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Chairman: Mr. Franz MATSCH (Austria).

AGENDA ITEM 70

General and complete disarmament (A/4218, A/4219, A/C.1/818, A/C.1/820, A/C.1/821, A/C.1/L.234) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE AND CONSIDERATION OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION (A/C.1/L.234) (continued)

1. Mr. VELAZQUEZ (Uruguay) said that, while the small and unarmed nations comprising the overwhelming majority in the General Assembly could contribute little to the achievement of the practical objectives of disarmament, they all had an equal stake in the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security. His delegation had been encouraged by the serious and optimistic tone of the debate and impressed by the unanimous support given to the principle of general and complete disarmament. It hoped that future meetings between the statesmen of the most powerful States and negotiations in the "spirit of Camp David" would ultimately translate that principle into reality. It further hoped that the progress already made by the major Powers on various principles of disarmament and, in particular, their agreement with regard to certain aspects of control in relation to the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, would extend to other more general aspects of the disarmament problem.

2. There now appeared to be full agreement that total disarmament could be carried out only under effective international control, and that control should go hand in hand with disarmament at every stage. The statements of the USSR representative (1026th and 1033rd meetings) would seem to show that the differences regarding the application of controls could ultimately be reconciled: there was to be no control without disarmament, because control could not operate in a vacuum; nor disarmament without control, because an agreement on disarmament did not per se create confidence or ensure its implementation. Control, however, retained a certain degree of priority. It should be possible to arrive at an agreement regarding the technical aspects of control beforehand and to hold that agreement in readiness until such time as an agreement on disarmament came into force. Even in the prevailing atmosphere of distrust, such a control agreement could not be regarded as a form of espionage or as a measure detrimental to the legitimate and sovereign interests of the parties.

3. While the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/L.234) explicitly recognized the primary responsibility of the

United Nations for disarmament and wisely left the detailed examination of the various proposals to the ten-Power disarmament committee, it might be useful to examine the doubts expressed regarding the implicit difficulties in the Soviet proposal (A/4219) and the questions raised concerning the preservation of peace in a disarmed world. Disarmament was being proposed as an end in itself on the grounds that nations deprived of the means of waging war would necessarily pursue a policy of peace. But that conclusion was not inevitable; armaments were an instrument of national policy, and their abolition was no panacea for the world's ills. Disarmament was a means of achieving peace and security, but peace was a political objective, the essential prerequisite for the well-being of the international community. It was conceivable that, since technological and scientific advances had rendered obsolete previous approaches to the disarmament problem, human beings, faced with the dire prospect of total annihilation, might drastically revise their ways of thinking. However, until that happened, the creation of a world at peace was a matter, not so much of intelligence or reasoning, as of will. It must be assumed that a disarmed world would not be a world without conflicts, and the Members of the United Nations should seek to provide adequate means of resolving those conflicts. That would require a tremendous effort of imagination. Careful attention should be paid, as disarmament progressed, to the type of international police force to be established and the principles of international law to govern its use, to the functioning of the Security Council and the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Apart from continued observance of the principles laid down in the United Nations Charter, nothing was required for the success of the disarmament negotiations but a genuine desire for peace.

4. Sir Claude COREA (Ceylon) emphasized the urgent need for progress on the major issue of disarmament. While Ceylon, as a small country, could not presume to offer advice, it was as much concerned with world peace and security as the more powerful States. The significance of the draft resolution before the Committee lay precisely in the fact that it had been drawn up jointly by the two most powerful countries responsible for peace and that the unanimous support it had received reflected the will of the whole world to achieve that goal. The proposals of the major Powers were courageous initiatives; Ceylon did not regard them as propaganda gestures designed to win a cheap popularity and assuage fears. It was to be hoped that all men of good will would respond to them by bending every effort to overcome the difficulties that stood in the way.

5. While it was reasonable to refer the detailed examination of the various proposals to the ten-Power disarmament committee, there was important work to be done in the United Nations before the start of negotiations in that body. The Organization's Disarmament

Commission should not be allowed to go into "cold storage". It was not sufficient to send its Chairman to Geneva to attend the meetings of the disarmament committee; he would not be a member of the Committee, for its composition had been delicately balanced and could not be upset; but he should not be sent as a mere observer. Under his able guidance, the Disarmament Commission, and in particular the overwhelming number of countries which would not be represented in the committee, should be permitted to propound ideas on the disarmament problem some of which might prove acceptable to the ten-nation group. They could thus make a constructive contribution to the negotiations and, by positive action, sustain the improved atmosphere in international relations. It was of vital importance to sustain and nurture that atmosphere. Indeed, recent history proved the value of frequent meetings of Heads of State and other statesmen, of the exchange of exhibits and information, and of reciprocal visits by representatives of the arts and sciences. No efforts by the ten-Power disarmament committee would avail unless the thaw in the cold war was maintained and intensified. Ceylon hoped that the new climate of confidence would be strengthened by other meetings, culminating in a summit conference. Nothing should be done to disturb that climate. It could, moreover, be further strengthened by serious attempts to settle outstanding political problems. Such political settlements would greatly facilitate the work on disarmament.

