



Monday, 7 January 1952, at 3 p.m.

Palais de Chaillot, Paris

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Chairman : Mr. Max HENRÍQUEZ UREÑA (Dominican Republic).

Report of the Trusteeship Council (A/1856)
(continued)

[Item 12]*

**JOINT DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY ARGENTINA
 AND IRAQ (A/C.4/L.176) (*continued*)**

1. Mr. ZARUBIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation would vote against the Argentine and Iraqi draft resolution (A/C.4/L.176). The addition of members to the Trusteeship Council would be contrary to the Council's rules of procedure and also to Article 86 of the Charter. According to rule 66 of its rules of procedure, the Council was empowered to establish such subsidiary organs as it deemed advisable, but the members of those organs should be members of the Council. The Fourth Committee had no authority to alter the Council's rules of procedure.

2. Mr. SCHNAKE VERGARA (Chile) said that his delegation was in favour of the draft resolution. The recommendation to the Trusteeship Council to associate countries which were not members of the Council with the activities of its subsidiary organs was a practical and constructive suggestion. If the Council associated in the work of its subsidiary organs countries which had formerly been members of the Council, the experience of those countries would continue to be of use. It would also be a practical step to associate with its work countries which would be future members of the Council. In his view the proposal did not conflict with the Council's constitution, and he recalled that countries which were not members of the Economic and Social Council took part in that body's subsidiary organs.

3. Sir Alan BURNS (United Kingdom) said that three separate ideas were expressed in the draft resolution. The first concerned Italy, which, though not a Member of the United Nations, was associated with the Trusteeship Council's work and might well be brought in to share the work of its subsidiary organs. The second was a suggestion that unless the non-permanent members of the Council were re-elected, their valuable experience was lost to the Council. The third was that

to avert that danger and to ensure the co-operation of the entire General Assembly with the Council, all Members of the United Nations should participate in the work of the Council's subsidiary organs.

4. The United Kingdom delegation was in agreement with the first of those ideas, which was implicit in the third paragraph of the preamble of the joint draft resolution, and would whole-heartedly support the participation of Italy in the Council's subsidiary organs, on the same basis as Italy participated in the work of the Council itself.

5. There was an element of truth in the second idea, but the remedy in that case was to re-elect valuable members of the Council. The chief reason why that was not done was the feeling that other countries should have an opportunity of acquiring similar experience, so that there would ultimately be available a body of experienced men whose wisdom would be of great assistance to the General Assembly in its task of supervising the Council's work. What the Council lost by the departure of retiring members was gained by the General Assembly, and by the Fourth Committee in particular.

6. With regard to the third idea, the United Kingdom delegation felt sure that every member of the General Assembly felt it his duty to take an interest in the Council's proceedings. The duties connected with the International Trusteeship System were among the most precisely defined duties of the United Nations, and all Members took them seriously. That constructive interest was best expressed in the Fourth Committee, which gave every Member State a chance of genuine participation in the Council's work. Such participation, however, did not involve interference in the Council's regular daily business. The functions and composition of the Council were clearly laid down in the Charter. It was for the Council to decide on the functions of its subsidiary organs. It would be invidious to oblige it to arrange for the participation of non-members in those organs. The Fourth Committee should confine itself to policy and general principles and should not attempt to organize the practical details of the Council's day to day work.

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

7. The United Kingdom was not in favour of paragraph 1 of the operative part of the draft resolution. It was far from clear that it would be in order for non-members of the Council to participate in the Council's subsidiary organs. Although the experience of former Council members could be helpful, the new members, unless they were allowed to think for themselves, would learn little from their period of service.

8. The United Kingdom delegation felt that the provisions in operative paragraph 2 of the joint draft resolution were unwise. The Council should be left to conduct its own business. Further, it was impossible to support, as a general principle, the participation of States not Members of the United Nations in the Council's subsidiary organs. Italy, which had been appointed an Administering Authority, was a special case. The proposal created an important precedent, possibly involving the amendment of the Charter, and could not be limited to the Trusteeship Council. Its importance was such that the sponsors of the draft resolution should more appropriately place their proposal on the General Assembly's agenda as a separate item.

9. He urged the delegations of Argentina and Iraq either to withdraw their draft resolution or not put it to the vote. If, however, the draft resolution was to be put to the vote, he wished to propose an amendment (A/C.4/L.189) which would restrict the recommendation to the particular case of Italy.

