



C O N T E N T S

	<i>Page</i>
Reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/1881, A/2187, A/2228, A/C.1/725, A/C.1/729, A/C.1/730 and A/C.1/732) (<i>continued</i>)	77

Chairman: Mr. João Carlos MUNIZ (Brazil).

Reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/1881, A/2187, A/2228, A/C.1/725, A/C.1/729, A/C.1/730 and A/C.1/732) (*continued*)
[Item 16(a)]*

1. The CHAIRMAN gave the floor to the representative of Israel, who wished to make a statement.
2. Mr. RAFAEL (Israel) noted that the representative of Lebanon at the previous meeting had injected into the discussion of the Korean question some references to the Palestine question which were completely unfounded. He agreed with the representative of Lebanon that the first act of deliberate aggression in United Nations history had been committed in Palestine. However, the annals of the United Nations, including statements by the Arab representatives, as well as Members of the Security Council, clearly showed that original responsibility for this aggression rested with the Arab States.
3. The CHAIRMAN, interrupting the representative of Israel, asked him to confine his remarks to a direct answer to the points raised by the representative of Lebanon.
4. Mr. RAFAEL (Israel) assured the Chairman that he would speak to the point. He declared that six Arab States had waged a war of aggression against the emerging State of Israel and were repelled. If those facts in their historical truth were applied to the situation in Korea, they might have relevance for the liberation of the Political Committee. Indeed, attempts to obscure the original responsibility for the act of aggression could only assist and encourage wider lawlessness.
5. In conclusion, Mr. Rafael hoped that the joint efforts and determination demonstrated at present in the Committee to restore peace in the Far East would be matched with the same zeal when another committee of the General Assembly took up the question

of establishment of peaceful and neighbourly relations in the Near East.

6. The CHAIRMAN declared that he could not allow interruption of the debate on the Korean question.
7. Mr. AMMOUN (Lebanon) and Mr. ZEINED-DINE (Syria) reserved their right to reply to the representative of Israel at a later stage.
8. Mr. ZAUDE (Ethiopia) stated that it was unnecessary for him to examine the Korean question in detail, inasmuch as the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and other countries who associated themselves with those representatives, had already spoken exhaustively on the question. Furthermore, he found it hardly necessary to reply to the surprising suggestion that the South Koreans were the aggressors, since a long and careful examination of the problem by the United Nations and the calculated refusal of the North Korean authorities to co-operate with the United Nations had clearly established the facts. He repudiated the allegation that by supporting South Korea his country was abetting aggression.
9. Ethiopia, in response to the call of the United Nations, had not only contributed funds to relieve suffering in Korea, but also had despatched an active fighting force to that country. The sole reason which motivated Ethiopia's participation in the campaign was the desire to safeguard the principles of collective security and to strengthen the authority of the United Nations. Moreover, Ethiopia's Emperor was a firm believer in the principles of collective security and was convinced that through such collective action alone could the peace and security of all nations, particularly the smaller ones, be guaranteed. Consequently, the prompt action taken by the United Nations to defend a small nation such as Korea against aggression, was a source of gratification, and Ethiopia was satisfied to have made a contribution however modest to further that noble cause.
10. Mr. Zaude pointed out that his Government and people were watching with deep concern the course

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

of the armistice negotiations. Considering the many lives that were lost in defence of the principles of the United Nations, the Member States should not allow the negotiations to fail to achieve the purpose of the United Nations in going to Korea.

11. The United Nations Command had made considerable progress in the armistice negotiations with the North Korean authorities. It had taken a firm but reasonable position. The main objectives of the Unified Command, as pointed out by the representative of the United States, were: first to bring the fighting to an end on a basis which achieves the purpose of repelling the aggression; second, to get the maximum possible assurance against a renewal of the fighting; and third, to bring about a fair exchange of prisoners. The Ethiopian delegation fully agreed with these objectives.

12. Regarding the question of repatriation of prisoners, Mr. Zaude stated that the Geneva Convention referred to by some delegates had been intended primarily to protect the rights of the individual prisoner, rather than the interests of the State to which the individual prisoner belonged. He argued further that if a prisoner of war wished to return to his homeland all members agreed that his wish must be respected. In that case why was not the prisoner's wish to be respected if he desired not to return to his homeland? Surely there was a fundamental inconsistency in not recognizing this correlative opinion.

13. It was due to these considerations that his delegation had co-sponsored the 21-Power draft resolution which was then under discussion (A/C.1/725). He appealed to those members who held contrary opinions to reconsider their position and agree with the views expressed by the majority with a view to ending the slaughter in Korea. Paying tribute to the United Nations forces in Korea, he reminded the members of the Committee of the achievement of the United Nations in vindicating the principle of collective security and urged that it was the duty of all members to seek to achieve not only an immediate end of the conflict but also a peace in conformity with the principles of the Charter.