6. He was gratified to note that real progress had been made with regard to the key question of control. As early as the summer of 1955, the Heads of the Soviet and the United States Governments had recognized that there could be no effective disarmament agreement unless provision was made for adequate reciprocal control and inspection at every stage. Since then, the positions of the two sides had become even more liberal and flexible. There was, therefore, reason to hope that they fully understood each other's difficulties and would be able to produce a feasible inspection scheme which, while not foolproof, would provide assurances to all parties that none of them would evade specific agreed measures of disarmament.

7. In his view, it was premature, before controlled disarmament had been achieved, to discuss the necessity for an international police force to enforce peace. However, some provision would ultimately have to be made to strengthen the authority of the United Nations so that it could effectively obtain compliance with disarmament agreements. Whatever adjustments might become necessary in order to vest the United Nations with such power—changes in the Charter, in the functions of the Security Council, and similar measures—could be discussed once a disarmament agreement had been concluded.

8. Mr. WINIEWICZ (Poland) said that the problem of disarmament was being discussed in a more favourable international atmosphere than ever before. Among the reasons for that fact were an increasing awareness that the real relationship of forces in the world was one characterized by the existence of two different economic and social systems, the realization that the principle of equal rights must prevail in international relations, the personal contacts that were being established between the Heads of Government of the great Powers, and the recognition that, because of the advances made in military technology, a new war would mean disaster for mankind.

9. The world faced an entirely new situation, for the old concepts had collapsed one after the other. The policy based on a monopoly of the atomic bomb had been the first to break down; more recently, new technological advances had caused the "deterrent" policy, based on the concept of "massive retaliation", to lose its validity because its proponents were themselves no longer immune to possible retaliation. Even some of those who until recently had consistently supported the policy of "positions of strength" were beginning to recognize those facts.

10. War had ceased to be profitable, and, by the same token, the arms race could no longer ensure superiority for one side in time of either peace or war. Consequently, the arms race should be ended for all time and negotiations should become the only method for solving international problems; instead of competing in the accumulation of destructive weapons, States should compete in raising world living standards and should pursue a policy of peaceful coexistence. Only through general and complete disarmament, as set out in the proposal submitted by the Soviet Union, could that ideal balance of power be achieved in which no State would need to fear the superiority of any other.

11. More than a quarter of a century ago, the Soviet Government had presented a similar plan for general and complete disarmament at Geneva;^{1/} however, the plan had been side-tracked by prolonged discussion, and in the meantime an accelerating arms race had driven the world towards war. One of the first actions of the United Nations had been to set up commissions to deal with the problem of disarmament, but extended discussions on disarmament had produced few results. Poland and other countries which sincerely sought disarmament had always made general and complete disarmament their ultimate aim; however, existing difficulties had made it necessary to seek partial solutions instead, and agreement had proved impossible even on that basis because of the attitude adopted by certain Powers. The continuing arms race was a primary factor in poisoning the international atmosphere, and that circumstance in turn led to a further intensification of the arms race. He was not recalling those facts in a spirit of recrimination, but rather in the hope that past experience might serve as a guide in drawing proper conclusions for the future.

12. There were three such conclusions that should be drawn: first of all, the time had come to evaluate the entire disarmament problem; old concepts must be abandoned, and the solution of the problem must be approached solely from the point of view of peaceful coexistence. Secondly, individual Governments and the United Nations should exert every effort to maintain and improve the present favourable international atmosphere; the success of the work of the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests was therefore vitally important. Thirdly, nothing should be done to worsen the existing situation by taking steps which would create new "faits accomplis" in the field of armaments; that was particularly true with regard to central Europe, where, as the chairman of the Polish delegation had stated at the 818th plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 2 October, action should be taken to prevent the manufacture of nuclear weapons and missiles and the equipping with such weapons of armies which did not yet possess them. In

^{1/}See League of Nations publications, *IX, Disarmament, 1932.IX.63* (documents Conf.D. 82 and 87), pp. 124-137.

that connexion, the recent decision of the Council of the Western European Union approving the manufacture of certain types of missiles by the Federal Republic of Germany confirmed his delegation's concern over the dangers inherent in current developments in that country.