10. Mr. DE PAIVA LEITE (Brazil) said that his delegation had listened with interest to the statements made by the United Kingdom and USSR delegations in opposition to the draft resolution. Nevertheless, the Brazilian delegation whole-heartedly supported it, for there were a number of pressing reasons in its favour. The composition of the Trusteeship Council being specified in the Charter, the General Assembly was unable to increase its membership unless new Administering Authorities were created. However, at times the Council's work had been considerably impaired by its small membership. He referred in particular to the organization of visiting missions; the Council had been unable to dispatch larger and more frequent visiting missions to Trust Territories because the Council members could not spare sufficient people for sufficient periods of time. The principle whereby non-members of the Council should be allowed to participate in its subsidiary organs, including visiting missions, was therefore both sound and helpful.

11. One argument put forward against the draft resolution was that it would create a precedent. However, as the Chilean representative had pointed out, the Economic and Social Council already enjoyed the participation of non-members of the Council in its subsidiary organs. Again, the Security Council had found it useful to have Canada a member of its subsidiary organ, the Atomic Energy Commission. It was also customary for the General Assembly to include in its various subsidiary organs those countries whose co-operation it found useful. For example, countries which were neither Members of the United Nations nor

of the Economic and Social Council were included in the Executive Board of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund.

12. The United Kingdom representative had said that other Members of the United Nations should be allowed to gain experience of trusteeship affairs by being elected to the Trusteeship Council. But no provision had been made for the period of transition. Machinery should be provided for making use of the experience of the retiring country while the new member was gaining experience. The Fourth Committee would therefore be wise to adopt the draft resolution.

13. He did not intend for the time being to discuss the United Kingdom amendment (A/C.4/L.189). The draft resolution concerned the participation of non-members of the Trusteeship Council in its work. The United Kingdom amendment concentrated on the single aspect of Italy and was in fact a completely different proposal and could not be regarded as an amendment. He reserved the right of his delegation to speak on that proposal at a later stage.

14. Mr. TAJIBNAPIS (Indonesia) said that, generally speaking, his delegation supported the draft resolution in document A/C.4/L.176. It was significant that the draft was sponsored by two experienced members of the Trusteeship Council. The Council's work had gained gradually in volume and importance during the past five years. It had been obliged in that period to establish the Standing Committee on Administrative Unions and the Committee on Rural Economic Development of the Trust Territories to help to deal with its long-term problems. At the General Assembly's current session, the Fourth Committee had approved a draft resolution (A/C.4/L.165/Rev.1) asking for the establishment of a standing committee on petitions. Moreover, it would consider later a draft resolution asking the Council to make arrangements for its visiting missions to make a longer stay in the Trust Territories visited (A/C.4/L.186). Both measures entailed an increase of work for Council members. The development was gratifying, but it also imposed a heavy burden on the smaller delegations. It would be most undesirable to allow a situation to arise whereby the Council would have too much work to enable it to give adequate attention to conditions in Trust Territories.

15. The draft resolution before the Committee (A/C.4/L.176) contemplated the association of more Members of the United Nations in the Council's work. In that way, they would gain knowledge of the tasks of trusteeship which would be of value to the Fourth Committee and also of benefit to the peoples of the Trust Territories. Not least, the pressure of work on the members of the Council proper would be reduced.

16. Mr. BALLARD (Australia) said that Article 86 of the Charter provided that the Trusteeship Council should consist of the same number of Members of the United Nations which administered Trust Territories as of Members which did not administer a Trust Territory in order to ensure equal representation of Administering Authorities and non-administering Powers. That principle must be respected. It followed that the analogies of the Security Council and the

Economic and Social Council were not applicable, since the composition of those Councils was not subject to the same considerations. The Trusteeship Council had been created by the Charter as a complete organ, not requiring to be supplemented either in itself or in its subsidiary organs. If sponsors of the draft resolution and their supporters felt that the Charter was defective, they should apply the pertinent provisions for its amendment, instead of seeking to amend it by indirect means.

17. The Council had the efficiency of a small and cohesive organ. Every member was fully familiar with its task. It would be wrong to exclude any member of the Council from any part of its work, as must ensue if the recommendation in the draft resolution were adopted. Additional non-members of the Council which the draft resolution was calculated to bring in could only be Members of the United Nations which did not administer Trust Territories. If parity of representation was to be retained, they would fill the places in the Council's subsidiary organs at present held by the non-administering members of the Council. Moreover, the election of the non-administering members of the Council was the concern of the General Assembly. For the Council itself to appoint associate members from among the Members of the United Nations would conflict with that principle.

