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## CONTENTS

Page

Methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter : report of the Collective Measures Committee (A/1891 and A/C.1/676) (continued) . .	125
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Chairman : Mr. Finn MOE (Norway).

**Methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter : report of the Collective Measures Committee (A/1891 and A/C.1/676) (continued)**

[Item 18]\*

## GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) recalled that the question of collective measures was being considered as a result of the adoption by the General Assembly at its fifth session, of the so-called "Uniting for peace" resolution. That resolution, which was represented as containing a programme for the enhancement of peace and security was but a programme for the preparation of a new war.

2. The appearance of that resolution was undoubtedly connected with United States aggression in Korea and had demonstrated, on the one hand, the recklessness of American monopolists and, on the other hand, their incapacity to cope with the situation that had arisen as a result of their aggressive action, without involving other States which were economically and politically dependent on the United States. Moreover, the connexion between the American aggression in Korea and the "Uniting for peace" resolution as well as the joint draft resolution on collective measures (A/C.1/676) had been confirmed by Mr. Acheson's New Year's speech and by the statement made at the preceding meeting by the United States representative.

3. Even the report of the Collective Measures Committee (A/1891) contained a special annex, Annex IV, devoted entirely to the history of the Korean question and saying in essence that the Korean events had enhanced the creation of collective measures.

4. The report represented the matter as if forty-seven Member States and two other non-members had decided to extend assistance. The report said that twenty-five States had made available their armed forces in Korea, twenty States their land forces, eight States their naval forces and four

States their air forces. The report did not conceal the fact that Japanese bases had been used and that that use was of great importance. However, one must admit that that part of the report—as well as the report as a whole—failed to represent the true state of affairs, since in reality, only eight States, and not forty-seven as it was alleged, had been participating in the Korean campaign. Thus, if only eight States were fighting in Korea, how could one claim that that war was being waged by the United Nations Organization.

5. In answer to the request made by the Secretary-General with regard to measures they might take in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 377 (V), only thirty-eight States, out of a total of sixty, had answered. Those replies from thirty-eight States made it clear that the United States was having difficulty in forging that collective measures system and structure. Out of those thirty-eight States, only eighteen had agreed to earmark forces for participation in collective measures. As for the remaining twenty, nine of them had refused to participate or to promise any forces for the future ; seven others had given evasive replies that amounted to a refusal and the remaining four had merely acknowledged receipt of the request. From the above enumeration it was clear that the war in Korea was not being waged by the Organization but by the United States of America and its satellites. In this connexion, one could not fail to note that even those Governments that had given positive replies, such as Brazil, Australia and New Zealand, had brushed the matter aside in one way or another.

6. The speech made by the representative of Sweden at the previous meeting deserved careful study. Mr. Vougt had declared that the "Uniting for peace" resolution, by virtue of which the General Assembly had declared itself competent to make recommendations on enforcement measures, had created a certain risk from the viewpoint of general peace. He had further explained that, under the present circumstances, the intervention contemplated on the part of the majority might lead to a permanent cleavage between States, a cleavage into two blocs which might clash in a future war.

7. Such a statement could only be construed as a timid but real admission that the so-called collective measures programme was far from strengthening peace and lessening the threat of war.

\* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

8. What was the worth of these collective measures if the Organization, and particularly the smaller Powers were made to confront the holocaust of war? Mr. Vyshinsky could not agree with the views of the Swedish representative that the report had merely dealt with technical matters which might arise in connexion with the possible application of international sanctions. Actually, the principal feature of the report was its political aspect and the line adhered to by its authors which reflected the policy of the States which were led by the international policy of the United States. One could not leave unnoticed the Swedish comment to the effect that some Member States were not disposed, at the present time, to assume in advance the obligation to participate in such collective measures: it might be decided upon only by a majority of the great Powers.

9. One could not pass over in silence the undeniable fact that the Korean war had been a convenient pretext for imposing upon the United Nations the so-called "Uniting for peace" resolution and the present collective measures report deriving therefrom.

10. Mr. Acheson had proved the veracity of this contention in his speech made on New Year's Eve in which he had declared that events in Korea had proved that collective security could be effective and had provided the impetus for its application. Likewise, already as long ago as 9 October 1950, Mr. John Foster Dulles had stated in public that the "Uniting for peace" resolution had been occasioned by events in Korea. In the circumstances, Mr. Vyshinsky wished to point out that the Korean war was provoked by United States aggression; the document of his delegation had submitted in support of that allegation had not been disproved.