14. Mr. SEVILLA SACASA (Nicaragua) observed that no one had expected at the time of the creation of the United Nations, that within five years the Security Council would be obliged to take action on 25 June 1950 to repel the aggression which occurred in Korea. Inasmuch as it was one of the purposes of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security and to use effective collective measures in order to prevent and eliminate threats to peace and to suppress acts of aggression wherever and whenever it occurred, the action of the Security Council was unavoidable when the North Korean invasion took place.

15. The sacrifices and efforts of the United Nations had not been in vain since the aggressors had been repelled by the collective action taken. Moreover, they had been warned that resolute action would be forthcoming in the face of any new aggression.

16. The war in Korea, Mr. Sevilla Sacasa continued, was not an ordinary war between two States or a group of States; nor was it a regional war. The

aggressors in Korea challenged and ignored the authority of the United Nations. Thus, on one side fought the Communist aggressors, and on the other side the world organization, whose main function it was to supervise peace and condemn any act of aggression.

17. The aim of the discussion in the Committee was to contribute toward the unification and rehabilitation of Korea, which obviously could not be achieved in a climate which was not peaceful. However, an armistice concluded on honourable and just bases would aid in the achievement of these objectives.

18. The issue of the repatriation of prisoners of war was the last obstacle in the negotiations at Panmunjom, as the USSR delegation, as well as the Sino-Korean Command, had asserted. This issue was in essence a juridical question. Mr. Vyshinsky had wished to condition the conclusion of an armistice on the return of prisoners of war, and the return of the prisoners of war on a whim which had nothing to do with international law. The question was whether the prisoners of war should be given the right to decide where they wished to go once their captivity had ended.

19. In international law the question of prisoners of war had been regulated by means of several multi-partite treaties. Moreover, international law possessed a body of rules governing warfare, which included the practices, customs and international conventions which should be applied during hostilities.

20. Citing a number of conventions and rules relating to prisoners of war, Mr. Sevilla Sacasa observed that all of these were intended, in letter and spirit, to safeguard the welfare of prisoners, including their right to choose their disposition.

21. The representatives of the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Poland, had quoted Article 7 of the Geneva Convention of 1949 under which prisoners of war could in no circumstances renounce their rights under the Convention. This did not mean, however, that repatriation should be carried out by force. Here again the Convention was subscribed to in the interests of prisoners and not of States.

22. Turning his attention to Mr. Vyshinsky's remark (514th meeting) that prisoners of war would not be able freely to choose their disposition, Mr. Sevilla Sacasa recalled that the letter of the Unified Command of 20 October 1952 to the Sino-Korean High Command was very fair and equitable. Also, Mr. Acheson (512th meeting) had supported the establishment of an impartial organ to give effect to the classification of prisoners of war. The good faith displayed by the Unified Command and the United States delegation was irrefutable. Would not the attitude of the USSR delegation put the members of the Committee in doubt as to the sincerity of its desire for an armistice?

23. The Nicaraguan Government was a co-sponsor of the 21-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/725), and sincerely supported all the proposals incorporated therein. It was also in favour of all proposals which might contribute to the establishment of peace in the Far East on a basis of good faith and honour.

24. In conclusion, Mr. Sevilla Sacasa asserted that his delegation warmly applauded the plan of the Presi-

dent of Mexico (A/C.1/730) and also favoured the commission proposed by the representative of Peru (A/C.1/732).

25. Mr. GHALEB (Egypt) recalled that the Committee had before it several draft resolutions, and probably several more were pending. Egypt, whose sole objective was peace, had endeavoured along with the other Arab-Asian nations, to aid in the efforts to bring about a solution to the present world tension.

26. He also recalled that the representative of Egypt on the First Committee, when the Committee was discussing the Korean problem about eight months before the armed attack was launched on 25 June 1950 in Korea, had made the following observation: first, that both South and North Koreans earnestly desired the independence and unification of Korea; secondly, that the tension along the 38th parallel was such that hostilities were apt to break out at any moment; and thirdly, that the situation demanded the exercise of wisdom by the great Powers. Hostilities had in fact occurred and had resulted in the present impasse.

27. The negotiations for an armistice which had started 15 months ago had the effect of lessening the human toll, but for the last five months one single issue, namely, the question of the repatriation of prisoners of war, had blocked the achievement of an armistice. While the United Nations advocated the principle of non-forcible repatriation, basing itself on the interpretation of all articles of the Geneva Convention in favour of the prisoner for whose sake the agreement was drawn up, the Sino-Korean Command and their supporters advocated repatriation *in toto*, evidently relying on the text of some of the articles of the Convention. Both sides had advanced legal arguments, which however were not totally convincing to his delegation. A solution would be possible if all the elements of doubt about both forcible repatriation and forcible detention were removed.