18. He felt some objection to the statement in the second paragraph of the preamble that the experience of members reached its most useful stage after three years' service on the Council. The implication was that the Administering Authorities were past their prime. The third paragraph of the preamble was in the nature of a *non sequitur*. Also, there was in fact only one State, Italy, in the position described in that paragraph. It could not be inferred from that that any State which was not a Member of the United Nations should be associated with the Council's work and should participate in its subsidiary organs in addition to members of the Council. Italy's position was unique because Italy was an Administering Authority. It could participate constructively in the subsidiary organs, and the amendment submitted by the United Kingdom (A/C.4/L.189) was therefore valuable. The desire expressed in the fourth paragraph of the preamble that the members of the General Assembly should co-operate to the full in the Council's work would not be satisfied by the association of a few members in the work of its committees.

19. He regretted that even if the points of drafting to which he had drawn attention were improved, the Australian delegation would be unable to accept the substance of the joint draft resolution and would therefore vote against it.

20. Mr. LANNUNG (Denmark), speaking as Rapporteur, suggested that the words "Members of the General Assembly", in the fourth paragraph of the preamble of the joint draft resolution, should be replaced by "Members of the United Nations" in order to conform to the language of other resolutions. He also suggested that the sponsors of the joint draft resolution should give a title to their text.

21. Mr. RYCKMANS (Belgium) said that the constitutional arguments against the draft resolution had been excellently put by the USSR representative. Only the Trusteeship Council was empowered to change its rules of procedure, a point that he himself had often had occasion to stress.

22. He supported the third paragraph of the preamble of the draft resolution, which, he assumed, referred to Italy. Italy already participated in the Council's work, without however the right to vote, and it was therefore normal and logical that its experience should be available to the Council's subsidiary organs. He was, however, unable to see any relation between the third paragraph of the preamble and paragraph 1 of the operative part of the draft resolution. It could not be deduced from the position of Italy that other non-members of the Trusteeship Council, whether or not they had ever served on the Council, should participate in its subsidiary organs. In the case of the Economic and Social Council, which had been quoted as a precedent, the work of subsidiary organs did not call for any special knowledge of the work of the Council itself. In the case of the Trusteeship Council, however, no one could give useful service on the subsidiary organs without a full knowledge of that Council's own work. Unless a country was fully acquainted with the annual reports of the Administering Authorities, it would be unable to contribute to the examination of petitions from Trust Territories or, for example, to appreciate the implications of the development of rural economy.

23. The Charter laid down that the Trusteeship Council should be a small body in which Administering Authorities and non-administering Powers were equally represented. The General Assembly was not empowered to go beyond the provisions of the Charter. In saying that the Council's work was impaired by its small membership, the Brazilian representative had made it clear that the real aim of the draft resolution was to circumvent the Charter. If it were felt that the membership of the Council should be increased, an amendment to the Charter should be proposed and no attempt should be made to get round the difficulty by increasing the number of members of the Council's subsidiary organs.

24. Although the Belgian delegation was in favour of the third paragraph of the preamble of the joint draft resolution, it could not agree with the remainder of the text and would be obliged to vote against the draft resolution as a whole.

25. Mr. PIGNON (France) said that the provisions of the Charter relating to the Trusteeship Council, a principal organ of the United Nations, required that Administering Authorities and non-administering Powers should be equally represented on it. That principle should therefore be respected in all its subsidiary organs, including the visiting missions. In that case, the draft resolution would be of no practical value since the number of the Administering Authorities was limited, and new members in the subsidiary organs would therefore merely replace the full members of the Council; that would be an unnecessary complication.

Italy, however, was in a special position and the French delegation would view favourably any proposal to associate it, where appropriate, with the activities of the Council's subsidiary organs.

26. Mr. PEREZ CISNEROS (Cuba) said that his delegation supported the draft resolution. He was unable to understand the constitutional objections raised by certain members of the Trusteeship Council. They were all the more surprising in that the Council itself had established a precedent by appointing an outsider—Mr. Eduardo Cruz-Coke of Chile—to the United Nations Visiting Mission to Western Samoa.

