressly provided for in Article 76 b of the United Nations Charter, it was enough to note that under Article 76 b of the Charter and article 6 of the Trusteeship Agreement, the Administering Authority was obliged to promote the progressive development of the Territory towards self-government or

independence, as might be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each Territory and its peoples and to the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned. As far as the Southern Cameroons was concerned, a plebiscite would determine what were the freely expressed wishes of the people. It would be difficult to argue that, if the people made one choice in the plebiscite rather than another, such a choice would be contrary to Article 76 b, or that the view which the people of the North had expressed was contrary to the Charter because it involved gaining their independence as part of the Nigerian Federation.

29. Mr. PACHACHI (Iraq) was gratified to note that, according to the statements of the representatives of the Cameroons under French administration, the Government of which Mr. Ahidjo was Prime Minister was in agreement with the Iraqi delegation on the need for organizing elections in the near future and on the reasons why such elections should take place. The only divergence of views was on the question whether the elections should be held in 1959 or 1960. The Iraqi delegation would be in favour of the first date, which would make it possible for the elections to be held under United Nations supervision. He wished to know whether Mr. Ahidjo did not think that it would be in the interests, not only of the Cameroonian people, but of the United Nations itself, if that course were to be adopted? Did he not think that the Government which came into office as a result of such elections would have incontrovertible authority and prestige, and that doubts would hardly be cast in the future on the representative character of the new assembly thus elected? Moreover, he would like Mr. Ahidjo to explain, in view of the allusion made by the representative of France in the Trusteeship Council to the precedent of Togoland,^{3/} whether the Conventions annexed to the 1959 Statute would really be automatically repealed when the Territory attained its independence, or whether they would have to be denounced by the Cameroonian Government.

30. Referring to the statement made by Mr. Foncha, to the effect that the question of unification would have to be settled after the Cameroons had decided against integration with Nigeria, he wanted to ask Mr. Foncha whether, in that case, the Government and the Assembly of the Cameroons would have full authority to decide on the question of unification without any consultation of the people.

HEARING OF PETITIONERS

At the invitation of the Chairman, the petitioners took places at the Committee table.

31. Mr. Paul BIBA (Association traditionnelle bantoue) said that the association he represented comprised a large number of tribes in the southern part of the Cameroons. It was the guardian of customs and tradition and for that reason was very anxious to maintain a Cameroonian personality. The association was grateful to the United Nations and to France for having introduced the Cameroonians to a new way of life, new ways of thinking and modern techniques.

32. What had remained to be done had been to secure recognition of the aspirations of the Cameroonians to unification and independence. Contrary to what had been said in the United Nations by certain petitioners who had deserted the Cameroons four years earlier

^{3/} See Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Twenty-third Session, 954th meeting.

and had adopted an attitude of systematic opposition, such recognition was now a fact; the right to independence was recognized by France, the Cameroonian authorities had passed an amnesty law, and the people of the Cameroons had proclaimed their desire for reunification. Henceforth, there should be no opposition between Cameroonians and France or among the Cameroonians themselves. The Visiting Mission had been able to see for itself the enormous majority which the Cameroonian Government enjoyed in the Assembly and throughout the country; it had been able to see how strong was the Government's desire for reconciliation and how eager the people were for independence and reunification. There was therefore no need to burden the country with fresh elections and a costly referendum. He asked the General Assembly to confirm the conclusions of the Visiting Mission, i.e. to proclaim the right of the Cameroons under French administration to national independence on 1 January 1960 and the termination of the trusteeship on that date. At the same time the General Assembly should proclaim the right of the two parts of the Cameroons, which had been arbitrarily divided after the First World War, to reunification. As France and the overwhelming majority of the Cameroonians had already reached agreement on those problems, nothing further stood in the way of the birth of an independent Cameroonian State, which would tomorrow take its rightful place beside the free and democratic nations of the world.

