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FIRST COMMITTEE  
VERBATIM RECORD OF THE EIGHT HUNDRED AND SEVENTH MEETING  
Held at Headquarters, New York,  
on Thursday, 8 December 1955, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Sir Leslie MUNRO (New Zealand)

1. Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments. Conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction: report of the Disarmament Commission [17] (continued)
2. Measures for the further relaxation of international tension and development of international co-operation [66] (continued)

Statements were made in the general debate on the item by:

Mr. Mates	(Yugoslavia)
Mr. Azkoul	(Lebanon)
Mr. Palamarchuk	(Ukrainian SSR)
Mr. Ramadan	(Egypt)
Mr. Belaunde	(Peru)

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REGULATION, LIMITATION AND BALANCED REDUCTION OF ALL ARMED FORCES AND ALL ARMAMENTS. CONCLUSION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION (TREATY) ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND THE PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC, HYDROGEN AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: REPORT OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION [Agenda item 17] MEASURES FOR THE FURTHER RELAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION [Agenda item 66] (continued)

Mr. MATES (Yugoslavia): The unanimous resolution on disarmament of the last Assembly was sent off by a considerable amount of goodwill by this Committee and by the Assembly. It was received in this same spirit all over the world and has aroused great hopes. The momentum of that resolution was much more the result of the unanimity of our votes than of the context itself. The resolution, by its procedural character, could not solve outstanding problems, but it could and, indeed, it did help the progress of further discussions in the Sub-Committee on Disarmament and among the Governments of the participating countries.

I am, of course, aware that the report on these discussions is rather disappointing inasmuch as it does not inform us of any final and operative agreements. But once we have overcome this feeling of disappointment we must examine this report with the aim of finding out whether the results of the discussions, in the course of this year, make it easier or more difficult to continue on the apparently rough road towards agreement on disarmament.

If we examine the report from this angle we must admit that some positive results have been achieved which can serve as a basis for further efforts. It has already been mentioned in this debate that the general acceptance of maximum levels of armed forces and a considerable measure of agreement on the comprehensive plan for disarmament in stages are among the positive results which have marked the discussions during this year.

This line of development has subsequently been superseded by the discussion of other proposals, which have introduced a new approach to the problem. This new approach, based on technical difficulties to control and supervise the elimination of nuclear weapons, has itself become the major source of controversy during the second part of this year.

(Mr. Mates, Yugoslavia)

It is, however, of considerable consequence that during this second stage of the discussions of this year no proposal has been completely or absolutely rejected. This does not necessarily mean that any one of the older or more recently submitted proposals alone could, after some further discussion, become generally acceptable. It simply indicates the possibility of such a combination of existing proposals which could reconcile the views reflected in those proposals.

The aforementioned new situation in the discussions on disarmament has, however, arisen not only on the basis of technical difficulties regarding the scientific limitations of supervision and detection of nuclear stockpiles, but -- as it is apparent from these discussions and the debate in this Committee -- very much on the basis of certain political considerations.

We, in the Yugoslav delegation, are under the impression that the crux of the problem and of the present controversies on disarmament is the attitude to accept a step forward in the field of disarmament only **in so far as it** satisfied the requirement of national security of those countries which are called upon to implement it. We do not believe that there is anything fundamentally wrong in this basic yardstick applied and defended so eloquently during the whole course of the discussions on disarmament in the United Nations.

Today security has, if anything, gained enormously in importance. It is no longer a question of being involved in another of the many wars which the human race has fought in its history; it is the vital question of being possibly involved in a nuclear war with all its consequences not only for the belligerents, but for all of mankind.

I hope that I am not very far from the truth when I say that a durable state of international security can prevail only in a world in which there are no such international conflicts and tensions which could develop into a war and in which there are no technical means readily available to carry it out.

So far we have neither of these requirements for a stable peace and, consequently, international security. One important change has, however, occurred in the world recently. The devastating weapons of war have become a powerful deterrent themselves and the folly of war has been generally recognized not only on the basis of the virtues of peace and of the disaster inflicted in war on so many, but primarily on the strength of the logic that it is folly to use a means which does not lead to any thinkable purpose.

(Mr. Mates, Yugoslavia)

This important change, which so decisively influenced international relations -- the international climate, as we usually describe it -- has deeply penetrated the discussions on disarmament. It would, nevertheless, be naive to believe that the awareness of this new situation is by itself a sufficiently strong and wide foundation on which we could allow the peace and security of the world to rest without continuing our efforts relentlessly and even with a greater sense of urgency, and with more determination to arrive at harmonious international relations in a disarmed world -- allowing, of course, for such divergencies and differences as are the unavoidable and, I should say, even desirable product of historical developments in various countries and parts of the world.

It is our view in Yugoslavia that there is no substitute for genuine security and that this can be achieved only through simultaneous efforts both in the field of disarmament and in tackling those controversial questions which still bedevil the relations among nations in the world.

Political difficulties, obstructing progress in the working out of a comprehensive plan of disarmament, have been essentially defined as the lack of mutual confidence. This can hardly be denied; it is rather a truism for everyone who has even superficially followed all previous discussions on this question. But to our mind it does not mean that this discovery should induce us to abandon or relent in our efforts. Past failures, although they are an important source of experience, cannot be automatically projected into the future. The realization of the folly of wars may not be sufficient to prevent them, but it is a new factor which has already brought about such important reappraisals and re-evaluations of values that we believe that, with patience and determination, results impossible in the past are now attainable.

So far I have not touched upon the question of technical difficulties in detecting nuclear stockpiles. I must confess that I have not even tried to penetrate the technical intricacies of this problem, which I understand could be usefully done by an international panel of qualified experts. It transpires, however, from the records of discussions in the Sub-Committee and discussions in other places, that such difficulties pose a formidable problem, and we have to accept this and hope that scientists will do their best to find proper technical solutions if they can.

(Mr. Mates, Yugoslavia)

But we should not stop at this statement of technical facts. We cannot and should not accept defeat so easily. I have been encouraged to find, in all the statements in this debate in which these difficulties have been emphasized, that such statements were not accompanied by an affirmation that therefore **comprehensive** disarmament becomes impossible. It has been repeatedly stated in this debate that only a combination of technical difficulties and the lack of a minimum of trust poses insurmountable obstacles.

This would appear to indicate that mutual trust and confidence is the really important element, and I venture to add that it is close to one's mind that the combined ingenuity of statesmen and resourcefulness of scientists could help us to overcome these difficulties, provided the attempt at a solution is conducted on an acceptable general platform.

The opposite view could mean nothing else but, at the best, the advice to let disarmament wait for such improvement in international relations that the technical difficulties will shrink to insignificance in the face of complete trust and the non-existence of tensions and conflicts. Such advice, if it were given, we would not propose to follow. It is, firstly, not likely that a world bristling with arms, including thermonuclear bombs, could ever achieve such a state of perfection; and, secondly, it would hardly be necessary to care about armaments and weapons in such circumstances.

It is for these reasons that my delegation does not favour putting the blame for our difficulties on the shoulders of scientists. Profiting from the advice scientists can give them, statesmen cannot avoid the responsibility of seeking and finding solutions of this problem -- and of doing it now, when it matters. The stakes are too high to accept the plea of helplessness, nor can we hope that mankind would accept it from us.

This, however, should not be understood as meaning that confidence-building plans which have been devised and proposed in view of the recognition of actual difficulties cannot be valuable and applicable in the framework of our general efforts and a partial answer to the problem.

(Mr. Mates, Yugoslavia)

We have a great respect for the wisdom and sincerity of plans intended to increase security, such as the well-known plan of President Eisenhower. I have very carefully listened to the forceful arguments of the representatives of the United States who explained this plan to us so ably.

It is not the substance of the plan that has created real difficulties in the discussions on disarmament. It appears to me, rather, that the main difficulty has arisen because of opposing views as to the context in which this plan should be carried out. I think, furthermore, that these views, although now in conflict, offer a possibility of conciliation.

It is, in our view, valid to put the emphasis on aerial surveys, inspections, controls and information -- that is, on all necessary organizational measures connected with disarmament, including the prevention of the use of existing, or, I should hope, remaining weapons for a surprise attack. This is, no doubt, a valid argument and is a legitimate interpretation of the requirements of security.

It is also valid, in our view, to consider that no measure which does not include the reduction of armaments, which is not an integral part of a comprehensive plan of disarmament, necessarily carried out in stages, meets the necessary requirement of vital security.

Unless it were possible to arrive at a mutual recognition of these arguments, it would be difficult to visualize real progress. Moreover, it would be difficult to visualize the development of a sufficient measure of trust on which further progress must necessarily be based.

But it is to be expected that such a reconciliation -- or, rather, combination and broadening of views -- may develop in further discussions in the Sub-Committee.

My delegation believes that it is possible and that it will occur, and it is for this reason that we are in favour of the prolongation of the mandate of the Sub-Committee. We hope that it should not be impossible for all the parties concerned to realize that, although security is universal, the specific interpretation of irreducible minimum security requirements must necessarily vary from country to country. It is not only their size and technical development, but geography, history and all other factors which define a nation that are relevant in this context.

Any attempt, therefore, to seek a solution of the problem of disarmament and international security by imposition, through whatever majority of votes, is doomed to failure; this was very forcefully and brilliantly stated to this Committee by my friend, the representative of France, Mr. Jules Moch, whose absence is regret. Apparently, the only way out of the present stagnation can be found in an effort to determine a common denominator which will combine the irreducible minimum requirements of security contained in still conflicting views expounded in the disarmament discussions. This, of course, means that actual disarmament -- the process which in its totality includes sizeable reductions of conventional armaments as well as the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons -- cannot be separated from any other initial steps.

Such a change in approach could, as I have submitted at the beginning of my remarks, pave the way to further progress. Real progress would then depend for the most part on the capability of finding workable solutions for those open questions in a comprehensive disarmament plan which have so far defied agreement or mutual understanding. All the principal open questions are more or less connected with control and supervision and the establishment and functioning of international organs for this purpose.