28. The Egyptian delegation offered the following observations: (a) the principle of a peace settlement in the Korean question was not a matter of disagreement; (b) there was no victor and no vanquished in this war, and, therefore, no question of face-saving on either side; (c) both sides had suffered and were still suffering great losses while the Committee was deliberating on legal points; (d) the men killed were not only Koreans, but also the nationals of many other countries; and (e) the objective of the Committee was to stop the fighting in Korea by finding a solution, not by drafting a resolution.

29. On the basis of these observations, the following suggestions could be considered: first, the immediate release and exchange of uncontested prisoners of war on both sides; second, the immediate release of all other prisoners of war into the demilitarized area, where they would be briefed on the facts of the situation by an impartial body containing representatives from both sides; third, the prisoners would thus be able to choose freely between the North and the South. Those choosing the South would be allowed to proceed only if the impartial body found them to be insisting on forcibly resisting repatriation. Finally, those who returned would be treated as free citizens and would not be subject to draft into any armed

forces during the armistice period. This plan, in effect, would provide for non-forcible screening, non-forcible detention, and non-forcible repatriation.

30. Mr. BARANOVSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) declared that the Korean question had continued to be the most important problem in international relations for more than two years. Millions were aware of the threat to peace which continuation of the Korean war represented. American aggression in Korea constantly threatened to spread to other areas. The USSR had consistently striven for a peaceful settlement and an end to that war. The American ruling circles, however, sought to extend their aggression. That was the reason for the deadlock in the armistice negotiations, for which the United States must bear responsibility. The United States must furthermore bear responsibility for continuation of the war.

31. Mr. Baranovsky noted no change in the attitude of the United States and stated that Mr. Acheson had said nothing concerning concrete conditions for a cease-fire and an armistice in Korea. Mr. Acheson had instead brought up the question of the prisoners of war, and had reopened the question of responsibility for the Korean war. The United States should be satisfied with the fact that an obedient majority in the General Assembly had declared that the real victims of aggression, the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China were the aggressors. The "liberating mission" of the United States in Korea had been revealed for what it really was: American expansion by force. It was clear that American policy was directed against all the peace-loving peoples of the world.

32. The policy of the United States to bring about an extension of its aggression, however, was encountering difficulties. The governments supporting the United States in its aggression in Korea were finding it more and more difficult to explain the situation to their own people, as even the representative of the Philippines had admitted. The fact that the aggressor had again found it necessary to seek new falsified evidence of his innocence in itself made it clear that that attempt to shift the responsibility was hopeless. Mr. Acheson's statement was an admission of the collapse of the American adventure in Korea. It was the speech of a defendant trying to counter the condemnation of world public opinion. Mr. Acheson had also avoided answering the question which was more and more insistently being asked throughout the world: for what purpose was the war in Korea being waged?

33. Other delegations had attempted to support Mr. Acheson. However, all the supposed evidence that had been adduced had been refuted by Mr. Vyshinsky, who had exposed its false and mendacious character. In that connexion, Mr. Baranovsky noted that the main evidence cited by Mr. Lloyed (515th meeting) to support the claim that South Korea was the victim of aggression was the Commission's report of 24 June 1950 (A/1350, annex 4). The statement of the military observers that the South Korean army had been deployed in defensive positions had been cited. What could the response be to the conclusions of the observers, which were based exclusively on circumstantial evidence. According to them, the South Koreans had supposedly

been entirely peace-loving and innocent and had made no attempt to prevent a North Korean attack. It was notable, however, that no evidence had been submitted concerning the preparation of any attack from North Korea. The careful selection of material from the report of the Commission to illustrate the lack of military preparedness of the South Korean army was in itself suspicious, and showed that the aggressors had endeavoured to prepare proof of their innocence in advance. Thus Mr. Lloyd had deliberately passed over the portion of the Commission's report concerning the state of the South Korean forces. That report contained much evidence of the fact that the United States authorities had assisted the reactionary Syngman Rhee Government in preparing its troops. That preparation had been carried out with care and according to a plan.

