



Monday, 14 January 1952, at 3 p.m.

Palais de Chaillot, Paris

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Chairman : Mr. Finn MOE (Norway).

Measures to combat the threat of a new world war and to strengthen peace and friendship among the nations (A/1944, A/1947, A/C.1/698 and A/C.1/699) (continued)

[Item 67]*

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. FRANCO FRANCO (Dominican Republic) felt bound to comment on a point of the debate which concerned his country in particular. At the previous meeting, the USSR representative had referred to the agreement concluded on 26 November 1951 between the Dominican Republic and the United States of America as something which was, to say the least, reprehensible.

2. The assertions made by the leader of the USSR delegation were totally without foundation ; that was clear from the general tone of the agreement, which should be considered in the light of the geographical position of the Dominican Republic.

3. No country had played a greater part than the Dominican Republic in the formation of the Organization of American States. As early as 1936, his country had taken the initiative for the creation of an American League of Nations and it had always collaborated wholeheartedly in the work for the defence and security of the Continent. The 1951 agreement was still further evidence of its constant loyalty to that great purpose.

4. Thanks to the " good neighbour " policy the relations between the United States and the other American States could serve as an example to countries in other parts of the world. Any danger to one American State was regarded as a danger to all of them. The USSR should not therefore be surprised at the conclusion of the agreement of 26 November 1951 which was quite obviously purely defensive. That defensive purpose and the scope of the agreement had both been clearly defined in the *communiqué* issued by the Dominican Government on the same date as the signing of the agreement.

5. Without that genuine spirit of mutual confidence and peaceful good neighbourliness the agreement could never

have been thought of, much less signed. His country had always been able not only to defend its own sovereignty but also to live up to its high calling in the emergence and development of the new world and of its international institutions.

6. Peace, happiness and welfare for all nations could only be achieved if that spirit of confidence and good neighbourliness was extended to embrace the whole world. At the same time, it would be foolish for any country to forget that, like all other countries, it had a duty to prepare for individual and collective self-defence, which was the over-riding consideration in all forms of the lives of men and of nations.

7. Mr. CHAUVEL (France) said that any novel element in Mr. Vyshinsky's statement at the previous meeting was contained only in the last part of that statement, dealing with the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/698).

8. The latter dealt with a number of different questions. The much-advertised new proposals appeared in the last line of the first sub-paragraph and the second line of the second sub-paragraph of paragraph 3, in the second sub-paragraph of paragraph 6 and at the end of the second sub-paragraph of paragraph 7. An allusion to military bases on foreign territory had been inserted in paragraph 5.

9. As for the context of the USSR draft resolution, referring to the first paragraph, regarding the North Atlantic Treaty, Mr. Chauvel said that the arguments adduced by Mr. Vyshinsky could not convince him that a defensive agreement within the framework of the Charter was contrary to the Charter. No argument had proved that to establish military, air and naval bases on the territory of States signatories of a treaty in order to enforce that treaty was an infringement of the Charter. Some of the speeches which had been made would almost give the impression that the USSR possessed no military facilities on the territory of its friends and neighbours.

10. Paragraph 2 of the USSR proposal mixed military and political questions and returned to one important point which had already been disposed of in the Panmunjom negotiations.

11. Paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 reiterated the substance of Soviet Union amendments which, after lengthy discussion, had not been incorporated in the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its 358th plenary meeting (A/L.25).

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

12. The proposal for a five-Power peace pact contained in paragraph 8 would remain in vain unless the USSR demonstrated by deeds its readiness to co-operate with others. After all, the Charter constituted a peace pact to which all nations should accede.

13. Mr. Chauvel wondered why Mr. Vyshinsky had submitted proposals relating to subjects which had been closed, in the midst of a text of such a controversial nature. Nevertheless, in a question as important as that of the reduction of armaments all roads must be explored that might lead to an agreement which was essential for the safety of mankind.

14. Four of the points contained in the USSR proposal—two points of substance and two of procedure—differed from the previous proposals.

15. The first proposal, relating to the simultaneity of the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of international control, amounted to a return to the USSR proposals of 2 November 1948¹, 21 November 1949² and 12 December 1950³. That proposal would not be sufficient to remove all obstacles.

16. Nor would an agreement that the control organ should inspect on a permanent and continuing basis be sufficient, since the modalities and the field of inspection remained to be fixed, and the categorical refusal to allow interference in the internal affairs of States constituted a reservation which needed careful study. It should be noted that the permanence and continuity of the right of inspection were not among the amendments submitted by Mr. Vyshinsky to the resolution adopted recently by the General Assembly.

17. Thus there had been some progress. In matters so delicate and important the greatest caution should be exercised; verbal agreement might cover fundamental disagreement. Nevertheless, on two points which had been under discussion for a long time there was a real *rapprochement*.

18. The question should therefore be carefully examined. The form of the USSR draft resolution would not facilitate that examination and it would therefore be best to extract the points relating to disarmament and refer them to the Disarmament Commission, of which the USSR would be a member and whose task would be facilitated by the fact that there was apparently some *rapprochement* between the diverging viewpoints.

19. He also noted that the change in the date proposed in the USSR draft resolution for the convening of a world conference would allow time to consider, on the basis of the Disarmament Commission's report, whether such a conference would be timely.

20. In conclusion, the representative of France read a draft resolution submitted jointly by the representatives of France, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/699) to the effect that paragraphs 3 to 7 of the USSR draft resolution should be referred to the Disarmament Commission established by the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its 358th plenary meeting.

