

# GENERAL ASSEMBLY

SEVENTH SESSION

Official Records



## FIRST COMMITTEE, 510th

MEETING

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*Chairman: Mr. João Carlos MUNIZ (Brazil).*

#### Election of the Vice-Chairman

[Item 5]\*

1. The CHAIRMAN introduced the Secretary of the Committee, Dr. Protitch, Principal Director in charge of the Department of Security Council Affairs.
2. Mr. CHARLONE (Uruguay) nominated Mr. van Langenhove (Belgium).
3. Mr. PALAR (Indonesia) supported the nomination.

*Mr. Fernand van Langenhove (Belgium) was elected Vice-Chairman by acclamation.*

#### Election of the Rapporteur

[Item 5]\*

4. Mrs. PANDIT (India) nominated Mr. Thors (Iceland).
5. Mr. VLAHOVIC (Yugoslavia) supported the nomination.

*Mr. Thor Thors (Iceland) was elected Rapporteur by acclamation.*

6. Mr. THORS (Rapporteur) expressed his appreciation to the Committee for his election for the third time to the post of Rapporteur and to the representatives of India and Yugoslavia for his nomination. He said that he would look forward to the continuation of his co-operation with the Committee's secretariat. Stating that the Rapporteur was the servant of the Committee appointed to report on its proceedings to the General Assembly he expressed the hope that on this occasion his task would require him to send forward messages of hope and encouragement.

#### Order of discussion of agenda items (A/C.1/721 and A/C.1/722)

7. The CHAIRMAN appealed for a high level of debate on matters relating to peace and security. He said that the pattern of international relations con-

fronted the Committee with a situation the seriousness of which could not be minimized. It was a time of crisis in the relations between the great Powers. The world was becoming reconciled to the idea of a new war which would imply the destruction of the present civilization. The United Nations, however, was based upon the conviction that peace could be preserved. The very fact that representatives of sixty nations with their divergent views were participating in the discussions despite their differences was the best proof that peace was not irretrievable. While discussions continued in the United Nations all was not lost.

8. It was their responsibility to avoid further deterioration in the relations between the great Powers. All should endeavour to keep their minds open and remember that no single country had a monopoly of right or wrong. They should draw upon the experience of all in order to compose conflicting views or they were not likely to achieve tolerance and better understanding. They should seek to convert diversity into positive factors in order to establish better conditions for international relations. Despite bitter divisions they could unite in pursuit of the principles of the Charter. The consolidation of peace should be the theme of their debate.

9. Mr. URRUTIA (Colombia) suggested that the Committee follow in its discussions the order of items contained in the first letter from the President (A/C.1/721), and then take up the two items in the second letter (A/C.1/722). It was, of course, possible, and in accordance with the rules, for the Committee to vary the order, but the sequence contained in the President's letters appeared to be preferable. By starting with the Report of the Collective Measures Committee (A/2215) they would be able to emphasize the peaceful and constructive aspects of United Nations activity. Discussion on the Report of the Disarmament Commission (DC/20) would follow logically and they could then consider the work of those two bodies as a concerted effort for peace. Indeed, after discussing the Disarmament Commission's report they might even be able to establish a genuine collective measures system. Those general matters should be dealt with before any specific questions were taken up.

\* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

10. For the Korean question the objective should be a permanent settlement. It might prove desirable, according to events, to move that item forward in their discussion, but that would have to be decided by circumstances. Then they might deal with the Austrian question in the hope that the understanding reached during the discussion of the first two items would make a settlement easier. The Tunisian and Moroccan questions might then follow. Mr. Urrutia understood that a group of delegations might desire earlier discussion of those items, but from the practical point of view it was perhaps unwise to expedite their debate. Several governments, in particular, France, were preoccupied with those questions and some time might be allowed for their efforts. Moreover, all delegations were still studying the situation. The lapse of a few weeks might allow the Tunisian and Moroccan questions to be dealt with in a more conciliatory atmosphere.

