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Chairman: Sir Claude COREA (Ceylon).

Organization of the Committee's work

1. The CHAIRMAN observed that it was essential that some conclusion should be reached on agenda item 71 (Question of Algeria) as rapidly as possible. He suggested that members of the Committee might voluntarily agree to limit their statements.
2. Mr. COOPER (Liberia) suggested a self-imposed time-limit of twenty minutes.
3. Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana) suggested that representatives should deal in their statements both with the general question and with the relevant draft resolution.
4. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to bear those suggestions in mind, on the understanding that they were not mandatory.

It was so agreed.

AGENDA ITEM 71

Question of Algeria (A/4418 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.265 and Add.1-2) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued) AND CONSIDERATION OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION

5. Mr. D'ARBOUSSIER (Senegal) said that his Government was deeply aware of its responsibility for contributing to a peaceful solution of the Algerian question. Since its relations with France were based on the mutual respect of two independent nations, it would express its views on the problem freely and frankly.
6. Immediately after its attainment of independence, Senegal had entered into negotiations with France for the withdrawal of Senegalese soldiers from the Algerian front, and those negotiations had led to agreement. His country's position had been defined by the Prime Minister of Senegal, Mr. Mamadou Dia, at the 940th plenary meeting of the General Assembly. Senegal supported the right of self-determination of the Algerian people, and favoured the establishment of an independent Algerian Republic, obedient to the will of the majority and respecting the rights

of the minority. It regarded the statement made on 4 November 1960 by the President of the French Republic, General de Gaulle, as a further step towards the decolonization of Algeria and a positive contribution to peace. It believed that the United Nations could and should help to overcome the differences outstanding between the parties, but that it must recognize its limitations: it could not impose a solution or even a procedure; its role should be to create the necessary atmosphere for a resumption of talks between the French and the Algerians. Senegal would be wary of any solution which deviated from those basic objectives, for it could only deepen the rift between the parties and prolong the conflict. On the other hand, his country did not underestimate the need for reciprocal guarantees, both of the cease-fire and of the proper implementation of the principle of self-determination; it believed, however, that such guarantees would be obtainable only through direct negotiations, which the United Nations should unanimously recommend.

7. The recent events in Algeria confirmed Senegal in its view that guarantees of neutrality and impartiality were essential. The fact that the Algerian people wanted independence was irrefutable. The tragic incidents of the past few days had finally exploded the legal fiction of a French Algeria, and had demonstrated that the people of Algeria wanted to be an independent nation, free to associate itself with France, and organizing itself on the basis of the interests of all the population groups it comprised, including those of the large European minority. Senegal therefore appealed to President de Gaulle to take immediate and decisive action by resuming negotiations for the full implementation of the Algerian people's right to self-determination, based on the reciprocal guarantees of the parties concerned and on guarantees of an international nature as well. In anticipation of such action, it urged that all executions based on previous court sentences should be suspended and that nationalist political prisoners should be released.

8. The Algerian problem was also an African problem, affecting the solidarity and unity of the African States. In addition, it had international implications which had become so serious that there was now a danger of intervention and of an extension of the conflict which might well lead to a clash in Africa between the great Power blocs. Consequently, it was the right and the duty of the United Nations to seek a solution at the earliest possible date.

9. As President de Gaulle's statement of 4 November 1960 had made clear, the peoples of France and Algeria were agreed on the principle of self-determination, on the exercise of that right by means of a referendum and on the need for reciprocal guarantees of the authenticity of such a referendum. While it was true that the only international guarantee which had

been suggested by President de Gaulle was the presence of international news personnel as observers, the important thing was that he had accepted the principle of an international guarantee. On the other hand, President de Gaulle refused to acknowledge the Algerian Provisional Government as the sole party with which the French Government should negotiate the necessary conditions and guarantees, although it was obvious that a cease-fire could be discussed only with the representatives of the combatants.

10. Those differences could be reconciled by negotiation. For example, it could be agreed that a cease-fire and the conditions for the referendum should be discussed simultaneously, and that while the negotiations on a cease-fire should take place between the French Government and the Algerian Provisional Government, those dealing with the organization of the referendum should be held between the French Government and the representatives of the Algerian people. In any event, it was along such lines that the General Assembly, and the friends of the two peoples involved, could help to find a way out of the deadlock.