21. Mr. VON BALLUSECK (Netherlands) said that the resolution on the reduction of armaments adopted by the General Assembly (A/L.25) was a realistic working programme which covered the whole field of armaments, including the question of military bases. They could not

isolate one aspect of the disarmament problem, such as the question of the atomic weapon, as the USSR did in its draft resolution. The USSR proposal, moreover, still appeared to be silent regarding the effective international control of atomic energy, which was vital to the security of the world.

22. The proposal for a one-third reduction of arms would increase the military preponderance of the USSR, and it might be asked why not a one hundred per cent reduction. In any case, information would be required for any such proposal, and it seemed obvious that it would be necessary to build up gradually a balanced reduction of armaments.

23. If the USSR had any new ideas, these would appropriately be considered by the Disarmament Commission, where the new USSR position would help widen the area of agreement.

24. Concerning the question of interference in the domestic affairs of States, which the USSR proposal would exclude, Mr. von Balluseck pointed out that the General Assembly resolution called for a minimum degree of interference. International control would be but an empty phrase if it could be ruled out at any time as constituting such interference.

25. The USSR, in its draft resolution, declared that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was aggressive in character. Citing the preamble and articles 3 and 5 of the Treaty, he failed to see how a system of collective self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter, which would be subordinated to the Security Council once that organ started to deal with any aggression, could be termed aggressive or incompatible with the United Nations. The idea could occur only to those who regretted that the North Atlantic nations were taking measures for self-defence.

26. It was true that the peoples of the western nations were bearing a heavy defence burden, as Mr. Vyshinsky had said. They did so because they were determined to maintain their freedom against those who had given them reason to fear that it was endangered. The North Atlantic Treaty had been designed to protect democracy from the vulnerability inherent in its tolerance and its peaceful nature.

27. There was no purpose to be served by dealing with the question of Korea at the present stage, since, as the First Committee had agreed, there should be no interference with the negotiations in progress in Korea.

28. As for the USSR proposal for a peace pact, nothing prevented the great Powers from getting together if they wanted to. They would do so in their own interest, if they felt there was any reasonable chance of agreement. A recommendation by the General Assembly would thus not assist matters and, if it were not successful, it might well leave the world in an even less hopeful state.

29. The representative of the Netherlands would oppose the USSR draft resolution A/C.1/689 and would support that submitted by France, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/699).

30. Mr. BELLEGARDE (Haiti) said that even if the Disarmament Commission should be successful in its task, the remedy for the troubles of the world could not lie only in the reduction of armaments and in the banning of the atomic weapon.

31. Mr. Vyshinsky had merely repeated previously rejected proposals, though the modifications which had been referred to were to be welcomed. There had been the same recriminations against those unwilling to accept the *pax sovietica*. Mr. Vyshinsky wondered why was there rearmament by

¹ See document A/C.1/310.

² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Session, Plenary Meetings, Annex, document A/1120*.

³ *Ibid.*, Fifth Session, Annexes, Agenda item 25, document A/1676.

nations which had not yet recovered from the Second World War? According to Mr. Vyshinsky the remedy for the malady afflicting the world was to accept the USSR views. That would merely be dealing with the reaction to the sickness, which itself stemmed from the fact that public opinion in the western world felt that the attitude and armament of the USSR were a standing threat to world peace. The record of the USSR lent little weight to its declarations to the effect that it would never attack anyone and sought no one else's territory. The atomic weapon was a terrible thing, but the man in the street believed it to be the sole safeguard for peace at present. Citing the fear in the United States of a USSR attack, Mr. Bellegarde thought that the people of the United States would not accept prohibition of the atomic weapon without sufficient safeguards.

32. Mr. Vyshinsky's references to Korea merely increased the distrust of other nations because of the fact that it was within the power of the Soviet Union to end the hostilities in Korea. Even those who did not believe that the USSR intended to unleash another war believed that it wished to maintain the state of tension in order to bring about the economic ruin of the rest of the world.

33. The peoples of the world should unite their strength against all forms of violence, hatred and aggression, in order to bring about the moral disarmament which was essential for a military disarmament. If the USSR renounced its policy of interference in the affairs of others and of fomenting strife, and co-operated with other States to attain the objectives of the United Nations, it would be possible to obtain that goal.

34. Mr. DE PIMENTEL BRANDAO (Brazil) pointed out that many of the provisions of the USSR draft resolution had already been discussed and rejected by the majority of the Members of the United Nations.

35. There were two points on which there might appear to have been some progress: namely, that prohibition of atomic weapons would become effective at the same time as the establishment of international control; and that inspection was to take place on a continuing basis. If the first point meant that the prohibition was to take effect when the system of control was still "on paper", there would be no substantial change in the position. There was no point in reaffirming the principle of inspection on a continuing basis since it had already been accepted by the General Assembly, though the support of the USSR was to be welcomed.

36. He therefore supported the draft resolution submitted by France, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/699).

37. Dealing with paragraph 1 of the USSR proposal, Mr. de Pimentel Brandao asked why those participating in the United Nations action in Korea, which, like the North Atlantic Treaty, had been branded as aggressive by the USSR, should not be treated in the same way as members of the North Atlantic Treaty. And was the "creation" of bases referred to because the USSR had completed its network of bases? The paragraph was doomed to failure by its own ridiculous nature.

38. As for paragraph 2 relating to Korea, Mr. de Pimentel Brandao thought that nothing had happened to justify departure from the Committee's decision at its 486th meeting to postpone consideration of the matter. The United Nations had assumed a primary responsibility in Korea and must see that the Korean question was settled in accordance with the principles of the Charter. Forty-seven members of the Committee had decided, however, that the present was not the best time to discuss the problem of Korea.

The meeting rose at 4.35 p.m.