11. The report also dealt with the establishment of a new executive organ which would be in charge of the application of collective measures. Such illegal measures were justified in the report by unfounded and artificial references to the inability of the Security Council to discharge its duties.

12. Nor was it accurate to maintain that they arose from the necessity of resisting the aggression of North Korea and that the so-called collective measures would enable the United Nations to discharge, in the future, the obligations placed upon it and to suppress aggression and defend the victims of aggression. In this connexion, Mr. Acheson, as well as the United States representative in the First Committee, had contended that Korea had proved that collective measures could be carried out in accordance with the Charter. But what was happening in Korea was mere piracy and a mockery of United Nations principles and not the beginning of the progressive development of collective security, as the United States representative had said.

13. Moreover, Mr. Acheson had declared in his speech of 31 December 1951 that collective measures would avert the dangerous possibility of the exploitation of various complications—the reference being of course, to Egypt and to Iran. Similar slanderous statements had been made by Mr. Acheson when speaking at the fifth session of the General Assembly of the present international tension and when saying that the root of all these difficulties was the "new imperialism of the Soviet Union". Though he did not explain at that time what he meant by Soviet Union imperialism, he did, however, offer an explanation in his December 1951 message wherein he had declared that the danger point in the Middle East area was occasioned by the question of the defence of the Suez Canal and the deadlock on the Iranian oil question, and that these two questions illustrated the danger of exploitation on the part of the Kremlin. But these questions were merely the result of

the fight of people for their independence and not the result of sinister intrigues hatched by the Kremlin. Such allegations had been made not only by representatives of the United States but also by representatives of certain Latin American countries, who had been ringing false alarms in order to divert world public opinion from the aggressive designs of the United States and of the members of the "Atlantic bloc".

14. Even military men had been making alarmist statements. General Bradley had recently stated that the security of the United States of America lay in the national formula of balanced forces and in the institution of a programme of international collective balanced forces on the basis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Thus, there was a direct organic link between the objectives of NATO on the one hand, and the collective measures system on the other. One therefore could not wonder that the report of the Collective Measures Committee contained merely the programme of a group of militant States which had joined together in a plot against peace and against the peace-loving peoples of the world.

15. The aggressive character of the report was, moreover, shown by chapter III, referring to economic and financial measures. Paragraphs 43 to 45 of that chapter referred with cynical candour to the way sanctions could be applied in a most effective manner to the economy of an aggressor State. Nothing could be more shameful than paragraph 45 of the report which praised the Napoleonic wars and merely regretted the fact that no favourable results had then been forthcoming because the industrial revolution had not been sufficiently advanced in 1812, and that countries which had been attacked by an aggressor had not then been vulnerable enough to economic blockades.

16. The United States of America and its adherents were not only regretting this fact, but had also been for some time applying it by prohibiting the export of some commodities to the USSR and the people's democracies. Not only did the United States impose such an embargo, but it was trying to get the approval of the United Nations.

17. It was no longer concealed by the leaders of the "Atlantic bloc" and by General Bradley that the objective of that bloc was to extract for the benefit of the United States of America all possible benefits that might result from so-called atomic superiority of the United States.

18. The same idea might be inferred from answers given by General Eisenhower to fourteen questions about war and peace published in *Paris-Match* in its issue of 27 October 1951. These answers made it clear that the plan of military operations drawn up by the staff of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization provided, as General Eisenhower put it, that the so-called Northern European Command would conduct operations in the direction of Leningrad, the Southern European Command in the direction of Hungary and Austria, and the Middle East Command in the direction of the southern part of the Soviet Union. Such a statement showed how "defensive" the plan prepared by NATO was in character. In concluding his interview, General Eisenhower had stated that when all the forces of the "Atlantic bloc" had been mobilized, they should certainly be able to fight far beyond the Rhine.

19. It was no accident that the Paris correspondent of the American newspaper the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* had said that it was in reality easier to convince a Frenchman that Russia wanted peace than that the United States wanted it, because even while the latter was stressing its peaceful objectives, it had always accompanied these statements with the arms-rattling of the "Atlantic alliance".