11. Like the Moslem population of Algeria, all of Africa was awakening to self-awareness, and would from now on view all that happened in the world in the light of its own interests. It would be especially vigilant against any manoeuvres designed to drag it into the cold war or to use it as a strategic base for the defence of rival Power blocs. Africa sought peace, not at any price but on the basis of one of the principles of coexistence proclaimed at the Asian-African Conference at Bandung in 1955, namely, the settlement of international disputes by negotiation. And the United Nations, which was bound under its Charter to preserve peace, should insist that the parties to any conflict should always have recourse to methods of peaceful settlement.

12. One of the reasons why the Algerian Provisional Government lacked confidence in negotiations with France was the French Government's plan to set up new institutions in Algeria. Yet President de Gaulle had asserted on 4 November 1960 that the new Algeria would be built on the basis of self-determination, which meant that it would not be built before the right of self-determination had been exercised. It would be dangerous to reverse that order and to reorganize the administrative and political structure of the Algerian Republic without consulting the Algerians who had been the first to fight for it. It should be particularly stressed that Senegal supported the Algerian people's right of self-determination only on the assumption that it would apply to the whole of the territory of Algeria.

13. Like a number of previous speakers, he wished to draw attention to the trend of opinion in France, particularly among the intellectuals, with regard to French policy in Algeria. In a recent article in the newspaper *Liberation*, it had been stated that the proposed referendum of 8 January 1961 would not end the war, but that negotiation would; and Jean-Paul Sartre, one of the most famous signatories of the "manifesto of the 121", had said in an interview published in the weekly *L'Express* that the primary objective should be to force the Government to enter into unconditional negotiations.

14. In view of the new turn of events in Algeria and the new orientation of French policy manifested in President de Gaulle's statements since 4 November

1960, the most effective action the United Nations could take would be to urge the immediate resumption of negotiations. Consequently, his delegation would have preferred operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.265 and Add.1-2) to have been drafted so as to recommend immediate negotiations on a cease-fire and the guarantees for a free referendum on self-determination, and to propose the establishment of a special international commission to facilitate contacts between the parties and to follow the course of the talks. Any other action on the part of the United Nations might be an obstacle to further negotiation, and might result in the continuance of the war, with the prospect of its becoming a world conflict leading to the partition of Algeria.

15. Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia) said that the Algerian conflict was one of the most shocking manifestations of present-day colonialism. Moreover, it was not a colonial war of France alone against the Algerian people: without the financial and military assistance of the other colonial Powers belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), headed by the United States, France would be unable to continue its costly aggression. The same Powers were also giving France political support, and had joined with other States members of aggressive military groups controlled by the United States to prevent the United Nations from adopting measures which could end the Algerian war on the basis of the right of the Algerian people to self-determination. Thus, despite their competition for the exploitation of the wealth of the colonial countries, the colonial Powers members of NATO, as they had demonstrated not only in Algeria but in the Congo, were united in their suppression of the national liberation movements in those countries.

16. However, the colonial Powers were not strong enough to continue to oppress the millions of disenfranchised people throughout the world, and they had accordingly been forced to retreat. Yet they still sought to usurp the decisive political and economic positions which would enable them to continue to exploit the peoples to whom they had formally granted independence.

17. Thus, France, having realized that it could no longer maintain its open colonial domination of Algeria, was now seeking to produce a solution which would in fact leave all the positions of the colonialists intact. During the talks held with the representatives of the Algerian Provisional Government at Melun in June 1960, the French Government, although it had paid lip-service to the Algerian people's right to self-determination, had sought to impose conditions which, for all practical purposes, amounted to an ultimatum. Moreover, President de Gaulle had made it clear in his statement of 4 November 1960 that the "free" referendum by which the Algerian people were eventually to decide their future was to be held under the supervision of the French army. Since the French army in Algeria was the strongest support of the interests which refused to entertain the idea of an independent Algeria and wished to continue the "pacification" of the country by force of arms, it was not difficult to see that such a referendum would hardly be "free". President de Gaulle had further stated that if the Algerians opted for independence, the French Government would take the necessary measures to protect Algerians who wished to remain French and to safeguard French interests.

