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Chairman: Sir Claude COREA (Ceylon).

AGENDA ITEMS 67, 86, 69 AND 73

Disarmament and the situation with regard to the fulfilment of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959 on the question of disarmament (A/4463, A/4503, A/4505, A/4509, A/C.1/828, A/C.1/L.249, A/C.1/L.250, A/C.1/L.251, A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.254 and Add. 1-3, A/C.1/L.255 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.259 and Add.1-2, A/C.1/L.260/Rev.1) (continued)

Report of the Disarmament Commission (A/4463, A/4500, A/C.1/L.250, A/C.1/L.251, A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.255 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.259 and Add.1-2, A/C.1/L.260/Rev.1) (continued)

Suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests (A/4414, A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.254 and Add.1-3, A/C.1/L.256, A/C.1/L.258/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.260/Rev.1) (continued)

Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons (A/4434, A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.253/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3, A/C.1/L.254 and Add.1-3, A/C.1/L.260/Rev.1) (continued)

**CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS
(continued)**

1. Mr. TCHOBANOV (Bulgaria) said that his country, like the other socialist countries, had always favoured the adoption of measures closely related to disarmament and calculated to reduce tension and promote confidence between nations. However, such partial measures should be designed to promote an agreement on general and complete disarmament; they should not be a mere substitute for the latter. It was in the light of those considerations that the draft resolutions now before the Committee should be viewed.

2. The draft resolution submitted by Poland (A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1) proposed the very types of measures that would facilitate the conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament. It provided, *inter alia*, for the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. The socialist countries had long urged that such tests should be ended and that an agreement should be concluded for that purpose. At the twelfth session, the Soviet Union had proposed that the question should be dealt with apart from the disarmament problem as a whole, in view of the grave dangers that nuclear weapons tests created for present and future generations.^{1/} At that time, the Soviet Union had taken the step of halting all such tests unilaterally. That step had resulted in the initiation of serious discussions on the question between the nuclear Powers; and an even more important result had been the fact that no nuclear explosions had been carried out for the past two years. Unfortunately, however, the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests had not yet resulted in a final agreement, and the Western Powers stubbornly refused to cease nuclear testing altogether. It was only that attitude on their part which prevented the conclusion of an agreement, for the discussions had clearly shown that there were no technical difficulties to be overcome. Ruling circles in the United States had been manifestly averse to any cessation of nuclear tests, and at the Geneva conference the United States had consistently sought the establishment of a time-limit after which tests could be resumed. Admittedly, the Polish draft resolution also proposed a time-limit for the conclusion of an agreement, but one with an entirely different purpose. It provided that unless an agreement was reached not later than 1 April 1961, the General Assembly should take up the matter immediately at a special session. That important provision of the Polish draft resolution was entirely in keeping with the demands of public opinion and complemented the other two draft resolutions on the subject (A/C.1/L.256 and A/C.1/L.258/Rev.1)—for which the Bulgarian delegation would also vote.

3. The Polish draft resolution also dealt with the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. The spread of nuclear weapons to new countries would make general and complete disarmament increasingly difficult to achieve; and what was even more serious was the danger that nuclear weapons might be consigned to the militarists of West Germany, who made no attempt to conceal their revanchist designs against neighbouring countries. Members of the First Committee would recall the notorious "Bundeswehr" memorandum; similar demands for nuclear armaments were being made even now by certain parties in West Germany. Knowing that those demands had occasioned wide-spread anxiety, the United States had sought to meet them under cover

^{1/} See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 24, document A/3674/Rev.1.

of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; consequently, the danger still remained, and urgent measures, such as those proposed in the Polish draft resolution, should be taken to avert it.

4. Compared with the draft resolution submitted by Ireland and other States (A/C.1/L.253/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3), the Polish proposal had the advantage of explicitly calling upon States not possessing nuclear weapons to refrain from manufacturing them on their own or other territory. Nevertheless, the Bulgarian delegation would also vote for the Irish draft resolution.

5. Another extremely important element of the Polish draft resolution was the provision to prevent the establishment of new military bases on foreign territory. The measures provided for in sub-paragraphs (e), (f) and (g) of the operative paragraph would greatly facilitate an agreement on the final elimination of such bases—a matter that was of the utmost concern to Bulgaria, which was endangered by the presence of foreign military bases near its frontiers. A first step of that kind would also help to restore confidence and promote understanding among nations in various parts of the world, including the Balkans.

6. The Bulgarian delegation would also support the Polish draft resolution on the universal dissemination of information on the consequences of a nuclear war (A/C.1/L.260/Rev.1), for the proposed measures would undoubtedly cause the people of the world to redouble their efforts to outlaw nuclear war. The draft declaration introduced by Ethiopia and other States (A/C.1/L.254 and Add.1-3) was also to be welcomed, and its adoption would be an important step towards prohibiting weapons of mass destruction and facilitating an agreement on general and complete disarmament. Bulgaria would accordingly vote for that draft resolution.