11. The item proposed by Czechoslovakia was not new, having been discussed at the previous session, and might well await the seventh place. Then would follow the item proposed by the United States for an impartial investigation of the charges of bacterial warfare. As the Polish item was a synthesis of other items on the agenda it should be left to the end and so serve to summarize the discussions in the preliminary debates.

12. Mr. SKRZESZEWSKI (Poland) proposed that the item presented by his delegation should be discussed first. The sequence of debate should not be approached in the theoretical manner suggested by the Colombian delegation. The fact was that a bloody war was raging in Korea and matters relating thereto should be regarded as the most urgent on their agenda. His proposal was based on the fact that the Polish draft resolution dealt not only with Korea but also with other crucial points. Not only should they consider measures to put an end to the bloodshed that was taking place, but they should also deal at once with the questions of the reduction of armaments, the prohibition of atomic weapons, and the prohibition of bacterial warfare. Mankind dwelt under the threat of such weapons and there should be no delay in measures which could relax international tension. The Polish item deserved priority because it dealt with the main questions. There could be no doubt that the adoption of the Polish draft resolution would expedite the solution of other items on the agenda.

13. Mr. PALAR (Indonesia) stated that five items on the agenda had been submitted as constituting threats to the peace. The nations known as the Asian-African group had put forward the Tunisian and Moroccan questions. The reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea had been put on the agenda by the Secretariat. The items submitted by Czechoslovakia and Poland had been put forward as dealing with threats to the peace. The Indonesian delegation believed that in the existing situation their first concern should be with subjects relating to war and peace.

14. The Korean question was one of the most acute and Mr. Palar would have been prepared to propose it as the first item for discussion had it not seemed doubtful that the great Powers would be of the same opinion on that question. He accordingly proposed the following sequence: Tunisia, Morocco, Korea, the Czecho-

slovak item and the Polish item. The other items could follow the order in which they appeared in the President's letter.

15. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation did not regard the Colombian proposal as acceptable. The order in which items were dealt with in the General Committee was quite accidental and that order, which appeared in the President's letter, should not be regarded as prejudging the order of their debate.

16. The Colombian representative had said that it would facilitate their other work if they dealt first with the reports of the Collective Measures Committee and the Disarmament Commission. The Soviet Union delegation, however, felt that such a course would only complicate their work. It should be observed that neither report proposed effective measures which would lead to any reduction in armaments or remove the threat of war. The authors of those reports only wished to promote discussions and did not wish to reach decisions. No basis for any solution had been suggested by them. It was hard to see how the procedure proposed by the representative of Colombia would facilitate their work unless he had had in mind that it would aid the Committee in putting a rubber stamp on the resolutions which could be expected from the United States. That course would not, however, facilitate the establishment of effective control over the prohibition of atomic weapons or the reduction of armaments and armed forces.

17. The statement that the Polish item was a synthesis of other questions and therefore should come last was no more than an attempt to postpone the most vital questions relating to peace and security. They should remember what had happened in the past. It could be expected that they would be told that it was getting late and that the item should be postponed. The Soviet Union delegation believed that they should first discuss the Polish proposal. It dealt with the most essential problems, such as measures to end the conflict in Korea and establish conditions for the unification of that country. The problem of putting an end to hostilities could hardly be put in the last place. The problem of the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of control was not a secondary question either, and no advance had been made towards a solution since it had first been raised in 1946. No one could claim that the question of bacterial warfare was not timely, since United States forces were making use of it in Korea. The proposal for a peace pact between the five great Powers was among the most important questions calling for a solution. All those matters were dealt with in the Polish proposal, and though all delegations might not like them, especially the United States, they could present their positions in the discussion.