Mr. Jacques Soustelle, a noted exponent of French colonialism, had stated during a recent television appearance in New York that such "safeguards" would entail the dismemberment of Algeria. Such a course of action would be a classic example of the old principle of "divide and rule", and could only lead to an intensification of the colonial war.

18. A peaceful settlement of the Algerian question consistent with the principle of self-determination could not be obtained on the basis proposed by the French Government. The Algerian people's decision on their future should not be taken under the supervision and control of France, a directly interested party whose representatives had openly stated that their objective was to continue to maintain the close union between Algeria and their country. Peace could only be restored in Algeria if the Algerian people were guaranteed the free exercise of their right of self-determination. Only thus could a basis be created for the peaceful development of the country as a free, independent and sovereign State which would ensure equal rights for all its citizens.

19. The Committee should resolutely reject the policy of inaction advocated by the Western delegations. The objective of that policy was to gain time and give France a free hand to break the resistance of the Algerian people by military means. The Committee should also reject appeals for a cautious approach to the solution of the Algerian question, for such an approach meant encouraging the aggressor. The United Nations must fulfill its responsibility by helping to put an end to the war of extermination being waged against the Algerians and to ensure the full exercise of their right of self-determination. The Czechoslovak Government believed that the draft resolution before the Committee (A/C.1/L.265 and Add.1-2) could provide a realistic basis for a peaceful solution of the Algerian question, and would support the resolution.

Mr. Kurka (Czechoslovakia), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

20. Mr. ADEEL (Sudan) asked how long the community of nations would stand by in apparent indifference, leaving the Algerian people no choice but to kill or be killed in defence of its freedom. At the fourteenth session of the General Assembly, after President de Gaulle's recognition of the Algerian people's right to self-determination, an effort had been made to secure the adoption of a resolution urging the holding of "pourparlers" between the two parties concerned. The resolution had failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority because a number of delegations had believed that its adoption would lead to a hardening of positions and prejudice the chances of an early solution of the problem. His delegation was disappointed at France's failure, in the intervening year, to justify the hopes placed in it at that time.

21. Now in its seventh year, the Algerian conflict was a total war which had already claimed 700,000 French and Algerian lives and sent hundreds of thousands of refugees into neighbouring countries. France had refused to apply humanitarian rules of warfare in Algeria, in spite of the declared willingness of the Algerian Provisional Government to do so. A quarter of the population of Algeria was being held in prisons and internment camps, where they were subjected to inhuman treatment which had been

the subject of a report submitted to the French Government by the International Committee of the Red Cross, and had been condemned by leading French churchmen and intellectuals.

22. A disturbing aspect of the Algerian war was the support which was being given to France by its NATO partners. The actions of NATO with regard to Algeria were difficult to reconcile with its claim to be an instrument for the maintenance of peace and the defence of freedom.

23. Sixteen African States had recently been granted independence; he failed to see why Algeria, with its long history and great cultural heritage, should be treated differently. The argument of the existence of a large European minority in Algeria was invalid; the Algerian Provisional Government had given repeated assurances regarding the future of the European minority, and it was to be noted that the hundreds of thousands of Europeans in Morocco, Tunisia and Libya were materially and psychologically better off than they had been before those countries' attainment of independence. The extremist groups responsible for the riots now occurring in Algeria were not representative of the majority of the European settlers, who wished only to live in peace in the land of their choice.

24. The time had clearly come for a civilized, peaceful settlement of a war which, besides destroying lives and property, was posing an increasingly grave threat to international peace and security. If the United Nations, through indifference and passivity, failed in its duty to help to solve the problem, it would be solved outside the United Nations, with tragic results for all. Those Member States which France considered its friends should make it clear to France that its present effort to deny freedom to a small nation was not only futile but also injurious to its moral standing in the world.