The new proposals of the heads of the four great Powers, submitted last summer in Geneva, could apparently be of great value in such efforts, and it is in this context that we consider the new elements introduced at that time into the discussions on disarmament as a possible new impulse rather than a delaying factor. We also believe that the initiative of the Prime Minister of India, urging all the Governments concerned to agree on the discontinuation of experimental explosions of nuclear weapons, could and would usefully complement these proposals. To this I would add the further proposal by India that there should be a truce in armaments, pending an applicable agreement on positive steps in disarmament.

Before concluding, I should like to re-emphasize our hopes, expressed last year, concerning the wisdom and usefulness of the proposal of 11 June 1954, submitted to the Disarmament Sub-Committee by France and the United Kingdom. We also consider it most gratifying that the Soviet Union accepted that proposal as a basis for discussion. The authors of the proposal have repeatedly stated that they are not satisfied with some of the interpretations given to their ideas in the subsequent Soviet Union proposal.

My delegation hopes that efforts towards agreement, exerted on all the possible avenues of approach, may facilitate more flexibility on all sides and generally acceptable constructive results.

Finally, I wish to touch upon an aspect of the problem which is at the centre of our thinking and is of the greatest importance in my Government's view.

We understand that it would be inappropriate to discuss the problems of disarmament in detail in a forum where all nations were represented, so long as there was no sufficiently prepared basis for discussion. Consequently, we supported the proposal, submitted by India two years ago, to establish a sub-committee. We are prepared again to prolong the Sub-Committee's life. We are not inclined to lose patience at the slow progress in the discussion among a limited number of representatives, but I must emphasize that we would welcome a greater understanding by the members of the Sub-Committee that they are a preparatory body of which we have requested the preparation of a text which would enable the United Nations to draft a universal convention on disarmament. This ultimate goal will, we hope, never cease to be in the minds of our colleagues on whose shoulders lies the heavy responsibility of being the negotiators and draftsmen of a project so vitally important to mankind.

Mr. AZKOUL (Lebanon)(interpretation from French): The remarks I shall make during the course of this statement will deal exclusively with the disarmament problem and the international tension which has severed our world into two different -- and even opposing -- slices. I shall not deal with local or regional tensions which, in turn, feed international tensions. At the very outset of my statement, however, I would take the opportunity to say that I endorse the sentiments expressed by the representatives of Iraq and Syria. I endorse their words concerning the gravity of the tensions in the Middle East and North Africa and concerning the urgent need of effective measures for the reduction -- indeed, the elimination -- of those tensions, in the interest of the peoples of those areas and in the interest of world peace.

The First Committee displayed much wisdom in deciding to examine concurrently the two agenda items entitled, respectively, "Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments" and "Measures for the further relaxation of international tension and development of



co-operation". These two items appear to have not only a cause-and-effect relationship, but also a mutual-interaction relationship. The armaments race seems to be one of the principal causes of prevailing international tension, and the prevailing international tension seems to provoke, encourage, accelerate and justify the armaments race. It would appear at first sight that we are floundering within a vicious circle. For, if present international tension is to be characterized by its main hallmark, mistrust, one is led to conclude that mistrust engenders the armaments race and the armaments race engenders mistrust. Thus, we have this insoluble and continuing petitio principii: there is no disarmament so long as there is mistrust, and there is mistrust so long as there is no disarmament. If one examines this problem more closely, however, one finds that, although mistrust feeds the armaments race -- in other words, although there is a cause-effect relationship -- the relationship is irreversible; that is, it cannot be argued, in the same sense, that the armaments race feeds mistrust.

(Mr. Azkoul, Lebanon)

The fact that a country arms itself to the teeth does not in itself prove that that country desires war and is girding itself for an attack upon another State. It may mean, quite on the contrary, that that country does not want war, but that it is afraid of being attacked and is arming because of that fear. Therefore, the fact of arming, pure and simple, cannot be said to engender **mistrust**. Only when one attributes to a State which is arming the intention of attack rather than defence and questions its peaceful desires does the fact of arming become a cause of mistrust. Then the fact of arming is regarded as a manifestation of possible aggressive design.

Consequently, it is not the armaments race itself but the interpretations attached to it which can engender mistrust. If a country was arming for fear of being attacked but could at the same time offer striking and irrefutable proof of its peaceful intentions, then no one could reasonably accuse it of provoking or increasing mistrust in the world. We may, therefore, conclude that if mistrust necessarily engenders the armaments race, the armaments race does not necessarily engender mistrust. It may, at most, intensify mistrust, provided such mistrust is already in existence.

The first practical inference to be drawn from these findings is that the natural, normal and logical way to call a halt to the armaments race and to achieve the desirable aim of disarmament is to seek to solve the problem of mistrust which is hampering international relations, and to reduce and eliminate the international tensions which weigh so heavily upon the world. That is to say, concretely, that what must be solved are the conflicts which pit States against each other -- especially conflicts between the two great camps, East and West.

I am not referring only to political or economic conflicts such as those to which many speakers have already referred here. We believe that problems of a social and ideological character are equally involved. It is the bounden duty of the United Nations to exert its pressure and to bring its influence to bear in order to induce States not only to abandon their political, economic and social designs which are illegitimate, but also and particularly to repudiate any ideology based on internal or external domination, expansion, exploitation and aggression. For if one casts about for the initial source from which the present mistrust in the world has sprung one has to recognize that that source

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is to be found in ideologies nurtured by such tendencies or ideologies which, in turn, feed such tendencies. It is these ideologies whose effects the rest of the world is entitled to fear. It is the upholders of these ideologies whom the world is entitled to mistrust.

It is true that efforts for the solution of outstanding problems and the consequent reduction of international tension are continuing ceaselessly within the United Nations. It may well be argued that almost all of the activities of the United Nations either are designed to bring this purpose about or are such as to be capable of contributing to it. Similar efforts are, quite properly, made outside the United Nations. One first-rate effort, whose broad effects we are not yet in a position to appraise, let alone foresee, has been the historic meeting of the heads of Government of the four great Powers at Geneva last July. That meeting gave rise to high hopes -- hopes which I shall describe not as exaggerated but, rather, as rash and impatient. We are not yet in a position to judge to what extent these hopes are or may be capable of fulfilment. May I also mention the conference of the four Foreign Ministers of the same countries which came on the heels of the big four summit meeting. I mention this conference of the Foreign Ministers despite the apparent total failure which it registered -- a failure which, in turn, cast a shadow upon the preceding summit conference. I mention these conferences because all these efforts are praiseworthy, even if they register real or apparent failure, and because they are efforts which must be persevered in. Hope must spring eternal. It is not certain that these were so many failures because it is quite possible that their effects will appear in the long run only. It is not certain either that their lack of success was due necessarily to lack of goodwill. Failure may well be caused by circumstances independent of human will.

To illustrate the first possibility, namely, that felicitous effects may already have been produced by the big four conference, may I ask this question? Why not believe that the reduction of armed forces announced by the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe was not, as many hastened to assert, a mere propaganda stratagem but the actual result of the impression of sincerity, rectitude and perhaps, may I add, innocence which the President of the United States evidently produced on the Soviet leaders at Geneva?

(Mr. Azkoul, Lebanon)

As far as concerns the Foreign Ministers conference, who knows whether it would not have produced better results if, instead of coming on the heels of the big four summit meeting, it had been scheduled only after more careful preparatory and elucidatory work which might well have been undertaken by experts or representatives at a lower level? Who knows that it would not have been better advised to start negotiations at the summit, as they were started, then to go down to the lower level, and finally to come up again to the relatively high Foreign Minister level at a later stage? That might have been a better idea. Who knows?

Efforts designed to bring about the relaxation of international tension -- efforts both within the United Nations and without -- must be persevered in and, indeed, intensified if we want that international tension to be relaxed and reduced, and if we want the armaments race to be stopped. But this normal, natural and logical method of discontinuing the arms race by eliminating its cause is, necessarily, a method which works slowly and with difficulty. It must, nevertheless, be persevered in despite difficulties and despite its slowness, although we cannot rest content with that. Other methods must be found to put an end to this armaments race more rapidly without awaiting the time when the first method will have yielded its results.

This is a necessary task, especially in view of the dangers of the armaments race which runs the risk of dragging the world into a new and dreadful holocaust the devastation of which cannot be imagined. This armaments race can bring about a war if either or both of the two opposing camps nurtures bellicose intentions. Indeed, in that case it is quite manifest that the armaments race is bound to lead straight to war.

(Mr. Azkoul, Lebanon)

However, should neither of the two camps want war, but nevertheless participate in the armaments race for the sheer purpose of defence, such a race is quite likely to drag them into war notwithstanding the desire of each side to avoid war; and this for the following reason. The military superiority which each side wishes to attain in order to deter the other side from attacking constitutes in itself an almost irresistible temptation to war. May I repeat this? The military superiority which one camp seeks to achieve in order to deter the other side from attacking constitutes in itself, for the former camp, a great temptation to war.

On the other hand, the realization that the armaments race required the allocation of a goodly portion of the resources and the vitality of a nation, with concentration on non-productive endeavours on the part of the population, besides the realization that such allocation can last indefinitely and may exhaust such vitality and such resources, may in time give rise to the desire to bring this intolerable situation to an end by destroying the party or the side regarded as the cause thereof.

An urgent solution of the disarmament problem is, therefore, necessary if only because of the dangers implicit in the armaments race, but, at the same time, we must recognize that the sense of urgency in the quest for a solution should not be confused with precipitate haste. No matter how great the dangers of the armaments race, the concrete possibility of a world war in the present day, especially since the advent of the atomic era, does not seem to be as great as some believe -- or wish to have it known that they believe. The possession by both sides of such destructive weapons as the atomic and hydrogen bombs, in sufficient quantity to wreak the maximum of havoc on either side, the certainty everywhere that to try to bomb the other side means to be bombed oneself -- such a situation is not of a nature to incite war.