33. Mr. Ndeh NTUMAZAH (One Kamerun) regretted that, at the very moment when the termination of United Nations trusteeship over the Cameroons was being contemplated, the right of people to self-determination had been disregarded and all sections of the Cameroonian population had not had the chance to choose freely what their future should be. For ten years One Kamerun had been demanding unification and independence, but it did not wish for independence within the French-African community, which would merely be a disguised form of colonialism. When it was remembered, furthermore, that the Visiting Mission had been instructed to consider by what procedure the people of the Cameroons should be consulted about their future, it was difficult to accept those parts of its report (T/1427 and T/1434^{4/}) that were designed to show that it had consulted the Cameroonians and that no further consultation was necessary.

34. With regard to the Cameroons under British administration, it was regrettable that the Mission had not recommended that the population of all parts of the Territory should be able to take part in the referendum, which was proposed for the Southern Cameroons only. He hoped that the United Nations would supervise every operation connected with the referendum, in which no one who had not been born in the Cameroons should be allowed to participate. In order to obviate the need for any further consultation, the Cameroonians should be asked the following question: "Do you want integration with Nigeria or federation with the Cameroons under French administration?" The United Nations should further undertake to assist the reunified Cameroons in drafting its constitution and to supervise elections for the Legislative Assembly. As far as the Northern Cameroons was concerned, neither the statements which Mr. Endeley and Malam Abdullahi had made to the Committee nor those which the political parties of

^{4/} Transmitted to Members of the General Assembly by a note of the Secretary-General (A/4092).

that section—which favoured integration with Nigeria—had made to the Visiting Mission reflected the true opinions of the people, who were unable to come out openly against the objectives of the Northern Peoples' Congress without being convicted or deported. In those circumstances it was essential that a referendum should be held in the Northern Cameroons.

35. With regard to the Cameroons under French administration, he recalled that following the boycott declared by the Union des populations du Cameroun (UPC), only 55 per cent of the voters had gone to the polls in the 1956 elections which had put Mr. Mbida's Government, later replaced by that of Mr. Ahidjo, in office. Mr. Ahidjo's Government, which was not supported by Mr. Mbida's group, represented barely 30 per cent of the registered voters of 1956; moreover, the 1956 electorate had not been called upon to decide on the future of the Cameroons. It could not therefore be claimed that Mr. Ahidjo's Government was representative. In addition, Article 76 of the Charter made it clear that the question of the future of Trust Territories was a matter of concern not only to assemblies and Governments, whether or not they were representative, but also to the entire population. There was no need for him to dwell on the reasons why unification should precede independence—those reasons had been stated by Mr. Ahidjo himself—except to request the United Nations to abide by the time-table which had been drawn up by the Cameroonian Government. He wished, however, to point out that the so-called independence which France was so eager to grant the Cameroons on 1 January 1960 would be nothing more than a new form of colonialism. The fact that France was opposed to fresh elections showed that it was anxious for a pro-French section of Cameroonian opinion to be kept in power, a group with which France had already concluded agreements providing for the Cameroons to belong to the French-African community and for French troops to remain in the Cameroons *sine die*. There could be no doubt that those troops would constitute a danger not only for the Cameroonians but also for all their African brothers. As for the amnesty law, it was simply a trap to catch the deported leaders of the dissolved parties as soon as they set foot in the country.

36. In conclusion, he stressed that in view of the very short period it had spent in the Territory the Visiting Mission had been in no position to ascertain the will of the Cameroonian people, and he urged the United Nations to ensure that the right of the Cameroonians to self-determination was respected.

37. Mr. Victor NGU (National Union of Kamerun Students) said that it would fall to the young Cameroonians he represented not only to put into effect whatever decisions the United Nations might take on the future of the Cameroons but also to suffer the consequences, good or bad, of those decisions. According to the Charter and the Trusteeship Agreements it was the General Assembly that was finally responsible for determining the future of the Trust Territories of the Cameroons, in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the people.