34. According to the report of the United Nations Commission of 1949 (A/936), as early as that year South Korea was supposed to have a regular army of 200,000 men, armed and trained by the Americans, in addition to a sizable police force, a militarized youth corps and naval units. The training of the armed forces of South Korea had been intensified towards the end of 1949. In that connexion, Mr. Baranovsky cited the figures given in that report on the appropriations for the maintenance of the army in the 1949-50 fiscal period. Despite its obvious bias against the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, the United Nations Commission had not passed over in silence the facts indicating the preparation of an attack against North Korea. Its report noted the intensification of the pace of rearmament by the South Korean Government, which had requested the United States to increase its military assistance. The United States had heeded that call, had poured new quantities of armaments into South Korea and had expanded its military mission. By May 1950, the preparations for the attack against North Korea had been completed.

35. According to the Commission's report, the United States military advisers in Korea had been firmly convinced of the absolute supremacy of the South Korean armed forces over those of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea. In that connexion, Mr. Baranovsky cited also a recent book published by a former State Department employee, John Caldwell, quoting a United States intelligence officer as having declared that the South Koreans were not only able to repel any attack from the North but could seize Pyongyang within two weeks if they so wished.

36. A large scale propaganda campaign had been undertaken simultaneously with the military preparations for aggression against North Korea. The responsible political leaders of South Korea had repeatedly made statements about the inevitability of civil war and calling for the use of force to unify Korea, as the United Nations Commission's 1949 report made clear.

37. All North Korean attempts to reach agreement on the unification of Korea had invariably failed because of the Syngman Rhee government's policy, which sought to destroy by force the People's Democratic Republic of Korea. Having completed preparations for aggression in the spring of 1950, the Rhee régime had provoked various border clashes, culminating in the attack on North Korea.

38. The Security Council's illegal decision of 27 June 1950 (S/1511) had been referred to as evidence of the supposed guilt of North Korea. As had been demonstrated by Mr. Vyshinsky, however, the United States representatives had rushed the Council into adopting a decision condemning North Korea, without any evidence, fearing that a proper consideration of the matter, with the participation of the representative of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, would frustrate the plan of aggression. For the same reason, the United States Government had violated the Constitution of the United States by entering the war without securing the agreement of the United States Congress, and had confronted it with an accomplished fact. Mr. Baranovsky cited a statement to that effect published recently in the Congressional record. The Korean war had been needed by the American financial and industrial circles to avert an impending economic crisis.

39. There was no evidence to support Mr. Acheson's slanderous fabrication. Indeed, the United States Secretary of the Navy in a speech of 29 October 1952 had revealed that the United States had to fight in Korea in order to avoid fighting elsewhere.

40. The United States had exploited the war in Korea in order to undertake an unprecedented armaments race. Mr. Stevenson, the Democratic candidate for the Presidency of the United States had recognized that fact in the April 1952 issue of *Foreign Affairs*. The role of the Korean conflict in the plans of the industrial, financial and commercial circles of the United States had been brought out in several issues of the reactionary American weekly, *United States News and World Report*, as well as by numerous other statements in the United States. The indisputable fact was that the American monopolists did not want an armistice in Korea, fearing that the cessation of hostilities might have catastrophic consequences for the United States economy, which depended so much on the expansion of war production. That was why the American side had proposed armistice conditions designed to be rejected by the Korean side.

41. The whole course of the negotiations had been marked by an uninterrupted series of obstacles erected by the Americans. In order to force the Korean side to make concessions, the American Military Command had expanded its programme of air bombardment aimed not only at the deliberate destruction of cities, but also designed to destroy indiscriminately towns and villages and even isolated houses. Unremitting air-raids, bacterial weapons and napalm bombs had all been used to break the resistance of the Korean people. The Americans had made new demands as soon as previous ones had been disposed of. Similarly, the provocative attitude of the United States representatives in the negotiations could only be explained by the desire to bring about a collapse of the negotiations. Only extraordinary forbearance on the Korean side and the concessions made by that side had enabled the reaching of the actual agreement on more than sixty points at issue. Thus, the United States Chief of Naval operations in July 1952 had recognized that an armistice would be concluded in Korea mainly because the Communists wanted an armistice to be concluded.

42. The United States ruling circles had availed themselves of the prisoners-of-war issue to bring about a collapse of the negotiations. The United States side had started with the ludicrous demand for an exchange on a one for one basis. The Americans had later provoked other disputes on the issue in order to retain as many prisoners as possible. Finally, they had settled on the so-called humanitarian approach to repatriation as an excuse to retain prisoners of war. They had talked about the right of prisoners of war to select whether they would go home, in other words, the right to commit treason against the fatherland.