13. A number of previous speakers had contended that the Soviet disarmament plan did not provide for adequate measures of control. However, a careful reading of that proposal, and of the statements made before the Committee by the representative of the Soviet Union, should dispel any doubts on that score. The Soviet plan provided for an effective system of control in which representatives of all States would participate; disarmament would be carried out by stages, and appropriate measures of control would be instituted at each stage. Controllers would remain in the various countries to ensure full compliance with the disarmament agreement after complete disarmament had been achieved; that fact should provide an answer for the speakers who had wondered how peace could be maintained in a completely disarmed world. At the same time, it should be stressed that any system of control must mean control of disarmament, not control without disarmament.

14. By eliminating the huge burden of arms expenditures now borne by States, general and complete disarmament would make it possible to spend larger sums for peaceful economic purposes, to promote international co-operation and to deal with the present dangerous situation in which two-thirds of the world's population went hungry.

15. As a result of the increasingly compelling character of the factors militating in favour of general and complete disarmament, the Committee had before it a draft resolution which, sponsored by all of its members, was unique in the history of the United Nations. It linked the aim embodied in the Soviet disarmament proposal—complete and general disarmament under effective international control—with a number of the most fundamental principles enunciated in the United Nations Charter. At the same time, the draft resolution would transmit the disarmament proposals submitted by the Soviet Union (A/4219), the United Kingdom (A/C.1/820) and other countries to the ten-Power disarmament committee, which was soon to convene at Geneva, so that it constituted a mandate for the work of that Committee; the draft also represented a commitment binding upon every Member of the United Nations and upon the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

16. As a member of the ten-Power committee and a country which had suffered greatly during the Second World War, Poland would make every effort to contribute to the success of the negotiations; his delegation had reason to believe that other members of that Committee were moved by the same resolve. Although reaching an agreement on disarmament would require statesmanship, patience and time, the constructive manner in which the First Committee had conducted its debate and the favourable reception given to the Soviet disarmament plan would undoubtedly contribute to a successful outcome at Geneva.

17. Mr. SHAHA (Nepal) said that, although his delegation was gratified at the resumption of disarmament negotiations after an interruption of two years, it regretted that the question of disarmament appeared

to have been temporarily taken out of the hands of the United Nations. Since disarmament was primarily a United Nations responsibility, any agreement on disarmament would eventually have to be brought within the framework of the organization; his delegation hoped that the ten-Power disarmament committee would keep the United Nations informed of its progress through the First Committee and the United Nations Disarmament Commission and that it would maintain its link with the United Nations through the Secretary-General. Although his delegation had always favoured entrusting the problem of disarmament to a small group of ten or fifteen countries, it would have preferred to see some of the uncommitted countries in various parts of the world—and not merely the two great military blocs—represented in the ten-Power committee. Nevertheless, the most important consideration was that the great Powers, which necessarily played the decisive role in the matter, should find a suitable means of reaching agreement on disarmament.

18. A positive feature of the debate in the First Committee was that, for the first time, all the great Powers seemed to agree that there must be an inseparable link between disarmament and control. In the view of his delegation, the two should go together, with each disarmament measure accompanied by a self-enforcing control measure.

19. His delegation was glad that less mention had been made at the current session of the necessity of settling outstanding political questions as a precondition for disarmament. At the same time, while his delegation had always felt that political settlements were not necessarily essential to agreement on concrete disarmament measures, the solution of such political problems as those of Germany, Berlin, Korea and Viet-Nam might well contribute to progress in the field of disarmament.

20. Another positive feature of the First Committee's debate was that both East and West seemed to agree that disarmament must be carried out in a balanced manner, so that the security of neither side would suffer in the process. The East and the West had found a measure of common ground in their greater willingness to discuss, respectively, the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests and that of a reduction in conventional arms and armed forces.

21. It was also gratifying that the great Powers now showed equal interest in comprehensive disarmament and partial disarmament measures, instead of continuing to debate the relative advisability of the two. Without wishing to minimize the overriding importance of ultimately achieving comprehensive disarmament, his delegation felt that agreement on such partial measures as the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests, the prevention of surprise attack and the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons might substantially contribute to that end.