38. He would point out that in spite of the long association of the Southern Cameroons with Nigeria there was still a demand in the Territory for secession and reunification, which had gathered momentum in the preceding eight to ten years. In the two Trust Terri-

tories of the Cameroons political parties had gained or lost the support of the population, and hence power, according to whether they supported or repudiated the idea of reunification. Clearly neither of the two parties in the Southern Cameroons which were in favour of separation from Nigeria advocated that as an end in itself. An independent Southern Cameroons would be driven sooner or later to seek union with the Cameroons under French administration, by then independent, or to request union with the independent Federation of Nigeria. The Southern Cameroons must therefore choose forthwith between the only two possible solutions, namely, secession from Nigeria and unification, or integration with Nigeria. Although the idea of a Cameroonian nation was a creation of imperialist Germany, it had nevertheless become a real thing.

39. With regard to the plebiscite to be organized in the Southern Cameroons, that was a matter for the General Assembly to decide. As the choice of secession would not necessarily mean a desire for unification, it would seem necessary to hold a second consultation later; unification, too, was unquestionably a matter within the competence of the General Assembly.

40. The National Union of Kamerun Students firmly supported the idea of entrusting a United Nations commission with the task of drawing up the electoral rolls and supervising all the stages of the plebiscite in the Southern Cameroons. It also thought that only Southern Cameroonians of at least twenty years of age should be allowed to vote and that those who were abroad should be allowed to vote by proxy or by post.

41. He went on to read out a statement adopted by the Ninth Congress of the Union, which had been held in 1958. The Congress had arrived at the conclusion that the vast majority of the inhabitants of the two Cameroons were in favour of unification and independence. It had asked for the immediate restoration of normal political life and the organization of a National Reconciliation Week in the Cameroons under French administration. It had expressed its appreciation of the support of One Kamerun and the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) for the cause of reunification and had advocated the formation of a united front to defend that cause. It had congratulated the UPC and its allied organizations on the unremitting struggle they were waging. It had decided that 20 February 1958 would be celebrated henceforth as Unification Day. It had noted with satisfaction the statement made at the All-African People's Conference held at Accra in December 1958 by the Nigerian political parties in which they had repudiated all responsibility for the deportation of the Cameroonian leaders and had supported the Cameroonian people in their struggle for national unity and independence. Lastly, the Congress had asked that a special commission of the United Nations General Assembly should be set up to organize, in the two Territories, a plebiscite before 30 June 1959 on the question of unification, and elections before November 1959 to a constituent assembly. The commission would supervise all arrangements in connexion with the plebiscite and the elections.

42. Mr. KELLY (Australia) asked Mr. Ngu how many subscription-paying members the National Union of Kamerun Students numbered.

43. Mr. NGU (National Union of Kamerun Students) replied that there were forty members in the United Kingdom, eighty in Nigeria and 1,600 in France.

44. Miss BROOKS (Liberia) asked Mr. Ntumazah whether after hearing the statements the Prime Minister of the Cameroons under French administration and the representative of France had made at the previous meeting he still adhered to that part of his statement in which he had affirmed that certain agreements concluded between France and the Cameroonian Government provided that the Cameroons would remain within the French-African community. She also asked Mr. Ntumazah whether, in the event of his party winning the elections in an independent and united Cameroons, he would pursue the same policy as the present Government.

45. Mr. NTUMAZAH (One Kamerun) said that even admission of the Cameroons to membership of the United Nations would not guarantee that the country would not remain within the French-African community. Before Mr. Ahidjo's Government had taken office France had signed numerous agreements in the name of the Cameroons, including one on the subject of the European Common Market; there was nothing in Mr. Ahidjo's statement to indicate that that agreement would be cancelled.

46. If One Kamerun took office in a Government, it would be because the people had put it in power in the knowledge that an independent State needed a Government able to negotiate and to speak in the name of the people: everything that Government would do would reflect the real wishes of the population.