27. Mr. SAYRE (United States of America) stated that his delegation felt it would be unwise to adopt the proposed draft resolution. Some of its provisions were impracticable and would in fact prove harmful to the Trusteeship Council's work.

28. He assumed that the third paragraph of the preamble related to Italy. There were valid reasons in favour of that country's participation in the Council's subsidiary organs: first, it sat in the Council itself and hence was familiar with the current work and trends of opinion in that body; secondly, it had an opportunity of following up in the Council any work undertaken by its subsidiary organs. The United States delegation would therefore endorse the United Kingdom amendment, which took account of Italy's special position in the Council.

29. He was, however, doubtful about the remaining parts of the draft resolution. The Council's subsidiary organs mentioned in paragraph 2 of the operative part could be divided into two categories: standing or current committees of the Council, and visiting missions. Thus far, no difficulty had been experienced in setting up Council committees. Hence, there was no need for the proposal with respect to Council committees. Moreover, so far as the Charter provisions on balanced membership were applied to its committees, the inclusion on Council committees of representatives of non-administering countries not members of the Trusteeship Council would mean the consequent exclusion from such committees of representatives of non-administering States which were members of the Council. That would seem perhaps unfair to the latter. In practice the proposal would be very cumbersome, providing as it did for nominations by countries rather than for appointment of individuals by the Council. Furthermore, any representative thus appointed would be primarily responsible to his own government rather than responsible to the Council. The recommendation therefore seemed unnecessary, impracticable and probably injurious to the Council's work.

30. So far as visiting missions, as distinct from committees, were concerned, there would seem to be sound reasons for avoiding in so far as possible the appointment of those who did not regularly attend the Council's sessions, for in such a case the experience and knowledge gained through the visit was lost to the Council in its subsequent consideration of problems in the Trust Territories concerned. The Cuban representative had referred to the Visiting Mission to Western Samoa. The person concerned in that instance had been

appointed as an individual, not as a representative of his country—a very important distinction—and unfortunately the fruits of his experience had been lost to the Council because he could take no part in its subsequent work. For all those reasons, therefore, the proposal in paragraph 2 seemed unwise.

31. The Belgian representative had already commented on the principle underlying the draft resolution. In the interest of sound administration only members of the Council should be responsible for its work. The Council's opinions were constantly changing and under review; and if anyone unfamiliar with current developments and changing opinions were appointed to a subsidiary organ, the unfortunate result might be that the Council and its subsidiary organs would work at cross purposes.

32. Lastly, it had been suggested that the Council was too small to carry out its task. The Charter provisions were very explicit on the composition of the Council; if the draft resolution were intended as a means of evading those provisions, the United States delegation would be compelled to oppose it. Therefore, although desirous of supporting any action in favour of Italy, it would have to vote against the unamended joint draft resolution.

33. Mr. MANI (India) said he would have great pleasure in supporting the joint draft resolution. It had been made clear during the discussion that its objective was not to confer a sort of associate status on members not re-elected to the Council. The aim was to ensure that the experience gained by former members should be used to the full in the Council's subsidiary organs. There was thus no question of an attempt to nullify the provisions of Article 86 of the Charter, and he disagreed with the constitutional objections based on that premise.

34. It would perhaps be in the interest of the Council, as the United Kingdom representative had suggested, if members who had rendered meritorious service were re-elected. But the question of merit alone did not govern appointment to the Council. He would like to see as many countries as possible have the opportunity to gain experience of its work.

35. In view of the confusion that had previously existed, he submitted an amendment (A/C.4/L.190) proposing certain changes in the second paragraph of the preamble and in paragraph 2 of the operative part of the joint draft resolution. The adoption of his amendment would, he felt, remove any misunderstanding as to the aims of the draft, and at the same time meet the objection of the United States representative to operative paragraph 2.

36. Mr. MENDOZA (Guatemala) observed that his delegation's attitude was governed solely by the interests of the inhabitants of the Trust Territories. Neither the joint draft resolution nor the United Kingdom amendment appeared to contain anything that would improve the situation of those peoples. Secondly, he found difficulty in accepting the reference to experience. Experience was a highly personal, individual matter, and could not be attributed to a government simply because it had been represented by

one individual on the Trusteeship Council for a number of years. Thirdly, the citing of precedents in the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council seemed to him merely to confuse the eminently clear provisions of the Charter. Therefore, although not actively opposing the draft resolution which did not seem to be either constructive or useful, his delegation would abstain in the vote on it.