22. Similarly, just as disarmament measures could serve to promote international confidence, measures designed to create that confidence could, if undertaken with due regard for basic security considerations, contribute to success, not only in the field of disarmament, but also in the settlement of political issues. Among the measures which might be helpful in that regard were the schemes advanced at various times for disengagement in Europe and the creation in central Europe of a zone free of nuclear weapons.

23. While unilateral announcements of reductions in military budgets might be of some use, an international agency should be set up to verify such statements and, ultimately, to integrate the work of verification into the international control system, which would come into being with the achievement of disarmament.
24. The small nations were inclined to be sceptical about the great Powers' proposals for diverting funds from armaments to assistance projects for the underdeveloped countries, particularly when they noted that \$900,000 million was spent on armaments each year, whereas it had been difficult to raise \$100 million for the United Nations Special Fund.
25. His delegation felt that the United Kingdom and the Soviet disarmament proposals had much in common despite some basic differences; together with the suggestions put forward by the French delegation (A/C.1/821), they should provide an excellent basis for discussion by the ten-Power disarmament committee. He also noted the disclosure by the United States representative (1027th meeting) that President Eisenhower had ordered a fresh review of the problem of disarmament and that the United States would shortly be ready to submit some concrete plans in that regard. His delegation was impressed by the genuine interest shown in disarmament by the leaders of the major Powers and hoped that a summit meeting would help to accelerate progress in that field.
26. It was imperative that man should match his rapid strides in technology and science with the wisdom to ensure his own survival by devising a system that made war impossible. While such a system could be evolved only through patient negotiation over a period of years, he hoped he was not being over-optimistic in suggesting that the draft resolution on general and complete disarmament, sponsored by all eighty-two Members of the United Nations, might eventually lead to the adoption of a plan for controlled world disarmament under the auspices of the United Nations.
27. Mr. NESBITT (Canada) observed that the Committee was committed by the draft resolution to the proposition that disarmament was the most important problem facing the world today. While that idea was not new, the present situation was unprecedented in that eighty-two countries had directly subscribed to it by sponsoring the draft.
28. The General Assembly had, in the past, adopted resolutions which recognized the importance of comprehensive disarmament and set out procedures for achieving it. Some of those resolutions had even been sponsored jointly by East and West. In view of the lack of results in the past, it should be borne in mind that unanimity regarding an objective did not necessarily mean that the objective could be realized easily. Since all were agreed that comprehensive disarmament under effective control was desirable, the present issue centred primarily on the steps that should be taken to achieve that goal.
29. Canada had long cherished the objective of comprehensive disarmament and had contributed to a number of outline plans for such disarmament as well as to plans for an initial stage. Those plans had foundered, not on differences over objectives, but on problems relating to the stages of transition from the present situation to a disarmed world. It was in that light that the various proposals should be analysed, not at the present stage, but during the discussions of the ten-Power disarmament committee, which would have all the relevant records available.
30. A distinction should be made between the discussion of principles that should govern an international agreement and the process of negotiation towards agreement on specific measures.
31. Since, in the matter of negotiation, initiative clearly rested with the major Powers, the establishment of the ten-Power committee as a forum for negotiation between those Powers gave cause for satisfaction, and Canada had agreed to serve on it in a desire to facilitate successful negotiations.
32. At the same time the General Assembly and the United Nations Disarmament Commission could make a useful contribution in attempting to establish the principles whereby disarmament could be carried out under the terms of the Charter. While, in recognition of the ultimate responsibility of the United Nations, the Disarmament Commission should be informed of the progress made in the ten-Power committee, the latter would have the benefit of the views expressed in the Assembly and subsequently in the Commission. Thus, Members of the United Nations who were not represented on the ten-Power committee would be able to express their views on how the committee's objectives could best be achieved.
33. Canada was, of course, completely in sympathy with the broad objectives of the draft resolution before the First Committee. Even in the absence of concrete solutions to political problems, the general political climate was itself important to the solution of disarmament problems. The series of meetings held between the principal Powers, the personal contacts between leading statesmen and, more recently, the joint communiqué issued on 27 September 1959 by the President of the United States and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union had all contributed to creating a favourable atmosphere for the coming negotiations. On the other hand, any revival of the cold war would make the process of negotiations more difficult and would impede the achievement of the desired goals. Accordingly, every opportunity should be taken to establish the necessary mutual confidence to secure peace while maintaining the balance of security at all stages.
34. There were several fields in which measures could be taken which would contribute to the necessary restoration of confidence and at the same time provide experience in the mechanism of inspection and control which would be of the utmost value when dealing with disarmament proper. It was to be hoped that the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests would provide a pattern that might be applied to other disarmament problems. Since the necessary confidence for the successive negotiations of wider problems could be achieved only through supervised disarmament, the questions of disarmament and control could not be separated. Canada also hoped that negotiations on measures for the prevention of surprise attack would be resumed.
35. Several delegations had made suggestions concerning matters which might be discussed by the Disarmament Commission. The representative of the United States had raised questions concerning institutions to preserve international peace and to promote the rule of law after disarmament had been achieved. The representative of Italy had pointed out (1031st

meeting) that general disarmament would call for a revision of the provisions of the United Nations Charter which assumed that partial and not total disarmament would be achieved and accordingly presupposed the existence of national forces which could be placed at the disposal of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