43. The theme had been taken up by various representatives in the First Committee in order to conceal the unwillingness of the United States Government to allow any prisoners of war the right of repatriation and to justify forcible retention of the prisoners, and thus to bring about a collapse of the negotiations. The excuse presented for the so-called right of free selection was that the majority of the prisoners did not want to be repatriated, fearing persecution and even death. That slander could not remain unanswered. Mr. Baranovsky repeated his delegation's categorical protest (511th meeting) against the refusal of the Americans and their partners in aggression to allow the representatives of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea to participate in the consideration of the Korean question in the First Committee. Fearing exposure, the aggressor had thus deprived that Government of the possibility of refuting in the United Nations the slanderous fabrication made against it, and had prevented the First Committee from hearing the truth about the atrocities committed by troops of the interventionists in Korea.

44. By bringing up the principle of voluntary repatriation the United States delegation had not only violated the Geneva Convention of 1949 but had in fact repudiated articles 51 and 52 of the draft armistice, which had already been agreed to by the United States. Those articles called for repatriation of all prisoners of war, and allowed exceptions only in respect of those prisoners of Korean nationality with homes in territories controlled by the detaining party. Mr. Baranovsky noted that article 7 of the Geneva Convention stipulated that prisoners could not waive the right to repatriation and that all would be repatriated upon the conclusion of hostilities. That was a position to which the Soviet Union had constantly adhered.

45. The Australian representative's attempt (516th meeting) to find an instance of inconsistency in the USSR's position on the question of repatriation, had been unsuccessful. Mr. Baranovsky cited the texts of the two war-time ultimatums, issued by the Soviet Government to German forces surrounded near Stalin-grad and Budapest, which made it clear that the guarantees mentioned in them were conditions offered to the enemy to induce him to capitulate. Those guarantees had been a generous concession not called for by any rules or usages of war, and they were given to avert needless bloodshed. There was nothing in common between such conditions offered to induce an enemy to surrender and the repatriation of war-prisoners.

46. The true issue was the attempt by the United States Military Command illegally and forcibly to retain the prisoners of war under cover of humanitarian considerations. In violation of the Geneva Convention, the United States Command had conducted forcible interrogation, screening and classification of prisoners of war, using methods which were tantamount to forcing the prisoners to declare that they did not want to go home, in order to justify the retention of those prisoners. The answer had been the mass resistance offered by the prisoners of war held on Koje island. The USSR and Polish representatives (514th and 517th meetings) had already adduced evidence demolishing the allegation that the disturbances in the camps on 18 February and 7 May 1952 had been caused by the Communists to prevent the majority of the captives from stating freely their unwillingness to go home. In reality, the Korean and Chinese patriots had done everything they could to fight against the violence of the United States Command and for their right to be repatriated. The scope of the resistance showed the true desires of the prisoners. Mr. Lloyd had had to recognize that fact. The desire of the prisoners to be repatriated was so great that none of the brutal methods used had been able to break their resistance.

47. Dealing with Mr. Lloyd's account of his visit to the camps in Korea, Mr. Baranovsky pointed out that Mr. Lloyd had only talked to prisoners who had already passed through the brutal screening process, which was of such a nature that it could hardly be expected that those who had gone through it would express their will freely, particularly in the presence of those who had tortured them. The United Kingdom representative had not established contact with those war prisoners who, despite the brutalities to which they had been subjected, nevertheless demanded repatriation. Had Mr. Lloyd failed to discover a single prisoner among the tens of thousands being held, who wanted to go home, or were they all prepared to resist repatriation by force? Such primitive attempts to defend the position of the United States interventionists were ludicrous. The truth was that the struggle in the camps was continuing because of the efforts of the United States Command to go on with the forcible interrogations and screening. The list of questions asked of the prisoners was obviously provocative in nature. How could prisoners of war express their free will when even United States officials admitted that the treatment received by the prisoners in the camps was barbarous? International law and the Geneva Convention recognized that, even in conditions where all the provisions of the convention were strictly observed, the status of prisoners of war did not permit a free expression of will. Mr. Lloyd had recognized that fact in dealing with article 7 of the Convention, but had tried to argue that that article could not limit the right of asylum for political reasons. The status of prisoners of war was, however, quite different from that of political emigrés and exiles, inasmuch as the latter sought sanctuary as a result of persecution for political activity in their home country. The allegation that some of the prisoners feared persecution in their home country was based on indoctrination of those prisoners, with the aim of making them fear the consequences of repatriation. The attempted transformation of prisoners into political exiles

was designed to circumvent the clear stipulation of the Geneva Convention.

48. The fact that prisoners were being given compulsory military training in American camps in Korea had been passed over in silence. Referring to a press report in that connexion, Mr. Baranovsky pointed out that there would be no reason for the American Military Command to impose such training if it intended to repatriate the prisoners. Such training was concrete evidence of the fact that there could be no question of free expression of will by the prisoners, whom the American Command wished to transfer into the armies of Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek.