I am quite unable to imagine, for example, a United States Chief of State who would give the order to destroy Moscow, let us say, by means of nuclear bombs, while he knows perfectly well that such an order is tantamount to an order that New York shall be razed to the ground; and vice versa. By the same token, both parties try to make sure that they have the overwhelming superiority required to ensure victory, and this difficulty in making sure of such superiority will,

(Mr. Azkoul, Lebanon)

in itself, act as a council of caution and wisdom. One cannot speak of overwhelming, or even substantial, superiority where nuclear weapons are concerned. As far as numerical superiority in conventional armaments and armed forces is concerned, one side may well have such superiority, but that can be compensated by the other side by means of alliances, qualitative progress in scientific and technical fields, and by economic, moral and other factors which operate in this field. Consequently, in this day and age, it is impossible, despite appearances to the contrary, to attain any assurance of a sufficiently overwhelming superiority to give good reason for starting a war.

But let us assume that some possible aggressor has convinced himself that, because of the mutual devastation by nuclear hydrogen weapons, neither he nor his adversary will resort to such weapons, and suppose that, at the same time, the possible aggressor will secure such superiority in the field of armed forces and conventional armaments as to grant him the expectation of victory even in such a situation, the possible aggressor is bound to realize that his very superiority in conventional armaments will determine his adversary, once the latter sees defeat as inevitable, to pin his hopes on the atomic weapon. Therefore, one is bound to hesitate a long time before determining on war, since war, even if accompanied by victory, is sure to be accompanied also by total destruction: all of which would seem to indicate that the possibilities of war in this day and age are slender. But because they are slender, it does not mean that they do not exist.

Moreover, there are so many unknown elements, so many unknown quantities determining the global power of the camps which are pitting against each other, so many operative motives which work in the minds and hearts of those responsible for the safety of the world, that it may well be argued that the slender chances of war may not be so slender and may, in future circumstances, be increased.

Therefore, urgently, but without precipitate haste, we must look carefully for a solution of this problem of the dangerous armaments race.

At the beginning of my speech I suggested the normal, natural and logical solution of the problem, which would be to eliminate the effect by eliminating the cause. This solution would put an end to the armaments race by eliminating its principal cause; that is, mistrust. But we have noticed also that this

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solution is a slow one and a difficult one. Therefore, even while continuing to look about for such a solution by all means at our disposal, we must at the same time prosecute the other swifter and more direct method which may save the world from the dangers of the armaments race before it is too late. This method is the one followed heretofore by the Disarmament Commission. It seeks to call a halt to the armaments race not by eliminating the causes, but by eliminating the object. What is the object of the armaments race? It is military superiority. In order to halt the race, the object must be rendered nugatory. It must become impossible for either side to achieve superiority over the other.

(Mr. Azkoul, Lebanon)

This can be achieved by setting ceilings on the armed forces and armaments of each side and by adopting necessary and adequate safeguards to prevent each side from exceeding these limits, either overtly or covertly. Since it has been recognized that the destructive power of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction presents a common danger for all mankind, these weapons would be destroyed and their production would be prohibited even while adopting the necessary and sufficient safeguards for the strict observance of these ends.

This would institute a harmonious and reliable balance between the military power of one side and the other. So long as such a balance existed, neither side, even though it might have aggressive designs, would be willing to begin a war if it had only equality with the other side. Without military superiority or the illusion of military superiority, war is virtually impossible.

Essentially, this is the global disarmament plan on which the Disarmament Commission has been working for all these years. This plan, once it has been completed in all its details, is designed to be accepted by all States in the atmosphere of distrust which now prevails in the world, and this is not a matter of detail. This is the real framework within which the plan is proposed to operate. This is what conditions and, indeed, determines its value and its scope. In order for it to be acceptable, this plan must be acceptable within the atmosphere of distrust which renders such a plan necessary. If there were no mistrust, there would be no armaments race, and if there were no armaments race, there would be no reason at all to talk about disarmament.

I wish to press this point because it is **indispensable that this point be kept constantly in our minds**, even while we examine the plan as a whole or in its constituent parts, even while we examine the various proposals which have been made, which are being made or which will be made with a view to modifying, completing or changing the plan. This plan is designed to be accepted by all States in the atmosphere of mistrust which prevails in the world. However, **for it to be accepted in this atmosphere of mistrust**, two objective conditions and one subjective condition must be fulfilled. All three of these conditions must be fulfilled at the same time.



(Mr. Azkoul Lebanon)

The first objective condition is that the disarmament measures contemplated in this plan should be of such a nature as to ensure a really harmonious balance between the parties. The second objective condition is that the safeguards written into the plan should be adequate to prevent this balance from being broken. The third, subjective condition is the good faith of the States which have so far participated in the armaments race. These States must be truly peace-loving, and the armaments race in which they are participating should have been caused only by mistrust and fear, and not by aggressive designs.

The statement of these conditions should make it abundantly clear that States of good will which are, however, mistrustful will accept the plan providing the balance written into it is genuine and provided the controls built into it are adequate. These States, in the course of the elaboration of this plan, will insist on the perfect fulfillment of these two conditions. However, a State acting in bad faith would reject such a plan precisely because these two conditions are fulfilled in the plan. A State acting in bad faith would only accept a plan which would enable it to break the equilibrium whenever its advantage so dictated, and thus would escape control.

The plan being prepared by the United Nations is designed to protect States acting in good faith, and not possible aggressors, and since this is so, it follows that the elaboration of measures to ensure harmonious balance and to safeguard its observance must necessarily be carried out with the greatest of care and caution.

Speaking of this harmonious balance of power, the members of the Disarmament Commission and of its Sub-Committee seem to have focussed their efforts up to the present on nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and on armed forces and conventional armaments. It may be argued that they considered that the aggregate power of a State, its total capacity to attack or to defend itself, is measured exclusively by these purely military yardsticks. It appears to my delegation, however, that other factors may well play a role which sometimes may be as important in increasing or diminishing the aggregate power of a State and, thus, the other factors must likewise be taken into account when the harmonious balance of power is determined.

(Mr. Azkoul, Lebanon)

An example of one of these other factors which I could quote is that of the system of alliances, formal or tacit. These systems are not stable. They are often subject to sudden changes. What happens to the balance of power when such changes occur? Let me give a hypothetical example. In the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission the maximum levels of the military effectives of the great Powers have been essentially agreed upon. The Soviet Union and communist China are to have an aggregate power approximately equal to that of the United States, the United Kingdom and France. In the present stage of international relations and in the present state of formal or tacit alliances, this distribution appears to be a harmonious one. But what would happen if one day communist China changed its regime or decided to alter the nature of its relations with the Soviet Union? Would not the equilibrium be dangerously disturbed? This would also apply to one or several of the countries which are now regarded as friends of the West and which, by internal revolution or by external provocation, might one day switch sides and join the communist camp.

My delegation recognizes that it is difficult to take such situations into account, since this is a fluid and unpredictable question. Perhaps that is why the Sub-Committee has touched upon this question only in a broad and general manner, but does not this very fact cast doubt on the very possibility of fulfilling the desirable harmonious balance and equilibrium. This is a question which we merely raise at this point, but I would be grateful if some member of this Committee or of the Disarmament Commission could give me some clarification of this issue.

With regard to the even more delicate subject of controls, the Sub-Committee seems to have attached increasing attention to this. So far as the control of nuclear weapons is concerned, the Sub-Committee recently reached a unanimous opinion that such a control is not possible in the present state of the advance of science. This revelation, however, has not much changed or altered the factual situation in the Sub-Committee.

(Mr. Azkoul, Lebanon)

The Soviet Union has always called for the preliminary prohibition of nuclear weapons prior to the preparation of controls, and it continues to take that stand even while the Western Powers continue to reject that demand, without pressing for the controls which they regard as impossible at the moment. The position of my delegation on this question is determined by the general framework within which any disarmament plan is bound to operate at this juncture, and that framework is the framework of mistrust. So long as mistrust prevails between the States, it is absurd to ask them to do something which presupposes the existence of confidence, even while that confidence does not exist. That is an elementary contradiction and, what is more, it is a dangerous proposal.

(Mr. Azkoul, Lebanon)

If both sides continue to possess the nuclear weapon in quantities which are roughly balanced as far as their destructive capacities are concerned, and if they continue to fear that resort to such weapons for the devastation or destruction of the adversary is bound to entail their own devastation and destruction, this in itself, as we see it, is a safeguard against the use of such weapons. This safeguard is much more reliable than would be its uncontrolled prohibition, than would be its prohibition which would be of such a nature as to make it possible for an eventual aggressor to rely on the absence of control to build up its nuclear armaments to launch an atomic war.

The study and exploration of the problem of control of nuclear weapons must be continued. My delegation has learned with satisfaction that the Government of the United States is prosecuting these studies vigorously. But my delegation endorses the views of the Norwegian delegation in suggesting that such action should concurrently be undertaken by the United Nations itself, if only in order to lend to the eventual conclusions of these studies the authority and confidence which would make it possible for these conclusions to be universally acceptable.

As far as control in other armament fields is concerned, my delegation again agrees with the Norwegian delegation which suggested to the Disarmament Commission that it study more closely the problem of the control of bacterial weapons, which seems to have been rather neglected so far.

As for control of conventional armaments, a number of spheres of action still remain open for our efforts. Suffice it to recall the eloquent and lucid and precise statement of the representative of France, Mr. Jules Moch. His statement made that position perfectly manifest.

I shall only sum up very cursorily, the broad fields of action which are still open to our efforts. The Commission may continue to examine the general disarmament plan in an effort to reduce such differences as still exist between the principle parties concerned. Secondly, it may undertake a study of such elements or aspects as are technically controllable and which are mutually agreed to be possible of control and verification independently of the general disarmament plan. Thirdly, it may prepare one or more juridical instruments with regard to these controllable and reducible elements or aspects.

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Finally, and above all, and urgently, it may examine more closely, with a view to adoption, proposals designed both to prevent surprise attacks and create a little more confidence in the world so as to pave the way for future strides in the problem of disarmament. I am thinking of President Eisenhower's plan of reciprocal aerial inspection; I am thinking of Mr. Bulganin's plan of ground control posts; I am thinking of Sir Anthony Eden's plan of localized inspection, and I am thinking of Mr. Faure's plan of publicity for military budgets and appropriations.