7. All the partial measures contemplated in the various draft resolutions would have the effect of curbing the armaments race, which inevitably sapped confidence between nations and rendered a solution of the disarmament problem more difficult. The Bulgarian delegation would also support any other measures which would help to engender confidence and would not relegate the negotiations on general and complete disarmament to second place. Over the years, the socialist countries had proposed several measures of that kind, such as the establishment of nuclear-free zones, the withdrawal of armed forces from foreign territories and an undertaking by the nuclear Powers not to be the first to use weapons of mass destruction. Unfortunately, those proposals had met with consistent opposition from the Western countries, which had continued to rearm, to strengthen their military alliances and install new bases on foreign soil. However, the armaments race was meeting with ever wider condemnation in the United Nations, and constructive proposals for disarmament were receiving increasing support. At the present stage of the discussions, the draft resolutions before the Committee should engage the full attention of all Members, for their adoption would greatly facilitate future negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

8. Mr. AIKEN (Ireland) said his delegation hoped that before long, progress would eventually be made towards disarmament and the rule of law. In the

meantime, the most urgent task was to stop the hard core of the problem from growing. To do that, it was necessary to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional nations and to revolutionary groups. The Committee would recall the draft resolution introduced by Ireland at the thirteenth session of the General Assembly^{2/} and that introduced by Ireland at the fourteenth session, which had been adopted by the Assembly as resolution 1380 (XIV). Unfortunately, the Geneva Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament had broken down before the Committee had considered the recommendation contained in that resolution. However, the dangers of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons had greatly increased over the past two years. At the current session, accordingly, Ireland, together with other delegations, had submitted a new draft resolution on the same subject (A/C.1/L.253/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3). In one respect the new text went further than previous resolutions for it called upon the nuclear States to declare at once their intention not to give nuclear weapons or the information for their manufacture to non-nuclear States. It also called upon the non-nuclear States, as a temporary measure, immediately to declare their intention not to make or acquire such weapons.

9. Realizing the dangers created by nuclear devices not only to the present but also to future generations, Ireland felt that there was a moral obligation to do everything possible to prevent the wider spread of nuclear weapons. Only if that was done now could a system of international security eventually be established that would make possible an agreement on the final destruction of such weapons or their conversion to peaceful uses. If the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers would be encouraged by world opinion to begin at once to negotiate agreements that would reduce the risk of a nuclear war. Nuclear stockpiles had grown to a point at which they undoubtedly acted as a deterrent to war between the nuclear Powers, although they offered no guarantees against it. Although there could be nothing to gain from starting a nuclear war, there was still a danger, so long as nuclear weapons existed, that some nuclear Power would use them through a fatal error of judgement. There was also the danger that a nuclear Power might believe it had achieved a technical break-through in nuclear striking power or in defence against nuclear weapons. But the greatest danger of all was that as nuclear weapons spread to additional States and became part of the normal equipment of smaller military forces, they might fall into the hands of fanatics prepared to use them regardless of the consequences.

10. The draft resolution took account of the difficulties of the nuclear Powers—the fact that their defence now depended upon nuclear weapons, that there was no infallible method of inspection and control, and that a secretly retained stockpile of nuclear weapons would give an unscrupulous State the power to dominate the world. For that reason, the draft did not call for the immediate surrender or destruction of nuclear weapons, and would not prohibit the nuclear Powers from retaining such weapons, pending future agreement, provided that they were kept in the possession and under the control of their own forces.

^{2/} *Ibid.*, Thirteenth Session, Annexes, agenda items 64, 70 and 72, document A/C.1/L.206.

It did, however, place a restraint on both the nuclear and the non-nuclear Powers, in that the former would undertake not to give nuclear weapons to other States while the latter would be expected not to manufacture or acquire them.

11. Scientists agreed that it would be quite feasible to ensure that the non-nuclear Powers were keeping an agreement not to manufacture nuclear weapons. But as the production of nuclear weapons became cheaper, it would be increasingly difficult for the Governments of non-nuclear Powers to resist the pressure of their military staffs to begin production. The sooner a general agreement could be reached between the non-nuclear Powers not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons, the better it would be for all concerned, for each addition to the number of nuclear Powers would necessarily make it harder for other Governments to resist the military demand for nuclear equipment.

12. The Irish delegation admitted that its proposals would impose a measure of restriction on the freedom of nations to pursue policies that would endanger their neighbours. It submitted, however, that the acceptance by sovereign States of reasonable restrictions on the right of some to do as they liked with their own nuclear weapons and of others to manufacture nuclear weapons was preferable to what had been termed "uncontrollable anarchy". Moreover, whatever inconvenience the proposals entailed, in the nuclear age it was surely the prime duty of the military staffs of nuclear Powers not only to prevent nuclear war in the short run but to take such steps as would prevent, or at least not increase, the danger of nuclear war in the long run. Since victory in a full-scale nuclear war was out of the question, they had a duty to make such dispositions of their forces and equipment as would be conducive to permanent peace, and would not lead ultimately to the destruction of their own people and of the rest of mankind. Statesmen, for their part, had a duty to reject all strategic conceptions that implied the spread of nuclear weapons and the risk of nuclear war.