36. The Disarmament Commission would seem to be an appropriate body to consider such weighty matters and careful attention should be given to each of the interim stages of total disarmament. Obviously progress in disarmament would be greatly facilitated by the development of effective institutions for collective security, and the United Nations would do well to review the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter in that respect. In any event, during the period of gradual reduction of national forces, greater use might be made of the existing procedures for the provision of national contingents for United Nations observational and supervisory work. Consideration might also be given to suggestions for stand-by arrangements with a view to greater utilization of such procedures.

37. Mr. Mongi SLIM (Tunisia) said that his country was one of those which most earnestly desired to see the achievement of general and complete disarmament as a means of ensuring international peace and security. It had repeatedly condemned the arms race as a source of distrust and tension which might easily give rise to a general conflagration and wished to see the funds expended on armaments diverted to humanitarian measures and to the improvement of standards of living in the less developed countries. Being powerless to prevent the spread of destructive weapons, Tunisia had only been able to point out, as it had done at the twelfth session of the General Assembly (886th meeting), that the maintenance of large-scale armed forces in themselves constituted a danger of a conflict which would end in the complete destruction of human life. Accordingly the Tunisian delegation warmly welcomed the proposals put forward by the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, both of which envisaged the goal of complete disarmament.

38. Those proposals had undoubtedly been made possible by the lessening of tensions brought about by the encouraging results of the recent Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests and by personal contacts.

39. The two plans would, of course, have to be studied carefully by the ten-Power disarmament committee, the body best suited to discuss such an issue.

40. The Tunisian delegation favoured general and complete disarmament and believed that disarmament could not be effectively achieved unless it was accompanied at all stages by suitable international controls. Since the greatest obstacle in the way of world peace was the lack of confidence between the great Powers, it was not sufficient merely to issue statements or sign disarmament agreements.

41. Furthermore, his delegation believed that a system of international control should be instituted immediately upon the cessation of the arms race and should apply to the production of both conventional weapons and nuclear weapons. The Tunisian delegation, moreover, felt it was extremely important that any plan for general and complete disarmament should cover both types of weapons.

42. There seemed to be two schools of thought on the subject, one of which considered that the first stage of disarmament should cover nuclear weapons, while the other gave priority to the reduction of conventional weapons. The Tunisian delegation could not share either of those views. While well aware of the destructive power of nuclear weapons, Tunisia, as one of the smaller nations, could not fail to observe the loss of human life that was being occasioned by conventional weapons in many troubled areas of the world. It was therefore essential that disarmament in its initial stage should comprise both nuclear and conventional weapons. The two schools of thought prevailing in the First Committee could surely be reconciled if the plan for general disarmament referred to both types of weapons in providing for the cessation of tests, followed by the discontinuance of production and, lastly, by the destruction of existing stockpiles and their conversion to peaceful uses.

43. A number of questions were raised by the proposal that, upon the completion of disarmament, only the forces necessary for maintaining internal security should be maintained. Consideration should be given to the type of weapons to be used by such forces. It should be borne in mind that many devices intended primarily for humanitarian purposes, such as helicopters, could be used as a means of destruction. Secondly, there was the question of the size of the forces necessary to maintain internal security. For instance, the forces needed to maintain the internal security of a large State might be far more numerous than those required for a small State. Such disparity might greatly endanger the security of the smaller State and to some extent impair its independence and sovereignty. Consideration should accordingly be given to the establishment of an international force, at the disposal of the United Nations, to keep the peace between the States and guarantee the freedom and independence of smaller States. In that connexion, his delegation would suggest that part of the funds currently being expended on armaments might be set aside for the establishment and maintenance of such an international force, whose functions would naturally have to be determined at a later stage. His suggestions, together with those put forward by other delegations, might be submitted with the two plans for consideration by the ten-Power committee. The Tunisian delegation whole-heartedly supported the draft resolution and hoped that its adoption and implementation might contribute to the institution of lasting peace.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.