20. More than ever before the world was witnessing the confirmation of a characterization of American imperialism as given by the British scholar, John Hobson, in his book *Imperialism*, wherein he had written that imperialism was needed by Messrs. Rockefeller and their companions so as to use their capital in profitable investments. Although this description was made half a century ago, it was still applicable today. American imperialism was the basic reason for the famous law of 10 October 1951, for the resolution of the so-called reduction of armaments, for the so-called "Uniting for peace" resolution and for the present report of the Collective Measures Committee.

21. Turning to the events of the first half of the sixth session of the General Assembly, Mr. Vyshinsky believed that United States claims of victories should be examined. The "election" of Greece to the Security Council had only been achieved by the most cynical form of pressure and only after eighteen defeats. On the German question the Swedish Press had asserted that the Swedish Government had been berated by the United States for giving an independent opinion. The United States had failed to answer the accusations relating to the Mutual Security Act and in the voting on that matter had failed to secure the support of eleven non-communist countries, including some in Latin America. Even the United States Press regarded United States policies at the United Nations as having failed. There were further disappointments awaiting the United States.

22. It had been claimed that the proposals for collective measures could aid the procedures for disarmament. But even the United States Press had pointed out the inconsistency of the disarmament proposals with the pressure on European Governments to establish additional divisions. The nations of Europe were not able to bear the burden. The Belgian representative on the "Harriman committee" had objected to an enlarged commitment. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom had given his countrymen a gloomy message at Christmastime. The full meaning of the forceful metaphor used by Mr. Churchill was not clear but at least it was plain that he had recognized that British foreign policy had been on the wrong track. Mr. Churchill had also reported that the United Kingdom was facing a financial crisis and would fall into bankruptcy if the disproportion between income and expenditure was not modified. He had further said that his country could not depend upon aid from the United States except in the matter of armaments. The Prime Minister's estimate of the situation was that they faced the need of accepting charity or starving.

23. The Secretary of State of the United States, in his review of 1951, had stated that three main tasks lay before the United States: first, the provision of armed forces for all its military needs; secondly, the inclusion of Germany in the western defence forces; and thirdly, the creation of a European army. Mr. Vyshinsky observed that guns were not butter and that the United States would not permit any reduction of the rearmament programme.

24. Such difficulties in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were aggravated by other internal contradictions. It was not a communist but the French Professor Lavergne who had described the Schuman plan as an instrument for economic warfare against Great Britain on the part of the participants in the steel-coal pool. The United States supported the Schuman plan in industry and the Pleven plan in the military field as offering the best means of ensuring United States hegemony in Europe. Its instruments would be the German cartels and the neo-nazi *Wehrmacht*. Those were the policies pursued by the United

States in the face of British resistance to the Schuman plan and the European army and of general European opposition to the re-establishment of the German army and heavy industry.

25. These matters were connected with the question of collective measures. United States, High Commissioner for Germany McCloy had stated at the end of August 1951 that the armed forces of West Germany could be incorporated into the forces of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization within eighteen months of a decision to rearm West Germany. In September a conference was held in Bonn under the Deputy High Commissioner to discuss the question of a West German army for NATO and was attended by a group of the Hitler régime heroes. General Eisenhower, on 26 November 1951, had stated in Rome that the United States needed German support and with that support could soon reach its objectives.

26. Those objectives were no secret and were determined by the aggressive policies of the United States and the desire to rake in profits and plunder other countries. The wars that were being conducted in Korea, Viet Nam and Malaya were colonial enterprises designed to suppress nationalist movements and permit the continued exploitation of the subject populace. Spokesmen for the United States, Britain and France all brandished the communist bogey and under the pretence of protecting the people continued to oppress them and enrich the capitalists of the West.

27. The same objectives had been pursued in the Mutual Security Act and hypocritical speeches had been made about the dangers of communist imperialism. Mr. Vyshinsky recalled the claims made in 1939 by Germany, Italy and Japan about the defensive nature of the anti-Comintern pact. At that time Generalissimo Stalin had said that the aggressors were seeking to delude public opinion but it was not hard to see through them.