18. If the problem were regarded objectively it would be clear that the Polish item should be dealt with first. If the Committee did not do so, it would mean that it was following the lead of the States which were not interested in ending the war in Korea, finding a solution to the problems of atomic and bacterial weapons and the reduction of armaments or concluding a peace pact between the five great Powers.

19. Mr. ENTEZAM (Iran) said he had intended to put forward the same suggestions as the representative

of Indonesia. The Iranian delegation recognized the importance and urgency of all items. However, many of them had been examined before, even if no solutions had been found. It had been thought that by starting with new items which might be dealt with successfully, a better atmosphere might be created for the old items. Mr. Entezam therefore supported the Indonesian proposal to begin with Tunis and Morocco.

20. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) said that the Committee was faced with specific items concerned with bloodshed, restlessness, and instability, and general items concerning the strengthening of peace. Practical measures in the latter cases were required if they were to avoid repeating the old words and phrases and the preparation of those measures would require time. The Iraqi delegation therefore supported the Indonesian suggestion that they should begin with the immediate and urgent questions. Korea could be first, followed by Tunis, Morocco, the Austrian treaty, disarmament, collective measures, the Polish item, the Czechoslovak item, and investigations into the charge of bacterial warfare.

21. Millions were looking to the General Assembly for decisions and actions indicative of the consolidation of international peace. The will for peace could be expressed in an end to the conflict in Korea and the liberation of Tunisia and Morocco. If those matters could be settled they could well offer the means for the settlement of the more general issues. Moreover, when dealing with the specific issues time might be required for negotiation and mediation. In that event they could deal with other items simultaneously, for there was no need to be rigid in their procedure. In general terms Mr. Jamali supported the Indonesian suggestion.

22. Mr. Zafrulla KHAN (Pakistan) requested a clarification of the statement by the representative of Iraq that he supported the Indonesian suggestion, since he had proposed that Korea be the first item.

23. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) said that he had misunderstood the Indonesian suggestion, but he was prepared to agree that the first two questions should be Tunis and Morocco. Those two questions and that of Korea were all urgent.

24. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) observed that any number of combinations was possible and the debate might become very complex. All items were important and the only consideration in arranging priority should be how the intervention of the United Nations could be most effective in finding a solution. While some delegations had an interest in promoting certain items to the first place, the Chilean delegation had no particular preference. They would, however, prefer that the report of the Collective Measures Committee not be considered first because their Government had not yet had an opportunity to define its attitude on the recommendations.

25. The Polish proposal undoubtedly dealt with vital questions, but three of them were connected with three other items on their agenda. Mr. Santa Cruz did not see how the Committee could discuss the Polish proposal relating to Korea without discussing the reports of the Korean Commission. Similarly, the Polish proposals concerning disarmament could not be sundered from discussion of the report of the Disarmament Commission where the background material was to be

found. Mr. Santa Cruz did not wish to prejudge the sequence, but he believed that such matters should be discussed together. He suggested that the Committee might wish to take advantage of rule 41 of the rules of procedure and ask the General Committee to make recommendations as to the priority of discussion.

26. Mrs. SEKANINOVA-CAKARTOVA (Czechoslovakia) said that it was the right and duty of the Committee to establish the most effective order of discussion and not take a mechanical approach. Each item should be listed logically according to its nature and significance so that their programme would be related to the great tasks which were before the General Assembly. The nature of the Polish proposal showed its basic importance for the General Assembly and, accordingly, for the Committee. It dealt with the most urgent problems of peace in the present and for the future: a settlement in Korea and measures to relieve international tension. It proposed the reduction of armaments to deliver the world from the threat of weapons of mass destruction, and conciliation between the five great Powers. Thus the Polish proposals would aid the United Nations to fulfil its basic principles and objectives. While the Czechoslovak delegation agreed that the Tunisian and Moroccan questions were most important, they were convinced that the Polish proposal was the broadest and that its discussion first would expedite future work.