13. Mr. WIRJOPRANOTO (Indonesia) said that Indonesia had consistently stood for the complete prohibition of the production, testing and use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. That had been its position not only in the United Nations but also at the Conference of African and Asian States held at Bandung in 1955, and the Indonesian Government and Parliament had repeatedly expressed themselves forcefully on the subject. At the current session of the General Assembly, President Sukarno himself had said (880th plenary meeting) that no political system or economic organization was worth the destruction of the world—including that system or organization itself.

14. Indonesia therefore warmly welcomed the declaration contained in the draft resolution submitted by Ethiopia and other States (A/C.1/L.254 and Add.1-3). There could hardly be serious objection to that draft resolution, for the declaration was backed by the moral force of world public opinion.

15. The draft resolution submitted by Ireland and other countries (A/C.1/L.253/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3) was also designed to relieve mankind of the dread of nuclear annihilation. No one today could be accused of exaggerating the terrible dangers facing

humanity. As Senator Albert Gore of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the United States Congress had warned on 10 October 1960, the development of new processes for producing atomic weapons would soon place nuclear weapons within the reach of as many as twenty or more nations. In past years, the world had been told of a "clean" bomb. Now it seemed that it would have a "cheap" bomb. But no bomb could be considered cheap—it was only humanity that could be considered cheap or dear, and if humanity was held dear, then preventive action must be taken with all possible speed. At its fourteenth session, the General Assembly had adopted by an overwhelming majority resolution 1380 (XIV), authorizing the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee to consider means of averting the danger of an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, nothing had been accomplished; yet something must be done. The draft resolution now under consideration certainly went further than that of the previous session. Indonesia would support it.

16. However, it considered that more specific measures were called for. The time had surely come for the establishment of a committee of non-nuclear Powers to consider the problem and to draft an international agreement for the prevention, subject to inspection and control, of the wider dissemination of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. The Indonesian delegation made that proposal because it felt that that was one problem in which the responsibility of the non-nuclear Powers was equal to that of the nuclear Powers. For the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons ultimately depended on the non-nuclear Powers. It was within their power to refuse to participate in the armaments race, by rejecting control over atomic weapons or the manufacture of such weapons. The non-nuclear Powers had already shown a commendable appreciation of their responsibilities in the matter. It had been Ireland, a non-nuclear Power, that had taken the initiative in bringing the issue before the General Assembly. That initiative had been supported by other non-nuclear Powers, which had been in the forefront in urging agreements that would encourage the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world. The Indonesian delegation therefore hoped that its suggestion for the establishment of a committee of non-nuclear Powers to draft an international agreement would meet with the approval of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.253/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3 as well as of other members of the Committee.

17. With regard to the cessation of nuclear tests, some encouragement was to be found in the fact that at least three nuclear Powers had suspended their tests and that a degree of progress was being made at the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests. But it should be impressed upon the negotiators at Geneva that the people of the world were following their deliberations with anxiety and high expectations. It was imperative that the United Nations should make known not only its abiding interest in the negotiations but also its desire for the continuance of the present suspension of tests, pending a final agreement. For those reasons, Indonesia sincerely hoped that draft resolution A/C.1/L.258/Rev.1, of which it was a sponsor, would be adopted by as great a majority as possible.

18. With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/L.260/Rev.1, submitted by Poland, the Indonesian delegation believed that the United Nations was not only the organ best suited to prepare a report on the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons but was morally obliged to do so, since such a report would provide the peoples of the world with vital information concerning their survival. An objective and scientific report of that kind would also create a good psychological climate for disarmament.

19. Finally, there was the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.259 and Add.1-2) on the question of disarmament, of which Indonesia was one of the sponsors. Indonesia felt it should be emphasized that the draft resolution was not a compromise one, since it respected the positions of both sides and did not require either of them to relinquish principles. Rather, it offered a modus operandi which should pave the way to renewed negotiations. There were, it was true, certain differences of interpretation, particularly with regard to operative paragraphs 2 and 3; but it was encouraging to note that those difficulties did not seem to touch on the substance of the problem.

20. The Western Powers seemed to agree with the Soviet Union on the desirability of negotiating a treaty on general and complete disarmament. On the other hand, the Eastern Powers were willing to concede the need for partial initial measures which would help to create a better atmosphere. There was actually nothing new in that, for negotiations had already been held, or were in progress, concerning partial measures, such as the preservation of Antarctica as a nuclear-free zone,^{3/} and the suspension of nuclear tests. It was now urgent to proceed with negotiations on general and complete disarmament. The Indonesian delegation regarded arguments over the relative importance of negotiating a treaty on general and complete disarmament and of reaching agreement on partial disarmament measures as pointless. Both were of equal importance and urgency; there should be no question of priorities. Surely, it was better to do all that could be done rather than nothing at all. The ultimate common goal was the attainment of a disarmed world; the end should not be sacrificed to the means, nor the means to the end. The only legitimate question was one of procedure, namely, how to make a start both on general and complete disarmament and on partial measures that would promote the attainment of that end. That procedural question should not be insoluble; after all, the twelve sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.259 and Add.1-2 had succeeded in formulating directives for negotiations on general and complete disarmament. Such negotiations would not only allay current fears and suspicions but would also go far towards removing the divergency of approach on disarmament. Negotiations on partial measures would be in keeping with the more cautious approach advocated by the Western Powers, and should in their turn remove any hesitancy on the part of the West to accept the more radical approach urged by the Soviet Union. It was in the interest of both sides, therefore, to advance constructively on both fronts.