49. Mr. Acheson's statement that the interventionists in Korea were prepared to solve the question of the prisoners of war on any basis, provided it included the principle of non-forcible repatriation, merely amounted to saying that agreement could be reached if the American ultimatum of forcible retention of war prisoners were accepted. It went without saying that it was impossible to reach agreement on the basis of such an ultimatum.

50. Consideration of the Korean question had shown serious differences between the views of the USSR and the countries of the People's Democracy on the one hand and those of the aggressive American-British bloc on the other. To force the General Assembly into endorsing the American stand, the interventionists had undertaken large-scale military operations in Korea on the eve of the present session. The heroic resistance of the Korean people had, however, frustrated that design. Even the reactionary American Press recognized that the military situation in Korea was not at present to the advantage of the aggressors. To save their military prestige and to wreak revenge for the military defeat they had suffered, the American aggressors had carried out a provocative air raid on the territory of the Chinese People's Republic on 26 October 1952. Having committed themselves to extension of aggression in the Far East, the American imperialists were detaining the prisoners of war so as to use them as cannon fodder in new military adventures. The recent announcement of the American Command setting up a sea zone was clearly to the detriment of USSR interests, and the responsibility for the consequences of that act lay fully on the United States Government.

51. The Ukrainian SSR delegation repudiated the United States draft resolution, which was founded on the forcible retention of war prisoners, because it held that international agreements must be observed and it adhered to the generally recognized standards of international law. His Government regarded a peaceful settlement of the Korean question as an essential preliminary condition for the unification, and particularly the rehabilitation, of Korea. Such a settlement must be carried out by the Korean themselves. Analysing the provisions of the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/729), which would permit a fair, just and peaceful settlement of the Korean question through an impartial United Nations Commission on which the countries concerned as well as others would be represented, he stated that his delegation would support that proposal.

52. Mr. VLAHOVIC (Yugoslavia) stated that the United Nations and world public opinion were aware of the fact that the Yugoslav delegation had taken an attitude with regard to the Korean question which was based on the interest which the people of Yugoslavia and all other peoples had in safeguarding world peace.

53. In considering the Korean question, the Yugoslav delegation believed that the roots of the conflict must be sought in the methods followed in solving the problems of peace and war during the Second World War. Two mistaken conceptions had been developed at the conferences held by the great Powers in Teheran, Yalta, Moscow and Berlin. The first was that it was possible for the great Powers to pursue a policy of spheres of interest without the assent of the smaller nations. The second was that only the great Powers could make decisions concerning international problems. Consequently, the problems of the Second World War had not been solved, although post-war events had made it urgently desirable to find a solution, for example, to the problem of Germany and Austria in Europe and Korea in Asia, as well as a series of other international questions.

54. Mr. Vlahovic said those two misconceptions inevitably led to an aggravation of relations between the great Powers. As an example, an analysis of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union showed that those two principles were the cornerstones on which it was built. The prolonged insistence of the Soviet Union on carrying out those principles had created a situation in Asia which was now the subject of the discussion in that Committee and had found expression in a number of European problems, including the attitude of the USSR towards Yugoslavia. So long as a great Power insisted upon taking decisions concerning the fate of small nations without consulting the people concerned, there would exist the constant danger of aggravating existing conflicts and creating new ones.

55. The question of the responsibility for the aggression in Korea, in the opinion of the Yugoslav delegation, was closely connected with that problem. It was a positive fact that world public opinion, enlightened by numerous recent experiences, did not pardon the aggressor nor would it put up with aggression. The pressure exerted by millions of men demonstrated that it was not profitable to be an aggressor, and thus draw upon one's self the hatred of millions of human beings. The discussions held in the United Nations since 1950 on the Korean question had shown that it was neither agreeable to be accused of aggression nor to participate in it.

56. It was not by chance that Mr. Vyshinsky, as well as the representatives of Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Ukrainian SSR, had spoken so much about the history of the Korean war and the aggression there, quoting various declarations and documents. It was a historical fact that the German Government, together with the German High Command, had tried in 1941 to prove on the basis of certain documents and declarations that the USSR had prepared an attack against Hitlerite Germany. However, everyone knew that Germany had attacked the Soviet Union without warning and that the democratic forces of

the world thereupon closed ranks beside the Soviet Union throughout the war.

57. Mr. Vlahovic stated that public opinion knew that North Korean troops, on 25 June 1950, had crossed the 38th parallel to invade South Korea. There was of course also the opinion, occasionally expressed, to the effect that the North Korean Army had attacked South Korea in order to prevent a South Korean attack. That opinion was supported by those who believed that South Korea was engaged in preparing for war. He had referred to that opinion merely in order to stress the fact that if it were true, the attack still would not have been justified. World public opinion, with reason, identified preventive war with aggression, and the Korean experience should serve as a lesson to political and military leaders who might favour the use of preventive war. The only means that would lead to the solution of conflicts was that provided by the Charter, which envisaged the use of all possible peaceful means.