27. The CHAIRMAN, summing up the situation, said that the Committee had before it the Colombian motion to follow the order contained in the President's first letter (A/C.1/721) and then take up the items referred to in the second letter (A/C.1/722). The Polish motion to consider the Polish item first could be considered as an amendment to the Colombian motion since it affected only one item. Then there was the Indonesian proposal for another sequence. He proposed to submit to the Committee for a vote first the Polish amendment, then the Colombian motion, and finally the Indonesian proposal.

28. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated in connexion with the remarks of the representative of Chile that even a cursory perusal of the Korean Commission's report (A/2187) would show that it had avoided the question of putting an end to the conflict. It discussed certain problems connected with the political and economic situation in South Korea. Mr. Gromyko could not agree that the discussion of those matters separately from the Polish item would lead to any repetition.

29. Mr. URRUTIA (Colombia) recalled that the Soviet Union representative had taken the position that discussion in the first place of the reports of the Collective Measures Committee and Disarmament Commission would complicate their debate. The Colombian delegation was convinced that it was necessary to tackle causes, rather than effects, and they regarded the Korean situation as an effect of the differences between the great Powers. He had not contended that the study of the reports of the Collective Measures Committee and the Disarmament Commission would directly facilitate the Committee's other work; but that it would make the approach to the whole of the Korean problem easier. In taking up the Korean question it was important that the Committee should be clear

as to the extent that there was sincerity on the part of the great Powers with respect to collective measures and disarmament. They would then know in general terms the positions of the great Powers before entering into specific questions. With regard to the remarks of the representatives of Indonesia, Iran and Iraq, Mr. Urrutia took the view that the fact that some regarded Tunis and Morocco as the more important, while others advocated Korea for first place, only served to bear out his view that they should begin with the first two items in the President's first letter.

30. Mr. SKRZESZEWSKI (Poland) said they should first decide what criteria they should use in determining priorities. It was the Polish view that such matters should be settled from a broad political aspect in accordance with the interest and requirements of the peoples of the world. The most important question for all peoples was the settlement of the bloody and destructive war in Korea. Surely even the peoples of Tunisia and Morocco would agree that that was the most urgent question. Accordingly, the Polish item, which contained proposals for a Korean settlement, should be considered first. That proposal, moreover, should be regarded as a unit with various facets, including proposals for a five-Power peace pact, the reduction and regulation of armaments, the prohibition and control of atomic weapons, and of bacterial weapons, and the question of a conference for the general reduction of armaments. Inasmuch as these were the basic questions facing mankind, the Polish item ought properly to be first on the agenda.

31. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) agreed with the representative of the Soviet Union that the report of the Korean Commission did not refer expressly to the action that had been taken to halt aggression in Korea, nor to the armistice negotiations. He believed, however, that under that item the General Assembly was bound to examine those matters to see whether the agencies of the United Nations in Korea had carried out the United Nations resolutions and how they had sought to do so. The matters were interconnected and it would be difficult to dissociate them.

32. Mr. SARPEN (Turkey) suggested that the Committee might agree on the first item only and consider afterwards what should follow.

33. Mr. CASEY (Australia) observed that several delegations had items which they wished to have at the head of the list, but there was one item which was more important than any others, namely Korea. Assuming that the Chairman would allow a broad discussion of the question under the heading of the report of the Korean Commission, he moved that the Colombian proposal be amended so that the Korean question be placed first.

34. Mr. TSIANG (China) said that there were no criteria which could determine the order of debate. A logical order would be desirable, but they could not find one that would be completely so. It would be difficult to agree on the relative importance of items. Furthermore decisions of the Committee or the General Assembly would not increase or decrease the importance of items. What they required were practical decisions. One point to consider was that not all delegations yet were complete and possibly particular representatives to deal with specific questions had not

arrived. Some delegations might not yet be ready to take a stand on some questions.