21. The twelve-Power draft resolution was by no means offered as an ultimatum—the sponsors would

not even insist on its being put to a vote. However, they did hope that it would prove acceptable to all parties concerned, if not at present, at least in the very near future.

22. Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania) said that the Committee had before it a number of draft resolutions calling for a wide variety of measures ranging from the cessation of nuclear tests to action to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear Powers and to induce States to refrain from doing anything that might aggravate international tension and render disarmament negotiations more difficult. Those resolutions, if adopted, would create a favourable atmosphere for the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. It was curious that the Western representatives had as yet made no comment on those draft resolutions, and in particular that the United States representative, who at the previous meeting had made a lengthy statement deploping the course of the Geneva negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests, had said nothing about the three draft resolutions dealing with that subject. If the United States Government had favoured any one of those draft resolutions, it would not have hesitated to make that fact known through its representatives in the Committee.

23. The Romanian delegation attached particular importance to draft resolution A/C.1/L.254 and Add. 1-3 relating to the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. It felt that that draft resolution should be an object of very special attention on the part of the General Assembly. The question of prohibiting the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons was not new. The socialist States and other peace-loving States had long favoured the outlawing of such heinous weapons. The problem had long been pending, and the United Nations, in the opinion of his delegation, would be widely departing from its fundamental principles if it failed once again to take action that would facilitate a solution. Since some time had passed since the submission of the draft resolution, the consultations provided for in operative paragraph 2 no longer appeared necessary; it should be possible for the General Assembly to take a decision at its current session on convening a conference in 1961 on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. His delegation would therefore suggest that the paragraph in question should be amended accordingly. It might also be advisable to add a third operative paragraph providing for the immediate appointment by the General Assembly of a working group to prepare a draft convention for submission to the proposed conference. If those suggestions were not acceptable to the sponsors, however, his delegation was prepared to vote for the resolution as it stood.

24. The various draft resolutions on partial disarmament measures were in no way linked to the resumption of negotiations on general and complete disarmament, and it was only the negative attitude of the United States and the other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which prevented their adoption. The United States representative had recently suggested that partial measures should be referred to the body entrusted with negotiations on general and complete disarmament; it should be pointed out, however, that no decision had yet been taken on what body that should be. Similarly, the

^{3/} Antarctic Treaty, signed at Washington, D.C., on 1 December 1959.

United Kingdom representative had said that the measures embodied in the Polish draft resolution (A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1) should constitute the first stage of general and complete disarmament; but that, as the Polish representative would undoubtedly agree, would mean going beyond the intended scope of those measures. The position of the Western Powers was thus perfectly clear: on the one hand they denied the possibility of any directives which could promote the resumption of negotiations on general and complete disarmament, and on the other hand, they sought to link partial disarmament measures with the resumption of those very negotiations. Although they had repeatedly accused the socialist countries of taking an "all or nothing" attitude, they themselves were attempting to include all disarmament measures in a single package.

25. Turning to draft resolution A/C.1/L.255 and Add.1, he said that after expressing, in its preamble, generous sentiments concerning the role of non-nuclear States in disarmament negotiations, the resolution merely went on to repeat certain questionable suggestions previously advanced by other delegations together with some of the sponsors' own. Instead of suggesting directives for new negotiations on general and complete disarmament, the resolution proposed that the United Nations should appoint "one or more impartial officers" to facilitate those negotiations; the aim was apparently to apply to disarmament negotiations the methods employed by the United Nations in the Congo. It should also be noted that the *ad hoc* committee of non-nuclear States proposed in operative paragraph 3 was not to be given any functions of mediation and reconciliation. The resolution sought to minimize the part to be played by non-nuclear States in disarmament negotiations by confining their functions to what was essentially librarians' work: that of preparing a compilation of the principles which should guide disarmament negotiations and of the various suggestions with regard to disarmament made by Member States at the current session of the Assembly. That would surely do nothing to overcome the opposition of the United States and its allies to general and complete disarmament. The purpose of the resolution was obviously to create the illusion that the Western Powers were taking action to promote the resumption of negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