These plans can be studied, adopted and implemented, independently of any other plans for comprehensive or partial disarmament. But they may serve to pave the road for such comprehensive or partial disarmament plans. With these four jobs before it, we feel that the Disarmament Commission has a great deal of useful work to do between now and subsequent sessions.

Before concluding, I should like to offer two more remarks; one concerning the spirit in which we shall undertake our disarmament work, and the other concerning the methods followed heretofore. Under the first heading, the spirit, my delegation regrets to note the swiftness, indeed the haste, with which some members of the Sub-Committee, and others for that matter, have interpreted virtually every rejection of a proposal or every silence in the face of a proposal as evidence of bad faith on the other side, as evidence of a hidden determination, in advance, to reject any possible disarmament plan if presented by the other side.

The rejection of proposals in this field, or confronting other proposals with mere silence, and the meanderings and detours which have occasionally been resorted to, might indeed have sprung from such a determination to be hostile to any viable or effective disarmament plan. But such behaviour may likewise spring from mere mistrust which is implanted in all hearts and minds today, or it may come from the conditions prevailing in each country, for instance, its regime, its ideology, and its state of heart and mind.

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Tolerance should be displayed in these discussions and negotiations and a certain modicum of trust, methodic trust, to use a Cartesian term, should be resorted to in these negotiations. Any plan which the United Nations may prepare or propose must necessarily rest on the premise that all States now participating in the armaments race are acting in good faith; because if the contrary were supposed even for one moment, then any hope for the adoption or implementation of such a plan would be lost and the fulfilment of such a plan would be abandoned once and for all.

The future will show who is acting in good or bad faith. There is no need to run ahead of that. This observation logically leads me to another, which has in fact already been suggested by the representative of New Zealand. This concerns the Disarmament Commission's working methods heretofore. It would appear that the Commission has so far not had the necessary time to discuss and debate the Sub-Committee's reports in detail.

But as the members of the Sub-Committee are principally engaged in the conflict which today divides the world and since it is they which displayed the greatest amount of mistrust with regard to each other, and since it is they which occasionally pass from the sphere of mistrust, which merely means uncertainty or doubts as to intentions, to the sphere of affirmations about the ill nature of the intentions of the adversary, it would seem that in such an atmosphere progress must necessarily occur at a snail's pace.

What we wish to suggest is that the Commission itself should seriously and in detail examine the reports of the Sub-Committee. In the Commission, countries less directly engaged in the conflict, less doctrinaire in their mistrust and more prepared to accept methodical confidence prima facie, and by that very token capable of distinguishing between objective and subjective elements in the controversy, these States, I say, may well contribute their important need to the clarification of differences and to the composing thereof.

We nurture the hope that with the new working plan which will have been assigned to the Disarmament Commission by the four-Power draft resolution, and if it is dealt with in a more conciliatory, more indulgent, more patient and forbearing spirit, and provided the members of the Commission who are not members of the Sub-Committee are called upon to make greater contributions

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than they have heretofore, more felicitous and more encouraging results may well emerge, and soon, along the road which leads to disarmament and to the elimination of the **specter** of war which the armaments race has raised before the anxious hearts and fearful imaginations of mankind.

Mr. PALAMARCHUK (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): The international importance of the disarmament problem is rather great. It is hardly possible to add much to what has already become known or what has been said on this question since the time when the United Nations first began to work out the fundamental provisions for entering into an international convention on the reduction of armaments, the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the institution of effective controls.

What remains, however, is the need to remember always that the peoples of the world want peace and that they are determined to prevent the world from being dragged into the holocaust of war since this would be fraught with the most grievous of consequences. The peoples of the world have great fear as to the possibility of atomic warfare. That is why, as far as they are concerned, the problem of disarmament means the prohibition of the weapons of mass destruction.

The resolution on the disarmament question (808 (IX)) which was unanimously adopted last year registered the General Assembly's conclusion that new efforts must be made to reach agreement on exhaustive, comprehensive and co-ordinated proposals to be embodied in the draft international disarmament convention. What are these comprehensive and co-ordinated proposals? The answer is given by the very text of the resolution. It states that this convention shall provide for:

"The regulation, limitation and major reduction of all armed forces and all conventional armaments;

"The total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type, together with the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes;

"The establishment of effective international control..."

To a certain extent, the General Assembly's resolution was essentially a political directive, a platform for the proceedings of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee. The resolution thus answered the purposes in the achievement of which all the peoples of the world are interested inasmuch as the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the major reduction of armaments are vital necessities for all States without exception.



(Mr. Palamarchuk, Ukrainian SSR)

As we know, the unanimous adoption of this resolution by the General Assembly was preceded by lengthy and patient negotiations which were marked by a desire on the part of the delegations to find a basis for working out a draft international convention. The negotiations were successful and, when a joint resolution of five States was presented to the Committee on 22 October, the representative of France declared: "October 22nd marks the dawn of new and swift successes on the road to disarmament." It is quite reasonable to recall these words at this stage.

What happened thereafter? The submission by the Government of the Soviet Union of the proposals of 10 May and 21 July helped considerably to improve the circumstances and the atmosphere for the implementation of the directives contained in the above-mentioned resolution of the ninth session of the General Assembly concerning the search for an acceptable solution of the problems of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of the atomic weapon, with the institution of effective international control.

The Soviet proposals, being concrete expressions of the peace-loving foreign policy of the Soviet State, are determined not by transitory or ephemeral considerations of expediency but are prompted by the consistent struggle of peoples for peace and security so as to ensure that the development of international relations should not be toward increased tensions and war but toward mutual confidence and peace.

The proposals of the Soviet Union of 10 May pursue one simple and clear objective: to bring about the cessation of the armaments race and a fundamental relaxation of tension in relations between the States. These proposals were designed to emancipate the peoples from the fear of war and to implant in them some security, some certainty as to the shape of tomorrow, so that human beings could live tranquilly, without fear, and work for the good and happiness of the generations to come.

In these proposals, the question of disarmament is regarded not in isolation with respect to the general state of international relations, and this is their main hallmark. It has been generally admitted that the proposals of 10 May brought about a considerable rapprochement between the views of the Soviet Union and those of the United States, Great Britain and France with respect to the main constituent parts of the disarmament question. For example, there are no

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differences remaining as to the question of the establishment of the levels of the armed forces of the great Powers. No differences remain as to the timing and sequence of the entry into force of the prohibition of the atomic weapon.

There is also a considerable rapprochement of the various positions concerning the establishment of international controls and inspection. The path of movement, even though difficult, but forward movement none the less, was opened to the gaze of world public opinion which assessed properly the solicitude of the Soviet Government for the peace and security of peoples.

The representative of the United States in the Sub-Committee, on 19 May, spoke of a detectable reduction in the differences in the views on disarmament between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers. The representative of the United Kingdom, however, made a speech which reminded one of the receding shadows of the cold war. Nevertheless, the representative of the United Kingdom called the proposal of the Soviet Government a comprehensive one on disarmament which constituted important progress. I do not intend to thank the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom for displaying realism in assessing the truly comprehensive scope of the programmes for reduction of armaments, prohibition of the atomic weapon and effective international control proposed by the Soviet Union since these same representatives in the Sub-Committee did everything in their power to slow down, frustrate and call a halt to this important progress and turn it into retrogression.

After 10 May, the Western Powers, dreading the prospect of the achievement of agreement concerning the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of the nuclear weapon, called a retreat.

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They crawled away from the positions they had previously adopted and abandoned the very things they had been proposing in previous years and at the very outset of the present year. Especially did they abandon the Franco-British proposals of 10 June 1954, which they now persist in regarding as obsolete. For example, in his speech yesterday, Mr. Paul Martin clearly, and surely with greater candour than was given us by the others, pointed out the fact that the Western Powers now challenged the very possibility of achieving of favourable affirmative results at this stage in the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of the atomic weapon.

The Canadian-United States-British-French draft resolution focuses, not on the task of achieving agreement on the reduction of armaments, the prohibition of atomic weapons or the establishment of international control, but on the swiftest implementation of the plan for the exchange of military blueprints and the carrying out of aerial reconnaissance.

It is argued that aerial inspection is the key which will open -- of course, we are not told when, but which will eventually open -- the doors to disarmament. It is argued that these measures will free the peoples from the dread of sudden possible attack. Is this true? A study of the proposal of President Eisenhower leads to the conclusion that the carrying out of aerial photography in present circumstances would not contribute to effective progress towards ensuring the security of States, let alone successfully bringing about disarmament.

Let us grant for the sake of argument that one State presents the other State with information on its armed forces and allows the other State to photograph its territory. The other State, once it has collected the necessary intelligence, can make use of it in order to increase its armed forces and stockpiles of armaments, including its reserves of weapons of mass destruction, inasmuch as there will not yet be any agreement on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. It is perfectly clear that such information, once it has been obtained, can well be used for sudden attack -- in other words, for aggression. We cannot lose sight of the fact that these measures will be carried out, or projected to be carried out, even while the armaments race continues, even while military groupings and networks of military bases exist -- bases which threaten the security of States in whose vicinity they are situated.

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There is a second important consideration, which was stated by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Bulganin, in his letter to President Eisenhower:

"We cannot fail to ponder what would happen if we engaged in this matter of aerial photography and the exchange of military blueprints without having taken effective measures for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. I have some fears which I cannot fail to share with you. Would this situation not lead to a reduction of vigilance in respect of the still existing danger of a breach of the peace which would be brought about by the armaments race?"

From all this we are bound to draw the conclusion that the Western Powers do not at the present time attach due significance to the reduction of armaments and that they are not interested in progress in that field. We have grounds to believe that the dawn of new possibilities on our path to disarmament, which was mentioned last year by the representative of France, or its glimmering which was visible from the lowering clouds of the armaments race, was precisely what went far beyond the actual intentions and designs of the Western Powers. Let us, however, examine the motives invoked here to support the actual refusal of the Western Powers to entertain the very proposals on disarmament which they had championed prior to the Geneva Conference, their abandonment of last year's resolution of the General Assembly, which charted the main contours of the draft international convention and which called for a determined and close correlation of the integral parts of the disarmament problem, to wit: the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, the major reduction of armaments and the establishment of effective international control.