25. The Algerian people's right to decide its own future was now accepted by both parties; the only outstanding issue was the Algerian nationalists' justified insistence that effective guarantees must be provided to ensure that the Algerian people would be permitted to make their choice in an atmosphere of complete freedom and impartiality. The Algerian Provisional Government had repeatedly offered to discuss with France the specific conditions for implementing the right of self-determination, but the experience of the Melun talks had shown that France was unwilling to negotiate on the matter. An additional obstacle to agreement between the two sides was France's apparent intention of partitioning Algeria, and the fact that the projected referendum was to be conducted by the French army and the French administration in Algeria, whose hostility towards the Algerian liberation movement was well known. The conduct of the 1958 referendum on the new French Constitution and the massacres of unarmed people which had been carried out by French troops in recent days showed why the Algerian leaders insisted that an agreement on a cease-fire must be accompanied by guarantees for the referendum. Now that the Algerian Provisional Government had exhausted all possible means of ensuring the proper implementation of the principle of self-determination, the only possible solution to the problem was immediate United Nations intervention to organize and supervise a referendum in which the Algerian people

would freely decide the future of their country as an integral whole.

26. Mr. HASAN (Pakistan) said that his delegation supported Algeria's struggle for freedom as it had that of Morocco, Tunisia and other countries. It was particularly regrettable that Algeria's struggle was being waged against a people which had always been identified with the cause of freedom. He appealed to other delegations not to speak in anger on the Algerian problem, whose solution called for the utmost skill.

27. In the course of the General Assembly's consideration of the Algerian question since 1955, a number of broad principles had emerged. First of all, it was clear that the problem was an international one in which the United Nations had an inescapable obligation to promote a just and peaceful settlement. At its eleventh and twelfth sessions, the General Assembly had unanimously adopted resolutions expressing concern at the Algerian war and urging a settlement in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. At the thirteenth session, the First Committee had approved a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.232), which had fallen one vote short of the required two-thirds majority in the plenary Assembly, stating that the situation in Algeria constituted a threat to international peace and security and calling for negotiations between the two parties concerned. At the fourteenth session, the Committee had approved a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.246 and Add.1) urging the parties to enter into "pourparlers" to determine the conditions necessary for the earliest possible implementation of the right of self-determination. A more moderate draft resolution (A/L.276) submitted in plenary meeting by Pakistan in an effort to facilitate agreement had failed to obtain a two-thirds majority, but all its individual paragraphs, including those recognizing the Algerian people's right of self-determination and calling for "pourparlers" between the parties, had been adopted by large majorities.

28. It should be noted that the views of the Asian and African nations sponsoring the draft resolution before the Committee (A/C.1/L.265 and Add.1-2) were supported by leading French intellectuals, who had recently proclaimed in a manifesto that the cause of the Algerian people was the cause of all free men.

29. Another point on which there was general agreement was the Algerian people's right of self-determination. That right had been recognized by President de Gaulle himself, who had announced on 4 November 1960 a new policy looking towards the creation of an "Algerian Algeria" with its own Government, institutions and laws. It was also recognized that the Algerian people's right of self-determination could be exercised only by means of a free and unfettered vote, the result of which would be binding on both France and Algeria; President de Gaulle had declared on 4 November that France would accept the Algerian people's decision, if it decided to sever the ties between the two nations. Finally, it was generally agreed that a referendum could not be organized in Algeria without co-operation between France and the Algerian nationalist leaders, who clearly enjoyed the same authority to speak on behalf of Algeria that President de Gaulle had had to speak on behalf of France during the Second World War. President de Gaulle had stated on 4 November that

the Algerian leaders would be able to take part without restriction in the talks relating to the organization of the projected referendum, in the campaign preceding the referendum, and in the supervision of the voting.

30. Those points of agreement had not been cited in order to minimize the divergences which still remained or the crucial distinction between the acceptance of a principle and its implementation. However, it was useful to identify the points on which agreement did exist, and it would be wrong to disregard the progress which had been made in the past year. Both parties had made vital concessions. On 16 September 1959, President de Gaulle had recognized the Algerian people's right to choose between independence, autonomy in association with France, and integration with France; and the Algerian leaders, in accepting the principle of self-determination, had abandoned their previous insistence on the recognition of Algerian independence as a prior condition for negotiations between the parties.