35. Some form of compromise was necessary, but in any event the Polish item could not be first. They could not have an orderly debate which would do justice to the various points it raised unless they dealt first with the various parts which were on their agenda. The Polish item, therefore, should come toward the end. From the practical point of view the Tunisian and Moroccan questions, which were new to the General Assembly, needed further study by some delegations and more effective debate would be achieved if they did not come up for two or three weeks. While no sequence would be acceptable to all, Mr. Tsiang believed that the Colombian proposal offered as good an order as they could adopt.

36. Mr. MARTIN (Canada) said that his delegation would be content for the time being to agree on two items for discussion: (1) Korea, and (2) the draft resolution concerning impartial investigation of charges of the use by the United Nations forces of bacterial warfare.

37. There must be general agreement that the question of Korea should have priority as the lives of millions of people were involved in the war in Korea. He would also support the Australian amendment in view of Canada's definite interest in the matter. The representative of Canada admitted that the Polish draft resolution was important, but pointed out that it covered all but three points on the Committee's agenda, namely Tunisia, Morocco and Austria. If the Polish proposal were adopted, the Committee would place, as the first item on its agenda, the discussion of practically all the items contained in the two letters from the President. Discussion of the second and third parts of the Polish draft resolution would involve discussion of matters having no direct bearing on the efforts to bring an end to the war in Korea. Moreover, the Polish draft resolution covered many items which had been discussed repeatedly on previous occasions. For instance, the adoption of the proposed peace pact, although a matter of importance, was not a necessary condition of world peace, when there was in existence the Charter of the United Nations itself.

38. Mr. MARTIN considered that the question of impartial investigation of charges of the use by the United Nations forces of bacterial warfare was next in importance to the Korean question, if not directly related to it. If it was not discussed jointly with the Korean questions, it should be discussed immediately after it.

39. Mr. Martin concluded by saying that he did not underestimate the importance of other questions like Tunisia and Morocco. However, the first thing in the minds of the people of the world was the Korean question.

40. Mr. KISELYOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that Mr. Tsiang had been unable to realize that the Polish draft resolution reflected the aspirations of hundreds of millions of human beings who demanded the cessation of hostilities in Korea, the withdrawal of foreign troops from that country, the prohibition of the atomic weapon, strict international control of that prohibition, and the conclusion of a peace pact among the great Powers. Since the Polish

proposal was in keeping with the desires of the peoples of the world and concerned matters which should be solved first, his delegation considered that it should appear as item 1 of the agenda.

41. Mr. MOSTAFA (Egypt) observed that there appeared to be a virtual unanimity to give high priority to the Korean question. His delegation supported this point of view. As for the next item to be put on the agenda, his delegation, along with other Asian-African delegations considered that the situation in North Africa was fraught with the direst consequences. Accordingly, he proposed that the questions of Tunisia and Morocco be taken up as items 2 and 3.

42. Mr. GROSS (United States of America) said that his delegation had understood that the order of items, as contained in the first letter from the President of the General Assembly to the Chairman of the Committee, reflected a general widespread canvass of opinion by the Secretariat of the United Nations and took into account a variety of viewpoints, including considerations of convenience, of practical political importance and of the importance of the questions on their merits. However, he agreed with other representatives that Korea was by far the most important item with which the Assembly must deal at that session, and the conscience of the civilized world attached the highest importance to the solution of the problem. He said that perhaps there had been a misunderstanding on the part of the representative of Indonesia when he mentioned the possibility of a certain disagreement among the great Powers on the discussion of the Korean question. As far as the United States Government was concerned, it was anxious to debate the Korean question and to put before the General Assembly all the facts and the considerations bearing upon this question.

43. Referring to the Polish proposal, Mr. Gross stated that it was falsely labelled and held out fraudulent inducements and, while it certainly involved questions which were essential to security and stability, it could not be accorded the dignity due to an honest and constructive draft resolution. The Polish draft resolution was not entitled to priority over the reports of the Collective Measures Committee and the Disarmament Commission, which dealt with matters essential to the elimination of tension in the world.