The representatives of the Western Powers seek to support their position, that is, their refusal to conclude agreements on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, by invoking difficulties in bringing about control over nuclear materials. We do not deny the existence of some difficulties in this realm; just as others did not deny the existence of these difficulties in the past. For instance, I recall the first report of the Atomic Energy Commission, which contains the findings of the scientific technical committee about the difficulties of instituting control over nuclear materials.

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For the sake of fairness, we should recall that in 1952 Mr. Moch also noted:

"The difficulty of establishing control over fissionable materials already manufactured will increase as the stockpiles of such materials grow. Even as time passes, the risk of concealment, the danger that past production of materials can no longer be discoverable grows with extraordinary swiftness."

At that time this statement by the representative of France escaped the attention of the members of the Sub-Committee. Two or three years ago the Western Powers opposed the cessation of the armaments race on the grounds that wars were being fought in Korea and Indo-China, that these wars had created tension in relations between the States and that only the cessation of such wars would create the conditions under which disarmament measures might well be undertaken. Blood no longer flows in Korea and Indo-China. Nevertheless, the armaments race continues apace, military budgets are still bloated and the danger of devastating atomic war still hangs over mankind like Damocles' sword. When genuine opportunities for reaching agreement and making progress in putting an end to the armaments race and bringing about the prohibition of atomic weapons became evident on the basis of the proposals of the Soviet Union and the proposals of the other Powers, then, in order to object to all this, in order to frustrate all this, the pretext is invoked of the alleged impossibility of establishing international control over the prohibition of nuclear weapons and, consequently, the conclusion is drawn that it is impossible to bring about any disarmament at all.

However, may I venture to ask, what are likely to be the consequences of the conception, more and more often proclaimed, that an international convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons is an unattainable objective as far as the United Nations is concerned? Those who encourage a sense of doom and fatalism in the minds of men, those who inspire aggressive circles, those who yearn for the cold war and favour an unbridled armaments race, are increasing the danger of devastating atomic war.

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If "hypocrisy" is the term that is to be bandied about, then it is not difficult to find who it is that is really hypocritical. In the interests of the strengthening of peace, the United Nations must have its weighty say concerning the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. As far as the latter is concerned, the prohibition of atomic weapons is provided for in the proposals of the Soviet Union and is regarded as the major urgent task of this day. But, if we look at the joint declaration by the United States, the United Kingdom and France presented at the Conference of Foreign Ministers at Geneva on 10 November of this year, we note that it contains a recommendation to forego the use of nuclear and all other types of weapons in any form that is incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations.

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What is noteworthy is the circumstance that this recommendation places a sign of equality between atomic and hydrogen weapons on the one hand and all other types of weapons on the other; that is, to put it more precisely, the Western Powers have now reduced nuclear or atomic weapons to the rank of conventional armaments. They now argue that essentially there are no differences between the ordinary bullet and an atomic bomb although the experience gathered towards the end of the Second World War would indicate that the atomic weapon is a weapon of mass destruction, devastation and extermination.

As early as 1947, in its second report to the Security Council, the then-United Nations Atomic Energy Commission defined the atomic weapon as one which may be utilized "for purposes of mass destruction, mass injury or mass poisoning". (Atomic Energy Commission, Official Records, Second Report to the Security Council, page 71)

The very fact that the above-mentioned proposal of the Western Powers places the sign of equality between conventional and mass destruction weapons bespeaks the desire to prevent any prohibition of the nuclear weapon. The idea is that its use should be legalized along with all other types of weapons and therefore, as it is argued, there is no reason to prohibit the atomic weapon, nor is there any reason to eliminate it from the armaments of States. On the other hand, the words "incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations", submitted in the proposal jointly made by the United States, the United Kingdom and France, is nothing but an attempt to fit the use of the nuclear weapon into the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter of the United Nations has already been used in the past as a camouflage for aggression.

There is no reason why a policy should not be charted for fitting the use of the atomic weapon into the Charter of the United Nations as well. This, however, runs directly counter to the purposes and principles of the United Nations which, as early as 1946, adopted a solemn decision on the necessity of the comprehensive reduction of armaments and on the total prohibition of the nuclear weapon.

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If we take a look at the joint draft resolution submitted by Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/L.150), even the most careful sifting will not reveal any words in it in favour of or even concerning the prohibition of the atomic weapon. This, of course, is by no means an accident. The third paragraph of the draft resolution, under the pretext of continuing the search for methods that could make possible thoroughly effective inspection and control of nuclear weapon material, this paragraph 3 of the operative part of the draft resolution, is in reality a recommendation that the problem of disarmament should be postponed or shelved for an indefinite period of time.

The representative of Canada, touching on the reasons which in his opinion worsened the prospect of progress in the field of disarmament, referred to the allegedly negative position taken by the Soviet Union with regard to the reunification of Germany and on the question of European security, a position which he said the Soviet Union adopted at the Conference of the Four Foreign Ministers at Geneva. Inasmuch as Mr. Martin touched upon the German question and on the question of European security, it is indispensable to compare the position of the Western Powers and the position of the Soviet Union, and to examine how their positions compared in Geneva concerning European security and in this connexion the German question.

The Western Powers seek to bring about the remilitarization not only of West Germany, which is already being carried out following the Paris Agreements, but also the remilitarization of East Germany, seeking to include all of Germany into the North Atlantic bloc, which is directed against the Soviet Union -- and not only against the Soviet Union.

It goes without saying that this policy runs counter to the interests of ensuring peace and security in Europe. To the contrary, the Soviet Union seeks to bring about the reunification of Germany as a peace-loving and democratic State which would not be a party to any military bloc and which would co-operate with other States in strengthening the peace. It is precisely this policy which is directed against the renascence of an imperialistic and militaristic Germany, which twice within the life of two generations has dragged the world into the holocaust of devastating war, that has commanded the warm support of the peoples of Europe. These peoples realize full well that the rebirth of German



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militarism is entirely incompatible with forestalling the threat of war, let alone the creation of European security.

The German question was not resolved affirmatively in Geneva because the Western Powers still seek to solve it without the participation of the Germans themselves. It is wholly manifest that the position of the Soviet Union on the German question has nothing to do with and is certainly not responsible for the fact that the prospects of progress in the field of disarmament have become rather remote. The United Nations, however, should not be doomed to inaction just because there are difficulties in the way of achieving joint agreement on the reduction of armaments.

In order to reduce the threat of atomic warfare and to dispel the dread of the peoples as to the destiny of the world and the future of mankind, the United Nations must do everything in its power to prevent atomic war, and this includes such methods as a moral and political condemnation of the use of the atomic weapon. If the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and France jointly declared that, pending the entry into force of an agreement on the total prohibition of the atomic weapon, they would assume the obligation not to be the first to use atomic and hydrogen weapons, and if they presented a proposal to this effect to other States as well, the significance of this moral undertaking would in the present circumstances be even greater than was the significance of the international agreement against the use of bacterial and chemical weapons which was adopted in Geneva in 1925.

Objections to a moral condemnation of the atomic weapon are usually based on doubts concerning the possibility of a bona fide fulfilment of such obligations, inasmuch as it is said that they are mere promises. History, however, tells of instances of similar obligations which were moral and political condemnations of weapons of mass destruction, and which brought about the result that these weapons were not used during past wars. That same Geneva Protocol, as is well known, prevented the use by the belligerents of chemical and bacterial warfare throughout the whole course of the Second World War. Consequently, the general principles of international law and international practice to date concerning limitation of the means of waging war provide a full and valid foundation confirming the necessity of a moral and political condemnation of the nuclear weapon, this most devastating weapon ever known to mankind.

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Along with the report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, this Committee is also examining the problem of measures for the further relaxation of international tension and the development of international co-operation. The draft resolution presented to this Committee by the Soviet Union in document A/C.1/L.151 notes:

"...the efforts made by States, particularly of late, to relax international tension, to promote mutual confidence and to develop co-operation among nations. In this respect the Geneva Conference of the Heads of Government of the four Powers, the Bandung Conference of Asian and African countries and the development of contacts between the political leaders of States are of particular importance".

(Mr. Palamarchuk,  
Ukrainian SSR)

Much has been said these days about the Geneva spirit. Some mention the Geneva spirit with a feeling of gratification and with the desire that the results of the Geneva conference should be further developed in the form of new concrete steps that would promote the strengthening of confidence between States. Others, however, especially those who do not like the Geneva spirit in any shape, form or manner, seek to minimize the significance of the Geneva conference so as to justify adherence in relations between States to the notorious policy of acting from positions of strength.

The General Assembly would make a useful contribution to the further relaxation of international tension if it appealed to States to follow the policy of co-operation charted at Geneva, regardless of the difficulties which may be encountered along this path.

The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR, prompted by these considerations, supports the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union. Its adoption by the General Assembly would have substantial significance in developing international co-operation.

The peoples have undiminished hope that all the States, and in the first instance the great Powers, following the path of co-operation and mutual assistance, will unswervingly continue their search for joint decisions in order to advance the solution of the problem of the reduction of armaments, the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of effective international control. We sincerely hope that this aspiration of the people will be fulfilled.

Mr. RAMADAN (Egypt)(interpretation from French): The four-Power conference that met at Geneva in July gave rise to so many hopes that the world felt that it was at last on the road to a relaxation of international tension and conciliation. A number of important decisions were taken at Geneva which established the groundwork for important disarmament plans and for greater contact between the East and the West.

These various plans were based upon the main idea of the need to re-establish confidence between the East and the West, a condition which is indispensable for the establishment of good relations and an atmosphere in which future agreement can be reached.