31. Thus, the only remaining issue was the precise means by which the Algerian people's right of self-determination could be implemented, and it was to that issue that the United Nations must address itself. In doing so, the United Nations would not be attempting to impose any unacceptable principle on either party; it would merely be taking for granted the desire of both parties to halt the killing in Algeria and their good faith in regard to the principles they had themselves recognized. In spite of the inflexible French approach at the Melun talks, and although there were vested interests in France that were determined to wreck President de Gaulle's policy in Algeria, France, he was confident, retained its fundamental loyalty to the United Nations and would be faithful to its pledge of self-determination.

32. It was agreed that the Algerian problem must be solved on the basis of the principle of self-determination; but that principle could only be successfully implemented under completely impartial auspices. He disagreed with those who cited France's various difficulties as an argument against United Nations organization and control of an Algerian referendum; those difficulties were in fact a further reason for holding a referendum under United Nations supervision.

33. In joining the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.265 and Add.1-2, his delegation had been guided by the considerations he had just set forth. Delegations which thought it inadvisable for the Committee to adopt a resolution should remember that the General Assembly's inaction at its thirteenth and fourteenth sessions had failed to produce the promised improvement in the situation in Algeria.

34. Mr. POPOVIC (Yugoslavia) said that the present critical situation in Algeria showed the tragic reality of long years of relentless warfare in that country and its implications for the international community and the United Nations. Only the day before, Mr. Ferhat Abbas had addressed an urgent appeal to President Tito of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and to other Heads of State to do everything in their power to put an end to the genocide that was being committed against the Algerian people.

35. The events of the preceding few days had to be considered within the wider context of the seven-

year-long war that had been waged against the National Liberation Front by a French army of 800,000 men. As President Tito had said in the General Assembly on 20 September (868th plenary meeting), the failure of the Melun talks had shown that France had not drawn the necessary practical conclusions from its recognition of the Algerians' right to self-determination. For its part, Yugoslavia could only welcome and support the proposal of the Algerian Provisional Government that a referendum should be held in Algeria under United Nations supervision. The recent events in Algeria had dramatically confirmed the Yugoslav Government's views on the Algerian question.

36. Two fundamental conclusions were to be drawn from those events. First, the Algerian people as a whole had once more clearly expressed their wishes which were not merely those of a certain political group. They were claiming their right to self-determination, to national independence and to all the benefits now being enjoyed by former colonial peoples throughout Asia and Africa. The mass demonstrations in the streets of Algiers—surely a plebiscite more telling than any conducted in the polling booths—left no room for doubt as to the real status of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria.

37. Secondly, it should now be clear how the right of the Algerian people to self-determination—a right which no one now dared to deny—would have to be exercised. It certainly could not be exercised under the control of an administration and an army which regarded normal and peaceful demonstrations in favour of self-determination and independence as sufficient reason for massacre. Any hope that France would be able to provide suitable conditions for the exercise of the right of self-determination had now been completely dispelled. No referendum or plebiscite would have any meaning unless it was organized under international, that is under United Nations, supervision. It was questionable, moreover, whether effective supervision would be possible so long as French armed forces, which had once again shown the true purpose of their presence, remained in Algeria.

38. Yugoslavia condemned the use of war, terror and violence to maintain a colonial system, and felt profound sympathy with the Algerian people in its heroic struggle. It felt bound to point out, moreover, that the Algerian war was having increasingly adverse effects on international relations in general, by creating tensions which threatened peace not only in one particular region but throughout the world.

39. Accordingly, the General Assembly should take effective measures to settle the Algerian problem in conformity with its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. The Yugoslav delegation considered that the proposal for a referendum in Algeria under United Nations auspices was not only fully justified but was the only means of guaranteeing the Algerian people's exercise of its right of self-determination. As President Tito had said, any failure to find an early democratic solution would amount to condoning force as a means of suppressing the legitimate aspirations of a people and, in fact, to condoning war in general. Since the draft resolution before the Committee (A/C.1/L.265 and Add.1-2) fully accorded with the views of the Yugoslav Govern-

ment, the Yugoslav delegation would whole-heartedly support it.