26. Although the Committee had been discussing the problem of disarmament almost without interruption since the beginning of the current session, and it was surely time to proceed to a vote on the various draft resolutions, efforts were being made to persuade the Committee either to conclude the debate without adopting any resolutions or to refer the question to the Disarmament Commission or defer it to the second part of the fifteenth session. It was asserted that it was difficult for the Western Powers to take important political decisions at the present time. But the Western Powers were daily taking important political decisions. For example, the United States was to base nuclear submarines in Scotland; the United States Navy had been sent to the Caribbean, as a prelude to American aggression against the Cuban people; the French Government had decided to create a nuclear striking force; and the United States Government had decided to place nuclear arms at the disposal of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Those decisions all had great political significance. There was no need to say that they were unlikely to facilitate the resumption and success of negotiations on general and complete disarmament or that, on the contrary, they tended to increase the danger of a nuclear war and to envenom the international situation and relations between States. The endeavour to further political decisions of that kind could not justify the interruption, without any action or decision, of the disarmament debate which certain delegations and leading persons, who, of course, were impartial, were advocating in the corridors. The Western Powers had opposed discussion of the question of general and complete disarmament in plenary session on the ground that it could be given more thorough consideration in the First Committee; yet attempts were now being made to end the Committee's debate on the matter without arriving at any decision. In the view of the Romanian delegation, the Committee should be able to take a vote on most of the draft resolutions before it by the following week.

27. Mr. ORMSBY-GORE (United Kingdom) said that in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1402 (XIV), he wished to report on the progress of the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests.

28. The conference had achieved a great deal. First of all, it had reached agreement on the scope and nature of its task, which was to draft a treaty prohibiting all nuclear weapons tests at present susceptible of effective control and to establish a detection and identification system to enforce that prohibition; to arrange a voluntary moratorium on those underground tests which were not at present susceptible of effective control; and to prepare a co-ordinated programme of research designed to improve existing methods of detecting and identifying small underground explosions, in the hope that the scope of the treaty could be progressively extended. Secondly, the conference had made important progress towards accomplishing the three objectives to which he had referred. The two sides had, by modifying their original positions, settled all points of disagreement about the form of the treaty; they had decided that it should be multilateral rather than tripartite, that it should contain detailed provisions on control instead of merely an undertaking to abandon testing, and that, subject to certain agreed conditions, it should be of indefinite rather than limited duration. The Conference had also adopted a total of twenty-one treaty articles and annexes dealing with such important substantive points as the structure of the projected control organization, the obligations of parties towards the organization, and procedures for amending the treaty. The two sides had also narrowed their differences on such crucial questions as the national composition of the staff of control posts and the procedures for the dispatch of inspection teams to investigate suspicious seismic events.

29. The conference had gone on so long because it was dealing with a complex of overlapping political and technical problems on which the two sides often had very different ideas. It was surely preferable that such differences should be settled at the conference, rather than be deferred until after a treaty had been concluded, with possible adverse effects on the efficient functioning of the control organization. The annex dealing with the privileges and immunities to

be accorded to the control organization and its staff, a highly detailed text which had required the most careful drafting, and the adoption of which had required ten months of negotiation, illustrated the complexity of the problems discussed.

30. Although a great deal remained to be accomplished at Geneva, he did not feel that any of the remaining problems were essentially more difficult to solve than those on which agreement had already been reached. Nevertheless, it was not true that the treaty, as the Soviet representative had frequently asserted, could be quickly concluded if the West accepted the Soviet position on two or three points. There were in fact a number of major unsolved problems whose solution required, above all, changes in the Soviet position. With regard to the staffing of control posts, the Soviet Union had abandoned its original demand that twenty-nine of the thirty technicians at any post situated in the Soviet Union should be Russians and only one a foreign national; however, it still insisted that the head of any post should be a national of the country in which it was situated. The Soviet Union also refused to agree to more than three annual inspections for the investigation of unidentified seismic events, whereas the Western Powers felt that an annual quota of twenty such inspections was necessary to deter potential violators of the treaty. Although the Soviet representative had stated at the 1119th meeting of the First Committee that the inspection quota should be subject to review two years after the treaty for the cessation of tests had entered into force in the light of the experience gained by the control organization up to that time, his statement seemed to have little meaning in view of the recent assertion by the Soviet representative at Geneva that no on-site inspections should take place until four years after the conclusion of the treaty. With regard to the nationality of the members of inspection teams, the Western Powers held that no team should include any nationals of the country being inspected, although the latter could attach as many observers to the team as it wished in order to ensure that the inspectors did not engage in unlawful activities such as espionage; the Soviet Union, on the other hand, insisted that one-third of the members of any team investigating a suspicious event in the Soviet Union should be Soviet citizens. A final question was that of the initiation of a co-ordinated research programme on the detection and identification of small underground explosions; Soviet scientists had agreed to such a programme in May 1960 only for it to be repudiated at the political level later that month.

31. The Soviet attitude on the points to which he had referred did not indicate a genuine desire to ensure the maximum impartiality and effectiveness of the work of the control system, nor could it be reconciled with the Soviet Union's repeated assertion that it was prepared to accept any system of control proposed by the United States, provided that the West agreed to general and complete disarmament. It should also be noted that in most of the important matters now under discussion at Geneva, the most recent proposals had been those offered by the Western delegations. The United Kingdom Government intended to pursue its efforts to bring about the earliest possible conclusion of an effectively controlled treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests.