58. The representative of Yugoslavia recalled that his delegation was a member of the Security Council when the Korean war commenced. His delegation then had immediately proposed (S/1500) that hostilities should cease and that the troops engaged therein should be withdrawn to their original positions. Two days later, they repeated their proposal (S/1509) for a cease-fire and mediation, and had maintained that position throughout the discussions on Korea in the Security Council and at the fifth session of the General Assembly. Unfortunately, the Yugoslav proposal did not receive the necessary support, although it had drawn its inspiration from a desire to solve the conflict by peaceful means and to prevent it from becoming a threat to world peace. If the Governments of North Korea and those States supporting it had accepted that proposal, the question of their responsibility for the aggression would not have arisen. Nevertheless, events took a different turn, and the question of responsibility did arise.

59. The position of the Yugoslav delegation was based on the belief that the Korean problem should not be allowed to become the exclusive problem of certain Powers, but must remain that of the United Nations as a whole. The conflict must be settled by peaceful means. To unify Korea by force would only aggravate the international situation and would not respect the will of the Korean people.

60. Mr. Vlahovic noted that Mr. Vyshinsky, although not mentioning Yugoslavia by name, had referred to the position of the Yugoslav delegation in the Security Council on 25 June 1950. At that time its position had been violently assailed by the Soviet Union. Now, however, Mr. Vyshinsky admitted to an extent that that position was justified.

61. The representative of Yugoslavia observed that it was characteristic of Soviet Union foreign policy to show no realism in evaluating international events. That was demonstrated in Mr. Vyshinsky's last statement (514th meeting). The fact that Soviet Union foreign policy did not take the concrete situation into account and evaluate situations in a realistic fashion inevitably had led that Government to commit one error after another. The Korean war was one of the most serious of those errors.

62. With regard to Korea, he said, there was another factor which characterized Soviet Union foreign policy in general, i.e., the continuation of the former Czarist policy, based on the establishment of spheres of influence. In February 1945, at Yalta, an agreement was concluded under which, *de facto*, the Soviet Union and the United States divided up the Far East into spheres of influence. Seven months later during the meeting at Potsdam, the demarcation line between the USSR zone of occupation and that of the United States in Korea was fixed at the 38th parallel. The USSR had taken from Czarist diplomacy the policy of division of spheres of influence based on existing geographical lines.

63. Mr. Vlahovic did not think that the striking coincidence between Czarist and Soviet diplomacy was an accident. He quoted from a statement made on 3 September 1945 by Stalin in the course of which he said: "The defeat of the Russian Army in 1904 . . . has left bitter memories in the minds of our people . . . The people have awaited that day when Japan would be beaten . . . We, the men of the old generation, have awaited that day for forty years". He also read a quotation from an article published in *Pravda* on 1 October 1945 elaborating on Stalin's statement. Mr. Vlahovic pointed out, however, that Lenin had condemned Russian imperialism for having pushed the Russian people into the Russo-Japanese war. What Lenin once condemned, Stalin and his comrades later glorified, and the only error in the Czarist régime would seem to lie in the fact that it lost the war.

64. In speaking of mistaken conceptions in the foreign policy of the USSR, the Yugoslav delegation was aware of the fact that the Western Powers, too, had committed errors in their foreign policies. The difference lay in the fact that the former, in the pursuit of its aggressive policy, covered it with the cloak of a struggle for justice, peace and the protection of the small nations. A solution to the Korean question would be found if the great Powers would refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of small countries.

65. He recalled that a strong movement for national liberation had been in existence in Korea for many years. For sixty years the Korean people had resisted foreign domination and struggled for political independence. Although that struggle had not yet been successful, it was not the fault of the Korean people. Thus, when seeking a solution to end the Korean war, the Committee should first consider the interests of the Korean people themselves. That truth was overlooked even by the Governments which had been set up in Korea. The Government of North Korea had subjected its policy to subserve the interests of the Soviet Union, and by doing so had become an instrument in the hands of foreigners and no longer served its own people in their struggle for independence and freedom. Likewise, the report (A/2187) of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea revealed weak characteristics in the Government in South Korea, in particular regarding the internal administration of the country. The Yugoslav delegation believed that neither the Governments in South Korea nor in North Korea had found the strength to achieve independence for Korea and to safeguard the right of its people to develop independently. If really free elections were to be held, the Korean people would choose a democratic

régime whose policy would be different from those pursued to date by either of the Governments.