37. Similar considerations applied to the United Kingdom amendment. Moreover, there was no need for a specific recommendation that Italy should be associated in the work of the Council's subsidiary organs, since that country's lack of voting rights would automatically preclude full participation. He would accordingly abstain on that amendment too.

38. Mr. DE PAIVA LEITE (Brazil) disclaimed any intention of wishing to amend the Charter. The argument that the Charter expressly provided for a small Trusteeship Council was erroneous. If all territories in the three categories mentioned in Article 77 had been placed under the Trusteeship System, the Council's membership would have been considerably larger than it was at present. Unfortunately, not a single territory in the category mentioned in sub-paragraph c of paragraph 1 of Article 77 had as yet been voluntarily placed under trusteeship by a State responsible for its administration.

39. He assured the French representative that there was no question of upsetting the principle of balanced representation in the Council's subsidiary organs. It should be noted, however, that that principle did not derive automatically from the Charter provisions, which applied to the Council itself but not necessarily to its subsidiary organs. In any case, the Council had already renounced that principle in one instance as it had appointed one Administering Authority and two non-administering Powers to the Visiting Mission to Western Samoa.

40. He challenged the statement that no difficulty had been experienced in setting up subsidiary bodies of the Council. The Chilean Member included in the Visiting Mission to Western Samoa had been appointed only after all efforts to find a representative from among the non-administering Council members had failed. Moreover, it was through no fault of his that the Chilean member of the Visiting Mission to Western Samoa had been unable to participate subsequently in the Council's work.

41. The Brazilian delegation was convinced that the joint draft resolution, if adopted, would prove advantageous to the inhabitants of the Trust Territories, as well as to the Council's work; it was, moreover, in accordance with precedent established in the United Nations.

42. Mr. SCOTT (New Zealand) endorsed the observations made by the United States, Belgian, Australian and United Kingdom representatives. He would not repeat his delegation's constitutional objections to the draft resolution, but would merely affirm its belief that the Trusteeship Council, under Article 90 of the Charter, had full authority to establish its subsidiary organs and determine their membership.

43. He was puzzled by the terms of the third paragraph of the preamble of the draft resolution. The only non-Member State which had been associated with the Council's work was Italy, and that had resulted from that country's special status as an Administering Authority. It therefore seemed rather weak to base a general conclusion on one particular case. Another interpretation might even be that States non-members of the Council should take precedence over Council members for appointment to subsidiary organs.

44. He agreed with the Danish representative that the fourth paragraph of the preamble should be amended in conformity with the wording of the Charter (Articles 9 and 86).

45. The false analogy drawn between the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council had already been exposed by other representatives. The work of the Trusteeship Council and its subsidiary bodies, unlike that of the Economic and Social Council, was an integrated whole, concerned entirely with the administration of the Trust Territories. A prerequisite for a useful contribution to the work of the Council's subsidiary organs was therefore a knowledge of conditions in the Trust Territories, and that could best be obtained by attendance at Council sessions when annual reports were under discussion.

46. Accordingly, the New Zealand delegation would be unable to support the joint draft resolution. On the other hand, it fully endorsed the United Kingdom amendment, and in that connexion he expressed surprise at the Guatemalan representative's intention to abstain. He had understood that the Guatemalan delegation whole-heartedly supported the participation of Italy in the Council's work and hence in that of its subsidiary organs.

47. Mr. MANTILLA (Ecuador) stated that his delegation would support the joint draft resolution as a whole. In addition to the other arguments refuting the constitutional objections raised, he directed attention to rule 12 of the Council's rules of procedure which, by making provision for the participation in its work of Member States non-members of the Council that had proposed items for its agenda, seemed to open the door for the proposal in the joint draft resolution. That was a constructive procedure likely to contribute to the Council's work.

48. The United Kingdom amendment, referring exclusively to the participation of Italy in the Council's work, would deprive the draft resolution of its real substance. Italy's participation was already fully covered by the third paragraph of the preamble of the original draft. Therefore, although agreeing in principle with the United Kingdom amendment, he would abstain in the vote on it and support the joint draft resolution as a whole.