That is how the spirit of Geneva was born. Unfortunately, the favourable signs that might have been interpreted as the desire of the Heads of the Governments for a relaxation of tension in the world, disappeared and were replaced by doubt and mistrust. This has been one of the questions most discussed in our debate. The latest phases which followed from the meeting of the heads of State at Geneva were marked throughout the world by alternating feelings of optimism and discouragement where the reasons to doubt the wisdom of the leaders of the great Powers seemed at times to outweigh the grounds for hope.

The Foreign Ministers conference at Geneva in October of this year should have been the starting point for the increase of confidence among States, which we felt would take place following the July meeting. But the positions adopted in the course of the Foreign Ministers' conference at Geneva were changed with regard to the question of European security and German unification. This difference separated the ideas which prevailed at Geneva concerning disarmament and other problems.

Unfortunately, the final communique at the close of the Geneva conference confirmed the observations of many observers. It appeared evident to all that the obstacles on the path of conciliation between the East and the West were caused by feelings of mistrust, which greatly changed the atmosphere of the negotiations. World public opinion was concerned, and quite justly, with the antagonisms that were voiced at the last meetings at Geneva. These apprehensions were justified by the fact that the seeds of mistrust tended to increase world tension, a tension that had been considerably reduced following the meeting of the Heads of State at Geneva.

Observers had hoped that the Geneva meetings would permit the Foreign Ministers of the four great Powers to find common ground in order to bring together their differing points of view on disarmament. They were led to believe that the views expressed by the Heads of State in July would bring fruitful results and would permit the establishment of basic agreement on disarmament and the control and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. This hope was strengthened by the fact that the entire world had indicated, in the interval between the July and October meetings, in statements by the Heads of Government in all parts of the world, the importance which was attached to the problem of bridging the gap between the great Powers and bringing about conciliation and relaxation of international tension.

But the last conference at Geneva showed that reciprocal mistrust underlay the reason for the differing opinions which were expressed. The existence of differing views on disarmament was naturally understood to be the cause of all this. Instead of the opposing views coming closer together, they became more and more separated. As soon as it became obvious to all that there was no way of guaranteeing control, reciprocal mistrust transformed the entire atmosphere of the negotiations.

It is obvious that the great Powers clearly understand the grave dangers to humanity in the event a conflagration were to break out -- it would most certainly annihilate civilization. We all know that today atomic warfare would be folly, resulting in a calamity beyond the proportion of anyone's understanding. It would obviously be much more dangerous than any possible advantage that might accrue to a victim. The possibility of unleashing nuclear warfare must be very carefully considered today, because destruction and isolation would not be limited to any one specific part of the world but would extend to the farthest corners of the universe. The treasures of civilization, the heritage of centuries of culture and the greatest creations of man would all be destroyed.

(Mr. Ramadan, Egypt)

Scientific knowledge acquired so far does not permit us to gauge the scope of nuclear war. But, outside this mass destruction, radioactivity that emanates from the utilization of atomic weapons could cause slow death, too: it would gradually destroy vegetation, it would poison water supplies, and it would gradually bring about the complete annihilation of all life on the face of the earth.

The smaller nations know perfectly well that they cannot play a major role in the arena, and therefore it is the greater Powers which have to fulfil their role. But there are two roles that they could play, one good and one bad. The bad role would be to precipitate this final catastrophe if these nuclear weapons are used for war purposes. The good role would be to convert what is today an instrument of terror into an instrument of welfare for humanity -- if these same nuclear forces are used for peaceful purposes and for peaceful purposes only.

The smaller and middle-sized nations are therefore today imbued with a greater strength. They have to speak to the greater Powers; they have to have their voice, as the voice of reason, heard in order to avoid this greatest of all dangers.

The message that was formulated and expressed most eloquently at the Bandung Conference was based not only on reasons of security. There were greater imperatives there. It was humanity endeavouring to keep itself alive, to keep alive the centuries of culture that have been accumulated on the earth, and to avoid the destruction of the edifice of our civilization. That message should and must be heard.

The smaller nations cannot avoid their responsibilities, especially since an element of urgency is known to exist. The stockpiling of nuclear weapons is such that peace can be threatened and international peace can be destroyed all over the world.

This stockpiling, besides being dangerous, is a very heavy load on the peoples of the world in so far as their budgets are concerned. The first step that should be carried out in order to lessen international tension would be to consider this question of disarmament from that point of view. This appears to us indispensable, because we cannot afford to think of a war today. It is also indispensable that it be thus considered because no nation can afford an arms race

which would swallow up all budgetary appropriations. Great advantages would accrue to the peoples of all countries if these budgets were reduced.

It would also be interesting to point out here that, in spite of the differences of opinion among the great Powers, some progress has been achieved with regard to the reduction of budgets, and also the stage at which the prohibition of the use of atomic weapons would be introduced.

We are certain that, in spite of the very cogent reasons expressed on one side as well as on the other with regard to the trends, the importance of the stakes is so great that the parties concerned with this problem, unanimously supported by all peoples of the earth, will make a serious effort to achieve constructive results.

I do not think that it is necessary that agreement be total and immediate on all points. It will be sufficient to do everything possible as soon as possible. Once some agreement has been arrived at between the great Powers, a feeling of security will take root which will contribute greatly to a relaxation of international tension.

As far as we are concerned, we know that real advantages will accrue to the world if we are able to channel budgetary savings to cultural purposes and also bring about the welfare of the peoples. The repercussions of such advantages would be felt in all critical parts of life because, as the standards of living improve in all countries, true progress would be achieved in the field of international relations. We are convinced that the desire for a relaxation of tension is the main objective of all peoples who are peace-loving.

Egypt is, naturally and obviously, amongst those countries whose peace-loving intentions cannot be doubted. If, in the course of the debate, certain allusions have been made with regard to certain agreements arrived at in the Middle East, and that may have created some international tension in that region, I should like here to dissipate any doubts or worry that anyone may have in mind. Egypt, like all sovereign States, has the right and the duty to assume the defence of its own territory, and it is exclusively within its jurisdiction to take measures necessary to defend itself. As far as was necessary to assure the defence and the guarantees of our security, we had to take certain steps, and we are convinced that the measures that we did take

(Mr. Ramadan, Egypt)

will safeguard our security and will also apply to the needs of our own legitimate defence. They, in themselves, are a factor of peace and stability in that part of the world.

Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) (interpretation from Spanish): Because of the fact that I was very busy in the debate on the admission of new Members, I was unable to be present at the earlier stages of this debate, and therefore I was not able to take note of the statements that were made. Consequently, my statement will have to be based on the studies that I have been making of this very interesting subject of disarmament since 1950. I shall endeavour to be brief and to the point.

There is a tragic meaning -- perhaps it is too much to say "tragic", and perhaps I should say that there is a dramatic meaning -- in the debate on disarmament. On the one hand, we see that there has been a drawing together of many points of view. I well remember that these stages of drawing together of differing points of view are the following: the theoretical, unconditional prohibition of the use of atomic weapons and the mechanical or arithmetical reduction to one-third as an intransigent position. On the one hand there was the Baruch plan for reduction of nuclear weapons in the hands of an international body that would naturally have a humanitarian and peaceful intent, since we are willing to believe that it would be peaceful, and, next to that, was the proportional reduction of armaments.

It was arduous work, but I think that, when we remember how arduous that work was, we should be more encouraged to have managed to convince the Soviet representative that theoretical and abstract reductions, based wholly on goodwill and confidence, was prohibition purely of a sham fashion; it was only just for salesmanship.



(Mr. Belaunde, Peru)

Frankly, I would say that that kind of reduction may have short-range effects, but not long-range effects.

I shall not quote Lincoln here, because I do not wish to be misunderstood or to interpret his words incorrectly. But I must say this: It is quite obvious that, especially in Paris, everyone was convinced that there could be no true prohibition without true control, and that there could be no control without inspection. Hence, after enormous intellectual efforts, we arrived at the concept of an indivisible trilogy: no prohibition without control, no reduction of armaments without control, and no control without inspection. Reduction, prohibition and control were different aspects of a juridical entity.

Thus, we recommended that the Disarmament Commission -- which was then part of the Atomic Energy Commission; in fact, the two Commissions formed one organ -- should prepare one convention or treaty which would lay down the juridical obligation to reduce armaments, establish control and prohibit atomic weapons. But then a great difficulty arose. We cannot do everything at once. We do not have God's ability to do everything at once. We are not ubiquitous. We have to do things one at a time.

The United States presented a very interesting proposal which marked, as it were, the difference between the concept of the Western Powers and the concept of the Soviet Union -- the Soviet Union's accent on nuclear weapons, in which it had an inferior position; and the Western Powers' accent on the reduction of armaments, in which they had an inferior position. Then, Mr. Acheson suggested that there should be established a scale of stages, linking the elements so that gradually, by a cartesian method, we should proceed from the easiest to the most difficult -- beginning with the possible reductions and ending with the prohibition of atomic weapons.

Mr. Vyshinsky, with that talent which we recognize today more than ever, made an observation: Those stages were not linked together. They did not represent a continuous series. It would be possible to enter one stage and then, if there were difficulties, not to go on to the other stages; in other words, a country which, in all good faith, had embarked on the work of the first stage would suddenly find that the other stages in which it was interested were not to be carried out.

(Mr. Belaunde, Peru)

Mr. Vyshinsky's argument convinced many people. I must say quite frankly that it convinced me. I represent a small country. Hence, I have the utmost impartiality. My only authority is the juridical position of my country. I am ignorant in this matter -- I confess that in all humility. I say: Is it not possible that in his argument Mr. Vyshinsky forgot one element implicit in the United States proposal, which was a very honest proposal? I interpret the United States suggestion of stages -- that is, chronological but indivisible stages -- in this way: If the entire plan is not implemented, if, for example, the third stage is not reached, anything done before that stage is automatically cancelled out; any country would be free to annul the obligations which it had undertaken in the first stage. Why? Because, as a student of law, I apply the principle of the indivisibility of obligations contracted in bilateral treaties, and under that principle the stages of the plan in question would be indivisible.

On the basis of that interpretation, the delegations of Brazil and Peru invited the Soviet Union delegation to accept the United States proposal.