66. It was the duty of the United Nations to assist the Korean people, once the armistice had been signed and the war concluded, to find a proper solution in their own interests. The war, from the point of view of the Korean people, had imperilled the achievements which they had realized during their long years of struggle. From the point of view of the maintenance of world peace, it had increased both the tension throughout the world and the threat of a new world war. Thus, the question of the internal government of Korea was of interest only to the Korean people. It was not sufficient merely to achieve Korean unity, but such unity must be based on the principles of true independence and democracy.

67. Turning to the question of the armistice, Mr. Vlahovic noted that the one remaining issue centred around the question of the disposal of the prisoners of war. During the debate, certain representatives had confined their remarks to either the juridical aspects or the humanitarian element of the question. In the opinion of the Yugoslav delegation, a solution must be found which was juridical, political and humanitarian.

68. Although, for example, the question of the return of Yugoslav prisoners of war after the Second World War was not exactly comparable, he thought mentioning his Government's experience would be useful. A great number of Yugoslav soldiers and officers had been taken away after the conquest of Yugoslavia in 1941 by the armies of Hitler and Mussolini. A certain number of them did not return to Yugoslavia after the war. Yugoslavia had never demanded that they be forcibly repatriated. Nevertheless, what did disquiet the Yugoslav Government was the way in which the prisoners were influenced in their decision. Elements hostile to Yugoslavia were given every liberty to influence them while the representatives of Yugoslavia were hampered in contacting them. Thus, because of the coercion exercised upon them, certain prisoners had cut themselves off from their country, homes and families. From reports originating in Korea, it could be concluded that a similar practice was being employed there.

69. He believed the smallest possible number of people should be separated from their homes and families, and a solution to the problem should be found which would permit each prisoner to make his own decision freely.

70. The true objective of the Geneva Convention was to protect the prisoners. If the Committee were to follow the spirit of the Convention and not merely stick to the letter, it would have positive results. The Yugoslav delegation did not believe that the question of the renunciation by prisoners of rights which were theirs could be raised in the Committee. Likewise no one could oblige them to use generally or at any given time their right of repatriation, because then it would become a duty rather than a right of theirs. Mr. Vlahovic observed incidentally that he had received, during the seventh session of the General Assembly, several letters from Yugoslavs, formerly prisoners of war, in the United States who wished to be repatriated.

71. The Yugoslav delegation believed that the Committee must adhere to the principle of the obligatory

release of all prisoners after the conclusion of an armistice and the obligatory repatriation of all those who wished to be repatriated. Likewise it must be made impossible for coercion to be exercised, and an impartial commission should verify that all prisoners who refused to be repatriated really freely exercised their will.

72. It was generally believed that the conclusion of an armistice depended upon the solution of the prisoner-of-war issue. The public wondered why the question was so complicated. However, there was a more decisive problem—the issue of peace or the continuation of war. In that connexion, two facts should be noted. First, during the time the question had been discussed, the war had resulted in more casualties than the total number of prisoners to be repatriated. It was clear that if a solution were not found, the number of victims would continue to increase and would far exceed the number of prisoners forming the subject of the deliberation. Secondly, public opinion hoped a solution would be found and expected that the Governments of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, upon whom the solution in the last analysis depended, would show a greater breadth of view and more goodwill. If the question were not solved, the impression would gain ground that the question of the prisoners of war was not the principal issue but that behind it were concealed other more serious problems.

73. The Yugoslav delegation considered that the draft resolution presented by the twenty-one Powers (A/C.1/725), the action taken by the delegations of Mexico (A/C.1/730) and Peru (A/C.1/732) and by the Arab and Asian countries reflected the desires of those governments to find a way which would lead to a solution of the Korean problem. Although various objections could be levelled against those proposals and policies, the interest which those governments had in the maintenance of peace could not be denied. The Yugoslav delegation would wait until the conclusion of the discussion before taking any position on the several draft resolutions. The pacific settlement of the Korean question would assure to a greater extent the maintenance of peace in the Balkans, in Europe and throughout the world.

74. The interest shown by Yugoslavia and by all the other States in the peaceful settlement of the Korean question signified that peace in the world was indivisible and that the war was not and could not remain an isolated incident. Every attempt at a unilateral change in the situation by military means involved the danger of spreading the conflict. A peaceful solution would contribute greatly to strengthening the prestige of the United Nations and the confidence of the people of the world in the possibility of maintaining world peace. It would signify the beginning of the solution of all the complex questions of the Far East.

75. Mr. Vlahovic concluded that for those reasons the Yugoslav delegation hoped that the States having primary responsibility for the Korean situation would make another effort to find a way out of the deadlock in order that the armistice might be concluded as rapidly and as effectively as possible.

The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.