32. Mr. NESBITT (Canada) observed that the remarks of the Romanian representative appeared to have been irrelevant to both the intent and the content of draft resolution A/C.1/L.255 and Add.1, of which Canada was a sponsor.

33. Until recently, the debate in the Committee had focused more on the question of general and complete disarmament than on other aspects of the item under discussion. Today he wished to deal with the important problem of nuclear tests. The Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada had stated at the 1086th meeting that the Canadian Government had taken a clear position against further nuclear testing, that it welcomed the unilateral discontinuance of testing by the three nuclear Powers during the Geneva negotiations and hoped that a treaty would be concluded banning tests for all time. With that statement of Canadian policy in mind, he wished to make some observations regarding draft resolutions A/C.1/L.256 and A/C.1/L.258/Rev.1.

34. While the cessation of nuclear tests was not in itself a disarmament measure, it would be an immeasurable boon to mankind and of great value in the improvement of international relations in regard to disarmament. The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation had been actively studying the nature and scope of the hazards of radiation, and its report was to be examined in the Special Political Committee at the current session, under agenda item 24. Meanwhile, a definitive end to nuclear testing would certainly relieve peoples everywhere of an oppressive fear and of a very real danger.

35. A controlled international agreement prohibiting nuclear tests would introduce an element of stability into the over-all armaments situation, for weapons technology could not be significantly advanced without operational testing. Such an agreement would also make it difficult for additional nations to acquire a nuclear capability, and would increase mutual confidence between States which already possessed nuclear weapons. Finally, a test-ban agreement would be of immense value in providing a working model for a verification system, with important implications for disarmament in general.

36. It was obvious that agreement on effective inspection and verification was indispensable, since any treaty which left open the possibility of one side's gaining a nuclear advantage by conducting clandestine tests might encourage the offending State to chance aggression. Even if no clandestine tests were actually held, the situation would be a source of mutual suspicion and international tension. It was therefore to be fervently hoped that the negotiating countries would soon come to accept the fact that it was very much in their mutual interests to devise adequate guarantees for the observance of the obligations incorporated in the treaty.

37. In the past year, France had entered the field of testing, and in the absence of agreement seemed disposed to go on with its programme of nuclear arms development. Other States might be tempted to follow suit. Although, therefore, the existing moratorium was most welcome, it provided no assurance that there would be no more tests. However, world opinion on the subject was quite clear: peoples everywhere were opposed to the further testing of nuclear weapons

by any State. That was the unequivocal position of the Canadian Government, a position repeatedly reaffirmed during the past year.

38. At the Assembly's fourteenth session, the Canadian delegation had unreservedly supported resolution 1379 (XIV) and resolutions 1402 A and B (XIV). It was now happy to declare its support for two draft resolutions addressed to the problem of nuclear testing (A/C.1/L.256 and A/C.1/L.258/Rev.1). Both proposals were sponsored by non-nuclear Powers, who were thus playing a welcome part in a field of vital concern to all States large and small. Both drafts made plain the overwhelming verdict of world opinion that tests should not be undertaken by any country, and both recognized the urgency of an agreement under international control.

39. After the statements on the Geneva talks made to the Committee by the representatives of the Powers concerned, the Committee had a much clearer understanding of the crucial issues at stake and would undoubtedly be encouraged by the degree of progress that had been made. It was precisely because the few remaining differences constituted formidable obstacles to complete agreement that his delegation vigorously endorsed the two draft resolutions, which reaffirmed the insistence of the United Nations that remaining difficulties should be overcome by the negotiating countries.

40. Mr. SCHURMANN (Netherlands) said that the Netherlands Government was still in favour of a treaty for the controlled cessation of nuclear test explosions. Such a treaty would put an end to the atomic radiation caused by such explosions; it would slow down the arms race; it would help to prevent the further dissemination of nuclear weapons; it would afford an opportunity for gaining useful practical experience in the field of international control; and, finally, it might ease the tension between East and West.

41. One lesson which had been learnt from the negotiations at Geneva was the advantage of having the parties place on the table detailed proposals. For fifteen years there had been disarmament debates, mainly centering on basic principles and measures of a general nature. Although he did not wish to deny the importance of such discussions, the Geneva negotiations on minutely worked out plans had had the advantage of clarifying the positions of the parties. While, of course, such clarification might show that those positions were not really as far apart as the parties had thought, it might on the contrary show that the agreement which had apparently existed when general formulas had been discussed was endangered when it came to drafting workable treaties. That was particularly relevant to the discussions at Geneva on effective international controls.