44. Mr. Gross stated that the importance and urgency of the item relating to the charges of bacterial warfare had been made clear in the explanatory memorandum submitted by his delegation. However, he agreed with the representative of China, that the essential point to consider was when and under what circumstances the most effective and constructive consideration could be given. Mr. Gross concluded by stating that while he supported the suggestion that high priority be given to the Korean question, he would reserve the position of his delegation with regard to the other items.

45. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) said the first criterion the Committee should apply was that it start with the specific and then move to the general. Secondly, it should move from the concrete situation to the abstract situation. Thirdly, urgent situations, involving bloodshed, should be given priority.

46. In accordance with these criteria, Mr. Jamali supported the Egyptian amendment.

47. Mr. MUNRO (New Zealand) supported the Australian proposal as he thought the question of Korea and the termination of the war was one that dominated all other considerations.

48. Mr. POLITIS (Greece) proposed that the first item on the agenda should be the question of Korea and thereafter the first letter of the President of the General Assembly should be followed.

49. Mr. PALAR (Indonesia) observed that in his earlier statement he had said that his delegation would have been prepared to place the question of Korea as the first item, if they had not been aware that the great Powers were not of the same opinion. If there could be some certainty on that question he would, of course, agree that it should be item 1. In that case he would urge that the Tunisian and Moroccan questions should be items 2 and 3.

50. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom) said that he would like to add one more criterion to those which had been submitted by the representative of Iraq. He thought that the Committee should also consider whether a debate would help to prevent bloodshed or cause more bloodshed. There were certain occasions when an acrimonious debate in the Committee would do more harm than good. Mr. Lloyd added that he would support the Colombian proposal as amended by Australia.

51. Mr. HOPPENOT (France) considered that the Korean question should be given priority and that the other items should be taken up in the order given in the letter from the President of the General Assembly. He joined the United Kingdom and Australian representatives in suggesting that the Committee should take a decision to that effect.

52. Mr. URRUTIA (Colombia) stated that in view of the opinion of the majority of speakers, he would agree that the Korean question be considered first. He would, however, like the order of items 1 and 3 to be reversed in order to meet also the point raised by the representative of Chile.

53. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) pointed out that while some representatives had suggested postponement of the consideration of the Korean question, for two or three weeks, they had not given any reasons for such a postponement. The representative of Colombia had stated that the consideration of items 1 and 2 would enable the Committee to measure the sincerity of the great Powers. Mr. Gromyko pointed out that the sincerity of the great Powers could be tested by the discussion of the Polish proposal. The USSR delegation was not opposed to consideration of the Korean question as the first item on the agenda, but it was opposed to having that question dealt with improperly. The Polish proposal contained a full programme for the settlement of the Korean questions, whereas the report of the so-called United Nations Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea did not contain any programme, but was devoted mainly to individual aspects of the situation in South Korea. Accordingly, the Polish proposal would be item 1. The second item could be the consideration of the reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, and the third item could be the questions of Tunisia and Morocco.

54. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that, at that stage of discussion, the Committee had before it first the Polish amendment to the Colombian proposal; second the Colombian proposal, as amended by Australia, and, third, the Indonesian proposal as amended by Egypt.
55. Mr. ENTEZAM (Iran) suggested that the Polish proposal should be put to the vote first. If the Polish proposal were rejected, then the Australian proposal should be put to the vote. The Committee could then vote on the Indonesian proposal. It would be sufficient for that meeting to settle the order of the first three items.
56. Mr. SARPER (Turkey) proposed that the Committee should take up simultaneously the question of Korea and the item concerning the impartial investigation of charges of use by the United Nations forces of bacterial warfare. There would be an opportunity for informal discussions before taking a decision on the order of the rest of the items on the agenda.
57. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) suggested that since there was agreement to discuss the Korean question first, and since the first part of the Polish proposal dealt with Korea, it would be better to discuss them together.
58. Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) suggested that the Committee should first vote on the first part of the Colombian proposal (to the effect that item 1 of the agenda should be the Korean question) and on any amendments to that part. After that vote, the Committee should adjourn.
59. Mr. MOSTAFA (Egypt) pointed out that his proposal was an amendment to the Australian proposal, and not to the Indonesian proposal, as stated by the Chairman.
60. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), on a point of order, pointed out that while the Chairman's proposal on the order of voting was generally acceptable, it was difficult at the present stage to predetermine the places of the subsequent items. He inquired why the first decision should not be confined to establishing the first item. The Polish amendment, which was submitted first, should be put to the vote first, and afterwards the subsequent amendments could be put to the vote.
61. Mr. CASEY (Australia) supported the order of voting as suggested by the Chairman. He considered that the USSR proposal would involve further waste of time for the Committee in discussing priority of agenda items at subsequent meetings.
62. Mr. BARANOVSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) supported the USSR proposal to decide first on the first item of the agenda and then decide about the subsequent items. Obviously the opinion of any delegation concerning subsequent items would depend on the decision concerning the first item.
63. Mr. ENTEZAM (Iran) thought that the best method would be first to put to the vote the Polish proposal as to the first item; then the Australian proposal putting the Korean question as the first item on the agenda. If that were carried, then the Committee would vote on the Indonesian proposal, which was designed to place the items relating to Tunisia and Morocco in second and third places respectively.
64. The CHAIRMAN proposed to put to the vote the various proposals in the following order: (a) the Polish amendment providing that the Polish draft resolution should be dealt with as item 1; (b) the Colombian proposal as amended by Australia, placing the Korean question first on the agenda; (c) the Egyptian amendment to the Australian proposal, which would have the effect of establishing the Korean question as item 1, and the Tunisian and Moroccan questions as items 2 and 3; (d) the Indonesian proposal, and (e) the Turkish proposal that a decision should be taken only on the Korean question and the question of bacterial warfare, leaving the priority of the other items to be settled later.
65. Mr. AL JAMALI (Iraq) pointed out that since the Egyptian proposal was an amendment to the Australian amendment, it should be voted upon before the Australian amendment.
66. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that, if the Polish amendment was not adopted, his delegation would propose that the Polish draft resolution be taken up as item 2 on the agenda. Accordingly, it would be preferable to decide first on the item which would be first on the agenda.
67. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom) pointed out that any question of an amendment to the Australian amendment did not arise, since the representative of Colombia had accepted an alteration to his draft resolution. Under those circumstances, he suggested that the Polish proposal should be voted on first and then the Colombian proposal.
68. Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) inquired whether it was possible to invoke rule 89 of the rules of procedure in order that the Colombian proposal could be voted upon in parts.
69. Mr. SKRZESZEWSKI (Poland) stated that if his first proposal was not adopted he wished to reserve the right to propose that the Polish item be considered second.
70. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the Polish amendment.  
*The amendment was rejected by 44 votes to 5, with 8 abstentions.*
71. After further discussion, the CHAIRMAN stated that the next vote would be taken on the Egyptian amendment to the Colombian proposal to the effect that the Korean question should be item 1 and the questions of Tunisia and Morocco would be items 2 and 3. The Australian amendment had been accepted by the representative of Colombia, and was incorporated in the Colombian proposal.
72. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) proposed that the Committee should not decide the sequence of all three items together, but only the position of one item as such a decision would rule out any proposal that the Polish proposal be put as item 2 of the agenda.
73. Mr. SARPER (Turkey) moved the adjournment of the meeting under rule 77 of the rules of procedure.
74. Mr. MARTIN (Canada) inquired whether under rule 129 the Turkish amendment should not have been put to the vote first, since it was the last amendment presented.

75. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that it was not the farthest removed in substance from the original proposal.