28. An examination of the report of the Collective Measures Committee could only lead to the conclusion that it disregarded the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter. The Committee proposed the establishment of an executive military authority which could be any State, even if it was not in the operational area, provided that it was furnishing forces. That was a clue to the reasons why the United States wished to have its forces included in various groups, no matter how distant geographically, in order to gain control under the terms of that proposal. Such recommendations were contrary to the United Nations Charter which provided for the Military Staff Committee under the Security Council to be the controlling organ. The Charter further provided that all enforcement measures should be approved by all the permanent members of the Security Council. Such procedure offered a guarantee that there would be no reckless decisions which might lead to another world war. The extension of the functions of the Security Council to the General Assembly would eliminate those guarantees. It followed that the programme devised by the Collective Measures Committee could not lead to peace but represented a path through majority decisions to the possibility of a major war.

29. Mr. Vyshinsky recalled the statement made in 1945 by Secretary of State Stettinius to the effect that if any of the permanent members of the Security Council chose the path of aggression, a world war would result regardless of the provisions for voting included in the Charter. Mr. Stettinius had further said that the Charter gave nations no rights which they did not already have and merely placed obligations on the five Powers to use their strength in concert for peace rather than in disunity for war.

30. The five-Power statement of 7 June 1945 at San Francisco, dealing with the question of voting had shown the great importance of the question how and by whom decisions were taken concerning the existence and suppression of aggression. If all important questions concerning the maintenance of peace and security required the concurrence of the five permanent members, the objectivity of the decisions would be guaranteed. The recommendations of the Collective Measures Committee were therefore untenable. In fact, they would give powers to the General Assembly where no guarantees existed and where majorities could be whipped up by pressure and intimidation.

31. The whole report was riddled with Charter violations, as had been predicted at the preceding session by the Soviet Union. Chapter II, dealing with political measures, would give the General Assembly the right to sever diplomatic relations, although such action had been reserved to the Security Council under Article 41. Under Chapter III on economic and financial measures various forms of embargo and financial restrictions had been listed as measures which the General Assembly could take although they were reserved to the Security Council under Articles 41 and 42. Functions which had been reserved under Articles 46 and 47 to the Military Staff Committee had been proposed in the report for the executive military authority. There was a proposal in Chapter IV concerning military measures for the earmarking of military contingents which might be requested by the General Assembly, in violation of Articles 43 and 45. In all those cases, the provisions of the Charter had been disregarded or violated in the Committee's report.

32. It had been claimed that the provision of forces to the General Assembly would make sure that forces were available before the agreements under Article 43 had been concluded. However, the reason why no such agreements existed was that France, the United Kingdom and the United States did not wish to have those agreements under which the Military Staff Committee and the Security Council could take action. They preferred to work through the General Assembly which they could control. It was clear from the statement of the United States representative

(476th meeting) that there was no intention at the present time of implementing Article 43.

33. While it was true that the measures proposed in the report to combat aggression were also to be found in the Charter it was for that very reason that there was no need to introduce them anew in a different framework. Those measures were already binding on the Members of the United Nations. But a procedure for their initiation had been laid down to ensure the correctness of any decisions in connexion with aggression. In the report there was no such assurance of objectivity.

34. Already there had been experience with the sort of decisions which could be reached by the General Assembly in the absence of guarantees. The General Assembly had declared the People's Republic of China to be an aggressor, although in fact it had been the object of aggression. The manoeuvres of the United States on the borders of China, in Thailand and Burma, suggested that new attacks were being planned upon the People's Republic of China and would be described as "defensive" by the United States. It was clear that the report would make the determination of aggression dependent upon the "Atlantic bloc", headed by the United States.

35. The situation could be rectified if all nations were prepared to carry out in good faith the provisions of the United Nations Charter. That, however, was not the policy of those who used peaceful words to mask their aggressive intentions and asked the General Assembly to approve their plans. The policy of securing United Nations approval for such plans was reflected in paragraphs 235 and 236 of the report which emphasized the importance of identifying operations with the United Nations by the use of the United Nations flag and other symbols. That was a policy of subverting the United Nations, which had been designed as an instrument of peace, to the role of a cloak for aggression with a view to deluding public opinion. Such a course could only doom mankind to suffering.

36. The Soviet Union delegation considered the conclusions of the report and also the joint draft resolution to be without foundation and harmful. It appealed to all peace-loving States to vote against the eleven-Power draft resolution.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.