49. Mr. THEODOROPoulos (Greece) said that his delegation still had an open mind on the draft resolution. He would like clarification on two points. Would non-administering members of the Trusteeship Council be represented on all its subsidiary organs? If so, it would be impossible for other United Nations Members to participate without upsetting the principle

of balanced membership. If the contrary was the case, he wondered what opportunity they would have to acquire the experience to which so much weight was attached. Secondly, would a country not previously serving on the Council have an opportunity to be appointed to its subsidiary bodies or would that be reserved for ex-members, as the second paragraph of the preamble of the draft appeared to suggest ?

50. Mr. DORSINVILLE (Haiti) welcomed the Indian amendment which brought a much needed clarification of the objectives of the joint draft resolution. However, one difficulty still remained. The third paragraph of the preamble, although worded in general terms, obviously referred to Italy and he wondered whether it might not be more appropriate to delete that paragraph, inasmuch as the sponsors had been unable to accept the more specific United Kingdom amendment. Before deciding his position, he would like to know what countries the sponsors had in mind other than Italy.

51. Mr. PEREZCISNEROS (Cuba) found constructive ideas in all the texts submitted. The difficulty would be to choose between the alternatives without rejecting any meritorious proposal. With the object of avoiding such a choice, he submitted an amendment (A/C.4/L.191) to the United Kingdom amendment—which in itself deserved support—to the effect that the paragraphs proposed in the United Kingdom amendment should be embodied in the original joint draft resolution by way of illustrating the more general considerations stated therein. That would go far towards satisfying many views, and would at the same time render acceptable the Indian amendment, since the case of Italy would be fully covered.

52. Mr. KHALIDY (Iraq) observed that the USSR representative's objections to the joint draft resolution and, on one point, the objections of Australia and France were based on the erroneous assumption that its purpose was to add to the number of members of the Trusteeship Council and thus to violate the Charter. That had not been the intention of the sponsors of the text.

53. The USSR representative had been right in saying that only the Trusteeship Council had authority to alter its own rules of procedure. The sponsors, however, had had no intention of altering the rules of procedure. But the Council was subsidiary to the General Assembly, and the Assembly had the right to direct and criticize the Council's work and to make recommendations to it. All the draft resolution did was to ask the Council to consider the suggestions it contained and, if the Council thought fit, it would amend its rules of procedure accordingly.

54. There seemed to be a mistaken impression that the joint draft resolution was intended as a criticism of the Charter. The sponsors and supporters of the draft had said that the membership of the Council was too small, but that was not the fault of the Charter. If the intention had been to amend the Charter, the sponsors would have made a proposal to that effect, but not in the Fourth Committee, which was not the appropriate place.

55. The implication which the Australian representative had read into the second paragraph of the preamble had not been intended ; the same remark applied to the fourth paragraph of the preamble. The draft resolution was concerned with method and not with substance. Its sole object was to enable as many Members of the United Nations as possible to co-operate in the Trusteeship Council's work.

56. He gladly accepted the amendment proposed by the Indian delegation (A/C.4/L.190) and hoped that the Argentine representative would also accept it.

57. With reference to the French representative's remarks, he observed that there was no intention of disturbing the balance in the Council.

58. In reply to the Greek representative, he would say that the principle of parity would be preserved in the Council's subsidiary organs ; the proposal was that should Council members be unable to serve on a subsidiary organ, other Members of the United Nations could be called on to do so in their place. It was not intended that the invitation should be confined to States which had already served as Council members.

59. The United Kingdom representative's suggestion that the draft resolution fell into three parts was due to a misapprehension. His argument was that Members of the United Nations who had gained experience in the Council could, after leaving the Council, use that experience to good effect in the Fourth Committee. That was quite true, but it would be well if they could use their experience in the Council as well. The Council was a technical body : as all its members knew, the first year of membership was spent chiefly in learning ; some participation became possible in the second year, but really valuable participation was hardly possible before the third year.

60. The United Kingdom amendment was not, properly speaking, an amendment, but a totally new proposal. The original draft resolution did not mention Italy. There was no longer any necessity to pass resolutions concerning Italy, the question of its participation having been settled. He would, however, be able to vote for the United Kingdom proposal, as amended by Cuba, if it were submitted as a separate resolution.

61. He suggested that the joint draft resolution might be entitled " Participation of non-members of the Trusteeship Council in its subsidiary organs ".