Thus, it appeared that prohibition by propaganda, prohibition on the basis of gentlemen's agreements, was to be discarded. Unfortunately, what is discarded from a juridical point of view can be reborn from a political point of view. The kind of prohibition that I have described -- which I had regarded as a spectre -- has returned to the debate, and that is one of the unfortunate aspects of the situation. This ghost of something which I thought had died has now returned. I think that this ghost is a most troublesome element. This kind of prohibition presupposes absolute confidence and good faith. I am sure that we should have confidence and good faith. But confidence and good faith cannot be decreed. Here, I would recall the words of Pascal, to the effect that there can be no obligation to love; one cannot tell a person to love another; love is a spontaneous thing. The same may be said of confidence and good faith: these are spontaneous things; they cannot be decreed.

Unfortunately, the efforts made by the Disarmament Commission on the basis of the abovementioned instructions have been fruitless. The ghost of prohibition has confronted us with the difficulty of confidence. The question of control, which is necessary to the plan as well as to absolute prohibition, also brings

up the difficulty of confidence and good faith. And there is another difficulty in connexion with control. Control must be adequate; it must be control with inspection, with organs having rather wide powers. But, according to the Soviet Union, such wide powers would be contrary to sovereignty. In Paris, the Soviet Union stated categorically that a State which valued its sovereignty could not accept wide powers of control. But what are the limits of sovereignty? Exactly when does the power of inspection violate the principles of sovereignty? Sovereignty is an admirable principle. In Paris, I stated that a vague meaning should not be ascribed to the word "sovereignty". The same could be said of prohibition. I stated that, under Latin traditions -- which are the traditions of common law -- sovereignty was the freedom of States within the international order. We cannot accept absolute sovereignty. Sovereignty is a sacred thing, and it is sacred precisely because it operates within the orbit of the law and the international juridical order. But, on this basis, it is easy to understand that it would be difficult for control to be effective. For what would be the limits of sovereignty and what would be the interests of the international order?

(Mr. Belaunde, Peru)

But there was a more interesting aspect of the Paris discussions. Chronologically, obviously, the stages as a whole -- or shall I say the action -- were first carried out in the field of conventional armaments, and only when conventional armaments had been reduced did we reach the stage of taking measures in the nuclear field. I will not say that there was a lack of favouritism but that there was inequality with regard to the superiority in conventional weapons of a State which lacked nuclear superiority. I remember that the Australian delegation raised the question of concurrent work on these two aspects, and this brought up in my mind another idea -- not of concurrency but of simultaneity. This concept of simultaneity forces its way in. It is the human process that some ideas have to appear at a certain moment and that then there has to be a process of maturing. And later, in the second period which began in 1953, that idea of simultaneity found an admirable expression to which I pay tribute. That expression was contained in the Franco-British memorandum where it was proposed to -- I have here to invent a word, and those who are purists in their attitude towards the Spanish language will forgive me -- "simultaneate" both nuclear and conventional reductions. Thus we had the satisfaction here, even during Mr. Vyshinsky's lifetime, that when we expressed in debates the importance, the justice and the appropriateness of carrying out the simultaneous work which was the great guarantee for those Powers which were inferior in nuclear weapons -- as well as a guarantee for those which were inferior in conventional armaments -- we reached a position where Mr. Vyshinsky himself announced that the Soviet Union accepted the Franco-British memorandum as a basis for discussion.

Once -- and this was a rare occurrence -- I felt a tremor of encouragement, but it was very transitory because the grave problem itself remained. What about control? There was a Soviet proposal which was extremely intelligent from the point of view of diplomatic strategy -- and I know that representatives appreciate full well that there is a diplomatic strategy just as there is a bellicose strategy. According to that Soviet proposal the Soviet Union accepted control, but provisional control exerted by a provisional body at a certain stage -- in order to facilitate a solution this was also divided into stages, going back somewhat to the previous plans -- with another, permanent control body envisaged once the first stage had been completed.

(Mr. Belaunde, Peru)

The first objection that was raised then was this: would it be a good system to have a temporary control body and then, subsequently, a permanent one? And this was the next great problem we had to overcome. If that system of prohibition, regulation, limitation, inspection and control, with certain variations, was acceptable to both sides, would it also be feasible? Is it not true that we accept the fact that reduction and control are indivisible from the metaphysical and logical point of view? They cannot be chronologically simultaneous because human nature does not permit us to do things with that simultaneity. Our imperfect means and our limitations force us to do things over a period of time, and time requires succession. There may be an essential philosophical and logical link between the elements of production, reduction and control, but, chronologically speaking, if control is indispensable for the application of prohibition at a certain stage and for reduction to take place, then the control body has to be set up before prohibition and reduction can be accepted. This is crystal clear, and on this matter the Western Powers were absolutely right.

Those who made the proposal to us were quite correct when they expressed the Franco-British idea that the control body must exist first, because how can we control if we have no controller? Naturally, before one builds a house there has to be someone to plan it efficiently -- someone with all the necessary powers at his disposal. And when we sent the resolution forward and asked the Disarmament Commission to begin its work on the basis of the Franco-British proposal, what happened? In the short time at my disposal I have tried to read through these documents and, with sadness in my heart, I have noticed that the ghost was returning as in Ibsen's The Ghosts. The ghost of prohibition was returning, and when it appeared that this matter was just about ready to be crystallized Mr. Gromyko, in London, proposed the unconditional destruction of all nuclear elements as an isolated and separate part of that which cannot be separated or divided.

(Mr. Belaunde, Peru)

To put it mildly, we are now in a difficult situation. We have not only the situation caused by this ghost of prohibition, but also the situation that even if prohibition were not a ghost but a living body there would still be a tremendous reality fighting against us -- a reality which the Soviet Union confesses and agrees with. It is found to be difficult to detect the existence of stockpiles of nuclear materials. Nuclear materials, which are so difficult to produce, have, by one of those satanic paradoxes, the added privilege that they are easy to hide. The greatest danger of all is the easiest to hide. This does seem to be a paradox worthy of study by the sociologists not only of history but of law as well. We are told this fact quite openly by the Soviet delegation. It is not something invented by the Western Powers -- this absolute impossibility of divining the existence of and detecting the stockpiles which might very well be used for warlike purposes. As I have said, we are opposed by a dire difficulty here. In mythical times there are said to have been wizards who claimed to be able to discover gold and precious stones with a divining rod. Modern science may have to find something of that kind. Radar was invented to discover moving objects. Perhaps we shall discover something of tremendous sensitivity which will detect not only the existence of stockpiles but the distance at which they are hidden -- something which will tell us exactly where this accursed treasure is being hidden. Unfortunately, however, a divining rod of that kind does not yet exist, and there are no present day wizards to tell us where these nuclear stockpiles are hidden -- as they can be hidden in some of the vast territories of the great Powers or in the islands which are lost in the Pacific. No one can tell us where they are hidden.

(Mr. Belaunde, Peru)

And now we are facing a situation which I would not hesitate to call tragic. That control which, in the course of these discussions, has seemed to be bedeviled by juridical difficulties, is now bedeviled by scientific difficulties besides. That erstwhile prohibition which was being left to good faith and confidence and that, let us say, could be controlled up to a certain point, led to someone denouncing a nation which was disloyal to an obligation, saying to such a nation: "You were going to prohibit, you were going to reduce your armaments, but you have not done so."

But we cannot do this. We have no means of telling a State to fulfil its obligations because if it commits the crime of stockpiling, we cannot know it. That hiding of stockpiles is pertinent. But let us go back to the problem of control.

Control is the essential element, and it appears now that we have not overcome the difficulties. We know that control is technically difficult. This was mentioned in the Soviet Union proposals which were read out to us. But we also find an aspect, which is very interesting to me and upon which I can speak with some authority, namely, that control is very difficult. First of all, I have referred to the stalemate as to the time when the control body was to be set up. When are we going to set it up? In the view of the Western Powers -- and they are quite right -- it should be created first of all. In the view of the Soviet Union, the control body cannot be set up immediately; it has to be later, and has to be a secondary and provisional kind of body. We might say that in all of the Soviet Union proposals -- even that very brilliant, intelligent and useful proposal of 10 May -- anyone reading them can find that the Achilles' heel is the slight emphasis which is placed upon the capitis diminutio maxima of an element which, to us, cannot be diminished.

The main question, as far as we are concerned, is control; yet, in the Soviet Union proposals control is always relegated to second place. With regard to inspection, there is a United States proposal whereby the control body is given clear and precise powers and those powers can be exercised immediately without appeal because, if those powers are to be utilized and then suspended, if the appeal has a suspensive effect, as we say in law, this is not control since, while we are negotiating the legitimacy of the measures taken by an inspection body, the hiding or the illegitimate and illegal use of those

(Mr. Belaunde, Peru)

stockpiles will have been carried out already. All that control and inspection presupposes is that measures taken cannot be suspended. Inspection presupposes that the measures are taken, and with regard to the legitimacy of the measures there can be an outside process by means of which an appeal can be made afterwards, but it cannot suspend those measures. Exceptions of legitimacy cannot be claimed by one party on the basis of sovereignty in order to surmount that a priori juridical process. I was asked, why mix the judicial with the political? Although it was Mr. Malik of Lebanon who said that, I feel that he was wrong because the juridical aspects can be accepted as long as we do not suspend the measures. The juridical process can go its way afterward, but the measures have to be followed. The sentence may be in favour of the claimant, but the measures have been taken. A measure can be repaired, but what cannot be repaired or redressed is the abuse of the use of nuclear energy. This is a very interesting juridical point.

If the inspector has dictated certain measures beyond his powers, the effects can be redressed, but if he has applied a measure correctly and that measure is suspended, the dreadful effects of the suspension could not be redressed, nor could they possibly be repaired.

I wonder whether the spirit of rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers has reached the point where the Soviet Union will accept the proposal of the United States regarding inspectors. Naturally, those inspectors must have complete freedom to travel and to visit all places where it is presumed that stockpiles are hidden or that nuclear energy is being produced. The inspectors must be able to make such visits, after which all they will do will be to appeal the legitimacy of the denunciation -- but not the suspension of the measure. If I had the right, I would ask: would the Soviet Union accept that?