47. Mr. RASGOTRA (India) asked Mr. Ntumazah what was the extent of the organization of his party; whether it was active in all parts of the Cameroons, i.e., the Cameroons under French administration and the Northern and the Southern Cameroons under British administration. He would also like to know the total membership of the party in the three parts of the Cameroons, the number of votes it had obtained during the recent elections in the Southern Cameroons, and the number of its candidates who had successfully contested the elections.

48. Mr. NTUMAZAH (One Kamerun) declared that, for his party and for himself, the artificial frontiers did not exist and the Cameroons formed one large whole. With regard to the elections, his party had not put up any candidates.

49. Mr. RASGOTRA (India) asked whether One Kamerun had boycotted the elections; if not, he wondered whether Mr. Ntumazah would take the Fourth Committee into his confidence with regard to the reasons why his party had not put up any candidates, especially since One Kamerun attached so much importance to the question of reunification, which had also been the main issue of the recent elections in the Southern Cameroons.

50. Mr. NTUMAZAH (One Kamerun) replied that it was not a matter of boycotting the elections. The members of the party had gone to the polls, as he had urged them to do in a broadcast, but they had certainly not voted for integration. The party had taken that course because it had thought proper, not to canvass for seats, but to prove to the world that the Cameroonian people supported the idea of secession.

51. Mr. KOSCZIUSKO-MORIZET (France) asked Mr. Ntumazah whether he had ever been in the Cameroons under French administration and when he had been there last.

52. Mr. NTUMAZAH (One Kamerun) said that he felt at home everywhere in the Cameroons. He often visited his elder brothers, who lived in the part under French administration, and he knew all about what went on in that part.

53. Mr. KOSCZIUSKO-MORIZET (France) pointed out that Mr. Ntumazah's statement had dealt primarily with the situation in the Cameroons under French administration, upon which he did not seem to be as competent to speak as the representatives of the Cameroonian Government.

54. Mr. Ntumazah had referred to the French-Cameroonian Conventions. At the previous meeting, however, Mr. Ahidjo had stated that those Conventions would become null and void, even the one concerning the Common Market. Of course, if the Government of an independent Cameroonian State so desired the Cameroons could remain associated with the Common Market, as the Republic of Guinea had done. He asked whether Mr. Ntumazah thought that such an association would limit the independence of a State.

55. Mr. NTUMAZAH (One Kamerun) pointed out that the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community had been signed by France and other European countries: as the Cameroons had not been consulted and had not signed the Treaty, it was not a party to the agreement.

56. Mr. TOURE (Guinea) said that, when he had left Conakry on 20 February, the Government of Guinea had not yet taken any decision on the Common Market.

57. Mr. MUFTI (United Arab Republic) asked Mr. Ntumazah whether his party was at present regarded as a legitimate party in the Cameroons under British administration or whether it had been subject to a decree of dissolution; was it allowed to function freely, and if not, what repressive measures had been taken against it?

58. Mr. NTUMAZAH (One Kamerun) replied that his party was not banned but that it was encountering all kinds of difficulties. For instance, when the Fourth Committee had granted the hearing it had requested, the party's treasurer had been arrested and £400 belonging to the party had been confiscated, with the obvious intention of preventing him from leaving the Territory. On various occasions he had had difficulties in obtaining a passport or organizing meetings.

59. Sir Andrew COHEN (United Kingdom) stated that there were no provisions against the activities of One Kamerun, but that people who happened to hold office in a political party were naturally subject to the laws of the country, like everyone else. During the month of June Mr. Ntumazah had obtained permits for twenty-one meetings.

60. Mr. NTUMAZAH (One Kamerun) said that the law should not always favour one side only. It often happened that he and the other leaders of One Kamerun were arrested without valid cause, while the parties whose programmes found favour with the Administering Authority could do as they liked. With regard to the meetings, the permits were not much use when the party funds had been seized and he was unable to buy the necessary petrol for the journeys.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.