42. The records left no doubt that the Soviet Union favoured a very restrictive interpretation of the terms "effective" and "international". That had again been underscored by the representative of the Soviet Union in his statement at the 1119th meeting. While the Soviet Union—like the United Kingdom and the United States of America—had made some important concessions during the talks, it had favoured—and to a certain extent still favoured—initial control measures which either amounted to self-control or otherwise reduced the efficacy of the control system. His

delegation hoped that the Soviet Union would avoid taking rigid positions on the important questions which still remained to be settled, including the number of on-site inspections to be carried out each year.

43. Although it was useful that the General Assembly should again call for the speedy conclusion of a treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests, his delegation could not agree with the implication in draft resolutions A/C.1/L.256 and A/C.1/L.258/Rev.1 that the parties concerned should continue their voluntary suspension of tests indefinitely, without regard to the negotiations at Geneva or to the necessity of having a treaty. Nor was it wise for the General Assembly to request "other States" to refrain from nuclear tests without having created any form of verification of the doings of such States. It would be better if the Assembly endeavoured to obtain the accession of as many States as possible to a treaty on the cessation of tests, once such a treaty had been concluded. There would then be a reasonable certainty that a general cessation of tests for the whole world would be achieved. His delegation would vote on the two draft resolutions with those considerations in mind.

44. At the Assembly's fourteenth session, he had expressed his Government's concern over the possibility of an increase in the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons, and had supported the idea of a study of that problem. The Netherlands Government had naturally been disappointed that in spite of the suggestion included in paragraph 1 of resolution 1380 (XIV), the question had scarcely been touched upon during the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament before the communist walk-out. It therefore welcomed the inclusion of the question in the agenda of the current session of the Assembly. However, it doubted whether the Assembly would be acting wisely in expressing an opinion on the substance of the matter in the manner recommended in draft resolution A/C.1/L.253/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3. While his delegation shared the view of the Irish delegation and the other sponsors on the end to be achieved, it regretted that the idea of a study had been omitted from the draft resolution, while the object, namely, an international agreement under which the nuclear Powers would refrain from handing over control of nuclear weapons to any nation not possessing them, had been relegated to second place, nuclear and non-nuclear Powers being requested to accept a unilateral moral obligation. The draft resolution did not propose any time-limit for the obligation; it did not offer sufficient assurances of substantial control, so that there was no reasonable certainty that every State would comply with the obligations entered into; and the possibilities of evasion would be at variance with the postulate that in the process of disarmament no party should obtain any military advantage at the expense of the other parties. For those reasons, his delegation regretted that it would not be able to vote for that draft resolution.

45. He wished to make it clear that the Netherlands Government still considered any increase in the number of nuclear Powers to be a great danger. However, it also still held that before decisions on substance could be taken, a thorough study of the possibility of applying methods to prevent circumvention had to be made.

46. In conclusion, he was authorized to state that the centrifuge system being developed by Dutch scientists, which some speakers had described as being of possible importance for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, would be used in the Netherlands, now and in the future, exclusively for peaceful purposes.

47. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) said that the Committee should not conclude its debate without adopting some of the resolutions before it. In view of the special nature and the great urgency of the question of the suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests, the draft resolutions on that subject (A/C.1/L.256 and A/C.1/L.258/Rev.1) should be voted on first. Since there was no important substantive difference between those two draft resolutions, it might be preferable to put only one of them to the vote. The prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons was another distinct question on which the Committee could take a separate decision. The Peruvian delegation, although it fully endorsed the practical and humanitarian objectives of draft resolution A/C.1/L.253/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3, would be unable for legal reasons to support it. It imposed an obligation, but did not offer any guarantee—other than a presumption of good faith—of compliance with that obligation. While such a presumption would be legitimate in a world of normal international relations, it was untenable in a world of collective psychosis and morbid mistrust between States.

48. Ideally, the debate in the Committee should have produced an agreed and effective resolution on general and complete disarmament. The number of draft resolutions before the Committee demonstrated its keen interest in the problem, and the discussion had helped to create an atmosphere favourable to the resumption of negotiations, which was recognized as an urgent need. However, the problem of defining the subject-matter of the negotiations and the scope of the directives which might be given by the Assembly still remained. Despite concentrated efforts, it had proved impossible to find a common denominator such as to make the directives worked out in the Committee acceptable to the parties. In the circumstances, a unanimous vote on directives would not be possible; and the adoption of a specific set of directives by majority vote would be more likely to hinder than to help negotiations. His delegation would therefore prefer the adoption of a resolution which merely called upon the parties to resume negotiations. That would not mean that the Assembly had renounced all responsibility for working out directives; it would be called upon, when deadlocks arose in the negotiating body, to consider how they should be resolved and to bring its moral influence to bear in favour of specific solutions.