But there is a more serious question, and one which is closer to home as far as I am concerned because it gave rise to a debate which had tragic elements. I said that, since the great Powers had the right of veto, and although that veto may not be applied when the nation itself is affected, if peaceful measures are taken, it is applied in case of the use of force. But when it is a matter of concealing stockpiles or a violation of the agreement on conventional armaments, such violations could occur not in the territory of the great Powers, but in the territory of one of their allies, in which case the veto would apply. I was deeply moved by this possibility. I sometimes feel great emotion, but I believe that I am able to control my nerves and my emotions; and I thank God for that.



(Mr. Bolaunde, Peru)

I turned to Mr. Vyshinsky and said that I did not think that this problem had any solution while the right to appeal still existed, especially an appeal against the suspensive effects -- an appeal to the control body or to the Security Council, where the great Powers have the right of veto; would the great Powers not have to renounce the veto, as Mr. Sandoval of Mexico proposed when these matters were being discussed in 1946? Mr. Vyshinsky replied very intelligently: "I cannot change the Charter. The Charter constitutes a duty and a law." And I must say that, in my proposal regarding the abolition of the veto, I was supported only by Australia and Brazil. That is by the way. There was discreet opposition from the United Kingdom -- opposition from the United Kingdom is always discreet -- but it said the same thing, that the Charter could not be changed. But let us be sincere. If the veto, with all its power, is applied because the control body is appealed against to the Security Council, and we accept the fact that the provisions of the control body, through its inspectors, can suspend measures, then I wonder whether disarmament can be effective if, in such cases, the veto still stands. Naturally, the answer given by the Soviet Union was intelligent since, as you say in English, Mr. Vyshinsky passed the buck. We say in Spanish: "He blew the feather to someone else's nose." Naturally, they would not accept the feather. Some of them held their peace. The United Kingdom said that the Charter could not be changed and, once again, we found that, even on that side, and in its final stages, control was impossible.

(Mr. Belaunde, Peru)

The tragic aspect of that debate was that I was the one who was moved by it. By tragic destiny, a few days later, Mr. Vyshinsky passed away. Today, analyzing this question sincerely and putting all our cards on the table honestly, there are tremendous difficulties about control from the juridical point of view. Now, I am not brushing these difficulties aside. I am not brushing anything aside, I am not renouncing anything. I think the United Nations is the greatest possible institution and it has the right to ask the peoples--- and Providence as well, since Providence very often has been generous -- everything. We have the right to ask our experts not to invent radar to discover planes that are flying over, but to invent a radar that will discover the caves, the hidden nooks and crannies and the places at the bottom of the sea where nuclear stock piles are hidden.

We have the right to ask the Soviet Union and all nations, and the peoples that make up the Soviet Union, since this is a matter of life and death, to advance in the juridical order and to permit inspection and to accept regulated sovereignty. Sovereignty is only acceptable and beautiful when it fulfils the international law and when it makes a sacrifice of negative faculties in the service of humanity. We have that right, and we will continue to work for it. We must give the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission a mandate to find the way in which this problem can be solved. We will wrack our brains and we will wrack the brains of scientists the world over to find a scientific way of discovering nuclear stock piles, and we in the juridical field will wrack our brains to find a juridical solution.

But this takes time, and in the meantime, dreadfully, stock piles are increasing. The Soviet Union already has an army of experts which, it seems to me, is more numerous than that of the United States of America. It is a race in which the advantages that have been gained may very soon be compensated for.

In disarmament we have done very little. The Soviet Union, and this is one thing about which we are satisfied, instead of mathematical reduction has accepted a reduction to certain levels in the manner proposed by the Western Powers. But this situation has not called for renunciation by the Western Powers. Even the American Press has said that the Western Powers have gone back to their old position, but in this they have unjustly accused the Western Powers of weakness. Perhaps "reservations" was not a felicitous word.

(Mr. Belaunde, Peru)

In these matters, the elements are so closely linked that if one element is in danger the other elements have to remain in a difficult and dangerous position. What the Western Powers have said is that they cannot advance until they know better the situation with regard to control and until they know what effective guarantees can be given. They have asked what they could do if they proclaimed reductions and stated levels if there was no effective control and if they did not have the elements to determine whether that reduction had taken place.

I rejoiced to hear Mr. Moch, in the one statement I heard him make in the Disarmament Commission, state that although there were no means of controlling the accumulation of stock piles, there could be ways of controlling production. There would have to be agreement on the means of controlling production and there would have to be inspectors with sufficient power so that their decisions would be followed. There could be appeals against the findings of the inspectors, but no suspensive measures. Therefore, there has been no back-tracking by the Western Powers.

What did occur was the inevitable suspension with regard to the change in circumstances, with regard to the difficulties inherent in these subjective discussions on control and also with regard to the tremendous scientific difficulties inherent in control. At that moment, when the problems seemed absolutely insoluble, there was once again a ray of hope. There was that most noble attitude, that extraordinary gesture that resounded through the world, the echoes of which we still hear and which we can never forget. Once again, the head of a people with a great tradition, of a dominating nature but who would not conquer man, a man who was a war-time hero who went through Europe with his victorious army and who traveled through Europe with his liberating forces, a man who was not only intelligent in strategy but wise in co-operation, a good man, an honest soul and sincerely cognizant of his own duties and responsibilities, gave us that ray of hope. He said that there were difficulties, but while those difficulties existed he would open the skies of the United States of America to Soviet planes with their perfect photographic equipment. The Soviet Union has that equipment because of the German, as well as the Soviet industry, which they have assimilated or incorporated.

(Mr. Belaunde, Peru)

The President of the United States proposed that the Soviet Union could see what the United States had. He wanted to have a guarantee that there would never be a great surprise attack upon the United States, and the Soviet Union could have the guarantee there would never be a great surprise attack upon them. He asked the Soviet Union to take into the account the tradition of his people and his own history. His people, he said, wanted work, well-being, happiness and freedom, and war would give them no advantage.

There is no advantage in war. War is a fool hardy adventure today. In the olden days, if there were no advantages to war, at least there was the dubious advantage of glory. Today, there is no glory, there is death, destruction and tears, and if the dead could curse, the dead would curse those who threaten war. With emotion, with the honest sincerity I have when I think of those words, I relive those moments of enthusiasm. That good man, simply and with his frank and open smile, stated that he would open the skies of the United States of America to photographic aerial reconnaissance. After declaring that, he said that he would give a complete blueprint, and that all he wanted was equal rights, not because of mistrust, but because of reciprocity by the Soviet Union. In the history of man's progress towards peace, that day was a milestone.

The General Assembly has to take note of those facts, the General Assembly has to take note of that desire that created the spirit of Geneva. That spirit has dissolved; that spirit has become darkened. But that spirit has not died. It cannot, it must not die. The great spirits cannot and must not die. By their very nature, they are immortal. Even if we do not welcome them, they live on. We have to live and batten on these spirits. We have to give these spirits greater strength to feed us.

(Mr. Belaunde, Peru)

Marshal Bulganin replied to that proposal with another proposal that was acceptable -- with a proposal that was incomplete, if you like, but convenient. The proposal was to place inspectors at the main cross roads and ports so as to avoid any surprise attacks. But we may be told: "Yes, but that is no prohibition." We may be told that that is not a reduction.

But as they say, the best is the enemy of good. A marching and progressing ideal will always have one great danger: the temptation for Utopia. Perhaps what we are looking for is Utopian. Let us not lose the substance for the shadow. Let us keep the good, the noble and the just which is contained in President Eisenhower's suggestion, and completed by Marshal Bulganin. When the Soviet Union accepts the principle of President Eisenhower's plan, it then goes on to add its own by saying: We must add to this the spectre of that ghost of prohibition. Why should there be that ghost? Why should there be that prohibition that cannot be controlled? Why not act like the imperfect human beings that we are, the limited human beings? Time and good faith will put us one step ahead. Let us take this step and then look ahead. No one knows whether that step is going to give us the next one.

That is why I am happy to see the Canadian proposal, because it is not pessimistic, because it reflects what has been done, and because it does not slam the door in our faces as we gaze at that far distant goal, that aim which we are seeking.

This proposal includes the Eisenhower plan and, side by side with that, the Bulganin plan. It says to the Committee: continue to work. But it does not block its road toward finding **that scientific control of** stockpiles, that prudent and efficient control of production, and the control of the reduction of armaments.

I wish to make one great, sincere appeal to the Soviet Union. I can do so because it is an impartial appeal. The Soviet Union knows of my impartiality in the United Nations. I think that from my lips words of bitterness have never fallen. When I have had to criticize, I have had a certain unhappiness, but nevertheless a personal respect for that person or attitude which I had to criticize, because persons are always sacred. May I appeal to the Soviet delegation not to insist on certain amendments which

(Mr. Belaunde, Peru)

are truly incompatible with the present situation. I reserve my right to refer to the draft resolutions in due course, but I note that once again, in the resolution, that unnecessary spectre raises its ugly head, that illusory prohibition which will not work.

At this moment it is more than unworkable; it is ironic. I support ~~wholeheartedly~~ the proposal of the great Powers, and I wish to express all my gratitude to that great man who fortunately is now better and who has recovered his health, and I trust that his recovery will also be reflected in a recovery of our own position in this debate.

The CHAIRMAN: We have now four further speakers in the general debate. The Committee will observe that we have what I trust is a proper allowance of time for us tomorrow. I would urge the Committee to be ready to proceed promptly at 10.30 tomorrow morning. The delay which we had today was quite out of my control. These delays sometimes arise, for quite understandable reasons, when speakers wish to adjust their position. But this will not arise tomorrow.

As the Committee knows, we have various important matters engaging the attention of us all. It is to my mind -- and I say it with great respect to the Committee -- imperative that we should deal with this very important matter with all the speed that we can. Nevertheless, I do suggest to the members that when they are speaking to the draft resolutions -- and I hope we will arrive at that stage tomorrow -- they will remember that the general debate is finished. I think that that is an adjuration that I can properly make to the Committee.

The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.