Sir Claude Corea (Ceylon) resumed the Chair.

40. Mr. SKURKO (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that by now everyone must know how hard the road to peace and independence was for the colonial peoples. In a world in which new scientific achievements were reported daily, enslaved peoples were still suffering hardships and tribulations. Much evidence of those sufferings had been heard in the United Nations, particularly with the admission of seventeen new nations which well knew what it cost to live under the colonial yoke. One of the peoples still suffering under colonialism was that of Algeria; France's unjust war against the Algerian people was bringing it nothing but dishonour, and far from settling the dispute between France and Algeria was merely widening the rift between them. The cruelties and tortures inflicted in the course of the war had been described by many witnesses, Algerian and French alike. All attempts to justify the Algerian war were vain; the war was being fought not for high-minded principles but merely to protect the interests of a group of oil monopolists who hoped to continue to exploit the Algerian people.

41. Much was said by the colonialists or their "civilizing mission" and of the benefits they had brought to the dependent peoples. Sometimes, indeed, representatives of African countries expressed gratitude to their former masters for having freed them. Such statements were of little help to Algeria, where colonialism still reigned supreme.

42. The colonial peoples had been forcibly imbued with the culture of the colonial Powers, and had been robbed of their own rich heritage. There could be no question of a civilizing mission in Algeria, for instance, where indigenous schools had been closed and the natural wealth of the country plundered. The colonies were regarded by the metropolitan countries as a convenient source of raw materials and cheap labour; if the colonialists had built anything at all, it had been jails, concentration camps, military bases and strategic communications. That type of construction had brought little benefit to Algeria, where the "fellahin" were still using the primitive tools of a thousand years ago.

43. The colonialists also asserted that Algeria was part of France. Yet Algeria was separated from France not only by the Mediterranean Sea but by a sea of blood—the blood of many thousands of Algerians who had fought with the French against fascism. Their contribution had soon been forgotten; in May 1945, 45,000 Algerians had been killed for attempting a peaceful demonstration.

44. The peoples of the world were clamouring for an end to the unjust war in Algeria, which was also a serious threat to world peace. The French people themselves were tiring of the heavy burden of the Algerian war, which had served only reactionary interests and had endangered their democratic and parliamentary system. Unfortunately President de Gaulle was adopting a mistaken approach to the problem in placing pacification before negotiations. By setting the Algerians conditions which amounted to unconditional surrender, the French obviously hoped to wreck the negotiations.

45. France would be wise to realize that it would never succeed in breaking the will of a people fighting for its independence, either by force or by misleading promises. General de Gaulle had announced that the Algerians would only be allowed to express their wishes several years after a cease-fire; but after so much bloodshed, France must already know what those wishes were. France's policy of "divide and rule" was doomed to failure; the Algerian problem could be solved only through negotiations with the Algerian Government which represented the Algerian people.

46. In his statement of 4 November 1960, President de Gaulle had made no constructive contribution to a solution of the Algerian problem. His manifest contempt for public opinion, for the principle of self-determination and for the United Nations showed that his thinking had progressed no further since the breakdown of the Melun talks. He had sought to create the illusion that peace would not be long in coming. Peace would indeed come, with the freedom of the Algerian people, but the colonialists were doing nothing to further it. Nor could General de Gaulle's charges against the socialist countries deceive any-

one. The position of the USSR was clearly expressed in the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, introduced for consideration by the General Assembly by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, on 23 September 1960 (869th plenary meeting), and had been set forth once again in a statement made by Mr. Khrushchev in Moscow on 20 October. The Algerian people could hardly be blamed for looking to the socialist countries for support in their struggle, for they could expect no hope from any other quarter. Moreover, they knew that the USSR, having no colonies of its own, had no ulterior motives in assisting the dependent peoples in their just fight.

47. The Byelorussian delegation believed that negotiations offered the only hope of a solution to the Algerian problem. It trusted that the fifteenth session of the General Assembly would go down in history not only because of the great political leaders who had attended it but also because it would have solved a question upon which the peace and the future of mankind depended.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.