76. Mr. SKRZESZEWSKI (Poland) requested that his delegation's amendment be voted upon before the Egyptian amendment.

77. Mr. HOPPENOT (France) agreed with the representative of the USSR that the Committee should first decide only on item 1, rather than vote on items 1, 2, and 3 together.

78. Mr. MOSTAFA (Egypt) pointed out, that under rule 88 of the rules of procedure, no representative could interrupt the voting except on a point of order in connexion with the actual conduct of the voting.

79. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that he would accept the Egyptian amendment if it were reworded to the effect that Korea should be placed as item 1 on the agenda and that other items, including the Polish proposal, would be dealt with subsequently.

80. Mr. RAFAEL (Israel), on a point of order, pointed out that since the voting had begun, no other motion could be accepted at that stage and the voting should be continued.

81. The CHAIRMAN agreed that the motion for adjournment submitted by the representative of Turkey could not be entertained, in view of rule 127 of the rules of procedure.

82. Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico), on a point of order, reiterated his request for a vote by division under rule 128 of the rules of procedure.

83. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that since there were amendments to the Colombian proposal, he could not put it to the vote by division. Under the rules of procedure, the Egyptian amendment to the Colombian proposal should be voted upon first.

84. Mr. SKRZESZEWSKI (Poland), stated that the proposal of the Chairman to put the Egyptian amendment to the vote first would rule out any possibility for his delegation to move the inclusion of his proposal as item 2 of the agenda. He therefore proposed that his amendment should be put to the vote before the Egyptian amendment.

85. After further discussion, Mr. HOPPENOT (France), asked for a vote by division on the Egyptian amendment.

86. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the first part of the Egyptian amendment relating to the Korean question.

*It was adopted unanimously.*

87. Mr. SKRZESZEWSKI (Poland) stated that he had already submitted an amendment to the Egyptian amendment, under which the Polish draft resolution should be assigned the second place on the agenda. He therefore asked that the Polish amendment to the Egyptian amendment should be voted upon first.

88. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the voting was in progress, in accordance with the division requested by the representative of France.

89. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), on a point of order, also requested the Chairman to take up the Polish amendment before putting the rest of the Egyptian amendment to the vote.

90. Mr. MOSTAFA (Egypt) agreed that the Committee vote first on the Polish amendment.

91. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the Polish amendment to the effect that the Polish proposal should be item 2 on the agenda.

*It was rejected by 44 votes to 5, with 11 abstentions.*

92. The CHAIRMAN then put to the vote the second part of the Egyptian amendment, providing that the Tunisian and Moroccan questions should be items 2 and 3.

*A vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Sweden having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, voted first.*

*In favour:* Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States of America, Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia.

*Against:* Sweden, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Iceland, Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru.

*Abstaining:* Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Greece, Honduras, Norway.

*The second part of the Egyptian amendment was adopted by 34 votes to 20, with 6 abstentions.*

93. The CHAIRMAN put the Colombian proposal, as amended, to the vote.

*It was adopted by 51 votes to 5, with 4 abstentions.*

94. Mr. PROTITCH (Secretary of the Committee) stated that, in accordance with the decisions taken by the Committee, the items on the agenda would be considered in the following order:

1. Reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea;
2. The Tunisian question;
3. The question of Morocco;
4. Methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter: report of the Collective Measures Committee;
5. Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: report of the Disarmament Commission;
6. Question of an appeal to the Powers signatories to the Moscow Declaration of 1 November 1943, for an early fulfilment of their pledges toward Austria;

7. Interference of the United States of America in the internal affairs of other States as manifested by the organization on the part of the Government of the United States of America of subversive and espionage activities against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the People's Republic of China, the Czechoslovak Republic and other people's democracies;
8. Question of impartial investigation of charges of use by United Nations forces of bacterial warfare.
9. Measures to avert the threat of a new world war and measures to strengthen peace and friendship among the nations.

*The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m.*