62. He accepted the Rapporteur's suggestion that the words " United Nations " should be substituted for " General Assembly " in the fourth paragraph of the preamble.

63. Mr. LESCURE (Argentina) entirely endorsed the Iraqi representative's remarks, to which he had nothing to add. He accepted the Indian amendment as well as that of Cuba, if the United Kingdom representative would agree to it.

64. Mr. SPINELLI (Observer of the Italian Government to the United Nations) thanked the representatives of Argentina, Iraq, the United Kingdom and others for their kind references to his country. The Italian Government would always be ready to

examine every possibility of increasing its contribution to the work of the Trusteeship Council.

65. Mr. RYCKMANS (Belgium), in reply to the Iraqi representative, pointed out that States which were members of the Trusteeship Council had accepted their nomination and thus *ipso facto* had accepted all the responsibilities appertaining to membership. It was inconceivable that sufficient members to make up a subsidiary organ should not be found among the non-administering members of the Council. The Iraqi representative's description of the Trusteeship Council as a technical body was correct, but its subsidiary bodies were even more technical. If members were unable to contribute much to the Council's work during their first year of membership, it was hard to see how they were ever to gain experience if they did not participate in the work of the subsidiary organs.

66. Sir Alan BURNS (United Kingdom) was unable to accept the Cuban amendment to his amendment. He was reluctant to vote against the draft resolution lest it be thought that he took exception to the position of Italy in the Trusteeship Council. His proposed amendment made it clear that the United Kingdom welcomed Italy's participation, both in the Council and in its subsidiary organs.

67. Mr. SCHNAKE VERGARA (Chile) was unable to understand why the representatives of the Administering Authorities appeared to feel that the joint draft resolution was an attempt to modify the Charter.

68. Delegations which opposed the draft resolution had argued that the Trusteeship Council's functions and powers were laid down in the Charter, but the Charter also contained provisions concerning the structure and functions of the Economic and Social Council, and that had not prevented the latter body from making important changes in the structure of its functional commissions. All the members of the Trusteeship Council were under an obligation to participate in its work and in the work of its subsidiary organs, but whereas the Administering Authorities had technical experts who could attend various meetings, the non-administering members might not always have sufficiently large delegations for that purpose, and in that event, it would be well to be able to appoint members of other delegations to those organs.

69. He would vote for the joint draft resolution, the Indian amendment and the Cuban amendment, and would abstain on the United Kingdom proposal.

70. Mr. MANI (India) asked what was the position of the sponsors of the joint draft resolution in view of the United Kingdom representative's refusal to accept the Cuban amendment to his proposal. Mr. Mani himself felt that the Cuban amendment strengthened the draft resolution and that there should be a reference to Italy. He would vote for the Cuban amendment and against the United Kingdom amendment.

71. Mr. TAJIBNAPIS (Indonesia) agreed with the Indian representative.

72. Mr. KHALIDY (Iraq) accepted the Cuban amendment.

73. Mr. PEREZ CISNEROS (Cuba), in order to make his amendment clearer, submitted a revised text (A/C.4/L.191/Rev.1).

The revised Cuban amendment (A/C.4/L.191/Rev.1) was adopted by 27 votes to 9, with 14 abstentions.

74. Mr. BALLARD (Australia) explained that he had voted against the Cuban amendment because he preferred the United Kingdom proposal.

75. Mr. ZARUBIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that he had abstained on the Cuban amendment because the question of participation had already been decided by the Trusteeship Council and there was no necessity for any further proposals on the subject.

76. Sir Alan BURNS (United Kingdom) asked for the amended joint draft resolution to be voted on paragraph by paragraph, or in order to save time, that there should be two votes, one on sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of the third paragraph of the preamble as well as on sub-paragraph 2 (a) of the operative part, and the other on the remainder of the text.

Sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of the third paragraph of the preamble and sub-paragraph 2 (a) of the operative part were approved by 42 votes to none, with 6 abstentions.

The remainder of the joint draft resolution was approved by 26 votes to 14, with 10 abstentions.

77. Sir Alan BURNS (United Kingdom) asked for a rollcall vote on the amended joint draft resolution (A/C.4/L.176) as a whole.

A vote was taken by rollcall.

Australia, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour : Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina.

Against : Australia, Belgium, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining : China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Israel, Norway, Pakistan, Sweden.

The joint draft resolution as a whole, as amended, was approved by 25 votes to 14, with 11 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m.