49. Mr. WINIEWICZ (Poland) said that the Committee had before it two sets of draft resolutions: a number of substantive proposals on general and complete disarmament, and a group of proposals calling for preliminary or initial measures conducive to creating a better international atmosphere and to eliminating the danger of the spread of atomic weapons and the possibility of new nuclear tests. It should put to the vote without delay the draft resolutions on the suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests (A/C.1/L.256 and A/C.1/L.258/Rev.1) and on the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons (A/C.1/L.253/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3). It

should also take a vote on the Polish draft resolution concerning the establishment of conditions conducive to reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament (A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1). It was a distortion of Poland's intention to suggest, as at least one speaker had done, that the measures set forth in that proposal belonged to the sphere of general and complete disarmament, and should be included in the negotiations on that subject. On the contrary, negotiations on general and complete disarmament should embrace measures of a more far-reaching and substantive nature, and should result in the conclusion of a treaty, while the measures suggested by Poland could be introduced immediately through an appeal by the United Nations to the Powers concerned.

50. Mr. JUNG (India), referring to an observation made by the representative of Peru, emphasized that there was a material difference between the two draft resolutions on the suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests. The draft of which India was one of the twenty-six sponsors (A/C.1/L.258/Rev.1), in its operative paragraph 2, not only urged the States concerned in the Geneva negotiations to continue their present voluntary suspension of testing, but—and the point was significant—requested other States to refrain from undertaking such tests. That request had not been made in the proposal submitted by Austria, India and Sweden (A/C.1/L.256). Consequently, his delegation wished both draft resolutions to be put to the vote.

51. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the various draft resolutions before the Committee should be divided for purposes of the voting into groups. The first group would include those proposals which dealt with the substantive question of disarmament (A/C.1/L.249, A/C.1/L.250 and A/C.1/L.259 and Add.1-2). The second group would consist of the five draft resolutions dealing with nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and related questions (A/C.1/L.253/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3, A/C.1/L.254 and Add.1-3, A/C.1/L.256, A/C.1/L.258/Rev.1 and A/C.1/L.260/Rev.1). The third group would comprise all the draft resolutions dealing with what might be called the machinery for facilitating progress towards agreement on disarmament (A/4509, A/C.1/L.251, A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1 and A/C.1/L.255 and Add.1). In addition to those three groups, there was one amendment (A/C.1/L.257) to draft resolution A/C.1/L.255 and Add.1.

52. He suggested that the draft resolutions in the first group should not be put to the vote at the present stage, and that the Committee should proceed to vote on those in the other two groups.

53. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) agreed that the substantive draft resolutions, namely, A/C.1/L.249, A/C.1/L.250 and A/C.1/L.259 and Add.1-2, should be grouped together, and that they should not be put to the vote for the moment. However, he would include in that group the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/L.251), which touched on a matter of substance, since it involved the question of general approach to the problem of disarmament. Furthermore the Polish draft resolution (A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1) should not be included in the category of proposals relating to the machinery of disarmament. The Polish proposal dealt with initial disarmament measures; it should therefore be included in the second group of proposals. It also contained a provision to the effect

that if no agreement on a test ban was reached by 1 April 1961, the problem should be placed before a special session of the General Assembly. That was a provision of a procedural nature, and should not be construed as relating to the machinery for disarmament. Finally, the Polish draft resolution should be put to the vote early in the voting proceedings.

54. The CHAIRMAN explained that he had tentatively placed the Polish draft resolution (A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1) in the third category because it appeared to deal with machinery, in that, as the Soviet representative himself had pointed out, it provided for the convening of a special session of the General Assembly in April 1961 if the talks on a test ban had not been successfully concluded by that time. However, the Committee was free to shift draft resolutions from one category to another as it saw fit.

55. Mr. ORMSBY-GORE (United Kingdom) said that while his delegation had no particular preference with respect to the category in which the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/L.251) was to be placed, it would suggest that the voting should start with the three least contentious proposals (A/C.1/L.253/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3, A/C.1/L.256 and A/C.1/L.258/Rev.1).

56. Mr. WINIEWICZ (Poland) said that the draft resolution submitted by Poland (A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1) belonged basically to the second category, i.e. to the group dealing with the suspension of tests and the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. Since, moreover, it had been introduced first, it should be given priority in the voting.

57. Mr. NESBITT (Canada) suggested that in view of the differences expressed regarding the order of

voting, it might be advisable to adjourn the meeting, so that informal consultations could be held, and begin the voting at the following meeting.

58. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said he regretted that the United Kingdom representative had not seen fit to include among the draft resolutions which he regarded as least controversial draft resolution A/C.1/L.254 and Add.1-3 on the renunciation of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons; surely the United Kingdom and the other nuclear Powers would have no objection to voting for that draft resolution.

59. In his view, all the draft resolutions which the Chairman had included in groups 1 and 3 could be placed in a single group, since they all related to negotiations on general and complete disarmament, and should not be put to the vote for the moment. Votes would then be taken only on the second group of draft resolutions mentioned by the Chairman, but including the Polish proposal (A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1). The various proposals would be voted on in the order in which they had been submitted.

60. The CHAIRMAN said that at the next meeting the Committee was to take up the Algerian question. The question of disarmament would remain on the agenda, and would be taken up whenever time allowed. The Committee would then deal with the order and method of voting and the voting itself, and with the draft resolution just submitted by five African States (A/C.1/L.264).

The meeting rose at 6.50 p.m.